

THIRD EDITION



HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE  
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC  
OF THE CONGO

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EMIZET FRANÇOIS KISANGANI  
F. SCOTT BOBB

## HISTORICAL DICTIONARIES OF AFRICA

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Emizet François Kisangani and F. Scott Bobb

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## Editor's Foreword

One of Africa's largest, most populated, and most generously endowed countries, located strategically at its core, the Democratic Republic of Congo (previously Congo Free State, Belgian Congo, and Republic of Congo) has both dominated the surrounding region and been affected by it. For three decades, its position was relatively predictable, under the control of a strong (if anything, too strong) leader, Mobutu Sese Seko, who brought political stability, but also economic decline and a stultifying system of government that crushed opposition and stymied change. With his passing, after a brief flicker of hope, the situation has actually gone from bad to worse under Laurent and then Joseph Kabila who, in addition to the collapsing economic, social, and political infrastructure, had to contend with one of the bitterest wars ever fought in the Congo, one that not only pitted different ethnic groups and geographic zones against one another but drew in meddlesome and predatory neighbors. As long as this war rages, the outlook for what is potentially one of Africa's richest and most dynamic states remains terribly bleak.

Although it is an often-grim exercise, it is essential to assess the situation over the intervening period and, in this case, look desperately for some way out of the impasse. That is the purpose of this new *Historical Dictionary of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, which builds on two earlier editions, greatly expanding and updating the previous versions. By now, the country can look back on half a century of independence, which followed upon over a century of colonial rule and—lest it be forgotten—many centuries of indigenous entities that shared the territory and carved out their own political units. So, the authors also have the daunting task of summing up an extensive period of history in a large and amazingly varied country. This is done mainly in the dictionary, with literally hundreds of entries on politics, the economy and society, the geography and ethnic makeup, noteworthy figures, and

significant events. Indeed, there is so much to consider that the many strands have to be drawn together, first in a chronology, and then in an overall introduction. The appendixes are also essential in sorting things out, the list of acronyms helps readers to identify key players, and a substantial bibliography permits those who wish to learn more to find useful books and articles on specific topics.

This third edition builds on two predecessors covering the same place but under different names, first Zaire and then Congo (Zaire), in keeping with official name changes. Both of these were written by F. Scott Bobb, who was brought up by missionary parents in the then Belgian Congo. He spent more than a decade living in various places within Congo, before and after independence, and he returned periodically while still following events from afar. Beginning in 1977, Bobb worked as a reporter-broadcaster for the Africa Division of the Voice of America (VOA) and wrote articles on African topics for "Africa Report." More recently, he became chief of the news division of the VOA, and then returned to the field, this time in Cairo, as Middle East correspondent. Now, a decade later, his book has been expanded and updated by Emizet François Kisangani, who was born and educated in Congo (Zaire) and later moved to the United States. He is professor of political science at Kansas State University. He has written numerous articles on the country, in its various manifestations, and was the author of *Zaire after Mobutu* and coauthor of *The Democratic Republic of Congo: Economic Dimensions of War and Peace*. Through their combined efforts, it is possible to follow the history of a country whose path has been anything but predictable, but is at least, thanks to this volume, considerably more comprehensive.

Jon Woronoff  
Series Editor

## Acknowledgments

This third edition of the *Historical Dictionary of the Democratic Republic of the Congo* would not have been possible without the two previous editions. I am particularly indebted to F. Scott Bobb for his efforts to write the first edition of the dictionary and to revise it. He made my job of revising the second edition easier. I am grateful to my student assistant, Alison St. Clair, for her hard work. Thanks also go to two graduate students in the Department of Geography at Kansas State University, Thomas Vought and Eli Martinsen, for preparing the first political map of the Democratic Republic of Congo, including provincial capital cities, and the map on natural resources. Any errors in this third edition are entirely mine.

Emizet François Kisangani



## Reader's Note

The country presently known as the *Democratic Republic of Congo* (DRC) emerged in 1885 as the *Congo Free State* (CFS). The CFS became a Belgian colony in 1908 and was known as *Belgian Congo*. On 30 June 1960, the country became the *Republic of Congo*. Four years later, the Luluabourg constitution promulgated on 1 August 1964, changed the name to the *Democratic Republic of Congo*. In 1971, the country's name became *Zaire* and its citizens *Zairians*. In 1997, President Laurent Kabila changed it back to the DRC. From 1885 to 1997, the name of the country has changed several times, as have the names of places, lakes, flora, and fauna. For example, under the banner of "Authenticity," from 1966 to 1971, many names were changed to "authentic" African names. Zairians dropped their Christian names in the early 1970s. President Joseph-Désiré Mobutu became *Mobutu Sese Seko*. Cities and provinces lost their colonial names, and the names of numerous organizations were changed to reflect these realities. However, with the advent of multipartyism in 1990, many opposition members rejected appellations adopted under Authenticity, and many Zairians resumed using their Christian names. With the fall of Mobutu and the installation of the Kabila government in May 1997, some regions regained names in use prior to the Mobutu coup and many organizations changed their names as well. A guide provides a reference to the major changes of geographical names (see page xxvii). However, we have used the name "Congo River" to describe the country's major river, because it was the term used by international geographers.

In passages referring to specific times, we have tended to use the name(s) in current use at that time (i.e., "Katangan secession" or "Shaba Wars"), but in general or multiple references, we have opted for the name in use at the time of this writing. Thus, citizens of the DRC are



referred to as “Congolese” and the DRC as “Congo” unless Congo-Brazzaville is mentioned in the entry. On first reference, we have given the full name of all individuals. We have made these changes where we could. For general reference, we have tended to use Congo, Congo-Kinshasa, or the DRC (if Congo-Brazzaville is mentioned in the same entry).

At one point, considerable political baggage was attached to whether one used “National Conference,” which was viewed as controlled by pro-Mobutu forces, or “Sovereign National Conference,” which was controlled by the opposition. Again, we have used these names in their historical context, with no political connotation intended.

Concerning the names of ethnic groups, we have adopted the increasingly common Anglophone practice of dropping prefixes, using “Nande” instead of “Banande” and “Zande” instead of “Azande” or “Bazande.” However, we have used “Kikongo,” “Kiswahili,” “Lingala,” and “Tshiluba” to distinguish these languages from the groups that speak them. We have also avoided for the most part the use of the term “tribe,” because it is considered pejorative by many Africans. When the term is used, however, it is meant in the sense of an ethnic group or nation, with no negative connotations intended.

We have used English spelling of French names that are well known in English, a practice that has meant dropping some orthographic accents. For example, in general, we use “Zaire” and “Leopoldville” as opposed to “Zaire” and “Léopoldville.” However, we have used French spellings when referring to official names of organizations, such as “Office National du Café” and “Université Nationale du Zaïre,” unless they have commonly used English translations, as with “Central Committee” and “African Union.”

Where clarity is not sacrificed, we have used standard abbreviations for units of measurement, for example, “km” for “kilometers” and “MW” for “megawatts.”

An effort has been made to cross-reference all major entries in the dictionary. Within entries, words that have their own entry are entered in **boldface**. However, a word is only cross-referenced if its entry relates to the topic under discussion. For example, in “Belgian government,” the word “government” would only be cross-referenced if it relates in some way to the Congolese government. Related entries that are not mentioned specifically in the text may appear in a *See also*.

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABAKO	Alliance des Bakongo (Alliance of Bakongo)
ABIR	Anglo–Belgian India Rubber and Exploring
ACMAF	Association des Classes Moyennes Africaines (Association of African Middle Classes)
AFDL	Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo)
AFP	Alliance des Forces Patriotiques (Alliance of Patriotic Forces)
AGI	Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo (Global and Inclusive Act on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo)
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AMP	Alliance de la Majorité Présidentielle (Alliance of Presidential Majority)
ANC	Armée Nationale Congolaise (Congolesse National Army)
AND	Agence Nationale de la Documentation (National Documentation Agency)
ANI	Agence Nationale d’Immigration (National Immigration Agency)
ANR	Agence Nationale des Renseignements (National Information Agency)
APIC	Association de Personnel Indigène de la Colonie (Association of Indigenous Personnel of the Colony)
APL	Armée Populaire de Libération (Popular Liberation Army)

ASADHO	Association Africaine de Défense de Droits de l'Homme (African Association for Human Rights)
AU	African Union
AZADHO	Association Zaïroise de Défense de Droits de l'Homme (Zairian Association for Human Rights)
AZAP	Agence Zaïroise de Presse (Zairian News Agency)
BALUBAKAT	Association des Baluba du Katanga (Association of Baluba of Katanga)
BNC	Banque Nationale du Congo (National Bank of Congo)
BNZ	Banque Nationale du Zaïre (National Bank of Zaire)
CADR	Corps des Activistes pour la Défense de la Révolution (Corps of Activists for the Defense of the Revolution)
CAR	Central African Republic
CCCI	Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie (Company of Congo for Trade and Industry)
CDC	Coalition Démocratique Congolaise (Congolese Democratic Coalition)
CEEAC	Communauté Économique des États de l'Afrique Centrale (Economic Community of Central African States)
CEI	Commission Électorale Indépendante (Independent Electoral Commission)
CEPGL	Communauté Économique des Pays des Grands Lacs (Economic Community of Countries of the Great Lakes)
CETA	Centre d'Entraînement des Troupes Aéronautiques (Center for Aeronautical Training)
CFA	Communauté Financière Africaine (franc zone/African Financial Community)
CFL	Chemin de Fer des Grands Lacs (Railroad of the Great Lakes)
CFM	Chemin de Fer de Mayombe (Railroad of Mayombe)
CFMK	Chemin de Fer Matadi-Kinshasa (Railroad Matadi-Kinshasa)
CFS	Congo Free State

CGTC	Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Congolais (General Confederation of Congolese Workers)
CIAT	Comité International d'Accompagnement de la Transition (International Committee Accompanying the Transition)
CK	Compagnie du Katanga (Company of Katanga)
CMZ	Compagnie Maritime du Zaïre (Maritime Company of Zaïre)
CN	Conférence Nationale (National Conference)
CND	Centre National de Documentation (National Center of Documentation)
CNECI	Caisse Natioale d'Épargne et de Crédit Immobilier (National Saving and Mortgage Loan Bank)
CNKi	Comité National du Kivu (National Committee of Kivu)
CNL	Conseil National de Libération (National Liberation Council)
CNR	Conseil National de la Résistance (National Council of the Resistance)
CNRI	Centre National de Renseignements et d'Investigation (National Center of Information and Investigation)
CNS	Conférence Nationale Souveraine (Sovereign National Conference)
COLTAN	Columbium-Tantalum
CONACO	Convention Nationale Congolaise (National Congolese Convention)
CONAKAT	Confederation des Associations Tribales du Katanga (Confederation of Tribal Associations of Katanga)
CPG	Compromis Politique Global (Comprehensive Political Arrangement)
CRISP	Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques (Research and Socio-Political Information Center)
CSK	Comité Special du Katanga (Special Committee of Katanga)
CSLC	Confédération des Syndicats Libres du Congo (Confederation of Free Labor Unions of Congo)

CVR	Corps des Volontaires de la République (Volunteer Corps of the Republic)
DDD	Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
DIC	Dialogue Inter-Congolais (Inter-Congolese Dialogue)
DSP	Division Spéciale Présidentielle (Special Presidential Division)
ECC	Église du Christ au Congo (Church of Christ in Congo)
ECZ	Église du Christ au Zaïre (Church of Christ in Zaïre)
ENDA	École Nationale de Droit et d'Administration (National School of Law and Administration)
EU	European Union
FAC	Forces Armées Congolaises (Congolese Armed Forces)
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo)
FAZ	Forces Armées Zaïroises (Zairian Armed Forces)
FEC	Fédération des Entreprises Congolaises (Federation of Congolese Enterprises)
FGTK	Fédération Générale du Travail du Kongo General Federation of Labor of Kongo)
FLNC	Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo (Front for the National Liberation of Congo)
FNI	Front Nationaliste et Integrationniste (Nationalist and Integrationist Front)
FNL	Front National de Libération (National Liberation Front)
FODELICO	Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo)
FPC	Forces Politiques du Conclave (Political Forces of the Conclave)
FPR	Ituri Front Patriotique de Resistance (Patriotic Resistance Front)
FRF	Forces Républicaines et Fédéralistes (Republican and Federalist Forces)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product

GECAMINES	Générale des Carrières et des Mines
GECOMIN	Générale Congolaise des Minerais
HCR	Haut Conseil de la République (High Council of the Republic)
HCR/PT	Haut Conseil de la République/Parlement de Transition (High Council of the Republic/Parliament of the Transition)
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IAA	International African Association (Association Internationale Africaine)
IAC	International Association of the Congo (Association Internationale du Congo)
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMEF	Interim Multinational Emergency Force
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INEAC	Institut National pour l'Étude Agronomique du Congo (National Institute for the Agricultural Study of Congo)
INEP	Institut National d'Études Politiques (National Institute of Political Studies)
INERA	Institut National pour l'Étude et la Recherche Agronomique (National Institute for Agricultural Study and Research)
JMPR	Jeunesse du Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (Youth of the Popular Revolutionary Movement)
KDL	Chemin de Fer Kinshasa–Dilolo–Lubumbashi (Railroad Kinshasa–Dilolo–Lubumbashi)
LAC	Lignes Aériennes Congolaises (Congolese Airlines)
LJV	Ligue des Jeunes Vigilants (League of Vigilant Youth)
MARC	Mouvement d'Action pour la Résurrection du Congo (Action Movement for the Resurrection of Congo)
MHO	Métallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt
MIBA	Société Minière de Bakwanga (Mining Company of Bakwanga)

MLC	Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (Movement for the Liberation of Congo)
MNC/L	Mouvement National Congolais/Patrice Lumumba (National Congolese Movement/Patrice Lumumba)
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (Mission of the United Nations in Congo)
MPR	Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (Popular Revolutionary Movement)
NZ	New zaire (nouveau zaïre) currency
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OBMA	Office des Biens Mal-Acquis (Office of Ill-Gotten Gains)
OCAM	Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (Afro-Malagasy Common Organization)
OCS	Office de Chemin de Fer du Sud (Office of Southern Railroad)
OGEDep	Office de Gestion de la Dette Publique (Office for the Management of the Public Debt)
OKIMO	Office des Mines d'Or de Kilo Moto (Kilo-Moto Gold Mines Board)
ONATRA	Office National des Transports (National Transport Board)
ONC	Office National du Café (National Coffee Board)
ONDE	Office National pour le Développement de l'Élevage (National Livestock Development Board)
ONP	Office National de Pêche (National Fisheries Board)
ONR	Office National des Routes (Highway Board)
ONS	Office National du Sucre (National Sugar Board)
OTRAG	Orbitl Transport und Raketen Gesellschaft
OZRT	Office Zaïrois de Radio et de Télévision (Zairian Radio and Television Agency)
PALU	Parti Lumumbiste Unifié (Unified Lumumbist Party)
PDSC	Parti Démocrate et Social Chrétien (Democratic and Social Christian Party)
PLC	Parti de Libération du Congo (Party of the Congolese Liberation)

PPRD	Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie (People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy)
PRP	Parti Révolutionnaire du Peuple (People's Revolutionary Party)
PSA	Parti Solidaire Africain (African Solidarity Party)
PSND	Projet des Services de Naissance Désirables (Project for Planned Birth Services)
PSZ	Projets Sucriers au Zaïre (Sugar Projects in Zaire)
PUZ	Presses Universitaires du Zaïre (University Presses of Zaire)
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy)
RDL	Rassemblement des Démocrates Libéraux (Assembly of Liberal Democrats)
REGIDESO	Régie de Distribution d'Eau et d'Électricité (Water and Electricity Distribution Administration)
RPC	République Populaire du Congo (People's Republic of Congo)
RTNC	Radio-Télévision Nationale Congolaise (National Congolese Radio and Television)
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SARM	Service d'Action et de Renseignements Militaires (Military Security and Intelligence Services)
SGB	Société Générale de Belgique (General Company of Belgium)
SGM	Société Générale des Minerais (General Company of Ores)
SMK	Société Minière de Kisenge (Mining Company of Kisenge)
SMTF	Société Minière de Tenke-Fungurume (Mining Company of Tenke-Fungurume)
SNCZ	Société Nationale de Chemins de Fer Zaïrois (National Company of Zairian Railroad)
SNEL	Société Nationale d'Électricité (National Electric Company)
SNIP	Service National d'Intelligence et de Protection (National Intelligence and Protection Service)



SOBAKI	Société Belgo-Africaine du Kivu (Belgian-African Company of Kivu)
SOCIR	Société Congo-Italienne de Raffinage
SODIMIZA	Société de Développement Industriel et Minier du Zaïre (Company of Industrial and Mining Development of Zaïre)
SOMINKI	Société Minière et Industrielle du Kivu (Mining and Industrial Company of Kivu)
SONAS	Société Nationale d'Assurances (National Insurance Company)
SOZACOM	Société Zaïroise pour la Commercialisation des Minerais
SOZIR	Société Zaïro-Italienne de Raffinage
UDEAC	Union Douanière et Économique de l'Afrique Centrale (Central African Customs and Economic Union)
UDI	Union des Démocrates Indépendants (Union of Independent Democrats)
UDEAC	Union des États de l'Afrique Centrale (Central African Customs and Economic Union)
UDPS	Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (Union for Democracy and Social Progress)
UFERI	Union des Fédéralistes et des Républicains Indépendants (Union of Federalists and Independent Republicans)
UGEC	Union des Étudiants Congolais (Union of Congolese Students)
UMHK	Union Minière du Haut Katanga
UN	United Nations
UNAZA	Université Nationale du Zaïre (National University of Zaïre)
UNC	Université Nationale du Congo (National University of Congo)
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIMO	Union Mongo (Mongo Union)
UNISCO	Union Nationale des Intérêts Sociaux Congolais (National Union of Congolese Social Interests)

UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
UNTC	Union Nationale des Travailleurs Congolais (National Union of Congolese Workers)
UNTZA	Union Nationale des Travailleurs Zaïrois (National Union of Zairian Workers)
UPC	Union des Patriotes Congolais (Union of Congolese Patriots)
UPDF	Uganda People's Defense Force
URD	Union pour la République et la Démocratie (Union for the Republic and Democracy)
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USORAS	Union Sacrée de l'Opposition Radicale et Alliés et Société Civile
UTC	Union des Travailleurs Congolais (Union of Congolese Workers)
VSV	La Voix des Sans-Voix pour les Droits de l'Homme (Voice of the Voiceless for Human Rights)



# Guide to Name Changes

## GUIDE TO NAME CHANGES

Most name changes occurred between 1966 and 1971.

Names marked with \* were changed back in 1997.

### Former Names

Albert, Lake  
 Albertville  
 Bakwanga  
 Banningville  
 Banzyville  
 Bas-Congo (province), now  
     Kongo Central  
 Baudouinville  
 Brabanta  
 Centime (currency)  
 Charlesville  
 Cristal (Mountains)  
 Congo, Democratic Republic of  
 Congo Franc (currency)  
 Congo River  
 Coquilhatville  
 Constermansville  
 Districts  
 Edouard (Edward), Lake  
 Elisabetha  
 Élisabethville  
 Frandria  
 Jadotville

### Name under Mobutism

Mobutu Sese Seko, Lake\*  
 Kalemie  
 Mbuji-Mayi  
 Bandundu  
 Mobaye  
  
 Bas-Zaïre (region)\*  
 Moba  
 Mapangu  
 Likuta (plural: makuta)\*  
 Djokopunda  
 Mayumbe (Mountains)  
 Zaire, Republic of\*  
 Zaire\*  
 Zaire River\*  
 Mbandaka  
 Bukavu  
 Subregions\*  
 Idi Amin\*  
 Lukutu  
 Lubumbashi  
 Boteka  
 Likasi

Katanga (province), now divided

into four provinces

Leopold II, Lake

Liverville

Luluabourg

Ministers

Mérode

Ministries

Stanley (Mountain)

Nouvelle Anvers

Orientale (province), now

divided into four provinces

Paulis

Port Francqui

Provinces

Stanley Falls

Stanley Pool

Stanleyville

Territories

Thysville

Shaba (region)\*

Mai-Ndombe, Lake\*

Lusanga

Kananga

State Commissioners\*

Tshilundu

Departments\*

Ngaliema (Mountain)

Mankaza

Haut-Zaïre (region)

Isiro

Ilebo

Regions\*


Boyoma Falls

Malebo Pool

Kisangani

Zones\*

Mbanza-Ngungu





## Chronology

**ca. 2000 B.C.** The first Bantu, also called proto-Bantu, settle in the Kongo Central and Uele regions. They arrive from the Benue area in Nigeria.

**1000 B.C.** Bantu-speaking people settle en masse in the Congo Basin as a result of migrations.

**1000 B.C.–A.D. 200** Bantu-speaking peoples spread throughout the Congo Basin.

**500** The Kuba people are unified under the leadership of a mythical king called Woot.

**500–1000** Bantu-speaking peoples spread to the savannas and toward the Indian Ocean through what are now the Kasai, Kivu, and Katanga regions.

**520–845** The Luba people are unified.

**700–800** Copper and iron are in use in the Congo Basin. A number of archaeological documents provide evidence from around Lake Kisale of the widespread use of copper and iron smelting techniques.

**900** Migration of other ethnic groups from Lake Chad region into Central Congo.

**ca. 1000** The Hunde people reach their present location in the Great Lakes region of North Kivu.

**1275** The Kongo Kingdom emerges. It is founded by Mani Kongo (king) Nimi-a-Lukenie.



**1400s** The Nande migrate to their present area, Beni and Lubero territories in Nord-Kivu, as the result of political changes that take place in the region of Kitara-Bunyoro, Uganda.

**1482** Portuguese admiral Diogo Cão arrives at the mouth of the Congo River, which he names the Zaire. Cão returns in 1485 and 1487 to establish trading posts.

**1491** The first Catholic missionaries arrive in the Kongo Kingdom. This first wave of missionaries inaugurates a long period of evangelization that will transform the Kongo into a Christian kingdom.

**1500s** Mangbetu, Zande, and other Nilotic peoples move in successive waves of migrations into north and central Congo and create powerful chiefdoms.

**1506–1543** King or Mani Kongo Mvemba Nzinga Afonso I reigns, and the kingdom reaches its apogee under his leadership. He establishes diplomatic relations with Portugal and the Vatican.

**1518** The son of Afonso I, Kinu Mvemba Dom Henrique is consecrated bishop in Rome by Pope Leo X and becomes the first African bishop in the Catholic Church.

**1500s–1600s** The legendary figures Kongolo and Ilunga Kalala create the Luba Empire. The Lunda Kingdom is founded by the Luba chief Tshibanda Ilunga and expands eastward.

**1600** The Portuguese introduce maize, cassava, and other varieties of cereals from the New World under the reign of Mani Kongo Alvaro II (1587–1614).

**1600–1630** Nyimi (king) Shyam a Mbul a Ngwoong, a legendary Kuba figure, reorganizes the Kuba Kingdom into a bureaucratized hierarchical system and brings it to the height of its influence. He also introduces the culture of maize and tobacco, raffia weaving, and sophisticated wood-carving techniques.

**1640** The Dutch replace the Portuguese as leading traders. The French and English establish a large presence, leading to the decline of Portuguese power toward the end of the 1600s and the departure of many missionaries.

**1700** The slave trade with the Americas begins to flourish.

**1789** José Lacerda e Almeida makes the first scientific exploration of the Congo Basin, penetrating as far as Katanga, where he discovers copper mines.

**1800** The Afro–Arab trade begins to flourish in eastern Congo.

**1816** A British expedition led by James Tuckey sails up the mouth of the Congo River.

**mid-1800s** Slavery is officially abolished in most European countries.

**1854** Scottish missionary/explorer David Livingstone reaches Lake Dilolo in Katanga and crosses the Kasai and Kwango river basins into Angola.

**1850s** Afro–Arabs from Zanzibar reached eastern Congo, today southern Maniema Province and northern Tanganyika Province.

**1858** British explorers Richard Burton and John Speke, traveling from East Africa, reach Lake Tanganyika.

**1860** Explorer Samuel Baker reaches Lake Albert.

**1865** The defeat of the Confederacy in the United States ends slavery throughout the country and closes the largest market for slaves in North America.

**1865–1891** King Msiri (M’siri) or Ngelekwa Mwenda ruled over Yeke Kingdom or what is commonly known as the *Garenganze* kingdom.

**1867–1868** Livingstone reaches Lakes Mweru and Bangwelu, arriving at Lake Tanganyika in 1869. Seeking the headwaters of the Nile, he sails down the Lualaba River and reaches Nyangwe in southern Kivu in 1871.

**1870s** Christian missionaries begin to return to Congo.

**1870–1888** Slavery is abolished in South and Central America.

**1871 10 November:** Journalist/explorer Henry Morton Stanley locates Livingstone at Ujiji after an expedition of 236 days.

**1874** Stanley, commissioned by the *New York Herald* and *Daily Telegraph* newspapers to continue Livingstone's explorations, sails down the Congo River, in part to prove that the Lualaba is not the headwater of the Nile. The trip takes 999 days. Stanley arrives at the Atlantic Ocean on 12 March 1877.

**1878–1887** Stanley, hired by Belgium's King Leopold II, sets out to establish trading posts and make treaties with local chiefs along the Congo River. He eventually returns with 450 treaties.

**1884–1887** Tippo Tip (Hamed bin Muhammed el-Murjebi) controls a quasi-trade monarchy in eastern Congo.

**1884 15 November:** The Berlin Conference begins with the participation of 13 European governments and the United States as an observer. It ends on 26 February 1885, with the signing of the Act of Berlin, through which the European powers partition Africa. Leopold obtains personal sovereignty over the Congo, which soon becomes the Congo Free State (CFS).

**1885 30 April:** The Congo Free State is proclaimed after the Belgian parliament voted on the issue and Sir Francis de Winton is named its administrator-general with the capital city at Vivi. **1 August:** The administrator-general notifies the Berlin signatories of the limits of the new state. **22 November:** Leopold II and the French government sign a protocol limiting the borders of the CFS and French colonies in the Manyanga region.

**1890–1894** A military campaign drives Afro–Arab traders from Congo and ends the slave trade with the Middle East.

**1895–1900** Congolese soldiers of the Force Publique stationed at Luluabourg mutiny against their European commanders in July 1895 marking the first of three mutinies (the others occurring in 1897 and 1900) under the CFS.

**1904–1905** Reports by missionaries and diplomats in the CFS of forced labor and brutalities by authorities of the CFS lead to a public outcry and legislative hearings in Europe and the United States.

**1908** Faced with international condemnation of human rights abuses in the CFS, Leopold II agrees to turn it over to the Belgian government.

**9 September:** The Belgian parliament reluctantly agrees to annex the territory as a colony. **15 November:** The CFS becomes the Belgian Congo.

**1910–1925** A large portion of the existing railway network is completed at great cost and with heavy human sacrifice.

**1914–1945** The economic fortunes of the colony largely follow the world economy, experiencing a boom in the 1920s and a depression in the 1930s. Congolese minerals help Allied war efforts, and Congolese soldiers fight with the Allies in the African theater in World Wars I and II.

**1945–1955** The *évolués* class of educated and primarily urban white-collar workers begins to emerge. Although political activity is banned, évolués gather in “associations” based primarily on ethnic and alumni affiliations. Calls are made for greater equality and advancement opportunities for African workers. Trade unionism emerges.

**1957** The colonial authorities allow elections for local urban districts and colonial councils. However, authorities say independence is at least 30 years away.

**1958** Belgium holds the Brussels World Fair and brings hundreds of Congolese to Brussels. Charles De Gaulle, speaking in Brazzaville, offers France’s colonies autonomy within a French community. **December:** The All-Africa People’s Conference is held in newly independent Ghana. Patrice Lumumba and other Congolese leaders attend and return home fired with the idea of independence.

**1959 4 January:** At a rally in Leopoldville, Lumumba calls for independence for the Belgian Congo. A confrontation with police leads to the arrest of Joseph Kasavubu and two weeks of rioting in the capital and several other cities. The colonial authorities agree to hold local elections. **December:** Elections are held but are boycotted by many of the emerging parties. The Belgian government, faced with continued unrest, agrees to hold a Round Table Conference in Brussels.

**1960 20 January:** The Round Table Conference begins with 45 delegates from various Congolese parties in attendance. The Belgian delegates reluctantly agree to set 30 June as the date for independence.

**25 June:** Elections are held, but are inconclusive. Talk of secession is heard in various regimes. A compromise is struck through which Kasavubu becomes president and Lumumba becomes prime minister.

**30 June:** The Congo becomes independent. **4 July:** The Force Publique mutinies for higher pay and better promotion opportunities. The violence leads to an evacuation of foreigners and the arrival of Belgian paratroopers. The Congolese government, fearful of Belgian occupation, asks the United Nations for military and administrative assistance.

**11 July:** Katanga secedes, followed by South Kasai on 3 August. During a political standoff between Kasavubu and Lumumba, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Joseph-Désiré Mobutu “neutralizes” the government. **5 September:** Lumumba is dismissed and is later captured while trying to join supporters in Stanleyville. **29 September:** The College of Commissioners is installed.

**1961 17 January:** Lumumba and two colleagues are killed shortly after arriving in secessionist Elisabethville under Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC) custody. The assassinations led to the secession of Orientale and Kivu Provinces. **9 February:** The College of Commissioners is dissolved with the formation of the Joseph Ileo government. Cyrille Adoula negotiates an end to the secession of South Kasai. **July 25:** Adoula is named prime minister. UN relief efforts are necessary to aid victims of famine and internecine fighting in Kasai and Katanga. **17 September:** UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld dies in a plane crash in Katanga.

**1963 14 January:** Following UN military intervention, the Katanga secession is ended and Moïse Tshombe goes into exile. **9 November:** The second devaluation since independence takes place.

**1964 6 July:** Tshombe is appointed prime minister at the head of a southern-dominated coalition. **1 August:** The country’s first constitution is adopted. **7 September:** The secessionist People’s Republic of the Congo is proclaimed in Stanleyville and is recognized by 13 foreign nations. **24 November:** Reports of atrocities by Stanleyville-based soldiers against Congolese and foreign hostages lead to a Belgian paratroop drop on Stanleyville. Over the next several weeks, the central government regains control over most of eastern Congo. Meanwhile, the Kwilu rebellion led by Pierre Mulele gathers force.

**1965 March:** Elections are held in which Tshombe's CONACO party makes significant gains. **13 October:** Tshombe is dismissed by Kasavubu, and Évariste Kimba is named prime minister. Parliament refuses to endorse the designation. An attempt by Ilebo is also thwarted. **24 November:** Amid the political standoff and a resurgence of the eastern rebellion, the military decides to take command and installs Mobutu as head of state with powers of decree. The Kwilu rebellion is put down. Mobutu consolidates his power with support from the Binza Group and the Corps des Volontaires de la République

**1966 17 April:** The Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR) is formed. **3 May:** City names are Africanized. **2 June:** Kimba and three other alleged coup plotters are publicly hanged in Kinshasa. An army rebellion in Orientale Province is put down by the central authorities.

**1967 2 January:** The Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK) is nationalized. **20 May:** The N'Sele Manifesto is issued. An attempt by Katangan Gendarmes and mercenaries to return Tshombe to power by fomenting a rebellion in eastern Congo is thwarted by the central authorities. **24 June:** The second constitution is promulgated, reducing regional autonomy and granting increased powers to the president. **30 June:** Tshombe is kidnapped while on a flight in Spain and is imprisoned in Algeria. Kinshasa hosts the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit and Mobutu becomes OAU chairman.

**1968 29 September:** Mulele accepts Mobutu's offer of amnesty, but is killed on 8 October upon returning to Congo. The last eastern rebellion is ended, although the Parti Révolutionnaire du Peuple (PRP) continues to control some territory in Kivu.

**1969 24 March:** Kasavubu dies. **29 June:** Tshombe dies in an Algerian prison.

**1970 November:** Elections are held and Mobutu, the sole candidate, is elected president. **23 December:** The MPR is declared the sole political party and supreme institution of the country.

**1971 27 October:** Congo becomes the Republic of Zaire. The three private universities are nationalized following student unrest.

**1974 15 August:** The third constitution is promulgated. It further centralizes power in the presidency and creates a party-state. **30 December:**

Retrocession is decreed, returning portions of Zairianized farms and companies to private ownership.

**1975** Following a drastic decline in copper prices, economic recession sets in and the government begins to fall into arrears on its foreign debt. **June:** The Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) faction that is fighting a civil war for control of Angola takes control of Luanda. Zaire, which opposes the MPLA, continues to support two other factions.

**1977 8 March:** The Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo (FLNC) guerrillas enter Shaba Region from bases in Angola. They advance to the outskirts of Kolwezi but are forced back into Angola by Zairian and Moroccan troops 80 days later. Foreign Minister Nguza Karl-I-Bond and other Lunda leaders are imprisoned and convicted of complicity. Nguza is later pardoned and returns to government. **October:** Zaire holds national and local elections. **2 December:** Mobutu is elected to a second term.

**1978 3 May:** FLNC guerrillas attack Kolwezi and occupy the town. Reports of looting and killing lead to a paratroop drop by Zairian, French, and Belgian troops. They regain control after two weeks, and the rebels flee back into Angola. A Pan-African peacekeeping force is established in the region and the government, stung by international criticism of its economic and political policies, enacts some reforms.

**1980** Thirteen parliamentarians, led by Étienne Tshisekedi, publish an open letter to Mobutu, urging political and economic reforms and the establishment of a multiparty democracy. Pope John Paul II visits.

**1981 April:** Nguza resigns unexpectedly and goes into exile. The Zairian government comes under severe criticism in the United States and Western European legislatures.

**1982 13 May:** Zaire reestablishes diplomatic relations with Israel. **18 and 19 September:** Legislative elections are held in which multiple candidates are allowed. Three-fourths of the incumbents are turned out. The 13 former parliamentarians form a second party, the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS), and are arrested and convicted of treason. **5 November:** Kengo wa Dondo is named prime

minister, charged with fighting corruption in government and imposing economic reforms.

**1983 21 May:** Mobutu proclaims a general amnesty whereby exiled dissidents may return if they cease opposition activities. **9 September:** Following nearly a decade of recession and debt arrears caused by low copper prices and mismanagement, the government announces a monetary reform, floats the currency on the free market, and removes overall subsidies on petroleum and agricultural products. Annual inflation reaches 100 percent. Labor protests are put down.

**1984 29 July:** Mobutu is elected to a third term. **November:** The Parti Révolutionnaire du Peuple (PRP) guerrillas attack Moba in November, demanding the end of the Mobutu regime. The army reoccupies the town two days later.

**1985 30 June:** Zaire celebrates 25 years of independence. Many former exiled dissidents, including Nguza, are present. However, PRP guerrillas attack Moba on the eve of the celebration. Annual inflation is reduced to 20 percent, drawing praise from international creditors. The pope pays a second visit.

**1986** Following a month-long meeting of the MPR Central Committee, the government says economic stabilization programs are strangling the economy and announces it will limit payments on its foreign debt to 10 percent of export revenues and 20 percent of government revenues. Kengo is sidelined and the post of prime minister is abolished. Responding to persistent criticism of Zaire's human rights record, Mobutu announces the creation of a ministry of citizens' rights.

**1987 22 May:** Zaire announces a major agreement with the Paris Club. **June:** Clashes are reported along the border with Uganda. Legislative elections are held and are dominated by young party cadres because the MPR Central Committee has become the primary forum for legislative debate.

**1988 8 February:** Tshisekedi is obliged to submit to a psychiatric examination and is declared to have a "disturbed personality." **1 October:** South African President Pieter Botha meets Mobutu in Gbadolite.



**1989** A new economic reform plan is announced, and new agreements are reached with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.

**1990 24 April:** In a speech, Mobutu announces the end of the single-party state and says he is resigning as president of the MPR. **30 April:** Security forces attack a UDPS rally, killing two. **11–12 May:** Masked soldiers invade dormitories of the Lubumbashi campus. As many as 100 students are killed. **28 May:** Protests are staged in Kinshasa. The United States, Canada, and the European Union (EU) suspend all non-humanitarian aid. **6 October:** Mobutu pledges no limits on the number of political parties, and the decree on party registration is passed on 25 November. **4 November:** An opposition rally is attacked and police kill four during protests over rising food prices.

**1991 May:** Pyramid schemes called Bindo Promotion, Nguma, and Panier de la Ménagère go bankrupt, leading to riots and “pillages” in Kinshasa. **June:** The Sacred Union is formed to press for a national conference and the departure of Mobutu. It eventually groups more than 200 opposition parties. Mobutu resumes the presidency of the MPR and announces that a National Conference will be allowed. **7 August:** The Conference convenes, but collapses on 15 August over accreditation disputes and political wrangling. **23 September:** Soldiers, angry over low and late salaries, loot containers at Ndjili airport. The looting spreads to Kinshasa’s commercial district and to some residential areas. Civilians join in. **25 September:** Order is restored after the arrival of French and Belgian troops. Thirty people are killed and 10,000 expatriates are evacuated. Damage is estimated at \$1 billion. **29 September:** Mobutu names Tshisekedi prime minister, but dismisses him when he refuses to sign an oath of allegiance to the president. **21 to 27 October:** Violence and looting occur in a number of regional cities. **23 October:** Bernadin Mungal Diaka is appointed prime minister. **31 October:** The Sacred Union forms a parallel government. **25 November:** Nguza is appointed prime minister and expelled from the Sacred Union. Inflation reaches 2,154 percent.

**1992 17 January:** Nguza reopens the National Conference, but closes it two days later saying it is too expensive. **22 January:** Twenty-nine soldiers seize the radio station in Kinshasa, demanding

democracy; the mutiny is quickly crushed. **16 February:** Security forces attack a group of protesters gathered after church services, killing 46. **6 April:** The National Conference reconvenes, declares itself sovereign on **17 April**, and renames itself the Conférence Nationale Souveraine (CNS). **21 April:** In a victory for the opposition, Archbishop Laurent Monsengwo Pasinya is named chairman. **14 August:** Pasinya proposes the Transnational Act aimed at overseeing the transition period and reducing presidential interference in the process. **15 August:** Tshisekedi is elected prime minister. **19 August:** Mobutu accepts Tshisekedi's appointment, but his decree makes no mention of the Transitional Act. Inflation accelerates to 4,130 percent. In an attempt to curtail the printing of banknotes to meet government expenses, Tshisekedi names new heads of the central bank and customs collection agency, but these are vetoed by Mobutu. Troops are stationed outside the bank, also preventing Tshisekedi from entering his offices, and seal off the CNS. The CNS drafts a constitution that considerably reduces the powers of the president. Mobutu announces he is convening the single-party legislature to draft another constitution more to his liking. **6 December:** The CNS establishes the Haut Conseil de la République (HCR) and dissolves itself.

**1993** The central bank issues new 5-million-zaire notes, worth about \$1 US each. Tshisekedi condemns them as inflationary. Some merchants refuse to accept them from recently paid soldiers. **28 and 29 January:** Troops go on a looting spree, battled by troops of the Division Spéciale Présidentielle. More than 100 people, mostly soldiers, are killed, including the French ambassador, who is shot while looking out his office window. **5 February:** Tshisekedi is dismissed after calling for foreign military assistance in overthrowing Mobutu. **24 February:** Troops surround the legislative chamber and hold HCR members hostage until they accept the 5-million-zaire banknotes, which they do on **26 February**. **March:** Mobutu names Tshisekedi's senior advisor Faustin Birindwa prime minister, leading to his expulsion from the UDPS. **October:** Negotiations lead to the merger of the CNS and MPR parliament into the 745-member Haut Conseil de le République/Parlement de la Transition (HCR/PT). **22 October:** Monetary reform is enacted. Three million zaires are exchanged for one new zaire (NZ). Annual inflation reaches 2,000 percent.

**1994 6 April:** The presidents of Rwanda and Burundi are killed in a suspicious plane crash. In two months, Rwandan militias massacre an estimated 500,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu. The Tutsi-led Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) seizes control of Kigali, causing 2 million refugees to flee into neighboring countries. Within a few weeks, more than 1 million of them arrive in eastern Zaire. Birindwa resigns. **17 June:** Kengo is elected prime minister in a vote contested by Tshisekedi and is charged with combating inflation and reviving the economy. He announces a number of austerity measures, including the closing of 64 embassies around the world. **7 December:** The World Bank declares Zaire in default and closes its office in Kinshasa. Annual inflation reaches 6,000 percent.

**1995 March:** An outbreak of the Ebola virus causes 244 deaths. **30 June:** The HCR/PT votes to extend the transitional period and postpone national elections until 9 July 1997. A few weeks later, Monsengwo is ousted as chairman of the HCR/PT, although he calls the dismissal illegal. Inflation officially is reduced to 382 percent, although prices for basic commodities are disproportionately higher.

**1996 8 January:** A cargo plane taking off from Ndolo airport crashes into a crowded market, killing 350 people. **18 March:** The electoral commission is formed and announces national and local elections will be held in May and June 1997, following a constitutional referendum. The UDPS splits over whether to participate in the vote, with Tshisekedi's supporters vowing to boycott. The HCR/PT drafts a new constitution. **22 August:** Mobutu undergoes prostate surgery and treatment for cancer in Switzerland. **18 October:** Rebels of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL) launch an offensive in Sud-Kivu and capture Bukavu on **30 October** and Goma on **1 November**. **17 December:** Mobutu returns, shakes up the military high command, and reshuffles the cabinet. **30 December:** Mobutu signs a decree calling for the constitutional referendum in February.

**1997 5 January:** The government introduces new banknotes of up to 1 million zaires. **17 January:** The UN and the EU pledge \$250 million to help finance elections. **20 January:** The government announces a counteroffensive, but rebels capture Kisangani on **15 March**, despite stiff resistance from government troops and foreign mercenaries. **24**

**March:** Mobutu dismisses Kengo and names Tshisekedi prime minister on **2 April**. **4 April:** Rebels take Mbuji-Mayi. **5 April:** A state of emergency is declared. **9 April:** After rebels take Lubumbashi, Mobutu dismisses Tshisekedi. **11 April:** He appoints General Bolongo Likulia prime minister and General Mahele Lieko Bokoungo defense minister. **12 April:** Kananga and Kolwezi fall. **29 April:** Kikwit falls. **16 May:** As rebels approach Kinshasa, Mobutu leaves for Togo. Mahele is killed that night at Camp Tshatshi. **17 May:** The rebels enter Kinshasa. **29 May:** Kabila is sworn in as president and pledges to hold elections by April 1999. He announces the country's former name, Congo, will be restored and the zaire will be replaced by the Congolese franc. **July:** Reports of massacres lead the United Nations to appoint a special investigative team. Fighting erupts in Brazzaville between forces loyal to President Pascal Lissouba and former President Denis Sassou Nguesso. Tensions in Kivu lead to clashes in which thousands are killed. **7 September:** Mobutu dies in a hospital in Rabat, Morocco. **October:** Four months of fighting in Brazzaville peak; artillery shells from the devastated capital land in Kinshasa, killing 21 people. The Kabila government sends troops to Brazzaville. Nguesso forces take control of Brazzaville and, backed by Angolan troops, seize Pointe Noire and consolidate control over most of the country. The Kabila government asks South Africa to extradite exiled Mobutu officials, including 20 generals. **28 November:** The arrest of Kabila's senior military advisor sparks a day of shooting in which three people are killed. **30 November:** The government bans foreign broadcasts on local radio stations but lifts the ban four days later. **2 December:** Kabila announces a reorganization of the military. **4 December:** A donor's conference ends in Brussels, pledging to disburse \$180 million in frozen aid to help rebuild the economy. **5 December:** The former director of Air Zaïre goes on trial, the first of 34 detained Mobutu barons facing charges of corruption. **23 December:** Kabila returns from a week-long visit to China saying that China will be the model for Congolese development. Heavy rains cause flooding in cities along the Congo River, displacing 20,000 residents of Kisangani.

**1998 3 January:** Kabila reshuffles his cabinet, naming Katangan Governor Gaetan Kakudji interior minister. He also orders officials to return property seized from former officials. **17 January:** Security

forces break up a UDPS meeting. **12 February:** Tshisekedi is arrested and banished to his home village. **April:** Three newspaper editors are detained for questioning after publishing articles critical of the government. **17 May:** In a speech marking his first year in power, Kabila reaffirms his pledge to organize a constitutional referendum during his second year in office and lift the ban on political parties. He creates a 300-member transitional assembly that drafts a new constitution later in the year. **Late May:** The government arrests five ministers and the directors of the state electricity, water, and oil companies for questioning as part of a corruption investigation. **1 June:** The ministers are sacked in a cabinet reshuffle. **24 June:** The three editors are released. **30 June:** The Congolese franc replaces the new zaire. **1 July:** Tshisekedi is released. **July:** Kabila visits Cuba. **27 July:** Kabila orders 100 Rwandan officers commanding Congolese troops to return home. **2 August:** A new rebellion is launched in eastern Congo by Banyamulenge, former Mobutu officials, and disaffected Kabila supporters. **3 August:** The rebels take Goma, and fighting breaks out at a barracks in Kinshasa. **8 August:** Laurent Kabila meets with Rwanda President Pasteur Bizimungu and other regional leaders in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, but any agreement remains out of reach. **16 August:** The rebels announce the formation of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) led by Ernest Wamba dia Wamba. They say they want to replace Kabila, whom they accuse of corruption and nepotism. The armies of six African nations enter the conflict on DRC soil, as Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi back the rebels while Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe support Laurent Kabila. **29 August:** Angola forces help government troops retake Matadi. Government forces, backed by troops from Zimbabwe and Namibia, drive the rebels from Kinshasa. **28 November:** Kabila attends a France–Africa summit as an acting head of state. There are various attempts to mediate the conflict in the following months, but they are stymied by Kabila’s refusal to meet with the rebels.

**1999 13 January:** The RCD, attempting to broaden its support, creates a “nationally representative assembly,” to act as a parliament in exile and a government with an eight-person collective presidency. **31 January:** Kabila signs a decree allowing political activity, but the UDPS criticizes the requirements for registering political parties as too restrictive. **16 February:** The UN human rights representative returns

to Congo and, after a week-long tour, announces that 20 different armed groups are in the country. Calls arise for an international peacekeeping force for the Great Lakes region. **14 March:** Kabila forms a new cabinet in an attempt to attract opposition leaders into his government, and one week later says he is launching a “national debate” on the country’s future. **10 July:** A ceasefire agreement is signed in Lusaka, Zambia, by the six states involved in the Congo conflict: the DRC, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Uganda. The rebel groups MLC and RCD sign the agreement on 1 August and 31 August, respectively. **6 August:** The UN Security Council authorizes deployment of UN liaison personnel in support of the Lusaka agreement. **13 September:** The Committee of Pacification is formed in Ituri. **30 September:** With its Resolution 1279, the UN Security Council agrees to the creation of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). **September:** The RCD-Kisangani is renamed RCD-Mouvement de Libération. Wamba is confirmed as its president, with Bunia as his capital. **21 October:** First UN liaison personnel arrives in Bunia. **December:** Former president of Botswana, Ketumile Masire, is appointed to serve as facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) provided for in the Lusaka agreement.

**2000 24 February:** With Resolution 1291 of the Security Council, the United Nations approves the deployment of 5,537 peacekeepers to monitor the implementation of the Lusaka Accord signed on 10 July 1999. **4–10 June:** Heavy fighting occurs between Rwandan and Ugandan forces in Kisangani. **16 June:** UN resolution 1304 calls for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Congolese territory, without specifying any deadline. **20 November:** Divisions in RCD-ML come to a head. Mbusa Nyamwisi and Tibasima remove Wamba from power in the “November Putsch.” Uganda appears to give up protecting Wamba. Splits also occur in the RCD-ML: dissident Roger Lumbala creates the RCD-Nationale, and in Beni, Governor Bwanakawa Nyonyi sets up the short-lived RCD-Populaire.

**2001 16 January:** President Laurent Kabila is shot dead. **17 January:** Joseph Kabila, son of the deceased, takes over as president of the DRC. **29 March:** MONUC deploys its first contingent to the east, first in rebel-held areas, and then, on **4 April**, in the government-controlled zone. **12 April:** A UN Panel of Experts publishes its first report on

exploitation of resources in DRC, concluding that the governments of Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda were profiting from the conflict by looting gold and other precious metals, diamonds, timber, ivory, and tax revenues. **20–24 August:** Preparatory meeting of the ICD is held in Botswana. **15 October:** The ICD officially opens in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, with 80 participants representing the government of Kinshasa, rebel movements (MLC, RCD-Goma, RCD-ML), unarmed political opposition groups, and civil society organizations. But the forum is postponed until February 2002.

**2002 25 February:** The ICD officially opens in Sun City, South Africa, with Sir Masire as mediator. Some 300 delegates assemble to elaborate an agreement for a transitional government ahead of elections. A partial power-sharing agreement is reached, but the RCD-Goma and several opposition groups refuse to sign. **19 April:** The ICD peace meeting held in Sun City adjourns after reaching wide agreement, but defers key terms on power sharing. **30 July:** The peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda is signed in Pretoria. **6 September:** The Luanda accord is signed between Uganda and the DRC. A 100-day timetable is set for the withdrawal of Ugandan armed forces after the establishment of an Ituri Pacification Committee. **5 October:** This marks the end of the withdrawal of Rwandan troops. **15 October:** The second UN report on the illegal exploitation of the DRC's resources adds more damning accusations against Uganda and the "elite" networks behind the plunder, including the half brother of President Museveni. **30 October:** This marks the end of the withdrawal of Angolan, Namibian, and Zimbabwean troops, allied to the DRC government. **17 December:** A comprehensive peace agreement is signed by most participants in the civil war. Under the agreement, Joseph Kabila will remain president with four vice presidents.

**2003 2 April:** The closure of the ICD in Sun City; warring factions sign the Global and All Inclusive Agreement that includes the creation of an interim constitution and a transnational government. Two days later, the transnational constitution is promulgated. **7 April:** President Joseph Kabila is sworn in as president under the new transitional constitution. **15 April:** The Special Interim Administration for Ituri is established. **30 May:** The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1484, by which it agrees to the creation of an emergency international force to secure

Bunia in Ituri. The operation, code-named Artemis, deployed by the European Union under French command and consisting of 1,850 troops, begins its operation on 6 June and ends on 1 September. **30 June:** The Transitional Government is installed in Kinshasa according to the Sun City agreement signed in late December 2002. It is led by President Joseph Kabila, assisted by four vice presidents. **17 July:** Six of the seven armed groups in the Ituri conflict sign the Kinshasa Engagement Act by which they agree to lay down their arms. **22 August:** The Transition Parliament opens its session, and militias in the war-devastated province of Ituri agree to work with the new government to restore security in the area. **31 August:** The French-led peace-keeping force in Ituri hands over posts to the beefed-up UN mission (MONUC), which formally takes over on 1 September. **8 December:** A new national army is formed from existing government soldiers and two main rebel groups, RCD and MLC, in accordance with the peace agreement.

**2004 28 March:** In an apparent coup attempt, gunmen attack military bases and television stations in Kinshasa, but the coup is unsuccessful; the government arrests 15, claiming they are members of former dictator Mobutu Sese Seko's personal bodyguard, and places security forces on high alert. **21 April:** Rwandan troops reportedly cross into DRC in breach of the peace agreement, and force a patrol of UN peacekeepers to return to base. **16 May:** The government appoints new governors and vice governors of the 11 provinces. **26 May–9 June:** Violent clashes erupt in Bukavu, South Kivu province, between the national army and two groups of dissident soldiers led by two rebel officers, General Laurent Nkunda and Colonel Jules Mutebusi. They withdraw from Bukavu on **9 June** under pressures from the UN. **23 August:** Azarias Ruberwa, DRC vice president and head of the Rwanda-backed RCD Tutsi former rebel movement, temporarily leaves the transitional government, protesting Kinshasa's failure to provide security and reintegrate militias in the Ituri and Kivu provinces. DRC President Kabila rejects renegotiation of the transitional government under South African mediation; but South African President Thabo Mbeki meets with Ruberwa on a two-day visit in an attempt to end the dispute. **29 September:** The UN Security Council agrees to enlarge the MONUC presence from 10,800 to 16,700, less than the 23,900 called for by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. The situation in the DRC remains tense.



**2005 1 January:** Acting under Chapter XII of the UN Charter and with its Resolution 1565 (2004), the UN Security Council decides to increase MONUC's troop strength and to reinforce its mandate. **10 January:** A mass demonstration in Kinshasa against a possible postponement of elections leaves at least four people killed. **25 February:** A Lendu militia attacks a MONUC convoy near Bunia, causing the death of nine Bangladeshi peacekeepers. As a result, humanitarian aid is suspended and the Congolese government deploys 3,000 additional troops in Ituri. **29 March:** The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1592 by which it extends the MONUC's mandate until 1 October 2005. **13 May:** A new Congolese constitution is adopted. **20 June:** Voter registration begins in Kinshasa. **14 December:** The transition period is extended until 30 June 2006. **18–19 December:** The new constitution is approved by more than 84.31 percent of valid votes.

**2006 18 February:** The president promulgates the new constitution that is officially adopted granting the DRC a new legal framework, including president–prime minister power sharing and a two-term limit for the elected president. **9 March:** Promulgation of the electoral law that sets the dates for different ballots. **30 July:** General elections take place, the first free polls in 40 years that are reported generally peaceful. **August:** A three-day gun battle in Kinshasa between supporters of Kabila and Bemba before the presidential results are announced kills 23 people. **20 August:** The President of the Commission Électorale Indépendante (CEI) releases voting results showing a regional divide: the eastern provinces vote for the incumbent Kabila, while the contenders Bemba, Gizenga, and Mobutu were strongest in western districts. After no candidate receives a majority of votes, a run-off between Kabila (44.8 percent) and Bemba (20.03 percent) was scheduled to coincide with provincial elections in October. **29 October:** Provincial and second-round presidential elections take place between President Kabila and Vice President Bemba; voting occurs mostly peacefully. **November:** The CEI announces Kabila's victory over Bemba. Kabila received 58 percent, Bemba 42 percent. The Supreme Court confirmed Kabila's victory, while Bemba, after initially rejecting the results, accepts the outcome on **28 November** and says he would play the role of opposition through legal means. **6 December:** Joseph Kabila is sworn in as the first popularly elected president since independence. The

second-placed Jean-Pierre Bemba announces his intention to lead the opposition for a Kinshasa senate seat. **15 December:** Forces of renegade General Nkunda and the UN-backed army clash in Nord-Kivu province, prompting more than 50,000 people to flee. **30 December:** Third-placed Antoine Gizenga, head of the Parti Lumumbiste Unifié (PALU), is appointed prime minister by President Kabila.

**2007 9 January:** Provincial elections take place. **February:** Senators are nominated by provincial assemblies. **March:** Government troops and forces loyal to opposition leader Jean-Pierre Bemba clash in Kinshasa. **April:** The DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi relaunch the regional economic organization the Communauté Économique des Pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL). Jean-Pierre Bemba leaves for Portugal, thus ending a three-week political stalemate in Kinshasa, during which he shelters in the South African Embassy. **May:** The Senate elects its bureau, naming as president Kengo wa Dondo from the opposition. **September:** A major outbreak of Ebola virus occurs.

**2008 6–22 January:** A peace conference is held in Goma, Nord-Kivu, between the government and armed rebel groups operating in eastern DRC. **22 January:** The International Rescue Committee says, in a study with Australia's Burnet Institute, that the DRC's civil war against Laurent Kabila and its aftermath has caused more than 4 million deaths; that is, more deaths than any other conflict since World War II. **23 January:** The government and rebel militias, including Laurent Nkunda, sign a peace pact aimed at ending years of conflict in the east. **April:** Army troops clash with Rwandan Hutu militias with whom they were formerly allied in eastern Congo, leaving a number of civilians dead and more than 10,000 displaced. **24 May:** Jean-Pierre Bemba, former vice president and leader of the country's main opposition party, the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC), is arrested in Belgium on the basis of an International Criminal Court warrant. **August:** Heavy clashes erupt in Masisi and Rutshuru territories, Nord-Kivu province, between army troops and fighters loyal to rebel leader Laurent Nkunda. **25 September:** Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga resigns because of his advanced age. **7 October:** Laurent Nkunda's rebel forces capture the major army military base of Rumangabo as thousands of people, including Congolese troops, flee as the clash intensifies. **10 October:** President Joseph Kabila appoints Adolphe Muzito

of the Parti Lumumbiste Unifié (PALU) as the new prime minister. **4 November:** The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, appoints former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo as his special envoy to Congo to facilitate talks between the government and the dissident Nkunda. President Joseph Kabila dismisses General Dieudonné Kayembe as the armed forces chief of staff over war in the east. He replaces him with Navy Chief General Didier Etumba Longomba. **14 December:** Forces from the DRC, Uganda, and southern Sudan launch a joint military operation against Uganda's Lord Resistance Army (LRA) in eastern DRC, destroying the LRA's main camp in the area. **22 December:** The UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1856 renewing MONUC's mandate until **31 December 2009** and extending the authorization of an increase in troop levels. **29 December:** The LRA rebels launch simultaneous attacks in several localities of the Haut-Uele Province, killing at least 190 civilians.

**2009 22 January:** Laurent Nkunda is arrested in Rwanda as he tries to resist a joint Rwandan–Congolese military operation against former Hutu soldiers still operating in eastern Congo.

## Introduction

The country presently known as the *Democratic Republic of Congo* (DRC or Congo) first emerged in 1885 as the Congo Free State (CFS) and was a private domain of King Leopold II of Belgium. The king's domain was annexed to Belgium as a colony on 15 November 1908 and was known as *Belgian Congo*. On 30 June 1960, it became independent under the name *Republic of Congo*. It became the DRC on 1 August 1964 after the promulgation of the Luluabourg constitution and remained so until 27 October 1971, when President Mobutu Sese Seko named it *Zaire*. On 29 May 1997, President Laurent Kabila changed the name back to the *DRC*. This introduction uses the *DRC* or *Congo* to refer to the country and *Congolese* to refer to its population.

Geographically, the DRC is located at Africa's center, and its shape has often been compared to that of a heart. Although the physiological comparison could be debated, there is no doubt that it is the heart of Africa. Its 2,344,895 square kilometers of territory cover one-half of the Congo Basin. The DRC thus represents the third largest country in Africa, after Sudan and Algeria. It is also 80 times the size of its former colonial power, Belgium. The basin is drained by the mightiest river in Africa, the Congo River, which is second in volume of flowing water only to South America's Amazon River. The 4,300-km-long Congo River and its tributaries form the backbone of the national transportation infrastructure. They provide the major surface routes, despite unnavigable cataracts above Kisangani and between Kinshasa and the deep-water port of Matadi. Because of its location, Congo has long been considered one of the most geopolitically strategic countries in Africa. It shares 9,165 km of border with nine countries: Angola (including the enclave of Cabinda), Zambia, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, Central African Republic, and Congo-Brazzaville. It also borders the lakes of the Great Rift Valley, which form the headwaters of

the White Nile River. Congo is considered a semi-enclave because it has only 37 km of coastline on the Atlantic Ocean, north of the mouth of the Congo River.

The DRC possesses great natural resources. The hydroelectric potential of the Congo River and its tributaries is 100,000 MW, more than that of the rest of Africa combined. Its mineral wealth is also of strategic importance. At its peak, Congo produced one-third of the world's cobalt (used to produce super alloys), a major portion of the world's industrial diamonds, and 7 percent of its copper. Environmentalists also contend that Congo is one of the largest remaining repositories of primary tropical rainforest in the world, containing hundreds of thousands of species of animal and plant life still unknown to science.

## LAND AND PEOPLE

Ranging from 5° latitude north to 14° latitude south, the DRC straddles the equator, with one-third of the territory in the northern hemisphere and two-thirds in the southern hemisphere. As a result, farming, which is centered around the rainy seasons, is carried out year-round in the country, and most rivers enjoy relatively stable water levels. A great deal of Congolese territory is characterized by the hot, humid climate of the Congo Basin. Congo's climate is tropical. A normal year is usually divided into a four-month rainy season of hot, wet weather and a long, dry season of cool, temperate weather. Each long season is usually broken up by a short (two weeks) season of alternate weather. Temperatures generally range from 20 to 35 degrees Celsius, or 68 to 95 degrees Fahrenheit, although temperatures in parts of Haut-Katanga and Lualaba Provinces sometimes fall below 10 degrees C (50 degrees F). Temperatures average 26 degrees C (78 degrees F) in coastal areas and 18 degrees C (64 degrees F) in mountainous areas.

Depending on the season and the region, humidity ranges from 35 to 95 percent. Average annual rainfall is 1,000 to 2,200 mm. Rainfall is usually heaviest north of the equator between May and September and in the southern hemisphere from November to March. With some variations, the dry season in the north is from November to March and from May to September in the south. The zones of heaviest rainfall are in the Congo River Basin and the eastern highlands. The zones of least rainfall

lie in the savannas of Haut-Katanga, Lualaba, and Kivu Provinces and westernmost Kongo Central Province. No region suffers from chronic drought. Because the country straddles the equator, the dry season in the northern part of the country (November through March) occurs during the southern part's rainy season, and vice versa. As a consequence, the country's main rivers are navigable the entire year. The one notable exception is the Ubangi River, which lies entirely north of the equator and is navigable only six months of the year.

Forest and woodlands cover more than 50 percent of the territory. Estimated arable land is 25 percent. However, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that only 3 percent of the land is devoted to crop cultivation. Other organizations estimate less than 2 percent of the land is under cultivation. One-tenth of the land is devoted to pasture, primarily in the west, southeast, and northeastern provinces. The topsoil of the Congo River Basin area, which covers more than half of the country, is thin and only moderately fertile. It is thus relatively poor for agriculture and the population is relatively sparse, as low as one person per square km. The soil covering territory bordering the basin is considered better, while the soils of the highland and savanna areas are considered excellent. The low-lying terrain generally contains relatively poor soils but the region is rich in game, fish, and hydro-electric potential. In the southeast, the terrain is characterized by more temperate savannas and woodlands that allow the cultivation of maize and millet, as well as the raising of cattle. Cattle raising is not possible in the basin because of the presence of the tsetse fly and numerous parasites. Woodlands and savannas also cover the northernmost parts of the country. Fertile, densely populated forests cover the eastern highlands, where the temperate climate allows the growing of seasonal crops. The terrain lying to the west of the capital, Kinshasa, is low, flat plains, an ancient seabed that is relatively fertile and, in the westernmost Kongo Central Province, is far enough away from the parasites of the rainforest to allow animal husbandry.

Several mountain ranges cross the territory: the Rwenzori Mountain range in the northeast, the highest range in Africa; the Virunga Mountains in the eastern Kivu provinces; and the Mayombe Mountains in Kongo Central. The mountains are largely responsible for the three stretches of cataracts that truncate the 3,000 navigable kilometers of the Congo River: between Kongolo and Kindu in the Maniema Province,

between Ubundu and Kisangani in the Tshopo Province, and between Kinshasa and Matadi in the Kongo Central Province. Despite the cataracts, which disrupt transportation between the Atlantic Ocean and most of the country, the 14,000 km of navigable waterways in the country provide a natural transportation system that can be used year-round. Railways were constructed between the 1890s and 1930s to circumvent the unnavigable portions of the river system and, during the first half of the 20th century, some 145,213 km of roads were constructed to provide a system to bring agricultural and mineral products to market. By 2007, Congo had less than 10,000 km of roads mostly located in Kinshasa and Kongo Central, Haut-Katanga, and Lualaba Provinces.

The United Nations estimated the Congolese population to be about 62.5 million as of mid-2007. Most Congolese speak one or more of the Bantu languages, but a few small groups are classified as part of the Adamawa branch of the Niger–Congo family or as part of the Central Sudanese language family. Four *lingua francas* exist in Congo: Kikongo, Kiswahili (sometimes called *Kingwana*), Lingala, and Tshiluba. Kikongo is spoken in Kinshasa and in Kongo Central and Kwango Provinces in the form of a simplified dialect called *Kileta* (Kituba). Kiswahili is used as a *lingua franca* in eastern provinces. Lingala is spoken along the Congo River between Ubangi-Uele and Kisangani. Although Tshiluba is the main language in southern Congo between Angola and Lake Mweru, the official language is French.

Christianity is the major religion in the DRC, followed by about 80 percent of the population. Catholics and Protestants represent 50 percent and 20 percent of the population, respectively. Kimbanguism, which is officially “the Church of Christ on Earth by the Prophet Simon Kimbangu,” accounts for 10 percent of the population. Islam also accounts for 10 percent. The remaining 10 percent of the population follow some type of traditional beliefs or syncretic sects. A number of ethnologists argue that the Congolese can be grouped in terms of clusters ranging from five to a dozen that include some 332 ethnic groups. About 66 percent of Congolese reside in rural areas, and the average density of population is low, estimated at 25 people per square kilometer in the early 2000s. However, the population is unevenly distributed, with high density in the two Kivu provinces, Kongo Central, Haut-Katanga, and Kinshasa.

## EARLY HISTORY

Little is known about the early inhabitants of the DRC, and archaeological research has been hindered in many parts of the country by the rain-forest. However, anthropologists and historians believe the first humans to arrive in the region were Bantu-speaking peoples from West Africa, who moved into the western and southwestern parts of the Congo Basin area beginning in 2000 B.C. Over the next 2,000 years, they spread throughout the basin and toward the Indian Ocean and southern Africa. Migrations and counter-migrations helped produce the considerable mixture of West African, North-Central African, and East-Central African strains of Bantu speakers found today. Sudanic and Nilotic clusters of ethnic groups began migrating into northern Congo in A.D. 1500. They intermingled with Bantu-speaking groups in the areas, creating a mosaic of ethnic cultures. Since 1500, the landscape of the DRC had shaped socioeconomic and political interactions of groups in the Congo Basin.

Moreover, because poor tropical soils required a system of shifting cultivation to rejuvenate the soil, Africans developed self-enforcing mechanisms, known collectively as communal ownership of land, which facilitated cooperative behavior and made individualized rights to land of little value. An important socioeconomic consequence of these environmental constraints and institutional arrangements was that most African polities in the Congo Basin had to rely upon some type of regional or long-distance trade for wealth accumulation, as well as on people for domestic slavery and portage. Therefore, the Congo Basin remained an integral part of a process of worldwide economy that expanded in the 16th century as the result of the slave trade. From the 16th century to the advent of colonialism in the area, four trade zones co-existed with both centralized and decentralized polities in the Congo Basin.

The first trade zone was the Portuguese–African trade region that comprised part of today’s Angola, lower Congo, Kasai Basin, and southern part of the former Katanga province. This vast zone differed in ecology and demography. The Atlantic area, which included Angola and the lower Congo River area, was characterized by a scarcity of arable land that drove people to concentrate in a few extensive areas of



superior rainfall and adequate groundwater. Peaceful commerce regularly cut across major boundaries between wetter and drier areas. In time of crisis, however, such contacts could turn violent, resulting into groups raiding each other's fields and livestock. The first Portuguese caravels, under the explorer Diogo Cão, sailed up the Congo River in 1483, as the Kongo Kingdom coalesced in the late 15th century. The kingdom expanded under King Afonso I in the first half of the 16th century (1507–1541).

The Kongo, unlike some of the peoples further inland, welcomed the European visitors. The reigning king was converted to Christianity, and the kingdom exchanged ambassadors with several courts in Europe. The Kongo also welcomed missionaries and traders. The former arrived seeking to save souls. The latter came at first seeking gold and silver but eventually settling for ivory and slaves in exchange for cloth, manufactured goods, and luxuries brought from Europe. The contact between Portugal and Kongo developed into cultural and military cooperation that drove many people to convert to Catholicism. Cooperation with Portugal became the key to the delicate balance of domestic power in the kingdom. Nonetheless, both the king and the Portuguese discovered that the real wealth of the area was its people. Each year, Portuguese bought African captives by the thousands and sent them across the Atlantic. Over time, the demand for slaves in response to the spectacular growth of the slave trade generated conflict between Portugal and Kongo. The slave trade transformed social interactions among friendly neighbors into open conflict, which until then had been limited to conflict over land ownership. The disputes escalated as slave hunting spread, sparing nobody, princes and paupers alike. The decline of the Kongo Kingdom made room for small merchant princes and warlords who emerged as brokers on the Portuguese–African zone. By the time Leopold II started his adventure in the Congo Basin, the area was dominated by weak rulers, intermediaries, European merchants, warlords, and mercenaries.

Unlike their counterparts in the Atlantic area, who experienced unreliable rainfall and rapid water run-off, the people in southwestern central Congo (Kasai basin and southern Katanga) were blessed with perennial streams and rivers that were oases of attraction to humans and that allowed agricultural activities. These activities produced several centralized polities, such as the Luba, Lunda, and Kuba Empires.

The control of regional or long-distance trade became an important factor of wealth accumulation and, hence, power consolidation. For example, a group of invaders and their descendants, known as *balopwe* (kings), occupied the region west of the upper Congo River (known as *Lualaba*) and north of the Katanga Lakes between the Lomami River and the western side of Lake Tanganyika. According to Luba tradition, their leader, a certain Nkongolo Mukulu, founded the Luba Empire and set the capital at Kitenta. He was succeeded by his nephew Kalala Ilunga.

Regional trade played an essential part in the expansion and disintegration of the Luba Empire, just as it did in the Atlantic zone. By 1874, the Ovimbundu from Angola were trading with the Luba emperor Kasongo Kalombo by strengthening his rule in exchange for ivory. The king's increasing reliance on trade also increased his dependence on guns to defend the empire. This dependence on long-distance trade was the main cause of the imperial collapse as ivory became scarce within the empire. By the late 1870s, the combined effect of the depletion of ivory, the plethora of guns, and rulers' reliance on mercenaries undermined the politico-religious basis of Luba kings. By early 1880, the Luba Empire had collapsed, and many chiefdoms had become entirely autonomous. The disintegration of the *balopwe* was one of the many forms of state collapse that characterized the 19th-century Congo basin as the result of trade expansion centered on foreign traders. The Lunda Empire and its Kazembe offshoot are also illustrative.

The Lunda Empire seemed to have been created by a brother of the reigning Luba king in the early 17th century. Soon after its creation, the empire started expanding from its capital into neighboring regions. The title of Lunda emperors became *Mwaat Yaav* (Lord of the Viper) after King Luseeng's son succeeded his father to the throne as *Mwaat Yaav* Naweej (1660–1690). He rapidly expanded the empire eastward in search of manpower for agricultural activities along today's copper-belt region of Katanga. During his long reign, the Imbangala from Angola opened a trade route between Kasanje and Mukamba, thus integrating the Lunda Empire into the Portuguese–African trade zone. The empire and its political organization further expanded in many directions by including defeated chiefs in the administration of the empire. This expansion created several Lunda subcultures. One of these was Kazembe, which became the most prestigious symbol of eastern Lunda expansion.

The Portuguese merchants made contact with Kazembe after the empire had already existed for more than 50 years.

Like the Luba Empire, long-distance trade became a major destabilizing factor in the Lunda Empire as the result of the infiltration of Tshokwe from Angola and that of Swahili traders from Zanzibar. By the early 1880s, Tshokwe mercenaries had cut the Lunda Empire into pieces. The empire disintegrated in late 1887 under a new wave of Tshokwe invasion in which the Lunda king, Mulaji II, was killed. The Tshokwe remained in control of Lunda land for almost 10 years. By the time King Leopold II was granted the Congo Basin at the Berlin Conference in late February 1885, the Lunda Empire had collapsed. Leopold's envoys were able to control the area, and placed Muteba III on the Lunda throne, thus making him a subject of King Leopold II.

The second zone was the Ubangi–Congo axis, and its players were mostly Africans. It expanded in the 1850s and superseded the old overland routes. This area developed along the Congo River from the Wagonia Falls (now Kisangani) down to the Malebo Pool (today Kinshasa) area. This zone was the oldest internal trading area, one that linked kings, headmen, fishermen, and farmers for centuries. Nonetheless, the Ubangi–Congo trade area gained preeminence only in the 1850s along the Ubangi–Congo banks. Centralized societies, such as the Bolya and Tyo kingdoms, benefited from commercial activities that flourished along the banks of the Congo River by trading with many acephalous societies. Both kingdoms were able to enjoy trade networks that Bobangi people expanded along the Congo River before the advent of European rule. Called *Nyanzi* (Bayanzi) in the 19th-century writings, the Bobangi were described as the Jews of the area. They were able to dominate trade by creating permanent trading camps along the Congo River. However, the arrival of Europeans in the late 19th century increased the number of traders competing with the Bobangi. The only option left to the Bobangi was to fish or to farm, because Europeans took over control of ivory and other trades. A number of Bobangi traders rejected this livelihood and became the first to join Europeans as soldiers or porters.

The third zone emerged in the early 19th century and represented the east–Swahili trading area that linked the Zanzibar Sultanate to the eastern Congo basin. Afro-Arabs from Zanzibar dominated this trade zone.

The Swahili trade zone was part of a vast network of long-distance trade along the eastern coast of Africa several centuries before Europeans came on the scene. It was not until the early 1810s that this trade zone penetrated into the Congo basin and expanded along the Upper Congo River and the Lomami River. From that time, Afro-Arab traders and their Nyamwezi auxiliaries found their way to Kazembe's capital to buy ivory, slaves, and copper. The Swahili trade zone became mostly controlled by an Afro-Arab from Zanzibar, Hamed bin Muhammed el-Murjebi, nicknamed Tippo Tip. It was not until 1879 that Tippo Tip and his men reached Wagenia Falls (now Kisangani), from whence he started launching other important expeditions.

By the time the Berlin Conference ended in late February 1885, Tippo Tip had already established a quasi-empire in the eastern part of the Congo basin. This empire was a loose conglomerate whose goal was more economic than political. Economic gains overshadowed administrative efficiency in collecting tribute, and it was a predatory system based on ivory collection and the slave trade. When Henry Morton Stanley entered the scene, Tippo Tip was already the dominant political and economic power in the eastern Congo basin.

The Afro-Arab penetration of the eastern Congo basin was a major factor in the collapse of the eastern Lunda Empire of Kazembe. A certain Kalasa, a subchief of the Nyamwezi people (known as Yeke) from the eastern shore of Lake Tanganyika and a leader of caravans, during trips to southern Katanga made blood covenants with important local chiefs, such as Chief Katanga. He bought copper and left some of his men there, the Yeke. On one of his trips, he came with his second son, Ngelengwa Mwenda (or Msiri). Around 1856, Msiri settled near Chief Katanga with the Yeke. He married Katanga's daughter and established himself in Chief Katanga's land by offering mercenary services to opposing political factions. The most successful of these ventures was his interference in the dispute among pretenders to the throne of Kazembe in 1862. Between 1865 and 1870, Msiri had incorporated all the possessions of Kazembe west of the Luapula valley in his estate. He took the title of king after his father's death in late 1870 and founded the state of Garenganze, with its capital at Bunkeya. Soon after, his power began to crumble, as the Sanga people led by Chief Mpande revolted against his rule. Msiri's abuse of power later precipitated mass defections to the Belgians.

The last trade zone was the Arab-Sudanese area in the northeastern part of Congo. Most of its outposts received traders from Cairo, the Red Sea, and Khartoum. In the 1820s, traders from the Red Sea and northern Africa began advancing southward and westward from Khartoum. Their search for ivory and slaves on the Nile River pushed them into what is today southern Sudan and northeastern Congo, where they encountered other polities, such as the Zande group and their Vongara rulers. The Vongara rulers even exploited trade opportunities with the Red Sea area and Egypt. Some of them, as vassals of Egypt, penetrated as far south as the Uele and the Bomokandi Rivers, where they met with slave raiders from Zanzibar. However, in 1881, the Mahdi (awaited religious leader), in opposing the Egyptian administration, installed the Mahdist state in Sudan that completely destroyed the Egyptian administration in the Congo Basin by 1885. In 1891, however, King Leopold's troops started penetrating from the south into the *Pax Azandae* and were able to stop its expansion across the Uele River. During the advance of King Leopold's troops into the Nile territory, some Zande chiefs sided with the Mahdists for slave trade; other chiefs collaborated with the Belgians; still others managed to remain autonomous.

Of all the regions in the Congo and Nile basins, only the Great Lakes area escaped long-distance trade and remained outside of its corridor. The Great Lakes region includes land located between the northern part of Lake Tanganyika and Lake Edward. The region is mountainous and rough, with altitudes between 900 and 3,360 meters above sea level. The area is mostly inhabited by Fuliro, Havu, Hunde, Hutu, Nande, Nyanga, Rundi, and Shi. Most of these groups were monotheist and had an agricultural-based economy, including some livestock husbandry. Politically, a number of confederal principalities developed in the area as early as the 14th century under a hierarchal system ruled by princes called *bami* (*mwami* in singular). By the late 18th century, these principalities were well established in the region and developed their rule based on agricultural surplus rather than gathered resources such as ivory. The advantage of the region over other areas in the Congo Basin was the existence of rich volcanic soil and small non-navigable rivers. This soil generated agricultural surplus that was exchanged among these groups for centuries. Despite some early European intrusions into the area, these polities remained autonomous during the scramble for Africa.

In sum, the state-building process in the Congo Basin was based on a precarious economic surplus using trade routes dominated by foreign merchants and mercenaries. Several centers disappeared and others emerged according to the vagaries of regional or long-distance trade. Most polities in the Congo Basin were ill prepared to resist attacks; some disappeared forever, while others recovered toward the end of the 19th century but remained quite weak. At this juncture, Europeans became increasingly important in the Congo Basin. By the time Leopold II started his African adventure, the Congo Basin was already on the brink of disaster and was ready for a new political cycle from the Atlantic to the Great Lakes region.

## BELGIAN OCCUPATION AND COLONIZATION

The political history of the DRC started on 1 July 1885, six months after the signatories of the Berlin Conference recognized King Leopold II as the sovereign of the CFS. The existence of Congo as a political entity thus reflects the work of Leopold II of Belgium and Duke of Brabant from the German House of Saxe-Coburg. Under the mantle of philanthropy, Leopold created associations and financed a number of expeditions into central Africa to explore the Congo Basin and negotiate trading agreements with local chiefs. As a result, when 13 European governments, with the United States as an observer, met in Berlin in November 1884 in an effort to “negotiate an end to international rivalry over Africa and promote civilization and trade on the continent,” Leopold was able to produce more than 250 treaties signed in his name with chiefs, primarily along the Congo River. The treaties, the king’s influence through the associations, and the preoccupation of Great Britain, France, and Germany with the more accessible coastal African territories, led the powers to agree to accept the Congo Basin as the personal domain of Leopold II, a decision codified in the Act of Berlin on 26 February 1885.

Shortly thereafter, the CFS was formed and an administrative system was established to govern and develop the territory and “civilize” its indigenous inhabitants. Leopold decided, however, that the cost of developing the territory should be borne by the territory itself. Consequently, the CFS granted European companies exclusive rights to trade

and to operate on large tracts of land in exchange for almost 50 percent of the profits. More significantly, a labor law was passed that allowed the companies and CFS agents to forcibly employ indigenous laborers or oblige them to provide a certain amount of marketable produce, particularly rubber, as payment of a “state tax.” The labor law was abused to such an extent that entire villages were forced into bondage, and the atrocities committed by agents of the CFS against groups that failed to meet their quotas raised a storm of international protest. The outcry led a reluctant Belgian government to annex the territory on 15 November 1908, and the CFS became Belgian Congo. According to Belgian historian Jean Stengers, in the financial transactions between Belgium and the CFS, which were separate states until 1908, Belgium paid 40 million gold francs (1,333 million Belgian francs of 1959) to the CFS, and King Leopold II received more than 60 million gold francs (1,999.8 million Belgian francs). King Leopold then repatriated his fortune to build big projects in Belgium and to buy real estate in Europe.

Under the Colonial Charter established by the Belgian parliament, the territory became a colony of the government. The king remained sovereign, although his decrees had to be countersigned by the minister of colonies, who was answerable to parliament. Despite avowed intentions to halt human rights abuses in Belgian Congo, the harsh labor laws persisted until the 1920s and numerous rebellions, harshly put down, occurred. In addition, political activity was prohibited and a policy of paternalism evolved that regarded the Congolese essentially as children, well-intentioned and potentially good citizens, but needing supervision and a firm hand. During the two world wars, Belgium was occupied by German forces. Congolese resources contributed to the Allied war effort and Congolese soldiers fought with distinction in the African theater.

Following World War II, colonial authorities and private companies began to regard Congolese labor as a resource to be developed and cultivated, and some of the harsher labor practices were abolished. Basic literacy was encouraged, and the colonial government subsidized many mission schools. Training for Congolese was, however, aimed primarily at filling semiskilled labor or clerical jobs. As a result, secondary education was reserved for a small minority, and the colony had no university until 1954. In addition, contact with Africans from other colonies was considered dangerous. As a consequence, few Congolese were allowed

to travel outside the colony until the Brussels World Fair of 1958, when the Belgian government, eager to display its good works in the colony, brought hundreds of them to Belgium.

Congolese were prohibited from forming political organizations, but in the early 1950s, they began forming alumni associations and ethnically based “interest” groups. Congolese workers also began organizing, calling for pay and advancement opportunities equal to those granted expatriate workers. Some Congolese started advancing their views in local periodicals. These were avidly read by the Congolese urban elite. They were tolerated for the most part by the authorities who felt their audience to be too small to matter. These activities were encouraged by missionaries and “progressive” Belgian political leaders who argued that the Congolese should be preparing to assume control of their country one day. However, the activities were opposed by other Belgian leaders and many colonial administrators who felt they were premature. For example, a report in the late 1950s that suggested independence might be possible in 30 years was considered daring.

Events began to move rapidly in 1958 following French President Charles de Gaulle’s offer of autonomy to France’s colonies and the convening of the All-Africa People’s Conference, held in newly independent Ghana. Several Congolese leaders, including Patrice Lumumba, attended the Accra conference and, upon their return, began calling openly for independence. During a rally in Leopoldville on 4 January 1959, a confrontation with security forces erupted into violence that led to two weeks of rioting. The Belgian government, in an effort to calm emotions, offered to move toward limited forms of self-government in the colony, and elections were held for local councils in December of that year. The campaign for the elections led to the emergence of numerous parties, many of them based on ethnic associations. However, some of the most influential parties boycotted the elections. In the face of continued unrest, the Belgian government called for the Round Table Conference in January 1960 to discuss some form of autonomy for the colony. Forty-five Congolese delegates from various parties attended. However, they surprised the Belgian delegation by making two demands before the conference: First, that a date for independence be set at the conference and second, that all of the conference’s resolutions be binding. Under pressure from both domestic and foreign sources, the Belgian government gave in. As a result, independence was set for 30



June, five months away, and the Fundamental Law was hastily drawn up to serve as a temporary constitution for the new nation.

As independence approached, political activity blossomed, and more than 200 political parties were formed. Attempts to form nationally based parties foundered on ethnic tensions and personality conflicts, and the larger coalitions splintered. Ethnic tensions degenerated into fighting in Kasai and Katanga provinces, causing friction in the political parties and the ranks of the army. Elections were held in May 1960. Because no political party received a majority in the lower house, political coalitions were necessary to form the first government. Legislators reached a compromise whereby Patrice Lumumba, the leader of the *Mouvement National Congolais* (MNC) and Joseph Kasavubu, the leader of the *Alliance des Bakongo* (ABAKO), became the prime minister and the president, respectively. The election of Kasavubu to the presidency ended talk of secession in the ABAKO stronghold of Bas-Congo, but southern-based parties, particularly the *Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga* (CONAKAT), led by Moïse Tshombe, left Leopoldville in anger over its relatively small representation in the Lumumba government.

### THE FIRST REPUBLIC, 1960–1965

The Belgian Congo became independent on 30 June 1960, as the Republic of Congo. Five days later, elements of the army, angry over low pay and lack of promotion opportunities, mutinied. The looting and violence that followed made headlines around the world and caused the evacuation of most of the remaining foreigners in Congo. The Belgian government intervened by sending its troops to protect foreigners. This was, however, seen by the Lumumba government as an act of aggression, and it requested a United Nations peace-keeping force in an effort to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Meanwhile, Tshombe, whose CONAKAT party had swept the provincial elections in Katanga, encouraged by foreign commercial interests, declared the Independent State of Katanga on 11 July. He used Katanga gendarmes and mercenaries to protect the seceded state. The UN Security Council adopted a resolution on 14 July, calling for the withdrawal of Belgian troops from Congo and for providing UN military assistance to the country. Guinean, Tunisian, Moroccan, and Ethiopian soldiers flew into Congo on

16 July to restore security. The UN subsequently began its first “police action” in Africa. The UN also sent administrators, judges, and technicians to reactivate government operations. In addition, relief supplies were sent to internally displaced persons and refugees who had fled famine and internecine fighting in Kasai and Katanga.

The army’s mutiny brought pay raises and promotions. Master sergeants, the highest-ranking Congolese soldiers at the time, overnight became colonels. One of these, a former journalist named Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, was appointed army chief of staff in order to Africanize the army officer corps. Albert Kalonji, a southern leader who had split from the MNC, declared South Kasai an independent state on 8 August. As these events were unfolding, the central government was finding it difficult to function. The Fundamental Law had established numerous checks and balances in government but had failed to specify the division of powers between the presidency and the parliament. In early September, tension mounted between Kasavubu and Lumumba. On 5 September, Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba after he threatened to seek military aid from Soviet-bloc countries to put down the secessions, and nominated Joseph Ileo in his stead. However, Lumumba refused to accept his dismissal, and his cabinet voted to “dismiss” Kasavubu. A joint session of the parliament fully endorsed Lumumba and conferred on him full powers, but the president suspended the parliament on 14 September.

The ensuing constitutional crisis resulted in a coup d’état by Mobutu to “neutralize” all political activities. He formed the College of Commissioners, composed of young intellectuals and technocrats, to run the government. Lumumba was placed under house arrest. In November, he escaped and was heading toward Orientale Province to join his supporters, led by former Vice Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga, when he was captured and imprisoned in a military camp in Bas-Congo. In a move that was never fully explained, the Congolese government ordered Lumumba and two senior officials flown to Elisabethville. Subsequent investigations revealed the prisoners were severely beaten by their army guards during the flight and were killed shortly after their arrival on 17 January 1961. Lumumba’s assassination halted any further overtures by the Congolese government to the Soviet bloc, but provoked an international outcry that led to the proclamation of a rival central government in Stanleyville headed by Gizenga.

In February 1961, the College of Commissioners handed power back to Prime Minister Joseph Ileo. The Ileo government was replaced by Cyrille Adoula in early 1961. Kalonji ended the South Kasai secession and joined the Adoula government. Gizenga and several MNC leaders were also named to the cabinet. In December 1962, UN troops took military action against foreigners believed to be aiding the Katangan government, and the Katangan secession ceased on 14 January 1963. Tshombe went into exile. The UN ended its mission in Congo in early July 1964.

While the UN was withdrawing from Congo, a rebellion led by Pierre Mulele broke out on 6 January 1964 in Kwilu province. Mulele was the minister of education under the first government of Patrice Lumumba. A few months after the outbreak of the Kwilu rebellion, on 15 April 1964, another rebellion started in eastern Congo by Gaston Soumialot. These rebellions were under the control of a leadership that wanted to radically transform the Congolese society in what they called the “second independence” movement.

On 9 August 1964, President Kasavubu removed Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula, who had been in office since August 1961, and appointed Tshombe as prime minister in order to quell the rebellions. This happened eight days after a new constitution had been promulgated with a new national flag and a new name, the DRC. Meanwhile, the eastern rebellion declared the People’s Republic of Congo in September and received diplomatic recognition from 13 countries. On 24 November 1964, amid reports of widespread atrocities committed against foreigners and the local population in the east, Belgian paratroopers dropped on Stanleyville from U.S. military transport planes. They recaptured the city, but not before 200 foreigners and several thousand Congolese “hostages” were killed.

To defeat the rebellions, Tshombe called on his former Katanga gendarmes from Angola and recruited white mercenaries to reinforce the flagging national army. In addition, the prime minister had to organize legislative elections scheduled from 1 February to 1 May 1965. In early 1965, Tshombe renewed the Leopoldville branch of his former political party, the CONAKAT, in anticipation of the upcoming elections. Some 49 tribal organizations also joined the CONAKAT to form the Convention Nationale Congolaise (CONACO) on 20 February 1965 in Luluabourg.

Unlike the 1960 elections, in which some 250 political parties vied for 137 parliamentary seats, the 1965 elections had 223 parties competing for a total of 167 seats. The CONACO received 122 seats (73 percent of the votes from most electoral districts). Instead of allowing Tshombe to form the government, Kasavubu nominated Évariste Kimba on 13 October as the new prime minister. However, the lower house voted against the new government, forcing it to resign. The president renominated Kimba in mid-November to form another government. The CONACO ascendancy led to tensions between Kasavubu and Tshombe. Under this uncertainty, 14 senior military commanders took over the government on 24 November 1965, and General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu became president.

## **THE SECOND REPUBLIC: MOBUTU'S ASCENDANCY AND DECLINE**

When Mobutu became president in late November 1965, he promised to curb the ethnic political demands that had polarized Congolese society since June 1960. During the following months, civilian political institutions were stripped of their powers, the army was purged and military operations were launched to regain control of territory still under rebel control. The first instrument Mobutu utilized to consolidate his power was fear and oppression through a nationwide network of secret police staffed at the top by people from his ethnic group, the Ngbandi. Then, in April 1966, the Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR) was launched and eventually proclaimed as the sole legal party. By decree, political power was gradually centralized in the presidency and codified in the Constitution of 1967. Many of the early political leaders accepted the new regime. A number of them, however, did not and were exiled or imprisoned.

By 1967, the Mobutu government had regained control over most of the territory. It began a program called “Authenticity” aimed at abolishing tribalism and regionalism and developing a sense of nationhood among the people. Under Authenticity, former colonial names were changed to “authentic” African ones. Congo was renamed “Zaire” and citizens changed their Christian names for “Zairian” ones. In addition, European-style dress was discouraged and Zairian fashions were

promoted. Efforts were made to rewrite Zairian history from a Zairian point of view and to develop political institutions that better reflected traditional patterns of leadership. The Constitution of 1974 codified the decrees of previous years, centralizing government in the presidency and creating a party-state.

In addition to centralization, Mobutu used co-optation or patronage to strengthen his power. A major source of patronage was a position in the executive branch, state-owned enterprises, and party organs. Mobutu's key strategy was the frequent reshuffling of the government, a strategy that inspired fear and insecurity among officials because retaining their posts depended neither on their effectiveness nor on their efficiency, but on Mobutu's willingness to keep them on the job. To hold a government position required neither a sense of management nor good conscience. Mobutu demanded absolute allegiance in return for all opportunities to accumulate wealth within the state apparatus. Corruption became so widespread that the Mobutu state became known as a "kleptocracy," a government ruled by thieves.

Economically, Mobutu also wanted to rebuild the economy when he took power. The Congolese economy was historically based at first on agriculture and subsequently on mineral exports. It had always tended to follow the business cycles of the world economy. It grew in the 1920s, experienced a severe depression in the 1930s, and rebounded following World War II. This economic impetus slowed down in 1956 and worsened during the first five years of independence as the result of political instability. Mobutu initiated several laws in an effort to rebuild the economy. The first was known as the *Bakajika Law*, passed in 1966, which stipulated that all public land was a domain of the state. The law also formally ended all grants and concessionary powers delegated to the colonial state. It paved the way to the nationalization of the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) that later became the Générale des Carrières et des Mines (GECAMINES). By the early 1980s, GECAMINES was the largest employer after the state, and a major source of state revenue, providing on average 51 percent of total revenues during Mobutu's self-rule.

Another economic policy was the monetary reform of June 1967 that intended to correct economic imbalances inherited from the first republic. The centerpiece of the reform was the devaluation of the Congolese franc and its replacement by a new currency, called the zaire (Z), which

was exchanged at the rate of \$2.00 (U.S.) for one zaïre. The net result of the reform was positive. The inflation rate fell and the economic growth rate increased by 8 percent from 1967 to 1968. From 1967 to 1973, Mobutu's economic model seemed to work relatively well. In November 1973, at the height of the economic boom and amid popular support for Authenticity, the Mobutu government nationalized all businesses with annual revenues of more than Z1 million (\$2 million) and all foreign-owned businesses in certain strategic sectors. The large mining consortia had been nationalized as early as 1967. "Zairianization" led to a flight of foreign capital. The nationalized establishments were also redistributed primarily on the basis of political connections rather than business acumen. As a result, productivity declined.

In 1974, the price for copper, the country's major export, plummeted to one-third of its level of the previous year. Government revenues tumbled, and the Mobutu government was obliged to borrow increasingly large sums to cover a growing balance-of-payments deficit. "Retrocession" was decreed in December 1974, which allowed up to 40 percent and later up to 60 percent foreign ownership in Zairianized businesses. Despite these and other incentives, foreign capital was slow to return. Meanwhile, accusations of mismanagement and corruption in government were growing. The Mobutu government signed a number of economic stabilization agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but for the most part it was unable to meet its goals. Annual inflation reached 100 percent. Production continued to fall, and foreign exchange became scarce enough on occasion to hinder production at the state-owned mining companies, which provided more than half of government revenues.

Amid this background of economic difficulties and political centralization, the first insurrection broke out against the Mobutu government since the end of the post-independence rebellions. On 8 March 1977, guerrillas of the Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo (FLNC) invaded southern "Shaba Region" from bases in Angola and, over a period of several weeks, marched to the outskirts of Kolwezi, which, after Lubumbashi, was the most important mining center in the country. The national army initially put up little resistance and only with the aid of Moroccan troops was it able to drive the guerrillas back into Angola 80 days later. The incursion focused world attention on the government's political and economic problems. It led to a degree of political

liberalization and the launching of the Mobutu Plan for economic revival. The incursion also led to new purges of the army, the arrest of several prominent leaders from Shaba, including then Foreign Minister Nguza Karl-I-Bond, and renewed efforts to induce exiled dissidents to return home.

In May 1978, the FLNC attacked again. This time, however, instead of marching through the sparsely populated countryside of southwestern Shaba, the guerrillas infiltrated Kolwezi and, in a surprise attack, seized the town and stopped work at the mines. The guerrillas then went on a looting spree. Amid reports of killings and atrocities, a force of Congolese, French, and Belgian paratroopers landed on Kolwezi and nearby towns and drove the guerrillas out. Two hundred foreigners and 1,000 Congolese were killed during the two-week occupation. Work at the mines, however, quickly resumed. A Pan-African peace-keeping force, comprised of troops from Morocco, Senegal, and Togo, was formed and efforts were made to address some of the grievances of the local population, which, to a certain degree, had supported the FLNC. In the same year, an insurrection also occurred in Idiofa, “Bandundu Region.” It was harshly put down, and 14 village chiefs were publicly executed.

The Mobutu government began a concerted effort to improve its image abroad. The effort was hampered by accusations of authoritarianism, corruption, and human rights violations leveled by exiled Congolese and by some members of the U.S. Congress and Belgian and French parliaments. However, with the upsurge of fighting in Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia, Western Sahara, Namibia, and Angola, public attention was diverted elsewhere. Meanwhile, the government made an uneasy truce with the government in Angola, which it had opposed during the Angolan civil war and which it suspected of backing the FLNC. The truce led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two neighbors in 1978 and an agreement not to support each other’s dissidents.

The advent of the Ronald Reagan administration in the United States in 1981 and its focus on combating the Soviet “evil empire” brought greater appreciation for Mobutu’s staunch pro-Western stance and less concern for internal policies. After the departure of the Jimmy Carter administration, which had sharply criticized Mobutu’s authoritarianism and human rights record, some of the political reforms began to be circumvented. Nevertheless, legislative elections were held in September

1982 in which multiple candidates were allowed within the MPR party, and three-fourths of the incumbents were turned out. By that time, however, Congo had become a party-state. The Central Committee of the MPR had assumed most of the legislature's role as the primary governing body for consultation and debate. The legislature, known as the Legislative Council, had evolved into a body that met primarily to approve party initiatives. Under a system that had been evolving since the early 1970s, the Political Bureau, consisting of a score of trusted Mobutu collaborators, assumed policymaking functions and undertook most legal initiatives. The Executive Council of high commissioners, or ministers, became primarily an administrative body, equivalent to a ministerial cabinet. The Judicial Council, composed of senior judicial officials and Supreme Court members, became a politicized organization, the independence of which was frequently questioned. Mobutu was elected to a third term in July 1984 by 99 percent of the vote, in elections that were rife with irregularities but were accepted by the international community.

Some political dissidence continued. Most of it was based outside the country and was mostly pacifist, except for the *Parti de Libération Congolaise* (PLC), which in the late 1980s staged sporadic attacks in northeastern Congo from bases along the Ugandan border. Two groups, however, were active within the country. The most notable was a group of 13 parliamentarians that in 1980 issued an open letter to Mobutu calling for a multiparty system. In 1982, they formed a second party, the *Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social* (UDPS), which, by law, was an act of treason. They were arrested, convicted, and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. They were amnestied the following year but, when they refused to cease their activities, were sent into internal exile. Over the next few years, they were imprisoned and released a number of times. The second group, the *Parti Révolutionnaire du Peuple* (PRP) under Laurent Kabila, consisted of guerrillas who fought in the 1964 eastern rebellion and established control over a remote portion of mountainous territory in Tanganyika and Sud-Kivu Provinces near Lake Tanganyika. The PRP seized four foreign students in Tanzania in 1975 and held them for a number of months. It also staged attacks on the port town of Moba, on the western shore of Lake Tanganyika, in November 1984 and June 1985. These attacks, quickly repelled by the national army, appeared intended primarily to embarrass the government.



In 1986, the government acknowledged human rights abuses had occurred and announced the creation of a ministerial-level post, State Commissioner for Citizens Rights, to attend to complaints of abuses of personal freedoms. However, the office was largely ineffectual. Elections for the Legislative Council were held in 1987, but because of the predominance of the MPR Central Committee, they attracted few influential politicians and were contested primarily by young party cadres.

Although political reforms were rolled back during the 1980s, attempts at economic reform continued intermittently. In September 1983, the currency was floated on the free market, ending 23 years of profiteering on the parallel market, where the currency sometimes traded at rates as low as 15 percent of the official exchange rate. In the mid-1980s, faced with continued inflation, high indebtedness, and low productivity, the Mobutu government made its first significant move to liberalize the economy. Overall subsidies on petroleum and agricultural products were ended and private participation was allowed in the mining, air transportation, and diamond industries. Government budget deficits were also reduced, imports were slashed, and greater efforts were made to service the foreign debt, which had surpassed the annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The measures impressed the international economic community but also triggered a severe recession in the country. Real purchasing power fell drastically, affecting all but the wealthiest. The measures caused some labor unrest, and many citizens expressed concern over the declining ability of the government to provide health, educational, and social services.

In October 1986, following a month-long meeting of the Central Committee, the Mobutu government announced it could no longer abide by IMF stabilization programs, because they were “strangling” the economy. The Mobutu government stopped devoting 50 percent of revenues to servicing its \$4.5 billion foreign debt and limited debt service to 10 percent of export revenues or 20 percent of government revenues. The move to peg foreign debt repayments to export revenues was unprecedented in Africa. However, many foreign donors initially expressed understanding for the country’s situation and what they called its “heroic” effort to redress its economy.

During the late 1980s, the economic situation worsened. Although GDP grew by 1 to 2 percent per year, per capita production declined because of a population growth rate of more than 3 percent. The govern-

ment failed to meet requirements for a series of stabilization agreements with the IMF, primarily targeted at reducing the deficit and controlling inflation. It also fell further behind in servicing its external debt, leading the IMF to declare it in “noncompliance” and suspend its drawing rights in 1989. Inflationary pressure rose during the period because the government increasingly resorted to printing money to pay the salaries of soldiers and civil servants.

In the late 1980s, a number of Francophone West African nations made moves toward abandoning the single-party political systems that had been widely adopted across the continent in the 1970s. The moves came amid pressure from Western donors and a decline of military dictatorships around the world. French President François Mitterand expressed the mood publicly when he announced during the Franco–African summit at Le Baule in July 1990 that henceforth France would link development assistance to progress on political reform. Several West African nations held national conferences. Opposition groups made inroads in Benin and Niger, but were defeated in Gabon and Cameroon.

Mobutu, under pressure at home and abroad to institute democratic reforms, announced the end of single-party rule in a speech on 24 April 1990, and resigned as head of the MPR. A number of parties, including the UDPS, announced their intention to register, and many leading politicians announced they were leaving the MPR to form their own parties. Mobutu backtracked in a speech on 3 May, stating that only two additional parties would be allowed, but his remarks were largely ignored. On 6 October, following months of demonstrations, Mobutu pledged that there would be no limits to the number of parties, and the decree on registration of new parties was passed on 25 November.

## FROM DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION TO STATE COLLAPSE

The opposition began to focus its efforts on pressing the government to hold a national conference to draft a new constitution and prepare national elections. An opposition alliance called the *Sacred Union* was formed, led by the UDPS, the Parti Démocrate et Social Chrétien (PDSC), and the Union des Fédéralistes et des Républicains Indépendants (UFERI). It began pressing for political reforms through a series of popular demonstrations and labor strikes. By mid-1991, more than

200 parties had joined the alliance. Many critics accused Mobutu of encouraging the proliferation of opposition parties and splinter groups within them in a maneuver to fragment the opposition, a practice that came to be called “multi-Mobutism.”

In April 1991, Mobutu agreed to hold a national conference and named Crispin Mulumba Lukoji prime minister to organize it. The conference opened on 7 August 1991, but quickly degenerated into chaos as nearly 8,000 delegates laid claim to the 2,800 seats. Conference leaders sought to settle the conflicting claims over accreditation, and the generous per diem that came with it, through vetting committees. However, the Sacred Union boycotted the conference because its leadership was controlled by Mobutu. The conference collapsed on 15 August, causing a rising sense of frustration among the general population.

On the night of 23 September 1991, elements of the airborne brigade mutinied over low pay and salary arrears and began looting containers at the international airport on the outskirts of Kinshasa. Over the next 36 hours, the pillaging spread to the downtown commercial district and some wealthy suburbs. More than 100 people were killed in the violence, which caused an estimated 1 billion U.S. dollars in damage and the collapse of many businesses. French and Belgian troops were sent to evacuate 10,000 expatriates. Between 21 and 27 October, similar incidents occurred in a number of regional cities, including Lubumbashi, Kolwezi, Kisangani, and Mbuji-Mayi. Human rights organizations estimated the overall death toll at 250 people.

Embarrassed by this violence, which had severely shaken his authority and brought yet another foreign military intervention, Mobutu nominated one of the leading opposition figures, Étienne Tshisekedi of the UDPS, prime minister on 29 September. However, he dismissed Tshisekedi two weeks later after the latter refused to sign the customary oath of allegiance to the president. Mobutu appointed Bernadin Mungul Diaka prime minister on 23 October, and the Sacred Union formed a parallel government, leading to months of political stalemate. Another prominent opposition leader, Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond, was appointed prime minister on 25 November, resulting in the expulsion of the UFERI from the Sacred Union. Nguza reopened the National Conference on 17 January 1992, but closed it a few days later, contending it cost too much money.

The suspension of the National Conference plunged the country once again into a state of tension after two months of relative calm. Then, on 16 February 1992, the clergy organized a peaceful demonstration, called the Christian March of Hope, for the resumption of the National Conference. More than 50 people were killed and several hundred wounded as Mobutu's presidential guards fired on unarmed civilians holding Bibles and rosaries. Despite Mobutu's efforts to suspend the National Conference indefinitely, pressures from the West and the Catholic clergy forced him to reopen it on 6 April 1992. The conference renamed itself the *Conférence Nationale Souveraine* (CNS) on 17 April and declared that henceforth its decisions would be legally binding. The resolution was, however, never acknowledged by Mobutu. The archbishop of Kisangani, Laurent Pasinya Monsengwo, was elected chairman on 21 April. Combining a talent for political compromise with considerable parliamentary skills, Monsengwo pushed and cajoled the often-unruly delegates through a broad agenda of topics, including the principles governing a future central government and a new constitution. In August 1992, Monsengwo drafted the Transitional Act to govern the transitional period and the *Compromis Politique Global* (CPG), which stated that no organ of state could be used to undermine the authority of another. It was a move aimed at neutralizing the military, which had been used on numerous occasions to intimidate the delegates and break up opposition rallies.

The CNS elected Tshisekedi prime minister on 15 August. Mobutu ratified this four days later, but made no mention of the Transitional Act. Confrontation between Mobutu and Tshisekedi began almost immediately. Tshisekedi, citing a need to put the country's economic house in order, sought to replace the governor of the central bank and the head of the customs collection office, who were viewed as conduits for unlimited funds to the president and his colleagues. Mobutu refused to accept the dismissals and stationed troops around the central bank headquarters.

During the following months, the CNS adopted a number of resolutions that reinstated the flag, national anthem, name, and political system established by the Constitution of 1964 and, in principle, called for a return to a Congo as it existed prior to the Mobutu coup. As the draft constitution began to take shape, however, Mobutu declared his

opposition to it and convened the MPR parliament, elected in 1987 but suspended in 1990 as part of the democratic transition, to draft an alternate document. As the standoff intensified, troops stationed around the bureau of the prime minister barred Tshisekedi from entering his office and sealed the People's Palace, where the CNS was meeting. Nevertheless, the CNS completed its work. It formed the Haut Conseil de la République (HCR) to act as a 453-member transitional parliament, with Monsengwo as its chairman. On 6 December 1992, the CNS disbanded itself.

The confrontation between the Tshisekedi government and the presidency was also intensifying over economic policy. In the early 1990s, because of mismanagement and the political uncertainties of the democratic transition, Congo's economic problems reached crisis proportions. Inflation, which had been 81 percent in 1990, rose to 2,154 percent in 1991 and to 4,129 percent in 1992, largely because of the enormous number of banknotes issued in higher and higher denominations to pay the salaries of soldiers and civil servants. Counterfeiting also flourished in the country. Moreover, an estimated two-thirds of the diamond trade was being conducted outside official channels. By late 1992, the value of the currency, the zaire, plummeted to a rate of Z5 million to \$1.00.

In January 1993, the central bank issued a new banknote of Z5 million worth \$2.00. Tshisekedi called it inflationary and urged his supporters to reject it. When merchants in Kinshasa refused to accept the notes from recently paid soldiers, the latter went on a looting spree on 28–29 January. Members of the presidential guard tried to suppress the rioting, leading to clashes in which an estimated 100 people, mostly soldiers but also including the French ambassador, were killed. The violence affected a large portion of what remained of the economically productive sector. From 1990 to 1992, GDP declined nearly 25 percent and urban unemployment rose from 20 to 80 percent. In March 1993, Mobutu called his supporters from the defunct National Assembly for a “conclave of the last chance,” and, after two weeks, nominated a former member of the opposition, Faustin Birindwa, as the new prime minister in defiance of the CNS proceedings. The hardline opposition refused to accept Tshisekedi's dismissal and continued to view him as the legitimate prime minister. Foreign donors, led by Belgium, France, and the United States, began a policy of diplomatically isolating Mobutu and members of his government. A stalemate ensued, during which time

dual governments claimed legitimate authority. However, the executive power was in the hands of Mobutu as the commander-in-chief. For example, Mobutu decreed monetary reform on 22 October 1993, creating the “nouveau zaïre” (NZ) that was exchanged for Z3 million and initially was valued at about \$1.00.

The political standoff, characterized by two rival governments, lasted until early 1994, when negotiations led to the merger of the HCR and the MPR parliament into what was called the *Haut Conseil de la République/Parlement de la Transition* (HCR/PT). Foreign donors, disturbed by the declining authority of the central government and increasingly desperate living conditions of most citizens, pushed for a compromise between Mobutu and the opposition. When Tshisekedi refused to negotiate with Mobutu, they backed the election by the HCR/PT of Léon Kengo wa Dondo as prime minister on 17 June. Kengo had served as prime minister in the 1980s, and his economic reforms had achieved some success before they were overturned.

Following his election, Kengo announced a number of austerity measures, including the closing of 64 Congolese embassies around the world and the privatization of a number of government-owned corporations. He was allowed to appoint the governor of the central bank and sought to halt the unofficial printing of banknotes and the black-market selling of diamonds. When Kengo took office, annual inflation was estimated at 6,000 percent. In 1995, it declined to 382 percent, largely at the expense of average citizens who, if they worked at all, earned a wage of less than \$15 per month.

Congo made the front pages of international newspapers in mid-1994, when more than 1 million Rwandan refugees arrived in eastern Congo, fleeing genocide and the takeover of the Rwandan government by the Tutsi-led Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF takeover caused France to send troops to southern Rwanda. The flight of the Rwandan refugees created a humanitarian crisis. The HCR/PT reacted to the influx of refugees by adopting on 28 April 1995 a resolution that stripped of their citizenship those Congolese of Rwandan origin, known as *Banyarwanda* in Nord-Kivu and *Banyamulenge* in Sud-Kivu. In August 1995, the Mobutu government even announced its intention to expel the Rwandan refugees, contending that they were creating too large a burden on the local population in the region. The decision met with loud approval in the national press, but except for one attempt

late in the year, it was not implemented. In January 1996, however, the government began closing certain refugee camps, which, according to officials, were being used by leaders of the deposed Rwandan government to stage attacks in Rwanda.

On 6 October 1996, the deputy governor of Sud-Kivu asked all the Banyamulenge to leave, in accordance with the 1995 parliamentary resolution. He gave them six days to vacate the Mulenge area and go back to Rwanda. The Banyamulenge refused to leave and turned to the Rwandan Tutsi-dominated government for help. The Rwandan soldiers and the Banyamulenge began attacking Mobutu's army in October 1996, and several anti-Mobutu groups also joined the Banyamulenge-led rebellion by the creation of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL) whose spokesperson became Laurent Kabila. The AFDL's ally, the Rwandan Tutsi-dominated army, called the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), attacked the refugee camps in mid-October 1996 in Goma, leaving a small eastern corridor toward Rwanda for refugees to escape. More than 550,000 refugees returned to Rwanda, and the Rwandan government announced that all refugees had returned home. However, some 500,000 Hutu refugees remained in Congo. More than 200,000 of these refugees were killed by the RPA during the AFDL's journey to Kinshasa.

By early December 1996, the AFDL had seized a 500-km stretch of Congolese territory along the border, including the cities of Bukavu and Goma. Mobutu, who had undergone surgery for prostate cancer in Switzerland on 22 August, returned home on 17 December, reorganized the army high command, and reshuffled the cabinet. He also signed a decree authorizing a constitutional referendum in February 1997 that called for elections in May and June 1997.

However, the AFDL continued to advance, encouraged by the weakness of Mobutu's army and the vacuum of political leadership in Kinshasa. Its troops were supported by soldiers from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, and subsequently by Angola, Mai Mai militias, and the Katangan Tigers (including former Katanga gendarmes and Lunda refugees) who had been behind the Shaba incursions in the 1970s. The Mobutu army, backed by Serb mercenaries, attempted to make a major stand at Kisangani but collapsed, allowing the rebels to take the city on 15 March 1997. In an effort to draw the opposition to his side, Mobutu again appointed Tshisekedi prime minister on 2 April, but dismissed

him after the AFDL took Mbuji-Mayi on 4 April and Lubumbashi on 9 April. Negotiations were hastily announced, but neither Mobutu nor AFDL leader Laurent Kabila appeared anxious to talk. South African President Nelson Mandela brought the two together on a ship moored at Pointe-Noire in Congo-Brazzaville in May, but by then the AFDL had taken Kikwit and was advancing on the capital.

Mobutu and his entourage left Kinshasa on 16 May for Togo (and subsequently Morocco). AFDL forces entered the capital the following day. Kabila was sworn in as president on 29 May and announced that a referendum would be held in 1998 on a new constitution leading to national elections in 1999. He also changed the name of the country back to the DRC. The national anthem and flag of 1964 were also restored, and it became clear that Kabila intended to remove symbols of the Mobutu government, which many viewed as illegal. Mobutu died of cancer in a hospital in Rabat on 7 September and was quietly buried in Morocco. He was remembered in newspaper obituaries abroad as the last great African dictator, but his death went largely unheralded in Congo.

## FROM THE SECOND REPUBLIC TO THE THIRD REPUBLIC

Soon after Laurent Kabila became president of the DRC, the UN, human rights organizations, and foreign news agencies accused his troops of the massacre of more than 200,000 Hutu refugees. Human rights organizations charged that Tutsi soldiers of the Rwandan army, which had backed the AFDL, committed the atrocities. A UN investigation was launched, but investigators were kept from traveling to the region. Western governments and the UN threatened to impose sanctions.

Kabila was also under pressure in Kinshasa. He had excluded Tshisekedi and most opposition politicians in Kinshasa from his government. He had banned political meetings after UDPS demonstrations ended in violence. He was also under criticism from local politicians, who accused the AFDL of being a government of foreigners. Tensions soon arose between different supporters in his government, including Tutsi from the east, former Katangan Tigers, Ugandan and Rwandan soldiers who had played major roles in the AFDL's military successes, and independent elements that suddenly emerged, proclaiming



themselves part of the Congolese military. The interethnic violence in the Great Lakes Region, which had been a major catalyst for the offensive that ended the Mobutu era, continued to drain government resources and undermine efforts to restore the authority of the central government.

As Kabila was consolidating his power, the Mai Mai groups that helped him during the anti-Mobutu revolt confronted the Banyamulenge battalion and other militiamen on 7 September 1997 in Kivu. This confrontation continued until early June 1998. The Mai Mai accused Kabila of selling Kivu to Rwanda. Meanwhile, the Rwandan government kept blaming Kabila for not providing security in eastern Congo, where former Rwandan soldiers continued their attacks on Rwanda.

The economy, however, stabilized somewhat. By 1998, the Kabila government had reduced inflation and stabilized exchange rates, largely by limiting the issuance of new banknotes. Congolese in certain areas reported some improvement in their lives. A major economic reform occurred on 30 June 1998, when the government replaced the NZ with the Congolese franc (CF). The buying rate was fixed at CF1.43 to \$1.00 and the selling rate at CF1.38 to \$1.00. All the banks received ample supplies of the new notes, which were exchanged at the rate of CF1.00 for NZ100,000 everywhere the NZ notes were in circulation. In the countryside, where the NZ notes were non-existent, the exchange rate was CF1.00 to Z14,000,000 (old zaires). To avoid panic, the government set a time limit of one year, during which the old currency had to be exchanged for the new.

Less than a month after his monetary reform, President Kabila decided to end his military relations with Rwanda and Uganda by ordering all foreign troops to leave. Banyamulenge in Kinshasa saw this as a policy move against them and quickly left the capital city. This ended the military cooperation that led to the overthrow of Mobutu. A second Congo war in less than two years was launched on 2 August by Congolese Tutsi, former Mobutu officials, and disgruntled Kabila supporters with the support of the Rwandan army. They quickly formed the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD) with headquarters in Goma, to pressure Kabila to broaden his government, which they accused of corruption and nepotism. Within days, their forces took Goma, Bukavu, and Kisangani and, backed by Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, took Moanda on 7 August and Matadi a few days later. As the rebels advanced on Kinshasa, Kabila sought to marshal support from friends

in southern Africa. On 19 August, Namibia and Zimbabwe pledged to assist Kabila at a meeting of Ministers of Defense of the Southern African Development Community (SADC, which the DRC had joined in September 1997). Zimbabwean troops arrived in Kinshasa the following day and secured the international airport. Fighting broke out near Ndjili airport, on the outskirts of Kinshasa, on 29 August, but Congolese forces, backed by troops from Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia, drove the rebels out and retook western Kongo Central.

In the following months, fighting continued in eastern and northern Congo, including aerial bombardments, atrocities against civilian populations, and widespread looting of industries and businesses. African leaders sought to mediate an end to the violence, but during the rest of 1998, Kabila refused to meet with the rebels.

As the cycle of violence and despoliation wore on, most Congolese remained preoccupied with surviving in a country where the formal economic infrastructure had collapsed, the currency was not trusted, and politicians were viewed with considerable disdain. The feeling among most Congolese was despair of ever ridding their country of the mentality of authoritarianism and plunder that had existed in various forms since the days of King Leopold II.

A few months after the war started, fissures materialized within the fragile rebel RCD coalition, producing several new rebel groups. One new group was the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC) of Jean-Pierre Bemba in November 1998, which included a number of Mobutists. In late 1998, 20 distinct armed groups, including six foreign countries, were operating in the DRC, causing the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Susan Rice, to call the war against Kabila as "Africa's First World War." On 31 January 1999, President Kabila lifted the ban on political activity, but imposed stringent requirements for the registration of political parties, leading to objections by the opposition.

Signs of tension within the RCD also became apparent in mid-May. The RCD deposed its chairman, Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, and replaced him with Emile Ilunga in an action supported by Rwanda but condemned by Uganda. Wamba moved to Kisangani, where he established the RCD-Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML) to distinguish it from the RCD-Goma. Violence in Kisangani between Rwandan and Ugandan forces caused Wamba to relocate in Bunia.

The rebels and the government met in Lusaka to conclude a cease-fire agreement on 10 July 1999. The accord confirmed the *de facto* partition of the DRC into three parts: the RCD/Rwanda-controlled zone, the MLC/Uganda zone, and the government/Angola/Zimbabwe zone. It also emphasized the deployment of UN forces, the neutralization of “negative forces,” such as Rwandan and Burundian rebels operating from Congo, and the withdrawal of foreign troops. In addition, it called for a political solution through the Dialogue Inter-Congolais (Inter-Congolese Dialogue or DIC) aimed at settling the terms of the transition to democratic government and to the restoration of state authority throughout the entire Congolese territory.

Despite the agreement, the revolt and other ethnic conflicts continued unabated. In one case, the old Hema–Lendu conflict in the Ituri Province reemerged on 19 June 1999. More specifically, the situation became explosive in Ituri, where Ugandan troops were siding with one group at the expense of another. Then, in December 1999, the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) appointed former Botswanan president, Sir Ketumile Masire, mediator in the Congo’s political dialogue. Masire recommended in January 2000 that some 150 representatives from the government, rebels, political opposition, and civil society be invited to participate in the negotiations in a neutral place.

On the economic front, the government devalued the Congolese franc from CF9.00 to \$1.00 to CF23.50 per \$1.00 in June 2000. The goal was to bridge the gap between the parallel and official markets. This measure was further reinforced by another devaluation on 24 October 2000, bringing the rate from CF23.50 to \$1.00 to CF50.00 per \$1.00. Despite these efforts, the Congolese franc plummeted; by the end of the year, it was exchanged at CF284.78 for \$1.00.

Laurent Kabila was assassinated on 16 January 2001, leaving his country in total economic chaos and half-occupied by foreign troops and rebel groups. On 23 January 2001, Joseph Kabila was sworn in as president, promising internal political liberalization and a dialogue with the DRC’s neighbors to end the war. The only document that offered any hope since the outbreak of the anti-Kabila revolt was the Lusaka Accord signed in July 1999.

After a number of false starts, the DIC effectively began in Sun City, South Africa, in late February 2002, as the result of pressures from the

international community and South African President Thabo Mbeki. However, the discussions failed to find a formula to bring Kabila's government, the MLC, and the RCD-Goma into power-sharing partnership. Efforts by President Thabo Mbeki salvaged the talks and, on 30 July 2002, a peace agreement was signed by President Kabila and President Paul Kagame of Rwanda in Pretoria. In October 2002, while the DIC was under way, the UN issued its third and final report on the illegal exploitation of Congo's resources and accused Congolese officials of looting Congo's natural resources and diverting state funds, in ways identical to those of criminal organizations. Leaders of Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, as well as a large number of multinational corporations, were also accused of looting.

The DIC ended on 17 December 2002 in South Africa with the signing of the *Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo* (Global and Inclusive Act of the Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo, AGI). The AGI included political arrangements of the transition, electoral deadlines, and a number of institutions of civil society, such as the *Commission Électorale Indépendante* (CEI), to oversee the elections. A number of other peace agreements followed in March and April 2003 in South Africa; these sought to restore democracy and stability in the DRC after the death of more than 5 million people during the civil war. Most of the deaths were not caused by violence but by malnutrition and preventable diseases after the collapse of health services. The AGI accord resulted in the formation of a national transitional and inclusive government that included Joseph Kabila as president, four vice presidents, and thirty-five ministers with their deputies on 30 June 2003.

Less than two months later, Kabila announced the nominations of the military leadership of the new unified armed forces. One of this new leadership was Laurent Nkunda. He was promoted to general in charge of the 81st and 83rd Brigades of the integrated army in Nord-Kivu. However, he refused to report to Kinshasa. Instead, he withdrew with a large number of his troops to the forests of Masisi territory in Nord-Kivu. A number of other officers also joined him later.

While the parliament was debating on the constitution in May, General Laurent Nkunda and his ally Colonel Jules Mutebusi captured Bukavu in a move to protect their fellow Tutsi, known as *Banyamulenge*, in the DRC. On 6 June, government soldiers recaptured Bukavu,

forcing Nkunda and his men to flee. A number of observers suspected that Nkunda was probably acting with Rwanda's approval. He had previously fought with the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the Tutsi rebel movement that took control of Rwanda in 1994, ending the genocide there. He later returned to Congo and joined the AFDL, and later the RCD.

In the midst of political unrest in Nord-Kivu, the bicameral parliament approved a draft constitution in mid-2005. The new constitution has two innovations from previous constitutions: the regime is described as "semi-presidential" (the French model) and the president's mandate of five years can only be renewed once. After postponing elections once in 2005, the transitional parliament sent the draft constitution to voters in late 2005. The results of the CEI indicated that 83.31 percent of the electorate voted for the new constitution and 15.69 percent against it; however, only 15.5 million voters out of 25 million registered voters cast ballots. The vote was the first open election in 40 years. The constitution was promulgated on 18 February 2006. Until mid-2006, the transitional government only sustained the war economy and cared less about social infrastructure. A pervasive system of patronage politics remained; top officials distributed jobs and allocated government resources according to their linkages with the president and his four vice presidents.

Free and fair legislative elections took place on 30 July 2006, the third since the DRC became independent on 30 June 1960. The first presidential elections with universal suffrage also occurred. Even though each aspiring presidential candidate had to pay a nonrefundable \$50,000 fee just to get on the ballot, 33 persons were registered. On 20 August 2006, the CEI released its full provisional presidential election results, indicating that no candidate was able to secure a majority. Results released late on 20 August showed that Kabila won 44.81 percent of the 17 million votes cast, and Jean-Pierre Bemba won 20.03 percent. Antoine Gizenga came a distant third with 13.06 percent. The incumbent president also failed to win a majority in the parliament. Kabila's Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie (PPRD) only gained 111 out of 500 parliamentary seats, while his coalition, the Alliance de la Majorité Présidentielle (AMP), received 224 seats.

A run-off presidential election was held in October, and Kabila won by 58.05 percent and Bemba received 41.95 percent of the votes. Most

of Kabila's support came in the Swahili-speaking east, where he sold himself as the architect of the 2003 peace agreement. Despite contestations, the Supreme Court validated the votes, and Kabila was sworn in as the fourth president of Congo on 6 December 2006. This outcome ended the so-called democratic transition to the Third Republic, which started on 24 April 1990.

Provincial elections took place in January 2007 for senators, provincial legislators, and governors. Senators were elected indirectly by national legislatures. Electoral results published by the CEI on 20 January showed that the Kabila's AMP achieved an absolute majority in the upper house, with 58 senate seats out of a total of 108. The PPRD won 22 seats out of the 58 seats of the AMP. The Bemba's MLC won only 14 seats out of 21 seats for his coalition, the Union pour la Nation. The governors were elected on 27 January.

President Kabila's victory was accepted as legitimate by national and international observers monitoring the Congo's first democratic elections in more than four decades. However, Bemba's troops refused to disarm as of mid-March 2007, sparking heavy fighting in Kinshasa that ended with 600 people killed. The order to disarm followed the expiry of a deadline for militias to disband. The army defeated Bemba's militia, and Bemba sought refuge in the South African embassy, where he remained until his departure to Portugal to seek medical treatment.

After securing 332 seats in the lower house and winning the majority of the seats in the Senate, Kabila's AMP expected to preside over the office of the Senate and control the two chambers of the parliament. However, Léon Kengo wa Dondo, a former prime minister under Mobutu and member of the opposition, was elected president of the Senate on 11 May 2007. The victory placed him constitutional position number two in the case of death or incapacitation of the president. Kengo won 55 votes against 49 for his rival, Léonard She Okitundu. Kabila's team underestimated the old eastern Kasai rivalry between the Tetela (whose leaders have included the late Patrice Lumumba and She Okitundu) and the Kasai Luba (whose senators unanimously elected Kengo as a "lesser evil").

While the electoral process was under way, the eastern part of the DRC remained under arms as renegade General Laurent Nkunda's rebellion dominated Nord-Kivu province. In early December 2006, a UN-brokered ceasefire collapsed when the former Rwandan soldiers

living in the DRC attacked Nkunda's troops close to the Rwandan border. Fighting broke out, pitting government troops against militias loyal to Nkunda, displacing more than 150,000 people. By late 2006, local officials estimated that Nkunda was earning more than \$2 million per year from local taxes, often collected at roadblocks. The result of the fighting increased the number of victims, especially women and children. According to the UN, 27,000 sexual assaults were reported in Sud-Kivu Province alone in 2007. The fighting between Nkunda and the regular army had also exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in Nord-Kivu in late 2007, with an estimated 400,000 civilians displaced since December 2006.

Representatives of the Rwandan government, accused by the UN of supporting Nkunda's rebellion, and those of the Congolese government met in Nairobi, Kenya, on 9 November 2007, to bolster at least a dozen previous, largely ineffective agreements to cease the fighting. The Kinshasa government pledged to disarm former Rwandan soldiers who committed the genocide, still roaming in Congo, and Rwanda agreed not to support any armed groups in eastern Congo and to prevent them from crossing its borders.

Two months later, the Congolese government sponsored a reconciliation conference in Goma that included political, military, and civilian leaders, as well as members of the civil society, to bring an end to the war in Nord-Kivu, which involved Nkunda's troops and to create the basis for a durable peace. All belligerents operating in Nord-Kivu signed the peace agreement on 22 January 2008. Eight months later, a new round of fighting resumed, worsening an already dire humanitarian crisis in Nord-Kivu. The situation also deteriorated in Sud-Kivu, where several armed groups pulled out of the peace plan agreed upon in January 2008. This time, Nkunda called for a rebellion to liberate the country, thus expanding his initial position that he had taken up arms solely to protect his Tutsi community from attacks by Rwandan Hutu rebels. For the purpose, Nkunda created the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP).

In Kinshasa, President Kabila appointed a former minister of budget, Adolphe Muzito, prime minister on 10 October 2008, to replace Antoine Gizenga. During nearly two years in office, Gizenga and his government came under increasing criticism for doing nothing to revive the economy shattered by the war and end continuing conflict in eastern

Congo. In late October, the new prime minister confronted his first war defeat as Nkunda's forces captured a major Congolese army base at Rumangabo and the headquarters of the Virunga National Park.

In early November 2008, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo as special envoy to the DRC to deal with the conflict between Nkunda and the government. One month later, Obasanjo and President Benjamin Mpaka of Tanzania convened direct talks in Nairobi, Kenya, between the representatives of the DRC government and the CNDP. The talks focused on establishing a framework for future negotiations on substantive issues to stop the conflict in eastern DRC. However, neither President Kabila nor rebel leader Nkunda were present, and the talks were suspended after four days. By late 2008, the conflict between Nkunda's troops and the national army remained a major security issue in eastern DRC. The 17,000 UN peacekeepers in the DRC never tried to move against Nkunda's forces, aware that disarming so many troops would not be easy. On 22 January 2009, Nkunda was arrested in Rwanda territory after he tried to resist a joint Rwandan–Congolese military operation in eastern Congo against former Hutu soldiers still operating in the area. His arrest gave the international community and a number of observers a glimpse of hope to end conflict in eastern Congo.

## ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

On 15 November 1908, the CFS was annexed by Belgium and became a Belgian colony. Leopold II gave up his domain to Belgium only after Catholic missionaries and liberals joined foreign critics in protesting predation and cruelty in the CFS. When Belgium took over the CFS, it inherited a major investment problem because of the CFS regime's state monopoly. The minister of colonies, Jules Renkin, re-established freedom of trade and gradually transformed the Leopoldian economy to a capitalist system. He replaced taxes in kind by taxes in money. The minister then realigned the Congolese franc to the Belgian franc to encourage foreign investment. The result was an increase in private investment from a mere 3.85 million Belgian francs or \$77,000 in 1909 (1959 = 100) to 101.02 billion francs (\$2.02 billion) by 1959, according to Belgian government figures. Transportation, insurance, banking, and



mining companies invested the lion's share in these foreign ventures. The mining sector came to dominate the colonial economy. Although approximately 3,600 private companies were in Belgian Congo, 10 mining companies (among them the UMHK, the diamond Société Internationale Forestière et Minière or Forminière in Kasai, the tin mine of Symetain in Kivu, and the gold mine of Kilo Moto in Orientale province), absorbed one-fifth of the labor force. As a result, the mineral sector contributed to more than 60 percent of export receipts before the 1950s. This mineral dominance continued in the post-colonial period.

Another government policy was to encourage agriculture. The colonial government embarked on an agricultural policy that intended to increase both cash and food production. The decree of 5 December 1933 set 60 days per year of compulsory cultivation, which was reduced to 45 days by the decree of 29 December 1955. Compulsory cultivation of cotton was enforced, and the state maintained this against considerable opposition. In 1958–1959, agricultural exports reached an average of 40 percent of total export earnings, competing with the mineral exporting sector, which averaged 42 percent. In 1959, Belgian Congo was a net exporter of foods.

The third colonial policy was to penetrate African societies by isolating Belgian Congo from the world and isolating the Congolese from one another. This policy was based upon the theory that Belgian Congo could develop and eventually be transformed from a backward and underdeveloped colony dependent upon Belgium to a fully industrialized modern state capable of running its own affairs. To a considerable degree, this policy succeeded. The industrialization process started in the early 1920s, and by the mid-1950s, the percentage of imported capital and consumer-manufactured goods covered by local production was on average 28.7 percent of the total, according to government figures. However, 44 percent of imported consumer goods were covered by local manufacturing production. Another indicator was impressive economic growth. From 1933 to 1940 and from 1945 to the early 1950s, this growth averaged more than 7 percent a year as the result of the diversification of the economy as agriculture and manufacturing expanded. The implication of this economic growth was that all economic sectors generated employment, and the state was able to diversify its sources of revenues by moving away from a mineral-dominated economy. Another example is road infrastructure to transport primary

commodities to the nearest port. In 1959, Congo had 145,213 km of roadways, a number far ahead of the second African country, Nigeria, which had 67,000 km.

Another important colonial policy was paternalism. Belgian colonial rulers viewed Africans as children to be taken care of by Brussels. The result was an increase in social programs. After World War II, the colonial administration continued its policy of paternalism, embarking on a 10-year social plan (from 1950 to 1959), which cost the government some 51.5 billion francs (\$1.04 billion) in investments. The result was an increase in state expenditures on primary education, social services, and rural areas. To finance these services, the colonial government had to borrow heavily rather than tax Africans because it feared popular unrest after the burden of the war effort. The result of this social investment was impressive. By 1959, each of the 135 territories in the Belgian Congo, each with 50,000 to 150,000 inhabitants, had a rural medico-surgical center, a surgical section, a maternity ward, and a prenatal and infant welfare advice center. Moreover, each of these territories had 3,041 hospitals furnished with 86,599 beds. The medical staff consisted of 5,663 Africans and 2,722 non-Africans, including 703 doctors, and a total of 525,200 persons received hospital treatment in 1959. A survey by the European Common Market indicated that, by 1958, the colonial medical infrastructure in the Belgian Congo was “the best in Tropical Africa.” This social infrastructure continued after independence, despite political instability. In early 1960, there were still 57 hospital beds per 10,000 inhabitants.

In the field of education, the paternalistic policy favored primary education at the expense of secondary and tertiary levels. In 1959–1960 alone, there were 1,644,000 primary schoolchildren representing 90 percent of school-age children; however, fewer than 28,961 available places existed in secondary schools to accommodate them. Primary education made traditional village life intolerable for many students, yet secondary school bottlenecks meant that access to satisfactory advancement in the modern sector was blocked. The number of primary school graduates increased, coinciding in 1957 with a halt in the spectacular economic growth rate of the early postwar years. The result was an increase in unemployment in rural and urban areas, where masses of unemployed youth proved to be highly volatile. Unemployment among the young rose from less than 15 percent in 1955 to more than 32

percent in 1958 and was about 48 percent in 1959. This youth coterie later became the source of considerable violence in the early 1960s. Thus, one major flaw in the 10-year colonial plan was in education. The system never allowed Congolese to continue schooling beyond high school until 1954, when the University of Lovanium was created. The sole avenue for secondary schooling and higher education was through the seminaries. Nonetheless, those few Africans who were granted education up to the middle school, called *évolués*, were the first to challenge the colonial system.

Although many of the policies of paternalism were beneficial, the state remained a rigidly controlling force, discouraging freedom of association and political development of the native population. However, the colonial state encouraged associations along ethnic lines as long as they neither interfered with the colonial administration nor challenged its authority. Thus, most *évolués* were ill-prepared to lead their country in 1960. Chaos and political instability set in. Despite Mobutu's ascendancy and relative political stability for almost 24 years (from 1966 to 1990), chaos resurfaced again in the 1990s, reminiscent of the early 1960s. In 2009, the DRC was still battling pockets of rebels in eastern Congo. Without political stability, there would be no socioeconomic and political development.

In fact, political instability of the early 1960s was one of the causes of Mobutu's coup d'état in November 1965. Despite political uncertainty in the early 1960s, the economic impetus of the late colonial period continued after independence, but began to decline in the 1970s. For example, the DRC's GDP, which in 1960 was equivalent to that of Canada, and in 1967 still matched that of South Korea, experienced barely perceptible growth from the mid-1970s on. When factored against population growth of about 3 percent per year, per capita GDP that stood at \$984 in 1959, the last year of colonial rule, had plummeted to a mere \$150 by 2007.

In late 2008, all sectors of the economy showed signs of distress, and major sectors had collapsed. For example, the mining sector that provided the post-colonial state more than 60 percent of state revenues had, by the mid-2000s, provided the state less than 25 percent of revenues. The agricultural sector, which represented 40 percent of export earnings in 1959, had plummeted to less than 5 percent by the mid-2000s. Although the DRC was a net food exporter in the late 1950s, it had become a net food

importer 40 years later. Once praised as an “investor’s paradise” during the colonial period, foreign investment is now scarce in the DRC.

At the social level, there were still 57 hospital beds for 10,000 inhabitants in 1960. By 1990, only 14 beds remained for 10,000 inhabitants. In 2007, this number was less than one bed for 10,000 inhabitants, and most hospitals left by colonial rulers had either been destroyed or now barely function in the countryside.

Patients in most hospitals lie on bedframes without mattresses. Sanitation no longer exists in the DRC, and many curable diseases have returned with a vengeance, including tuberculosis, typhoid, diarrhea, intestinal parasites, leprosy, and malaria, many of them waterborne and spread through unsanitary conditions. The deterioration of transportation infrastructure has contributed to the declining health infrastructure. In 1959, Congo had 145,213 km of roads. By 2007, Congo had less than 10,000 km of roads, mostly located in Kinshasa, as well as in the Kongo Central, Haut-Katanga, and Lualaba Provinces.

Two successive wars in the late 1990s made matters worse. Even the tenuous stability under Mobutu was better than the chaos and anarchy that prevailed in combat zones. No real civil order was maintained; along with sudden death from fighting, there was a gradual reduction in life expectancy as health and other infrastructures crumbled. Families in both rebel- and government-controlled areas have little, if any, access to health or social services.

Although the situation was bad all around—aside from those enriched by corruption—the situation was particularly bad for women. As military activities increased, so did rapes and other crimes against women and girls. Sexual abuse had been used both as a weapon of war and as part of a more general attack. Armed groups raped women and girls whom they found in the fields, in the forests, along the roads, or in their homes. Some combatants even shot victims in their sexual parts or mutilated them with knives, bayonets, or razor blades. Some attacked girls as young as five years of age or elderly women as old as seventy. Women, as providers for their households, were unable to tend the fields, to go to the forests to make wood charcoal, or to go to markets to sell their goods in order to provide livelihoods for their families. Also, whole new generations of children were growing up without proper food, water, and clothing, and without decent education or access to jobs.

In short, for 48 years after independence, no government in the DRC can pride itself on having provided a sustained level of economic and social development. Despite its impressive potential wealth, despite the infrastructure inherited from Belgian Congo, the DRC has gone through repeated phases of regression, and there is still no sign this will stop. From Mobutu to the Kabilas, pervasive corruption has remained endemic. Most Congolese cities that barely deserve the name have spawned plagues of poverty on a scale never known in the late years of colonial rule. A politicized judicial system also perpetuates a culture of impunity and grave human rights abuses by both the government and its army. Thus, citizens are now locked within a political system that has been “privatized and criminalized,” to use a metaphor borrowed from Filip Reyntjens, to the extent that neither the electoral system nor massive foreign aid will be able to rescue them soon. Political renewal and economic recovery appear bleak, and human security is likely to remain a distant dream for many years to come.

## The Dictionary

– A –

**24 APRIL 1990.** The date **Mobutu Sese Seko** announced the transition to multiparty democracy and the end of party-state control over **labor** unions, the print news **media**, and other elements of society. The transition lasted one year. During this period, local councils were to continue to operate, but the Council of Ministers was considered to have resigned. He also said “Zairians” could abandon their “authentic” names and **dress**, and that he was resigning as head of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) in order to head a caretaker government. Mobutu initially called for three **political parties**, one of which would be the MPR. He thus envisioned a three-party system, with the MPR and the **Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social** (UDPS) on either end of the political spectrum and a centrist group, headed by former barons like **Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond** and **Léon Kengo wa Dondo**, which he expected to draw into a dominating coalition. However, the move was soundly rejected and demonstrations ensued, pressing for a **national conference** and the complete removal of controls on political organization. President Mobutu was reacting to pressure from creditors, economic collapse, **opposition** groups, foreign governments, and **human rights** organizations, as well as to a growing trend in national conferences in Francophone Africa.

Mobutu eventually acquiesced to these and other demands, but only after debilitating civic unrest, acts of repression, and extended periods of political crisis and governmental paralysis. Political infighting, the disturbances of 1991 and 1993, delay tactics by hardliners, and obstacles erected by the **president** himself slowed progress.

In mid-1995, the transition was extended for a third time, until 9 July 1997. The offensive by the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL), beginning in October 1996, disrupted the process. After **Laurent Kabila** became president on 29 May 1997, he announced at his inauguration that his government would hold a constitutional referendum in 1998 and free national **elections** in 1999, thereby extending the **democratic transition** to virtually the end of the decade.

**ABACOST.** The term refers to *à bas le costume* (down with the suit). It was the national **dress** for men adopted during **Authenticity** in 1971. It consists of a tight-fitting, two-piece suit tailored of dark material highlighted by a silk scarf instead of a tie. **President Mobutu Sese Seko** championed the *abacost* and, for a time, virtually all males in officialdom wore it. The *abacost* was no longer mandatory when Mobutu announced political liberalization in April 1990. Subsequently, only hardline supporters of Mobutu and his **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) party continued to wear it.

**ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME (AIDS)/HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS (HIV).** AIDS is a disease in which the body's immune system breaks down and is unable to fight a variety of illnesses. The consensus among epidemiologists is that HIV is the virus that causes AIDS. The virus enters the body, lives, and multiplies primarily in the white blood cells, which mostly protect the body from disease. The disease strikes males and females in roughly equal numbers and is believed to be transmitted in Congo primarily through heterosexual activity, blood transfusions, and unsafe medical practices, such as needle sharing through repeated use of unsterilized needles and syringes for injections to cure various ailments (above all, malaria). A nonlethal strain of AIDS was also found in a species of monkeys inhabiting northern Congo.

AIDS was initially viewed as a disease brought in by foreigners. Its transmission, primarily by sexual contact, discouraged official recognition of its dangers. As a result, in early 1987 the government officially acknowledged only 150 cases of AIDS in the country, whereas doctors at **Kinshasa's** General Hospital alone said they had recorded 300 cases of the disease and that 12 percent of newborn babies at

the hospital carried HIV. Studies by Congolese, Belgian, and **United States** teams in the 1980s revealed that 5 to 15 percent of the urban population and as much as 30 percent of the prostitute population had been exposed to AIDS/HIV, albeit to a variety not always lethal. By the 1990s, continued public awareness campaigns, combined with the deaths from AIDS of a number of well-known personalities, had raised awareness considerably, although surveys showed the adoption of preventative measures among the general population to be slow. By the mid-1990s, researchers estimated tens of thousands of Congolese had died from the disease and hundreds of thousands were infected. An average of 3.2 percent of the Congolese population ages 15–49 was infected with HIV/AIDS between 2002 and 2006, according to the **World Bank**. The deterioration of the public **health care** system and the collapse of most blood banks worsened the situation. Moreover, the AIDS pandemic has been exacerbated by deepening poverty and other factors, such as **civil wars**. The Congolese government, shackled by poor terms of trade and crippling debts, has neither the finances nor the personnel to address the pandemic.

**ACTE GLOBAL ET INCLUSIF SUR LA TRANSITION EN RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO (AGI) [GLOBAL AND INCLUSIVE ACT ON THE TRANSITION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO]**. The AGI was signed on 17 December 2002 in Pretoria, South Africa, by the government of the DRC, the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma** (RDC-Goma), the **Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo** (MLC), the RCD/Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML), the RCD/National (N), and **Mai-Mai** groups to end the **civil war** that started on 2 August 1998 against **Laurent Kabila**. The first objective of the AGI was to reunify, pacify, and rebuild the country and establish state authority over the entire Congolese territory. The second objective was to achieve national reconciliation and to establish the formation of a new, restructured, and integrated national army. Third was to organize free and transparent elections at all levels in order to establish a constitutional democratic regime. The final goal was to establish new structures for a new political order. *See also* SECOND CONGO WAR.



**ADMINISTRATION.** The administration of government and state in the post-colonial period remains, in part, a colonial legacy, especially the work of King **Leopold II** of **Belgium**. The colonial administration emerged after the **Berlin Conference** conferred on the king the **Congo River Basin**. In May 1885, the central administration of Congo, then **Congo Free State** (CFS), was located in Brussels and consisted of departments of Foreign Affairs and Justice, Interior, and Finance. On 1 September 1894, the king issued a decree that centralized his administration under the rubric of Secretariat of State. The link between the central structure in Brussels and the administration in the CFS was the general administrator and later general **governor**, who served as the king's chief agent in the CFS. In August 1888, Leopold II promulgated a decree that divided the CFS into 11 districts. Seven years later, the number of districts increased to 15. The CFS became a Belgian colony, called **Belgian Congo**, in 1908. The chief executive of the colony, residing in Brussels, was minister of colonies. The Belgian colonial system continued with the Leopoldian centralization policy by incorporating districts into **provinces**.

The post-colonial Congo inherited the administrative reform of 1933 that established six provinces headed by provincial governors: **Leopoldville**, **Équateur**, Constermansville (later **Kivu**), Elisabethville (later **Katanga**), **Orientale**, and Lusambo (later **Kasai**). Provinces were divided into districts and districts into territories. Each territory comprised posts, and each post included native circumscriptions. The territory was the most crucial echelon of the colonial administration because it represented the point at which the European administration exercised its control over African intermediaries, mostly traditional chiefs. The colonial administration functioned without substantial oversight from outside bodies. Although the colony had consultative provincial councils appointed by the government, they only represented European interests. The colonial administration was thus a formal system, and its relative freedom from control by any legislative body made Belgian Congo a model colony, headed from top down by posts held by Europeans.

On the eve of independence, only a tiny handful of Congolese had acceded to posts of responsibility within the colonial administration. On **30 June 1960**, when Belgian Congo became independent, no Congolese were acting as administrators or deputy administrators

heading territories. The European exodus after June meant a quick **Africanization** of the administration with unfit personnel who did not have the necessary education or background experience. Elected provincial governors or provincial presidents who emerged in mid-1960 appointed Africans to replace the departing Europeans on the basis of regional or ethnic compatibility and only secondarily on the basis of administrative criteria. The promotions made during the Africanization of 1960 inevitably placed many Congolese in positions far above those to which their civil service ratings entitled them. The law on decentralization promulgated on 27 April 1962 increased the number of provinces from six to 21. The result was an increase in the number of administrative positions, making the government the largest employer after independence. From 1960 to 1965, the fragmentation of administrative authority through a multiplication of factionalized provincial jurisdictions only rendered territorial administration ineffective and inefficient.

When General **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** took power on **24 November 1965**, he inherited this fragmented, decentralized, and politicized administrative apparatus. In 1966, he reduced the number of provinces (later called *regions*) from 21 to eight and made them pure administrative subdivisions without political power. Provincial governors, called *regional commissioners* in 1972, were responsible to the central government. Their nomination by Mobutu meant that provincial chief executives served at the pleasure of the president. Although the Mobutist state was highly centralized, regional commissioners enjoyed, in practice, some degree of autonomy.

At the national level, the administration of the **government** and state was nominally the responsibility of the various ministries, but the Bureau du Président (Office of the President), created in 1969, retained most of the final authority for policymaking from the mid-1970s until the **democratic transition**. The bureau consumed about one-third of the government's operating budget. In its heyday, it was staffed by the best and brightest young professionals and exerted predominant influence over policymaking and the allocation of resources. In a sense, the administration traditionally was highly centralized in **Kinshasa**, leading to complaints of neglect from the remote regions, particularly the eastern Congo. During the reforms of the 1980s, some attempts were made to decentralize by increasing

the authority and staffing of regional administrations. By the 1990s, with the collapse of the formal **economy** and the decline of influence of the central government over the regions, a great deal of the local administration became fragmented. Many localities refused to send tax revenues to the central government. Others began levying their own forms of taxation. Local businessmen financed some public works projects, such as **road** repair and public clinics. A number of local governments, in the spirit of **federalism** called for by the **Conférence Nationale Souveraine** (CNS), issued their own “visas” and charged disembarkation fees to travelers.

When **Laurent Kabila** became **president** in May 1997, he changed *regions* to *provinces* but kept the same centralized system as under Mobutu. He inherited 10 provinces and the town of Kinshasa that Mobutu had created in the late 1980s. Each province was divided into districts (for a total of 25 districts), except the three provinces of former Kivu (**Maniema**, **Nord-Kivu**, and **Sud-Kivu**). Districts were further subdivided into territories (145) and towns (20). The town of Kinshasa was divided into 24 communes. Despite a law passed in July 1998 to decentralize the provinces, nothing was implemented. The only administrative reform to break with the past was the creation of new provinces, as stipulated by the 2006 **constitution**, which increased the number of provinces to 26, including the capital city Kinshasa.

**ADOULA, CYRILLE (1921–1978).** Adoula was born in **Leopoldville** on 13 September 1921, but his parents were from the Budja area, located in the Bumba territory in **Équateur Province**. A graduate of the Saint Joseph Institute, Adoula was an *évolué* who in 1954 joined the Amicale Socialiste. He was a cofounder of the **Mouvement National Congolais** (MNC) and a member of its first executive committee. Following the inconclusive **elections** of 25 June 1960, he was a major architect of the compromise that brought **Joseph Kasavubu** and **Patrice Lumumba** to power. He served as interior minister in the **Joseph Ileo government** from February to July 1961, after the dissolution of the **College of Commissioners**. As minister, he ended the wave of arbitrary arrests and the atmosphere of intimidation that reigned in early 1961 in the capital city. He was appointed prime minister on 25 July 1961, following Ileo’s dismissal. During the fol-

lowing three years, he attempted to negotiate an end to the **Katanga secession** and the **rebellions** in northeastern Congo and **Kwilu**. He thus headed the government during most of the period of the **United Nations** presence in Congo. In June 1964, a few days before the departure of the UN forces, Kasavubu dismissed him and appointed **Moïse Tshombe** to head a new government. Adoula went into exile for two years, but returned following the **coup d'état** by General **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** and served as ambassador to Brussels and Washington. In August 1969, he returned to government as foreign minister, but was removed from the post in a cabinet reshuffle shortly thereafter. He died on 24 May 1978 in Lausanne, Switzerland. Adoula is best remembered for his belief in a united Congo and his tireless efforts to negotiate between the central government and the various secessionist factions. *See also* KITONA AGREEMENT; LEOPOLDVILLE TALKS.

**AFONSO I (? –1543)**. King of the **Kongo Kingdom** from 1506 to 1543, Afonso was baptized during the reign of his father, Ndo Funsu. He welcomed the Portuguese explorers, traders, and **missionaries** who sailed up the **Congo River** during the first half of the 16th century. He converted to **Christianity**, along with a large number of his people, and sent members of his court to Europe. One of Afonso's sons, Don Henrique, who was sent to Lisbon, became bishop in 1530. King Afonso established diplomatic relations with a number of European powers and corresponded with European leaders. He also offered **slaves** to the Portuguese in exchange for European articles and missionaries to preach in the kingdom. However, these slaves were mostly prisoners or undesirable persons in Kongo society. In 1510, the slave trade, which was then moderate, drastically increased as the result of sugar cane plantations in Spanish and Portuguese America. Five years later, slave traders began veritable raids inside the Kongo Kingdom and even started kidnapping members of the royal family. Afonso complained to Portugal of these practices without success.

**AFRICAN CHARTER OF HUMAN AND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS**. A document signed by most African governments, including Congo, on 27 June 1981 in Banjul, Gambia, and entered into force on 21 October 1986. It pledges respect for basic **human rights** and individual

liberties. However, African governments, which have the monopoly over the instruments of coercion, have not always respected the provisions of the Banjul charter. As a result, the charter has remained largely unobserved.

**AFRICAN UNION (AU).** African heads of states inaugurated the union on 9 July 2002 in Durban, South Africa, two years after they signed the Constitutive Act in Lomé, Togo, on 11 July 2000. The act occurred one year after an extraordinary summit of the **Organization of African Unity** (OAU) convened in Sirte, **Libya**, in 1999. The idea behind the OAU began with the Pan-African movement and its demand for greater solidarity among the peoples of Africa and its call for self-defined consciousness among Africans. Although the desire to have a regional organization might have been natural, the process of forming one was difficult. Two groups of African countries emerged with entirely different views of the organization. First was the Casablanca Group, which brought together a few so-called radical or progressive countries. It pressed for a much stronger political union, arguing that without it, African states could not wield enough influence to play a significant role on the world stage. The Casablanca Group supported a strong central **government** in Congo, as advocated by **Patrice Lumumba**. Following Lumumba's death, its members met in Casablanca, **Morocco**, and announced the withdrawal of their troop contingents that had been taking part in the **United Nations** (UN) operation in Congo. All except Ghana did so. The second group of countries objected to the idea of a political union. This group became known as the *Brazzaville–Monrovia Group*, and consisted of 20 African states. It was a conservative pro-Western group and rejected the radicalism of the Casablanca Group.

Ultimately, and not unexpectedly, the African states failed to agree on a stronger union, and the Charter of the OAU was a compromise between the two groups. The Charter, which was adopted on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, stipulates that all African states should unite so that the welfare and well-being of their peoples can be assured. Among other goals were the promotion of economic development and regional integration, the peaceful settlement of African disputes, and the elaboration of joint African positions on international issues. Congo remained for the most part a member

of the “moderate” camp of the OAU. It supported **independence** movements and the struggle against apartheid in **South Africa**, but opposed membership for the Soviet-backed Movimento Popular de Libertação de **Angola** (MPLA) after it came to power in Angola. Congo also suspended its participation in the OAU in 1984 when the (Western) Saharan Republic was admitted over the protests of Morocco, Congo’s longtime ally. Congo hosted the OAU summit of 1967 that elected **Mobutu Sese Seko** chairman for the 1967–68 term. For the event, a multimillion-dollar “OAU Village” was constructed in **Kinshasa**, which later was used as an exclusive resort for prestigious gatherings, such as the France–African summit of October 1982. The OAU leadership made modest attempts to help mediate disputes, such as the violence in **Rwanda** and eastern Congo in the mid-1990s and the fighting in **Republic of Congo** in 1997, but it was stymied by provisions in the OAU Charter that prohibited it from interfering in the “internal affairs” of member nations. In August 1998, when **Laurent Kabila** accused Rwanda of financing the rebellion against him, the OAU was slow in responding to the accusation and delegated the issue to the **Southern African Development Community** (SADC). However, after the creation of the AU in 2002, Thabo Mbeki, the president of South Africa and chairman of the AU, became more involved in the peace process in Congo. Thus, the AU can take credit for the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI) signed in Pretoria, South Africa, on 17 December 2002.

Although the Congolese crisis was the main issue addressed by AU in 2002, the AU Peace and Security Council also dealt with other conflicts in Africa, especially in Côte d’Ivoire, where factions had refused to disarm in 2005 to pave the way for elections scheduled for October. The AU also faces many challenges, including such health issues as combating malaria and the **acquired immune deficiency syndrome/human immunodeficiency virus** (AIDS/HIV) epidemic, political issues (such as confronting undemocratic regimes and mediating in the many civil wars in the continent), economic issues (such as improving the standard of living for millions of impoverished and uneducated Africans), and ecological issues (such as dealing with recurring famines, desertification, and lack of sustainable development).

The principal topic for debate at the July 2007 AU summit held in Accra, Ghana, was the creation of a Union Government, with the aim of moving toward a United States of Africa. A study on the Union Government was adopted in late 2006, and proposes various options for completing the African Union project. There are divisions among African states on the proposals, with some (notably Libya) following a maximalist view leading to a common government with an AU army, and others (especially the southern African states) supporting a strengthening of the existing structures, with some reforms to deal with administrative and political challenges in making the AU Commission and other bodies truly effective.

Following Accra, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government agreed in the form of a declaration to review the state of affairs of the AU, with a view to determining its readiness for a move toward a Union Government. A panel of eminent persons was set up to conduct the “audit review.” The review team began its work on 1 September 2007. The review was presented to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at the January 2008 summit in Addis Ababa. No final decision was taken on the recommendations, however, and a committee of 10 heads of state was appointed to consider the review and report back to the July 2008 summit held in Egypt.

**AFRICANIZATION.** A term used in the late 1950s and early 1960s to denote a policy of advancing Congolese quickly into positions of responsibility in **government**, the **military**, **civil service**, and private enterprise. However, resistance by entrenched colonial bureaucrats and the lack of preparation for **independence** meant that, when the colonial era ended, few Congolese were serving in positions above the clerical level. *See also* ADMINISTRATION; ZAIRIANIZATION.

**AFRO-ARABS.** Traders and slavers originally from Zanzibar and the East African coast who spread west, reaching the **Congo River Basin** in the second half of the 19th century. Most of the Afro-Arabs were driven out of Congo by 1900. *See also* SLAVERY; TIPPO TIP.

**AGENCE NATIONALE DE DOCUMENTATION (AND) [NATIONAL DOCUMENTATION AGENCY].** *See* INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.

**AGENCE NATIONALE DE RENSEIGNEMENTS (ANR) [NATIONAL INFORMATION AGENCY].** *See* INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.

**AGRICULTURE.** Three climatic regions lie within Congo: an equatorial region where **palm oil**, **coffee**, cocoa, bananas, and rice are grown; a tropical region of wooded savannas where **cotton**, peanuts, and manioc are grown; and the high plains where potatoes, leeks, and Arabica coffee are grown and **livestock** are raised. However, the eastern highlands of **Ituri** and **Kivu** contain fertile soils largely of volcanic origin, and their cooler climate permits the extensive cultivation of such vegetables as cabbage, onions, tomatoes, and even strawberries. Elsewhere, most of the soil is moderately fertile. Twenty-five percent of Congo's land is considered arable, but less than 2 percent is under cultivation. An estimated 68 percent of the population is engaged primarily in agriculture, 65 percent at the subsistence level. Congo's major cash crops are palm products, **rubber**, coffee, tea, and **sugar** cane. In the large subsistence sector, such crops as bananas, maize, manioc, rice, and, to a lesser degree, beans, peanuts, and cotton are grown. However, the first four crops represent the most important staples in the Congolese diet.

Banana and its cousin, the plantain, are grown in the wet lowlands. Their production has followed a steady increase over the years, reaching 410,000 metric tons of bananas and 2,424,000 tons of plantains in 1994. For the next two years, this pace of production remained almost the same. A declining trend started in 1997, and by 2003, the last year in which data are available from Food Agriculture Organization (FAO), production of bananas and plantains was 313,000 and 1,250,000 tons, respectively. Both crops are viewed by the **government** as potential **exports**. However, poor **transportation** links with the areas where the banana tree grows best continue to impede exploitation for all but domestic consumption.

The second important staple is maize, which is grown throughout Congo. It is most popular in the southeast, where it is the major staple. Maize was introduced by Portuguese settlers, along with manioc, in the 1500s in western Congo and in central Congo in 1600. It grows particularly well in the higher lands and cooler climates of **Katanga**. Production steadily increased from 516,000 tons in 1980



to 1,225,000 tons in 1995, making it the country's third-largest food crop after manioc and bananas/plantains. Although production declined after 1996, it remained above 1,000,000 tons by 2003.

Manioc, on the other hand, is a fast-growing tuberous root, sometimes called *cassava*, which grows well in relatively poor soil. The production of manioc remains higher than other staples, showing a steady increase since the second half of the 1960s, except in 1974, when its production declined from 10,000,000 tons in 1973 to 8,879,000 tons. It reached its peak of 20,835,000 tons in 1993. By 2003, the production of manioc was 14,929,000 tons, which represents the level reached in 1983. Manioc can be cooked as a vegetable, but most Africans prefer to use it as flour. After being harvested, the root is usually soaked for several days, then dried and crushed. The flour is then used to make a dough or paste that is eaten with various sauces and dishes. Because of its low protein content, researchers are seeking to develop more nutritious strains.

The Congolese diet also includes rice. The country produced 165,000 metric tons per year in the late 1950s, primarily from small landholdings, often of less than one hectare, in the **Congo River Basin**. Production fell drastically following **independence**, and only 55,000 tons were produced in 1964. Production began to rise in the late 1960s, reaching 341,000 tons in 1989 and 458,000 tons in 1993–94, according to FAO figures. Production began to decline in 1995 and fell to 315,000 tons in 2003. Because of the popularity of rice as a staple among urban dwellers, the government historically imported large amounts of rice. Moreover, since the second half of the 1970s, Congo has been importing more food than ever before.

This is a paradox, because the agricultural potential of Congo is impressive. For example, from 1928 to 1958, average annual growth in commercialized agricultural output was 5.4 percent. In 1958, 40 percent of the export value was from agriculture, as compared with 10 percent in 1973 at the apogee of **Mobutu Sese Seko's** leadership. By the time **Laurent Kabila** became **president** in May 1997, agricultural exports represented a mere 2 percent of total exports, despite rhetoric from the central government on the importance of agriculture. **World Bank** figures reveal that annual agricultural production grew at an average rate of 0.4 percent in 1975–79, 3 percent in 1980–85, 2 percent from 1985 to 1989, to less than 0.9 percent in

the 1990s, and less than 0.1 percent in the first decade of the 21st century. However, because of **population** growth, per capita food production declined steadily by 2.3 percent in the late 1970s, 0.7 percent in the early 1980s, and 1.2 percent in the early 1990s, although it was less than 1 percent in the early 2000s. As a result, food exports also declined by 5.8 percent in the early 1980s and by 7.6 percent from 1985 to 1993. By 2006, Congo's food exports had declined to represent a mere 0.2 percent of total exports. Historically, the mineral sector dominated the Congolese **economy**, but the severe decline in mineral production in the 1990s caused the proportion of agricultural production to rise from one-sixth of **gross domestic product** (GDP) in the late 1980s to one-third of GDP in the mid-1990s. However, the **civil war** against Kabila reversed this trend.

In addition to the civil war, the decline in production of major Congolese crops is the result of many other factors. First is government neglect of agriculture. Although the colonial **administration** devoted 20 percent of its budget to agriculture and agricultural research-related activities, the post-colonial administration only engaged less than 3 percent of government expenditures in agricultural investment, and these had been allocated primarily to administrative organs.

At independence, the country had achieved net self-sufficiency in food, partly through the use of taxation schemes and forced growing programs in the 1950s, and cash crops earned 40 percent of total foreign exchange. Following independence, political instability and the flight of experienced technicians caused a rapid fall in production and private investment in agriculture. Contributing further to the decline were mismanagement and the failure by the government to invest in the transportation, agricultural extension, and **communications** networks needed to support the agricultural sector. The place of agricultural exports in the overall economy dropped sharply in the first five years of independence; over time, the capacity of citizens to feed their families in the face of a growing urban population was becoming increasingly problematic.

The development of agriculture and the achievement of self-sufficiency in **food supply** were the "priority of priorities" of the Mobutu government from the mid-1970s. However, a nationalization program, **Zairianization**, further aggravated the situation. In

November 1973, the government, concerned over failing production, announced it was nationalizing those agricultural operations with annual revenues of more than 1 million zaires (\$2 million). More than 100 farms and plantations were affected. In less than two years, Zairianization was a complete failure and was reversed. The failure was attributed to several factors. The Congolese who received the Zairianized properties were generally politically well-connected individuals who knew little about farming. They came to be known as *acquéreurs*. The departure of experienced managers led to the disruption of the marketing system. The *acquéreurs* tended to view their new property merely as a source of revenue and did not invest in its maintenance and long-term growth.

Production continued to decline and, in December 1974, the government announced the policy of **Retrocession**, whereby 40 percent foreign participation would be allowed in the large operations, but smaller plantations would be reserved for Congolese. The lack of response to these measures led the government a few years later to allow up to 60 percent private ownership in the sector. The government announced the Agricultural Recovery Plan of 1978–80 in mid-1977 as the result of continued stagnation of agriculture. Capital expenditures for agriculture, which had fallen from 15 percent of GDP in 1978 to 3.7 percent, were gradually increased, reaching 13 percent of GDP in 1977.

In 1983, the government implemented a series of measures to encourage Congolese to invest in farming. Price controls on food products were eased and foreign currency disbursement by the **central bank** for imported food was severely restricted. The government also instituted programs to increase the production of rice, manioc, vegetables, and meat, and launched projects to improve **roads** and bridges, particularly in western Congo, in order to improve the farm-to-market networks. As a result, Congo produced 50,000 tons of wheat in 1985, according to government figures, or roughly one-half of total demand, and 1.5 million head of cattle or three-fourths of demand. The government announced that production had returned to pre-independence levels. However, population growth continued to outpace production gains and a severe setback in the early 1990s, brought on by **inflation**, “**pillages**” (looting), and shortages of fuel and spare parts, caused per capita production in the formal sector to

decline sharply. The loss of purchasing power by salaried workers also lessened demand. As a consequence, many farmers could not afford to take their produce to market and subsequently reduced their production.

The government of Laurent Kabila, in the months after it took power in 1997, launched an appeal for low-cost farm implements and inputs in an effort to revive the sector. A year later, he confronted a civil war, and the agricultural sector received less than 2 percent of operating budget from 1998 to 2008. Food production plummeted, especially in eastern Congo. For example, sweet potato is a major staple in Kivu, and its production declined drastically during the civil war from 404,000 tons in 1998 tons to less than 200,000 tons in 2002. In late 2007, Congo remains a net importer of food; during disasters, it often receives emergency relief aid from international donors. The decay of the transportation infrastructure and **banking** system, policies against agriculture, inflation, **unemployment**, and the loss of individual earning power have fostered the growth of subsistence cultivation—even in urban areas where people grow vegetables in small plots of land. *See also* PLANTATIONS.

**AIR CONGO.** Congo's national air carrier, called *Air Zaïre* from 1971 to 1997, Air Congo emerged in 1960 and began its services in a close partnership with the Belgian airline, Société Anonyme Belge d'Exploitation et de Navigation Aérienne (SABENA), which served the Belgian Congo since the 1930s with DC-3s, DC-4s, and DC-6s. At independence, Air Congo inherited some of these airplanes for internal use, in addition to Beach 18 and the Curtis C-46. Air Congo used a Boeing 707 for services to Brussels, Rome, and Paris until 1963, when the company replaced it with a Douglas DC-8 with more capacity. In 1965, Air Congo became independent of SABENA and acquired two SE 210 and Caravelles in 1967. As the result of a number of technical difficulties, a partnership with Pan America airlines was established, and Air Congo acquired more DC-8s from Pan Am.

In 1971, Air Congo became Air Zaïre. Two years later, it acquired its first DC-10. At its peak in the 1970s, the airline operated one DC-10, two DC-8s, and a fleet of small jet and propeller planes. However, it consistently lost money, due in part to **Mobutu Sese Seko's**

propensity for commandeering its aircraft for official and personal travel by his family and entourage. Mobutu even commissioned Air Zaïre's planes to transport **coffee** from **Kivu** in early 1978 and **cobalt** from **Shaba** in 1979–80. The carrier depended on substantial government subsidies; with the government's growing financial woes in the 1970s, it began to decline. A number of capital infusions were announced, often with foreign participation.

The French company Union des Transports Aériens (UTA) managed it for a time under an agreement announced in 1986. By the 1990s, the airline was struggling and operated only a few flights on an erratic basis using a DC-10 and a Boeing 737. In 1995, it jointly operated a few external flights with Cameroon Airlines. On several occasions, its aircraft were seized for payment arrears when they landed at foreign airports, creating diplomatic strains between Congo and the local authorities. It was declared bankrupt by a Belgian court in 1995. It resumed operations in November 1997 under a new name, **Lignes Aériennes Congolaises**, initially utilizing one Boeing 737. Its director, General Kikunda Ombela, was put on trial in December on charges of corruption. *See also* AIR TRANSPORTATION.

**AIR TRANSPORTATION.** Air **transportation** is an important link to parts of Congo because of the size of the country and the poor condition of most **roads**. At times, it has also been used to transport minerals and food. The national Air Zaïre airlines, renamed **Lignes Aériennes Congolaises** (LAC) in 1997, officially provide service to 40 airports. Three of these, **Kinshasa**, **Lubumbashi**, and **Kisangani**, are international airports and can accommodate wide-body aircraft. One hundred fifty mostly unpaved airfields and landing strips, some of which are privately maintained, are also available primarily for small planes. Moreover, missionary and relief agencies also operate small fleets of single- and twin-engine planes. The state-owned **Société Nationale d'Électricité** (SNEL) operates a fleet of several planes and helicopters to maintain the **Inga-Shaba power line**.

During the first 20 years of independence, air service was dominated by Air Zaïre (originally **Air Congo**), which at its peak in the mid-1970s operated one dozen aircraft, including four large jets. In the late 1970s, domestic air service was opened to private carriers, and a number of small companies emerged. One of the first was

**Scibe Airlift**, which was formed in 1982 and operated routes between Kinshasa and northern Congo, **Belgium**, and several neighbors in East Africa. **Shabair** was launched in the early 1990s and operated routes between Lubumbashi and Kinshasa, **Mbuji-Mayi**, and Johannesburg. Blue Air Lines was formed in 1993 and served four cities. Express City was formed in the mid-1990s and served nine Congolese cities. The number of private air companies exceeded 100 in the mid-1990s, fueled in part by trafficking in arms, diamonds, and **currency** dealings, but declined to 10 by 1998. In March 1999, the Belgian airline *City Bird* signed a five-year partnership agreement with LAC to fly the Europe–Kinshasa routes.

Since the early 1990s, maintenance generally has been considered lax by international standards. On 18 December 1995, a Lockheed leased by Trans Service Airlift crashed in northern **Angola**, killing 141 people. On 8 January 1996, a **Russian**-operated Antonov-32 belonging to African Air crashed upon takeoff from **Ndolo Airport** into a market in central Kinshasa, killing more than 300 people on the ground. In June 1996, a cargo Ilyushin-76 crashed upon takeoff at **Ndjili Airport**, killing 12 crew members. On 28 July 2002, an Antonov-26 belonging to Africa One crashed at Kinshasa airport. It was overloaded with a dozen tons of freight. The crash prompted the airspace regulatory body, the Regie des Voies Aériennes (RVA), to draw up an emergency action plan for Kinshasa International airport to enable it to deal with disasters. Until then, the RVA had no plan of action aimed at coordinating the airport's various services in the event of an emergency. Nonetheless, three years later, on 5 May 2005, another airplane crashed outside of Kisangani. Several other crashes occurred in 2006 and 2007. One publicized crash happened on 15 April 2008 when at least 18 people were killed when a Hewa Bora Airways plane took off at **Goma** international airport and tore roofs off houses as it powered through a densely populated market place near the runway.

**AIR ZAÏRE.** *See* AIR CONGO.

**ALBERT I (1875–1934).** The third king of **Belgium**, who visited **Belgian Congo** as crown prince; he advocated a more humane colonization. Albert I ascended to the throne in 1909 upon the death of

his uncle, **Leopold II**. He ruled during World War I and the Great Depression until his death in a mountain-climbing accident on 19 February 1934.

**ALLIANCE DE LA MAJORITÉ PRÉSIDENTIELLE (AMP) [ALLIANCE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL MAJORITY]**. The AMP emerged as a conglomerate of a number of **political parties** in 2006 to facilitate the victory of presidential candidate **Joseph Kabila** during the presidential and legislative elections in mid-2006. This bloc held the majority of seats in both the lower house, the National Assembly, and the upper house, the Senate of the Third Republic.

**ALLIANCE DES BAKONGO (ABAKO) [ALLIANCE OF BAKONGO]**. ABAKO was one of a number of groups that formed in **Leopoldville** (now **Kinshasa**) and a few other urban areas following World War II, as Congolese began to press for an end to restrictions on trade unions and political gatherings. It became one of the major **political parties** to wield power in the five years between independence and the **coup d'état** that brought **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** to power in November 1965.

ABAKO had its roots in 1935, when Father Van Wing set up an ad hoc commission after consultation with a number of apostolic vicars in **Bas-Congo**, now **Kongo Central Province**, for the purpose of unifying the Kikongo language. The commission never completed its work because of technical difficulties related to the three existing Kikongo dialects. However, the commission provided the initial stimulus that led to the organization of ABAKO in 1951. Its founder, Edmond Nzeza Nlandu, advocated the idea of Bakongo nationality and the defense of the rights and interests of the Kongo people. Once the colonial administration had recognized ABAKO in 1953 as an ethnic association representing the Kongo people, Nzeza Nlandu began advocating the revival of the ancient **Kingdom of Kongo** that would include portions of **Congo-Kinshasa**, **Angola**, and **Congo-Brazzaville**.

In late 1953, he called upon **Joseph Kasavubu**, from the Yombe subgroup, to join the central committee of the ABAKO, in response to the charge that the committee had been ruled by the Tandu subgroup. The increased visibility of ABAKO in the 1950s was mainly

owing to Kasavubu's own dynamism and extraordinary popularity among Europeans, urban dwellers, and rural masses in Bas-Congo. In mid-1950s, ABAKO began to be viewed with suspicion among some groups in Kinshasa that even identified it with **Kimbanguism** and **communism**. It was not until 23 August 1956, following the publication of the *Conscience Africaine* manifesto calling for a greater African voice in the affairs of **Belgian Congo** that ABAKO issued its Declaration of Civil Rights, calling for immediate freedom of speech and association for the Congolese people. The metamorphosis of ABAKO into a major vehicle of anticolonial struggle unleashed considerable unrest in Leopoldville and Bas-Congo. The result was that ABAKO emerged a net winner in the urban **elections** of 1957, capturing 133 communal council seats out of a total of 170 seats. This victory gave the group unfettered control of the African communes. Its leaders were considered radical by the colonial authorities and were frequently imprisoned.

ABAKO drew most of its strength from Bas-Congo. However, the relatively large numbers of Kongo living in the capital, Leopoldville, added to its influence. ABAKO scored impressive victories in the 1960 legislative elections leading up to independence. However, these were not enough to give it a majority in the legislature. In a compromise, ABAKO's leader, Kasavubu, assumed the primarily ceremonial post of **president**, and another major winner in the elections, **Patrice Lumumba**, became **prime minister**. ABAKO was dissolved with all other political parties following the coup d'état in which Kasavubu was overthrown.

The party quickly reformed following Mobutu's announcement of the **democratic transition** on **24 April 1990**. Although subsequently split by internal rivalries, ABAKO, for the most part, opposed Mobutu and allied with the **Sacred Union**. Although many members initially allied with **Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond's Union des Fédéralistes et des Républicains Indépendants** (UFERI), they left the alliance when Nguza was appointed prime minister and expelled from the Sacred Union in November 1991. ABAKO adherents maintained a deep grudge against the Mobutu government for refusing to acknowledge the historical significance of Kasavubu, the country's first president. A political party using the acronym ABAKO called the *Alliance des Bâtisseurs du Kongo* (Alliance of the Builders of



Kongo) won three seats in the National Assembly in the 2006 general elections.

### **ALLIANCE DES FORCES DÉMOCRATIQUES POUR LA LIBÉRATION DU CONGO (AFDL) [ALLIANCE OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF CONGO].**

A group of four small **political parties** that signed an alliance in Lemera, **Sud-Kivu**, and launched an offensive in eastern Congo on 18 October 1996. The first party was the Alliance Démocratique du Peuple (ADP) of Deogratias Bugera, a **Tutsi** of Masisi. The second party was the Conseil National de la Résistance pour la Démocratie (CNRD) of Kisase Ngandu. He became the commander of the AFDL but was assassinated on 4 January 1997. Third was the Mouvement Révolutionnaire pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (MRLC-Z). It was a more or less improvised group under Anselme Masasu Nindaga, who was a young mechanic born of a Kivu father and a Rwandan Tutsi mother. He was recruited by Paul Kagame's army and also served as a bodyguard to President Yoweri Museveni of **Uganda**. The last party was the **Parti Révolutionnaire du Peuple** (PRP) of **Laurent Kabila** established in 1967.

All these parties were Lumumbist groups of **Nord-Kivu** and **Sud-Kivu Provinces**. The alliance remained underground until the fall of **Goma** on 1 November 1996. Six days later, Kabila gave a press conference as the spokesperson of the AFDL and announced that the alliance did not seek secession, but rather the overthrow of **Mobutu Sese Seko**. Kabila emerged as the leader of the political wing of the alliance. He was one of the few dissidents who had never joined in a **Mobutu government**, and his credentials as a guerrilla leader and early supporter of **Patrice Lumumba** enhanced his appeal to exiled opponents of Mobutu. Weak resistance from the Mobutu **army** and a vacuum of leadership in **Kinshasa** caused by Mobutu's illness bolstered the alliance and brought statements of support from **opposition** parties in the capital. The AFDL took **Kisangani** on 15 March 1997, where the national army, backed by Serb mercenaries, had mounted a major defense. AFDL forces took the diamond-mining center of **Mbuji-Mayi** on 4 April and **Lubumbashi** eight days later. The capture of Lubumbashi, the headquarters of the state mining

company **Générale des Carrières et des Mines** (GECAMINES), gave the AFDL some international recognition.

The international community, fearing a bloodbath if the AFDL reached Kinshasa, sought to organize mediation talks. President Nelson Mandela of **South Africa** brought Mobutu and Kabila together in early May, but no agreement was reached, and the negotiations were overtaken by the AFDL offensive. Mobutu and his entourage left Kinshasa on 16 May as the AFDL forces neared the capital. In the evening, the national army commander, **Mahele Lieko Bokoungo**, persuaded Mobutu's elite presidential guard to lay down their arms, for which he was killed, and the AFDL met little resistance when it entered Kinshasa on 17 May. Kabila was sworn in as president on 29 May 1997.

The AFDL sought to remove symbols of the Mobutu era. The name of the country was changed back to the **Democratic Republic of Congo** (DRC), the Congo franc replaced the **zaire**, and the flag and national anthem of the country prior to the Mobutu coup were reinstated. Within a month of his presidency, Kabila initiated two major policies. First, he pledged to exclude all Mobutu's clients and several prodemocratic groups from his government. He came under criticism for excluding respected opponents of Mobutu, in particular **Étienne Tshisekedi**, and for allowing interethnic violence to continue in the east.

Second, he created an economic police called **Office des Biens Mal-Acquis** (Government's Office of Ill-Gotten Goods) to investigate Mobutu and his clients' assets. At the end, the AFDL lost its momentum when Kabila created the **Comités du Pouvoir Populaire** in order to give power back to the people. The slogan was "people's power, for the people, by the people." However, these committees were criticized for the fact that they reminded people of Mobutu's early **Corps des Volontaires de la République** (CVR).

**ALLIANCE DES FORCES PATRIOTIQUES (AFP) [ALLIANCE OF PATRIOTIC FORCES].** A political alliance of about 30 **political parties**, many from the **Sacred Union**, formed by **Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond** after he was appointed **prime minister** and expelled by the Union in November 1991. It attempted to form a moderate

**opposition** bloc at the **National Conference** by espousing political change. However, it was mostly dismissed as pro-**Mobutu Sese Seko**; it collapsed the following year, when Nguza was removed as prime minister.

**ALUR.** An ethnic group of Nilotic origin that shares the Aru territory with other groups in **Ituri Province**. According to a number of foreign ethnologists, it is the only major group in Congo that speaks an Eastern Sudanic language, although Congolese ethnologists cite the Kakwa, Logo, and Lugbara as equally important groups of Nilotic descent. The group is characterized by relatively small political groupings. **Chiefs** are religious figures who, through intercessions with the ancestors, mediate disputes and are believed to control natural phenomena, such as rain.

**ALVARO I (1542–1587).** King of the **Kongo**, who is credited with returning the kingdom to stability following the **Jaga** invasion of 1568–70. However, under his successors, Alvaro II, Alvaro III, and **Garcia II**, the Kongo kingdom continued to lose influence and suffer rebellions from outlying subkings.

**AMNESTY, POLICY OF.** A policy favored by **President Mobutu Sese Seko** whereby exiled dissidents would be allowed to return home or those sentenced to prison would be pardoned if they ceased their antigovernment activities. The first amnesty was granted to 800 soldiers who were part of the **gendarmerie Katangaise** in the **mutinies** of 1966 under Colonel Ferdinand Tshipola and that of 1967 with the **mercenaries**. The 1967 mutineers had fled the border to **Rwanda** in early November. The diplomatic solution between Rwanda and Congo was found in the general amnesty Mobutu promised to the former Katangan mutineers. On 3 December 1967, mutinous Katangan gendarmes who had fled across the border returned to Congo under the amnesty. However, they subsequently disappeared, and most of them were killed. The methods used to kill these gendarmes were ominous: many were forced to drink gasoline, while others were dropped from helicopters. Of the 800 gendarmes, only a few dozen escaped, fleeing to **Angola**, where they told the story of the massacre of their comrades.

The same fate befell **Pierre Mulele**. After the government had put down the **rebellion** in **Kwilu**, its leader, Mulele, fled to Brazzaville. Mobutu offered him amnesty in 1968, but upon his return to **Kinshasa**, he was tried for treason. He was tortured and executed in October: his eyes were pulled from their sockets, his genitals were ripped off, and his limbs were amputated one by one, all while he was alive. What was left was dumped in the river.

The most publicized case of amnesty occurred on 21 May 1983 when the government announced a general amnesty for political **dissidents**. Although the response was cautious at first, a number of prominent exiles eventually took advantage of the policy. These included former **Prime Minister Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond**, former Foreign Minister **Thomas Kanza**, former Ambassador to **Belgium Bernadin Mungul Diaka**, **Tshombe Ditenj** (son of the late **Moïse Tshombe**), former Ambassador to **France Mbeka Makosso**, and former leader of the **Stanleyville** rebellion **Christophe Gbenye**. Several members of the **Group of Thirteen Parliamentarians** sentenced to prison or internal exile for subversion were also pardoned.

In mid-2006, the members of parliament adopted an amnesty law for crimes and political offenses from August 1998 (when the **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila** started) to June 2003 (when the transitional government was set up). Most members of the parliament who voted for the law argued that the move was part of the transition from civil war to free **elections** of June 2006.

**AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL.** *See* HUMAN RIGHTS.

**ANCIENTS, LES.** A term, roughly translated as “veterans,” given in the revolutionary days of the 1970s to citizens who had been involved since **independence** in Congolese politics, business, **administration**, the **military**, or other leadership positions. Some Congolese admired them for the ability to survive. Others did not.

**ANGLO-BELGIAN INDIA RUBBER AND EXPLORING (ABIR).**  
*See* CONCESSIONARY COMPANIES.

**ANGOLA, RELATIONS WITH.** Angola, with an estimated population (2005) of 15.9 million people spread sparsely over its 800,000

square km of territory, has a 2,511-km-long border with Congo. Portuguese **explorers** arrived on the Angolan coast at the same time as in Congo. Trading and **missionary** activities were carried out jointly in the area for centuries. The colonial period in Angola is considered to have been at least as harsh as that in Congo, but when calls for independence began to be heard in Angola in the late 1950s, they were suppressed. After the **Belgian Congo** obtained its **independence**, it supported Angolan independence movements and allowed many Angolan **refugees** to live in western Congo. Three liberation movements fought for independence in Angola. They included the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, FNLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, UNITA), and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, MPLA). The FNLA was a group based primarily in northern Angola with strong ties to the **Kongo** people of **Bas-Congo**. Its leader was **Holden Roberto**, **President Mobutu Sese Seko's** son-in-law. The UNITA operated in eastern and southern Angola under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi. The MPLA was under the leadership of Agostinho Neto. It controlled much of the central region and the enclave of Cabinda. The MPLA later became divided into MPLA/Neto and MPLA/Daniel Chipenda. Chipenda established his headquarters in **Kinshasa**.

Another dissident group that sought independence for the oil-rich Angolan enclave north of the Congo River was called Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda, FLEC). This group surfaced in the 1970s, demanding independence for Cabinda, at first from **Portugal** and, after 1974, from independent Angola. Cabinda, an enclave of 600 square km, was a special Portuguese possession until it was attached administratively to Angola in 1956. It lies along the Atlantic coast, separated from Angola by the mouth of the **Congo River** and the Congolese territory that surrounds it. The Mobutu **government** began supporting FLEC in 1974 and was rumored at the time to be interested in annexing Cabinda, which had considerable offshore **petroleum** reserves.

Relations between Congo and Angola were mutually suspicious from the time of Angola's independence from Portugal in 1975 to

the time **Laurent Kabila** became president of Congo in May 1997. This unease started on 24 April 1974, when a group of mainly left-wing military officers, called the *Armed Forces Movement*, seized power in Portugal in a bloodless coup d'état, ending 40 years of civilian dictatorship. The new leadership promised to end colonial rule and to move toward self-determination of the Portuguese colonies. President Mobutu quickly started negotiations with the new government to avert the danger posed by the existence of a large number of former members of the **gendarmerie Katangaise** in Angola. Mobutu and the new president of Portugal, António Sebastião Ribeiro de Spínola, met secretly in September 1974 and agreed to form a coalition government for Angola, to be headed by Roberto, Savimbi, and Chipenda, and excluding the Marxist Neto. Another important agreement was to grant all Congolese refugees living in Angola a general amnesty. On 30 September 1974, however, Spínola resigned as president and was replaced by General Francisco Costa Gomes who appointed a leftist, Vasco dos Santos Gonçalves, as his prime minister. The result was that the agreement signed between Mobutu and de Spínola was no longer valid. The new Portuguese government quickly moved toward negotiations with the three rebel groups.

Despite their ideological differences, the leaders of the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA signed an agreement with Portugal in early 1975 calling for an independent Angola on 11 November 1975. The accord was short-lived because, in the following months, the FNLA, the MPLA/Chipenda, and the UNITA formed a tacit coalition against the MPLA/Neto. A flow of covert foreign support began to the three parties as early as February 1975. Between March and April 1975, 1,200 of Mobutu's soldiers, with **United States** assistance, entered Angola. On the eve of Angolan independence, five battalions of Mobutu's forces, along with irregulars from the FLEC, invaded the enclave of Cabinda. On 10 November 1975, the Portuguese high commissioner in Angola departed after a brief ceremony, and at midnight, Neto proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of Angola under the MPLA leadership. On 23 November, the FLNA-UNITA alliance announced the formation of a rival Democratic People's Republic of Angola, with the central highland city of Humbo (formerly Nova Lisboa) as the capital city of the new republic. Soon after the

two republics were proclaimed, the fight for the control of the capital city of Luanda began.

The alliance between the MPLA and former members of gendarmerie Katangaise stopped the advancing Congolese troops, the FLNA, and UNITA. The defeat of the Mobutu troops gave President Neto valuable time to gain control of the capital city before the arrival of Cuban troops in Angola. Neto installed a Marxist-based regime that was admitted to the **Organization of African Unity** (OAU) on 11 February 1976, and to the **United Nations** (UN) on 11 December 1976. However, the FNLA and UNITA factions, backed primarily by the United States, **South Africa**, and Congo, continued a guerilla war against the Luanda government. Meanwhile, support for the FLEC was officially halted following an agreement between Congo and Angola in Brazzaville on 26 February 1976.

Following the **Shaba** incursions of 1977 and 1978, in which the **Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo** (FLNC), based in Angola, occupied parts of southern Shaba, Presidents Mobutu and Agostinho Neto met and agreed to end hostilities. The two leaders established diplomatic relations in July 1978. Neto visited Kinshasa in August, and Mobutu returned the courtesy in October. Relations improved slowly thereafter. However, mutual suspicions remained and were heightened by the Cuban and Soviet military presence in Angola and by the economic ties between Congo and South Africa.

Attempts were made to reopen the **Benguela Railway**, which, until its closure in 1974, had provided the most efficient route to the sea for Congo's mineral **exports**. However, UNITA kept the railway out of operation through sabotage. In April 1978, UNITA announced it would no longer sabotage the Benguela, but the railway remained largely closed because of continuing clashes between the factions and physical decay of the line and rolling stock. Congo continued to support the FNLA during the 1970s, but after its activities declined, it switched its support to UNITA. Mobutu allowed the Congolese territory to be used for guerilla bases and arms shipments to the UNITA guerillas. President Neto died of cancer in the Soviet Union on 10 September 1979. José Eduardo dos Santos became head of the MPLA and president of Angola following Neto's death.

FNLA activity decreased in the 1980s, but UNITA continued to threaten the MPLA government. UNITA controlled large por-

tions of territory in the eastern and southern parts of the country, and disrupted the economy by halting mining and agriculture and by sabotaging the Benguela Railway. In December 1985, relations were strained when an Angolan plane carrying 40 Cuban and three Angolan soldiers to Cabinda landed in Congolese territory, 280 km southeast of Kinshasa and was set afire. In the 1980s, the FNLA virtually disappeared, while UNITA continued its guerrilla war against the MPLA. Nevertheless, the FNLA sometimes resurfaced, seeking financial support and demanding to be included in any power-sharing arrangement between the MPLA and UNITA.

In the late 1980s, relations were soured by press reports that Mobutu was allowing the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to use a military airfield at **Kamina** to supply UNITA. In fact, the government of **Zambia** accused Mobutu of using the Congolese territory to supply covert military aid from the United States to UNITA. Mobutu denied the charge and declared his support for the MPLA government, although reports persisted of U.S. supplies going to UNITA through Congo. A ceasefire was negotiated, leading to elections in September 1992 won by the MPLA and rejected by UNITA. After a period of renewed fighting, a second agreement was reached in 1995 whereby UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi was to assume the vice presidency. Relations remained cool into the 1990s because of Congolese support for UNITA during the protracted peace negotiations and because of extensive **diamond smuggling** from northwestern Angola to the southern Kasai area and the use of Congolese territory to supply arms to UNITA forces.

In December 1996, several UNITA leaders assumed positions in the armed forces senior command as part of an agreement to merge the rival forces. Angolan troops backed the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) in its offensive to overthrow the Mobutu government. Following the installation of the Laurent Kabila government in May 1997, Angola sought to cut off UNITA's supply lines through Congo, and clashes intensified in northern Angola. The arrival of the AFDL in Kinshasa in May 1997 placed considerable pressure on UNITA, which lost control of a major diamond-smuggling and arms-trafficking route through southern Congo. UNITA began using **Congo-Brazzaville** as a conduit for the arms and diamond trade, leading the Angolan government to back the



militia of former president Denis Sassou-Nguesso against President Pascal Lissouba. In October 1997, 3,000 heavily armed Angolan troops entered Congo-Brazzaville from Cabinda and helped the Sassou-Nguesso fighters take control of the country. Their purpose was to destroy FLEC bases in Congo-Brazzaville and end the use of airstrips in the territory as transshipment points for UNITA arms and diamond shipments.

In August 1998, the government of Angola intervened in Congo to help Kabila against Rwandan forces and the Congolese rebel group, named the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD). Also during this period, UNITA forces in northern Angola were caught between Angolan and Congolese government troops, leading to a gradual erosion of the Angolan ceasefire and renewed fighting in southern Angola. Angola withdrew its forces from Congo in early 2002 to concentrate against UNITA. On 22 February 2002, Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, was killed in combat with government troops, and a ceasefire was reached by the two factions. UNITA gave up its armed wing and assumed the role of major opposition party. Although the political situation of the country began to stabilize, President dos Santos has refused to institute regular democratic processes. In August 2006, a peace deal was signed with the FLEC separatist rebels.

Relations between Angola and Congo chilled in the third week of February 2007. The Congolese government delivered an official protest over the expulsion from Angola over the previous weeks of more than 8,000 Congolese migrants and the occupation by the Angolan army of several villages in the Kahemba area of the **Kwango Province**. In mid-March 2007, a meeting was held in Kinshasa between delegations from Angola and Congo, and the two parties insisted on the need to revitalize the regular functioning of the existing mechanisms of bilateral cooperation, with a view of preventing situations liable to affect relations between the two countries. In the meeting, it was decided to set up a bilateral technical team, charged with the task of identifying the 112 border landmarks that delimitate the two countries over an extension of 2,511 km of common border. *See also* FOREIGN RELATIONS.

**ANTONIANISM.** *See* KIMPA VITA NSIMBA, NDONA BEATRIZ.

**ARAB COUNTRIES, RELATIONS WITH.** Congo's relations with Arab countries were largely affected by its relations with **Israel**, which have been substantial since **independence**. On 4 October 1973, during the Arab oil embargo that followed the Israeli–Egyptian conflict known as the *Yom Kippur War*, **President Mobutu Sese Seko** announced before the **United Nations** General Assembly that his country was breaking relations with Israel. A number of African governments followed suit. Relations with Arab countries improved markedly in the following years. The Mobutu government signed agreements with a number of Arab governments, exchanging oil for minerals and timber. In 1976, however, Congo voted against expelling Israel from the United Nations and refrained from condemning Israeli ties with **South Africa**. However, relations with moderate Arab governments, particularly **Morocco**, Saudi Arabia, and Iran (until the Shah was overthrown) remained warm.

On 13 May 1982, Congo reestablished relations with Israel after Israel's return of the Sinai Peninsula to **Egypt**, a fellow member of the **Organization of African Unity** (OAU), thus ending Africa's quarrel with Israel. Congo began to receive Israeli assistance in the areas of **security**, **agriculture**, and **transportation**. It also received support from the Jewish lobby before the U.S. Congress, which had been holding embarrassing hearings on Mobutu's economic mismanagement and **human rights** violations. Although Congo had received \$444 million in aid from Arab countries from 1973 to 1982, the government was said to be disappointed by what was characterized as a lack of serious Arab investment in the country's **economy** and the lukewarm Arab support for African issues, such as the efforts to end apartheid and South Africa's occupation of Namibia. A number of Arab governments, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, **Libya**, and South Yemen, broke relations with Congo. Others reduced their diplomatic missions and virtually all aid was cut off in 1986. Congo's renewal of relations with Israel was followed that same year by Liberia and by Côte d'Ivoire.

Relations with Arab nations were gradually restored as virtually all African governments recognized Israel. In the 1990s, Congo's relations were warm with most Arab states, although they remained hostile with Iraq, Iran, and Libya, which viewed Mobutu as a puppet of the West. Relations with Libya improved under **Laurent Kabila**,

who visited it in 1998. Libya was instrumental in initiating the peace process to solve the war against Kabila. On 18 April 1999, President Muammar Kadhafi convened a meeting in Sirte, Libya. The attendees agreed in principle to a ceasefire, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Congo, and the deployment of a neutral African peacekeeping force to help guarantee the security of Congo's neighbors. The Sirte meeting paved the way to the **Lusaka Peace Accord**.

Since his nomination and then election to the presidency, the **Joseph Kabila** government has maintained good relations with most Arab countries, especially Egypt and Libya. On the economic front, Egypt and Congo signed a number of bilateral agreements in which Egyptian model farming would be attempted in Congo. The relations between Morocco improved after the death of **Hassan II** when his son, Mohammed VI, succeeded his father to the throne. In mid-2005, Morocco and Congo began talks of increasing trade between the two countries. In March 2006, King Mohammed VI visited Kinshasa. The visit ended with the signing of bilateral accords covering a number of areas of cooperation between the two countries. During the same visit, King Mohammed decorated **President Joseph Kabila** with Morocco's highest distinction, the Wissam Al Mohamedi Chain.

**ARMED FORCES.** *See* MILITARY.

**ARMÉE POPULAIRE DE LIBÉRATION (APL) [POPULAR LIBERATION ARMY].** The official name given to the loosely organized fighters of the former **Orientale Province** who, in 1964, waged an armed struggle against the central **government** during the eastern **rebellion** of 1964–66. More popularly known as “**Simbas**” (**Kiswahili** for “lions”), the fighting force was composed primarily of adolescents who were given amulets and taught chants to protect them from bullets. Tens of thousands of Congolese and hundreds of foreigners were killed during their reign of terror and the military campaign to end it. *See also* CHILD SOLDIERS.

**ARMY.** *See* MILITARY.

**ARTICLE 15.** The term means “fend for yourself” in the Congolese parlance. It emerged in the 1970s during the period of belt-tightening

when local administrators remained heavily dependent on funds periodically sent from **Kinshasa**. The economic crisis that had plagued Congo since the 1970s had made things worse, and it had been quite rare for local administrators to receive all the *frais de fonctionnement* (spending budget) to which they were entitled. The modus operandi at the local level is popularly known in Congo as “Article 15,” after a fictitious clause in seceded **South Kasai**’s 1960 constitution that simply instructed state authorities to *debrouillez-vous* (to improvise).

**ARUWIMI RIVER.** The river begins as the **Ituri** River. It arises in the savannah north of the Kibali River watershed. It runs south-southwest until it is joined by the Shari River that flows by **Bunia**. The Ituri then turns west, through the fabled **Ituri Forest**, becoming the Aruwimi where the Nepoko River joins it, at the town of Bomili. The river continues westward, joining the **Congo River** at Basoko, for a total length of about 1,300 km (800 miles). It is about 1.5 km wide where it joins the Congo River. **Henry Morton Stanley** used it in his 1887 expedition to “rescue” Emin Pacha. The cataracts above Yambuya made it impossible to use the river for navigation, and the expedition had to go by land. The watershed of the Ituri/Aruwimi is almost entirely dense forest with just a handful of villages along its course.

**ASSOCIATION AFRICAINE DE DÉFENSE DE DROITS DE L’HOMME (ASADHO) [AFRICAN ASSOCIATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS].** The association was originally founded as the Association Zaïroise de Défense de Droits de l’Homme (AZADHO) in 1991. By the late 1990s, the ASADHO had become the country’s leading **human rights** organization. It was particularly courageous in speaking out against human rights violations in eastern Congo during the **ethnic cleansing** that began in 1993 and during the **civil wars** against **Mobutu Sese Seko**, in 1996–97, and **Laurent Kabila**, in 1998–2003. The organization is affiliated with the International Commission of Jurists and the International Federation of Human Rights.

**ASSOCIATION DE PERSONNEL INDIGÈNE DE LA COLONIE (APIC) [ASSOCIATION OF INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL OF THE COLONY].** A civil servants’ trade union founded in **Leopoldville** in 1946 that was one of the first to begin lobbying

for better pay and working conditions for Congolese workers. The restrictive colonial legislation placed so many obstacles in the path of the association's organization that APIC was not very effective outside Leopoldville. However, it played a significant role in exerting pressures for a unification of the civil statutes and access for Congolese to upper ranks of the colonial administration.

**ASSOCIATION DES BALUBA DU KATANGA (BALUBAKAT)** [ASSOCIATION OF BALUBA OF KATANGA]. An association founded by **Jason Sendwe** in 1957 to represent the interests of the **Luba** in **Katanga** and to prepare for municipal elections. The elections, which occurred in late 1957, resulted in the victory of non-Katangan burgomasters: two Baluba from **Kasai**, one **Songye** from Kasai, and a **Kusu** from **Kivu**. From the defeat, the idea of "authentic Katangans" emerged, meaning those who belonged to the so-called indigenous ethnic groups of the province, such as the **Lunda**, Luba of North Katanga, **Yeke**, Sanga, **Chokwe**, Tabwa, and Bemba, whereas "foreigners" were all those people whom the **Union Minière du Haut Katanga** (UMHK) recruited to work the mines in southern Katanga, especially the Luba of Kasai. The BALUBAKAT then joined **Moïse Tshombe's** **Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga** (CONAKAT) to represent the interests of all authentic Katangans in February 1959, in order to reinforce such interest-based action upon acceptance of the administrative unity of Katanga as a valid coordinate of reference. The Luba of Kasai were "foreigners" not only because they were Luba but also because they came from Kasai. In 1959, the Luba of Katanga shared the resentment of their CONAKAT partners after the defeat of the 1957 elections.

The legislative elections of May 1960 proved to represent an artificial alliance between BALUBAKAT and CONAKAT. At the provincial level, CONAKAT received 25 out of 60 seats, while the BALUBAKAT coalition gained 22 seats, and individual tickets represented 13 seats. Despite complaints by BALUBAKAT of a number of electoral irregularities, the Belgian government accepted the electoral results as valid. To show their disapproval, the BALUBAKAT legislators boycotted the meeting of the provincial legislature on 1 June 1960, which had to elect members of the government according to

articles 110 and 114 of the **Loi Fondamentale**. This action paralyzed the proceedings because the law required two-thirds of all members of the provincial legislature to deliberate and vote. One solution to deal with the impasse was to amend the law on the quorum. CONAKAT addressed a petition to the minister of colonies and requested that the law be amended. On 14 June 1960, the Belgian Parliament amended the two articles of the law and CONAKAT proceeded without BALUBAKAT by voting on the provincial government by which Moïse Tshombe was elected president of the province. Ten days after independence, Tshombe declared the **Katanga secession** on 11 July 1960, leading to a revolt by BALUBAKAT in the northern part of the province and a short-lived declaration of secession that lasted until January 1961.

BALUBAKAT allied with **Patrice Lumumba's** wing of the **Mouvement National Congolais** (MNC), which espoused a unified Congo. The Luba of Kasai, despite strong ethnic affinities with the Luba of Katanga, supported the **Fédération Kasaïenne**, which was at odds with the MNC-Lumumba wing because of a perception that it was dominated by **Lulua** elements in the region. In 1964, however, BALUBAKAT representatives in the **parliament** joined with CONAKAT under the **Convention Nationale Congolaise** (CONACO) banner to elect Tshombe **prime minister**. When then **President Joseph Kasavubu** dismissed Tshombe on 13 October 1965 and appointed another BALUBAKAT leader, **Évariste Kimba**, to form a government, CONACO twice blocked approval of the Kimba government, leading to a government crisis and the **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu coup d'état**.

The term resurfaced in 1992 when the governor of Katanga, **Gabriel Kyungu wa Kumwanza**, launched a program to drive the Luba from the region. In what came to be called "**ethnic cleansing**," after the term used in the former Yugoslavia, tens of thousands of Luba were ousted from homes and jobs and obliged to camp at railway stations and public buildings until they could obtain passage to **Kasai Oriental**. Not only does the term BALUBAKAT characterize the Luba of Katanga who had settled in the area (especially in the Upemba depression) since A.D. 1000 and became part of the early Luba Empire, it has also come to describe the Luba of Katanga in general.

**ASSOCIATION DES CLASSES MOYENNES AFRICAINES (AC-MAF) [ASSOCIATION OF AFRICAN MIDDLE CLASSES].**

The ACMAF was an association of Congolese small businessmen and farmers founded in 1954 with encouragement from the colonial government. Some of its representatives were appointed to colonial, consultative government councils. It was one of the **labor** and professional organizations that began pressing for an end to discrimination against Africans and greater Congolese participation in government.

**ASSOCIATION DES LULUA-FRÈRES [ASSOCIATION OF LULUA BROTHERS].**

The association was formed by **Chief** Sylvestre Mangole Kalamba in **Kasai** in 1952 to raise the status of **Lulua**, in reaction to the growing political and economic influence of the rival **Luba** Kasai. The colonial administration and Catholic missionaries even helped the Lulua to establish the association because of their own fear of Luba political consciousness. The first peaceful confrontation between the Lulua and Luba in Kasai occurred in December 1958, with the organization of **elections** in **Luluabourg**. In the two African quarters of the city, Nganza and Ndesha, 83 Luba, 29 Lulua, and other candidates competed for only 36 council seats. The Lulua cast disciplined votes and received 16 seats although they represented only 26 percent of the Luluabourg population. On the other hand, the Luba group received only 17 seats although it represented 56 percent of the population. Following this victory, the Lulua became more aggressive in their demand for land and social status.

The first major bloody confrontation over land between the two groups took place in Luluabourg on 11 October 1959. Three months later, the colonial administration set a Conciliation Commission to settle the land dispute between the Lulua and Luba. After only two days of discussion at Lake Munkamba, the Commission decided that 100,000 Luba must return to their homeland in **South Kasai** within two months, as violence against them spread in Lulua-dominated areas. In this confused environment, in Kasai Province the May 1960 general elections took place. With 2.1 million inhabitants in 1960, the Kasai Province had to fill 70 seats in the lower house and provincial institutions. Under the sobriquet Union Nationale Congolaise, the Association of Lulua Brothers ran an alliance with the **Mouvement**

**National Congolais** of **Patrice Lumumba**, which seemed the most effective way of accomplishing its ethnic objectives in 1960.

**AUTHENTICITY.** In April 1971, **President Mobutu Sese Seko** revealed the idea of Authenticity to serve as the centerpiece of state ideology. The concept emphasized the value of all things African. Mobutu first mentioned *Authenticity* in February 1971 in a speech in Dakar, Senegal, during which he defined it as “being conscious of one’s own personality and values and being at home in one’s culture.” In interviews, Mobutu said he formally launched the movement on 12 February 1972. The concept began to emerge during the late 1960s and early 1970s, partly in reaction to colonialism and the continuing dominance of European and other non-African customs and values. It was also partly caused by the rising nationalism, idealism, optimism, and growing expectations that characterized the early years of the Mobutu regime.

Authenticity sought to create a truly “Zairian” identity by developing “Zairian” institutions and “Zairian” forms of expression in the nation’s political, economic, and cultural life. The essence of Authenticity was a return to the ancestral heritage as a spiritual source. Colonial names of cities, streets, bridges, and boats were changed to Congolese ones. Christian names were dropped. Citizens were encouraged to abandon European **dress** for more traditional clothes, a policy that launched a wave of new fashions, such as the *abacost*, the boubou, and other clothes made from Congolese-designed **cloth** and prints. The **constitution** was modified. Christian liturgy and influence in **education** and society were challenged. Educational curricula were changed. School and history books were rewritten. Foreign-owned businesses were taken over by Congolese under **Zairianization**, and companies were urged to replace expatriate personnel with Congolese trainees. Hundreds of studies, monographs, and documentaries on Congo by Congolese were commissioned and published.

By the late 1970s, Authenticity had lost some of its luster, in part because of the country’s waning economic fortunes and in part in reaction to its excesses (at one point, visitors who arrived at **Kinshasa**’s airport had their ties cut off with scissors). Friends resumed



calling each other privately by their Christian names and dropped the requisite title of “citizen.” The need for expatriate expertise was acknowledged, and many nationalized firms were returned to their previous owners in a move called *Retrocession*.

In the 1990s, with the advent of multiparty politics and the decline in popularity of Mobutu, Authenticity came to be viewed with some skepticism by the **opposition** at least. Nevertheless, many of the changes brought by Authenticity remain. Authenticity helped form the concept of a national character, served to unify the country in many ways, and was widely admired and imitated in other African countries.

However, Mobutu, like other African leaders, used the concept primarily to concentrate power. Authenticity helped Mobutu to rule without contest as he discerned in Congo’s cultural heritage monistic leadership. Mobutu’s selective use of African traditions completely and deliberately overlooked the notion of checks on authority of the **chief** in African traditional societies. He never mentioned the possibility of removing an unsatisfactory chief, so common in African traditional societies. It is widely believed that Mobutu’s attempt to have himself named Life President in 1972 faltered when Kasongo Nyembo, a major chief of **Luba** of Katanga and a former member of the Political Bureau of the single party **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution**, remarked that “not even the Emperor of the Luba served for life.”

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**BAKA REGIMENT.** See CIVIL WARS; MUTINIES.

**BAKAJIKI LAW/LOI BAKAJIKA.** Promulgated on 7 June 1966 as Ordinance-Law 66-343, the Bakajika Law granted all wealth above and below the ground to the Congolese state. It thus extinguished all land grants and concessionary power delegated by the colonial state. The law aimed primarily at ensuring that public mineral rights went to the **government**. Despite this law, the colonial system of land control and alienation continued. The first major change came in 1973, in the form of another “Bakajika Law.” All land, including land that

was administered by **chiefs**, became state property. Customary law, as codified under colonial rule, ceased to be a legitimate source of land rights. Chiefs were also integrated into the state's administrative hierarchy, and attempts were made to shift them to posts outside their home areas, as was being done with higher-ranking territorial administrators, from the territorial to the provincial level.

**BAKWANGA.** Capital of secessionist **South Kasai** and center of the **diamond-mining** trade. Its name was changed to **Mbuji-Mayi** in 1966.

**BALADOS.** A term in vogue during the 1980s to describe the young men and women who populated the streets of **Kinshasa**, surviving by doing odd jobs or, in some cases, engaging in petty theft. The word is derived from the French *se ballader*, meaning to roam or “hang out.”

**BALANCE OF PAYMENTS.** Congo registered balance-of-payments surpluses in the 1950s, a mixture of surpluses and deficits during the 1960s, and increasingly large deficits beginning in the 1970s. The small deficits of the early 1970s were offset by capital inflows from abroad because of high mineral prices and **foreign investment**. In the mid-1970s, growing budget deficits were offset by large borrowing from foreign creditors. The balance-of-payments situation improved somewhat in the 1980s, but remained under pressure from low mineral prices and the large amount of foreign exchange exported to service the external **debt**. In the late 1980s, the government fell repeatedly into arrears on debt repayments. Although these were rolled over in new agreements on a number of occasions, by 1990, the government had ceased virtually all foreign debt servicing, leading to its expulsion from the **International Monetary Fund (IMF)**.

Despite continuing government budget deficits, high **inflation**, and a valueless local **currency**, Congo's balance of trade improved in the mid-1990s, partly because the government was no longer servicing the external debt. According to data from the IMF, **exports** reportedly rose from \$368 million in 1993 to \$419 million in 1994, and **imports** continued to fall, reaching \$382 million in 1994. Trade surpluses continued in the second half of the 1990s, averaging \$478

million a year. These surpluses can be attributed to scarcity of foreign exchange and the continued contraction of the **gross domestic product**. However, trade deficit resurfaced again in 2003 and was \$500 million in 2006. *See also* EXTERNAL TRADE.

**BANANA (CITY).** A **port** town near the mouth of the **Congo River**, Banana is one of Congo's three deep-water ports and a major base for the **navy**. In the early 1980s, the **Mobutu Sese Seko government**, in an effort to ease congestion at **Matadi** and **Boma**, enlarged the port and improved the **road**, connecting it to Matadi.

**BANDA.** *See* ZANDE.

**BANDIYA.** *See* ZANDE.

**BANDUNDU.** *Bandundu* is the name of the province formerly known as **Kwilu Province**, as well as the name of its capital. The topography of former Bandundu Province, lying in the west-central part of Congo, consists primarily of sandy and relatively infertile soils of the **Congo River Basin** in the southern part of the region. The northern part encompasses 100 million hectares of tropical **rainforest** containing hardwoods that are considered prime **export** material. Although a number of agreements have been signed with foreign companies to exploit the reserves, the forests have been largely untouched because of **transportation** difficulties. The fertile areas are conducive to the cultivation of **palm oil** and manioc, and the raising of cattle and hogs. A great deal of the estimated **population** of 5.8 million (4,141,758 in 1982) live primarily from river **fishing** and trade. The 2006 constitution divided the former Bandundu province into three new provinces: **Kwango**, **Kwilu**, and **Mai-Ndombe**. Bandundu has the status of "town."

Bandundu city lies 400 km upriver from **Kinshasa**, near the confluence of the Kwango and **Kasai Rivers**. Formerly called *Banningville* (from the Belgian **Banning**), it was a small river **port** and fishing town until the government made it a regional capital, partly in retaliation against Kikwit, which was the center of antigovernment activity in the region following **independence**. *See also* LIVESTOCK.

**BANKING.** Congo's banking system has historically been small and has primarily been utilized by the *élite*. At its peak in the 1980s, the system consisted of the **central bank** (Banque Nationale du Congo [BNC]) and 17 private banks and investment organizations. Several of these were affiliated with large multinational banks, but the most important were those with significant **government** participation, including two development institutions: the **Caisse Nationale d'Épargne et de Crédit Immobilier** (CNECI) and the Société Financière de Développement (SOFIDE). Congo's banking system collapsed in the early 1990s because of the economic crisis. Most banks were closed by 1993, and the central bank acted primarily as the distributor of newly printed **zaire** notes to those with political connections or who were willing to pay a considerable fee for the service. In contrast, an informal banking system was booming, in offices and on the streets of major cities, sustained by the large informal sector. However, in 1997, a large number of private foreign banks began operating in major cities. By 2005, 20 had operations in **Kinshasa**. *See also* ECONOMY; "WALL STREET."

**BANNING, ÉMILE THEODORE HUBERT (1836–1898).** A Belgian citizen born on 12 October 1836, Banning received a doctor of philosophy and literature. He started his career in 1862 as a journalist with *L'Écho du Parlement*. He became an archivist and librarian at the Royal Library and was later appointed to the Department of Foreign Affairs. Belgian historian Pierre Devaux introduced him to King **Leopold II** in 1867, and Banning's vision seemed to coincide with the king's colonial vision. Banning was the architect and secretary of the Brussels Conference that took place from 12 to 19 September 1876, and which was attended by the representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, **Great Britain**, **France**, Italy, and **Russia**. The Brussels Conference began the colonial adventure of Leopold II with the creation of **International African Association** in 1876. Banning was also a leading negotiator in limiting the boundaries of the **Congo Free State**. He died on 13 July 1898.

**BANTU.** As much as 80 percent of the Congolese **population** is considered to belong to the Bantu group of African people. Although

debate still continues over the origins of the Bantu, many anthropologists and historians believe they immigrated into the **Congo Basin** as early as 1000 B.C. from the Nigeria/Cameroon/Chad area and, over the next 2,000 years, spread south and east along **Congo River** tributaries, eventually reaching both coasts and developing a **language** system that would be called *Bantu*. Later, some began to emigrate toward southern Africa, while others moved back through the forest in the direction from which their ancestors had come. As hunters, gatherers, and cultivators, they initially formed small villages, usually organized loosely around clan, descent, or lineage groups. By the 1500s, some of the groups had evolved into large states, such as the **Kongo Kingdom** and, later, the **Luba** and **Lunda** Empires.

The Bantu encountered the **Pygmies**, believed to be the first settlers of the **rainforest**, and utilized them as workers or **slaves**. They developed stone and iron tools. Sometime after 1500, two groups of non-Bantu speakers entered the savanna north of the Congo Basin. Some were assimilated by the Bantu and some were repulsed, leading to the mosaic pattern of **ethnic groups** in northern Congo. According to oral tradition, Bantu groups entered the **Kasai/Katanga** area from the north about 1500 A.D. and formed small states. Others entered the Sankuru/**Lulua** area at about the same time, perhaps fleeing the **Jaga** wars. They hunted and fished and eventually developed buildings and methods of food storage. By 1700, Bantu speakers were established along the Congo River from **Malebo Pool** to Bolobo, above the confluence with the **Kasai River**.

Bantu in the coastal areas entered into contact with Europeans in the late 15th century. **Afro-Arab** traders from the East African coast penetrated into eastern Congo in the 1800s, trading cloth, guns, and other goods for **gold**, **ivory**, and slaves. By the time the Bantu came into contact with Europeans, their societies had developed political systems that varied considerably in the hierarchy of their **chiefs**, their degree of authority, and their religious or ritualistic responsibilities. Chiefs were chosen or established their authority through wealth and judicious distribution of riches. Though often authoritarian in demeanor and feared by their subjects, they frequently ruled through consultations and by consensus. They usually made decisions upon the advice of counselors and after spiritual consultations with their ancestors. Another common characteristic was the tradition of paying

tribute to a higher king. Some groups had officials with judicial powers, in addition to a chief with ritualistic responsibilities. Others had a war leader or other officers with specific responsibilities.

**BANYABWISHA.** *See* BANYARWANDA; HUTU.

**BANYAMULENGE (plural of MUNYAMULENGE).** The Banyamulenge are people of Rwandan origin found in Uvira, Fizi, and Mwenga territories in **Sud-Kivu Province**. The word *Banyamulenge* emerged in 1976 and means in Kifulero “people” or “inhabitants” of “Mulenge.” The Banyamulenge are descendants of **Tutsi** cattle herders who migrated to Uvira in the second half of the 19th century. With the approval of local **Fuleru** traditional authorities, they relocated to the mountains of Itombwe in exchange for land tribute. Before 1933, their number was so small that there was no mention of the tribe in any ethnocartography of the **Belgian Congo**. During colonization, the Belgian government encouraged further migration from **Burundi** and **Rwanda** to work on cotton plantations and in the agropastoral industry. The independence of Congo, Burundi, and Rwanda in the early 1960s brought a new political configuration to the Great Lakes region because it transformed the relationships between the Banyamulenge and their neighbors, the Fuleru and Vira.

First, the revolution of Rwanda in 1959 and subsequent migrations of Tutsi into Sud-Kivu gave the Banyamulenge a Tutsi characterization. This “Tutsization” of Banyamulenge was the first import of the Rwandan political and ethnic conflict into the area. The second wave of Tutsi from Rwanda into Sud-Kivu occurred in 1962, when Grégoire Kayibanda became the first president of Rwanda, thus ending the Rwandan monarchy. This inflow consisted mostly of Tutsi royalists from the Rwandan Unitarist Party who supported Mwami Kigeri V. However, the Banyamulenge opposed the unitarists because they were worried about their Congolese status and wanted to distinguish themselves from these Rwandan Tutsi **refugees**. In addition to official refugees, undocumented migrations have also occurred over the years, blurring the line between refugees and early migrants.

Until the 1964 eastern **rebellion** by **Gaston Soumialot**, the Banyamulenge had strong relations with local traditional authorities. However, when the rebellion hit Uvira and Fizi, the Banyamulenge

fled, although the Rwandan Tutsi refugees joined the rebellion because Soumialot, the leader of the rebellion, promised to help them reconquer Rwanda. Unlike many ethnic groups in Uvira that joined the rebellion, the Banyamulenge did not. Thus, when **mercenar-ies**, **Katanga gendarmes**, and **government** forces penetrated into **Maniema** and Sud-Kivu, rebel groups fled to the high mountains, where they killed the Banyamulenge livestock to feed themselves. In retaliation, the Banyamulenge joined government forces to protect their families and cattle. The offensive of government forces headed by mercenaries, Katanga gendarmes, and Banyamulenge defeated the eastern rebellion in its fiefdom of Sud-Kivu and Maniema provinces. Therefore, the alliance between the Banyamulenge and the national army was perceived by other **ethnic groups** in Sud-Kivu as an unforgivable expression of collaboration with the enemy.

After the rebellion, the central government confirmed the traditional authority of Banyamulenge in Kamanyola and the high plateau of Itombwe. However, this decision was never acknowledged by other ethnic groups in the area. Other groups, such as the Fulero and Vira, interpreted this outcome as a reward for the Banyamulenge's betrayal, resulting in animosity toward them. This animosity never escalated to an armed clash because Banyamulenge kept their clientelist relations intact with their patrons, the Fulero.

In 1972, the **nationality law** conferred Congolese citizenship on the Banyamulenge. However, in 1981, another law denied them Congolese nationality. Like the **Banyarwanda** living primarily in **Nord-Kivu**, the Banyamulenge were drawn into the interethnic violence that spilled into Congo from Rwanda and Burundi in the 1990s. The transitional parliament promulgated a resolution in April 1995 that required the repatriation of all peoples of Rwandan origin. On 8 October 1996, the deputy governor of Sud-Kivu, Lwabanji Lwasi, gave the Banyamulenge an ultimatum: leave Mulenge in what he called a "cleansing of the plateau." He gave them eight days to vacate Congo, but the Banyamulenge refused to leave. A day later, the Banyamulenge attacked a hospital in Lemera administered by Protestant missionaries; they massacred nurses and a dozen soldiers. It was not until 18 October that the Banyamulenge and other anti-**Mobutu Sese Seko political parties** announced the formation of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (ADFL).

The Banyamulenge spearheaded an offensive in Sud-Kivu beginning on 18 October 1996 and, with the AFDL, took power in **Kinshasa** in May 1997. Clashes reportedly continued in their region, causing 2,000 deaths the following year, according to **human rights** organizations. In August 1998, Banyamulenge leaders formed the Forces Républicaines et Fédéralistes, under Joseph Mutambo, and later joined the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD) in its rebellion against the **Laurent Kabila** government. The transitional government installed after the accords of Pretoria in late December 2002 paved the way to the Nationality Law promulgated in 2004 that granted the Banyamulenge Congolese nationality. *See also* CIVIL WARS; SECOND CONGO WAR.

**BANYARWANDA (plural of MUNYARWANDA).** The name given in Congo to the people who migrated primarily to **Nord-Kivu Province** from **Rwanda** before **independence**, especially from the 1930s to the 1950s. Since the early 1960s, the term has also been used to describe **Hutu** and **Tutsi** living in Rutshuru territory. By the early 1990s, their **population** had reached 17 percent of the population of Nord-Kivu, making the Banyarwanda the second largest group of the province after the **Nande**.

Early Rwandan migrations were organized by the colonial state and had two primary causes. First, famine frequently struck Rwanda. Second was the shortage of labor in the **Belgian Congo** for mines and plantations, and the colonial administration needed to satisfy the demand for labor in the growing private sector. The colonial administration of Kivu, Rwandan authorities, and the Kivu Committee signed an agreement that created the Mission d'Immigration des Banyarwanda (Immigration Mission of the Banyarwanda or MIB). The act of land cession was signed in 1936 by the colonial administration and the Hunde chief, Albert Kalinda, in Masisi Territory, who received 29,600 Belgian francs in compensation for 350 square km of land (19.5 km × 18 km) in Gishari to host the first group of Rwandan migrants, mostly Tutsi, in 1937. From 1937 to 1945, 25,000 Rwandan migrants moved to Gishari.

In the late 1940s, a major famine swept Rwanda, resulting in more migrations of Rwandans into Congo between 1949 and 1955. An additional 60,000 people moved to the hills of Masisi. The new



migrants could not be accommodated in the 350 square km allocated to them by the 1936 contract, so they were moved deep into the Hunde zone of Washali-Mokoto. In addition to these early organized migrations, the Belgian rulers recruited about 80,000 Rwandans to work on Congolese plantations and in the mines. As migrants moved into the Nord-Kivu district, they became a distinct group of people. The original Hutu and Tutsi inhabitants of Rutshuru, known as *Banyabwisha*, slowly began taking on a different identity as the number of migrants from Rwanda increased in the 1950s. The third wave of Rwandan migrants, 60,000, were **refugees** fleeing the Hutu taking power in Rwanda in 1959. By the early 1960s, people in Nord-Kivu began calling Rwandan migrants *déplacés*, meaning “displaced.”

Resentment against the Banyarwanda began in 1962, when their elite refused to be part of Nord-Kivu province and requested a referendum to attach the area where most of them lived, Rutshuru and Goma territories in Nord-Kivu, to Kivu Central (today’s **Sud-Kivu**). The results of the referendum attached the two territories to Nord-Kivu in 1965. Although the nationality law passed in 1972 recognized their right to Congolese **nationality**, the law passed in 1981 restricted citizenship to those whose ancestors were in Congo before 1885. However, the 1981 law was never implemented.

In 1991, the Banyarwanda delegation was excluded from the **national conference**, and its status was never resolved. Angered over their exclusion, the Banyarwanda threatened to refuse to pay taxes. In March 1993, then governor of Nord-Kivu Jean-Pierre Kalumbo Mboho launched a program of “**ethnic cleansing**” aimed at driving the Banyarwanda back to Rwanda. He was suspended in July, but his speeches led to clashes in which hundreds of villages were destroyed, an estimated 7,000 to 30,000 people were killed, and about 350,000 people were made homeless. Ethnic conflict continued in Nord-Kivu in subsequent years resulting in the deaths of thousands of people.

The Banyarwanda were among those who supported the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL), which launched an offensive in the east in October 1996 and took power in **Kinshasa** the following May. The war against **Laurent Kabila** in August 1998 revived hatred against Banyarwanda in Nord-Kivu. The signing of the peace accord in Pretoria, South Africa, in late 2002 paved the way to the nationality law of 2004 that granted

all Banyarwanda Congolese nationality. *See also* CIVIL WARS; SECOND CONGO WAR.

**BANZA-MUKALAY, NSUNGU.** Vice president of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) and its main spokesman during the **democratic transition**, Banza-Mukalay was appointed minister of mines in the **Léon Kengo wa Dondo** government of December 1996. He reemerged in November 2005 as vice minister of international cooperation in the transitional government.

**BAS-CONGO.** *See* KONGO CENTRAL.

**BAS-UELE.** A district of former **Orientale Province**, Bas-Uele became a province under the 2006 constitution, with Buta as its capital city. Lying south of the **Uele River**, the new province is a remote area with a sparse **population** estimated at 900,000 in 2007 (567,040 in 1982). Its inhabitants are mostly **Boa** (plural, Baboa), engaged primarily in subsistence farming, hunting, and some river commerce.

**BAS-ZAÏRE.** *See* KONGO CENTRAL.

**BAUDOUIN I (1930–1993).** Baudouin was born on 7 September 1930, in Brussels, as Baudouin Albert Charles Léopold Axel Marie Gustave, the son of **Leopold III** and Queen Astride, who died in a car accident when Baudouin was four years old. After the Belgian surrender to Germany in World War II, he accompanied his father and family to Austria. Following the war, the Belgian government, angry over what was viewed as Leopold's collaboration with Nazi Germany, refused to allow the royal family to return to **Belgium**. As a result, the family lived in Switzerland until 1950, when Leopold asked the parliament to pass a law delegating his powers to his son. His abdication allowed the royal family to return to Belgium. Baudouin assumed the throne on 17 July 1951. He oversaw with tact and diplomacy the end of the Belgian colonial experience in the 1950s and the debate it caused in Belgian society. The only reigning Belgian monarch to visit the territory, King Baudouin paid an official visit to the **Belgian Congo** in 1955, during which he foresaw **independence** in a speech, but said, "Before we realize this high ideal, much remains to be done." In

December 1959, he returned to consult with Congolese leaders on independence. King Baudouin witnessed the lowering of the Belgian flag in Congo by personally attending the festivities of independence. He gave a speech that most Congolese nationalists thought insensitive to the atrocities committed by Belgians in Congo. His speech received a blistering response from **Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba**.

Baudouin married Doña Fabiola de Mora y Aragón of Spain on 15 December 1960. He died of a heart attack on 31 July 1993, while vacationing in Spain. He was succeeded by his younger brother, Albert II. Baudouin reigned during the time of Belgium's greatest interest in and influence over Congo.

**BAYONA WA MEYA, NICOLAS ABEL (1938–1998).** Born on 25 November 1938 in Voka, **Kongo Central**, he was educated in a little seminary from 1952 to 1960 and received his law degree in **Lovanium University** in 1964. He obtained his doctorate in law in 1969 at Lovanium University. He moved into academic ranks and quickly became a professor and then dean of the Faculty of Law at the National University of Zaire, Kinshasa Campus, in 1971. He became Supreme Court president, prosecutor-general, and minister of sciences and research. In March 1996, he was appointed president of the **Electoral Commission** charged with organizing a constitutional referendum and national **elections** aimed at ending the **democratic transition** period in 1997. Bayona was quickly rejected by the **opposition** as a puppet of the **Mobutu Sese Seko** government who would not be able to ensure the planned free elections. His commission was abolished with the arrival of the **Laurent Kabila** government in May 1997. He died on 26 August 1998.

**BELGIAN CONGO.** *See* CONGO, BELGIAN.

**BELGIUM, RELATIONS WITH.** After **independence**, relations between Congo and Belgium remained ambivalent and fluctuated widely between normal and stormy. As the former colonial power, Belgium was still resented in Congo and often blamed for domestic problems for which it may have been only partly responsible. Relations suffered under populist leaders, such as **Patrice Lumumba**,

who accused Belgium of having fomented the **Katanga secession**. Relations prospered under such moderate leaders as **Moïse Tshombe**. Following the **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu coup d'état** in November 1965, relations were initially good. Over subsequent years, they were frequently disrupted by crisis and confrontation. Mobutu raised the question of revisiting the convention of 6 February 1965, which supposedly settled the **Contentieux Belgo-Congolais**; that is, the bundle of disputes concerning the assets and debts of **Belgian Congo**, the former colony. Belgium rejected the demands to revise the convention but agreed to reopen negotiations, because it had some unsatisfied demands of its own. When bilateral negotiations failed to produce substantive results, Congo acted unilaterally on 13 July 1966, breaking off the negotiations, freezing the assets of certain Belgian organizations, and seizing a number of their properties in **Kinshasa**. In June 1966, in what was to be a precursor of the wave of **nationalism** soon to strike the continent, the government ruled that the headquarters of all enterprises operating in the country must be transferred to Congo. Further, the government promulgated the **Bakajika Law**, which, in effect, cancelled concessions granted before independence. But by December 1966, the **Union Minière du Haut-Katanga** (UMHK), the major **mining** company and source of government revenues, still had not conformed to the new law. On 2 January 1967, Congo announced the nationalization of the UMHK and formed the Générale Congolaise des Minerais (GECOMIN) to replace it. Under agreements signed later, Belgian companies continued to provide technical assistance and marketed some of the mineral products. Many minerals continued to go to Belgium for refining.

In the late 1960s, relations improved. Mobutu visited Belgium in June 1968 and was received as a houseguest by King **Baudouin**. The apogee of amity was reached in June 1970, when the Belgian monarch and his wife visited Congo. In September, however, relations deteriorated when the UMHK lost out to the Tempelsman consortium in the bidding on major new copper concessions. The relations between the two countries further deteriorated in March 1971 after a number of Belgian companies were accused of dealing in the Congo's parallel **currency** market. Four Belgian officials of the Société Congolaise de Banque (SOCOBANQUE) were jailed on charges of currency fraud and tax evasion. The imprisonment of Belgian executives

created an uproar in Belgium until the issue was resolved. A short-lived ceiling was placed on Belgian imports during this period. The battle between Mobutu and the **Catholic Church** over **Authenticity** in 1971 also offended most Belgian Christian Democrat circles, adding to the chill. A new phase of relative cordiality resumed later in 1972, and Belgium was quite pleased to see Mobutu sever Congo's connections with the French-dominated **Organization Commune Africaine et Malgache** (OCAM), into which Tshombe had taken the country in 1965. However, the **Zairianization** measures in November 1973 were a new blow. Relations suffered in 1974 after the implementation of the nationalization law, under which numerous Belgian properties were seized. In March 1976, a new cooperation agreement was signed, and Congo promised to compensate Belgians who had lost assets under the nationalization policy. The Mobutu government later allowed foreigners whose property had been expropriated to recover 60 percent of their assets, leading to a Belgian renewal of interest in investment. Relations were strained yet again in the late 1970s and early 1980s by the activities of Congolese **dissidents** based in Belgium.

Relations briefly improved when a number of vocal dissidents living in Belgium returned home under the **amnesty** of 1983. However, relations soured again in April 1986 when a Belgian judge, responding to a complaint by a Belgian former pilot of **Air Zaïre** that he had been unfairly dismissed, ordered an Air Zaïre DC-8 passenger plane grounded at Ostende airport. The judge also ordered Air Zaïre to pay \$100,000 in damages and back pay. The government of Mobutu accused Belgium of humiliating its former colony, banned all flights to Congo by the Belgian national carrier Sabena, and threatened to sever all **trade** links.

In the late 1980s, pressured by international **human rights** groups and the local Congolese dissident community, Belgium began to publicly criticize excesses of the Mobutu government and to express support for political liberalization. It welcomed Mobutu's announcement of the **democratic transition** in April 1990. However, following the attack by his troops on students at **Lubumbashi** University in May 1990, Belgium suspended all nonhumanitarian aid, as did the **European Union**, Canada, and the **United States**. Mobutu retaliated

by expelling 700 Belgian technicians and closing all but one Belgian consulate in Congo.

During the 1990s, Belgium joined **France** and the United States in a group that pressed for more rapid democratic reforms. Called the “troika” by the Congolese news **media**, the group frequently criticized Mobutu for blocking the democratic transition; during the early 1990s, the group backed his major opponent, **Étienne Tshisekedi**, and adopted a policy of diplomatically isolating Mobutu. Many barons of the regime were refused visas, even for personal travel. However, Belgium began to view Tshisekedi and his followers as too obstructionist and sought a more accommodating posture toward Mobutu. It offered to end its policy of isolating the regime and to support a moderate or centrist government leader in exchange for progress toward free **elections**. The process was slow.

As a result, Belgium, along with most Western nations, welcomed the pledge by the **Laurent Kabila** government to reform the system after its installation in May 1997 and hold elections in 1999. Many Belgians were tired of Congo and its seemingly eternal crises. Commercial ties had eroded because of the looting incidents and economic decline. Nevertheless, interest continued on the part of some political and civic leaders because of historical ties and a sense of at least partial responsibility for the Congolese debacle. After the death of Laurent Kabila, Belgium became a crucial player in pressuring Congolese to end the civil war against Kabila that started in August 1998. During the transitional government of Congo, 2003–2006, Belgium disbursed \$1 billion in foreign aid to support the transition. More specifically, in mid-2005, the Belgian government provided the **Commission Électorale Indépendante** with more than 2,700 electoral kits that included cameras, microcomputers, scanners, laser printers, and generators.

A revival of a more structural cooperation resumed in early 2007 with a donation of \$250 million to boost key social sectors of health and education. In April 2008, the **Joseph Kabila** government recalled its ambassador to Belgium and closed its consulate in Antwerp as a reaction against the statement from Belgian Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht that Belgium had a “moral obligation” to respond to events in Congo because it provided Congo with about \$328 mil-

lion annually. Kinshasa's decision was intended to send "a powerful protest" that Congo was an independent sovereign country and that no other country had a moral right over it. The situation was normalized in early 2009. In the trade area, Belgium has remained the major trading partner with Congo since independence. *See also* LEOPOLD II; LEOPOLD III.

**BEMBA, GOMBO JEAN-PIERRE (1962– ).** Born in Bokada, **Équateur Province**, Bemba is the son of Jean **Saolona Bemba** and the owner of the cellular telephone company, COMCEL, an aviation company, and private television stations. He formed the **Mouvement de Libération Congolais** (MLC) in November 1998 and launched a **rebellion** in his home region of northern Congo against **Laurent Kabila**. During the civil war against Kabila, he was invited to the **Central African Republic** (CAR) by President André-Felix Patassé to help put down a coup attempt. **Human rights** activists accused the MLC fighters of committing atrocities against civilians in the course of conflict in the CAR. In March 2003, Patassé was ousted, and the government that replaced him pressed charges against Patassé and Bemba in September 2004. International arrest warrants were issued, but because the new government of CAR was unable to have Bemba arrested, it referred the matter to the International Criminal Court (ICC) while Bemba was serving as one of the four vice presidents in the transitional government in charge of Economic and Financial Commissions.

In presidential elections, Bemba was one of 33 candidates who ran on 30 July 2006. However, according to results announced on 20 August, Kabila won 44.8 percent of the vote and Bemba won 20 percent. The two presidential candidates faced each other in a second round, held on 29 October. The electoral commission announced the official results on 15 November, naming Kabila the winner with 58 percent of the vote. Bemba's supporters alleged fraud; however, on 27 November 2006, the Congolese Supreme Court rejected the fraud charges brought by Bemba and confirmed Kabila as the newly elected Congolese **president**. A day later, Bemba said that he disagreed with the court's decision, but that "in the greater national interest and to preserve peace and to save the country from chaos and violence," he would participate in the system by leading the political

**opposition.** In January 2007, Bemba ran for and won a Senate seat from **Kinshasa**.

A dispute over Bemba's personal guard led to an outbreak of fighting near Bemba's residence in Kinshasa from 22 to 24 March 2007 between Bemba's guards and the presidential guard. It seemed that Bemba's guard did not obey a 15 March deadline to register at a military base in order to be incorporated into the **military**. Bemba called for a ceasefire and negotiations and took refuge in the **South African** embassy. On 11 April, Bemba left the South African embassy and was taken to the airport by **Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo** (MONUC) forces, then flown out of the country to Portugal, along with his wife and children. While in Portugal, ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo decided on 22 May 2007 to open investigations into crimes committed in the CAR. One day later, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC found reasonable grounds to believe that Bemba bore individual criminal responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the CAR between 25 October 2002 and 15 March 2003, and the ICC issued a sealed warrant for his arrest. He was charged with five counts of war crimes (murder, rape, torture, "**pillages**," and outrages upon personal dignity) and three counts of crimes against humanity (murder, rape, and torture). On 24 May 2008, Bemba was arrested near Brussels. He was surrendered to the ICC on 3 July 2008 and transferred to its detention center in The Hague, Holland.

**BEMBA, SAOLONA JEAN (?–2009).** One of Congo's wealthiest citizens and owner of the Association Nationale des Entrepreneurs food marketing group and **Scibe Airlift** airline. From **Équateur Province**, he was a close collaborator of **Mobutu Sese Seko**. He remained in the country after the fall of Mobutu, however, and in 1998 rejected the rebel movement of his son, **Jean-Pierre Bemba**. In March 1999, he was appointed minister of economy and industry in the **Laurent Kabila** government. He was elected senator in January 2007 for the province of **Sud-Ubangi**. He died two years later.

**BENGUELA RAILWAY.** A **railway** built by the Portuguese in the 1920s and opened in 1931. The 1,400-km-long Benguela railway links **Katanga** to the Angolan port of Benguela, near Lobito, on the



Atlantic coast. At **Dilolo**, the railway meets a Congolese rail network that connects the former Katanga and **Kasai** provinces to **Zambia** and southern Africa. The Benguela route is the most cost effective way to transport minerals from Katanga to the coast. However, it was closed in 1974 by guerrillas fighting against the Portuguese colonial administration of **Angola** and the Angolan government that took power following independence in 1975. When Congo and Angola established relations in 1978, they officially reopened the route and a few trains traveling under heavy guard passed through. However, guerrillas of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) demonstrated they could sabotage the track at will. UNITA announced in 1987, however, that it would allow the reopening of the railway and again in 1991 said it was reopening the route with help from **Belgium**. Nevertheless, it remained closed for many years because of tensions between UNITA and the government. As a result, minerals from Katanga were exported primarily via the **National Way** and through **Tanzania** and southern Africa.

**BENI.** A town located in northeastern Congo, lying immediately west of the Virunga National Park and the **Rwenzori Mountains** on the edge of **Ituri Forest**. It was home of several **Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo** (MONUC) bases.

**BENUE-CONGO.** A term used by linguists to denote a group of African **languages** that include the **Bantu** tongues. Bantu and Adamawa-Eastern, spoken by a small portion of the Congolese **population**, form the Niger–Congo linguistic division of Benue–Congo.

**BERLIN CONFERENCE (1884–1885).** On 15 November 1884, 13 European nations gathered in Berlin, with the **United States** as an observer, to settle border disputes and the peaceful partition of Africa. During the meeting, major European powers partitioned the **Congo Basin** among **France**, **Portugal**, and **Belgium**. The participants recognized **Leopold II's International Association of Congo** and acknowledged him as sovereign of the territory that would become the **Congo Free State**.

The conference ended with the General Act of Berlin, signed on 26 February 1885, under which the powers agreed that Congo should

be governed by certain principles: freedom of trade and navigation, neutrality in the event of war, suppression of **slave** traffic, and improvement of the condition of the indigenous people. History shows that these principles were widely disregarded in Congo, as well as in many other colonies. The Act of Berlin formally ended the “scramble for Africa” and launched the colonial era. It also institutionalized a partition that left, as its heritage, 54 balkanized African states, whose borders cut across traditional African political and ethnic boundaries, and created on the continent a mosaic of linguistic, judicial, political, and economic systems.

**BINZA GROUP.** Named after a suburban neighborhood of **Kinshasa** in which a number of wealthy Congolese leaders lived, the Binza Group was an informal caucus that emerged in late 1961. Its principal members included the army commander **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu**, security police chief **Victor Nendaka**, foreign minister **Justin Bomboko**, **central bank** president Albert Ndele, and interior minister permanent secretary Damien Kandolo. The last three members of the group served in the **College of Commissioners** that replaced the **parliament** for six months in 1960–61. **Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula** was consistently supported by the group and in close communication with it, but was not a participant. The Binza Group was critical of the **Joseph Kasavubu presidency** and the fractiousness of parliament. Following the **coup d'état** of November 1965, Mobutu sent many of its prominent members abroad as ambassadors, ostensibly to explain the goals of the new regime but in reality to reduce any threat to him. Some of the members were later arrested and accused of plotting against the Mobutu **government**.

**BIRINDWA, FAUSTIN (1943–1999).** A technocrat who, in the early years of the **democratic transition**, was a senior advisor to **opposition** leader Étienne Tshisekedi and the **Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social** (UDPS). He was designated finance **minister** in the Tshisekedi **government** of October 1991, which never assumed office, and foreign minister in the government of August 1992, which did. After **Mobutu Sese Seko** dismissed Tshisekedi in February 1993, Birindwa was appointed **prime minister** by the pro-Mobutu **Forces Politiques du Conclave** on 18 March 1993. He was expelled

from the UDPS and the **Sacred Union**. His government, which included six former activists in the Sacred Union, attempted to address Congo's economic crisis. In September 1993, it announced monetary reform and launched the "new **zaire**" **currency**. Birindwa's government also tried to organize **elections** but was continuously challenged by the Sacred Union, which refused to recognize its authority and maintained Tshisekedi was still the legitimate prime minister.

The Birindwa government was replaced following the agreement that created the **Haut Conseil de la République/Parlement de la Transition** (HCR/PT) that in June 1994 elected **Léon Kengo wa Dondo** as prime minister in a vote that was also disputed by the opposition. Birindwa died on 29 April 1999.

**BISENGIMANA, REMA BARTHÉLEMY (? –1979)**. An engineering graduate from **Lovanium University**, he began his administrative career in the Office of **President Mobutu Sese Seko** in 1969 as secretary-general in charge of technology. He was promoted chief of staff or director of Mobutu's office in 1970. A **Tutsi** from **Rwanda**, Bisengimana was the architect of all Mobutu's policies in the early 1970s, including the 1972 law on citizenship, which conferred citizenship on people of Rwandan descent, and the **Zairianization** policy, which gave nationalized businesses to Congolese. In 1977, he was accused of pocketing more than his share of commissions from a **Kisangani**-based textile plant. He died two years later.

**BLACK MARKET**. *See* CURRENCY; ECONOMY.

**BOA**. An influential ethnic group that lives in **Bas-Uele Province**, a former district of the former **Orientale Province**. In an extensive study, ethnologist Jan Vansina noted that the Boa are primarily a patrilineal group that has no clans but operates on a system of lineages, each with its senior male member and usually including **slaves**. Newcomers to the region, if comprising a large enough group, are allowed to form their own lineage.

**BOBOLIKO LOKONGA MONSE MIHOMO, ANDRÉ (1934– )**. A union leader considered by many to be the father of trade unionism in Congo, Boboliko was born on 15 August 1934 at Lobamiti

in the former **Bandundu Province**. He attended Catholic secondary schools in **Leopoldville** and worked at a printing shop there until he was sent on a scholarship to Louvain, **Belgium**, to study social work. In 1959, he returned to Congo and was elected secretary-general (*administrateur national*) of the Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens du Congo, a major union. In 1960, Boboliko was elected secretary-general of the Union des Travailleurs Congolais (UTC), one of three major Congolese trade unions. He was a member of the **College of Commissioners** that replaced the **parliament** in 1960–61 and was elected president of the UTC in 1961.

When the trade unions were united by the government under the banner of the **Union Nationale des Travailleurs Congolais** (UNTC) in 1967, Boboliko was elected secretary-general of that organization. He was appointed to the **Political Bureau** of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) in 1968 and a member of its **Central Committee** in 1980. With the advent of multipartyism in 1990, Boboliko joined the **Parti Démocrate et Social Chrétien** (PDSC) of **Joseph Ileo** and was elected its vice president. Following Ileo's death in 1994, Boboliko assumed the presidency of the PDSC and Ileo's post of vice president in the **Haut Conseil de la République/Parlement de la Transition**. He was elected in January 2007 as senator for the newly created province of **Mai-Ndombe**.

**BOBOZO SALELO, LOUIS (GENERAL) (1915–1982)**. A war hero who was one of the commanders approving the **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu coup d'état** of November 1965 and who commanded the Congolese **armed forces** from the 1970s until his death in July 1982. Bobozo began his army career in the **Force Publique** in 1933 at the age of 18. He rose through the ranks and at **independence** was one of the highest-ranking of Congolese officers. He was a warrant officer stationed at Camp Hardy in Thysville when the army mutinied following independence. After the **mutiny**, he was promoted to colonel and made commander of Camp Hardy.

**BODHO, PIERRE MARINI (ARCHBISHOP) (1938– )**. Born on 30 March in Zeu, Mahagi Territory in **Ituri Province**, Archbishop Bodho became the head of the **Église du Christ au Congo** (which includes most **Protestant Church** denominations in Congo) after

the death of **Bokeleale Itofo Jean**. Bodho holds a doctorate in theology from the Faculté Libre de Théologie Protestante de Paris and degrees in comparative law and secondary education. From 2003 to 2006, he served as the president of the Transitional Senate. He was chosen because most Congolese politicians viewed him as a reasonably neutral and consensual figure, and as a representative of the organized religion of the civil society. He has been married since February 1957 with Charlotte Kabengi Ayenya, and he is the father of seven children.

**BOKELEALE ITOFO, JEAN (ARCHBISHOP) (? –1997).** Head of the **Église du Christ au Congo** that includes most **Protestant Church** denominations in the country. Originally from the former **Équateur Province**, Bokeleale was educated and ordained in the Disciples of Christ denomination. **Opposition** leaders criticized him for not speaking out about the excesses of the **Mobutu Sese Seko** government, as the **Catholic Church** and its more vocal leader, Archbishop **Joseph Malula** did. However, supporters pointed out that under his guidance, the smaller Protestant Church prospered and stayed out of fractious politics. Bokeleale died in 1997 and was replaced by **Bodho Pierre Marini**.

**BOLIKANGO AKPOLOKAKA-NZUBE, JEAN (1909–1982).** An early political leader who attended the **Round Table Conferences** and served in a number of **governments** following **independence**. Bolikango was born in February 1909 in **Leopoldville** to parents originally from the former **Équateur Province**. He studied and later taught with the Scheut Fathers. He joined the **Mouvement National Congolais** (MNC) and led its conservative wing for a short time, but split with it to form the Parti de l'Unité Nationale (PUNA), of which he became president. In 1960, Bolikango ran for **president** under the PUNA banner. He was arrested when **Patrice Lumumba** declared martial law in August 1960. He later served as vice prime minister and information minister in the **Joseph Ileo** government and as vice prime minister in the **Cyrille Adoula** government. Following the **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu coup d'état**, he served as minister of public works in the government of **Léonard Mulamba** and was appointed to the **Political Bureau** of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolu-**

**tion** (MPR) in 1968 and to its **Central Committee** in 1980. He died of an illness in February 1982.

**BOMA.** A **Bantu** ethnic group that lives in the **Mai-Ndombe Province** along the **Congo River** north of the **Kwa/Kasai River**. The Boma (Baboma) are considered a relatively heterogeneous group that traces its origins to the **Tio Kingdom** of the pre-colonial era.

**BOMA (CITY).** An early capital of the **Congo Free State** (CFS) and one of Congo's three **ports** accommodating ocean-going ships, Boma lies on the north side of the **Congo River**, about halfway between **Matadi** and the Atlantic Ocean. As part of the administrative reorganization of 1978, Boma was made an urban subregion. With an estimated **population** of 300,000 in 2005 (182,930 in 1982), Boma is larger than Matadi, but Matadi's location at the head of the **railway** leading to **Kinshasa** makes it a more important commercial center. Boma acts as a transport center for the agricultural and textile products arriving from the Bas-Fleuve subregion. Its links to Kinshasa were improved in the 1980s by the paving of the **road** to Matadi and the construction of a bridge over the Congo River at Matadi.

**BOMBOKO LOKUMBA IS ELENGE, JUSTIN-MARIE (1928– ).** Bomboko was born on 22 September 1928, in Boleke, former **Équateur Province**, and attended **Catholic Church** schools in 1945–51. He studied political science at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, where he headed the **student** association before returning to Congo shortly before **independence**. He headed the **College of Commissioners**, a group of young intellectuals who governed in 1960–61 during the period of “neutralization” of **parliament** following the first standoff between **President Joseph Kasavubu** and **Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba**. He served as foreign minister in the **Joseph Ileo government** after Lumumba's death. Except for the period in 1964–65 when **Moïse Tshombe** was prime minister, Bomboko remained foreign minister until 1969, when he was named ambassador to Washington. He was recalled in 1970 and was arrested following the unrest of 1971. Bomboko remained out of politics for nearly 10 years thereafter, devoting himself primarily to business, although he was appointed vice first state commissioner (equivalent to deputy

prime minister) in 1981 for a brief period. He retired from politics in the mid-1990s.

**BOSHONGO (or BUSHONG).** A major subgroup of the **Kuba** nation that lives in **Kasai Province** around Deseke, north of **Ilebo**. Boshongo initially were fishermen, but in the 17th century they began to grow maize, manioc, and tobacco, and eventually conquered some of neighboring **Lulua** and **Mongo** groups.

**BOYOMA FALLS.** Formerly known as *Stanley Falls* in the colonial era, the Boyoma Falls are cataracts on the **Congo River** between Ubundu and **Kisangani**, where **Henry Morton Stanley** began his voyage down the Congo River. The Boyoma Falls consist of seven cataracts, each no more than 5 m (15 feet) high, extending over 10 km (6 miles) along a curve of the Lualaba River between the river port towns of Ubundu and Kisangani in **Tshopo Province**. At the bottom of the falls, the Lualaba becomes the Congo River. It has a total drop of 61 m (200 feet). A rail line goes around the falls, connecting Kisangani and Ubundu.

**BRASSAGE DE L'ARMÉE [ARMY INTEGRATION].** A prerequisite to fair and free **elections** was the integration of armed factions involved in the **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila** into a new national army called *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC) and the demobilization of those who were surplus or unsuited to the needs of the FARDC after the signing of the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI) in December 2002. To achieve this goal, a number of centers of integration (*centres de brassage*) were opened across the country and accepted their first intake of military units in February and March 2005.

However, commanders of various military forces were reluctant to enter wholeheartedly into the process and kept their best forces away from these centers. Other military commanders refused to reveal the real size of their troops because they benefited financially from a massive overstatement of the forces under their command. The issue of integration contributed to two major military and political crises in **Nord-Kivu** and **Sud-Kivu** and remained until late 2008 a

military security threat because one of the former commanders of the FARDC, General **Laurent Nkunda**, refused to integrate his troops. From 2004 until late 2008, he was a major destabilizing element in Nord-Kivu. He was arrested in late January 2009 in Rwanda. *See also* SECOND CONGO WAR.

**BRUSSELS, TREATY OF (1890).** A treaty signed following a conference convened in Brussels from 18 November 1889 to 2 July 1890 to address the problem of **slavery** in the **Congo Free State** (CFS). The conference was called partly in reaction to public outcry in Europe and the **United States** over reports of mistreatment of Congolese by officers of the CFS and private companies. The treaty was signed by most participants on 2 January 1892. In the treaty, **Leopold II** agreed to reforms but also won the right to impose a 10 percent import tax to defray administrative costs.

**BRUSSELS WORLD FAIR.** The Brussels World Fair was held in the fall of 1958. Belgian leaders, anxious to show their accomplishments in one of Africa's largest colonies, brought large numbers of Congolese to Brussels to participate. These individuals ranged from traditional **chiefs** to the up-and-coming *évolués*. During the fair, young Congolese, such as **Patrice Lumumba** and **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu**, began to realize how isolated they had been from the rest of the world. They came into contact with Africans from other colonies: with leaders from Ghana, which had been granted independence the previous year, and with leaders from the French colonies that had elected representatives to the French government and were on the verge of receiving some form of autonomy. This contact with more mature independence movements seems to have been a major factor in setting the stage for the demands by Congolese, beginning in late 1958, for immediate **independence**.

**BUKAVU.** The capital of **Kivu Province** until the province was divided into three provinces as part of administrative reforms in 1988. The town emerged in the early 1900s and was known as *Nyalukemba*. The colonial administration renamed it *Constermansville*. Bukavu is presently the capital of **Sud-Kivu** and is located on the southern shore of **Lake Kivu** near the border with **Rwanda**. With an area of



about 60 square km and an estimated **population** of 476,000 in 2004 (158,465 in 1982), Bukavu lies in one of the most densely populated areas of Congo. Located in the mountains along a major **trade** route with East Africa, Bukavu was an important trading center until the 1970s, but, by the 1980s, had been replaced as the main urban center in the region by **Goma**, capital of **Nord-Kivu**, lying on the northern tip of Lake Kivu.

In 1994, Bukavu became one of three major **refugee** centers after being inundated by 200,000 refugees fleeing the civil war in Rwanda. In October 1996, rebels of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) and Rwandan troops, led by veteran **opposition** leader **Laurent Kabila**, seized Bukavu in one of the first victories of the offensive that overthrew the **Mobutu Sese Seko** government in May of the following year. In August 1998, Rwanda supported the rebel **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD) against Kabila. The RCD was dominated by the **Banyamulenge**, and Bukavu saw sporadic fighting between government troops and the RCD, especially in 2004.

**BUMBA.** A river **port** on the **Congo River** in northern Congo. Bumba, sometimes called “the gateway to the northeast,” is located between the two provincial capitals of **Mbandaka** and **Kisangani**. It was the port of embarkation for goods traveling by **railway** to Isiro, Buta, and Bongo in the northeastern corner of the country.

**BUNIA.** The capital city of **Ituri Province**. It lies at an elevation of 1,275 m on a plateau about 30 km west of **Lake Albert** and the Great Rift Valley, and about 25 km east of the **Ituri Forest**. The city was the scene of the **Ituri conflict** between the **Lendu** and the **Hema** from 1999 to 2006. A French-led force had to be dispatched to Bunia to provide humanitarian assistance and to help the troops of the **Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo** (MONUC) assert their authority over armed militias backed by **Ugandan** forces. The conflict resulted in the death of more than 60,000 people. Consequently, the city was the base for one of the largest United Nations peacekeeping forces in Congo during the transition from 2002 to 2006. The area's natural resources include **gold**, oil, and **diamonds**.

**BURUNDI, RELATIONS WITH.** Burundi is a small, densely populated country of 27,830 square km with an estimated population of 7.5 million in 2005. It was originally colonized by the Germans but administered by **Belgium** after World War I. It lies along Congo's eastern border and on the banks of **Lake Tanganyika**, where its remote location caused it to be somewhat neglected by Belgian colonial authorities. Relations between Congo and Burundi have been close since the two countries gained **independence**. **Mobutu Sese Seko** helped mediate a dispute between Burundi and **Tanzania** in 1972 after a group of dissidents took refuge in Tanzania following a failed coup to overthrow the government of Burundian President Michel Micombero and the genocide that ensued in which 200,000 people were killed. Relations were further strengthened in 1976 when Burundi joined Congo and **Rwanda** in forming the **Communauté Économique des Pays des Grands Lacs** (CEPGL).

In the 1980s, President Mobutu exchanged numerous visits with Presidents Jean-Baptiste Bagaza and his replacement, Pierre Buyoya. Mobutu also supported Burundi's bid to host the France–Africa summit in December 1984, which was attended by nearly two dozen heads of state. Congo supported Burundi's democratic transition, in which President Buyoya's **Tutsi**-dominated military handed power to an elected civilian government led by **Hutu** politician Melchior Ndadaye.

The assassination of President Ndadaye in 1993 by Tutsi soldiers sparked a series of interethnic clashes in which hundreds of people were killed and tens of thousands were forced to flee to eastern Congo. President Mobutu joined other East African presidents in trying to mediate the conflict. In mid-1996, in the face of rising instability due to clashes between Hutu and Tutsi, Buyoya returned to power in a military coup. Burundi's neighbors imposed tough economic sanctions against the country and refused to allow Buyoya to attend regional conferences. In October 1996, rebels of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL), led by Congolese Tutsi, launched an offensive in eastern Congo, near the Burundian border, and in seven months seized **Kinshasa**, driving Mobutu into exile. Relations between Burundi and the government of **Laurent Kabila**, installed in May 1997, initially were excellent, but

soured the following year, when Burundi backed a rebellion against the Kabila government. In retaliation, Kabila supported Burundian rebels in order to destabilize their country. In early 2005, ethnic quotas were formed for determining positions in Burundi's government. Throughout the year, elections for parliament and president occurred. To this day, conflicts between the Hutu and the Tutsi continue. As of 2008, the Burundian government is talking with the Hutu-led Palipehutu-National Liberation Forces (NLF) to bring peace within the country.

**BUTEMBO.** The largest city in **Nord-Kivu** province, Butembo is located in the northeastern part of Congo lying west of the Virunga National Park. It is divided into four communes that include Bulengera, Kimemi, Mususa, and Vutamba. Butembo is an important commercial center with an estimated population of 250,000 inhabitants in 2006, according to city officials.

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**CAISSE NATIONALE D'ÉPARGNE ET DE CRÉDIT IMMOBILIER (CNECI) [NATIONAL SAVING AND MORTGAGE LOAN BANK].** The CNECI was Congo's national savings and loan institution. It was established by the **government** to promote savings and to help citizens purchase homes or finance mortgages. The CNECI, which tended to favor the wealthy *élite*, was bankrupted by the **inflation** of the early 1990s; by 1993 it had virtually ceased operations.

**CÃÃO, DIOGO (ca. 1450– ?).** A Portuguese **explorer** who was the first European to land at the mouth of the **Congo River** in 1483, a decade before Christopher Columbus reached America. In the 1480s, Cão visited the area several times, establishing contacts with the **Kingdom of Kongo**, bringing Portuguese **missionaries** to the kingdom, and taking nobles from the Kongo's court to **Portugal**.

**CASEMENT, ROBERT (1864–1916).** British consul to the **Congo Free State (CFS)**, commissioned by the British government in the

early 1900s to report on **labor** conditions. His report, published in 1904, was one of those that, along with **missionary** reports and the works of **Edmund Dene Morel**, aroused public opinion in **Great Britain** and the **United States** against abuses in the CFS and **Leopold II**'s sovereignty over it.

**CATARACTES.** A district of former **Bas-Congo Province** named after the cataracts formed by the **Mayombe Mountains** that render the **Congo River** unnavigable for 200 km and contribute to the country's status as a "semi-enclave" state. The former district is a relatively fertile area with an estimated **population** of 1.3 million in 2005 (590,793 in 1982) that engages in farming, **livestock** raising, and some trading.

**CATHOLIC CHURCH, ROMAN.** The Catholic Church has been the largest organized religious system in Congo since the turn of the 20th century. The Vatican's *Annuario Pontificio* states that 50 percent of the **population** of Congo is Catholic. The Church has played a significant role in political life, sometimes acting as the conscience of the nation.

Catholic **missionaries** first arrived in Congo in 1482 and heavily influenced life in the **Kongo Kingdom** for nearly 100 years. They converted a number of kings and **chiefs** to **Christianity** and established missions, churches, and schools. The influence of Catholic priests slowly declined in the 1600s as the Kingdom of Kongo was struck by a number of natural calamities, such as the invasions of locusts and famines. This influence almost disappeared in late 1600s. Around 1700, a woman **prophet**, called **Kimpa Vita Nsimba Ndona Beatriz**, began to claim that she was in contact with heaven. Her movement was stopped when the prophetess was condemned and burned for heresy.

Organized missionary activity resumed in 1870 as European interest in the **Congo River Basin** reawakened as the result of Cardinal Charles Lavigerie's plea against the Arab **slave** trade when he was Archbishop of Algiers. He persuaded Pope Leon XIII to evangelize east Africa to counter the influence of Islam in the Congo River Basin. Lavigerie requested the support of King **Leopold II** to sensitize Belgians to the idea. The king approved the project but requested that

priests sent to the **Congo Free State** (CFS) be Belgians. Although the Catholic Church received legal status in the CFS, it was not until 26 May 1906 that King Leopold II and the pope signed a Concordat that gave the church an official role in helping to colonize the CFS. Under the agreement, **Belgium** subsidized most mission activities and missionary groups and appointed Catholic representatives to advisory boards of the colonial government. The main task conferred upon the missions by the colonial authorities was in the field of **education**. Hundreds of parochial schools were set up during the first decades of the 20th century; beginning in 1925, the colonial government further encouraged these efforts by subsidizing (primarily Catholic) mission schools to train Congolese. The role of the Catholic Church in education was limited to primary education and post-primary vocational schools (usually three years). The first university, **Lovanium University**, was founded by the Catholic Church only in 1954. The sole avenue to secondary school and higher education before 1954 was thus through the seminaries. In 1917, the first Congolese priest was ordained and the first bishop was installed in 1956.

At the time of **independence**, there were approximately 500 African priests and four bishops. By 1962, Congo had 10 bishops, but had only a handful of university graduates from social sciences, humanities, and natural sciences. In addition to the educational work, the Church established clinics and hospitals, carried out large-scale baptism programs, and built many churches. In the 1980s, more than 700 missions were in the country, working primarily in education, **health care**, and to a lesser degree in **agriculture**. Many sects arose around the Catholic teachings, most notably the **Jamaa** and the **Katete**, which attempted to meld Catholic principles with African sensibilities and customs.

The Catholic Church has long been a political power in Congo, and alumni groups of the mission schools were among the first to condemn discrimination against Congolese and other abuses of colonialism. However, the Church as an institution usually worked with the authorities, both before and after independence, and often played a stabilizing social role. The Church came into open conflict with the state in the 1970s. **President Mobutu Sese Seko** nationalized Lovanium University in 1971 following **student** unrest. The **Au-**

**thenticity** program also irritated the Church, particularly the decree ordering Congolese to abandon their Christian names for “authentic” African ones and the attempts to convert parochial schools into lay institutions. The decrees outlawing all **youth** movements, except the **Jeunesse du Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (JMPR)**, the youth wing of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR)**, and ordering the establishment of JMPR branches in all schools and seminaries also irked the Church. The Church responded by threatening to close its seminaries.

On 12 January 1972, the journal *Afrique Chrétienne* questioned the policy of Authenticity and was closed down. The leader of the church, Cardinal **Joseph Malula**, also objected at that time to the use of hymns with the word *Mobutu* substituted for *God* in the lyrics. Malula was forced to leave the country, and his residence was sacked. In March 1972, the **Political Bureau** of the MPR announced religious services would no longer be part of official state functions. Later in the year, the government banned all religious television and **radio** broadcasts and prohibited religious church groups from meeting. In February 1973, 31 religious publications were banned. The antireligious moves came at a time when Mobutu, influenced by the People’s Republic of **China** and North Korea, wished to establish the unquestioned supremacy of party and state. However, the measures were resented by many citizens who remained highly religious and many of the decrees were eventually relaxed.

Church–state relations soured again a few years later when the Catholic Church condemned **corruption** and the decline of morality in the country. However, efforts were made to accommodate some government policies, and Pope **John Paul II**’s visit in 1980 signaled a rapprochement. The pope paid a second visit to Congo in 1985, this time beatifying a Congolese nun, **Nengapeta Anuarite Marie-Clémentine**, who was killed by **Simba** rebels during the eastern **rebellion** of the early 1960s.

During the late 1980s, Catholic leaders became increasingly critical of the Congolese **government** and society. A group of priests wrote a public letter in 1987 decrying the moral degeneration of the society. Malula died on 14 June 1989, at the age of 72 years, in Louvain, after a lengthy illness. The bishop of **Mbandaka**, Monsignor

**Etsou Nzab-Bamungwabi Frédéric**, was named archbishop of **Kinshasa** in 1990, then raised to the rank of cardinal, replacing Malula as titular head of the Catholic Church in the country.

Many more letters criticizing the elite and the moral decay of society were issued in the 1990s. On 16 February 1992, priests and their followers organized a march in Kinshasa, called the *Christian March* or *Marche d'Espoir* (March of Hope) on a Sunday following Mass, requesting the resumption of the **National Conference** stalled by Mobutu. The march was violently crushed by security forces, resulting in 46 deaths. In August 1998, when **Rwanda** invaded Congo in support of the rebel group, **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD), the Catholic Church vehemently condemned the invasion, and most priests in eastern Congo even called on parishioners to boycott goods from Rwanda in protest. During the transitional government, from 2003 to 2006, the Catholic Church was again critical of corruption and moral decay of the government. However, the political role of the Catholic Church has declined since the 2006 elections, as the result of a dispute between **Appolinaire Malu Malu**, president of the **Commission Électorale Indépendante** (CEI) and Cardinal Etsou. Etsou criticized Malu Malu of being biased toward President **Joseph Kabila** at the expense of challenger **Jean-Pierre Bemba** during presidential elections.

The Interdiocesan Center in Kinshasa is the primary coordinating body of the Church in Congo. Major orders present in the country include Assumptionist, Jesuit, Dominican, Paulist, Sacred Heart, Capuchin, Marist Brothers, Brothers of the Christian Schools, Sisters of Mary, Sisters of the Sacred Heart of Mary, and Sisters of Saint Joseph.

## **CENTRAL AFRICAN CUSTOMS AND ECONOMIC UNION.**

*See* UNION DOUANIÈRE ET ÉCONOMIQUE DE L'AFRIQUE CENTRALE (UDEAC).

## **CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, RELATIONS WITH.**

The Central African Republic (CAR) is a small, landlocked country of an estimated 4.4 million people (2005), with 622,980 square km of territory. Lying along Congo's northern border, the CAR has historically maintained good relations with the government of Congo. Because

of its isolation and smaller size, it has usually been a junior partner in any joint endeavors. The government in Bangui had warm ties with the government of **Mobutu Sese Seko**, who was from a small town on the southern side of the **Ubangi River**, which forms a large part of the border between the two countries, and whose family is said to have originated in part from the CAR.

The CAR depends on the Ubangi and **Congo Rivers** (the former only navigable between six and eight months of the year) for most of its overland transportation and commerce, and as a result it tries to maintain good relations with Congo and **Congo-Brazzaville**, its other neighbor downriver. During the war against **Laurent Kabila**, the **Mouvement de Libération du Congo** (MLC) of **Jean-Pierre Bemba** became involved in **human rights** violations in order to quell a coup to remove President Ange Patassé of the CAR.

From September 2003 to late 2004, the government of CAR closed the border between the two countries. It partly reopened it to traffic in August 2004. The Bangui authorities placed conditions on a complete reopening of their border with Congo. Among these preconditions was the disarmament and demobilization of former troops of the ousted CAR President Ange-Félix Patassé, stationed in Zongo, Congo. In early 2005, a mixed commission was set up to examine the practicalities of this precondition. This precondition was solved in 2007. In late December, a joint session of government representing both countries signed a memorandum of understanding to reopen the common border. *See also* CHAD, RELATIONS WITH.

**CENTRAL BANK.** As the **government's** central **banking** and clearing house for **currency** and foreign exchange, the central bank was called the *Banque Centrale du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi* during the colonial era. The bank was known as *Conseil Monétaire du Congo* from 1961 to 1964, when its name was changed to *Banque Centrale du Congo*. During the **Mobutu Sese Seko** years, when Congo was called **Zaire**, the bank became known as the *Banque Nationale du Zaïre* (BNZ). The name was again changed to *Banque Nationale du Congo* (BNC) after the fall of Mobutu in May 1997. Despite these name changes, the governor of the central bank has been always appointed by the president. Thus, the Central Bank of Congo has never had a monetary policy independent from the government.



In 1978, as part of an economic stabilization agreement with the **International Monetary Fund** (IMF), the government permitted an official chosen by the IMF to assume the position of principal director (second to the bank governor) in order to curb excessive and unofficial disbursements of scarce foreign exchange. A former director of West Germany's central bank, Erwin Blumenthal, was the first foreigner appointed principal director of the central bank as part of the IMF agreement. Blumenthal's job was to help bank officials control irregularities in the disbursement of Congo's foreign exchange. However, it turned into a quixotic attempt to prevent barons of the Mobutu regime from raiding state coffers.

In December 1978, Blumenthal shocked Congolese business and political leaders by prohibiting 51 prominent Congolese businessmen from drawing foreign exchange from the central bank because of debts and irregular dealings with the bank. One of those affected by the measure was **Litho Moboti**, Mobutu's uncle and head of the family financial empire. Seven others were members of the **Political Bureau** of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR). Blumenthal left in 1979 and was replaced by another, less flamboyant IMF executive. In 1983, Blumenthal again shook the Mobutu government in a report detailing incidents of corruption by senior officials and the presidency. The report was meant to be confidential but was leaked to the public and became an important piece of evidence in hearings by the U.S. Congress. During the 1980s and 1990s, Congolese more intimately involved with the inner workings of the system wrote about what came to be known as the *Congolese kleptocracy*, but Blumenthal provided one of the first documented insights into official corruption under the Mobutu regime.

The bank adopted austerity measures and restricted purchases of foreign exchange for luxury items. The attempts, were, however, considered largely ineffective until 1983, when, as part of a package of fiscal and monetary reforms, the government began to allow private banks to sell foreign exchange and the currency was floated on the free market. Following the collapse of the formal economic sector in the early 1990s, the central bank became known for issuing larger and larger currency notes, which were used to pay soldiers and civil servants and which frequently were traded directly on the parallel market in exchange for foreign currency. *See also* ECONOMY; "WALL STREET."

**CENTRAL COMMITTEE.** A 120-member body of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) that **President Mobutu Sese Seko** created on 2 September 1980 to assume most legislative functions within the party-state during the 1980s. It became the basic consultative body for the president and the **Political Bureau** and was responsible for debating laws proposed by the latter. Members were appointed by the Political Bureau or, more specifically, by Mobutu. The **Legislative Council**, the members of which were chosen in popular elections, remained but primarily as an organ that ratified the laws emanating from the executive branch and the party. The Central Committee declined in influence following the announcement in 1990 of the **democratic transition**, in part because the **National Conference** increasingly became the forum for legislative-style debate and many of the Central Committee's members left to form their own **political parties**.

**CENTRE D'ENTRAÎNEMENT DES TROUPES AÉRONAUTIQUES (CETA) [CENTER AERONAUTICAL TRAINING].** The training center for Congo's airborne forces, based at **Ndjili Airport** on the outskirts of **Kinshasa**. CETA gained notoriety for sparking the "**pillages**" or looting that began on 23 September 1991 and spread to various urban centers. The violence began over dissatisfaction with low and late pay but became generalized when the local population joined in the "pillages." It brought a Franco-Belgian military intervention and the evacuation of 10,000 expatriates. *See also* MILITARY.

**CHAD, RELATIONS WITH.** Congo and Chad have had close relations since they became independent. Congo sent troops to Chad in the late 1960s to bolster the François Tombalbaye government in the face of a northern rebellion. In 1981, **Mobutu Sese Seko** supplied troops as part of the **Organization of African Unity** (OAU) peace-keeping force sent to Chad to protect the government of Goukouni Oueddai. In 1983, Congolese troops, including the **Kamanyola Division**, were dispatched again and remained for two years after the Goukouni forces, driven from Ndjamena by supporters of Hissen Habré, threatened to return in an offensive backed by **Libya**. Chad-ian soldiers were frequently sent to Congo for training, and Mobutu visited Chad many times.

In the economic sector, Chad joined Congo in 1968 in forming the Union des États de l'Afrique Centrale (UEAC), but the move was greeted with hostility by Cameroon, **Congo-Brazzaville**, and Gabon, which had already joined Chad and the CAR in the **France-backed Union Douanière et Économique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC)** customs union. The organization disbanded in the 1970s. Chad and Congo eventually joined UDEAC in the 1980s. Both were founding members in September 1983 of the 11-nation **Economic Community of Central African States**.

The relationship with the **Laurent Kabila** government remained friendly and, in 1998, when Kabila was fighting a **civil war**, the government of Chad dispatched troops to Congo to help Kabila's troops against the rebels. Since 1998, relations between Congo and Chad remain cordial, although trade between the two countries remains quite small, averaging less than 1 percent per year.

**CHIEFS.** This is the titular head of a traditional political entity ranging in size from a small village to a feudal state. Often the chief's most important function was to perform religious rituals, settle disputes, and protect the land. Among a number of ethnic groups, chiefs are believed to control the weather and intercede with the ancestors to settle disputes. Some societies developed elaborate chieftaincy structures. For example, in the **Luba** and **Teke** empires, groups of villages formed chiefdoms, several chiefdoms formed a province, and all the provinces formed a kingdom.

Chiefs rarely made decisions alone and usually only after consulting a council of elders. A notable exception was the **Zande** group, which developed a system of supreme chiefs who delegated their power and privileges to subordinates. Some chiefdoms, such as among the **Nande** and the **Shi**, were hereditary. Some were appointed, as in some Luba societies. Others were assumed on the basis of wealth. Some were elected, and others were chosen through a combination of means.

After the proclamation of the **Congo Free State (CFS)**, chiefs were expected to provide links between the **administration** and traditional societies. The creation of native space or chieftaincies (*chefferies*) occurred in 1891. The basis of the law was "indirect rule," in which *chefferies* were established to help the colonial administration rule

the vast territory of the **Congo River Basin**. However, the colonial administration appointed chiefs to societies that lacked the institution of chieftaincy and kept hereditary chiefs in societies that accepted a single ruler. The decree of 18 April 1906 recognized the traditional authority of chiefs as representatives of the state and, in August, the colonial administration acknowledged 450 chiefs in the CFS. All chiefs were under state protection and received a regular salary, so that their obligation was to provide order and justice to their people. The chiefs' major responsibility was to administer **customary law**, which was a separate legal system from colonial law, unless the law threatened the colonial order. Nonetheless, a European could not be tried under customary law, but an African could be tried under either of the two systems, depending on the nature of the charges. In the 1920s, the chieftaincies were subdivided into sectors. These divisions did not coincide with traditional boundaries and, as a result, created confusion.

Following **independence**, chiefs continued to exercise their functions, although the extent of their influence depended on their personal prestige and the amount of control they exerted over local administrative authorities. In a number of areas where sectors predominated, chiefs were forced from office in the immediate post-independence period and sometime replaced by party militants. Because of their alignment with the colonial power before independence and with moderate politicians thereafter, chiefs (especially sector chiefs) were often the targets of violence during the rebellions of 1964–66 in **Kwilu**, **Maniema**, and **Sankuru**. In other areas of eastern Congo, most chiefs enjoyed in practice a nearly total freedom of action, which inclined certain among them to abuse of power. During the administrative reforms of 1972–73, the **Mobutu Sese Seko** administration tried to transfer chiefs to other areas, as had been done with provincial or regional governors and military commanders, but was obliged to abandon the policy because of public protest regarding the transfer of hereditary chiefs. A few powerful chiefs even completely ignored the reform and remained in their positions. This was true of the Nyim of the **Kuba**, the Mwaant Yav of the **Lunda**, Kabare of the Shi, and Biondi of the Nande. In sum, the experiment with transferring chiefs lasted less than two years. In 1976, transferred chiefs were allowed to return to their original communities.

The reform failed to achieve its goal of incorporating chieftaincies into a centralized state system. Since then, the government for the most part has avoided centralizing attempts to develop policies toward or regulate the activities of traditional chiefs. Instead, it has tended to approach chiefs individually, or as a group in a certain area, to help solve specific problems and achieve specific goals, such as acquiring land for public use or obtaining local manpower for public works. Although not always visible to outsiders, traditional chiefs could influence **government** policy, especially if they had experience in dealing with government officials. Traditional chiefs were officially recognized in the **democratic transition**. A large number of them attended the **National Conference** in 1991–92, some as representatives of their officially recognized civic association.

The arrival of **Laurent Kabila** to power only reinforced chiefs' traditional legitimacy, especially after the **civil war** that began in early August 1998. The constitution of the Third Republic promulgated in February 2006 even reserved a number of seats for traditional chiefs to be represented in the provincial legislatures. In fact, of the 690 provincial assembly members, 632 were directly elected and 58 were co-opted in early January 2007 from among the customary chiefs. Because national senators are elected from provincial assemblies, chiefs are likely to be part of the Senate without being elected through universal suffrage.

**CHILD SOLDIERS.** The use of children as soldiers began in 1964 during the rebellion that almost toppled the central government. Approximately 60 percent of rebel forces under the leadership of **Gaston Soumialot** were youth between the ages of 12 and 17. Although many children were forced to join the rebellion, a large number of these youth saw an opportunity to gain a living by joining the **military**. In fact, these young people often migrated to urban centers, only to find little productive work. They had received a rudimentary education in mission schools, where they were often encouraged to abandon their traditional beliefs, but they were not given enough education or contact with the modern world to obtain economically useful skills or to develop a new and coherent system of values. Young people thus constituted a huge proportion of the population, but with no vested interest in the status quo. In the early 1960s, unemployment

was rampant, averaging no less than 91 percent per province, except in Southern **Katanga** and **Bas-Congo**, which represented two zones of economic prosperity. In rebellion and military service, these disenfranchised youth found the freedom to express a great degree of the aggression that probably had its origins in the frustration of poverty and lack of employment.

Again in the 1990s, as in the early 1960s, the Congolese economic situation was dire. Economic growth plummeted and remained negative. By the time **Laurent Kabila's** forces, the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL), crossed the Congo from east to west, youth were ready to follow him as an alternative to destitution under the **Mobutu Sese Seko** regime. The Mobutu state left them without hope; most schools were closed by the mid-1990s because of Mobutu's funneling of public funds to his private uses. From the 1970s to the 1980s, spending on education declined by more than 45 percent. Government spending on education plummeted further in 1991 and was almost zero after 1993. Without schools to provide opportunity, youth flocked to Kabila's army, which had approximately 25,000 children called the *kadogo* (**Kiswahili** for "little thing that means nothing"). Youth aged 13 to 19 joined the AFDL and traveled through the vast Congo **rainforest** until they reached **Kinshasa** from eastern **Kivu Province**.

This picture of youth as a dynamic group that toppled Mobutu should not cloud the fact that these children were mobilized only several weeks after the war had already started in **Sud-Kivu**. These young rebels did not affect the onset of the anti-Mobutu revolt. More importantly, the enlargement of the AFDL by youth recruitment was fueled by enthusiasm for unseating President Mobutu. The recruitment of children was an integral part of the policy of AFDL to increase the number of rebels. When a locality was conquered or controlled by rebels, the **population** was assembled in a public place to listen to political propaganda that blamed Mobutu as the cause of their misery, while boys who were already in the AFDL talked with local youth to encourage the uncommitted to enroll. Most of these children had no understanding of "state" or true government, which disappeared in the 1980s, beyond that of soldiers roaming the countryside.

A survey of youth done by the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) in Bukavu in late 1997 showed that children joined the

anti-Mobutu **civil war** for many different reasons. According to the survey, 25 percent of *kadogo* joined Kabila because he promised them generous compensation for their efforts to topple Mobutu; 28 percent decided to join because the civil war provided the only opportunity to make a living; 15 percent were convinced by other child soldiers to join; another 15 percent wanted revenge against abusive soldiers of the Congolese army; and 7 percent thought it was patriotic to do so. In short, 53 percent of child soldiers saw economic opportunity in joining the AFDL.

The story became quite different in the **Second Congo War** that started in early August 1998 against Kabila. Both the national army and other armed groups used child soldiers in their ranks. After being drugged, child soldiers were forced to kill people, loot villages, and terrorize people. A large number of children were abducted by militias on an ethnic basis. Many of these children were abused on a regular basis and forced to carry guns that were heavier than their body weight.

The situation was worse for girls. Girls associated with armed groups were often assaulted, raped, and infected with **acquired immune deficiency syndrome/human immunodeficiency virus** (AIDS/HIV). According to **human rights** reports published in 2007, more than 10,000 girls belonged to different armed groups operating in Congo. Thus, earlier **United Nations** (UN) programs advocating disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of all combatants had failed those girls. By late 2008, some human rights groups estimated that more than 15,000 children remained prisoners of armed groups operating in eastern Congo, especially in Nord-Kivu and Sud-Kivu provinces.

**CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF, RELATIONS WITH.** Following **independence**, relations between the Congolese **government** and China were cool because of Chinese support for the **Pierre Mulele** uprising and the eastern **rebellion**. Congo established diplomatic relations with China in 1972, several years after the end of the Congolese rebellions and upon the entrance of China as a member of the **United Nations**. The friendship between Congo and China deepened when both opposed the **Soviet**-backed Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) faction in the Angolan civil war.

**Mobutu Sese Seko** visited Beijing and North Korea in 1973 and, upon his return, announced he would radicalize the “Zairian revolution”; henceforth he would be addressed as “citizen,” and he would establish cooperative systems of production. The **nationalization** of foreign-owned businesses with annual gross incomes over 1 million **zaïres** (\$2 million in 1973) and an increased emphasis on cultural **Authenticity** followed shortly thereafter.

The Chinese government backed Congo during the **Shaba** invasions of 1977 and 1978, claiming they were the work of the Soviet-backed government in **Angola**. The Chinese built a convention hall called the “People’s Palace” in **Kinshasa** that was the venue for the **National Conference** of 1991–92. The hall is today home of both the lower and upper houses of parliament. China also provided assistance and training in agricultural, particularly rice, projects in Congo. The Mobutu government appreciated China’s support, which did not fluctuate with international opinion and the ups and downs of Congolese relations with Western governments. The Chinese government saw many parallels between Congo and its own large nation of disparate, struggling peoples. The relations between the two countries became even stronger with the advent of the **Laurent Kabila** administration.

When **Joseph Kabila** was elected **president** in 2006, he quickly invited China to help in rebuilding Congo. In late 2007, China and Congo signed a bilateral agreement under which Beijing would offer a \$8.5 billion line of credit to finance the building and rehabilitation of roads, railways, hospitals, and power and water plants in return for mining concessions and toll revenue deals. The deal was formalized in mid-2008. China was also the first country to begin some military cooperation with Congo. In a move to initiate some type of bilateral military cooperation, Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan was the first senior official visiting Congo since the founding of the new government in February 2007.

**CHOKWE (TSHOKWE).** A **Bantu ethnic group** related in many ways to the **Lunda**, with whom they are often at odds. The Chokwe were originally a seminomadic, matrilineal society of hunters and some traders from northeastern **Angola**; they were largely unknown to Europeans until the mid-1800s, when they began expanding rapidly into **Katanga**, **Kasai**, and the upper **Kwango** and **Kasai River**



areas. A people of the savannas, they were organized into groups of small chieftaincies that enabled them to raid Lunda settlements and, at one point, to take over the Lunda capital near what is now the Congo–**Zambia** border area. The Lunda halted the Chokwe expansion in the 1890s, but did not push them back.

Following **independence**, the Chokwe were an important political force in southern Congolese politics. For a time, they allied themselves with the **Association des Baluba du Katanga** (BALUBAKAT) because of their conflicts with the Lunda, who dominated the **Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga** (CONAKAT). In later years, however, their politics were characterized primarily by resentment against the national **government in Kinshasa**, which they felt appropriated the wealth of the region for its own uses and returned little of it to the region. The advent of **Laurent Kabila** further marginalized the Chokwe by excluding them from major government positions and appointing people from his **ethnic group**, the **Luba**, in strategic positions. **Joseph Kabila** has also followed the same policy.

**CHRISTIANITY.** An estimated 70 to 80 percent of the Congolese **population** is considered Christian, although Christianity is often mixed with local religious practices and liturgy. The **Catholic Church** predominates, claiming adherence of 50 to 60 percent of the country's Christians. Twenty percent are estimated to belong to **Protestant** denominations, and the remainder adhere to African offshoots of Christianity, such as **Kimbanguism**. (Kimbanguism, the church of followers of **Simon Kimbangu**, mixes African traditions with Christianity. Kimbanguism was harshly repressed in its early years by the colonial authorities, but eventually was accepted. It was admitted to the World Council of Churches in 1969. Its membership has grown steadily, and may now constitute at least 10 percent of all Congolese Christians.)

Christianity arrived in Congo during the 1480s, when **missionaries** brought by explorer **Diogo Cão** converted the reigning king's brother, who later became King **Afonso I**. Afonso proved receptive to Catholicism and to aspects of European culture. Christianity began spreading slowly eastward with European missionaries and traders. Its influence, however, declined in the late 1600s with the rise of

**slavery** and the **ivory** trade. However, it returned, beginning in 1880 with the arrival in **Boma** of the **France**-based Fathers of the Holy Spirit and the Order of Missionaries in Africa (“White Fathers”) on the shores of **Lake Tanganyika**. **Belgium**’s Scheut Fathers arrived in 1888 and, by 1900, the number of Catholic missions had grown to 17.

The first Protestant mission was founded in 1878. Following the **Berlin Conference**, Protestant missions expanded quickly, with American, Belgian, British, French, and Swedish churches sending missionaries to build schools, churches, and hospitals. Forty-six Protestant missionary groups were in the country at **independence**; that figure has nearly doubled since.

The churches have always been influential in politics. With the advent of **Authenticity** and the **nationalistic** policies of the late 1960s and early 1970s, they entered a period of confrontation with the **government**. In 1972, **Mobutu Sese Seko** decreed that all Congolese (then Zairians) would bear the names of their ancestors, instead of Christian surnames. Other measures were taken to lessen the influence of the church in politics, including the suspension of the journal *Afrique Chrétienne*, the banning of all Christian broadcasts, and the temporary exile of the head of the Catholic Church, Cardinal **Joseph Malula**, in 1972. At the peak of the antireligious fervor, some hymns were adapted by the government with the word *Mobutu* substituted for *God*. In the mid-1970s, the government loosened some of its antichurch policies and, in October 1976, rescinded an earlier decision to take over all church schools. In addition, the Catholic Church was quite critical of the Mobutu regime and the moral decay and corruption in Congo. It further blamed people’s misery and destitution on the Mobutu’s **kleptocratic** regime. On a number of occasions, Catholic leaders publicly criticized the government for **human rights** abuses and decried the moral decay of society.

Relations between church and state had been officially mended by the time Pope **John Paul II** paid his first visit to Congo in 1980. He visited again in 1985. Since the late 1980s, Catholic priests have been particularly active in pressing for democratic reforms. The **National Conference** was chaired first by a Protestant leader, **Kalonji Mutambayi**, and subsequently by **Monsengwo Pasinya**, the archbishop of **Kisangani**.

The Christian clergy was also critical in the resumption of the national conference when it was suspended by **Prime Minister Nguza Karl-I-Bond** in January 1992. It organized a peaceful demonstration on 16 February, called *Marche d'Espoir* (March of Hope), or *Christian March*, for the resumption of the National Conference. Fifty-two people were killed and several hundreds were wounded when Mobutu's presidential guards fired on unarmed civilians holding Bibles and rosaries.

In 1993, the Catholic bishops again publicly condemned the regime and accused Mobutu of seeking to maintain control over the political apparatus through state terrorism, **ethnic cleansing**, and economic sabotage. Throughout, nevertheless, a great portion of the church devoted itself primarily to tending the needs of those suffering because of urban migration, the loss of family support systems, and the decline of the public social services network. Church agencies have, since the late 1980s, assumed an increasingly large role in distributing foreign **food** shipments and developing educational texts and facilities.

When **Laurent Kabila** began his quest to oust Mobutu, most Christians supported him. Once in power, Kabila also was criticized by the Catholic clergy for banning **political parties**. However, most Christians in eastern provinces of **Nord-Kivu** and **Sud-Kivu** supported Kabila against the Rwandan government and the rebel group **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD) during the **Second Congo War**, from 1998 to 2003. A number of demonstrations were organized in Bukavu against what the archbishop of Bukavu, Emmanuel Kataliko, called an occupation force, asking all Christians to resist it by nonviolent means. He was arrested and later died of a heart attack. Although such nonviolence was widespread in eastern Congo, most Catholic priests favored a peaceful resolution to the civil war and strongly supported the **Lusaka Peace Accord**. In 2004, the cleric **Appolinaire Malu Malu** was nominated president of the **Commission Électorale Indépendante** (CEI).

The role of Christian clergy in the political life of Congo declined after 2007, as the result of a dispute between Malu Malu and the late Cardinal **Etsou Nzab-Bamungwabi Frédéric**. In a statement published on 11 November 2006, the cardinal criticized the CEI for being biased toward the incumbent president **Joseph Kabila** because

the cardinal seemed to doubt the outcome of presidential **elections**. These statements created tension in the capital city of Kinshasa, the stronghold of challenger **Jean-Pierre Bemba**, whose family is close to the cardinal and also hailed from the same **Équateur Province**, a fact that might have explained the cardinal's alleged partiality. By 2007, church groups were the major conduits for international aid distributions, and their political views had declined accordingly. *See also* ÉGLISE DU CHRIST AU CONGO (ECC) [CHURCH OF CHRIST IN CONGO].

**CIVIL GUARD.** *See* MILITARY.

**CIVIL RIGHTS, DECLARATION OF [DECLARATION DES DROITS CIVILS].** A document published by the **Alliance des Bakongo** (ABAKO) on 23 August 1956, partly in reaction to a more cautious manifesto published in *Conscience Africaine* on 30 June 1956. The declaration called for immediate political rights of association, speech, and press for Congolese. It is often considered the first public manifestation of growing pressure from Congolese intellectuals for political freedom and eventual **independence**.

**CIVIL SERVICE [FONCTION PUBLIQUE].** A system of public employment that was essentially inherited from the Belgian colonial-era structure, but which underwent some modifications following **independence**. The **government**-wide civil service was abolished in 1972 in order to give the state commissioners (ministers) greater leeway in hiring and firing employees within their departments. However, significant constraints were maintained. The Department of Finance and the Permanent Commission for Public Administration continued to oversee employment practices to control abuses. The concept of civil service resembled that of many other African countries, where government jobs were viewed by many as a reward for political service, and political appointments were routine. A job with the government was considered relatively secure, although paychecks were not always on time. During the 1970s and 1980s, civil servants were expected to profess "militancy" within the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) party. Like all Congolese, they were automatically members of the MPR.

With the **democratic transition** beginning in April 1990, constraints were lifted on party affiliation, and many civil servants openly displayed their support for the **opposition** by abandoning the *abacost* and resuming use of their Christian surnames. With the lifting of restrictions on **labor** unions, a number of unions were created in the civil service. These were among the most vocal in criticizing the stagnation of wages and loss of buying power. Lengthy strikes were staged in the 1990s, and union leaders on occasion were detained. On 6 March 1995, the government of **Prime Minister Léon Kengo wa Dondo** dismissed 300,000 government workers after an audit revealed that one-half of the country's 600,000 civil servants did not exist. In the mid-1990s, poor pay and lack of career mobility led to rampant absenteeism and the unofficial practice of requiring payment for virtually any kind of service. By 2008, the state remained the largest employer in Congo because the private formal economic sector was nearly nonexistent. *See also* ADMINISTRATION.

**CIVIL WARS.** Political scientists usually define a civil war as a domestic armed conflict that results in at least 1,000 deaths. Applying this definition to central Africa, Congo has experienced, since **independence**, a number of civil wars that include secessions, insurrections, rebellions, mutinies, invasions, and revolts. The first civil war was the **Katanga secession**. On 11 July 1960, **Moïse Tshombe**, angered by the lack of representation of his party in the central **government** and encouraged by private business interests, declared the secession of Katanga **Province** and formed an independent state. He relied on **mercenaries** and Katanga **gendarmerie** for the defense of the seceded state. However, the **Luba** of Katanga (**Baluba du Katanga** or BALUBAKAT) and a large portion of the **population** in Katanga refused to recognize the seceded state and fought against it, leading to the BALUBAKAT insurrection in October 1960. The North Katanga insurrection ended on 19 December 1961, and the **United Nations** (UN) defeated the Katanga secession on 14 January 1963. Both the secession and the insurrection cost the lives of more than 80,000 people.

Less than a month after the Katanga secession, on 8 August 1960, **Albert Kalonji**, angered by the massacre of Luba of **Kasai** by government troops and taking advantage of the weakness of the central

government, declared the secession of **diamond**-rich southern Kasai and formed the Independent Mining Republic of South Kasai. The South Kasai secession ended on 2 February 1962, but an insurrection followed in northwestern Kasai on 1 October 1962 that pitted two groups of Luba, known as *Bena Tshibanda* (people from the lowlands) against *Bena Mutu wa Mukuna* (people from the highlands). The insurrection in South Kasai ended on 15 April 1964. More than 15,000 people died in both events.

After the defeat of the Katanga secession, the UN began its withdrawal from Congo, completing it on 30 June 1964. As the UN withdrew, new warfare emerged in western and eastern Congo. A **rebellion** led by **Pierre Mulele** broke out on 6 January 1964 in **Kwilu** province, when his partisans set fire to the administrative center of Mungindu, which was a symbol of the state. Mulele was the minister of education under the first government of **Patrice Lumumba**. A few months after the outbreak of the Kwilu rebellion, on 15 April 1964, another rebellion started in eastern Congo, when several hundred unemployed youth armed with arrows, machetes, and a few firearms, under the leadership of **Gaston Soumialot**, attacked the police quarter of Bagira commune of **Bukavu**. On the same day, rebel groups attacked several administrative centers of Fizi and Uvira. Both Mulele and Soumialot wanted to radically transform Congolese society, in what they called the “second independence.” In the second half of 1964, the eastern rebellion succeeded in eliminating government authority from the northeastern part of the country to North Katanga and very nearly toppled the national political structure.

On 9 August 1964, **President Joseph Kasavubu** removed **Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula**, who had been in office since August 1961. Then, to quell the rebellion, he appointed the ex-president of Katanga, Tshombe, as prime minister. On 5 September 1964, rebel leaders in eastern Congo proclaimed the **People’s Republic of Congo** with its capital in **Stanleyville** and **Christophe Gbenye** as its president. Tshombe called his former Katanga gendarmes back from **Angola** and also recruited white mercenaries to reinforce the flagging national army. During this period of political instability, **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** took power on **24 November 1965**.

By the end of December 1965, the Kwilu rebellion was over. The eastern rebellion continued, but was weak enough by 1 July 1966

to pose no major threat to the central government. In total, the two rebellions caused the loss of more than 55,000 lives.

When Mobutu took power in late November 1965, he promised to curb the ethnic political demands that had polarized Congolese society since June 1960. In his quest to consolidate power, Mobutu decided in early 1966 to integrate both mercenaries and former Katanga soldiers into the national army. As he was reforming the army, a mutiny broke out in **Kisangani** on 24 July 1966 that involved the Baka Regiment, which was a unit of the national army made up of 2,000 Katangan soldiers under Colonel Ferdinand Tshipola. The mutiny ended on 25 September 1966, after more than 3,000 deaths.

Nine months later, on 5 July 1967, another mutiny began in Kisangani, instigated by 11 white mercenaries under the leadership of **Jean Schramme** and 100 Katangan soldiers. More than 400 soldiers and their families were killed on the first day. Within a week, the mutineers were joined by 150 mercenaries, 600 Katangan soldiers, and 400 renegades from the former rebel army. The death toll reached between 2,000 and 6,000 people by the time the revolt ended on 5 November 1967. After the mutiny, Mobutu began reorganizing the army again, realizing that the **military** was crucial to his survival.

For almost eight full years, 1968–76, Mobutu seemed firmly in control of Congo until opponents of his regime from the **Front de Libération Nationale du Congo** (FLNC) based in Angola invaded Katanga on 8 March 1977, in what is known as *Shaba I*. This civil war ended on 8 May 1977, after 1,250 deaths. The invasion was carried out by fewer than 2,500 rebels against 25,000 Congolese soldiers. Despite such numerical superiority, Mobutu's army was completely disoriented and had to be rescued by **Moroccan** troops and French transport before defeating the rebels. Another invasion, known as *Shaba II*, occurred between 13 May 1978 and 20 May 1978. Although this incident was shorter than Shaba I, the number of casualties was much higher, with close to 3,000 people killed. The rebels seized several areas, especially the main headquarters of the **Générale des Carrières et des Mines** (GECAMINES) mining company. They were driven out by French and Belgian paratroopers. The **United States'** role was limited to providing air transport and materials during the paratrooper drop.

Congo remained relatively calm from 1979 to 1990. However, on 8 November 1984, a group of dissidents labeled *Parti Révolutionnaire du Peuple* (PRP) under **Laurent Kabila** confronted the national army in **Moba**, on the shore of **Lake Tanganyika**. The group captured the town and held it for two days before the Congolese army regained control. The confrontation lasted one week, and ended with fewer than 150 deaths. The same group attacked again in early 1985 without much success. These two conflicts do not qualify as civil wars because the death toll remained below 1,000.

The end of the Cold War and internal pressures forced Mobutu to liberalize his political regime on **24 April 1990**. The **opposition** requested a **national conference** to set new institutions for the Third Republic. After several false starts, the national conference opened on 7 August 1991, but Mobutu flooded the conference with his supporters, resulting in a walk-out by the opposition. Under pressure from the West, Mobutu appointed **Étienne Tshisekedi** from the unified **Sacred Union** as prime minister to deal with the crisis. A week later, Mobutu dismissed him because he refused to swear allegiance to the president, and subsequently appointed **Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond**. Then, in mid-January 1992, Nguza indefinitely suspended the national conference on the grounds that the dominance of the conference by the opposition was contributing to violence, and that the conference was costing the national treasury thousands of dollars a day. Despite these efforts on Mobutu's part, pressures from the West and the **Catholic** clergy forced him to reopen the proceedings on 6 April 1992.

The conference, chaired by Archbishop **Laurent Monsengwo**, declared its own status and decisions binding on citizens. From April to August 1992, the conference convened and elected Tshisekedi as prime minister and voted overwhelmingly for the resignation of Nguza. However, the removal of Nguza sparked ethnic conflict in South Katanga (now **Haut-Katanga**). The Luba of Kasai became objects of harassment by the **Lunda**, who supported Nguza's political party, the **Union des Fédéralistes et Républicains Indépendants** (UFERI). The clash erupted into open conflict in early September 1992, leaving less than 400 people dead; thus, this uprising does not qualify as a civil war.



A major ethnic conflict that does qualify as a civil war occurred in **Nord-Kivu Province** on 20 March 1993, in the marketplace of Ntoto in Walikale territory when the **Nyanga** people attacked the **Banyarwanda** as a result of land dispute. The conflict expanded to Masisi territory a week later. According to **human rights** organizations, 996 Nyanga and **Hunde** people and as many as 1,238 Banyarwanda were killed within a month. When the conflict ended on 31 August 1993, between 7,000 and 30,000 people were dead. A new round of deadly confrontations between Hunde and Banyarwanda in Masisi occurred from 17 July 1995 to 21 December 1995, resulting in 6,000 to 9,000 deaths. In July alone, 450 people were killed in the confrontation. The bloodiest ethnic confrontation in the history of Nord-Kivu province happened four months later, beginning on 17 April 1996 and lasting until 12 October 1996. Some 30,000 people were killed in Masisi territory. In short, ethnic conflicts in Nord-Kivu, especially in Masisi, claimed 40,000 to 70,000 lives from 20 March 1993 to 12 October 1996.

On 6 October 1996, while ethnic conflicts were unfolding in Nord-Kivu, the deputy governor of **Sud-Kivu**, Lwabanji Lwasi, asked the **Banyamulenge** to leave in accordance with a parliamentary resolution passed a year earlier that stripped the latter of their Congolese nationality. The Banyamulenge refused, turning to the Rwandan **Tutsi** government for help. This call for help suited the Tutsi-dominated government of **Rwanda**, which needed to deal with its own internal conflict and repeated incursions into Rwanda from refugee camps in Congo by the former Rwandan soldiers and militias who committed the genocide. The Rwandan troops and Banyamulenge attacked **refugee** camps in Sud-Kivu on 18 and 30 October, forcing the refugees to move northward toward **Goma**. During this period, several anti-Mobutu groups joined the Banyamulenge-led rebellion to oust Mobutu. In mid-November, the same troops attacked refugee camps in Goma, Bukavu, and Uvira (that hosted 1.2 million Rwandan Hutu refugees) from all sides, leaving a small eastern corridor toward Rwanda for refugees to escape. Approximately 660,000 refugees returned to Rwanda, but more than 530,000 remained in Congo, according to UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

On 7 November 1996, Laurent Kabila emerged as the spokesperson of the anti-Mobutu war and announced the intention of the **Alliance**

**des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) to oust Mobutu. In their quest to capture Kinshasa, Tutsi-dominated Rwandan troops, who spearheaded the AFDL, tracked down the rest of the **Hutu** refugees escaping west, and 233,000 of these refugees were killed. The AFDL captured **Kinshasa** on 17 May 1997. Kabila, who emerged during the offensive as leader of the AFDL, was sworn in as president on 29 May. The departure of Mobutu was welcomed by most, but dissatisfaction soon set in, especially with the large number of foreign troops that had backed the offensive. These came to be seen as an occupying force. In late 1997, an insurrection by the **Mai-Mai** militia groups occurred as they confronted the AFDL and Rwandan forces in eastern Congo. The Mai-Mai accused Kabila of selling Kivu to Rwanda. The conflict resulted in the deaths of 4,500 to 8,800 people.

In late July 1998, Kabila decided to end his military relations with Rwanda and **Uganda** by ordering all foreign troops to leave. Banyamulenge in Kinshasa saw this as a policy move against them and quickly left the capital city. This ended the military cooperation that led to the overthrow of Mobutu. On 2 August 1998, a group of former Kabila supporters launched a civil war, the **Second Congo War**, against Kabila and announced the formation of the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD) 10 days later. The rebels advanced quickly, reaching the outskirts of Kinshasa on 26 August, but they were repulsed by government forces reinforced by troops and aircraft from **Angola**, **Namibia**, and **Zimbabwe**. The rebels and the government met in Lusaka to conclude the **Lusaka Peace Accord** on 10 July 1999, which called for the **Dialogue Inter-Congolais** (DIC).

Despite the agreement, the revolt and other ethnic conflicts continued unabated. In the **Ituri conflict**, the **Hema** and **Lendu** fought from 11 June 1999 and until 31 December 1999, resulting in 6,000 to 8,000 deaths. Fighting resumed again in early 2000. More specifically, the situation became explosive in Ituri, where Uganda troops were siding with one group at the expense of another.

The assassination of Laurent Kabila on 16 January 2001 left the country in total economic chaos, partially occupied by foreign troops and rebel groups. On 26 January 2001, **Joseph Kabila** succeeded his father. The DIC effectively started in Sun City, **South Africa**,

in February 2002. On 17 December 2002, the government and all belligerents signed the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI) in Pretoria, South Africa. The peace agreement resulted in the formation of a national transitional government that included Joseph Kabila as president, four vice presidents, and 35 ministers with their deputies. The accord also called for the reintegration of former rebels into the national army. This ended the war against Laurent Kabila, a war costing, according to human rights organizations, the lives of more than 5 million people.

Despite the signing of the AGI, a number of military commanders refused to join the process. The most notable example occurred on 26 May 2004, when **Laurent Nkunda** was promoted to general. He was appointed regional military commander of **Kasai Oriental** after the installation of the transitional government in 2003. However, he declined the offer for personal security reasons. In early 2006, his rebel forces attacked and occupied Rutshuru territory, Nord-Kivu, after routing the Congolese army stationed in the area. For almost two years, Nkunda made Nord-Kivu province ungovernable. In January 2008, most belligerents operating in Nord-Kivu and Sud-Kivu signed a peace agreement, called *Amani* (peace), to end hostility.

In late 2008, the area under Nkunda's control lay north of Lake Kivu in Rutshuru and Masisi territories, in Nord-Kivu Province. Nkunda's insurgency also prompted the revival of Mai-Mai groups that have been attacking Nkunda positions. In 2008 alone, the stand-off between the national army, Nkunda's forces, the Mai-Mai, and the UN resulted in the death of more than 2,000 people in eastern Congo, and in thousands of internally displaced people. Nkunda was arrested in January 2009 in Rwanda. *See also* DISSIDENTS.

**CLASS.** The dynamics of inequality that characterize Congolese society have led a number of observers to divide it into classes. For example, **Pierre Mulele** proposed the following classes during the uprising of the 1964 rebellion: first, foreign imperialists who extract the wealth of the country; second, reactionaries or the politicians and their bureaucratic collaborators who facilitate the looting; third, *retardataires*, or persons in intermediate positions, such as teachers and clerks, who fail to perceive their exploitation; and fourth, the popular

masses, above all the peasants and villagers. Mulele's concept was intended as a moral charter for revolutionary action.

Using different terms, this categorization has been replicated by most students of Congolese politics. Thus, in descending order of status, Congolese society before the 1980s could be divided into the following categories: the foreign expatriate class whose salaries in foreign **currency** allow an extremely high standard of living; the Congolese political *élite*, or high bourgeoisie, whose political connections allow large and rapid accumulations of wealth; an entrepreneurial class whose members are often uneducated but aggressive, astute, and often achieve business success in the informal sector; an impoverished but still respected professional class that includes doctors, university professors, clergy, high-ranking parastatal managers, and military officers; a subprofessional or lower bourgeoisie whose members include teachers, clerks, junior military officers, and low-level civil servants; a working class of urban and rural wage earners; small or individual workers in cottage industries or the informal sector, such as tailors, cobblers, small traders, smugglers, prostitutes, and petty thieves; and the peasant class that exists on subsistence farming, small-plot gardening, and small-time trading.

Since the early 1980s, the idea of a rigid traditional delineation of class in Congo has seemed unwarranted because professional groups have become a fluid set of groupings that might change depending on situation or individual perception at any given time. Because of Congo's economic decline, all but the top three classes are impoverished, benefit little from social services, and live with little protection from financial catastrophe other than family solidarity. However, within society, members of the subbourgeoisie, informal, and peasant classes sometimes benefit from the middle-status groups, which in turn benefit from the upper classes. In Congolese society, it is widely held that it is important to help the less privileged in times of need, whether through monetary assistance or social connections. Failure to do so is traditionally considered antisocial. Although economic decline has rendered such responsibilities increasingly difficult to fulfill, members of the more privileged classes are aware of this responsibility, and they tend to hold similar views about those with a status higher than theirs. This sense of solidarity or philanthropy tends to help "spread the wealth" and has remained one reason for the

ability of many Congolese to survive the country's many economic crises. *See also* MIDDLE CLASS.

**CLOTH.** In Congo and other Francophone African countries, the word *pagne* is used to denote the colorful print fabrics used to make everything from bed sheets and curtains to clothing and headdresses. The cloth originated primarily in Dutch-controlled parts of Malaysia, where the use of **wax** and dyes to make colorful prints created some of the most valued pieces of cloth in the world. Manufacture of these prints spread through Africa quickly and became identified as one of Africa's major contributions to fashion. Today, most African countries, including Congo, have textile factories. The cloth, made in bolts two yards wide, is usually cut for resale into strips of two to six yards in length. The cloth can be hemmed and worn as a robe or body wrap, or cut to make shirts, blouses, and pajama-style outfits. A staple of African culture and dress, many prints are given a name. Some are designed and marketed for special purposes, either to praise a leader or to mark a special event, such as a summit meeting, a soccer tournament, a cultural festival, and a visit by a foreign head of state. The gift of cloth between two individuals is considered a major gesture and often precedes a special request. *See also* DRESS.

**COALITION DÉMOCRATIQUE CONGOLAISE (CDC) [CONGOLESE DEMOCRATIC COALITION].** An alliance of forces dominated by the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD)**, which launched a **rebellion** against the **Laurent Kabila government** on 2 August 1998.

**COBALT.** Cobalt, a by-product of some **copper** ores, is used to make super alloys, particularly for the aerospace industry. At its peak, Congo produced nearly half of the world's cobalt from two refineries at **Likasi** and **Kolwezi**, operated by **Générale des Carrières et des Mines (GECAMINES)**. Production rose steadily during the 1970s, averaging 14,000 tons per year and peaking at 15,500 tons in 1980, when prices reached \$40 per pound on the spot market. Production fell over the next three years, in part because of a lack of spare parts for **mining** equipment and the exhaustion of easily accessible ores. Production began rising again in 1984 and reached 39,500 tons in

1990. This was the highest level of cobalt production in the post-colonial era. Production declined rapidly following the civil unrest in **Katanga** and the slide of GECAMINES toward insolvency. Production fell to 3,000 tons in 1994, but improved slightly to 6,067 tons in 1996. In 1999, cobalt production was only 2,308 tons, representing the lowest level of production since 1960. In early 2000, the **Laurent Kabila** government announced joint ventures with several foreign companies to revive production in **Tenke**, Kolwezi, and Kipushi. Production improved to 10,000 tons in 2001, and this rising trend continued even during the **civil war** against Kabila. By 2005, the production of cobalt was 22,000 tons, according to government figures.

**COFFEE.** Two major varieties of coffee are grown in Congo: the hearty robusta in low-lying areas of the **Ubangi**, **Uele**, **Kivu**, **Kasai**, and **Bas-Congo** areas, and the lighter arabica, grown in the higher altitudes of eastern Kivu and **Ituri**. Arabica coffee constitutes one-fifth of the total crop. The high price of coffee in the second half of the 1970s helped a group of Congolese exporters gain millions of dollars. In the 1980s, coffee was Congo's largest **agricultural** export. Production, in decline since **independence**, began to rise following **government** reforms to the marketing system in 1983. According to data from the government agency **Office National du Café**, production reached 100,000 tons in 1985, of which 80,000 tons were "exportable." Production declined again to 52,000 tons in 1997 and 36,000 tons in 2000. The decline continued as the result of **civil war** in eastern Congo, which is a major coffee-producing area. In 2002, coffee production was 32,000 tons, the lowest level of production since 1960. A year after the signing of the peace agreement in December 2002, coffee production jumped to 40,000 tons in 2003, the last year for which data are available.

**COLLEGE OF COMMISSIONERS [COLLÈGE DES COMMISSAIRES GÉNÉRAUX].** A group of young intellectuals formed to direct state affairs after **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** had "neutralized" the Congolese **government** in September 1960, following a constitutional crisis created by the political standoff between **Joseph Kasavubu** and **Patrice Lumumba**. The college, headed by **Justin-Marie Bomboko**, was formally installed on 29 September 1960.

Like the government it replaced, it was weakened by factionalism. It was dissolved on 9 February 1961, following the formation of the government of **Joseph Ileo**.

**COLONIAL CHARTER [CHARTÉ COLONIALE]**. A law passed on 18 October 1908 by the parliament of **Belgium** that formally abolished the **Congo Free State** (CFS) and ended King **Leopold II**'s personal sovereignty over the territory. The charter, adopted partly in reaction to the international outcry over **human rights** abuses in the CFS, set out goals for the colonization of what would become the **Belgian Congo**. These included a "civilizing" mission of **educating** and **Christianizing** the indigenous people and guaranteed that the abuses of the CFS would not reoccur. To address the reluctance among some Belgian political leaders to assume so heavy a financial burden, it was also determined that the colony would earn a "profit" for the mother country and be a self-financing endeavor. Under the charter, Leopold II lost his sovereignty over the territory but still retained a great deal of authority. He governed with the Belgian parliament and executive branch and ruled by decree, although his decrees required the approval of the minister of colonies. *See also* CONSTITUTION.

**COLTAN.** *See* COLUMBIUM–TANTALUM.

**COLUMBIUM–TANTALUM (COLTAN).** Coltan is the colloquial Congolese name for columbite–tantalite, a metallic ore containing the elements of niobium (columbium) and tantalum. In appearance, coltan is a dull black mineral. Mineral concentrates containing tantalum are usually referred to as *tantalite*. Columbium is used in the steel and aerospace industries. Tantalum from coltan is used in consumer electronics, such as cell phones, DVD players, and computers.

The Société Minière du Kivu, of which the government owns 30 percent, operated most coltan mines in eastern Congo. The production of coltan represented 10 percent of world total from 1955 to 1959. However, production of tantalite was even more impressive, representing 50 percent of world production during the same period. In the first five years of independence, 1960–65, Congo's production declined, averaging 43,000 kg of columbite per year and 73,000

kg of tantalite per year. The production of coltan picked up in the second half of the 1960s, to 170,000 kg in 1968. In the 1970s, its production averaged 67,000 kg a year. From 1980 to 1984, production of coltan averaged 66,000 kg a year, but suddenly increased to 184,970 in 1985. In the second half of the 1980s, the production of coltan remained at 51,000 kg; in 1988, it registered its lowest production since 1960, 33,500 kg. The declining trend continued, so that in 1994, Congo produced only 4,120 kg.

The **civil war** against **Mobutu Sese Seko** ended most **mining** contracts, and coltan disappeared from official statistics. Its resurgence occurred after the civil war against **Laurent Kabila** as illegal exports of coltan provided warring parties with the financial means to continue the war. Exports of coltan from eastern Congo to European and American markets were attributed by the **United Nations (UN)** Panel of Experts to helping finance the civil war against Kabila. The Rwandan occupation in the east of Congo meant that Congo was unable to exploit the resource for its own benefit. A 2003 United Nations Security Council report charged that a great deal of the ore was mined illegally and smuggled over the country's eastern borders by militias from neighboring **Uganda**, **Rwanda**, and **Burundi**. Coltan smuggling had also been implicated as a major source of income for the military occupation of Congo.

This trade raises ethical questions akin to those surrounding conflict **diamonds**. Owing to the difficulty of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate mining operations, several electronics manufacturers have claimed to forgo central African coltan altogether, relying on other sources. The high-tech industry's demand for tantalum clearly fueled an increase in coltan mining worldwide—including in the Congo region. But because coltan ore trades hands so many times between its mining to its ultimate use in electronics products, companies often have no idea where the original coltan ore came from (or frankly do not care). Statistical analysis shows it to be nearly inconceivable that these companies made all their products without using Congolese coltan. Despite denials by all players involved, three UN reports investigating the plunder of gems and minerals in Congo listed approximately 125 companies and individuals involved in business activities breaching international standards.



**COMITÉ D'ÉTUDES POUR LE HAUT-CONGO [COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF THE UPPER CONGO].** An association of entrepreneurs formed by King **Leopold II** on 25 November 1878 to finance expeditions by **explorers** aimed at establishing profit-making enterprises in Congo. On 10 December 1878, the king hired **Henry Morton Stanley** to establish trading posts in the **Congo River Basin** and to forge alliances with local chiefs. The committee replaced the **International African Association**. At the time of its formation, the committee was viewed as a noble and even daring venture. However, modern historians have called it a maneuver by a wily monarch to grab as much of central Africa as possible under the guise of scientific research. The committee declined in influence and disappeared after the **Berlin Conference** recognized Leopold II as sovereign of what was to become the **Congo Free State**.

**COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL D'ACCOMPAGNEMENT DE LA TRANSITION (CIAT) [COMMITTEE IN SUPPORT OF THE TRANSITION].** Established by the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI) in December 2002, the CIAT operated at the ambassadorial level and was instrumental in avoiding the breakdown of governmental transition in Congo from 2003 to 2006 through flexible but firm interventions each time the transition was in jeopardy. The CIAT included all five members of the **United Nations** Security Council, as well as **Belgium**, Canada, and **South Africa**. The committee held its last meeting on 11 December 2006, satisfied with the successful rounds of **elections** in 2006 that ended the transition period.

**COMITÉ NATIONAL DU KIVU (CNKi) [NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF KIVU].** An autonomous and semiprivate company created by a convention between the colonial state and the Compagnie de Chemin de Fer du Congo Supérieur aux Grands Lacs Africains (CFL) on 7 November 1927. The convention was approved a few months later by the decree of 13 January 1928. The purpose of the CNKi was to develop **Kivu Province** and encourage Belgian settlement in the temperate and mountainous climate of the region. The CNKi was intended to finance the necessary infrastructure, such as roads, and to open up the region to settlers. It was able to devolve this costly obligation to the

state and thus retreat into the profitable function of serving as a land office for selling public domain for the benefit of its shareholders. In the words of journalist Paul Mason, the CNKi became a monster that was hated by all, African elites and European settlers alike.

The CNKi received a total of 12 million hectares of land. However, the exceptionally high population density of the area made such expropriation of African lands quite difficult, and, in 1933, the total area subject to the administration of the CNKi was reduced to 800,000 hectares and to 300,000 hectares in 1935. The CNKi had rights to sell or rent land under its jurisdiction for profit, to issue permits to fell timber, to carry on **mining** exploration, and exploit any uncovered mining sites or to cede these rights to third parties. The Belgian government dissolved the CNKi on 30 May 1960. *See also* CONTENTIEUX BELGO-CONGOLAIS.

**COMITÉ SPÉCIAL DU KATANGA (CSK) [SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF KATANGA].** The CSK was a joint-venture **mining** consortium established by King **Leopold II** (60 percent of shares) and the **Compagnie du Katanga** on 19 June 1900 to explore **Katanga** for minerals. It was one of a number of large companies or “trusts” given authority by the **Congo Free State** (CFS) to administer monopolies over vast areas of territory. A royal decree of 6 December 1900 gave the company the power to establish its own police force and to collect taxes on the territories under its jurisdiction. By 1904, the CSK had a police force of 1,075 men. It later conceded an ore-rich tract of 34,000 square km in the Upper Congo River (Lualaba), Lufira, and Lwabula basins to the **Union Minière du Haut-Katanga** (UMHK) in 1906. The Belgian government dissolved the CSK by a decree promulgated on 27 June 1960. However, its affairs were not settled until 1966 in the heavily debated **Contentieux Belgo-Congolais**.

**COMITÉ ZAÏRE.** A group of opponents of the **Mobutu Sese Seko** government based in **Belgium** with enough financial support to provide a semiregular newsletter detailing **corruption**, **human rights** violations, and abuses of power in Congo. Some Congolese political exiles allied with the Comité Zaïre and utilized its facilities, but most **dissidents** preferred to form their own organizations. *See also* OPPOSITION.

**COMMISSION ÉLECTORALE INDÉPENDANTE (CEI) [INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION]**. Established in June 2004 by the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI), the CEI was in charge of organizing **elections** at all levels in Congo. Headed by the cleric **Appollinaire Malu Malu**, the CEI became operational in November 2004, when its provincial offices were put in place with 42,000 electoral agents. This number rose to 250,000 during the elections. The CEI successfully conducted a complex operation of voter identification and registration. More than 25 million voters were registered between June and December 2005. Its first act was the referendum on the **constitution**, which voters approved by 84 percent. The second major task involved the organization of the first popular presidential elections and the first legislative elections since 1964. By mid-2009, the CEI had accomplished the monumental task of carrying on elections at all levels in a country without a functional infrastructure.

**COMMUNAUTÉ ÉCONOMIQUE DES ÉTATS DE L'AFRIQUE CENTRALE (CEEAC) [ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES]**. Modeled on the larger and more established Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS), the CEEAC was first proposed in the early 1980s by **Mobutu Sese Seko** and Gabonese President Omar Bongo, in an attempt to form a Central African common market. The organization seeks to integrate the disparate economies of nations, ranging from the relatively large Congo and Cameroon to small, landlocked **Burundi** and **Rwanda** and the island nations of Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé and Príncipe. In September 1983, 10 nations formally signed the agreement to form the community: Burundi, Cameroon, **Central African Republic**, **Chad**, **Congo-Brazzaville**, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, and **Congo-Kinshasa** (then Zaire). Economists predicted many obstacles to establishing a common market in the region, such as a lack of infrastructure and widely diverging economic and social policies. Nevertheless, progress by the smaller, Francophone-dominated **Union Douanière et Économique de l'Afrique Centrale** (UDEAC) has given central African leaders some hope of implementing at least initial steps, such as an alignment

of customs tariffs and free movement within the region by citizens of member nations.

**COMMUNAUTÉ ÉCONOMIQUE DES PAYS DES GRANDS LACS (CEPGL) [ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF COUNTRIES OF THE GREAT LAKES].** An economic community established in September 1976, grouping **Congo-Kinshasa**, **Burundi**, and **Rwanda**. With its headquarters at Gisenyi, Rwanda, the Community aims to increase economic integration by harmonizing tariffs, **external trade**, and the economic policies of member states. It was dominated by Congo, and its early years served primarily to legalize some of the **smuggling** of contraband goods across **Lakes Tanganyika** and **Kivu**. In the 1990s, **Mobutu Sese Seko** sought to mediate the Rwandan civil war and interethnic clashes in Burundi through the offices of the CEPGL. The CEPGL remained dormant until April 2007 when Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi relaunched it.

**COMMUNICATIONS.** In the early days, communications in Congo were carried out mostly orally and over distances by messengers traveling from town to town on foot and by canoe. "Talking drums" were a major form of communication among the indigenous societies of the forest and were used by some early **missionaries**. The drum, usually a hardened tree trunk or other form of hollowed wood, imitated the tones and vowels of some of the **Bantu languages**. As a result, talking drums could be understood by ethnic groups speaking different languages. In the mid-1900s, two-way **radio** came into use, and communications networks were set up by colonial officials, missionaries, and private companies.

Beginning in 1950, telephone line systems were established in some parts of the country, notably **Kinshasa**, **Bas-Congo**, and **Katanga**, but their effectiveness was hindered by heavy rains and dense forest. In the 1970s, the **government** began a program to link major urban centers through a combination of long lines, microwave towers, and satellite stations. In 1984, the government announced an ambitious program to install thousands of telephones throughout the country by the end of the century. A satellite earth station was established outside **Matadi** in 1985. By 1990, 32,000 telephones had

been installed. Congo's major urban areas were the only centers with established **telecommunication** links, and these had deteriorated considerably by the early 1990s, because of a lack of maintenance. As a result, cellular systems and private radio networks operated by embassies and large commercial establishments became the primary forms of two-way telecommunications.

Congo has one of the lowest teledensity rates in the world, with just 23,000 fixed lines for an estimated population of 62.5 million in 2007. However, cell phone usage has surged since 2000 and the arrival of several multinationals offering global system for mobile communication (GSM) technology. Total mobile phone subscriptions are estimated to have reached more than 5 million people in 2008. Cell phone services are now available in all of the country's major cities. The South African company Vodacom and the Dutch-owned Celtel are the main cell phone service providers in the country, offering services from towns to remote villages.

**COMMUNISM.** Communism never played a large role in Congolese life or politics, although its influence was felt in the 1960s when the country was a battleground for the rivalries of the Cold War. **Patrice Lumumba** espoused some tenets of **socialism** but also sought to play Soviet-bloc nations against Western governments. This practice led to his dismissal as **prime minister** by **Joseph Kasavubu** and was considered a factor in his arrest and death. Following the political polarization due in part to Lumumba's assassination, his deputy, **Antoine Gizenga**, declared a rival **government** in 1961 based in **Stanleyville**, which was backed by the **Soviet Union** and recognized by 13 governments. Thus, communist governments found friends among the early Congolese **opposition**. The People's Republic of **China** backed **Pierre Mulele**. The Soviet Union supported Gizenga and **Christophe Gbenye**.

Certain aspects of scientific socialism, such as the concept of communal property and the elimination of the gap between rich and poor, appealed to some Congolese. The idea of revolution and the policy of struggle against colonialism espoused by the Soviet bloc also struck a sympathetic chord. However, most Congolese felt uncomfortable with an ideology that placed the state and a foreign-styled bureaucracy over family and religion.

After **Mobutu Sese Seko** took power, relations with the communist powers were poor. During the **Authenticity** campaign of the early 1970s, however, Mobutu sought a nonaligned policy, frequently using the phrase, "Neither to the left nor to the right, but straight ahead." China and North Korea eventually developed **trade** and economic assistance ties with Congo, but the Soviet Union made few inroads and its ambassadors, on several occasions, were expelled amid charges of interfering in Congo's internal affairs.

Following the **Shaba Wars** of 1977 and 1978, Congo accused Moscow of financing the rebel **Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo** (FLNC) and broke relations with **Cuba** and East Germany, whom it accused of complicity. At the same time, relations warmed with socialist regimes in Asia. Mobutu visited Beijing in 1973 after Congo recognized the governments of China and North Korea. Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang visited Congo during a trip to Africa from December 1982 to January 1983. With *détente* in the 1970s, the Soviet Union was allowed a discreet though sizable diplomatic presence.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War saw a decline in Congo's strategic importance in the international arena. Although old ties and commitments remained, major powers found fewer reasons to court Mobutu. An increasing desire to see political and economic liberalization in Congo began to take priority in the foreign policies of Congo's Western allies. The overthrow and execution in 1989 of Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu, with whom Mobutu had felt a particular affinity, reportedly profoundly disturbed the Congolese leader. The decline of communism, international pressure for political and economic reforms, and a trend toward multipartyism in other African nations are said to be primary reasons for Mobutu's announcement of the **democratic transition** in April 1990.

**COMPAGNIE DU CONGO POUR LE COMMERCE ET L'INDUSTRY (CCCI).** A large Belgian holding company noted for its heavy investments in Congo following World War I, it was established on 27 December 1886 by a confidant of King **Leopold II**, Captain Albert Thys. The company's goal was to pursue various commercial, agricultural, and industrial activities in the **Congo Free**

**State.** However, the king's decrees in 1889–1891 paralyzed the company's activities and resulted in an open conflict between the king and the company's directors. After long negotiations in March 1891, the two sides reached an agreement to create a charter company named **Compagnie du Katanga**. In 1928, the CCCI came under the control of Belgian Conglomerate, **Société Générale de Belgique**.

**COMPAGNIE DU KASAI.** *See* CONCESSIONARY COMPANIES.

**COMPAGNIE DU KATANGA (CK).** A charter company created on 15 April 1891 by the Friends of King **Leopold II** to explore and develop the far south of the **Congo River Basin** and to administer **Katanga**. The British move into the area made it urgent for Belgian financiers to finance the endeavor with initial capital of 1 million gold francs. They added another 600,000 francs of capital later. In return, King Leopold offered a concession of one-third the land surface of Katanga to be allocated in checkerboard patterns of 4,600 blocs of 120 square km each. Thus, two state blocs of land alternated with one bloc of the CK. The company created a number of occupation posts in Katanga and organized a police force to ensure order and security. King Leopold received 12 percent of the company's shares.

In the late 1890s, the distribution of land by the CK became impractical as the result of the checkerboard patterns, and a conflict on the exploitation of Katanga and land concessions occurred between the king and company's administrators. On 19 June 1900, the **Congo Free State** (CFS) and the CK decided to create a common partnership by establishing the **Comité Special du Katanga**. The CFS received two-thirds of the capital and income. The CK gave up its rights and obligations in exchange for a third of profits to be realized by the exploitation of land conceded to the new company. The lease of land granted to the CK expired at **independence** on 30 June 1960. *See also* CONTENTIEUX BELGO-CONGOLAIS.

**COMPAGNIE DU LOMAMI.** *See* CONCESSIONARY COMPANIES.

**COMPROMIS POLITIQUE GLOBAL (CPG) [COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL COMPROMISE].** This 10-point document

was proposed on 14 August 1992 by Archbishop **Laurent Monsengwo** at the height of the standoff between **Mobutu Sese Seko** and the **Haut Conseil de la République** (HCR). The HCR had succeeded the **Conférence Nationale Souveraine** (CNS) in December 1992 after it elected opposition leader **Étienne Tshisekedi** prime minister and drafted a new **constitution**. The CPG established that no organ of the transition could use its powers to prevent another institution from functioning, a measure designed to prevent the disruption of the **democratic transition** by the military. Under the terms of the CPG, the parties also agreed to abide by the **Transitional Act**.

The agreement brought a three-month truce to the political confrontation, but Mobutu never acknowledged it. The truce ended when Mobutu determined that the CNS was controlled by the **opposition** and refused to accept its draft constitution. Instead, he convened the former single-party **parliament** to draft a new constitution. He eventually dismissed the Tshisekedi government and appointed a new one, with Tshisekedi's former economic advisor, **Faustin Birindwa**, as prime minister, leading to another period of political paralysis with two competing governments. This impasse only ended in late 1993 with the merger of the HCR and the parliament into a single body, called the ***Haut Conseil de la République/Parlement de la Transition*** (HCR/PT).

**CONCESSIONARY COMPANIES.** King **Leopold II** created enterprises, called concessionary companies, in which he held half of the shares in order to collect profits from rubber, ivory, and other natural products in the **Congo Free State** (CFS). The Compagnie Anversoise du Commerce au Congo (known as *Anversoise*) was the first to emerge, on 2 August 1892, to exploit the Mongala Basin, which was rich in ivory and rubber. Four days later, the king created the Anglo-Belgian Indian Rubber and Exploring (known as *ABIR*), which received a concession of land in the district of **Équateur** in the Lopori and Maringa Basins. Three more companies were established, including the Compagnie du Lomami (5 July 1898), Compagnie du Kasai (24 December 1901), Comptoir Commercial Congolais (11 July 1904), and the American Congo Company (5 November 1906). With more than half the shares in these companies, the king controlled them by nominating commissars to represent his interests.



These commissars had unlimited power to collect red rubber, which represented, by 1904, more than 80 percent of exports from the CFS. This exploitation was not without price. To collect rubber, Africans were overworked, coerced, and underfed. Resistance to the CFS emerged almost everywhere. Millions of Africans were either killed by Leopold's agents or suffered death from forced labor, mutilations by these agents, and inhumane conditions while gathering wild rubber. External and internal pressures forced Leopold II to officially cede the CFS to Belgium on 15 November 1908.

**CONFÉDÉRATION DES ASSOCIATIONS TRIBALES DU KATANGA (CONAKAT) [CONFEDERATION OF TRIBAL ASSOCIATIONS OF KATANGA].** A political association dominated by **Lunda évolués**, CONAKAT was formed in **Katanga** on 11 October 1958 by **Moïse Tshombe** and supported by Belgian mining and financial interests. It reflected the disaffection with **Leopoldville** that was common in Katanga among Congolese and Europeans alike. In 1959, CONAKAT began advocating for autonomy for Katanga within a Congolese federation. With the approach of **independence**, it became a **political party** and, in the **elections** of 1960, gained control of the Katangan provincial assembly, despite opposition from the **Luba-dominated Association des Baluba du Katanga (BALUBAKAT)**. When BALUBAKAT delegates boycotted the assembly, Tshombe obtained an exception to the **Loi Fondamentale** that allowed the assembly to meet without a quorum and established a one-party provincial government in Katanga. However, CONAKAT was unhappy with its representation in the first **Patrice Lumumba** government. Encouraged by Belgian commercial interests and by moves for autonomy in **Orientale** and **Kasai** provinces, Katanga seceded on 11 July 1960. Following reunification in 1963, Tshombe enlarged his political base through the formation of the southern-based **Convention Nationale Congolaise (CONACO)** party.

**CONFÉRENCE NATIONALE SOUVERAINE (CNS) [SOVEREIGN NATIONAL CONFERENCE].** The name given itself by the Conférence Nationale (CN) in April 1992 when it reconvened after nine months of political stalemate. The original name for the Sovereign National Conference was CN, which was to meet for one

month in August 1991 to chart the one-year transition to multiparty **democracy**. The conference opened on 7 August under the chairmanship of **Isaac Kalonji Mutambayi**, a veteran politician, to draft a new **constitution**, but it quickly degenerated into chaos because of disputes over accreditation and charges by the **opposition** that pro-**Mobutu Sese Seko** forces were trying to load the assembly with their delegates. It was suspended and reconvened a number of times during the next four months, a period marked by political demonstrations, **labor strikes**, and the “**pillages**” of 23–24 September.

In December 1991, with most of the accreditation disputes resolved, the conference reconvened under the chairmanship of **Mon-sengwo Pasinya**, the archbishop of **Kisangani**. In April 1992, it proclaimed itself the *Sovereign National Conference* and subsequently declared that its measures would be constitutionally binding and the **president** henceforth would be obliged by law to carry them out. The CNS adopted a number of measures restoring the **flag**, anthem, and system of **government** under the 1964 **constitution**, which was suspended following the **Mobutu coup d'état**. It changed the country's name back to *Congo*, drafted a new constitution, and established the **Haut Conseil de la République** (HCR) to oversee the **democratic transition**. In October, Mobutu rejected these measures and, in a move widely viewed as illegal, convened the single-party **parliament** that had been disbanded earlier. When Mobutu dismissed opposition leader **Étienne Tshisekedi** as **prime minister** in February 1993 and appointed his former advisor, **Faustin Birindwa**, as the new prime minister, the country entered a period characterized by two rival governments. The stalemate was ended in late 1993 with the merger of the HCR and the parliament into the **Haut Conseil de la République/Parlement de la Transition** (HCR/PT).

**CONGO, BELGIAN.** The name given to the **Congo Free State** (CFS) when it was annexed to **Belgium** on 15 November 1908 by a treaty approved by the Belgian Parliament in August and by King **Leopold II** in October of the following year. The colony remained *Belgian Congo* until the proclamation of **independence** on 30 June 1960, when it was renamed the *Republic of Congo*. The government of **Belgium** only agreed to assume control over the territory after heated debate, during which many leaders opposed the annexation, saying it

would be too costly. Under international pressure because of publicity over **human rights** abuses in the CFS, however, the parliament eventually agreed to assume responsibility for the territory out of what it said was a religious belief in the need to “civilize Africa” and on condition that it operate at a profit. The **Colonial Charter** was passed on 18 October 1908, setting up the guidelines for administering the territory. Belgian Congo was divided into 15 districts in 1908, then into four provinces in 1926. The last colonial administrative reform of 1933 increased the number of provinces to six.

Under colonial **administration**, many monopolies were diluted, but a number of large companies, including the **Société Générale de Belgique**, the **Comité National du Kivu** (CNKi), and the **Comité Spéciale du Katanga** (CSK), retained special privileges. The king, as head of state, ruled by decree, but for the decrees to be valid, they had to be countersigned by the minister of colonies and reviewed by the Belgian parliament. In the colony, an advisory council of **government** composed of older, conservative leaders was established in 1911, but political activity was forbidden. The king was represented by a **governor-general**, who, as chief administrator, issued ordinances carrying the power of law. Some resistance to the colonial administration occurred, particularly by the **Yaka**, **Zande**, **Luba-Katanga**, and **Lele**. By the late 1920s, most territory in Belgian Congo was under colonial control, except a few chieftaincies in Kivu. Congolese were appointed to the council beginning in 1947. In the colonial era, **labor** policies improved somewhat from the harsh practices of the CFS, but nevertheless remained oppressive for decades. *See also* PATERNALISM.

**CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE.** The name commonly used for the former French Congo, the **Republic of Congo** with its capital in Brazzaville, to differentiate it from the former **Belgian Congo**, the **Democratic Republic of Congo**, or **Congo-Kinshasa**, with its capital in **Kinshasa**.

**CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF.** Congo was officially known as the *Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)* from 1 August 1964 until 27 October 1971, when it became the **Republic of Zaire**, and again beginning in May 1997, after forces led by **Lau-**

**rent Kabila** took power. It was often called **Congo-Kinshasa** to differentiate it from **Congo-Brazzaville**, the former French Congo. The name was changed from *Republic of Congo* to the *DRC* by the **constitution** of 1964.

The Democratic Republic represented an attempt to set aside the disorder following **independence**. Although it brought some improvements, political fragmentation and administrative disintegration continued, leading to **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu's military coup d'état** 15 months after its promulgation.

**CONGO, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF.** The name given to Congo under the **constitution** drafted by the **Haut Conseil de la République/Parlement de la Transition** (HCR/PT) to be approved by a popular referendum in February 1997, which was never held. The new constitution was due to come into force at the end of the **democratic transition** on 9 July 1997, but the process was disrupted by the **military** offensive that drove **Mobutu Sese Seko** out of power in May 1997. After the **Laurent Kabila government** was installed, it announced a new timetable, promising a constitutional referendum in 1998 and national **elections** in 1999.

**CONGO FREE STATE (CFS) [ÉTAT INDÉPENDANT DU CONGO].** The CFS came into existence on 1 July 1885, four months after the **Berlin Conference**, at which 13 European nations recognized King **Leopold II's** sovereignty over the territory. The Berlin Act stipulated that the territory be governed by the principles of free **trade** and navigation, neutrality in war, and policies aimed at improving the lives of the indigenous people. Leopold II was recognized as sovereign of the territory and ruled by decree with advice from the **Belgium** ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Interior. The territory was divided into 15 districts, each headed by a commissioner. The authority of the local **chiefs** was reduced.

To pay for the **administration** of the territory and render a profit to the king, the CFS established **concessionary companies** and restricted business competition by decrees requiring many commodities produced in the CFS to be sold only to the state. The CFS also decreed that all land not owned by Europeans belonged to it (the CFS) and granted to various private companies exclusive rights for

exploitation and trade on large tracts. A **security** force called the *Force Publique* was formed to curb the influence of the local chiefs, drive **Afro-Arab** traders out of the eastern part of the territory, and prevent disruptions to trade. By 1900, concern was building in the international community over reports of maltreatment of the indigenous populations in the territory. A number of writers, most notably **Edmund Dene Morel**, drew on **missionary** reports to describe atrocities in the CFS. A 10-percent **labor** tax, passed in 1890, became an excuse for demanding large quantities of **rubber** from African populations. Failure to pay the tax was punished by flogging, execution, and occasionally the destruction of entire villages. Soldiers were required to produce the right hand of villagers who had been executed for not paying their taxes.

The procurement of hands became an end in itself, reportedly leaving thousands of maimed victims. An international commission of inquiry and U.S. Congressional hearings substantiated the abuses. Public outcry led the Belgian parliament to annex the territory as a colony on 15 November 1908. Labor conditions improved somewhat during the colonial era. Nevertheless, they remained harsh for decades, and the end of the CFS did not mean the end of the exploitation of Congo and its people. *See also* CONGO, BELGIAN.

**CONGO-KINSHASA.** The name frequently used for the former **Belgian Congo**, which is now officially called the *Democratic Republic of Congo*, to differentiate it from the former French Congo, which is also called the *Republic of Congo* or *Congo-Brazzaville*. *See also* ZAIRE.

**CONGO, PEDICLE.** It refers to the southeast corner of Congo that resembles a boot sticking into **Zambia**. It almost divides Zambia into two lobes. The pedicle measures 100 km wide and 200 km long, ending in a very stubby toe into Zambia. The pedicle is a major problem for Zambia because it affects communications for about one-quarter of the country related to the swampy area created by the Luapula River.

**CONGO, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (PRC) [RÉPUBLIQUE POPULAIRE DU CONGO (RPC)].** A short-lived people's republic proclaimed on 7 September 1964, during the **rebellion** in eastern

Congo. The PRC dissolved following the Belgian–American mission to free **Stanleyville** and Paulis and the mercenary-backed offensive by the Congolese army to retake control of the territory in November 1965. At its peak, however, it was recognized by 13 foreign governments, and its delegations were seated at some international conferences. This should not be confused with the People’s Republic of **Congo-Brazzaville**, which was declared in the former French Congo by Marien Ngouabi on 24 June 1973, and which changed its name to **Republic of Congo** when it renounced Marxism in 1990. *See also* GIZENGA, ANTOINE; MOUVEMENT NATIONAL CONGO-LAIS; SIMBAS.

### CONGO, REPUBLIC (BRAZZAVILLE), RELATIONS WITH.

Called the *People’s Republic of Congo* until 1990, **Congo-Brazzaville**, as it is commonly known, has always prided itself on being different from its neighbor across the **Congo River**. Relations between the two countries, which, for 11 years following **independence**, shared the same name, fluctuated considerably, marked by periods of friendship broken by disputes resolved months later.

The former French colony is much smaller than **Congo-Kinshasa**, with 343,000 square km of territory and a population of 3.9 million persons concentrated in the two urban centers of Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire. Brazzaville was the capital of French Equatorial Africa during the colonial era and also was the headquarters of the Free French forces during World War II. Congo-Brazzaville became independent on 15 August 1960. A military coup in September 1968 led to Marien Ngouabi’s assumption of the presidency on 1 January 1969. Congo formalized its affiliation with Marxism–Leninism by becoming a people’s republic on 24 June 1973. Nationalization of large private companies followed.

Ngouabi was assassinated on 18 March 1977, by a group of commandos. Former President Alphonse Massamba-Debat was held responsible, convicted, and executed for the assassination. Joachim Yhombi-Opango was named president on 4 April 1977, and in June the new government resumed relations with the **United States** after a 12-year break. However, Yhombi-Opango resigned on 4 February 1979 in a power struggle and was replaced by Denis Sassou-Nguesso. The nationalizations hurt the economy in the 1970s, but in the 1980s

the country entered an economic boom due to the discovery of significant deposits of offshore petroleum. Congo renounced Marxism in 1990, changed its name to *Republic of Congo*, and embarked on its own, sometimes difficult, path toward democratization. Disputed elections in 1992 led to violence, while the economy declined because of a government practice of mortgaging future oil production to finance current expenditures in a practice called “forward selling.”

Diplomatic relations between Congo-Kinshasa and Congo-Brazzaville were frequently suspended over contraband, gunrunning, **currency smuggling**, and illegal immigrants. Ideological and historical differences also played a role in the sometimes stormy relations. Congo-Brazzaville supported the **Stanleyville** rival **government** and became the home in exile of one of its leaders, **Antoine Gizenga**. The Brazzaville government also supported the uprising in **Kwilu** and was the source of arms and explosives used in terrorist attacks in **Leopoldville**. After the Kwilu **rebellion** was put down, its leader, **Pierre Mulele**, fled to Brazzaville. He subsequently accepted an offer of amnesty from **Mobutu Sese Seko**. But upon his return to Kinshasa, he was executed, leading a furious Brazzaville government to break diplomatic relations.

Congo-Kinshasa and Congo-Brazzaville often voted with opposing blocs at the **United Nations** General Assembly, and they supported different factions in the civil war in **Angola**. In the 1970s, as the very different “revolutions” of each nation matured, and with *détente* coming to much of the world, some of the mistrust dissipated. In 1976, the Brazzaville government attempted to mediate the differences between Congo-Kinshasa and Angola by hosting a reconciliation meeting between Mobutu and Angolan President Agostinho Neto. In 1978, following the second **Shaba War**, the Brazzaville authorities hosted a series of talks that brought an agreement by Congo-Kinshasa and Angola to establish diplomatic relations with one another and to refrain from supporting each other’s **dissident** guerrilla groups. In April 1985, Congo-Kinshasa and Congo-Brazzaville signed a protocol agreeing in principle to the construction of a 17-km-long bridge across the Congo River to link the capitals of the two countries. Relations soured in 1989 and 1990 over expulsions of illegal immigrants and were suspended in 1993 following a ferry accident that killed 150 Congolese deportees.

Disputed elections in 1992 and 1993 caused fighting between several political factions in which 2,000 people were killed. However, it subsided with an accord under which Pascal Lissouba assumed the presidency in Brazzaville. The fall of Mobutu and installation of the **Laurent Kabila** government in Kinshasa in May 1997 was partly responsible for another period of instability in Congo-Brazzaville. Fighting broke out in Brazzaville on 5 June 1997, when government troops loyal to Lissouba tried to disarm militias led by former president Sassou-Nguesso. During the next four months, artillery barrages destroyed much of central Brazzaville and, on several occasions, reached Kinshasa. In one two-day period in September, mortar shells killed 21 people in Kinshasa, causing the Kabila government to send troops across the river. In Brazzaville, the fighting killed thousands of people and caused nearly one-half of the population of 1 million to flee.

The fighting was aggravated by elements of the former Congolese military that had fled across the river after Mobutu's fall and had thrown their support behind Lissouba. In October, 3,000 Angolan troops entered Congo-Brazzaville from Cabinda and helped the Sassou-Nguesso militias take control of most of the country. The Angolan government was angry at the Lissouba government for allowing its territory to be used by the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) opposition group as a base for arms trafficking and **diamond** smuggling. The number of Angolan troops was reduced to 1,500 by December and, from 5 to 14 January, Sassou-Nguesso chaired the National Peace and Reconciliation Forum in Brazzaville, pledging to oversee elections within two years. Relations between Congo-Brazzaville and Congo-Kinshasa have remained friendly since Angola emerged as a major regional power to stabilize it.

In mid-May 2000, Kinshasa and Brazzaville agreed to speed up the implementation of the nonaggression pact signed in Brazzaville in December 1998. Essentially, the pact sought to end army support to rebel movements and to curb any hostile campaigns against each other. In early 2001, security officials of both countries met in Kinshasa and Brazzaville and decided to organize joint patrols along the 1,500-km common border. However, the deal was postponed after the Brazzaville government accused Kinshasa of killing eight



people and injured dozens during an air raid on a remote community of Congo-Brazzaville. Relations resumed again several months later. In late 2005, Congo-Brazzaville handed over to Congo-Kinshasa 557 soldiers of the former Zairian army who fled to Congo-Brazzaville after the 1997 toppling of Mobutu. This gesture provided the two countries with the first step toward implementing the pact signed in 1998. By late 2008, relations between the two countries seemed normalized, despite an increase in diamond smuggling from Congo-Kinshasa to Congo-Brazzaville.

**CONGO, REPUBLIC OF (KINSHASA).** Congo was called the *Republic of Congo* from **independence** on 30 June 1960, until the promulgation of the first **constitution** on 1 August 1964. During that time, the country was governed by the **Loi Fondamentale**, a charter modeled on the Belgian system of government.

**CONGO RIVER.** Congo's major **river** and Africa's largest flowing body of water, the Congo River is 4,300 km long and carries the second-largest volume of water in the world, after the Amazon River. It provides an average flow at its mouth of 40,000 cubic meters per second, with an estimated hydroelectric potential of 100,000 MW. The river was named the **Zaire River** when the country's name was changed to *République du Zaïre* in 1971, under **Authenticity**, by the **Mobutu Sese Seko** government. The change was not acknowledged by international cartographers. The river continued to be called the *Congo* by **Congo-Brazzaville**. The name *Zaire River* was dropped in May 1997 by the government of **Laurent Kabila**. The name *Congo* was originally given to the river by **explorers** who named it after the **Kongo** people they met when they landed at its mouth in the 15th century. The Mobutu government said the name *Zaire* was derived from the name actually given by the people to the river. However, it was an adaptation of the word *nzadi*, which means "big river" in the Kikongo **language**.

**CONGO RIVER BASIN.** Known in French as the *Cuvette Centrale*, the Congo River Basin is a topographical depression, lying at an altitude of about 400 m above sea level, which covers 3 million square km, including nearly two-thirds of **Congo-Kinshasa** and

parts of **Congo-Brazzaville**, the **Central African Republic**, and southeastern Cameroon. The basin is the most sparsely populated area in Congo, with five persons or less per square km. It is inhabited primarily by **Bantu-language** speakers, **pygmies**, and some speakers of Adamawa-Eastern languages. The basin is drained for the most part by the **Congo River** and its tributaries. An area of heavy rainfall, averaging 2,000 mm per year, it is covered by swamps, marshes, and a lush tropical **rainforest**, where the primary means of **transportation** is by boat or dugout canoe. At higher elevations, the ground is covered by clay-like topsoil that allows some forms of **agriculture**. However, sandy soil with generally poor mineral content covers most of the **region** and makes farming difficult. The basin contains an estimated 100 million hectares of forest, but only 60 percent of it is considered accessible for **timbering**.

**CONGO-ZAÏRE.** The name sometimes used in 1997–2002 to identify the **Democratic Republic of Congo** (République Démocratique du Congo), which was reinstated after the **Laurent Kabila** government took power in May 1997 and abandoned the name **Republic of Zaire** and other symbols of **Mobutism**. Although the changes were quickly accepted by the international community, some **Mobutu Sese Seko** adherents maintained they were imposed illegally. As a result, *Congo-Zaire* was sometimes used to indicate neutrality in the dispute. However, the 2005 **constitution** promulgated in February 2006 officially ended the dispute in favor of the DRC. Thus, this book uses *Congo* or **Congo-Kinshasa** and its adjective *Congolese* to refer to the DRC, whereas **Congo-Brazzaville** refers to the former French Congo.

**CONSEIL DE GOUVERNMENT [COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENT].** A consultative group set up by the colonial authorities in 1914 with provincial replicas to provide a source of ideas and information from persons outside the colonial power structure. The body was composed primarily of **civil servants** but also included **missionaries** and social workers who were considered the primary representatives of the Congolese. Only two Africans were named to the Council in 1947, and that number was enlarged to eight in 1951. These early Africans were mostly chiefs or notables who,

in some cases, spoke no French and could not follow the debates. This outcome made some observers contend that the expansion of African representation in 1951 was mainly to appease international critics. The main effect of the Council after World War II was only to strengthen the voice of European pressure groups in the **Belgian Congo**. The final reform occurred in 1957, with the nomination African *évolués* who were able to articulate African grievances. The Council was entitled to express only suggestions or wishes, which were not binding on the colonial administration.

**CONSEIL NATIONAL DE LIBÉRATION (CNL) [NATIONAL LIBERATION COUNCIL]**. A political group formed in the **Congo-Brazzaville** on 3 October 1963, which claimed to group all Congolese revolutionary organizations. Its goal was to overthrow the government of **Cyrille Adoula** in **Leopoldville** and to achieve the total decolonization of **Congo-Kinshasa**. Among its leaders were **Christophe Gbenye** and Egide-Davidson Bocheley, both members of the **Mouvement National Congolais/Lumumba (MNC/L)**. However, the two leaders were bitterly divided from the start because of personality and leadership style; this split the organization into CNL/Gbenye and CNL/Bocheley in February 1964. The CNL/Bocheley claimed to be associated with **Pierre Mulele's rebellion in Kwilu**. It faded from view, however, as relations improved between the governments in **Kinshasa** and Brazzaville. On the other hand, the CNL/Gbenye gained momentum in eastern Congo after Gbenye decided to send his two lieutenants, **Gaston Soumialot** and **Laurent Kabila**, to Kivu and northern Katanga to start a rebellion in their respective regions. In September 1964, CNL/Gbenye declared the birth of **Congo People's Republic**.

**CONSTITUTION**. Since the creation of the **Congo Free State (CFS)** in 1885, Congo has been governed by four constitutions and two charters. The first document, the **Colonial Charter** (Charte Coloniale), was adopted by the Belgian parliament on 18 October 1908 to guide the administration of the **Belgian Congo**. The second charter, the **Loi Fondamentale** (Fundamental Law) was passed on 19 May 1960, six weeks before the Belgian Congo attained inde-

**pendence.** It was designed to guide the **Republic of Congo** during its early years.

Congo's first constitution, which created the **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)**, was drafted partly in reaction to weaknesses in these charters. Promulgated on 1 August 1964, the constitution creating the "First Republic" gave the **president** greater powers and made it clear that he was above the **prime minister**, with the authority to appoint and dismiss the cabinet. The Constitution of 1964 merged the two houses of **parliament** into one national assembly. It also eliminated the provincial assemblies and, in an effort to diffuse separatist sentiment, divided the Congo into 21 **provinces**. The 1964 Constitution, however, failed to adequately address the eventual power struggle between president and prime minister. A subsequent standoff created yet another power vacuum that was a major reason for the decision by the **military** to stage the **coup d'état** of 1965 and suspend political activity.

Congo's second constitution was promulgated on 24 June 1967, less than two years after the coup that brought **Mobutu Sese Seko** to power. It responded to what many saw as the failures of the previous document. The new constitution, which was approved by 98 percent of voters, provided for a unicameral legislature and a strong presidency. It removed most powers previously granted to the provinces. The president was given the power to suspend parliament and political activity and rule by decrees. Armed with the power of decree, Mobutu moved quickly to consolidate his authority and launch a personality cult, which he felt was needed to provide the country with strong leadership and a sense of nationhood.

Using his decree powers, Mobutu made many de facto constitutional changes. Launched in 1966, the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR)** party became the sole legal **political party** on 23 December 1970. In that same year, Mobutu was elected unopposed to his first term. The number of provinces was gradually reduced. As part of a move toward **Authenticity** and to bury the trauma of the years following independence, the **names** of government institutions, cities, and even the nation itself were changed. The *ministries* became *departments*, *ministers* became *secretaries*, **Leopoldville** became **Kinshasa**, **Congo** became the **Republic of Zaire**.

The third constitution, promulgated on 15 August 1974, codified the decrees of the previous seven years. It further concentrated power in the office of the president. It eliminated the separation of powers, since members of the **judicial system**, executive branches, and candidates for the legislature were appointed by the president. The third constitution removed any distinction between party and state by establishing “**Mobutism**” as the official ideology and doctrine. Under the constitution, most terms of office were for five years, except for the president’s, which was raised to seven.

The political process was liberalized somewhat in 1977–78, reportedly under pressure from Western donors following the **Shaba Wars**. Local party cells were allowed a voice in the selection of legislative candidates and, for a brief time, the legislature was allowed to summon ministers for questioning. Multiple candidates were allowed in the legislative **elections** of 1982 and, for a brief period, some members of the **Political Bureau** were elected. In the 1980s, however, many reforms were circumvented or phased out. The constitution was rewritten in 1983 to incorporate these changes. Congo became a party-state. All citizens were declared party members from birth until death. The 120-member **Central Committee**, created in 1980, became the de facto legislative body. The Political Bureau was the main policy-making body and inner core of political leadership and power. The legislature’s role was primarily to approve decisions of the Central Committee, while the **Executive Council** in essence became a committee of senior administrators. The constitution was no longer a document to build consensus but one that discouraged dissent and invited excesses.

When Mobutu announced the transition to multipartyism in April 1990, many tenets of the constitution, such as the supremacy of the MPR, were mooted. Restrictions on political parties, trade unions, and newspapers were lifted. Most institutions of the party-state atrophied because several key politicians or Mobutu’s clients defected to form their own political organizations. Nevertheless, Congo continued to operate under the 1974 constitution until the **Conférence Nationale Souveraine** (CNS) passed the **Transitional Act** in August 1992, which was to serve as a provisional constitution. Under this act, the CNS established a transitional government composed of a figurehead president, an independent judiciary, and a transitional

parliament, called the **Haut Conseil de la République** (HCR), which elected the prime minister.

The transitional government was to govern for two years, during which time a new constitution was to be drafted and national elections were to be held. However, progress was stalled by political infighting, disruptive tactics by Mobutu, and the “**pillages**” in 1991 and 1993. Following protracted negotiations, pro-Mobutu forces and the **opposition** agreed on a compromise by joining the HCR and former parliament into a single body, called the ***Haut Conseil de la République/Parlement de la Transition*** (HCR/PT), to draft a new constitution and organize national elections.

On 30 June 1995, the HCR/PT voted to extend the transitional period until 9 July 1997 and to postpone elections by two years. The 1974 constitution continued in effect, but primarily as a source of reference, subject to amendment by presidential decree and political negotiation among the various parties. In August 1996, the HCR/PT completed a draft constitution creating the **Federal Republic of Congo**. It was to be submitted to a national referendum in February 1997. This timetable was disrupted, however, by the military offensive that overthrew Mobutu in May 1997 and brought the **Laurent Kabila government** to power. The Kabila government announced a new timetable, saying a constitutional referendum and national elections would be held by 1999. However, a **civil war** against Kabila broke out on 2 August 1998, and the prospect for a new constitution faded away. After the assassination of Kabila in January 2001, his son **Joseph Kabila** began aggressive diplomacy to end the civil war.

All parties involved in the civil war signed an agreement in late 2002 that paved the way toward a new constitution. This constitution was approved by referendum on 18–19 December 2005 by 84 percent of Congolese, with 64 percent of registered electors casting their votes. President Joseph Kabila promulgated the fourth constitution on 18 February 2006. The new constitution established a semi-presidential system. Under the constitution of the Third Republic, the prime minister shares the leadership of the executive branch of government with the president, the head of state. The former is appointed by the latter, from the party or political group that has the majority in the lower house, the National Assembly. The prime minister has a secondary role in the executive branch when he or she is from

the presidential party or majority. However, when the presidential party or group does not control the lower house, the prime minister's importance is enhanced, because then the president exercises little power. This is known as *cohabitation*.

**CONTENTIEUX BELGO-CONGOLAIS.** The *contentieux* was used in 1966 to refer to several economic issues that confronted the **Mobutu Sese Seko** regime from the time it assumed power. The first issue involved the status of charter companies and other companies in which the colonial state held shares. These companies included the **Compagnie du Katanga** (CK) and its affiliate **Comité Spécial du Katanga** (CSK), **Comité National du Kivu** (CNKi), the Compagnie des Chemins de Fer du Congo Supérieur aux Grands Lacs (CFL), and the Minière du Bécéka (MB), which grew out of the Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas Congo au Katanga. The second and third issues concerned the disposition of the colonial debt and the situation of very large areas in which land or mineral rights had been conceded to colonial corporations but remained undeveloped.

In 1891, the CK was created and received from King **Leopold II** one-third of the land surface in **Katanga**. The cadastral problems between the king and the CK made the exploitation of Katanga impractical. The two sides agreed to create the CSK, which later conceded an ore-rich tract of 34,000 square kilometers to the newly formed **Union Minière du Haut Katanga** (UMHK). The CK became a golden tree that grew from a mere \$2 million seed, collecting an annual land rent of no less than \$200,000 per year in the late 1930s, as well as UMHK dividends. From 1955 to 1959, the CK collected more than \$19.4 million in rents. With political **independence** near, the new Congo state would become a major partner in the CSK, with 60 percent of the voting shares in the UMHK. Thus, the UMHK would automatically become a state-controlled corporation. Fears in **Belgium** that the new state would inherit the giant UMHK were averted by the dissolution of the CSK by the Belgian government on 27 June 1960.

The second company, the CFL, built a **railway** in northeastern Congo and received 4 million hectares of transferable land and mineral rights along the eastern frontier, mainly in Kivu. Its history is considerable because of the creation of the CNKi in 1928 as a

joint venture between the CFL and the colonial **administration**. The CNKi received a 12-million hectare tract of land that was reduced later to 400,000 hectares. Its goal was to sell land to Belgian colonists to help them settle in the temperate climate of Kivu. Because the state held the majority of shares in the CNKi, the Belgian government also dissolved it on 30 May 1960.

The second issue in the *contentieux* related to colonial debt as the result of a 10-year social program, from 1950 to 1959, which cost the colonial government 51.5 billion francs (\$1.05 billion) in investments. After long years of surpluses, the state budget was in the red from 1956 onward. The external debt, negligible in 1950, rose rapidly in the final colonial years, reaching \$1 billion by 1960. Moreover, debt service payments represented 17 percent of the 1959 operating budget. Foreign enterprises, which represented the wealthiest sector of the **economy**, even received a tax break. They were allowed to transfer to Belgium an average of 3 billion francs (\$60 million) per year between 1950 and 1958. About 30 to 50 billion francs or \$600 million to \$1.1 billion (1950–59 price = 100) were transferred to Belgium from 1950 to 1958. Without an adequate tax base, no payments of the colonial debt were thus made by Congolese leaders during 1960–65. Given the deterioration of relations between Belgium and Congo in early years of independence, Belgium retained possession of the portfolio of state holdings in the colonial corporations valued at 37.5 billion francs (\$750 million) in 1960, in escrow against the liability of the \$46 billion franc debt.

**Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula** made the first effort to resolve the *contentieux*. Belgium and Congo signed an accord in March 1964 that assured that the debt liability would be split. In November 1964, Prime Minister **Moïse Tshombe** endeavored to sweep away some of the colonial debris by formally dissolving the three charter companies, CSK, CNKi, and CFL. The Belgian private sector complained indignantly, demanding compensation for the extinction of rights. The Belgian government backed its private sector and refused to proceed with the debt portfolio transaction until the charter company issue was settled. Tshombe acceded to the compensation. A compromise was reached on the colonial debt: Belgium agreed to pay the 11 billion Belgian francs it had guaranteed and Congo took over 23 billion in Congo francs, which were devalued by inflation. Nonetheless,



the Congo payment required it to pay 300 million Belgian francs per year. In exchange, Belgium turned the portfolio over to Tshombe. Congo continued payments until 1971, then ceased to pay because the debt was considered liquidated.

Once in power, Mobutu reopened the *contentieux* in early 1966 because Belgium refused to release colonial state holdings in 10 companies on the grounds that Congo had to negotiate the specific terms of the turnover with private shareholders. Of these, three companies were substantial: Sabena (an airline company), FORMINIERE (a diamond mining company), and Société des Mines d'Or de Kilo Moto (a gold mining company, later **Office des Mines d'Or de Kilo Moto**, OKIMO). The colonial state held 24.8 percent, 55.6 percent, and 98 percent in the three companies, respectively. Mobutu accused Tshombe of treason and considered the settlement on the *contentieux* made with Belgium as invalid. New accords were reached in May 1966.

A final attack on the vestiges of colonial economic privilege came through the enactment of the **Bakajika law** in 1966 that was promulgated in July. It stipulated that all public land was the domain of the state and formally extinguished all land grants and concessionary powers delegated by the colonial state. This set the last battle against the UMHK in 1966–67. On 8 December, Congo broke all negotiations, and Mobutu announced the nationalization of the UMHK on 1 January 1967. Although the nationalization of UMHK seemed to have been motivated by economic nationalism, in the end, it was a political act to consolidate Mobutu's power and to control ample resources without resorting to taxes, in order to offer financial backing to potential political rivals.

**CONVENTION NATIONALE CONGOLAISE (CONACO) [NATIONAL CONGOLESE CONVENTION]**. A coalition of political groups that merged into a **political party** headed by **Moïse Tshombe**. It was an effort to form a nationally based political party by the leaders of the **Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga** (CONAKAT) in **Leopoldville**. In the March 1965 elections, the CONACO won 122 of 167 seats in parliament or 73 percent of the votes from most electoral districts. Once the results were official, candidates began to contest the results. The Leopoldville Court of Appeals,

which was also the electoral deliberating court, only considered electoral appeals from a few electoral districts. The court simply voided the legislative elections of two electoral districts, **Kivu Central** and **Goma-Rutshuru**, but confirmed their provincial elections. In the other four cases, the Court declared both legislative and provincial elections null and void. The Court also decided to send voters back to the polls in a number of electoral districts. The elections occurred again in these areas between 8 and 15 August 1965.

The parliament opened its first session on 20 September 1965 to verify members' eligibility and prerogatives, as well as to organize committees. The CONACO majority received both presidency and vice presidency of the lower house, while the opposition received the presidency of the upper house. On 13 October 1965, **President Joseph Kasavubu** appointed **Evariste Kimba** of the **Baluba du Katanga (BALUBAKAT)** from the minority coalition as the new **prime minister**, charged with forming the **government**. But the lower house voted against the new government, forcing it to resign. The president renominated Kimba on 15 November to form another government. The CONACO ascendancy led to tensions between Kasavubu and Tshombe. The deadlock, combined with renewed uprisings in eastern Congo, helped set the scene for the military **coup d'état** that ushered in the **Mobutu Sese Seko** era. CONACO's activities were suspended, along with those of all political parties following the coup.

**COPPER.** Most of Congo's copper is found in a rich lode, 100 km wide, called the **Zambia Copper Belt**, which runs for about 400 km through the southern part of Congo's former **Katanga Province**, between **Kolwezi** and Sakania. Important mines are located at Kolwezi, **Lubumbashi**, **Likasi**, **Tenke**, Kipushi, and Musoshi. In the 19th century, tales of rich copper lodes brought **explorers** from the east and west coasts of Africa, but surveys determined the deposits were not commercially viable. However, discoveries by a British exploring team in 1901 led King **Leopold II** to send engineers and to start building a **railway**. Production began in 1911. It reached 100,000 tons in 1928 and 300,000 tons in 1960.

During the first half of the 20th century, copper production was virtually monopolized by the **Union Minière du Haut-Katanga**

(UMHK), which operated a dozen mines. The UMHK was nationalized in 1967 and replaced first by the **Générale Congolaise des Minerais** (GECOMIN) and in 1971 by the **Générale des Carrières et des Mines** (GECAMINES). A second venture, **Société de Développement Industriel et Minier du Zaïre** (SODIMIZA), was founded in 1969 by the Nippon Mining Company, with the state holding 15 percent of the equity. It received a concession of 93,000 square km of land in southern Katanga, and its production began in 1972 with 50,000 tons of copper at the Mushosi plant, near the Zambia border. However, SODIMIZA abandoned operations of its Congo mines in 1983.

A third venture was organized in 1970 by a consortium of French, Japanese, South African, and **United States** companies. Called the *Société Minière de Tenke-Fungurume* (SMTF), it offered a 20-percent interest to the state in return for the concession. Its actual work began in 1972, but a prolonged slump in the copper market after mid-1974 hit the SMTF very hard. In 1976, the company was forced to suspend operations, and it was liquidated in 1984. However, in November 1996, a Canadian company announced a joint venture with GECAMINES to resume production by 2000.

The first and only smelting plant, owned by GECAMINES at Lubumbashi, started in 1911 and produced 100,000 tons of refined copper by 1928. Production increased over the years to respond to world demand. Total copper production (refined and smelted) remained on average 285,000 tons per year between 1960 and 1965. It increased throughout the early 1970s, with a peak of 499,428 tons in 1974. It began to decline in 1975 and reached 399,584 tons in 1979. It picked up again in 1980, with total production remaining above 500,000 tons, before declining to 422,192 tons in 1989. Production plummeted from 339,000 tons in 1990 to 45,300 tons in 1993. For the next six years, 1994–99, production of copper remained on average 39,400 tons per year. In 2000, production was only 21,000 tons, which represented the lowest copper production in the history of Congo since 1911. Although total production picked up, it was only 92,000 tons in 2005, which is the last year for which official data are available.

At the peak of world copper prices in the mid-1970s, copper was Congo's major **export**, supplying one-half of the **government's**

revenues and two-thirds of its foreign exchange. During that period, Congo was the seventh-largest producer of copper in the world, supplying 7 percent of total world output. A number of factors explain the saga of copper.

During the boom years of the early 1970s, the government sought to expand copper production, despite warnings that its emphasis on mineral extraction for foreign exchange was undermining **agriculture**. An expansion program brought copper production to 499,428 tons in 1974. Prices for copper rose sharply in 1973–74, following the Arab oil embargo, and reached \$1.75 per pound. The following year, however, they dropped to \$0.50 per pound. By the end of 1986, prices were in the \$0.60–0.70 range, but production had stagnated because of oversupply on the world market. However, lower prices caused a gradual decline of production in the late 1980s. Then, the collapse of the formal **economy** in the early 1990s idled many **mining** companies and caused production to fall sharply: in 1996, it was one-tenth of its peak level of 500,000 tons in the mid-1980s.

Congo's copper exports were also hindered by high **transportation** costs. The most efficient route, the **Benguela Railway**, has been closed since 1974 because of the civil war in **Angola**. The **National Way** system, entirely within the national territory, became increasingly difficult because of deteriorating **rail** and **river** transport systems. On occasion, the government reportedly transported refined copper by air from Katanga to customers in Europe. The collapse of major underground shafts in the 1990s and the insolvency of GECAMINES severely reduced production in the 1990s. For example, 40,147 tons in 1996 came from the large stock of previously refined ore.

Following the overthrow of **Mobutu Sese Seko** in 1997, the **Laurent Kabila** government signed a number of agreements establishing joint ventures with foreign companies to revive production. One venture sought to restore production levels to 100,000 tons per year by 2000, using ore at the **Tenke-Fungurume** concession. Another sought to refine ore tailings at Kolwezi and Kipushi. The **civil war** against Kabila made it impossible to sign meaningful contracts to revive the copper industry in Congo, and artisanal mines continued. By late 2008, the government had not promulgated a clear investment code capable of attracting foreign investors.

**COQUILHATVILLE.** *See* MBANDAKA.

**COQUILHATVILLE CONFERENCE.** A conference organized by the Congolese central **government** in Coquilhatville (now **Mbandaka**) from 24 April to 28 May 1961, as part of negotiations aimed at ending the secessions in the **provinces**. Eighteen delegations were represented at the conference. It followed a meeting in Tananarive (now Antananarivo), Madagascar, the **Tananarive Conference**, which called for a confederal system of government in Congo and thus a large measure of autonomy to the provinces. **Moïse Tshombe** favored a confederal formula. The Coquilhatville Conference rejected the confederal formula in favor of a federal system. After receiving no support for his confederal system, Tshombe and his delegation walked out of the meeting on the second day. The conference proceeded without him, and all the participants agreed to have a parliamentary meeting before September 1961 to end the constitutional crisis, which started after the removal of **Patrice Lumumba** as **prime minister**. This meeting occurred in **Lovanium, Leopoldville** in July 1961. The result of the meeting was the election of **Cyrille Adoula** as the prime minister of Congo on 2 August 1961.

**CORRUPTION.** *See* KLEPTOCRACY.

**COTTON.** Cotton became a principal commercial crop in Congo during the colonial era, when it was promoted by colonial administrators as a crop to be grown by individual farmers. The crop was traditionally reserved for them and was grown extensively on small plots of land, one-half to one hectare in size. Production surpassed 100,000 tons before **independence**, but fell steadily thereafter. In the 1980s, the Mobutu **government** attempted to revive cotton production but failed because of a lack of fertilizers and pesticides, and a preference by farmers to grow the more lucrative **coffee**. By the late 1980s, Congo imported cotton for its **cloth** industry because production had declined drastically. By the late 1990s, production of cotton averaged only 9,000 tons, plummeting to its lowest level of 7,000 tons a year in 2001–2004, according to Food and Agriculture Organization data. *See also* AGRICULTURE.

**COUP D'ÉTAT.** Congo experienced a successful **military** coup d'état on **24 November 1965**, which brought **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** to power. As with many coups, the military decided to seize power following a political crisis exacerbated by bickering among political leaders and the inability of the civilian **government** to deal with threats to the **security** of the territory. Mobutu had briefly assumed power on 14 September 1960, during a political standoff between **President Joseph Kasavubu** and **Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba**. At that time, he made a point of stating he was not staging a coup, but only “neutralizing” the politicians until passions cooled and political order could be restored.

Mobutu assumed power a second time in 1965, during a similar standoff between Kasavubu and **Moïse Tshombe**. It was an especially tense time. Leopoldville was being rocked by urban terrorism and banditry, and the eastern **rebellion** was not yet over. Although Mobutu used the military to wield and remain in power, he did not establish a military regime. Rather, he announced a civilian cabinet and vowed to bring a new political order. This soon became a “revolution” that brought the single-party state to Congo, with Mobutu as its undisputed leader.

A number of plots were conceived to overthrow the Mobutu government, usually with collaboration from some elements of the military. All failed, in part because of the president's efficient internal security network and his practice of offering handsome rewards to his informers. On many other occasions, these plots were fabricated by Mobutu to purge unwanted elements from his entourage and the officer corps.

**COURTS.** *See* JUDICIAL SYSTEM.

**CRIME.** The Congolese **government** publishes no statistics on crime, court cases, or **prison** populations, so it is impossible to know exactly the extent of criminality or its incidence relative to other countries. Crime of all sorts is present in Congo and, as in most of the world, appears to be worst in the cities, where poverty makes burglaries, pickpocketing, and petty theft common occurrences. Most **middle-class** and upper-class households are protected by high walls and

guards. Tight controls on firearms made their use relatively rare until the 1990s. However, following the economic collapse of the early 1990s, crime skyrocketed throughout Congo. The “pillages” of 1991 and 1993, led by elements of the **military**, were never punished and, as the crisis worsened, the practice grew among some **security** forces of relying on the **population** to supplement their declining incomes.

By the mid-1990s, most civilians lived in fear of shakedowns at checkpoints by gunmen in military uniforms. Another form of crime consisted of sweeps through neighborhoods by security forces that robbed, looted, and raped, and shot anyone who resisted. Arms trafficking was also on the rise. Large quantities of weapons were being shipped through the country, initially to rebels of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) in exchange for **diamonds** and, in the mid-1990s, to belligerents in the interethnic violence in **Rwanda** and **Burundi**. Arms began to appear in the possession of civilians, who used them to protect their families and police their neighborhoods.

After the fall of **Mobutu Sese Seko**, the **Laurent Kabila** government announced a crackdown on crime, and the forces of order subsequently were criticized at times for their overzealous punishment of alleged criminals. On 27 January 1998, military firing squads in **Kinshasa** publicly executed 21 people convicted of murder and armed robbery. Thirty-nine others were executed in similar fashion in **Goma**, **Bukavu**, and **Lubumbashi** in early 1998. However, the **civil war** against Kabila weakened government’s tough posture against crime, which became widespread as state presence disappeared. By the mid-2005, petty thefts were quite common in towns, and thieves would not hesitate to grab anything from bystanders and disappear in the crowd. At night, armed groups attacked houses asking for money, jewelry, or anything that could be sold quickly. Many of these armed groups were soldiers trying to make ends meet. *See also* HUMAN RIGHTS; KLEPTOCRACY.

**CUBA, RELATIONS WITH.** Congo’s relations with Cuba were cool and at times even hostile following **independence**. Cuba was among the **Soviet**-bloc nations that supported the eastern **rebellion**, in particular the **People’s Republic of Congo** in **Stanleyville** in 1964–65. A Cuban contingent, led by Ernesto “Che” Guevara, fought against

**government** troops in eastern Congo in the mid-1960s. During the Angolan civil war, Cuba sent an estimated 15,000 troops and advisers to **Angola** to back the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) against rival forces, such as the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) that was supported by the Congolese government. Despite recognition of the MPLA government by the **United Nations** and the **Organization of African Unity** (OAU) in 1976, Congo continued to back the FNLA's guerrilla war against the MPLA. Following the first **Shaba** incursion in March 1977 by guerrillas of the **Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo** (FLNC) from bases in Angola, Congo severed relations with Cuba.

Relations improved gradually after Congo and Angola established diplomatic relations in late 1978 and the activities of the FNLA diminished. However, tensions remained as the Angolan civil war continued and Congo switched support to another rival of the MPLA, the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi. During the early 1980s, the Cuban presence in Angola increased to more than 25,000 soldiers, and a sizable Cuban contingent guarded petroleum installations in the Angolan enclave of Cabinda, only a few kilometers from the Congolese border. Cuba began withdrawing its troops and advisors in the late 1980s because of the weakening Cuban economy and a decline of popular support in Cuba for the intervention. Relations between Congo and Cuba improved drastically after **Laurent Kabila** became president. Kabila visited Cuba in late June 1998. The relations between Congo and Cuba remained normal throughout the 2000s. In February 2009, the Cuban delegation to the 12th Summit of the **African Union** in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, met with numerous African personalities, including the foreign minister of Congo. However, nothing important emerged from the meeting.

**CULTURE.** Congolese **government** policy seeks to preserve the traditional culture of the hundreds of **ethnic groups** in the country. As a result, the government has sponsored numerous studies, exhibitions, films, seminars, and performances. Some Congolese artists also make concerted efforts to propagate aspects of traditional culture in their work, whether **literature**, **music**, painting, or theater. Nevertheless, many Congolese feel that a lack of funds and the disruption of



traditional transmission patterns caused by **urbanization** are eroding traditional culture. Modern urban Congolese culture, however, is vibrant. Drawing on aspects of the traditional past and melding them with influences from city life, contemporary culture influences fashion, music, and the arts throughout Africa and increasingly in parts of Europe and the Americas. The influence of central African sculpture on modern art is well documented. Today, Congolese influences are regularly felt on the international fashion and music scenes as well. *See also* CLOTH; DRESS; SPORTS.

**CURRENCY.** The currency of the **Kingdom of Kongo**, when the Europeans arrived, was a certain kind of shell that could only be found in the king's fisheries. During the colonial era and for a number of years after **independence**, the currency was the Congolese franc, pegged at a 1:1 ratio to the franc of **Belgium**. The two currencies were de-linked at independence. The Congolese franc began to lose its long-standing value of 50 francs to one U.S. dollar and was devalued a number of times. The first two devaluations occurred in 1961 and 1963, when the value of the Congolese franc dropped from 50 to 100 francs per U.S. dollar in 1961, then to an average of 165 francs in 1963.

In June 1967, a currency reform was decreed, and the currency was changed to the **zaire (Z)**. One zaire was the equivalent of and could be exchanged for 1,000 francs, equal to two U.S. dollars. A smaller unit, the likuta (plural: makuta), was worth 1/100th of one zaire. Originally, an even smaller unit, the sengi, equaling 1/100th of a likuta, was issued, but it quickly went out of circulation. Zaire remained the major unit of currency from June 1967 until June 1998.

The zaire was never strong, and declined steadily in value. The weakness of the currency was due in part to Congo's historically negative balance of trade, but primarily to the **government's** tendency to borrow from the Treasury to meet its budget deficits. Shortages of foreign exchange also gave rise to a thriving parallel market, in which the U.S. dollar often traded at three to seven times its official exchange rate.

By 1980, according to **International Monetary Fund** figures, the value of the zaire had declined drastically and was exchanged officially at 2.8Z to one U.S. dollar. On 9 September 1983, the Congo-

lese government again announced monetary reforms, which allowed private banks for the first time to buy and sell foreign exchange at weekly auctions held by the **central bank**. The rate of exchange was set according to supply and demand. Overnight, the value of the currency plunged from a rate of six zaires to one U.S. dollar, to 30 zaires to the dollar. These reforms also allowed private banks, for the first time, to trade in currency through auctions and, in essence, float the zaire on the free market. Under the new system, banks met weekly to set the exchange rate, based on supply and demand. After an initial plunge to one-fourth its previous level, the zaire remained stable for a number of years, and for a time the parallel market was virtually eliminated. In 1985, 50 zaires were exchanged to one dollar.

During the late 1980s, the decline of the zaire resumed and accelerated, primarily caused by rising budget deficits and shortages of foreign exchange. It also fluctuated depending on supply and demand at the central bank auctions. In 1990, one U.S. dollar was equivalent to 718 zaires. During the period of hyperinflation in the 1990s, the zaire declined to 15,587 zaires to the dollar in 1991, and to 645,549 zaires to the dollar in 1992 (because of political uncertainties and a swelling money supply).

Currency reform on 22 October 1993 introduced the new zaire (NZ), one unit of which (worth nearly two U.S. dollars) was exchanged for 3 million “old” zaires. By late 1993, one dollar was worth 5 million NZ, which was also the largest note in circulation. The **opposition** accused the government of printing money to pay its expenses and thereby fueling **inflation**. The decline of the new currency was slowed for a time by austerity measures. Inflation was reduced in 1994 and 1995, and the value of the new zaire stabilized somewhat. However, by mid-1995, the NZ was exchanging at a rate of 5,000 NZ (equivalent to 15 billion old zaires) to the dollar. Thus, the new currency proved to be equally susceptible to the effects of inflation and the tendency of the government to print banknotes to meet its payroll. In early 1997, the new zaire was trading at 200,000 to one U.S. dollar.

Following the fall of **Mobutu Sese Seko** in May 1997, **President Laurent Kabila** was able to stabilize exchange rates as part of a vigorous anti-inflation effort and, in January 1998, the dollar was being exchanged for 110,000 NZ in **Kinshasa** and about 130,000

in the major provincial commercial centers. On 30 June 1998, the Kabila government reintroduced the Congolese franc (CF), exchanging it at the rate of one CF for 100,000 NZ. The new currency was exchanged at a rate of 1.4 CF to the U.S. dollar, but was devalued on 24 October 2000 from 23.50 francs to 50 francs per dollar. However, the dollar was selling at about 96 francs in the parallel market by late October. A year later, the U.S. dollar was equivalent to 319 francs. After another decline to 414 francs in December 2003, the Congolese franc improved to 382 francs per dollar a year later as the result of confidence in the peace process after a long **civil war**, which started in early August 1998. The franc somehow stabilized in subsequent years; by December 2008, one U.S. dollar was exchanged at 428 Congolese francs.

For 23 years following independence, Congo's currency exchange rate was set at unrealistically high levels. Consequently, foreign exchange, whether Belgian francs, U.S. dollars, or French-backed Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) francs, was always in high demand and short supply. The shortages at the central bank led to a flourishing parallel market, in which hard currency was exchanged at three to seven times the official rate. This parallel market enriched the political *élites* for nearly a quarter-century. Those with political connections acquired foreign exchange through the central bank at the official rate, ostensibly to import essential goods. Many used the hard currency, however, to purchase consumer goods and luxuries that were subsequently sold at parallel market rates. In some cases, the hard currency was merely dumped on the parallel market for an instant profit.

During periods of instability, banks frequently would not or could not provide currency to customers. As a result, free-market traders, often operating from stools on the streets of downtown Kinshasa in a section that came to be known as "**Wall Street**," became a major force in the exchange market. During some periods, their activities amounted to one-fifth of the country's total foreign exchange transactions. Businessmen and diplomats were obliged at times to send their couriers to the free market to purchase the currency needed for their operations. A free-market exchange system also thrived in the wealthier regions of the country, where rates often varied considerably from those in the capital. *See also* BANKING; KLEPTOCRACY.

**CUSTOMARY LAW [LOI COUTUMIÈRE].** The laws and traditional courts that governed Congolese during the colonial era, as opposed to the Belgian-style system that governed Europeans. Customary law was part of a two-tiered **judicial system** that allowed Congolese accused of offenses to be judged under their own traditional systems. **Chiefs** often acted as judges in these “people’s courts.” The **government** officially ended the dual system on 10 July 1968, incorporating customary law into the national judicial system. Professional judges replaced local chiefs. However, the system was never fully implemented, and many citizens continued to seek arbitration and justice through elders and other traditional leaders because the traditional system requires no fees or long queues.

**CUVETTE CENTRALE.** *See* CONGO RIVER BASIN.

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**DE GAULLE, CHARLES (1890–1970).** President of **France** during the African **independence** period, De Gaulle’s speech in Brazzaville on 24 August 1958, in which he offered autonomy to France’s African colonies, dramatized the different prospects for independence in the **Belgian Congo** and those in its French-ruled neighbors. De Gaulle’s speech, along with the **Pan-African Conference** in Accra and the **Brussels World Fair** that same year, fueled the independence movement and the riots in **Leopoldville** beginning on **4 January 1959**, which set into motion the move toward independence.

**DEBT, EXTERNAL.** The Congo was one of the first casualties of the developing world’s debt crisis, caused in part by falling commodity prices and rising interest rates, but also by liberal lending policies by banks. In the 1960s, Congo’s debt remained quite modest despite a number of development projects dating back to the late 1950s. During the early 1970s, as mineral prices soared following the Arab oil embargo, prices for **copper** and **cobalt** rose to historic heights. Foreign banks loaned large sums to Congo to finance large-scale development projects. As a result, the external debt quintupled between 1967 and 1973, reaching \$1 billion in 1973. In 1974,

copper prices fell to one-third their level of the previous year, and the Congolese government began to fall behind in debt repayments. By the late 1970s, foreign debt more than quadrupled, reaching \$5.1 billion, roughly the equivalent of 41 percent of the country's annual **gross domestic product** (GDP) in 1981. The **government** signed a series of stabilization agreements with the **International Monetary Fund** (IMF) in the second half of the 1970s, but most of the IMF "standbys" were suspended because of the failure of the government to reduce its budget deficit and control **inflation**.

In 1983, Congo undertook a series of drastic fiscal and monetary reforms that included floating its **currency** on the free market and slashing its budget. These measures caused a severe recession, but they also brought renewed confidence and expressions of support from the IMF and foreign creditors. After several years of recession and few signs of economic revival, the government, fearing a social upheaval in 1986, began limiting debt repayments to 10 percent of **export** earnings. It failed to meet this target, however. It negotiated another reform program in 1987, and yet another in 1989. These programs usually included a rollover of payment arrears, rescheduling of outstanding loans, and infusions of new money. In exchange, the government agreed to anti-inflation and budget-reduction measures.

By 1990, Congo's external debt had exceeded \$10 billion and represented 110 percent of GDP. All foreign lenders had virtually frozen their aid programs because of mismanagement, failure to service existing loans, and **human rights** violations. In February 1992, the IMF declared Congo "noncooperative," thereby making it ineligible for further borrowing. In July 1993, the **World Bank**, which until then had been the one multilateral institution receiving payments from Congo, froze all lending because of service arrears and closed its office in **Kinshasa**. In 1995, Congo's external debt was \$13 billion, 235 percent of GDP.

When the government of **Laurent Kabila** deposed **Mobutu Sese Seko** in May 1997, he called for forgiveness of the debt, saying it had all gone into the private accounts of Mobutu, his family, and the barons of his regime. After the death of Kabila, foreign lenders became more sympathetic to Congo's plight and forgave close to \$3 billion. In July 2001, the IMF and the World Bank agreed that Congo would have to take steps necessary to reach its decision point under

the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. Under the HIPC Initiative, debt relief from all of its creditors amounted to approximately \$10 billion in nominal terms or \$6.3 billion in net present value. By 2005, foreign debt was down to \$1.1 billion, but still remained equal to 149 percent of GDP. *See also* ECONOMY; LONDON CLUB.

**DEMOCRACY.** Like many African nations, Congo was a multiparty democracy at **independence**, modeled on Western European principles of government. The **Loi Fondamentale** (Fundamental Law), which established the political institutions at independence, was largely influenced by the political system of **Belgium**. It provided for a bicameral legislature with a **president** and **prime minister**, both of whom were elected by the **parliament**. However, the Loi Fondamentale did not define the power-sharing relationship between the two and the institution that chose them. Because of the explosive growth of regionally and ethnically based **political parties**, estimated to number 125 prior to the **elections** of 1960, and because no party or group obtained an absolute majority, regional tensions were aggravated, making governing difficult.

The **constitution** of 1964, which followed the end of the early secessions and insurrections, addressed some of these problems. As parliamentary politics began to mature, some political coalitions emerged, leading to significant victories by the **Convention Nationale Congolaise** (CONACO) in the 1965 elections. However, power struggles between the president and prime minister continued, and regional tensions kept the political climate unsettled. Amid **rebellions** and another constitutional crisis caused by a political standoff between the president and the ruling parliamentary coalition, **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** took power on **24 November 1965**. The new president ruled by decree, suspended all political activity, and promised to hold elections in five years. Following purges in the **military** and the exile of many **opposition** leaders, Mobutu founded the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) and established a single-party system. In what was to become a trend in many African countries, the sole legal party became the institution of state and the presidency increasingly assimilated political and administrative powers.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Congo adopted a single-party system that contained limited democratic principles. Thus, Mobutu was elected to seven-year terms in 1970, 1977, and 1984. Each time, he ran unopposed and received more than 99 percent of the vote. During the elections, observers noted many irregularities, such as a dearth of “No” ballots and the active presence at the polls of “pressure” groups of party militants and soldiers. By the late 1970s, Congo had officially become a party-state with two supreme institutions, the presidency and the **Political Bureau** of the party. The president appointed members of the Political Bureau, as well as the occupants of most senior-level positions in party and government. All Congolese were made party members automatically from birth.

In the late 1970s, under pressure from Western donors, some liberalization was enacted. This included allowing some members of the Political Bureau to be elected, permitting multiple candidates for legislative elections, and giving local party members a voice in selecting legislative candidates from their region. Parliament (officially called the *Legislative Council*) was unmuzzled and allowed to summon state commissioners (ministers) for questioning on their **department** budgets.

Parliamentary freedom led to raucous political debate. In part to counter this loss of control, Mobutu created the MPR **Central Committee** in 1980, which gradually assumed responsibility for major debate and lawmaking functions in government. The Legislative Council’s role became one of approving decisions by the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the presidency. Controversial legislative elections were held in 1987, and a new parliament was convened, but it was viewed as weak and occupied by Mobutu *cadres*. Nevertheless, pressures began building for change and, following several years of demonstrations and international pressure, Mobutu announced on **24 April 1990** the end of the party-state and the beginning of a transition to multiparty democracy. Protracted conflict within the elite prolonged the transition until May 1997, when **Laurent Kabila** became president and ended the Mobutu regime.

In August 1998, a **civil war** broke out and Congolese had to wait seven years to vote on a constitutional referendum, which was held on 18–19 December 2005. It was approved by 84.31 percent of eligible voters (with 15.69 percent against). The constitution paved the

way to free legislative and presidential elections on 30 July 2006, the first multiparty elections since Mobutu took power in 1965. In the first round of presidential elections, **Joseph Kabila** received 44.81 percent and **Jean-Pierre Bemba** received 20.03 percent. In a run-off election scheduled in October 2006, Kabila received 58.05 percent against 41.95 percent for Bemba. Kabila became the first president of Congo to be elected directly by popular vote. Provincial elections followed in early 2007. In accordance with the new constitution, provincial assemblies elected senators. *See also* DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION.

**DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION.** The end of the 1980s marked the end of the Cold War, an event felt around the globe, as the superpowers contemplated a new era. Although Western pressure to liberalize the **Mobutu Sese Seko** regime started in the late 1970s, the collapse of the **Soviet Union** ended Mobutu's game of playing the communist card to gain Western support. The end of the Cold War in 1989 and increasing pressure by Western powers for movement toward multiparty **democracy** in Africa brought pressure to bear on Mobutu. In addition, some Congolese, backed by the **Catholic Church**, staged protests and public demonstrations for greater individual freedoms. On **24 April 1990**, Mobutu announced the Third Republic. Some of the restrictions of the single-party state were dropped, freedom of the press was allowed, and a number of **dissidents** were released. His view was that Congo would enter a transitional period of one year, during which two additional **political parties** would be allowed, leading to **elections** in 1991.

Mobutu's speech, rather than easing pressure for political reform, brought an explosion of political activity and calls for a complete liberalization of the political process. After months of protests and negotiations, Mobutu agreed to remove limits on the number of political parties. In a matter of months, more than 200 were announced. The **opposition**, backed by a loud and sometimes irresponsible emerging **press**, rejected the offer of elections in one year and instead called for a **National Conference** to lay the foundation for a new political order. A number of Francophone African countries also were planning national conferences, with mixed results. Threatened with a cutoff of Western aid and weakened by the loss of alliances provided



by the Cold War rivalry, Mobutu acceded to many demands, but only after lengthy periods of confrontation, often accompanied by harsh repression of civil unrest.

Alliances were formed and betrayed as parties jockeyed for position. Nevertheless, several political blocs emerged: the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) and its allies; the **Sacred Union** (Union Sacrée) of more than 200 opposition parties led by the **Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social** (UDPS), the **Parti Démocrate et Social Chrétien** (PDSC), and the **Union des Fédéralistes et des Républicains Indépendants** (UFERI), and a group of parties espousing the nationalistic, socialistic tendencies of the martyred **Patrice Lumumba**.

Many parties were led by nationally known political figures, most of whom had served in previous **governments**. However, these leaders had to contend with young challengers who criticized the old political ways and called for a new political mentality. In addition to the “generation gap rift,” a number of parties split over whether they supported Mobutu’s plans for the transition. There was speculation that President Mobutu encouraged and financed factionalism in order to sow disorder and create what some pundits called “**Multi-Mobutism**.” Nevertheless, agreement was eventually reached to hold a national conference. It opened on 7 August 1991, with veteran politician **Isaac Kalonji Mutambayi** as president. It quickly slid into chaos as nearly 8,000 “delegates” laid claim to the 2,800 seats. The work of the conference was disrupted dozens of times by boycotts, government-ordered lockouts, and the “**pillages**” (lootings) of September 1991.

Following the riots, Mobutu named UDPS leader **Étienne Tshisekedi** as **prime minister** but dismissed him one week later after he refused to sign an oath of allegiance. Mobutu then designated a supporter, **Bernadin Mungul Diaka**, to be prime minister, leading Western nations to announce a cutoff of economic aid to Congo. Four weeks later, Mobutu appointed as prime minister UFERI leader **Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond**, a former prime minister with strong support among Western governments.

The competing claims to the seats were eventually resolved and the National Conference reconvened on 11 December 1991, chaired by the archbishop of Kisangani, **Laurent Monsengwo Pasinya**. In

April 1992, the body proclaimed itself the *Conférence Nationale Souveraine* (CNS), whose decisions were law and were to be carried out without question by the executive. This measure led to protests by Mobutu partisans and a comment by the president that there had been a civilian **coup d'état**. On 15 August 1992, the CNS elected Tshisekedi prime minister and passed the **Transitional Act**, which was to guide the nation until a new **constitution** could be drafted and elections held. The CNS concluded its work and dissolved itself on 6 December 1992. One of its final acts was to establish the **Haut Conseil de la République** (HCR), with Monsengwo as its president, to act as an interim **parliament**.

Mobutu's term had officially ended in December 1991, but he stayed on under terms of the transition. By the end of 1992, he had determined that the reforms voted by the CNS had gone too far because the HCR was controlled by the opposition, and the constitution it had drafted posed a threat to national security. He refused to approve the transitional constitution and recalled the former parliament, the **Legislative Council**, which was elected under single-party rule. The Council had not met since the transition began and requested it to draft a new constitution. The country entered a period called "*bicéphalisme*" ("two-headedness"), during which the two rival legislatures both claimed to be the legal government.

In January 1993, the HCR passed a measure declaring Mobutu guilty of treason because of his mismanagement of the **economy** and refusal to carry out its orders. Mobutu convened a group of political parties that came to be called the *Forces Politiques du Conclave*, boycotted by the opposition, to take over the reins of the transition. He "dismissed" the Tshisekedi government, which he did not have the authority to do under the Transitional Act, and appointed **Faustin Birindwa**, a senior Tshisekedi advisor, prime minister of a "government of national salvation." Birindwa was expelled from the UDPS and the Sacred Union for accepting the post, but managed to take a number of minor opposition leaders with him. However, his government was not recognized internationally, and Western governments began a policy of diplomatic isolation of Mobutu. The **United Nations** (UN) named a special envoy to Congo in July 1993, but he was rejected by the opposition after he visited **Gbadolite** (which for the opposition had become a symbol of cooperation with Mobutu).

In late 1993, after nearly a year of political paralysis, during which the economic crisis worsened, the parties agreed to a compromise whereby the HCR and the MPR parliament were merged to form the **Haut Conseil de la République/Parlement de la Transition** (HCR/PT). This body of 745 members was to oversee the transition, draft a constitution, and organize elections, which, under the Transitional Act, were scheduled to be held in December 1994.

In June 1994, the HCR/PT elected as prime minister **Léon Kengo wa Dondo**, a former prime minister who headed a coalition of “centrist” parties. The hardline opposition denounced the vote as taken without a quorum and thus illegal. It formed the Union Sacrée de l’Opposition Radicale et Alliés et Société Civile (USORAS) and refused to recognize the Kengo government. Western governments, frustrated by the lack of progress, backed the Kengo government as a compromise and eased their policy of isolating the Mobutu regime. Kengo visited Europe and Washington in October 1994, where he was urged to press ahead with political and economic reforms. Kengo, who had overseen as prime minister the economic reforms of the mid-1980s, was viewed within Congo as a technocrat created by Mobutu and had little popular support.

The HCR/PT voted on 30 June 1995 to extend the transitional period by two years and postpone elections until 9 July 1997. A few weeks later, USORAS and pro-Mobutu forces joined to dismiss Archbishop Monsengwo, whom each side viewed as favoring the other. The **Electoral Commission** was appointed in March 1996. A new constitution was drafted by the HCR/PT in August, and a referendum was scheduled for February 1997.

This timetable was disrupted by the offensive launched in October 1996 by the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) from eastern Congo. In seven months, the AFDL took power, sending an ailing Mobutu into exile and installing **Laurent Kabila** as president. In his inauguration speech on 29 May 1997, Kabila pledged to complete the transition by holding a constitutional referendum in 1998 and national elections in 1999. However, he excluded Tshisekedi and the major opposition parties from his first government and banned political demonstrations shortly thereafter, leading to fears that his government would seek to control the political process and the political stalemate would continue.

The ban on political parties was lifted on 31 January 1998, but burdensome requirements for their registration led to protests. Kabila even arrested Tshisekedi on 12 February for having defied the ban on political parties. On 30 March, the Constitutional Commission had concluded its work and adopted a draft constitution. Nonetheless, the draft constitution included 250 names of people, who, if the text was endorsed, could not run for president. Ironically, Tshisekedi's name also appeared on this list because he was accused, among other things, of misappropriating buildings in **Kinshasa** business district. In short, the civil war against Kabila, which started on 2 August 1998, ended the democratic transition in Congo.

**DENARD, BOB.** A retired French sergeant who fought in Indochina and later became a policeman in Morocco, Denard was hired by the Katangan government during the **Katanga secession** and subsequently by the **Moïse Tshombe government** in the mid-1960s to put down the eastern **rebellion**. Denard later moved to the Comoros, where he was involved in a number of coups. In the 1980s, he was convicted of murder in absentia, in France. On 4 October 1995, he surrendered to authorities in the Comoros after a fourth coup attempt and was extradited to France.

**DEPARTMENTS.** On 5 January 1973, the *ministries* of the executive branch were renamed *departments*, the *ministers* were renamed *state commissioners*, and the *Council of Ministers* became the ***Executive Council***. The names and functions of the departments changed over the years, and their number varied between 20 and 30, but their basic responsibilities (interior, defense, foreign affairs, education, agriculture, etc.) and their staffs remained. As the power of the **presidency** became institutionalized, another trend developed. The departments became increasingly subordinate to the party and the Office of the President, both of which maintained organizational substructures similar to the executive branch. The Office of the President, in particular, attracted the brightest *cadres* and appeared to experience the fewest restraints on spending. The *departments* were changed back to *ministries* following the installation of the **Laurent Kabila government** in May 1997.

**DIALOGUE INTER-CONGOLAIS (DIC) [INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOGUE]**. On 10 July 1999, the major belligerents in the **civil war** against **President Laurent Kabila**, which started on 2 August 1998, met in Lusaka and signed the **Lusaka Peace Accord** after interminable discussions at ministerial level. One of the major components of the accord was the organization of a dialogue among Congolese aimed at providing the terms of the transition to democratic institutional arrangements and reestablishment of state authority throughout the entire national territory.

The DIC did not move forward until the assassination of Kabila, who first tried to manipulate the process by offering Ketumile Masire, the neutral facilitator for the dialogue, \$1 million if he could guarantee that Kabila were selected as interim president of the transitional government to emerge from the DIC. Having failed to corrupt the facilitator, Kabila did everything he could to delay the process. Following his death in January 2001 and the nomination of his son, **Joseph Kabila**, as president, the peace process accelerated as the new president announced that he intended to cooperate with the facilitator. On 5–7 June 2001, Masire organized a meeting in Cotonou, Benin, to prepare for the ICD. The various rebel groups were invited to participate, but their sponsors did not allow them to attend, and they never showed up at the meeting. However, by July 2001, Masire had managed to jumpstart the DIC by organizing a preparatory meeting in Gaborone, Botswana, of representatives of the five parties—the Congo **government**, **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD)**, **Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC)**, political **opposition**, and the civil society—to agree on its framework, its agenda, and the composition of the delegates. The battle over the final composition and the number of delegations to attend the DIC was not resolved in the Gaborone meeting. This conflict continued when the facilitator called for the opening of the Addis Ababa meeting in October 2001. The meeting collapsed because of the inability of the delegates to resolve the issue of representation. A deal was finally brokered by the **United Nations (UN)** special envoy, Ibrahim Fall, in December 2001, and the **South African** venue of Sun City was accepted for the forty-five consultations, to start on 25 February 2002.

On the economic front, the DIC never offered enough, because all parties preferred the status quo on the frontlines. On the political front, the Sun City talks provided a partial agreement between Joseph Kabila and **Jean-Pierre Bemba** of the MLC. The talks confirmed the former as president and the latter as **prime minister** of the transition. However, the talks collapsed two months later. In July 2002, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan appointed a special envoy, Mustapha Nyasse, to help restart the dialogue. He quickly began a shuttle diplomacy between the belligerents and was able to bring all five parties to the negotiating table in November in Sun City. On 17 December 2002, the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** political agreement was signed by all parties, thus ending the DIC. *See also* SECOND CONGO WAR.

**DIAMONDS.** Congo has produced an estimated one-third of the world's industrial diamonds and, in the mid-1990s, was the world's third-largest producer after Australia and Botswana. The diamonds, a small percentage of which are of gem quality, come primarily from the **Mbuji-Mayi** and **Tshikapa** areas in the former province of **Kasai Oriental** and nearby areas of northeastern **Angola**, where they originate in kimberlite deposits along several **rivers**, but especially along the Lubilash River. The **government-owned Société Minière de Bakwanga** (MIBA) concession was the main producer. However, wildcat artisanal digging and panning was a tradition in the area and led to clashes on occasion. Total official production averaged 12 million carats in the 1970s but fell to 6 million carats in 1981, because of theft, **smuggling** (which reached 70 percent of total production according to estimates), and shortages of spare parts for **mining** equipment. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Congolese government was the sole legal diamond trader. Diamonds were marketed by the De Beers Central Selling Organization, except for a period from 1981 to 1984, when a government-owned company, **Société Zairoise de Commercialisation des Minerais** (SOZACOM), was responsible for marketing.

In 1982, the government legalized artisanal mining in certain areas and established a system of trading counters that privatized marketing. MIBA continued to market its diamonds through De Beers,

while Lebanese, Belgian, Israeli, and Congolese groups operated counters that bought diamonds from local miners and middlemen. Official production increased, reaching an estimated 15 million carats in 1995, then declined slightly, but rose again to 23 million carats, in 1998. Earnings were estimated at \$500 million in 1994.

The industry was rocked by a number of scandals in the early 1990s. The government of **Étienne Tshisekedi** in 1992 closed two major counters after it was revealed that the **central bank** was granting them foreign exchange with which to purchase diamonds at a 30-percent discount. This concession effectively allowed them to corner the market. In addition, Angola protested diamond smuggling from fields in its territory and, in mid-1995, announced that military patrols were authorized to shoot “suspicious” foreigners in the border area on sight. Rumors of rich deposits created a diamond rush in the **Kisangani** area in 1995.

Following the takeover of the **Laurent Kabila** government, which was supported by the Angolan government, Angolan troops launched a major offensive in the diamond-mining area in northern Angola, controlled virtually since independence by the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). As a result, several thousand Congolese prospectors were driven back home in January 1998.

Although the **civil war** against Kabila had prevented the government from collecting diamond revenues from eastern Congo, the government was still in charge of the **Kasai River** basin where most diamond mines were located. The production of diamonds picked up in the second half of the 1990s, averaging 22 million carats per year between 1995 and 1999, of which an estimated 20 percent of total diamond production was gem quality. Despite a slight decline in 2000 and 2001 (averaging 17 million carats per year), production increased in subsequent years from 22 million carats in 2002 to a record high since the 1990s of 30 million carats in 2005.

**DIANGIENDA KUNTIMA, JOSEPH.** Son of the **Prophet Simon Kimbangu** and founder of an offshoot of the Congolese **Protestant Church** called the *Church of Jesus Christ on Earth by the Prophet Simon Kimbangu* (Église de Jésus-Christ sur la Terre par le Prophète Simon Kimbangu). The church grew following Kimbangu’s death in

1951 and was the first independent African church to be admitted to the World Council of Churches.

**DIET.** The diet of the Congolese depends on location. The most common staple is manioc (cassava), but maize is preferred in the savanna regions and rice is the staple of urban dwellers who can afford it. The diet is supplemented with meat, fish, or vegetables when they can be afforded or acquired through artisanal hunting, **fishing**, and farming. Many families in the cities have vegetable gardens, and forays into the countryside to gather bananas, fruits, and berries are common. Congo has one of the lowest per-capita incomes in the world and, according to **United Nations** (UN), one-fourth of its children are undernourished. During the economic crisis of the 1990s and early 2000s, characterized by high **inflation** and **unemployment** of up to 80 percent, the rate of **malnutrition** rose markedly. In the cities, more than one-half of the **population** did not receive the minimum daily nutritional requirements, and families frequently could not afford one meal a day. *See also* AGRICULTURE; FOOD SUPPLY.

**DILOLO.** A town of about 67,000 inhabitants, Dilolo lies in western **Lualaba Province**, along the border with **Angola**, where the southern **Katanga railway** system connects with the **Benguela Railway**. During the first **Shaba War**, Dilolo was the first town to be taken by the guerrillas of the **Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo** (FLNC) and the last to be retaken by Congolese and **Moroccan** troops nearly three months later. The **Lunda ethnic group** predominates on both sides of the border in the area. As a result, there were reports of reprisals against the town by Congolese troops who felt residents had aided the rebels.

**DIOMI, GASTON.** One of the founders of the **Mouvement National Congolais** (MNC) party through which **Patrice Lumumba** rose to prominence, Diomi attended the **Pan-African Conference** in Accra, Ghana, in December 1958 with Lumumba. He was one of the speakers who reported on the conference at a rally in **Leopoldville** on **4 January 1959**, which led to two weeks of rioting in Leopoldville and accelerated the movement toward **independence**. Diomi, along



with **Joseph Kasavubu**, was imprisoned following the riots. In 1965, Diomi was elected vice governor of South Katanga.

**DISSIDENTS.** Dissidents, organized and unorganized, have been perceived to be a threat to political stability virtually from **independence**. Popular reactions against the factionalism and secessions of the early 1960s were one reason for the **military coup d'état** in 1965 and the considerable support it initially received. However, authoritarianism and the establishment of a one-party system led to increased **opposition**.

Some of the better-known exiled dissident groups in the 1970s included the **Mouvement National Congolais** (MNC) led by supporters of **Patrice Lumumba**; the **Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (FODELICO), led by **Antoine Gizenga**, which were involved in the **rebellions** in northeastern Congo; the **Mouvement d'Action pour la Résurrection du Congo** (MARC), led by **Munguya Mbenge**, which was involved in the **university student** demonstrations of the 1970s; and the **Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo** (FLNC), led by **Nathaniel Mbumba**, which was involved in the **Shaba Wars** in 1977 and 1978.

In the 1980s, two dissident groups could be described as internally based. The first was the **Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social** (UDPS), formed in 1982 as a second **political party**, which pressed for a multiparty system and, in 1990, became a major opposition party. The second was the **Parti Révolutionnaire du Peuple** (PRP), which attacked an army garrison at **Moba** in 1984 and 1985.

During the 1980s, the UDPS was the most important opposition force. Some of the founders of the UDPS had published a 52-page letter on 31 December 1980, accusing the **Mobutu Sese Seko government** of authoritarianism and **corruption** and calling for multiparty **democracy** in Congo. In 1982, they were convicted of treason. On 21 May 1983, Mobutu issued the general political **amnesty** of 1983, in which he offered to allow exiles to return to Congo unmolesed if they gave up their antigovernment activities. Over the next two years, many took advantage of the amnesty. Even members of the UDPS were amnestied, but were imprisoned again when they resumed their activities. They were released once more on 30 June 1985, as part of the festivities marking the Congo's 25th year of

independence, but were detained yet again when they still refused to halt their activities.

With Mobutu's announcement of the **democratic transition** on **24 April 1990**, dissent was legalized. Political activities were freed in principle, and political parties were allowed to hold rallies. However, many rallies and demonstrations were harshly dispersed by **security** forces, and the homes of many politicians were attacked. Political parties were allowed to form in November, and many exiled dissidents returned to launch or affiliate with one of the more than 200 parties that emerged the following year. Although the government continued to monopolize the broadcast news **media**, the print media was liberalized and dozens of newspapers began to appear, mostly in **Kinshasa**. In October 1996, the PRP and three other parties created the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) and launched an offensive from eastern Congo. Backed by troops from **Rwanda**, **Uganda**, **Burundi**, and **Angola**, the AFDL overthrew Mobutu, took control of the country, and brought **Laurent Kabila**, head of the PRP, to power.

Once in power, Kabila soon confronted the **Mai-Mai** groups that accused him of selling out Congo to Rwanda. Moreover, prodemocracy groups in the capital city also challenged Kabila's legitimacy as he cracked down on political parties and members of the civil society. For example, both **Étienne Tshisekedi** and **Antoine Gizenga** were jailed on a number of occasions in 1999 for public disobedience. After the assassination of Laurent Kabila, **Joseph Kabila** pursued the same intimidating strategy against dissidents of his regime. A break occurred during the transition, 2003–2006, in which Kabila had to share power with former rebel leaders. However, during the **elections** and thereafter, Joseph Kabila's security forces were accused by **human rights** organizations of having killed 500 dissidents of the regime from late 2006 to 2008.

**DIVISION SPÉCIALE PRÉSIDENTIELLE (DSP) [SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL DIVISION].** *See* MILITARY.

**DRESS.** In Congo, dress and fashion tend to follow Central African and European patterns. The Arab-style robe, as seen in north and west Africa, is rare. For Congolese **women**, fashion includes a

traditional wrap of two to four yards of African print **cloth**, or *pagne*, with a blouse and matching headdress worn with sandals or high heels. African-style garb for men includes the bou-bou or dashiki, loose-fitting shirts made from colorful **wax** cloth, slacks, sandals, and rarely a hat. During the heyday of **Authenticity**, **Mobutu Sese Seko** pioneered the modernistic, urban version of the traditional woman's garb, whereby the ample, loose folds of the *pagne* were turned into a long, tight skirt and blouse that emphasized the hips. For men, the *abacost* was created. It was a tight-laced, two-piece suit usually of dark, formal material, with a Mao-type collar that was buttoned to the throat. Ties were not worn, but among the stylish, a silk scarf was permissible. For the politically correct, the party lapel pin of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) was a required accessory.

In the late 1980s, European business suits returned as common dress among the apolitical. Among well-to-do youth, sleek French and Italian styles of casual dress were popular, as were American jeans and sneakers. With the announcement of the transition to multiparty politics in April 1990, dress was liberalized for the political class. Most members of the **opposition** abandoned the *abacost*, which, however, remained de rigueur for supporters of the president.

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**EASTERN HIGHLANDS.** The highest and most rugged region of Congo, the Eastern Highlands range for 1,500 km along the lakes of the **Great Rift Valley** and include the headwaters of the White Nile. A series of mountains range from 80 to 560 km wide and extends from the **Rwenzori Mountain** chain in northeastern Congo through the **Virunga** volcanic range in the **Kivus** to the **Mitumba** chain in the **Tanganyika Province**. The hills and mountains vary in altitude from 1,000 to more than 5,000 meters, giving the region a cool climate that led some to call it “the Switzerland of Africa.” The region produces **gold**, **tin**, iron ore, **sugar**, textiles, methane gas, **palm oil**, tobacco, and **coffee**. Some light **industry** was developed around the two main urban centers of **Bukavu** and **Goma**.

The Eastern Highlands region is known for its independent attitude toward the central **government** in distant **Kinshasa**. The government

at various times tried to reduce the area's isolation, but economic decline and deteriorating infrastructure led to a strengthening of commercial ties with neighboring countries in East Africa. The offensive of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL), which overthrew **Mobutu Sese Seko** and took power in Kinshasa in May 1997, began in the Eastern Highlands in October 1996 and was widely supported by the local populace. The revolt against **Laurent Kabila** in August 1998 also started in the eastern highlands and continued until the installation of a transitional government in mid-2003. During the elections of 2006, the eastern highlands voted overwhelmingly for **Joseph Kabila**.

**EASTERN WAY.** The term describes the **transportation** route for mineral **exports** from **Katanga** through **Tanzania** to the port of Dar es Salaam. The Congolese **government** viewed this route less favorably than the **Benguela Railway** through **Angola**, the **National Way** that passes entirely through Congolese territory, or the **Southern Way** that goes through **Zambia** and **Zimbabwe** to the **South African** port of **Durban**. The Eastern Way is 2,715 km long, longer than the National Way, and requires several transshipments. It also requires shipping goods by rail for 1,300 km from **Lubumbashi** to **Kalemie** on **Lake Tanganyika**, by boat across the lake, and by the Tazara Railway to Dar es Salaam. Goods were often delayed by maintenance problems with the rolling stock and by congestion at the port. According to government figures, in 1974, \$78 million out of a total of \$574 million of minerals (**copper**, **cobalt**, and **zinc**) or 13.5 percent of goods were exported through Eastern Way. **Exports** increased to almost 17 percent (\$86 million out of \$517 million) in 1977. The evacuation of minerals through the Eastern Way declined thereafter, reaching 4 percent of total (\$18 million out of \$451 million) in 1980. Although less than 9 percent of the country's copper was exported via the Eastern Way during the 1980s, the percentage of other minerals declined even further. The decline of exports through the Eastern Way continued throughout the mid-1990s, reaching almost zero in the 2000s. However, smuggling of minerals, including **uranium**, continued throughout this period.

**EBOLA VIRUS.** *Ebola* refers to a group of viruses belonging to genus *Ebola*, family *Filoviridae*, and to the disease that they cause, *Ebola*

hemorrhagic fever. This highly contagious disease of viral origin encompasses a range of symptoms, including fever, vomiting, diarrhea, generalized pain or malaise, and sometimes internal and external bleeding. Mortality rates are extremely high, with the human case/fatality rate ranging from 50 to 90 percent, depending on viral subtype. The virus is named after the Ebola River in northern Congo, where the first recognized outbreak of fever occurred on 26 August 1976 in Yambuku, causing 280 deaths. An outbreak also occurred in 1976 in **Sudan** that killed 151 people. Other outbreaks followed in 1977 in Congo, in 1979 in Sudan, and in 1994 in Gabon, with a less severe death toll.

A third major occurrence of Ebola virus in Congo was first detected in March 1995 in **Kikwit**, a city of more than 400,000 residents in the **Kwilu** province. It caused considerable alarm because of fears it might spread to **Kinshasa**, the capital of 5 million people located 185 km to the west. International medical workers rushed to help Congolese teams contain the epidemic. Virologists from Congo, **Belgium**, and the **United States** collected more than 3,000 samples of insects and birds in hope of discovering the host of the virus during its periods of inactivity. In August, scientists announced the outbreak was over. Of the 315 people infected, 250 died. In 1996, Gabon announced that Ebola virus killed 45 people. For the next two years, none of these countries reported any case of the virus. In 2000, an outbreak in **Uganda** killed 224 people. In late October 2001, both Congo and Gabon reported minor outbreaks of Ebola.

Another major outbreak occurred in Congo from December 2002 to April 2003, killing 128 people. Sporadic cases of the virus killed 29 people between November 2003 and December 2004. Then, on 30 August 2007, 103 people were infected by a suspected hemorrhagic fever in the village of Mwaka, in Congo, after the funerals of two village chiefs, and 217 people in four villages fell ill. The World Health Organization (WHO) sent a team to take blood samples for analysis and confirmed that many of the cases were the result of the Ebola virus. The Ugandan government also announced on 24 November 2007 another occurrence of Ebola in the Bundibugyo District. After confirmation of samples tested by the U.S. National Reference Laboratories and the Centers for Disease Control, the WHO confirmed the presence of a new species of Ebola virus. On 20 February 2008, the Uganda Ministry officially announced the end of the epidemic in

Bundibugyo, with the last infected person discharged on 8 January 2008. Ugandan officials confirmed a total of 149 cases of this new Ebola species, with 37 deaths attributed to the strain.

In mid-December 2008, another outbreak occurred in Mweka and Luebo in the southern province of **Kasai**, Congo. The epidemic was over by early January 2009. Thirty-two cases were reported, including 15 deaths, but the number might have been higher. According to health officials, some people died and were buried before samples could be obtained.

There is no specific treatment for the disease. Currently, patients receive supportive therapy. This consists of balancing the patient's fluids and electrolytes, maintaining oxygen level and blood pressure, and treating any complicating infections. The prevention of the spread of Ebola fever involves practical viral hemorrhagic fever isolation precautions or barrier nursing techniques, such as masks, gloves, gowns, and goggles; the use of infection-control measures, including complete equipment sterilization; and the isolation of Ebola fever patients from contact with unprotected persons. The aim of these techniques is to avoid any person's contact with the blood or secretions of any patient. If a patient with Ebola fever dies, it is equally important that direct contact with the body of the deceased patient be prevented. After the 1995 outbreak, doctors in Congo said transfusions of blood from infected individuals who had survived increased survival rates, pointing toward a possible form of treatment until a cure could be developed.

**ÉCOLE NATIONALE DE DROIT ET D'ADMINISTRATION (ENDA) [NATIONAL SCHOOL OF LAW AND ADMINISTRATION].** The ENDA is a professional school in **Kinshasa**. It was founded by the decree of 29 June 1962 to train Congolese for careers primarily in law and the **civil service**. The school began with a faculty comprised primarily of expatriates with little knowledge of Congolese issues. The composition of the faculty during the school year 1962–63 is illustrative. Out of a total of 33 faculty members, 12 were from France, seven from Belgium, and only one from Congo. Since its inception, the school has graduated numerous administrators. On 22 December 2001, the government changed ENDA to *École Nationale d'Administration Publique* (ENAP) (National School for Public Administration). In 2002, the school included three sections: consular

and diplomatic studies, customs studies, and judicial administration. The total number of students in 2004–2005 was 300.

**ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES (ECOCAS).** *See* COMMUNAUTÉ ÉCONOMIQUE DES ÉTATS DE L'AFRIQUE CENTRALE (CEEAC).

**ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF COUNTRIES OF THE GREAT LAKES.** *See* COMMUNAUTÉ ÉCONOMIQUE DES PAYS DES GRANDS LACS (CEPGL).

**ECONOMY.** Congo is a country so blessed with natural resources that it is sometimes called a “geological scandal.” Notwithstanding its rich endowments in natural resources, and its rich flora and fauna, economic growth in Congo has followed a checkered path. Congo’s **gross domestic product** (GDP), which in 1960 was equivalent to that of Canada, and in 1967 still matched that of South Korea, has experienced barely perceptible growth since the mid-1970s. As shown in Table 1, GDP increased from almost \$4.9 billion in 1970 to a record high of \$15.4 billion in 1978, when it began a gradual decline. In 1980, GDP was close to \$14.4 billion. However, from 1984 to 1992, it oscillated between \$7.1 billion (1985) and \$9.4 billion (1990). Despite a slight increase to \$10.7 billion in 1993, GDP plummeted to \$5.8 billion in 1994 and reached \$4.3 billion in 2000. From 2001 to 2005, GDP had increased at a slow pace, and by 2006 it was \$8.5 billion. When factored against a **population** growth of about 3 percent per year, using current prices, a per capita GDP that stood at \$984 in 1959 (the last year of colonial rule) had plummeted to a mere \$141 by 2006. The decline was even more drastic in constant prices (2000). In fact, GDP per capita declined from \$327 in 1970 to a mere \$91 in 2006.

The GDP growth rate, which had experienced negative growth in the 1970s, remained positive in the 1980s, averaging 2 percent per year. However, economic growth remained mostly negative in the 1990s, except in 1996, during which it improved slightly by 0.1 percent. The negative trend also continued until 2002. During this period, industrial activity declined from about 30 percent of capacity to 10 percent. This is also reflected by the consumption of electricity, which declined from 157 kilowatts in 1970 to 89 kilowatts in 2000. Economic value-added, in most sectors except **agriculture**, declined

from 1970 to 2000 as well. From 2002 to 2006, economic growth remained positive, averaging 4 percent per year.

Historically, the Congolese economy has followed the economic fluctuations of the world economy: severe depression in the 1930s, recovery after World War II, and a boom during the early 1970s. However, there were several exceptions. One was a recession in the early 1960s following independence caused by secessions, **rebellions**, and the departure of many technicians. Another recession was caused by **civil wars** in the 1990s and early 2000s.

One constant remains: Congo's formal economy depends heavily on the extraction of raw materials, such as **copper**, **cobalt**, industrial **diamonds**, and, to a lesser degree, **timber**, **coffee**, **palm oil**, and related products, cocoa and tea. During the first three decades following **independence**, copper alone accounted for one-half of **government** revenues and nearly two-thirds of foreign exchange earnings. Cobalt, derived from some copper ores, was an important by-product. In the early 1970s, buoyed by high copper prices and encouraged by lending institutions, the government launched the **Politique des Grands Travaux** (Great Works Policy), which focused on building large-scale development projects aimed at transforming the country into a modern industrial state. With the fall of mineral prices in 1974–75, the Congolese economy entered a period of stagnation.

**Table 1. Economic Overview, Four Decades.**

	1970	1980	1990	2000	2006
Population (thousand)	20,598	28,071	37,942	50,689	60,644
% urban	30.3	28.7	27.8	29.8	32.7
GDP, \$ million	4,878	14,395	9,350	4,306	8,543
GDP per capita, \$	237	513	246	85	141
GDP per capita, \$(2000)	327	249	202	85	91
GDP growth (%)	−0.25	2.2	−6.6	−6.9	5.1
Electricity per capita (kWh)	157	142	119	89	91
Economic value-added					
(%GDP) Agriculture	16.1	26.8	30.9	49.9	45.7
Industry	45.3	34.9	28.9	20.3	27.7
Manufacture	−15.2	11.3	4.8	6.5	
Service	38.6	38.2	40.0	29.7	26.6
FDI, %GDP	0.1	0.3	0.24	3.9	2.1
Net flows DAC (\$million)	0.84	339.8	684.4	136.2	1,722.6

Source: World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, 2008.



Congo was self-sufficient in **food** at independence, but, by the 1980s, was importing large quantities of food products, consumer goods, and **transportation** and construction equipment. The disastrous policy of **Zairianization** devastated the economy—especially the agricultural and food sectors. Productivity declined on a per-capita basis through the 1980s, despite various attempts at economic reform. In the early 1990s, political uncertainty, loss of control over fiscal and monetary policies, and civil unrest brought a period of economic collapse. Less than one-third of the population participated in the formal economy, and that proportion declined significantly after the “**pillages**” of 1991 and 1993, which closed many factories and businesses.

Political economists predicted in mid-1995 that the worst had passed and that under **Prime Minister Léon Kengo wa Dondo**’s austerity measures cause for hope existed. They noted a number of proposals to export Congolese **electrical power** from the **Inga hydroelectric complex** in **Kongo Central** to southern Africa and even to **Egypt**, and that new deposits of **petroleum** had been discovered off the coast. However, there was little optimism for recovery of the state-dominated **mining** industry, historically the driving force of the economy. Most mining companies were technically insolvent, operating at less than 10 percent of capacity and were expected to require massive infusions of new capital to reactivate collapsed mines and old equipment. **South African** companies were the first to express interest in investing in this sector and, in November 1996, a Canadian company announced plans to revive production at a major copper concession.

The culture of pillages continued in subsequent years. This is reflected by the value-added in the industrial, manufacture, and service sectors. The additional value of a commodity over the cost of commodities used to produce it from the previous stage of production declined drastically in manufacturing and service, from 11.3 percent of GDP in 1990 to 4.8 percent in 2000 in the manufacturing sector, whereas the decline was from 40 percent of GDP in 1990 to 29.7 percent in 2000 in the service sector.

Other symptoms of economic crisis include **inflation**, deficit in **external trade**, and debasement of the **currency**. For example, high inflation or hyperinflation and widespread counterfeiting caused the

value of the currency, the **zaire**, to collapse. Another symptom of the crisis is foreign **debt**, which grew to \$14 billion in 1997. As foreign debt was increasing, so was **foreign aid**. It was quite modest in the 1970s and 1980s. However, it gradually increased, especially during the transitional period, 2003–2006. *See also* EMPLOYMENT; ENERGY; FISHING; FOREIGN INVESTMENT; KLEPTOCRACY; LABOR; NATIONALIZATION; PRIVATIZATION; RETROCESSION; SMUGGLING; UNEMPLOYMENT.

**EDUCATION.** During the colonial era, considerable emphasis was placed on primary school programs. The main purpose of the colonial education system was to prepare Congolese for clerical and secretarial jobs. Officially, 70 percent of all school-age Congolese were enrolled in a primary school in the 1950s. Few Congolese were able to attend secondary schools or **universities**. One university existed at independence, at **Lovanium** outside **Kinshasa**, founded in 1954 by the **Catholic Church**. As a result, there were less than 30,000 enrolled secondary **students** (2 percent of total enrollment) at **independence**, fewer than 200 high school graduates, and only about two dozen Congolese have university degrees. The new **government** boasted one of the highest literacy rates in Africa.

A **Protestant** university, the Université Libre du Congo, based in **Kisangani**, was founded in 1963. A state-run institution, the Université Officielle du Congo, was founded in 1964 in **Lubumbashi**. The average length of course of study at the universities was three to seven years. Students were obliged to pass a nationally administered state examination before they could receive the equivalent of a bachelor's degree. Students benefited from government stipends and subsidies. Two institutions trained teachers: the Institut Pédagogique National-Kinshasa and the Institut Pédagogique National-**Bukavu**. Vocational and professional education was carried out by more than one dozen schools that focused primarily on **agriculture** and **administration**. They generally offered programs lasting two to four years.

Education in Congo made considerable progress following independence, but it was also hindered by a lack of funds, qualified instructors, and curricula designed to train individuals to address the country's most pressing needs. The duration of compulsory education is six years between the ages of 6 and 11 years. The primary

school-leaving certificate is awarded upon successful completion of grade 6, which includes passing the terminal examination.

Primary education during the colonial period was handled primarily by religious organizations, although lay “official” schools were later established in urban centers. The dual system was maintained after independence, but the government established certain standard curricula. Primary school is designed to impart literacy, computational skills, and basic knowledge of **health care**, sanitation, and nutrition. Textbooks were developed that used Congolese as role models and the village and *cit  * as locations. However, many schools were hampered by the poor quality of teachers, who were seriously underpaid, and a lack of basic teaching materials. There was some instruction at the primary level in the four “national” **languages**, Kikongo, **Lin-gala**, **Kiswahili**, and Tshiluba, depending on the region.

The second cycle is the secondary education that consists of a *cycle long* (long cycle) and a *cycle court* (short cycle). General, pedagogical, and technical streams are offered in the former, with 7th and 8th grades called *tronc commun* (common trunk), then the next four years introduce the differentiation between the three streams with a number of options within each stream. The short cycle consists of vocational schools alone. At least 33 options are offered in the vocational stream. Secondary education, available to a much smaller proportion of the population, is conducted entirely in French, the “official” language. A great many secondary school teachers were expatriates until the mid-1970s, when many left because of a lack of funding for salaries and pressure for more Congolese teachers to take their place. Secondary schools were afflicted with many of the material and human-resource problems of primary schools. One post-colonial innovation was the *dipl  me d’  tat* (state diploma) that consists of a nationwide exam in which high school graduates compete to earn the most prestigious diploma in the nation in June of each year.

Finally, the entry to tertiary education is conditional on obtaining the *dipl  me d’  tat d’  tudes secondaires* of long cycle, after passing the *examen d’  tat*, in which the school’s evaluation of the student is also taken into account. Higher education consists of three years of undergraduate (*graduat*) and two years of post-graduate (*license*), which is equivalent to an American bachelor degree. In human medicine and veterinary medicine, the second cycle lasts for three addi-

tional years and leads to the title of *doctor in medicine* and *doctor in veterinary medicine*.

Enrollment in primary education grew steadily until the mid-1990s but fluctuated sharply thereafter. Unlike other sub-Saharan African countries, Congo embarked early on a path of education expansion. The period 1960/61–1976/77 witnessed close to a 4.7 percent annual growth rate in primary education and a 19 percent annual growth rate in secondary education, according to the **World Bank**. The second period, 1976/77–1986/87, saw a considerable deceleration in both primary and secondary enrollment. This situation coincided with the deepening economic crisis that began in 1974. By the early 1980s, the country was under structural adjustments that required further cuts in government spending. A rebound occurred in the second period, 1986/87–1995/96, with a 4 percent annual growth in primary education enrollment, 5.4 percent per year in secondary school enrollment, and almost 10.5 percent in tertiary education. These developments occurred against a background of deepening socioeconomic crisis, with sharp declines in the per capita income of most families and state revenues and an increase in violence.

An emphasis on education following independence raised the literacy rate to 79 percent of males and 45 percent females by 1985, according to figures from the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF, now United Nations Children's Fund). In this case, *literacy* was defined as those individuals over the age of 15 years who could read and write. According to UNICEF figures published in 1987, the proportion of Congolese children enrolled in primary school who completed first grade was 65 percent, whereas 33 percent of eligible males and 13 percent of females were enrolled in secondary school. By 1985, there were 20,000 university graduates, some of whom had been educated abroad but many of whom had received their degrees from Congolese universities.

The final period, 1995/96–2006/07, displayed a considerable deceleration in secondary education enrollment averaging 0.9 percent per year and an absolute decline in primary education enrollment of –1.5 percent per year. The third period represents the first major change since independence, followed immediately by the outbreak of **civil war**, which engulfed several provinces and took the lives of more than 5 million people, including children. For example,

from 1998 to 2000, the first two years of civil war against **Laurent Kabila**, a steep decline occurred in primary enrollment of close to –25 percent. By contrast, the growth in enrollment in secondary education was sustained even during the war.

In the early 1970s, most primary and one-half of the secondary schools were staffed and managed by religious groups. Their administration was centered in the government's Department of Education and they received government subsidies. In August 1971, following a period of antigovernment student unrest, the universities were nationalized and renamed *Université Nationale du Zaïre* (UNAZA). Their faculties were reorganized on the three campuses in existence at the time, Kinshasa, Kisangani, and Lubumbashi. In the following years, the universities were closed a number of times because of student unrest, primarily over low stipends, poor food, and difficult living conditions.

In 1974, however, during the height of **Authenticity**, theological faculties were abolished, and religious instruction was phased out of primary and secondary schools. By 1976, the government had assumed full administrative control. Beginning with the decline of the Congolese **economy** in the late 1970s, a lack of government revenues left many public schools under-equipped, sometimes even without desks and blackboard chalk. Teachers were often paid several months late. As a result, they often left classes during the day to engage in commerce or charged fees to issue grades. Parents were often called upon to help provide equipment and subsidize teachers' salaries. In the face of deteriorating conditions and as relations with the churches improved in the late 1970s, the government returned control of many primary and secondary schools to the churches. As state-supported schools declined, private schools proliferated. The **National Conference** in 1992 called for the return of universities to the churches that had founded them.

With the decline of government support for higher education, local governments and businessmen began to establish privately funded campuses. In 1985, the Université de **Katanga** was founded and, in 1989, the University of **Butembo** was created by the Catholic Church. In the 1990s, other private universities opened in **Mbuji-Mayi**, **Mbanza-Ngungu**, **Bandundu**, and Bukavu. By 1996, more than 180 private institutions of higher learning were reported in various stages

of operation. However, the economic decline of the 1980s to early 1990s had undermined the quality of education in Congo to the extent that children of that period are called the “lost generation.”

More than three decades of economic crisis, political chaos, and war have created extremely difficult conditions for education in Congo. Economies of looting or “**pillages**” that started in September 1991 led to enormous destruction of buildings and furniture, from which most schools have not recovered. The neglect of **road** infrastructure by the government has resulted in the abandonment of many schools in rural areas. More notable has been the consequence of wars that created new groups of vulnerable children. These include child soldiers, street children, and orphans. The **United Nations** estimated about 35,000 child soldiers and UNICEF estimated 17,000 street children in the early 2000s. Orphans constitute, perhaps, the most numerous group. By 2005, 3.1 percent of children in the age group of 0–14 years had neither parent or had lost their mother, according to the World Bank. These children had no chance for education.

**ÉGLISE DU CHRIST AU CONGO (ECC) [CHURCH OF CHRIST IN CONGO]**. An organization that groups most of the **Protestant churches** in Congo, with 83 member churches in 1982. The ECC evolved out of a series of organizations formed in the early 20th century to avoid duplication and competition among Protestant churches working in the **Belgian Congo**.

The Comité de Continuation Congolais (CCC) was formed in 1911 by Protestant missions in Congo to encourage contact and cooperation among the various denominations. The Conseil Protestant du Congo (CPC) was created in 1924 from the CCC. In 1934, members of the CPC voted to rename it the *Église du Christ au Congo*. With 62 members, it became the ECZ when Congo’s name was changed to *Zaire* in 1971. The 1960s witnessed an **Africanization** of the organization’s leadership. Rev. Pierre Shaumba was elected the first Congolese secretary-general following **independence**. He was succeeded by Archbishop **Jean Bokeleale** in 1968, who became archbishop in 1970. Bokeleale died in 1997 and was replaced by the ECZ Vice President **Pierre Marini Bohdo**. The organization changed its name back to *ECC* when Zaire became Congo once again, after the fall of **Mobutu Sese Seko** in 1997.

**EGYPT, RELATIONS WITH.** Congo established diplomatic relations with Egypt a few days after **independence**. Following independence, Egyptian judges formed part of an international corps of magistrates that presided over Congolese courts until Congolese jurists could be trained. However, the removal of **Patrice Lumumba** from power in mid-September 1960 cooled relations. When **Antoine Gizenga** moved to **Stanleyville** and established a pro-Lumumba **government**, he dispatched **Pierre Mulele** to Egypt to represent the newly created government in late December 1960. In 1964, Egypt financially supported the rebellions in Congo. The advent of **Mobutu Sese Seko** and his elevation of Lumumba to the status of national hero was enough to restore the situation between Egypt and Congo. Under Mobutu, Congo historically maintained warm relations with Egypt, in part because of a general similarity of policies on international issues and in part because of joint enmity with such **Arab countries** as **Libya**, **Iran**, and **Iraq**.

Egypt also sent 50 pilots to aid the Mobutu government's counter-offensive against rebels of the **Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo** (FLNC) during the first **Shaba** incursion in 1977. In 1990, the two governments signed a military cooperation agreement under which Egypt trained Congo's **Civil Guard** and provided Egyptian-built military equipment to the **armed forces**. In 1992, the two countries signed an agreement to build a high-tension **electrical power** line from Inga to Egypt's Aswan area. The proposal benefited from a feasibility study funded by the African Development Bank, but was viewed by many as unrealistic.

In December 2008, an agreement was being discussed between Egypt and Congo to establish an Egyptian model farm in Congo and a fish farm, in addition to a comprehensive medical service center in Kinshasa. One month later, the Egyptian government dispatched an Egyptian medical team to provide basic health care services to inhabitants of eastern Congo. Egypt and Congo have maintained good relations throughout the 2000s.

**EIGHTY-DAY WAR.** *See* SHABA WARS.

**ELECTIONS.** The first elections held in Congo, then **Belgian Congo**, were the municipal elections of 1957 that followed reforms enacted

by colonial authorities to give Congolese a voice in running local affairs. According to the decree of 26 March 1957, major urban centers were divided into communes (or zones), roughly equal in population, with each commune electing a council. In turn, elected council members had to nominate mayors or burgomasters from their members. The electoral system was based on single-member constituencies. The process took place in **Leopoldville** and **Elisabethville** in late 1957 and was extended in 1958 to other provincial capital cities. Congolese candidates were allowed to run for posts in the “communes” (urban districts). In December 1959, elections were held to choose representatives to territorial and communal councils. The elections were inconclusive because they were boycotted by the **Mouvement National Congolais** (MNC), the **Alliance des Bakongo** (ABAKO), and several other major parties. However, a number of leaders emerged during the campaign who would play significant roles following independence: **Joseph Kasavubu**, **Patrice Lumumba**, **Moïse Tshombe**, and **Albert Kalonji**, among others.

In May 1960, as part of the preparations for independence, 250 **political parties** competed for seats in **parliament** and the provincial assemblies. The MNC/L and its direct allies received a total of 41 legislative seats (30 percent), with MNC/L alone holding 24 percent from five provinces, other than **Katanga**. Because no political party received an absolute majority in the parliament, political coalitions were necessary to form the first government. Legislators reached a compromise whereby Lumumba became **prime minister** and Kasavubu **president** on 25 June 1960, ending talk of secession in **Bas-Congo**. The Lumumba **government** received a vote of confidence in the lower house on 23 June 1960 and in the upper house one day later. Lumumba and Kasavubu tried to form a coalition government but failed. Lumumba succeeded on his second attempt, backed by a group of smaller parties, and formed a cabinet of 23 ministers. Tshombe, angered by the exclusion of his party, the **Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga** (CONAKAT), withdrew to Katanga. Kalonji eventually split with Lumumba and took his wing of the MNC to **Kasai**. Katanga seceded on 11 July 1960, and **South Kasai** followed in early August. However, the South Kasai secession ended in February 1962 while **United Nations** forces defeated the Katanga secession in early January 1963. The leaders of both



secessions, Tshombe and Kalonji, left Congo and went into exile in Europe.

As the United Nations withdrew from Congo, a rebellion led by **Pierre Mulele** broke out in early January 1964 in **Kwilu**. A few months later, another rebellion started in eastern Congo. In early August, President Kasavubu removed Prime Minister **Cyrille Adoula** and appointed the former president of the seceded province, Tshombe, as prime minister to quell the rebellions. In addition to quelling the rebellions, Tshombe had to organize legislative elections scheduled from February to May 1965 according to the **Luluabourg constitution** promulgated on 1 August 1964. In early 1965, Tshombe renewed the Leopoldville branch of his political party, the CON-AKAT, in anticipation of the upcoming elections. Forty-nine tribal organizations also joined the CONAKAT to form the **Convention Nationale Congolaise** (CONACO) in Luluabourg on 20 February 1965. The primary goal was to win the upcoming legislative elections.

Congo held its first elections as an independent nation in March 1965, under the newly promulgated Luluabourg constitution. The elections occurred between 18 March and 30 April 1965. Unlike the 1960 elections, in which 250 political parties vied for 137 parliamentary seats, the 1965 elections had 223 parties competing for a total of 167 seats. The CONACO received 122 seats (73 percent of the votes) from most electoral districts, except Kwilu, Lake **Leopold II**, Moyen Congo, **Nord-Kivu**, and Shabunda. Once the results were official, candidates began to contest the results. The Leopoldville Appellate Court, which was also the electoral deliberating court, only considered electoral appeals from **Kivu** Central, **Goma-Rutshuru**, Cuvette Centrale, Fizi, Kwilu, and **Maniema**. The court simply voided the legislative elections of Kivu Central and Goma-Rutshuru, but confirmed their provincial elections. In the other four cases, the Court declared both legislative and provincial elections null and void. The Court also decided to send voters back to the polls in Kivu Central, Goma-Rutshuru, Cuvette Centrale, and Kwilu. Legislative elections occurred again in these areas between 8 and 15 August 1965.

The parliament opened its first session on 20 September 1965, to verify members' eligibility and prerogatives and to organize committees. The CONACO majority received both the presidency and vice

presidency of the National Assembly, while the opposition received the presidency of the Senate. On 13 October 1965, President Kasavubu nominated **Évariste Kimba** from the minority coalition as the new prime minister, charged with forming the new government. But the National Assembly voted against the new government, forcing it to resign. The president re-nominated Kimba on 15 November to form another government. The CONACO ascendancy led to tensions between President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Tshombe. Under these circumstances of uncertainty General **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** took power on 24 November 1965.

By the time the next elections were held on 11 November 1970, the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) had been declared the sole legal party. Mobutu ran unopposed and won by an official vote of 10,131,699 registered voters against only 157. Legislative elections were scheduled for November 1975, but were canceled by presidential decree. Instead, the names of the MPR candidates were read in public and approved by popular applause. In October 1977, following a series of liberalization measures, elections were held for the **Legislative Council** (parliament), urban councils, and some members of the MPR's **Political Bureau**. Any citizen was allowed to run, but party officials eliminated many candidates on technicalities. On 2 December 1977, Mobutu was reelected president for a seven-year term.

Legislative elections were held again on 18–19 September 1982. Under the liberalization process, multiple candidates were allowed within the party structure. Candidates were nominated by local MPR cells, then approved first by regional party leaders and ultimately by the Political Bureau. Considerable changes were made to some of the lists. Nevertheless, the campaign was lively. About one-half of the incumbents failed to make the list of nominees and, of those who did, half were not reelected. The results led to the youngest legislature in the country's history, with an average age of 35 years. This outcome reflected popular dissatisfaction with the party barons. Many defeated incumbents, however, received positions in the party hierarchy. On 29 July 1984, Mobutu again ran unopposed and was reelected by more than 99 percent of the vote in elections that were held six months early because, according to the government, "The will of the people made it evident that further campaigning was not

necessary.” Legislative elections were held in 1987, except in Kivu, but were dominated by young party *cadres*, because by then the **Central Committee** of the MPR had taken over as the main organ of state for debate and consultation.

In these elections, many reports of irregularities surfaced, including a shortage of “No” ballots to be used by voters against the MPR candidates, surveillance and harassment of voters at the polls by soldiers and party militants, and a lack of observers during the ballot counting. However, the results were recognized by the world community.

Elections scheduled for 1991 were delayed by the transition to multipartyism announced in April 1990 and were postponed a number of times because of disputes over power-sharing between pro-Mobutu and **opposition** forces. After five years of political stagnation, elections were announced for May and June 1997. An **Electoral Commission** was appointed in March 1996, a constitution was drafted in August, and a constitutional referendum was scheduled for February 1997. However, many opposition leaders planned to boycott the process because they believed that these elections would be rigged and the country’s **transportation** and **communication** networks had deteriorated to such a degree that a massive reconstruction program was needed first.

The offensive by the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) disrupted the timetable. When the AFDL assumed power in May 1997 following the overthrow of Mobutu, it pledged to hold elections in 1999. However, a **civil war** broke out on 2 August 1998 against **Laurent Kabila** that made the electoral process unlikely. Less than a year after the conflict, the belligerents met in Lusaka and signed the **Lusaka Peace Accord**, which provided the framework for the **Dialogue Inter-Congolais** (DIC). After two years of intense diplomatic maneuvers and counter-maneuvers, the belligerents signed a peace agreement in Pretoria, South Africa, on 17 December 2002, resulting in the formation of a transitional government in June 2003 and the creation of institutions of civil society. Created at this time was the **Commission Électorale Indépendante** (CEI), chaired by cleric **Apollinaire Malu Malu**, whose goal was to oversee the elections scheduled for 2006. The first free and fair legislative elections since 1965 and the first direct

presidential elections in the country since 1960 took place on 30 July 2006. Parliamentary elections were contested in 189 electoral districts or constituencies. Some 6,000 candidates ran for a 500-seat National Assembly according to a proportional representation system.

Thirty-three presidential candidates contested for the highest office. **Joseph Kabila** received 44.81 percent of votes from 17.9 million registered voters, and **Jean-Pierre Bemba** had 20.03 percent. In the second round held on 28 October, Kabila won with 58 percent of votes, against the challenger with 42 percent of 16.6 million counted votes. Despite claims by a number of critics of systematic cheating, the Supreme Court validated the results a few days later. Meanwhile, the incumbent president, who narrowly failed to be elected in the first round, also failed to secure a majority in the National Assembly. His party, the **Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie** (PPRD), only gained 111 out of 500 parliamentary seats. However, the pro-Kabila coalition reached a total of 224 seats. The final results indicated that Bemba's coalition won 100 seats and the Parti Lumumbist Unifié (PALU) of **Antoine Gizenga** won 34 seats. An alliance, the **Alliance de la Majorité Présidentielle** (AMP), between the presidential coalition and the PALU, was necessary; Gizenga was nominated as the prime minister of Congo.

This was a great accomplishment in a country that had no free and fair elections for more than 40 years. To complete the transition, the newly elected parliament and the CEI organized provincial elections in late 2006, from which, according to the constitution, 108 senators were elected. The CEI reported the results of provincial elections on 29 November, and the presidential party received 20 percent of provincial assembly seats. Moreover, as indicated by the constitution, provincial assemblies had to elect senators and appoint a number of traditional authorities to the upper house. The results of the CEI, announced on 20 January 2007, indicated that the AMP had won 56 seats out of the 108-member Senate and was thus able to secure a majority in both lower and upper houses. The last phase of the electoral process occurred in 2009 to elect leaders at territorial level and urban areas.

**ELECTORAL COMMISSION.** An electoral commission was established on 18 March 1996 to organize national **elections** in May and

June 1997, as part of the **democratic transition** called for by the **Haut Conseil de la République/Parlement de la Transition** (HCR/PT), which was acting as an interim legislature. **Bayona wa Meya**, a former president of the Supreme Court and minister of justice, was appointed chairman of the commission. However, the hardline **opposition** dismissed him as a puppet of **Mobutu Sese Seko** and said it would not participate in any elections organized by his commission. The commission was disbanded by the **Laurent Kabila government**, which pledged to establish an independent organ before holding elections in 1999.

**ELECTRICAL POWER.** The Congo is estimated to hold 13 percent of the world's, and one-half of Africa's, hydroelectric potential (100,000 megawatts [MW]). Total installed capacity in the early 1990s was 2,400 MW, 90 percent of it at hydroelectric complexes, and the remainder at small, thermal units, many of which had fallen into disuse by the late 1990s. One-half of the country's electrical generating capacity is at the **Inga hydroelectric complex**, 40 km upriver from **Matadi** in **Kongo Central**, where two phases of an original three-phase project operated with a capacity of 1,300 MW. The former **Katanga** Province was the second-largest producer of electricity, with three complexes on the **Lualaba River** north of **Kolwezi** and two on the **Lufira River** northeast of **Likasi**. Smaller hydroelectric complexes provide power to other areas. These include complexes on the Inkisi River near **Kinshasa**, on the Tshopo River near **Kisangani**, on the Aruwimi River near Bunia, on the **Ruzizi River** supplying **Bukavu** and **Burundi**, and small stations near Puna, Piana, **Mbuji-Mayi**, **Tshikapa**, **Kalima**, Sanga, and **Zongo**. A line linking Bukavu to **Goma** via Katana was completed in 1985, and a hydroelectric unit at Mobayi supplying **Gbadolite** was inaugurated in 1989.

The **Inga-Shaba power line**, built at a cost of more than \$1 billion, was completed in 1982. A 500-kilovolt direct-current, high-tension line with an installed capacity of 560 MW links the Inga complex in **Kongo Central** to **Haut-Katanga** and **Lualaba Provinces** 1,750 km away. The **Régie de Distribution d'Eau et d'Électricité** (REGIDESO), the national water-management corporation, turned over to the **Société Nationale d'Électricité** (SNEL) a number of

small thermal units that supplied about 30 Congolese cities in the interior.

Congo-Kinshasa is potentially a major exporter of hydroelectric power. In the 1990s, it supplied about one-third of **Congo-Brazzaville**'s electricity and also sold power to **Rwanda**, Burundi, and **Zambia**. In 1992, Congo signed a number of accords to export electricity to **Egypt** and to a number of other African countries. In one plan with Egypt, a high-tension line would have been constructed to carry 600 MW from Inga to the Aswan dam. In Southern Africa, South Africa is the largest consumer of power in the region, with some of its supply imported from Congo.

In 2008, barely 5 percent of the population of Congo had access to electricity, compared to an average of 20 percent access for households across sub-Saharan Africa. Yet the **Congo River** has enough hydroelectric potential to light up all Africa. In its grandest form, a project called "Big Inga" would see the entire river diverted to a dam producing up to 40,000 to 45,000 MW, more than twice the power of China's Three Gorges Dam and enough capacity to export power to Europe as well as other African countries. Foreign officials admit that Big Inga, which would cost \$45 billion to complete, remains a project for the future.

**ELEPHANTS.** Before the 18th century, Congo had one of the largest elephant populations in the world, numbering in the millions. However, the **ivory** trade has seriously reduced the population, which was estimated in the 1990s in the tens of thousands. Only herds in the remotest areas were spared. Poaching reportedly was carried on virtually unimpeded in more accessible areas because of **corruption** and lack of patrols. A worldwide ban on ivory trading in the 1990s lessened demand considerably, but poaching continues, fueled by demand from clandestine markets abroad. The **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila** in the late 1990s and early 2000s increased poaching further. Furthermore, corruption and mismanagement of national parks have taken a heavy toll on elephant herds. Besides ivory, which has been internationally banned, elephant meat provides income for a number of Africans. In 2004, for example, an elephant was the most profitable bush meat, potentially worth about \$400 per elephant. By late 2006, Congo had no more than 1,000 elephants left.

**ELISABETHVILLE.** *See* LUBUMBASHI.

**EMPLOYMENT.** Congo's **labor** force in the mid-1990s was estimated at 16 million out of a total **population** of 43 million. The International Labour Organization (ILO) reported that, in 1995, 37.5 percent of the total population was "economically active," defined as including the military, the employed, and the unemployed, but excluding **students** and housewives. By 2005, this figure was more than 60 percent. However, most work was performed in the informal sector. **World Bank** figures showed slightly more than 1 million people were active in the formal **economy**, 80 percent of these in the public sector. The number is believed to have fallen with the decline of the formal economy in the 1990s. Employment rates during the 1980s were estimated at 60 percent in **Kinshasa** and 20 percent in most other cities. Following the "**pillages**" (lootings) of 1991 and 1993, many factories and businesses were closed, and employment is estimated to have fallen to 20 percent of the labor force or less. It recovered to an estimated 40 percent in 1996, but many of those working in **government** or public services were paid irregularly. From 1998, when the **civil war** against Kabila started until the end of the transitional government in 2006, most government employees in the provinces had salary arrears of as much as eight years.

As a result, most political economists contend that the informal economy has employed several times the workforce of the formal economy, although no official statistics exist. In rural areas, according to United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 80 percent of the population lived mainly from subsistence farming and hunting. In urban areas, activities included trading, **smuggling**, small-scale businesses (such as tailoring or tire and auto repair), and individually contracted services (such as house or yard work).

Historically, labor in Congo has not been organized. Trade unions were not permitted to form until after World War II. Following **independence**, however, several emerged. They were joined by decree in 1967 into the Union Nationale des Travailleurs Congolais (UNTC), which in 1971 was renamed the *Union Nationale des Travailleurs Zaïrois* (UNTZA). Their leaders generally followed party line and there were few **strikes** until the liberalization of 1990, when UNTZA lost its monopoly of the trade union movement. At that time,

several early unions reemerged and were joined by a number of new organizations, formed in the professional or economic sector. Strikes became frequent and prolonged, especially by workers in the public sector whose salaries had been reduced by **inflation** to a few dollars per month. *See also* AGRICULTURE.

**ENERGY.** Congo possesses relatively abundant energy, and 95 percent of this energy is hydroelectric. However, the lack of infrastructure hinders the delivery of **electrical power** to remote areas. Hydroelectric potential is estimated at 100,000 MW, nearly one-half that of all of Africa. Installed capacity is 2,400 MW, most of this from the **Inga hydroelectric complex** near **Matadi**.

Known **petroleum** reserves are relatively poor. There was no oil production until 1975, when several wells off the Atlantic coast came on line and production began on an island in the mouth of the **Congo River**. Estimated at 180 million barrels of heavy-grade crude in the mid-1990s, production reached nearly 10.7 million barrels in 1990, but declined subsequently until 1995, when new discoveries boosted production to 11 million barrels. Production declined thereafter, averaging 9 million barrels a year until 2001. After dropping to 8.4 million barrels in 2002, production increased to 9.2, 10.1, and 10 million barrels in 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively. Some prospecting had been undertaken in the 1990s, indicating that oil exists in the **Mbandaka** area and oil fields in eastern Congo near the border with **Tanzania** and **Uganda**. A refinery with an installed capacity of 750,000 tons was built with Italian participation near Moanda, but it could not refine the heavy grade of crude produced in the territory and, as a result, crude oil was imported from Nigeria for refining.

Congo has significant deposits of low-grade coal located in the north, but exploitation was not economical because of **transportation** costs. Small coal deposits between **Likasi** and **Kamina** and near **Kalemie** produced 125,000 tons per year until the late 1980s. All of it was used by local **industry**. Higher-grade coke and coal needed to power the **copper** refineries was imported from Zimbabwe, especially in the 1990s when production levels declined to 60,000 tons in 1990. Production continued to decline in subsequent years, reaching 10,000 tons in 1995. It was less than 5,000 tons thereafter. From 2000 to 2005, production of coal averaged only 1,000 tons per year.



The government has historically maintained a heavy presence in the energy sector and was sole owner from the mid-1960s until the 1980s. With the reforms of 1983, however, it began to allow partial participation by private investors. It deregulated prices in 1983 and, in 1985, lifted the state monopoly on the marketing of petroleum products. During a severe fuel shortage in 1992, the government took over foreign petroleum companies, but returned them with compensation a few months later. Most Congolese get their power from wood and wood charcoal.

**ENVIRONMENT.** Environmentalists tend to view Congo's exotic animal life as a highly at-risk resource. The gorillas of the **Virunga Mountain** range have received considerable attention in the mass **media**, as has the threat to the country's population of **elephants**, rhinoceros, and other large game caused by poaching and human encroachment. A broader concern is the potential threat to the country's 120 million hectares of **rainforests**, representing roughly 6 percent of the world's remaining forest cover. Unlike those of many African countries, Congo's forests were considered 85 percent intact in the mid-1990s. However, environmentalists warned in 1995 that the government had signed **timber** concessions covering one-third of the country's forests. They expressed particular concern over **Kongo Central's Mayombe Forest**, which is relatively accessible to ocean **ports**. Another major concern was damage to the environment caused by urban pollution, particularly in **Kinshasa** and the densely populated areas of Kongo Central.

The World Wildlife Fund issued a report in May 2001 detailing the havoc that the civil war against **Laurent Kabila** in August 1998 caused to the environment. Much of the forest in **Kivu** was destroyed, and endangered species were decimated by foreign troops, rebels, and poachers. The first **United Nations** report published in 2001 estimated that, from 1998 to 2001, the rate of deforestation increased at an alarming pace in eastern Congo as **Ugandan-** and **Rwandan-**based companies exploited timber in violation of any minimally acceptable rules of timber harvest for sustainable management. In the Kivu **provinces**, unregulated mining of **coltan** (columbium-tantalum) deposits underlying arable land had destabilized hillsides, causing landslides that destroyed fields. An estimated half of the land

that was seized for unplanned prospecting and artisanal coltan mining was no longer suitable for **agriculture**. Subsistence livelihoods had been further damaged by logging, which produced soil erosion that destroyed fisheries and wildlife habitat as well.

**ÉQUATEUR PROVINCE.** One of the former eight provinces, Équateur lies in the northwestern corner of Congo, in the heart of the **Congo River Basin**. Its topography is dominated by vast **rainforests** and numerous swamps, **rivers**, and streams. However, in the northernmost parts along the border with the **Central African Republic**, the terrain is higher, drier, and covered by some wooded savanna. With an area of 403,293 square km and an estimated **population** of 5.4 million in 2002 (3,288,353 in 1982), Équateur was one of the most sparsely populated regions in Congo, with 13 persons per square kilometer. The region is largely inhabited by members of the **Mongo ethnic group**, with some groups of Sudanic origin present in the northern parts. Most live from hunting and **fishing**, although some have a tradition of gathering and cultivation.

The provincial capital is **Mbandaka**, with an estimated population of 729,254 in 2004. Major economic resources include **palm oil**, **coffee**, **timber**, **livestock**, and some cocoa and rice farming from irrigated projects. The region is believed to have large deposits of iron ore, but these have yet to be exploited. Originally one of the more remote and neglected areas of Congo, Équateur received more attention during the **Mobutu Sese Seko** years, in part because it was the home region of the president and many of his close collaborators and in part because of a **government** policy of attempting to develop less-prosperous provinces of the country. The new constitution promulgated in February 2006 divided the former Équateur province into four provinces that became operative in February 2009. They are Équateur (capital city, Mbandaka), **Nord-Ubangi (Gbadolite)**, **Sud-Ubangi (Gemena)**, and **Tshuapa (Boende)**.

**ÉTAT INDÉPENDANT DU CONGO.** *See* CONGO FREE STATE.

**ETHNIC CLEANSING.** A term coined to describe efforts by belligerents in the former Yugoslavia to rid disputed areas of rival **ethnic groups**. The term came to be used in Congo during the early 1990s

to describe expulsions and violence in **Shaba** and **Nord-Kivu** and to a lesser degree in **Bandundu** and **Orientale** provinces.

The incidents in Shaba began in August 1992 after **Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond**, a **Lunda** from Shaba, was replaced as **prime minister** by **Étienne Tshisekedi**, a **Luba** from neighboring **Kasai Occidental**. The governor of Shaba at the time, **Gabriel Kyungu wa Kumwanza**, was a member of Nguza's **Union des Fédéralistes et des Républicains Indépendants** (UFERI) party that had allied with **Mobutu Sese Seko** and saw a threat to its base from Tshisekedi's **Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social** (UDPS). Kyungu, who preferred to call the region by its original name of **Katanga**, had been making fiery speeches for months advocating "Katanga for Katangans." This raised long-standing resentments among Lunda and other original settlers of the region against the Luba. Some Luba had immigrated to Katanga before the colonial era. They came to be called **Baluba du Katanga** (BALUBAKAT). Others, called *Balubakasai*, had immigrated during the colonial period to work in the mines. Both groups had prospered because of an affinity for business and were characterized by a strong sense of ethnic solidarity.

Following Kyungu's speeches, attacks began on the Luba and their property by youth militias. An estimated 500 people were killed and more than 100,000 were forced to flee their homes. Many camped for months at **railway** stations and public buildings awaiting **transportation** to Kasai. Their homes and businesses were reportedly occupied by local UFERI supporters. Sentiments ran especially high after Mobutu announced he could not assure the safety of Luba in Shaba. However, outrage grew domestically and internationally. Kyungu was dismissed as governor on 19 April 1995, after being accused of illegally marketing **cobalt** from Katanga mines and of stockpiling arms for a planned secession of the region.

In March 1993, violence broke out in Nord-Kivu between members of the **Nyanga** and **Hunde** ethnic groups against the **Banyarwanda**. The Banyarwanda, primarily of **Tutsi** origin, had immigrated from **Rwanda** as early as the 19th century to Rutshuru territory and, in the 1930s, to Masisi territory, both in Nord-Kivu. They were never viewed as Congolese by the indigenous populations. Like the Luba in Katanga, they prospered during colonialism. They were granted citizenship at **independence**, confirmed in 1972, but this was rescinded

by a decree in 1981 that was never implemented. A commission of the **National Conference** in 1991 never resolved the matter and, as a result, the Banyarwanda were not represented at the conference. The clashes in Nord-Kivu erupted after Governor Jean-Pierre Kalumbo Mboho began making speeches calling for the extermination of Banyarwanda and promising support from **security** forces. These clashes caused 7,000 to 35,000 deaths and left 350,000 homeless in March 1993.

**Opposition** leaders and **human rights** groups accused Mobutu and his supporters of instigating the clashes in order to clear certain regions of opposition voters prior to national elections. In July 1993, Kalumbo was suspended and a contingent of the **Division Spéciale Présidentielle** was dispatched to the region to quell fighting.

In mid-1997, reports surfaced of massacres of 230,000 Rwandan **Hutu** refugees in eastern Congo by the Tutsi-minority Rwandan Patriotic Army and **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL). The **United Nations** (UN) announced an investigation into these reports. However, the investigation was blocked for several years by the AFDL **government**, which criticized the investigation for not including the atrocities committed under ethnic cleansing. Continuing interethnic violence led to another rebellion in eastern Congo, beginning in August 1998, which included numerous incidents of ethnically motivated massacres. Human rights groups also claimed that another ethnic cleansing occurred during the war against Kabila that started in August 1998 and officially ended in late 2002.

**ETHNIC GROUPS.** Although estimates vary, Congolese historian Isidore Ndaywel è Nziem estimates that Congo has 333 distinguishable ethnic groups, speaking as many distinct **languages** and 250 dialects. Most of these belong to the **Bantu** people that dominate central Africa. Although no single ethnic group is believed to exceed 10 percent of the total **population**, a number of major groupings or “clusters” have been identified. Nziem provides four major clusters. The first is what he calls people of the southern savanna, divided into the Kongo group, groups from **Angola**, groups from the northwestern Atlantic coast, the **Lunda** cluster, and **Luba** groups. A second cluster is made up of peoples of the Cuvette that include **Mongo**

groups, Ngombe people, groups of the eastern forest, and peoples of **Maniema**. Third is the northern savanna people, mostly of Sudanese origin. The final group is the **Kivu** cluster. *See also* AFRO-ARABS; ALUR; BALUBAKAT; BANYAMULENGE; BANYARWANDA; BOA; BOMA; BOSHONGO; FULERU; HEMBA; HUNDE; HUTU; JAGA; KAZEMBE; KUBA; KUNDA; KUSU; KWESE; LELE; LIA; LUNGU; MAMVU; MANGBETU; MBALA; MBANZA; MBOMU; MBUN; MVUBA; NANDE; NDEMBO; NGALA; NG-BANDI; NGOMBE; NJEMBO; NKU; NTOMBA; NYAMWEZI; NYANGA; PENDE; PYGMIES; SAMBALA; SENGELE; SHI, SONGYE; SOONDE; SUKU; TEKE; TEMBO; TETELA; TIO; TUTSI; VUNGARA; YAKA; YEKE.

**ETSOU, NZAB-BAMUNGWABI FRÉDÉRIC (CARDINAL)** (1930–2007). Born on 3 December 1930, Etsou was former bishop of **Mbandaka** who became archbishop of **Kinshasa** and head of the **Catholic Church** in Congo upon the death of Cardinal **Joseph Malula** in 1990. He was proclaimed cardinal by Pope **John Paul II** on 28 June 1991. A number of observers in Kinshasa claimed that Etsou was chosen with **Mobutu Sese Seko's** support. He was one of the electors who participated in the 2005 papal conclave that selected Pope Benedict XVI.

In a statement published on 11 November 2006, the cardinal criticized the **Commission Électorale Indépendante** for being biased toward incumbent president **Joseph Kabila** because the cardinal seemed to doubt the outcome of presidential **elections**. These statements created tension in Kinshasa, stronghold of challenger **Jean-Pierre Bemba**, whose family is close to the cardinal (who also hailed from the same **Équateur Province**), a fact that might have explained the cardinal's alleged partiality. The cardinal died in Leuven, Belgium, of pneumonia on 6 January 2007.

**EUROPEAN UNION (EU)**. Called the *European Economic Community* and then the *European Community* until October 1994, the EU has become one of Congo's major trading partners, supplying more than one-half of the country's **imports** and purchasing nearly three-fourths of Congolese **exports**. **Belgium** was the largest individual trading partner, although trade with Belgium declined in the 1980s in

favor of the **United States**, Germany, and **France**. In 1975, Congo signed the **Lomé Convention**, the first trade agreement between the EU and African countries, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP). Congo also signed three subsequent Lomé agreements in 1979, 1984, and 1989. Each agreement increased European aid in exchange for lower trade barriers in ACP countries.

Beginning in the late 1980s, EU governments started pressuring the Congolese **government** for economic and political liberalization and greater respect for **human rights**. Aid was suspended in 1990 following an army attack on **students** at the **Lubumbashi** campus of the national **university**, and again in 1992 after **Mobutu Sese Seko** nominated a rival government to that of the elected **Prime Minister Étienne Tshisekedi**. Following the fall of Mobutu in May 1997, the EU pledged to support the government of **Laurent Kabila** if it pursued the **democratic transition**. However, it criticized the Kabila government's initial crackdown on political rallies and the news **media** and its obstruction of a **United Nations** investigation into alleged massacres in eastern Congo during the offensive that brought it to power.

The war against Kabila that started in August 1998 brought changes in diplomacy between the EU and Congo. Despite divergence of positions, most EU members favored diplomatic talks among the belligerents and solutions to complex humanitarian emergencies as the result of the war. For example, the United Nations Security Council authorized deployment of an EU reserve force (EUFOR), called *Operation Artemis*, on 25 April 2006 to bolster stability in **Bunia**, **Ituri Province**, and to protect internally displaced people. The EUFOR, which was mostly composed of French soldiers, was deployed in June 2006. **Trade** with the EU has continued to dominate, given both colonial ties with Belgium and cultural ties with France.

**ÉVOLUÉS.** A term used primarily in the 1950s and early 1960s to describe Congolese who were most assimilated into European-style society and lifestyles, usually because of **education** or training and experience at European firms. The term contained more social connotations than *immatriculés*, which had legal implications. Most *évolués* were educated urban dwellers. Some appeared or feigned to be largely disassociated from their traditional societies. Following independence, they quickly moved into positions of leadership.

**EXECUTIVE COUNCIL [CONSEIL EXÉCUTIF].** The rough equivalent of a ministerial cabinet, the Executive Council was officially created on 5 January 1975 by merging the Council of Ministers and the National Executive Council of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR). Members were appointed by the **president**. Formation of the council began in 1972 and was one of the first moves to merge party and state. As the party became the supreme organ of state, its governing bodies, the **Political Bureau** and **Central Committee**, assumed increasing importance, and the Executive Council became primarily a committee of chief administrators of the executive branch. Moreover, with increasing centralization of powers in the presidency, the Executive Council in the 1980s frequently was overshadowed by the Office of the President until the **democratic transition** was announced in April 1990.

**EXPLORERS.** Recorded history says little about African and Arab explorers who traveled and traded across central Africa well before the arrival of Europeans in the late 1400s. **Tippo Tip** was perhaps the best known of these early explorers. Europeans, beginning with **Diogo Cão**, who arrived at the mouth of the **Congo River** in 1483, are better known. These include **José Lacerda e Almeida** of **Portugal** and British explorers **David Livingstone**, **Henry Morton Stanley**, Richard Burton, John Speke, **James Tuckey**, and Samuel Baker. At home, these hardy adventurers were forgotten while they were gone and adulated when they returned. Nevertheless, their explorations and mappings helped spark European interest in Congo. Greater knowledge of the region came later, from traders, **missionaries**, and colonialists.

**EXPORTS.** *See* EXTERNAL TRADE.

**EXTERNAL TRADE.** Trade is an old enterprise in most African countries. Four trade zones co-existed with both centralized and decentralized polities in the **Congo basin** before the advent of colonialism in the late 19th century. The first zone was the **Ubangi–Congo** axis, and its players were mostly Africans. It expanded in the 1840s, superseding the old overland routes. The second zone was the Portuguese–African area that emerged in the late 15th century dur-

ing the early years of the **slave** trade. It centered in the Congolese estuary, as well as in the **Angolan** towns of Luanda, Benguela, and Maçâmedes. Its major actors were the Portuguese, Imbangala, Ovimbundu, and **Chokwe**. The third zone emerged in the early 19th century and represented the east–Swahili trading zone that linked the Zanzibar Sultanate to eastern Congo basin. **Afro–Arabs** from Zanzibar dominated this trade zone. The Arab–Sudanese zone in the northeastern region formed the fourth trade area. Most of its outposts received traders from Cairo, the Red Sea, and Khartoum.

These four trade zones exported mostly **ivory**, beeswax, slaves, and a few minerals from the Congo basin in exchange for guns, cloth, and other manufactured goods. The abolition of the slave trade in the early 19th century never changed slave trade in the Congo basin. However, the arrival of King **Leopold II** of **Belgium** was a major event in the trade equation in the Congo basin. After the **Berlin Conference** had recognized him as sovereign of the **Congo Free State**, Leopold II started a war against the Afro–Arabs to control the trade of ivory and **rubber**. Rubber and ivory contributed 60 percent of the total value of exports in 1890, but were responsible for 95 percent of the total in 1900. By 1903, rubber exports represented almost 83 percent of Congo’s total exports as ivory declined because, by the 1890s, many **elephants** had been “shot out.” Exports considerably exceeded imports during the early years of the colony. Compared to other colonies at the time, this pattern continued until the end of the 1920s, when **mining** development in Katanga and other areas radically changed both the volume and structure of Congolese commerce.

After Belgium took over the Congo Free State, it started a process of diversifying the **economy**. Major investments in the mineral sector boosted exports. By the 1930s, minerals represented 65 percent of total exports. This trend changed in the 1940s; by the late 1950s, **agricultural** exports represented 40 percent of total exports, and the mineral sector was close to 42 percent of total exports. Belgian Congo was a net exporter of **foods** by the 1950s. Following **independence**, the share of minerals, especially **copper**, **cobalt**, **diamonds**, **gold**, **zinc**, and **tin**, increased drastically at the expense of agricultural exports.

Copper, historically the dominant export, declined by nearly 90 percent in the 1990s because of the collapse of state-owned **Générale**



**des Carrières et des Mines** (GECAMINES) mining conglomerate. As a result, exports witnessed a major compression. According to Table 2, copper exports represented 66.4 percent of total exports in 1970. However, by 2004, this was a mere 4 percent. As copper lost its preeminence, diamond exports increased. Until the deterioration of the mining sector in the early 1990s, more than 80 percent of export revenues came from minerals, 65 percent from copper alone.

During this period, agricultural products, primarily **coffee** and **palm oil**, formed the second largest export sector. Other agricultural exports included **timber**, rubber, cocoa, tea, and **cotton**. Agricultural exports declined for many years because of mismanagement, **Zairianization**, and lack of investment. **Privatization** and more liberal policies beginning in 1983 spurred agricultural production. The subsequent decline of the mineral sector caused agricultural exports to reach one-third of total exports in the mid-1990s. **Smuggling** has been a perennial problem, but the **government** attempted to address it in 1983 by removing price restrictions on domestically marketed commodities and by allowing the overvalued **currency** to float freely on the open market.

**Table 2. Composition of Exports and Imports, 1970–2006.**

	1970	1980	1990	2000	2006
<b>Exports</b> (\$ million)	782.0	2,269.0	1,276.0	824.0	2,300
Agricultural exports (%)					
Coffee	4.9	10.1	0.50.5	—	
Palm oil	3.6	0.50.0	0.0—		
Mineral exports					
Copper	66.4	41.3	30.2	10.0	15.00
Cobalt	6.0	20.2	18.0	—	—
Diamonds	5.1	4.242.0	50.0	—	
Food exports	11.6	0.20.1	0.10.0		
<b>Imports</b>	583.0	1,519.0	1,252.0	697.0	2,800.0
Agricultural products	0.2	1.13.2	4.8—		
Food imports	14.6	21.6	30.4	50.6	—

Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), *International Financial Statistics*, 1992. United Nations (UN), United Conference on Trade and Development, 1970–2004.

**Table 3. Total External Trade (\$ million).**

	1970	1980	1990	2000	2006
Exports	799	2,269	1,240	1,171	2,300
Imports	583	1,519	1,151	769	2,800
Balance of trade	216	750	89	402	-500

Source: IMF, *Direction of Trade*, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2007.

**Table 4. Direction of External Trade, Four Decades, Percent of Total.**

	1970	1980	1990	2000	2004
<b>Exports to</b>					
Belgium	42.3	4.5	54.4	60.9	47.4
Italy	11.5	5.4	4.4	2.3	1.3
United Kingdom	7.3	4.3	1.1	0.1	0.7
France	6.9	6.2	6.9	1.6	1.2
Germany	2.6	4.1	6.2	0.3	0.7
US	1.7	13.1	12.5	19.2	10.8
South Africa	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.6	
EU	72.7	28.3	74.6	76.1	74.5
Africa	23.5	33.8	5.7	2.0	4.1
<b>Imports from</b>					
Belgium	24.4	16.2	25.4	18.1	14.5
US	10.7	9.7	9.8	1.4	5.6
Germany	10.4	9.7	10.0	3.0	5.5
France	8.1	7.8	11.3	5.5	10.1
United Kingdom	7.2	4.0	4.4	0.1	1.0
Italy	5.4	4.4	3.4	1.2	2.0
South Africa	0.0	9.5	4.7	17.2	17.2
EU	60.6	44.3	59.1	34.4	40.8
Africa	7.7	19.9	7.4	53.0	42.1

Source: IMF, *Direction of Trade*, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2007.

According to International Monetary Fund data, export earnings, after a decline of 15 percent during the 1980s, returned to their 1980 level of \$2.2 billion in 1990. However, with the economic crisis, they declined again to \$1.2 billion in 1994. Imports totaled \$1.5 billion in 1980, but fell to \$850 million in 1982. Following economic reforms of 1983, they began to rise again, reaching \$1.2 billion in 1985 and \$1.5 billion in 1990. With the economic crisis of the 1990s, however, imports declined to an estimated \$600 million in 1994. Balance of trade was positive in the 1970s and 1980s. It remained mostly

negative in the 1990s. It was positive again in the early 2000s as the result of a lack of foreign exchanges to import. The negative trend emerged again in 2006.

The **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila** resulted in the diversion of a number of export items to belligerents. In 2000, exports represented only \$824 million. The signing of peace agreements and the formation of a transitional government in June 2003 gave the exporting sector a major impetus, to the extent that exports increased to \$2.3 billion in 2006. On the other hand, imports remained quite low, giving the impression that Congo was self-sufficient. On the contrary, the contraction of imports was the result of a quasi-absence of foreign exchange to import. In 2006, the current balance shows a deficit of \$500 million.

Table 4 indicates that Congo's major export markets before the 1980s were Belgium, Italy, **France**, and **Great Britain**. The 1980s provide a different picture. Exports to the **United States** increased drastically and have remained above 10 percent ever since, representing one-fifth of total exports in 1990. However, Belgium regained its role as a major importer of Congo's exports after the 1980s. In short, the **European Union** has remained a major market for Congo's exports, averaging more than 70 percent, except in 1980. The same pattern characterizes Congo's imports. The United States remained the second major partner up until 1990, then lost this position to **South Africa**. In fact, Congo's imports from South Africa have increased since the 1990s, making South Africa the second source of imports after the EU.

A great deal of the country's foreign exchange went to import fuel, industrial equipment, and consumer goods. International financial institutions often criticized the government's import policies, saying the large amount of imported consumable and luxury goods aggravated the **balance-of-payments** deficit and weakened the currency. Since the early 1980s, 40 percent of Congo's imports were consumable goods, 25 percent were raw materials and semimanufactured goods, 20 percent were capital goods, and 15 percent were **energy** products. Undeclared imports by the government and by state-owned companies during these years often reached 65 percent of the total. Principal imports were food items, such as rice, maize, and wheat.

Other imports included raw and semiprocessed material used in the food and clothing industries, equipment, and spare parts.

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**FAMILY PLANNING.** The Congolese **government** began to express interest in limiting the size of families in 1973, when it issued a decree establishing an agency to disseminate information on family planning. A nongovernmental organization called the *Association Zairoise pour le Bien-Être Familial (ASBEF)/Zairian Association for Family Well-Being* was established in 1978 and began working with international agencies on family planning programs. Another organization called *Santé Rurale (SANRU)/Rural Health* was given responsibility for coordinating projects in the countryside.

In 1982, the government launched the first large-scale family planning effort in the country, the *Projet des Services des Naissances Désirables (PSND; Project for Planned Birth Services)*. The PSNC targeted 800,000 women in 14 urban areas and sought to increase the use of contraception from 1 percent to 12 percent by 1986. By the end of that period, it reported that only 4 percent of targeted women were using contraception. A number of other projects attempted to target women in rural areas and promote family planning through clinics and pharmacies. Aggressive public awareness campaigns and the distribution of condoms in an effort to limit the spread of the **acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)/human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)** also advanced family planning. One form of birth control, the condom, achieved considerable exposure because of educational campaigns to limit the spread of AIDS/HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases.

Despite a government family planning program, less than 6 percent of the **population** in the early 2000s was estimated to use some form of contraceptive. Moreover, efforts to promote family planning continued to be frustrated by traditional values and high infant mortality rates. Because of the traditional value placed on large families by Congolese society, high infant mortality rates, and relatively low life expectancy, family planning has never been popularized in

Congo. With the average Congolese **woman** giving birth to six or seven children, Congo has one of the highest population growth rates in the world, more than 3 percent per year. The high proportion of rural poor living on subsistence **agriculture**, high **unemployment** rates in the cities, and the absence of an effective social services system meant that a large family was the only security net for most couples or single mothers. Social services were further stymied by the economic crises of the 1990s and the **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila** and its aftermath, which extended even after the 2006 **elections**. These factors made the purchase of contraceptives a luxury many families could not afford.

**FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF CONGO.** *See* CONGO, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF.

**FEDERALISM.** The concept of federalism, that is, **provinces** or **regions** with considerable autonomy in local affairs but joined together in national affairs, was frequently advanced as a way for Congo's disparate regions to coexist in a modern state. At **independence**, many **political parties**, in particular those with power bases in the east and south, espoused federalism, although they differed widely on what powers should be granted to the regions and what should be retained by the central government. The **constitution** of 1964 institutionalized a form of federalism, but this was displaced by the military **coup d'état** of 1965, subsequent centralization of power in the **presidency** in the constitution of 1967, and creation of the party-state by the constitution of 1974.

The **democratic transition** period beginning in 1990, however, brought a resurgence of federal sentiment. Some political parties, notably **Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond's Union des Fédéralistes et des Républicains Indépendants** (UFERI), made federalism a pillar of their platform. The **National Conference** drafted a constitution that restored a form of federalism similar to that of the 1964 constitution. However, **Mobutu Sese Seko** refused to recognize the document. The collapse of central services, as well as that of the formal **economy** and the authority of the central government in the 1990s, led to a de facto form of federalism. Many regional and local **governments** began collecting their own taxes and duties and refused to send them to **Kinshasa**.

Although local **military** commanders continued to take orders from central command, some worked closely with regional authorities on day-to-day matters and established ways to subsidize soldiers' wages, which frequently failed to arrive from the capital. Travelers arriving in some regions were obliged to purchase entrance permits and have their passports stamped, as if they were entering a foreign country.

In August 1996, the **Haut Conseil de la République/Parlement de la Transition** (HCR/PT) passed a draft constitution that would have granted a large measure of autonomy to the regions and established the **Federal Republic of Congo**. A referendum on the constitution was scheduled for February 1997, but was never held because of the offensive of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) that began in October 1996. When the AFDL assumed power after the fall of Mobutu in May 1997, it pledged to draft a new constitution and submit it to a national referendum in 1998. However, this was postponed because of the **civil war** against the **Laurent Kabila** government that began in August 1998. After more than four years, the belligerents signed an inclusive peace accord in December 2002, called the *Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo* (AGI), which paved the way to an inclusive transitional government in mid-2003. The AGI also contained a number of provisos for the elaboration of a constitution; this was put to a referendum in late 2005 and promulgated in early 2006. The new constitution institutionalized federalism through the creation of 25 provinces and the federal capital Kinshasa. In its articles, from 201 to 206, the constitution defines the powers of both central and federal provincial entities.

**FÉDÉRATION DES ENTREPRISES CONGOLAISES (FEC)**  
**[FEDERATION OF CONGOLESE ENTERPRISES]**. An association of businessmen and entrepreneurs formed after the takeover of the **government** by **Laurent Kabila** in May 1997. In January 1998, the FEC complained to the government that the Congolese judiciary was strangling economic revival in the country. According to the FEC, overly zealous fiscal inspections and excessive fines were hurting business, and the FEC urged the government to remove corrupt judges. The organization again reiterated its plea after **Joseph Kabila** was sworn in as president in 2007.

**FÉDÉRATION KASAÏENNE.** This was a political alliance of **Luba** in **Kasai** Province at **independence**. It wanted considerable autonomy for Kasai.

**FETISHISM.** *See* SPIRITUALISM, FETISHISM, SORCERY, AND WITCHCRAFT.

**FIOTE.** A major dialect of Kikongo, spoken by the **Kongo** people of **Kongo Central** and **Congo-Brazzaville**, Fiote evolved as a trade dialect during the colonial era. Sometimes called *Kituba*, it was used by Europeans and came to be considered the “official” Kikongo.

**FISHERIES.** Congo is endowed with extensive fisheries resources, found mostly in the eastern Rift Valley lakes, from **Lake Mweru** in the south to **Lake Albert** in the north, and in the riverine and swamp fisheries of the **Congo River Basin**. Lake Mweru has historically served as an important commercial fishing area because of the strong markets for fish in the nearby copper-belt and southern **mining provinces** of Congo. Fishing has expanded rapidly since the early 1980s, to the extent that it constitutes the most important element of the entire **Haut Katanga** Province. Production for the lake in the recent two decades is estimated to have been about 13,000 metric tons (mt) per year.

Fishing in **Lake Tanganyika** has also intensified considerably since the second half of the 20th century, in association with the dramatic expansion of human **population** and settlements around the lake and the introduction of various technological innovations, such as paraffin oil (kerosene) pressure lamps for night fishing, synthetic netting material, and motorized craft. Lakewide annual harvest levels in the 1990s and early 2000s were estimated to vary in the range of 165,000–200,000 mt.

The third Rift Valley lake is Lake **Kivu**. In the early 1990s, 1,306 active fishing units were reported to operate in Congo’s side of the lake. However, fishing activity has been heavily affected by regional civil turmoil and warfare from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, and harvest levels have fallen off accordingly. The same conclusion can be drawn from both **Lake Edward** and Lake Albert.

The vast Congo River Basin, which includes the **Lualaba** complex and flooded forests in the central basin, also provides an annual catch of more than 120,000 mt. According to the Food Agriculture Organization (FAO), up to 20,000 mt of fish reach markets in Kinshasa every year. Two lakes in the western Congo Basin, **Lake Tumba** and **Lake Mai-Ndombe**, also provide the Congolese with fish. An annual yield has been estimated in the range of 2,000–3,500 mt in Lake Tumba and an annual catch of 4,600 mt in Lake Mai-Ndombe. The final stretch of inland water is located in Kinshasa, called **Malebo Pool**, formed near the Atlantic Ocean at the **Congo River's** mouth. There are 165 species reported in the pool. No recent catch/effort data are available.

Congo has a very small Atlantic Ocean coastline, and marine production is very modest, accounting in the 1990s and early 2000s for an estimated 2 percent of total national fish harvests. Almost all marine production reportedly derives from artisanal units using canoes and beach seines.

Fisheries administration in the country does not exist. Statistical and other information on specific water bodies is either lacking or very outdated. Overall, the responsibility of fisheries management nominally lies with the Service National pour le Développement des Pêches (National Service for Development of Fisheries, SENADEP), under the Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation, and Tourism. Congolese fisheries policy emphasizes the need to increase fish production to provide animal protein for local populations and thus ensure food security. Fisheries administration at all levels has for some years been moribund because of civil strife and national economic collapse.

The first law to regulate the fishing sector was the 1932 decree on Exclusive Fishing Rights. This decree enabled competent authorities to grant exclusive fishing rights in a designated area to any person. The only comprehensive legislation in the post-colonial era was a 1979 decree, amended in 1983, related to fees and license categories. In 1985, a draft law providing a general legal framework for both marine and inland fisheries was devised with the assistance of FAO. It is a comprehensive piece of legislation composed of 70 articles primarily directed at regulating inland fisheries. However, this law has remained in draft form and has never been submitted to parliament.



Although Congo's vast network of lakes and **rivers** endows it with an abundant supply of fish, an important source of protein in the Congolese **diet**, a great deal of fishing remains at the subsistence level or on a small commercial scale. There were some commercial fishing operations by European-owned companies on the Great Lakes, but these virtually disappeared after **Zairianization**. Fuel shortages in the years following **Retrocession** hampered a revival. The Société des Pêcheries Maritimes du Zaïre (PEMARZA) in the 1980s operated a small fleet of fishing boats at the mouth of the Congo River, supplying **Bas-Congo** and the **Kinshasa** area. Since the mid-1990s, no major fishing company has operated in any part of the Congo Basin.

Although it is not possible to evaluate the present state of fisheries resource exploitation on a countrywide basis, imports have consistently figured as a substantial share of the total annual supply of fish and fishery products for human consumption. Thus, for whatever reasons, and even during periods of relative political and economic stability, Congo's capture and culture fisheries sectors have not produced at anywhere near the levels necessary to meet domestic demand.

**FLAG.** In 1885 when King **Leopold II** created **Congo Free State**, he adopted a flag with a yellow star in the middle of a sky-blue background. The star meant civilization whereas the blue represented darkness. The flag was changed under Belgian rule with the addition of six small stars from top down on the left, representing the six provinces of **Belgian Congo**. This flag remained after independence until the promulgation of the **Luluabourg constitution** in August 1964, which changed the name of the country to the **Democratic Republic of Congo** (DRC). The 1964 flag included a star on the left corner and a red ribbon with yellow borders running diagonally across a sky blue background. The blue in the flag symbolized peace, red represented the blood of the DRC's martyrs, yellow was the country's wealth, and the star was a symbol of unity. From 1966 to 1971, **Mobutu Sese Seko** used the same flag but with different meaning: the red symbolized the people's blood, yellow meant prosperity, blue represented hope, and the star symbolized unity. After 1971, Mobutu unveiled a new flag. It was light green, ornamented in the center with a yellow circle in which a right hand was holding a torch with a red flame.

When **Laurent Kabila** became **president**, he restored both the name and the flag of the 1964 constitution. In February 2006, President **Joseph Kabila** promulgated a new constitution that officially adopted the 1964 flag.

**FOOD SUPPLY.** Congo was self-sufficient in food at **independence**.

However, the civil unrest during the 1960s disrupted extension services and harvests while a deteriorating **transportation** sector reduced productivity. New investments in **agriculture** during the period also fell to negligible levels, choking off the establishment of new farms. During the years following the **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu's coup d'état** in 1965, agricultural production grew by 4 percent per year. By the early 1970s, overall production had returned to pre-independence levels. Agriculture was deemed the “priority of priorities” by Mobutu in 1973, and **government** expenditures, traditionally averaging 1.5 percent of total expenditures, were increased for a time. In the late 1970s, growth of food production slowed to a rate of less than 1 percent per year. It rose again following the liberalization of price controls in 1983, averaging an annual growth rate of 3 percent in the 1980s, then declined severely in the 1990s because of **inflation** and shortages of fuel and spare parts.

Production never kept pace with **population** growth, however. As a result, Congo was forced to **import** many food items, ranging from rice and maize to fish, meat, and dairy products. According to official figures, Congo imported an average of \$220 million worth of food per year during the 1970s and 1980s, but this declined to \$100 million in 1992. The amount spent on food imports outside official channels was estimated to be several times the official amount. The country also received food aid from many donors, especially during the **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila** that lasted more than four years.

The development of the food index is illustrative of Congo's dependence on food aid and food imports. Given the base year of 1999–2000 = 100, food production was 122.1 in 1992 and remained on average above 100 from 1993 to 1999. The index began to decline in 2001 and subsequent years, averaging 97 until 2004, according to data from the Food Agriculture Organization. *See also* FOREIGN AID.

**FORCE PUBLIQUE.** The name of the **army** of Congo prior to **independence**. Force Publique was officially mentioned in the decree of 30 October 1885 that defined the structure of government of the **Congo Free State** (CFS). According to this decree, the task of the Force Publique was to ensure the occupation and defense of the colony, to maintain peace and public order, to prevent insurrection, and to overlook and ensure the execution of laws, decrees, ordinances, and rules—especially those relative to the police and general **security**. In addition to other roles of supervising **government** building and construction of **roads**, the army was also designed to preserve the entity of the colonial state. On 5 August 1888, King **Leopold II** passed an ordinance officially creating the Force Publique. The decree also stipulated its organization.

The recruitment of Congolese was a slow and painful process for King Leopold II. In 1885, there were only 10 Congolese serving, with the remainder being non-Congolese Africans from as far away as Liberia. A coercive recruitment system was later imposed on the colonial **administration**. Each year, the governor set the number of recruits and determined for each district the share of recruits to be delivered and localities where the recruitment had to take place. However, by the early 1900s, such coercive measures were no longer necessary because a number of young men had learned the benefits associated with **military** service. It became quite attractive because they were not only fed, clothed, paid, and given land on being mustered out, but they could exploit their position. The royal decree of 20 April 1900 standardized the period of volunteer service as a seven-year tour of active duty. By the time the CFS was annexed to Belgium in 1908, the Force Publique had 18,000 men.

The first sign of its fighting ability was tested against German forces in World War I. Some 18,000 soldiers of the Force Publique attacked German lines in its eastern possessions along the Great Lakes and defeated them in 1916. On 10 May 1919, the colonial administration completely reorganized the Force Publique after its performance in World War I by dividing the colonial army into two groups: *troupes campées* and *troupes en service territorial*. The former received a purely military training to defend national borders, while the latter became a gendarmerie in charge of maintaining law

and order. After another reorganization by ordinances of 28 April 1932 and 29 September 1933 by the general **governor of Belgian Congo**, the army was divided into three *groupements* (groups or military regions), one for two provinces.

The strategic importance of the Great Lakes region in World War II resulted in intense recruitment, and a brigade of the Force Publique participated in the Ethiopia Campaign and another went to Nigeria. After World War II, the Force Publique benefited from a favorable evaluation from the Allies. Moreover, its role in society also became apparent. This disciplined military machine in a stable colony played a major role in the professionalization of thousands of Congolese. A large number of technical schools, such as schools for drivers, carpenters, mechanics, radiotelegraphers, and so forth, were created throughout the country to educate and form soldiers. By 1956, the Force Publique graduated 1,500 specialists in various technical fields.

Despite any advantages, the Force Publique was a repressive force that used police and military operations to subdue natives who were opposed to colonial rule. For example, in 1915 alone, it carried out 21 police operations and nine military operations. The former was to patrol troubled areas to show force, while the latter was to destroy **dissident** groups. Most of these operations aimed to force Africans to pay taxes. Its repressive capability was displayed in 1941, when it was used to subdue a strike in the **Union Minière du Haut Katanga** in **Elisabethville** that ended with 60 people killed by the army. It also played a major role in quelling the riots of 4 January 1959 and in restoring order between the **Luba** and **Lulua** in the region of **Lulua** (now **Kananga**). One major feature of the Force Publique was that it was staffed by Belgian officers. By the time Belgian Congo became independent in June 1960, there were only nine master sergeants, who were promoted adjutants before independence out of some 1,000 officers.

**FORCES ARMÉES CONGOLAISES (FAC).** *See* MILITARY.

**FORCES ARMÉES DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO (FARDC) [ARMED FORCES OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO].** *See* MILITARY.

**FORCES DÉMOCRATIQUES POUR LA LIBÉRATION DU CONGO (FODELICO) [DEMOCRATIC FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF CONGO].** An **opposition** movement founded by **Antoine Gizenga**, the successor to **Patrice Lumumba**. Gizenga announced the creation of FODELICO after going into exile following the end of the 1964 **rebellion**. Gizenga's primary support was said to have come from Marxist and radical nationalist African regimes, but he claimed to be a nonaligned, leftist African patriot. The movement for a time was based in **Congo-Brazzaville**. It faded after Gizenga returned to Congo following political liberalization of **24 April 1990** that lifted the ban on **opposition political parties**. He subsequently emerged as the head of an alliance of Lumumbist parties called the *Parti Lumumbiste Unifié* (PALU).

**FORCES POLITIQUES DU CONCLAVE [POLITICAL FORCES OF THE CONCLAVE].** A coalition formed by **Mobutu Sese Seko** in early 1993 to counter the **opposition** in the **Haut Conseil de la République** (HCR), particularly the hardline **opposition Sacred Union** and centrist **Union pour la République et la Démocratie** (URD). Commonly referred to as the "Conclave," it helped to elect **Faustin Birindwa**, a senior official of the **Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social** (UDPS), as **prime minister**, creating a rival government to that of UDPS leader **Étienne Tshisekedi**. Angered by Mobutu's abandonment of a power-sharing agreement outlined in the **Transitional Act** and the **Compromis Politique Global**, the opposition refused to participate. Western governments also charged Mobutu with undermining the **democratic transition** and adopted a policy of diplomatically isolating his **government** until the election of **Léon Kengo wa Dondo** as prime minister in June 1994.

**FOREIGN AID.** Historically, Congo has been one of the largest recipients of foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa. According to the **World Bank**, Congo received \$931 million, \$1.86 billion, and \$4.6 billion in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, respectively. As a share of **gross domestic product** (GDP), foreign aid represented 2.4 percent, 1.7 percent, and 3.5 percent of GDP in these three decades, respectively. In 1990 alone, the DRC received \$782 million in foreign aid, which represented the highest level of foreign aid in a single year since it be-

came independent in 1960. However, foreign aid declined from \$476 million in 1991 to \$271 million in 1992 because of **human rights** abuses and delays in the **democratic transition**. Although foreign aid declined for a number of years, it remained almost equivalent to 3 percent of GDP from 1990 to 1996 during the last years of **President Mobutu Sese Seko**. Foreign aid declined further and was equal to 2.2 percent of GDP from 1997 to 2000 under President **Laurent Kabila** because of his old Cold War approach, which viewed the West as the causes of Congo's predicament. After his assassination in January 2001, foreign aid increased from 3.9 percent by December of the same year to 7.6 percent in 2002.

After the formation of the transitional government, known in Congo as *1 + 4* (one president and four vice presidents), foreign aid skyrocketed, reaching the unprecedented level of 87.7 percent of GDP (\$5.1 billion) in 2003 as the result of Western support for the transition. Although foreign aid dropped in subsequent years, it remained on average 20 percent of the GDP per year from 2004 to 2006. Primary donors were Western governments, led by the **United States, France, Belgium, Germany, and Great Britain**. Other nations, including the People's Republic of **China, Japan, North Korea, Egypt, and Morocco**, also funded important programs.

**FOREIGN INVESTMENT.** Foreign investment in Congo fluctuated during colonial times with world economic and business cycles and according to policies enacted by the **government** in power at the time. Although these cycles affected foreign direct investments (FDI), political instability has remained a major factor. For example, the stability of the colonial period made **Belgian Congo** an investor's paradise. According to Belgian official documents, foreign investment increased from a mere \$77,000 in 1909 (1959 dollar prices) to \$2 billion by 1959. The **mining** sector received an average of 25 percent of total foreign investments per year from 1909 to 1959 and was second to only the **banking** and insurance sectors, which averaged 36 percent of FDI a year. Political instability during the early 1960s scared investors and caused foreign capital to leave Congo.

However, the rise of **President Mobutu Sese Seko** to power brought confidence to investors after his successful monetary reform of June 1967. Foreign investment reached its peak in the late 1960s

and early 1970s, when foreign banks granted large loans for ambitious infrastructure and industrial development projects based on projected revenues from Congolese mineral **exports**, which at the time were enjoying historically high prices. After the collapse of commodity prices and the subsequent recession in 1975, new investment virtually disappeared despite increasingly attractive terms offered by the Congolese government and a trend toward **privatization** of the **economy**. Following economic and monetary reforms in 1983 and a subsequent stabilization of the **currency**, some foreign investors began to return. Agreements were signed with Japanese and European firms for mining prospection, and international consortia were formed to examine investment in various **industries**.

Foreign investors continued to invest in Congo through the 1980s, but were often discouraged by the need for political connections and by business practices that in their countries were considered unethical or illegal. According to the **World Bank**, foreign investment remained below 1 percent of GDP in the 1980s. With the **democratic transition** beginning in 1990, a period of political uncertainty ensued.

Following the “**pillages**” of 1991 and 1993, large foreign investors absorbed their losses and waited for future possibilities. New investments, however, were put on hold. Following the fall of Mobutu in May 1997, the **Laurent Kabila** government sought to encourage the return of foreign investors, and a number of joint ventures were signed in the subsequent months. Despite a staggering increase of foreign investments to 11 percent of GDP in 1999, investors remained skeptical because of the **civil war**, which started in August 1998. Foreign investment declined to 3.9 percent and 2 percent of the GDP in 2000 and 2001. Prospects for peace and the formation of a transitional government in 2003 increased net foreign investment to 6 percent of GDP. Despite an increase to 10.2 percent of GDP in 2004, foreign investment began another declining trend in 2005. In 2006, it represented only 2.1 percent of GDP.

**FOREIGN RELATIONS.** The **Democratic Republic of Congo** (DRC) has generally pursued a moderate line in foreign policy by trying to avoid involvement in non-African issues. During the Cold War, it followed a foreign policy of nonalignment and maintained

diplomatic relations with such ideologically diverse governments as **Belgium**, **France**, the **United States** (U.S.), **Japan**, North Korea, the People's Republic of **China**, and most East European nations. Relations with its former colonial ruler, Belgium, were periodically strained following **independence**, partly because a number of Congolese **dissidents** against President **Mobutu Sese Seko** were based in Brussels. Nonetheless, Belgium remained a major foreign aid donor. Relations with the **Soviet Union** during this period, however, were generally poor. Congo tended to side with the moderate conservative group of African nations. Radical regimes called it a U.S. puppet, although it often was criticized by the U.S. government for authoritarianism, economic mismanagement, and **human rights** violations.

Relations with French-speaking countries in Central Africa have fluctuated. For example, the Union of Central African States was formed with **Chad** in 1968, and more than 3,000 Congolese troops were sent to Chad in support of President Hissene Habré in 1983. **Burundi** and **Rwanda** also joined Congo (then **Zaire**) in establishing the **Communauté Économique des Pays des Grands Lacs** (CEPGL) for an eventual common market. Relations with its southern neighbor, **Zambia**, remained cordial. In the west, however, border incidents involving **Congo-Brazzaville** periodically erupted in the 1980s. In the east, Congolese troops were given permission by the government of **Uganda** to cross borders to engage rebels associated with the **Mouvement National Congolais** (MNC). The strained relations between pro-Soviet **Angola** and Congo, which reflected Cold War rivalry, ended in August 1978 as the presidents of the two countries signed a cooperation agreement and pledged to establish a commission under the **Organization of African Unity** (OAU, later **African Union**, AU) to guard against any rebel violations from either side of the common border. Despite some U.S. covert operations to facilitate delivery of supplies to the Angolan rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi, the heads of states of Angola, Mozambique, and **Zambia** met in Luanda in 1987 and concluded a declaration of intent to reopen the **Benguela railroad** that had effectively been closed by Angolan guerilla operations since 1976.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the Mobutu **government** saw itself as a regional and subregional leader. It was the first sub-Saharan African nation to break relations with **Israel** following the 1973 war, and it



was the first to reestablish relations in 1982 after Israel completed its withdrawal from **Egypt**'s Sinai Desert. Congo was an early backer of such regional organizations as the **Communauté Économique des Pays de l'Afrique Centrale** (CEPAC) and the Institute for Bantu Studies. It also proposed the creation of an international organization of black African states to supplement the activities of the OAU, which for a time was seen as focusing too much on **Arab** problems. During the 1980s, Congo increased its profile among Africa's Francophone countries, particularly after it hosted the France–African Summit in 1982. In the same year, President Mobutu announced that his government was resuming diplomatic relations with Israel. In response, a number of Arab countries severed relations with Congo. As the result of his relations with Israel, Mobutu secured a military aid commitment in May 1985 during a visit to Israel. In 1986, he resumed his country's participation in the OAU after a two-year hiatus occasioned by the OAU's admission of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). This hiatus was to support **Morocco**, whose government has always claimed that the SADR is part of the Moroccan Kingdom.

With the end of the Cold War, relations with Western nations became strained as their governments increased pressure on Congo for political and economic reforms. Most Western nations cut off nonhumanitarian aid following the massacre by **security** forces of **students** at the **University of Lubumbashi** in May 1990. On 24 September 1991, France and Belgium sent troops to Congo to protect foreigners threatened by widespread rioting and looting. One month later, both countries announced their disengagement from Congo and called for regional intervention. In late November, Washington described Mobutu as having lost the legitimacy to govern and called for the regime to share power with the opposition. When Mobutu dismissed the transitional government of **opposition** leader **Étienne Tshisekedi** in early 1993 and appointed a rival government, three major allies, Belgium, France, and the U.S., adopted a policy of diplomatically isolating the Mobutu government. They withdrew their ambassadors and refused to issue visas to senior Congolese officials. Their support for Tshisekedi cooled by 1994, however, and they switched support to more moderate opposition leaders. They also adopted a policy of accommodation with Mobutu, which, it was hoped, would help

revive the much-delayed **democratic transition**. During this period, Congo's relations continued largely unchanged with Arab, Asian, and South American nations, which espoused a policy of noninterference in its internal affairs.

In the 1990s, African governments tended to avoid official reference to the power struggle between Mobutu and the opposition. Many of them faced similar difficulties, as they struggled with political and economic reforms and shifts in traditional alliances brought on by the new world order. To deal with the opposition, Mobutu used subterfuge reminiscent of his autocratic rule. In February 1994, Amnesty International accused his regime of continued violations of human rights, including indiscriminate executions.

Four months later, eastern Congo was flooded by 1.2 million Hutu **refugees** from Rwanda escaping the new Tutsi led government. On 1 September 1994, the Mobutu government under **Prime Minister Léon Kengo wa Dondo** announced that the Rwandan refugees in Congo would have to leave by the end of the month. This demand provoked renewed dialogue on the refugees' plight and, in late October, Congo, Rwanda, and the **United Nations** High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) signed an agreement designed to facilitate their smooth repatriation. In August 1995, the Congolese government again ordered the expulsion of refugees, citing rumors that both Burundi and Rwanda were preparing to attack the camps to suppress rebel groups. More than 15,000 refugees were forcibly repatriated, while more than 100,000 fled into the countryside and disappeared into the Congolese Hutu population. In February 1996, Congolese troops, under the UNHCR supervision, began sealing off the camps in an effort to isolate them from the local population and urged the refugees to return home. The program was quickly abandoned when troops demanding payment of salary arrears left their posts. While the international community was contemplating a military intervention to avoid mass starvation of refugees, the Rwandan government attacked the refugee camps in October, sending 660,000 Hutu back to Rwanda, while another half million disappeared into the Congo forests. Approximately 233,000 of this group were later killed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army and the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL).

After **Laurent Kabila** became president of Congo in May 1997, his government was accused of having staged the massacre of refugees. After less than two years in power, Kabila confronted a **civil war** that began in early August 1998. From 1998 to 2001, the foreign policy of Congo hinged on the roles its neighbors played on both sides of the civil war. Troops from Angola, Chad, **Namibia**, and **Zimbabwe** supported the Kabila **administration** accused them of invading Congolese territory. A number of African countries also expressed their sympathies with the Congo government, but played no major role in the dispute. On the rebels' side, Rwanda and Uganda provided such a large amount of personnel and supplies that the Kabila **administration** accused them of invading Congolese territory. The United Nations also accused the two countries of illegally exploiting Congolese resources in 1998–2004. Because of the large number of African countries in the civil war, the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Susan Rice, called the war “Africa’s First World War.” Rwanda withdrew its forces in late 2002, but intermittently sent its soldiers abroad to dislodge former Rwandan soldiers who committed the genocide in Rwanda. Uganda also withdrew its forces by May 2003, and the two governments agreed in 2004 to cooperate in suppressing rebel groups on both sides of their joint borders.

In December 2005, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in favor of the DRC in regard to the case the DRC had filed accusing Uganda of an illegal incursion into the DRC during the 1998–2003 civil war and the plunder of Congolese natural resources. The ICJ ordered Uganda to pay reparations to the DRC, although a final amount was not determined. A similar charge was filed against Rwanda, but Rwanda refused to accept the Court’s jurisdiction. Thus, relations with Rwanda remained strained, with Congo charging that Rwanda was still supporting dissident groups in **Nord-Kivu** and **Sud-Kivu** as of late 2008.

The relationship between Congo and the West, especially Belgium, France, and the United States, became critical after the signing of the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI) in late December 2002. In fact, the three countries were involved in all aspects of the transition, including the holding of elections in 2006 and 2007. *See also* CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC; CUBA; EUROPEAN UNION; GREAT

BRITAIN; LIBYA; PORTUGAL; SOUTH AFRICA; SUDAN; TANZANIA; TOGO.

**FORESTS.** More than one-half of Congolese territory, 1.2 million square km, is covered by forests, which contain the world's largest reserves of African hardwoods. The forests dominate the **Congo River Basin** area in the heart of Congo, but can also be found in western **Kongo Central** and the mountainous areas of the **Eastern Highlands**. Exploitation of the forests was centered primarily in Kongo Central, which by 1995 had been heavily deforested, and the most accessible parts of the Congo River Basin. According to government figures, 400,000 cubic meters of **timber** were being cut per year in the 1990s, of which an average of 250,000 cubic meters was exported per year. Production was considered relatively small, contributing less than 0.3 percent of **gross domestic product (GDP)**, and the **industry** was regarded as "underdeveloped." Opening forests to logging makes them vulnerable to increased bush-meat hunting and clearing of mature forests for **agriculture**.

Nonetheless, timber concessions covering one-third of the forests were signed by the early 1990s, leading some environmentalists to classify Congo's great **rainforests** as at risk. A number of projects initiated by the **World Bank** were criticized by activists. The complaints were initially made on 19 November 2005 by an advocacy group, the Organisations des Autochtones Pygmées et Accompagnant les Autochtones Pygmées en République Démocratique du Congo. They related to two bank-financed operations: the Emergency Economic and Social Reunification Support Project and the Transitional Support for Economic Recovery Grant Operation Development Policy Plan. The critics argued that these bank-reform projects had disregarded the rights of millions of forest-dependent people and ignored the existence of between 250,000 and 600,000 pygmies, whose lives depend on the forests. Meanwhile, forests in Kongo Central are being cleared without controls. In late 2007, Global Witness found a "complete absence of meaningful controls, legal ambiguity, and lack of standardized practices leaving the sector in anarchy and providing fertile ground for abuse and fraud." *See also* ECONOMY; ENVIRONMENT; EXTERNAL TRADE.

**FRANC, CONGO.** *See* CURRENCY.

**FRANCE, RELATIONS WITH.** France's interest in Congo dates from the "scramble for Africa" of the 1880s when, following the **Berlin Conference**, the French government sent Count Pierre Savorgnan De Brazza to central Africa on a territory-claiming expedition aimed at countering the expeditions of **Henry Morton Stanley** financed by **Belgium's** King **Leopold II**. The **Belgian Congo's** colonial-era experience was considerably different from that of the French colonies, but, from the late 1950s, it began to develop an affinity with the French colonies and closely followed their affairs. France included Congo in the special relationship it reserved for the Francophone nations of the world and of Africa in particular, and often stated that Congo was the second-largest French-speaking country after France. **Charles de Gaulle's** offer of autonomy to France's African colonies in a speech in **Congo-Brazzaville** in August 1958 was one of several developments that led Africans in the Belgian Congo to begin pressing for **independence**.

Congolese relations with France, although friendly, were relatively underdeveloped in the early years following independence, but increased steadily after the second **Shaba War**, when France sent 700 French paratroopers to **Kolwezi** to help Congolese soldiers drive out guerrillas of the **Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo** (FLNC). Relations grew closer because of Congo's mercurial relations with Belgium and because of France's much greater ability to provide **foreign aid**. The entrance into the French "family" was sealed in October 1982, when Congo hosted the ninth France-African summit in **Kinshasa**.

During the 1980s, relations with the **François Mitterrand** government were initially cool and suspicious, primarily because of the Socialist president's criticism during his campaign of Zaire's close ties with authoritarian regimes in Africa. However, within two years of Mitterrand's inauguration, a policy of pragmatism evolved and Mitterrand mended fences with **Mobutu Sese Seko**. The Socialists began to appreciate the support of moderate African governments for French policies in Africa and their receptive markets for French **exports**. Later, Mobutu and other moderate African leaders would persuade a reluctant French government to send military forces to

**Chad**, exert moderation in the face of the revolution in Burkina Faso, and press for forgiveness of the continent's external **debt**.

Relations began to cool in the 1990s after France started linking aid to political and economic reforms in Africa, a policy formally announced by Mitterrand in a speech to the France–African summit at Le Baule in July 1990. Following the attack on **students** at **Lubumbashi University** in May 1990, France joined the Western cutoff of aid to Congo and later joined Belgium and the **United States** in a pressure group called “the Troika,” which pressed for democratic reforms. Following the “**pillages**” of September 1991, France sent troops to evacuate the estimated 4,000 French expatriates in Kinshasa. During another round of violence and looting in January 1993, French ambassador Philippe Bernard was killed in his office by a stray bullet.

France was Congo's major foreign partner in **telecommunications**. It built the **Voix du Zaïre** complex in Kinshasa, which, when completed in 1976 at a cost of \$1 billion, housed some of the most up-to-date television and **radio** broadcasting equipment in the world. France also funded military equipment and training, humanitarian assistance, and economic development projects. French aid to Congo reached \$189.6 million in 1990, when France replaced Belgium as Congo's largest provider of foreign aid. This foreign aid declined considerably after the massacre of students in Lubumbashi, to \$55.7 million in 1991, and plummeted to its lowest level (\$3.3 million) in 1994. The arrival of **Laurent Kabila** to power saw some improvement in French foreign aid, which increased from \$77.2 million in 1997 to \$377.6 million a year later. However, Kabila's attitude toward the West cooled the relations between the two countries, and French foreign aid declined to \$8.2 million in 2000. The French government also was involved in the **civil war** against Kabila in June 2003 when the **United Nations** Security Council passed Resolution 1484 to deploy a French-led Interim Emergency International Force (IEMF), code-named Operation Artemis, into the eastern town of **Bunia, Ituri Province**. After the signing of the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI) to end the war against Kabila, France increased its financial aid to support the transitional government. Foreign aid reached a record high of \$1.27 billion in 2003, but subsequently declined to

\$134.7 million, \$88 million, and \$57 million in 2004, 2005, and 2006, respectively.

France became a major trading partner in the late 1980s after Belgium, the United States, and Germany. However, it lost ground in the 1990s to **South Africa**, Italy, and **Japan**. In 1994, Congolese **exports** to France totaled \$16 million, mostly **coffee**, cocoa, and **timber**, and **imports** from France totaled \$18.5 million, mostly machinery, vehicles, and consumer items. Congolese exports to France declined substantially in the 2000s, representing only 1.6 percent and 1.2 percent of total exports in 2000 and 2006, respectively. Congolese imports from France also declined from 11.3 percent of total imports in 1990 to 5.5 percent in 2000, but increased again to 10.1 percent of total imports in 2006.

The conflict in **Nord-Kivu** had prompted France to reiterate its support of President **Joseph Kabila**. However, the existence of a “Sarkozy Plan” in early 2009 received a negative reaction in Kinshasa. The daily newspaper *Le Potentiel* of 21 January 2009 quoting *Le Monde* stated that “the plan included three major areas: revisiting borders in the Great Lakes Region, the division of land between Rwanda and Congo, and common exploitation of natural resources in the region.” The Congolese government and its parliament were perplexed by the plan, although the French government denied the existence of such a document.

**FRANCIS, BARON DHANIS (1861–1909).** A Belgian civil servant, the name *Dhanis* is supposed to be a variation of D’Anvers. Having completed his education at the École Militaire, he entered the Belgian army, joining the regiment of grenadiers, in which he rose to the rank of major. As soon as he reached the rank of lieutenant, he volunteered for service in the **Congo Free State**. He fought the **Afro-Arabs** and, in 1896, took command of an expedition to the Upper Nile to occupy the enclave of Lado in **Sudan**. His troops, largely composed of the **Tetela**, mutinied and murdered many of their white officers in what has become known as the Batetela **mutiny**. During the 1897–1898 period, he was constantly engaged in a life-and-death struggle with them. Eventually he succeeded in breaking up the several bands formed by his mutinous soldiers. Baron Dhanis returned to Belgium

in 1899 with the honorary rank of vice governor-general. He died on 13 November 1909.

**FRANCK, LOUIS.** The Belgian minister of colonies in the 1920s, Franck was credited with enacting changes in the colonial administration of Congo following World War I that consolidated the chiefdoms into sectors. The measures Europeanized or de-Africanized the colonial **administration** by separating it from the traditional African political and judicial structures. After 1918, he realigned the Congolese franc to the Belgian franc to encourage **foreign investments**. The result was an increase in private investments from a mere 3.85 million Belgian francs (1959 = 100) (\$77,000) in 1909 to 31.41 billion francs (\$628 million) by 1930.

**FRONT NATIONAL DE LIBÉRATION (FNL) [NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT].** An antigovernment group created in **Congo-Brazzaville** in the late 1960s. It was said to be linked to the **Conseil National de Libération**, which had been formed earlier and was reportedly headed by **Antoine Gizenga**. The FNL was accused of responsibility for alleged plots against the Congolese government in 1970 and 1971. It faded from view in the 1970s with the consolidation of **Mobutu Sese Seko's** power and the warming relations between Congo-Kinshasa and Congo-Brazzaville.

**FRONT POUR LA LIBÉRATION NATIONALE DU CONGO (FLNC) [FRONT FOR THE NATIONAL LIBERATION OF CONGO].** An **opposition** group headed by **Nathaniel Mbumba**, a former member of the **Gendarmerie Katangaise**, which supported the **Katanga secession**. After the secession, a large number of gendarmes were integrated into the national army and others exiled to **Angola**. When **Moïse Tshombe** was appointed **prime minister** in August 1964 to quell the **rebellions**, he hired **mercenaries** and recalled his gendarmerie from Angola. After the **coup d'état** by **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** in November 1965, Tshombe went into exile, and a group of Katangan gendarmes mutinied in **Kisangani** in June 1966. Less than a year after the mutiny, on 5 July 1967, the mercenaries, Katangan gendarmes, and some renegades from the



1964 rebellion revolted against the central government in Kisangani. After 1967, a large number of Katangan gendarmes moved to Angola, where they fought with the Portuguese against guerrillas fighting for Angolan independence. When Angola became independent in late 1975, a number of veterans from the Gendarmerie and a large number of youth refugees from southern Katanga fought with the Angolan government against two rival factions.

The FLNC was best known for launching the **Shaba wars** of 1977 and 1978, which were only repulsed by Congo with the aid of foreign military troops and equipment. The FLNC included younger individuals, primarily of the **Lunda ethnic group**, who resented the imposition of authority from distant **Kinshasa**. The FLNC expressed little ideology or political orientation other than a desire to overthrow Mobutu. The attention it initially received faded considerably after the Shaba incursions, although it was still considered a major opposition group in the mid-1980s. Mbumba returned to Congo after the end of single-party rule in 1990 and was a delegate to the **National Conference**. *See also* CIVIL WARS.

**FRONT SOCIALISTE AFRICAÏN [AFRICAN SOCIALIST FRONT]**. An exiled **opposition** group affiliated with the **Parti Solidaire Africain** (PSA), the Front Socialiste Africain was formed by **Cléophas Kamitatu** in the late 1960s after the end of the eastern **rebellions**. The group disappeared after Kamitatu accepted **Mobutu Sese Seko's amnesty** of 1983 and returned to Congo.

**FULERU**. A small **Bantu ethnic group** living between **Bukavu** and **Uvira** in the **Eastern Highlands**. According to some ethnologists, it was organized into a single political grouping, in contrast with other groups of highland Bantus in the region, which tended to be divided into several political groupings, each with its own king or **chief**. Fulleru chiefs welcomed the **Tutsi** who migrated from **Rwanda** and gave them land in Itombwe area in exchange for annual tribute. Today these Tutsi are called **Banyamulenge**.

**FUNDAMENTAL LAW**. *See* LOI FONDAMENTALE.

**FUNGURUME.** A small town in **Haut-Katanga Province** west of **Likasi** located in an area containing large deposits of high-grade **copper** and **cobalt**. Resources are estimated at 222 million tons grading at 4.59 percent copper and 0.36 percent cobalt and reserves at 93 million tons with the same grading percentage. In 1970, a consortium of British, French, Japanese, and U.S. **mining** companies formed the **Société Minière de Tenke-Fungurume** (SMTF), with 20 percent government participation to exploit these deposits. Low prices for copper and the closure of the **Benguela Railway** in 1974 led to the liquidation of the company in 1984.

In November 1996, a Canadian company announced a joint venture with the **Générale des Carrières et des Mines** (GECAMINES) aimed at resuming production in the area by 2000. The agreement was overtaken by the offensive of anti-**Mobutu Sese Seko** forces a few months later. It was renegotiated following the installation of the **Laurent Kabila government** in May 1997 and was renegotiated again in 1998, when the Kabila government, facing accusations of favoritism, reopened bidding and brought in companies from Europe, **South Africa**, and the **United States**. By 2008, Tenke Mining Corporation, a subsidiary of Phelps Dodge, and GECAMINES owned the **Tenke-Fungurume** copper-cobalt deposits.

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**GARANGANZE (GARENGANZE) KINGDOM.** *See* YEKE KINGDOM.

**GARCIA II (?–1661).** King of the **Kongo Kingdom** from 1641 until his death in 1661, Garcia II ruled over what many historians believe were the twilight years of the kingdom. He faced problems reconciling recently introduced **Christianity** with traditional Kongo religious practices. After his death, war broke out in 1665 between the Kongo and Portuguese-ruled **Angola**, resulting in the defeat of the Kongo and a weakening of allegiance by sub-chiefs in distant parts of the kingdom.

**GBADOLITE.** This is a small town on the **Ubangi River** in the former **Équateur Province**, 400 km upriver from Bangui, the capital of the **Central African Republic**. The **Mobutu Sese Seko** family traces its origins to Gbadolite, although its most famous son, Mobutu, was born and raised in **Lisala**. During the Mobutu years, Gbadolite became a model town, with electricity, paved **roads**, and well-developed **health** and **social care** facilities. It also was home of the shrine to Mobutu's mother, Mama **Yemo Marie-Madeleine**. In 2009, Gbadolite became officially the capital city of **Nord-Ubangi Province**, according to the 2006 **constitution**.

**GBENYE, CHRISTOPHE (1927– ).** Interior minister in the **Patrice Lumumba government** of 1960, Gbenye was a lieutenant of **Antoine Gizenga**, who assumed control of the **Stanleyville** rival government in its brutal, final days; in 1964, he became president of the short-lived **People's Republic of Congo** (not to be confused with the People's Republic of Congo that was established later in **Congo-Brazzaville**). Fearing an offensive by government troops and **mercenaries** in late 1964, Gbenye took hostage the 2,800 Europeans and Americans living in the region. Reports of atrocities led to a Belgian paratroop drop from **United States** military planes on Stanleyville on 24 November 1964. An estimated 10,000 Congolese and 200 foreigners were killed during the final days of the **rebellion**. Gbenye fled to **Uganda** and Europe, but returned to Congo in 1984, following the general **amnesty** law of 1983. In the early 1990s, he headed the Lumumba wing of the **Mouvement National Congolais** (MNC). He retired from politics in the mid-1990s.

**GENDARMERIE KATANGAISE.** A group of well-trained paramilitary units that helped maintain law and order in **Katanga** before **independence**. The Gendarmerie Katangaise, formed primarily of members of the **Lunda ethnic group**, supported the **Katanga secession** in 1960. By mid-1962, the gendarmerie numbered 17,000 troops. After the end of the secession in mid-January 1963, many gendarmes fled to **Angola**. When **Moïse Tshombe** became **prime minister** in August 1964, he recalled his gendarmes to quell the **rebellions**. They remained autonomous, keeping their own military commanders while fighting the rebellions. In late 1965, **Joseph-Dé-**

**siré Mobutu** took power; many of the gendarmes fled to Angola and other units remained in the national army. These gendarmes were implicated in the **mutinies** of the Congolese Army in 1966 and that of a **mercenary**-led revolt that occupied **Bukavu** for 100 days in 1967, in an attempt to return Tshombe to power. The Gendarmerie's leader, Brigadier General **Nathaniel Mbumba**, formed the **Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo** (FLNC) in 1968 in Paris. The Gendarmerie fought for the **Portuguese** colonial authorities against pro-independence guerrillas in Angola in the early 1970s, and following Angola's independence in November 1975, fought with Angolan government troops against opposition guerrillas supported by Congo (then **Zaire**).

A number of veterans of the Gendarmerie Katangaise formed the core of the FLNC who staged the **Shaba Wars** in 1977 and 1978. By 1977, most elements of the FLNC were young refugees from southern Katanga who never participated in the Katanga secession. They were supported by the Angolan government, which was angry at Mobutu's support for Angolan opposition movements. The rapprochement between Congo and Angola following the second Shaba war ended most of the FLNC's troops' activities until 1996, when these troops, called now *tigres* (tigers), supported the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) in its offensive to overthrow Mobutu. Following the fall of Mobutu in May 1997, the tigers became a major force in the government of **Laurent Kabila**.

**GENDARMERIE NATIONALE.** A paramilitary **police** force of 20,000 members formed from the colonial **Troupes en Service Territorial** in 1959. During the years following **independence**, the Gendarmerie was placed administratively in the Defense Ministry, and its commander reported to the **armed forces** chief of staff. On 1 August 1972, **Mobutu Sese Seko** dissolved the National Police, which had been under the Interior Ministry, and its members were absorbed by the Gendarmerie. The decree essentially moved police responsibilities from the Interior to the Defense Ministry (renamed *departments* the following year) and made the commanders of all **security** forces answerable directly to the **president**. In June 1997, one month after the fall of Mobutu, the **Laurent Kabila** government disbanded the

Gendarmerie and, with assistance from **South Africa**, recreated a national police force. *See also* MILITARY.

### **GÉNÉRALE DES CARRIÈRES ET DES MINES (GECAMINES).**

More commonly known by its acronym *GECAMINES*, the Générale des Carrières et des Mines was Congo's largest corporation. GECAMINES traced its origins to 30 October 1906, when it was formed as the **Union Minière du Haut-Katanga** (UMHK) by the **Société Générale de Belgique** (SGB) and the British Tanganyika Concessions, Ltd., to exploit deposits of **copper** and other minerals in southern **Katanga**. The name was changed to *Générale Congolaise des Minerais* (GECOMIN) on 2 January 1967, when the UMHK was nationalized following the refusal by its officers to move company headquarters from Brussels to **Kinshasa**.

Negotiations on compensation took several years, but were resolved for the most part by the early 1970s in an agreement through which a Belgian company, the **Société Générale des Minerais**, assumed responsibility for technical operations in exchange for a portion (about 6 percent) of revenues. In 1971, GECOMIN was renamed *GECAMINES*. The company had a dozen subsidiaries operating several dozen mines and several refineries. Historically, it provided the **government** with one-half of its total revenues and two-thirds of its foreign exchange. The size of the company and its power made it virtually a state-within-a-state, and it dominated the economic affairs of such cities as **Lubumbashi** and **Kolwezi**. From 1975 until the early 1980s, GECAMINES was crippled by low prices for copper and a shortage of foreign exchange and spare parts. In 1976, the **Mobutu Sese Seko government** granted the company the right to use one-half of its foreign exchange earnings to refurbish and modernize its plants. Seven years later, faced with mounting shortages of spare parts and supplies needed for refining, it was granted de facto permission to purchase foreign exchange on the parallel market.

GECAMINES was restructured in 1984, and a great deal of the top-heavy central management was redistributed among three entities: GECAMINES-Exploitation, responsible for the extraction, processing, and transport of the minerals to embarkation points; GECAMINES-Commerciale, charged with marketing the minerals; and GECAMINES-Développement, responsible for developing ag-

**gricultural** and **livestock** units to feed company workers. The three legally and financially independent entities were grouped under GECAMINES-Holding. At its peak in 1984, GECAMINES produced 560,000 tons of copper, making it the seventh-largest producer in the world, and 18,000 tons of **cobalt**, 50 percent of world production of that element. It also produced 70,000 tons of **zinc** in raw and semi-refined form, 1.2 million ounces of **silver**, 80,000 ounces of **gold**, and 300 tons of cadmium. The company employed 33,500 persons, of which fewer than 300 were expatriate technicians. Revenues exceeded \$1 billion in 1984.

From the mid-1980s, GECAMINES began a slow decline. Production of all minerals except cobalt fell during the late 1980s, although the workforce increased to 37,000. Receipts were often diverted to government coffers in Kinshasa or to private bank accounts in Europe. Equipment and physical plant deteriorated. The political infighting in Kinshasa following the advent of multipartyism in April 1990 accelerated this decline. During the civil unrest and “**pillages**” of September 1991, equipment was looted and expatriate technicians were evacuated. Copper production declined from 339,000 tons in 1990 to an estimated 40,000 tons in 1995, the lowest level of production since 1960. Moreover, copper production plummeted in 2000 to 21,000 tons. Despite an increase in production to 59,800 tons in 2003 and 92,000 tons in 2005, copper production remained far below its earlier levels. Zinc production, in decline since the 1980s, rebounded briefly in 1990 to 134,000 tons, but declined again to 42,000 in 1991. Production of zinc was only 1,147 tons in 1997. This trend continued, with GECAMINES producing only 215 tons in 2000. By 2005, production of zinc was 15,000 tons. Cobalt, which had remained at relatively high levels during the 1980s, began to fall, from 39,000 tons in 1990 to an estimated 3,000 tons in 1994. Cobalt production remained below 5,000 tons until 1999, then jumped to more than 10,000 tons thereafter. By 2005, production of cobalt was 22,000 tons.

By 1995, GECAMINES was considered insolvent. Several **South African** firms expressed an interest in reviving the enterprise. On 30 November 1996, the Switzerland-based Group Lundin announced that an agreement had been signed between GECAMINES and its Canadian affiliate, Eurocan Consolidated Ventures, to resume production at **Tenke-Fungurume** in southern Katanga. Under the

agreement, GECAMINES would own 45 percent of the venture, which planned to produce 100,000 tons of copper and 8,000 tons of cobalt by 2000. However, the agreement was undermined by **civil wars** against Mobutu in late 1996 and **Laurent Kabila** in late 1998. After the second civil war, Tenke-Fungurume is partly owned by Phelps Dodge and GECAMINES. *See also* MINING; SOCIÉTÉ ZAÏROISE DE COMMERCIALISATION DES MINÉRAIS (SO-ZACOM).

**GIZENGA, ANTOINE (1925– )**. Born on 5 October 1925, Gizenga was president of **Parti Solidaire Africain** and joined the coalition with the **Mouvement National Congolais** (MNC) in early 1960. He became vice prime minister in the **Patrice Lumumba government** of 1960 and chief lieutenant of Lumumba's wing of the MNC. Gizenga was dismissed along with Lumumba by **President Joseph Kasavubu** on 5 September 1960. Gizenga left for **Stanleyville** on 13 November to form a rival central government. Lumumba was captured and subsequently assassinated while trying to join him. This assassination caused an outcry among many nations of the "Afro-Arab" and Soviet blocs.

Following negotiations with the **Leopoldville** government, Gizenga agreed in 1961 to participate in a federally structured central government. He was made first vice **prime minister** of **Cyrille Adoula's** government of reconciliation. He was arrested on 16 January 1962, with support from the **United Nations** (UN), and was imprisoned on Bula-Bemba Island at the mouth of the **Congo River**. When **Moïse Tshombe** became prime minister in July 1964, he released Gizenga, but placed him under house arrest in October. He was freed by **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** following the **coup d'état** in November 1965. Gizenga was rumored to be involved in the **Congo-Brazzaville-based Front National de Libération**. In the early 1970s, he formed the **Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (FODELICO) in exile.

In 1977, Mobutu invited him to return to Congo to oppose him in **elections**, which Gizenga declined. Nevertheless, he did return after the **democratic transition** was announced in 1990 and, by 1993, had brought together a number of Lumumbist parties under the **Parti Lumumbiste Unifié** (PALU). In July 1995, 10 people were killed when

**security** forces broke up an unauthorized protest march by PALU in **Kinshasa**. Gizenga was arrested, and his home was looted following the incident. He was released five days later.

Following the fall of Mobutu in May 1997 and the installation of the government of **Laurent Kabila**, who had also been a Lumumba supporter, Gizenga and PALU remained in the opposition, and PALU marches on several occasions were harshly put down by security forces. Gizenga was the PALU presidential candidate in the July 2006 elections. He came in third with 13.06 percent of the vote, after **Joseph Kabila** and **Jean-Pierre Bemba**. On 30 September 2006, Gizenga signed a coalition agreement with the **Alliance de la Majorité Présidentielle** (AMP), Kabila's platform, whereby he would back Kabila in the second round of the presidential election in October 2006, in exchange for the premiership. Kabila won the election and was sworn in as president on 6 December 2006. He subsequently appointed Gizenga as "Informant," a position that involved identifying a parliamentary majority so that a government can be formed, and then nominated Gizenga as prime minister on 30 December 2006. Gizenga's first government was announced on 5 February 2007. A new government was announced on 25 November 2007, with its size reduced to 44 ministers.

On 25 September 2008, Gizenga submitted his resignation as prime minister to Kabila. Later in the day, he said that he had decided to resign because of his advanced age. According to Gizenga, he felt unable to continue in office. For the **opposition**, however, Gizenga's resignation constituted an admission of failure and negligence from a government that, after nearly two years, left the country in a general state of disarray. The governing coalition, the AMP, remained in place after Gizenga's resignation, and negotiations were held regarding the selection of his successor. The successor, **Adolphe Muzito**, was appointed by Kabila on 10 October 2008.

**GOLD.** The search for gold was one of the main reasons for the exploration of the interior of Congo, particularly **Katanga**, by Europeans. However, explorers found none and so turned to trading in **ivory** and **slaves**. Gold was discovered in 1903 near **Bunia**, in the **Ituri**, and later in northern **Kivu**.



Official production of gold peaked in the 1930s and 1940s at 16,000 kg per year, and fell thereafter, reaching 958 kg in 1983. That year, the Congolese **government** legalized artisanal **mining** and, in 1985, launched a large-scale reinvestment program. In 1988, it awarded contracts to rehabilitate two mines to a Brazilian and a British firm. Official production rose to 2,000 kg in 1988, but declined to less than 100 kg by 1993.

The major gold mining operation was the **Office des Mines d'Or de Kilo-Moto** (OKIMO), nationalized in 1973, which worked alluvial and underground deposits in an 83,000-square-km concession in the Ituri area. Two other companies were also involved in gold production, primarily in Katanga Province: the **Générale des Carrières et des Mines** (GECAMINES) and the **Société Minière et Industrielle du Kivu** (SOMINKI). A fourth, Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières (BRGM), of mixed private and state ownership, in 1985 undertook feasibility studies of two sites in **Haut-Congo** but production never began.

Historically, a great deal of Congo's gold was lost to **smuggling** out of the country, most often through east Africa. During the 1970s, for example, **Uganda** became a major exporter of gold, although it produced none. In the mid-1990s, Kenya became an exporter, although it, too, had no gold mines. Official gold production declined substantially in the 1990s, to represent a mere 150 kg by 1998. By 2000, gold production was only 66 kg. A year later, production increased to 6,018 kg, and in 2002 it was 7,498 kg. Since 2003, gold production has fluctuated but remained above 3,900 kg per year.

**GOMA.** The capital of **Nord-Kivu Province**, Goma is a city on the northern shore of **Lake Kivu**, with a population of 200,000 people. The history of Goma has been dominated from 1994 to 2008 by several major events. First was the genocide in **Rwanda** and its aftermath. In response to the genocide, the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front took power in Rwanda, forcing 1.2 million **Hutu** to flee to Congo. This massive influx caused a severe humanitarian crisis because of an acute lack of food, shelter, and water. Shortly after the arrival of **refugees** in Goma, a deadly cholera outbreak claimed 50,000 lives in the Hutu refugee camps. World attention was subsequently riveted on Goma, as relief agencies tried to distribute emergency aid flown in

by troops from donor nations. The presence of officers and soldiers from the deposed Rwandan government and members of militias that had carried out mass killings of 500,000 people in Rwanda created considerable insecurity in the region. In August 1995, the Congolese government announced it would expel the refugees because the local populations could no longer support the strain. It relented under international pressure, but **security** in the area deteriorated because of attacks by Rwandan militias based in the refugee camps against installations in Rwanda. Rwandan forces stormed the refugee camps in Goma, resulting in thousands of deaths and many refugees going back to Rwanda.

In October 1996, rebels of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) launched an offensive in the region. They drove the Rwandan militias deeper into the interior and, over the next seven months, moved west, taking **Kinshasa** on 17 May 1997. Goma was seized on 2 August 1998 by rebels of the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD), the first victory of its drive to unseat **Laurent Kabila**. The **civil war** against Kabila was unprecedented in Africa for the loss of civilian life in massacres and atrocities.

Another event was the eruption of Nyiragongo volcano in January 2002 in Goma. It sent a stream of lava 200 m to 1 km wide and up to 2 m deep through the center of the city as far as the lake shore. Agencies monitoring the volcano were able to give warning, and most of the population of Goma evacuated to Gisenyi, Rwanda. The lava destroyed 40 percent of the city, more than 4,500 houses and buildings. The lava also covered over the northern 1 km of the 3-km runway international airport. By late 2008, the lava had yet to be removed in many parts of town, including the airport. *See also* SECOND CONGO WAR.

**GOVERNMENT.** Over the years, Congo has seen a variety of governmental systems, ranging from monarchy and dictatorship to parliamentary and highly centralized presidential systems. A tendency toward authoritarianism was a major characteristic of virtually all of these. After the partition of Africa at the **Berlin Conference** of 1885, Congo was recognized as a sovereign territory of King **Leopold II** and was ruled by him for 23 years as the **Congo Free State**. The

king continued **trade** patterns set centuries earlier by European and **Afro–Arab** traders. Nevertheless, the excesses of his rule caused the Belgian parliament to annex the territory in 1908 and ushered in the colonial era, during which the king exercised considerable authority, but the colony was officially administered by a colonial **governor** appointed by the parliament.

With **independence** in 1960, Congo adopted a bicameral parliamentary system that considerably diluted executive powers and left unclear how power was to be shared by the **president** and **prime minister**. The goal of the system was to provide checks and balances and prevent abuses. However, it led to confusion and a series of confrontations between the president and prime minister. When the authority of the central government broke down following independence, a variety of federal and confederal systems were contemplated, and the first **constitution**, promulgated in 1964, granted considerable autonomy to provincial governments. Following the **military coup d'état** in 1965, Congo entered a period during which power gradually became concentrated in the presidency.

In the 1980s, the president enjoyed broad powers of decree and controlled virtually all aspects of **security**, legislation, economic policy, and the **judicial system**. Congo (then **Zaire**) evolved into a party-state, modeled on the Chinese system. The concept of **chief-taincy** was also retained, and a personality cult developed around President **Mobutu Sese Seko** and his family. Multiple candidacies within the ruling **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) party were allowed during the 1980s, but control over the process was retained by the president and party hierarchy.

Under the third **constitution**, promulgated in 1974, the party was the supreme body of state and sole legal party, to which all citizens automatically belonged from birth to death. There were seven basic organs of state: the president, who was the center for decisions and control of the activities of the MPR and who presided over all of the state organs; the **Political Bureau** of the party, which was the central policy and decision-making organ; the **Central Committee** of the party, which was the major forum for debate and discussion of ideas emanating from the Political Bureau; the Congress of the Party, which was the broad-based forum for consultations with party members; the **Legislative Council**, or legislature, which essentially was a

consultative body; the **Executive Council**, which was the equivalent of a ministerial cabinet; and the Council of the Judiciary, which grouped the senior judges and members of the Supreme Court.

A system for political succession in the case of the president's death existed but was never tested. Under the constitution, in the absence or incapacitation of the president, the dean of the MPR Central Committee would assume the presidency for a period of 30–60 days, during which time the Political Bureau would organize elections and choose the party's candidate for president.

Administratively, Congo was organized into 10 **provinces** (called *regions* from 1972 to 1997) and the autonomous capital district. The provinces were divided into districts (called *subregions* from 1972 to 1997), urban and rural, and the rural districts were divided into zones.

The judicial system consisted of five levels of courts. Independence of the judiciary was guaranteed by the constitution, but was weakened considerably because of the omnipotence of the party and president.

The system of government began to change on **24 April 1990**, when Mobutu declared the birth of the Third Republic and announced the launch of a one-year transition to a multiparty system. He initially said that two other **political parties** would be allowed (later, he amended it to allow an unlimited number of parties) and that he was lifting restrictions on public gatherings and the print news **media**. Until then, calling for a second party was a treasonous offense punishable by death. All aspects of the constitution and government continued in effect unless specifically repealed or amended.

The following years were characterized by political jousting between an **opposition** convinced that real **democracy** could only be achieved with the removal of Mobutu, and the president, who was determined to stay on at all costs. The opposition used popular and international pressure to seek concessions from the president, while Mobutu utilized parliamentary maneuvers, his patronage powers, and force when necessary to keep the opposition on the defensive. As a result, government was largely paralyzed during the 1990s, while a fractious **National Conference** struggled to draft a constitution (which was eventually rejected by the president). The authority of the central state decayed, and the formal **economy** was shaken by

hyperinflation and recession. Although the government continued to be recognized internationally, the government commanded little authority or popular respect at home.

In August 1996, the transitional parliament, which had emerged following years of bickering, drafted a constitution calling for a **federal** system and renaming **Zaire** the ***Federal Republic of Congo***. National **elections** were scheduled for May and June 1997. However, the process was slowed by political infighting and Mobutu's deteriorating health. In October 1996, the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) launched an offensive in eastern Congo that led to the exile of Mobutu in May 1997 and the installation of **Laurent Kabila** as president. At his inauguration on 29 May, Kabila pledged to hold national elections in 1999. He sought to revive the **administration** of government and promised to pay salary arrears of **civil servants**. Elections never occurred as Kabila faced a **civil war** in August 1998. Kabila was assassinated in January 2001 and was succeeded by his son, **Joseph Kabila**. One year later, the belligerents signed the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en Démocratie République du Congo** (AGI) that resulted in the government of transition, known in Congo as 1 + 4 formula, meaning the president and four vice presidents. The transition lasted from mid-2003 to mid-2006. Elections were held in late 2006, and Joseph Kabila was elected president in the second round of presidential elections.

However, without a majority in the parliament, Kabila had to build a coalition with a number of political parties, from which **Antoine Gizenga** was named prime minister. In late 2008, Gizenga resigned and was replaced by **Adolphe Muzito**. According to the 2005 constitution promulgated in February 2006, Congo is a semifederal republic with a semipresidential system composed of 25 provinces and the federal city of Kinshasa. The provincial administrative units are called *territories*. *See also* DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION; MOBUTISM.

**GOVERNORS, COLONIAL.** The governors of the **Belgian Congo** (gouverneur general) were appointed by the government of **Belgium**. Although they were responsible to the king and Belgian parliament, they exercised considerable individual power because of the distance and slowness of communications between **Leopoldville** and Brus-

sels. The governors implemented the colonial era policy of **pater-  
nalism**, which included isolating Congolese from other Africans  
and preventing the formation of political organizations. The last  
colonial governors were: Eugène Jungers (1946–52), Léon Pétillon  
(1952–58), and Hendrik Cornelis (1958–60).

**GREAT BRITAIN, RELATIONS WITH.** Great Britain was one of  
the first European nations in the 1800s to become interested in central  
Africa and its commercial possibilities. The British government and  
British associations financed numerous expeditions by **explorers**, par-  
ticularly of the eastern Congo and **Congo River**. British firms **traded**  
for a time with merchants in Congo, but, following the **Berlin Con-  
ference** of 1885, they focused increasingly on British colonies. Britain  
was in the forefront of the **antislavery** movement and led the inter-  
national outcry against the harsh **labor** practices of the **Congo Free  
State**. It was the first European power to grant **independence** to its  
African colonies, beginning with Ghana in 1957. In the 1990s, Great  
Britain had fewer economic and social ties with Congo than other  
industrialized nations, such as **Belgium**, the **United States**, **France**,  
West Germany, **Japan**, and Italy. However, relations were cordial  
despite British concern over mismanagement, authoritarianism, and  
**human rights** abuses during the **Mobutu Sese Seko** regime. Rela-  
tions remained normal even after **Laurent Kabila** became president.  
During the **civil war** against him, Great Britain pushed for dialogue  
and peaceful solutions to the conflict. Great Britain was a major trade  
partner of Congo in the 1970s, importing 7 percent of Congolese ex-  
ports. The same can be said of Congolese imports from Great Britain.  
However, trade declined in the 1980s and 1990s to the extent that,  
by the 2000s, trade between the two countries represented less than 1  
percent of total trade. Great Britain provided the transitional govern-  
ment \$542 million, which represented about 5 percent of total foreign  
aid from 2003 to 2006. In early February 2006, Great Britain gave \$75  
million in humanitarian aid to Congo in response to an appeal by the  
**United Nations** for \$500 million to end the forgotten crisis before it  
held **elections**. *See also* RHODES, CECIL.

**GREAT CITY OF THE KING.** *See* MBANZA KONGO DIA NTO-  
TILA.

**GREAT LAKES REGION.** The area around the lakes of the **Great Rift Valley** that forms Congo's border with **Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania**. They include **Lake Albert, Lake Edward, Lake Kivu, and Lake Tanganyika**. The term is also used in a wider sense to extend to all Kenya and Tanzania, but not usually as far as **Zambia**, Malawi, and Mozambique, nor as far north as Ethiopia, although these four countries border one of the Great Lakes. Because of the density of population and the agricultural surplus in the region as a result of the rich volcanic soil, the area became highly organized into a number of small states or principalities before the advent of colonial rule.

In September 1976, Burundi and Rwanda joined Congo in forming the **Communauté Économique des Pays des Grands Lacs** (CEPGL), an economic **trade** zone with its headquarters in Gisenyi, Rwanda. Although seen as a region with great potential after independence, in the 1990s the region has been marred by **civil wars** and conflict, from which only Tanzania was largely spared. The region was destabilized in the mid-1990s by interethnic violence in Rwanda and Burundi, which spread into eastern Congo and continued after the fall of **Mobutu Sese Seko** in 1997. The worst-affected areas have been left in great poverty and destitution.

**GREAT RIFT VALLEY.** A geographical fault that divides east Africa from the rest of the continent. The western edge of the rift, characterized by rugged mountain ranges and deep lakes, lies in eastern Congo.

**GROUP OF THIRTEEN PARLIAMENTARIANS [GROUPE DES TREIZE PARLEMENTAIRES].** This group of 13 members of **parliament** published a 52-page open letter to **Mobutu Sese Seko** on 1 November 1980, listing numerous abuses of power under the single-party system and calling for the creation of a multiparty **democracy**. In 1982, members of the group founded an **opposition** party, the **Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social** (UDPS), which under the **constitution** of 1974 was considered an act of treason. As a result, members of the group, who included **Étienne Tshisekedi, Joseph Ngalula, and Gabriel Kyungu wa Kumwanza**, were convicted of conspiracy in 1983 and sentenced to prison terms

ranging from 15 years to life in prison. They were later pardoned but continued their activities and were frequently subjected to various forms of detention. In the 1980s, the parliamentarians, mostly from **Shaba** and **Kasai Regions**, were the most prominent internal **dissidents** in Congo. Following the announcement of multipartyism on **24 April 1990**, they were freed. The UDPS was one of the first parties to be registered after multipartyism was formalized in November, and it quickly became a leading opposition party and pillar of the **Sacred Union** alliance. *See also* DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION.

**GULF OIL ZAÏRE.** This company was part of a consortium led by Gulf Oil (called Chevron–Gulf after the purchase of Gulf Oil by Chevron in 1984) with participation by the Congolese **government**, Japan Petroleum, and the Belgian **Société du Littoral Zaïrois**. The consortium engaged in offshore **petroleum** production near the mouth of the **Congo River**, beginning in 1975. Production averaged 17,000 barrels per day in the 1970s, but rose to 25,000 in the late 1980s and 30,000 in 1995. The crude extracted was too heavy for the country's sole refinery and was exported.

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**HAMED, BIN MUHAMMED EL-MURJEBI.** *See* TIPPO TIP.

**HAMMARSKJÖLD, DAG (1905–1961).** A Swedish national, Hammarskjöld was secretary-general of the **United Nations** (UN) from 11 April 1953 until his death, on 18 September 1961, in an airplane crash while en route to Ndola, Northern Rhodesia (now **Zambia**), in an attempt to mediate an end to the **Katanga secession**. The cause of the plane crash was never fully determined. It could have been accidental, but anti-UN sentiments were high in the seceded Katangan **government**, which had a small air force. The people of southern Katanga were bitter over the armed intervention by UN troops in the area and the attempts to expel Belgian advisors and **mercenaries** from the territory. As a result, many UN officials believed the plane crashed either after being hit or while being harassed by a Katangan fighter plane that was reported in the air over the region that day.



In 1992, the British newspaper *The Guardian* published a letter by C. O'Brien and G. Smith stating that Hammarskjöld's plane was shot down by mercenaries employed by Americans and Europeans who owned the Katanga copper mines and who sponsored the Katangan secession because they feared that the left-leaning government of the newly independent Congo would threaten their holdings.

**HASSAN II (1929–1999).** The king of **Morocco** who maintained close relations with the **Mobutu Sese Seko government** virtually since it came to power. Morocco sent 1,500 troops to help the national army to repel the first **Shaba War** in 1977. They returned in 1978 following the second Shaba incursion and remained for several months, forming the backbone of an **Organization of African Unity (OAU)** peacekeeping force deployed until Congolese troops could be retrained and reorganized. The Mobutu government consistently supported Morocco's claim to the Western Sahara. When the Polisario Front's Saharan Republic, which was fighting Morocco for control of the former Spanish territory, was admitted to the OAU in 1984, Morocco left the organization. Congo, in a show of support, suspended its participation for two years, the only member to do so. The friendship between Hassan and Mobutu remained strong. When Mobutu fled Congo in May 1997, he was granted asylum in Morocco, where he died on 7 September. The relations with Morocco after Mobutu remained cold, although Morocco kept its embassy in **Kinshasa**. Morocco was part of the **Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (MONUC)**. Hassan II died in 23 July 1999 and was succeeded by his son Mohammed VI.

**HAUT CONSEIL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE/PARLEMENT DE LA TRANSITION (HCR/PT) [HIGH COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC/PARLIAMENT OF THE TRANSITION].** A 780-member provisional **legislature** established in September 1993 to end a stand-off between pro-**Mobutu Sese Seko** forces and the **opposition**. The agreement merged the **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)** and the **Legislative Council**. The former was viewed as controlled by the opposition, while the latter was elected under single-party rule and was controlled by Mobutu. The transition quickly entered another standoff in January 1994, when the HCR/PT failed to reconfirm

opposition leader **Étienne Tshisekedi** as **prime minister**. He was elected to the post by the HCR in August 1992, but was dismissed by Mobutu the following year. On 14 June 1994, the HCR/PT instead elected a centrist candidate, **Léon Kengo wa Dondo**.

The hardline opposition, known as the ***Sacred Union***, called the vote illegal and boycotted the Kengo government. In July 1995, the Sacred Union representatives allied with pro-Mobutu delegates to oust the president of the HCR/PT, **Laurent Monsengwo**. The body subsequently was governed by two vice presidents, one from the Sacred Union and one from the pro-Mobutu camp, called the ***Forces Politiques du Conclave***. The HCR/PT appointed an **electoral commission** and drafted a **constitution** to be submitted to a popular referendum prior to national **elections** scheduled for May and June 1997. However, its work was overtaken by the offensive of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL), which overthrew Mobutu in May 1997 and brought the government of **Laurent Kabila** to power.

**HAUT-KATANGA PROVINCE.** Known as *South Katanga*, Haut-Katanga became a province in February 2009 as the result of the 2006 **constitution** that increased the number of provinces from 10 to 25. The capital of the province is **Lubumbashi**. The area was home of the government of the **Katanga secession** from 11 July 1960 to 14 January 1963. Haut-Katanga includes seven territories: Kambove, Kasenga, Kipushi, Mutshatsha, Mitwaba, Pweto, and Sakania.

**HAUT LOMAMI PROVINCE.** A new province established in February 2009 as the result of the 2006 **constitution**. The capital of Haut Lomami is **Kamina**.

**HAUT-UELE.** A remote former district of **Orientale Province** in the northeastern corner of Congo, Haut-Uele's main economic activities include **agriculture** and some **mining** of iron ore and **gold**. Its major exportable product is **palm oil**. It is linked to the rest of the country by the **Ubangi** and **Uele Rivers**, navigable only part of the year, and a small-gauge **railway**. As a result, traditional trading patterns are with southern **Sudan** and the **Central African Republic**. One of the most sparsely populated regions in the country, Haut-Uele, north

of the Uele River, had an estimated 2 million inhabitants in 2005 (1,063,202 in 1982). Haut-Uele became a province in 2009, according to the 2006 **constitution**, with Isiro as its capital city.

**HAUT-ZAÏRE.** The name given to the former northeastern **Orientale Province** in 1971. The provincial capital, **Stanleyville**, was renamed **Kisangani** in 1966. “Orientale” was restored after the fall of **Mobutu Sese Seko** in 1997. The **constitution** promulgated in February 2006 divided **Orientale Province** into four provinces: **Bas-Uele**, **Ituri**, **Haut-Uele**, and **Tshopo**.

**HEALERS, TRADITIONAL.** Traditional healing, not to be confused with sorcery and witchcraft, is a profession that has gained respect and legitimacy in modern Africa and other parts of the world. The Congo **government** supports the scientific study of herbs, plants, and methods used by traditional healers. Scientific testing has proven some traditional plants and herbs to be effective against malaria, amebic dysentery, infections, and parasites. Traditional healers have also successfully performed a variety of surgical operations under clinical scrutiny using traditional instruments with little or no medication or anesthesia. As a result, members of the international medical community, including the World Health Organization, support scientific study of healers and their methods. *See also* HEALTH CARE.

**HEALTH CARE.** In the 1950s, Congo had the best health care system in sub-Saharan Africa. A survey by the European Economic Community indicated that, by 1958, the colonial medical infrastructure in the **Belgian Congo** was “the best in Tropical Africa.” In 1959, a year before **independence**, each of the 135 territories in the Belgian Congo, with 50,000 to 150,000 inhabitants, had a rural medico-surgical center, a surgical section, a maternity ward, and a prenatal and infant welfare advice center; each medico-surgical center was also served by two Western doctors, one of whom was responsible for visiting rural dispensaries that were scattered across each territory. Moreover, in 1959, the Belgian Congo had 3,041 hospitals equipped with 86,599 beds, representing an average of 64 hospital beds for 10,000 inhabitants; the medical staff consisted of 5,663 Africans and 2,722 non-Africans, including 703 doctors (an average of 5.2 doctors

for 100,000 inhabitants); a total of 525,200 persons received hospital treatment during that year. In late 2008, Congo had only a handful of operational hospitals, mostly located in **Kinshasa, Lubumbashi**, and a few other cities.

Public health care in Congo is relatively poor. The deterioration of the health care system started in the mid-1970s as the result of incoherent policies. In the mid-1990s, less than 20 percent of the **population** had access to health services, according to **United Nations (UN)** figures. In the 2000s, there was one hospital bed for every 10,000 persons. However, the statistics are misleading. Because of a lack of supplies, families of patients usually were obligated to furnish virtually all medicine, bandages, and surgical material, and to pay hospital staff for routine care. The public health system was dysfunctional as of late 2008. Besides the lack of supplies, poorly paid staff members were often absent, obliged by financial hardship to engage in commerce or other money-making activities outside their jobs.

Historically, the **government** allocated 2 to 3 percent of its total budget to health care, but in the 1990s, this figure declined to less than 1 percent. At this time, government expenditures on health care averaged only \$1 per person. Approximately one-tenth of children under one year of age receive the four major immunizations (against polio, diphtheria, tuberculosis, and measles) and up to one-half receive at least one of them. A great deal of health care is supplied by religious missions and, during emergencies, by foreign relief agencies. Some large commercial enterprises provide health care facilities for their employees. Members of the general public use private clinics or traditional methods when they can afford them. The wealthy go abroad for treatment.

Disease accounts for one-half of the deaths in Congo and is an important factor in the low national life expectancy rate of 50 years in 2006 and high infant mortality rate of more than 170 per thousand for children under five years of age. Major diseases are malaria, measles, many forms of diarrhea, diphtheria, pertussis, poliomyelitis, tuberculosis, gonorrhea, trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness), onchocerciasis (river blindness), schistosomiasis, and leprosy. To the list of major diseases has been added **acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)**, which has attained pandemic proportions in the cities. Studies in the 1980s revealed that 5–15 percent of the urban

population and up to 30 percent of prostitutes carried the virus, for which a cure has yet to be found. In addition, outbreaks of rare but deadly diseases, such as **Ebola** fever in 1976, 1995, 2001/2002, and 2008; Lassa fever in the 1980s; and monkey pox in 1996, have received widespread international attention.

The worst health situation occurred during the **civil war** against **President Laurent Kabila**, from 1998 to late 2003. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) attempted a few surveys during the conflict. Their latest survey covers up to April 2007 and was released in early 2008. According to the IRC, since the war started in 1998, 5.4 million people died in the conflict against Kabila, a war that was the world's deadliest conflict since World War II. Moreover, the vast majority actually died from nonviolent causes, such as malaria, diarrhea, pneumonia, and malnutrition, which are typically preventable in normal circumstances, but have come about because of the conflict. Although 19 percent of the population perished, children accounted for 47 percent of the deaths. Furthermore, more than 45,000 persons died each month during the war. *See also* HEALERS.

**HEMA.** The Hema people are an ethnic group with about 160,000 members located in **Ituri Province**. The Hema consist of southern Hema or Nyoro (or Banyoro) and northern Hema or Gegere (Bagegere). The former are mostly pastoralist, but the latter are a mix of traders and pastoralists. The Hema were the last group to move into the Ituri area in the 19th century, in search of pasture land for their cattle. Some relocated along the western bank of **Lake Albert** and became associated with the **Lendu**. These Hema are known as the *Gegere*. They intermarried with their neighbors, the Lendu, and speak the Kilendu language. However, another group of the Hema, the Nyoro, pushed the Lendu farther north, thus delimiting their own land without mixing with the Lendu. They possessed their own land distinct from that of the Lendu. In 1999, preferential treatment given to the Hema by **Ugandan** officials during the civil war against **Laurent Kabila** had been blamed for igniting the **Ituri conflict** in which more than 100,000 people died.

**HEMBA.** A cluster of **ethnic groups** that lives in the savanna area straddling former **Katanga** and **Kasai Provinces**. A matrilineal

group that is related to the **Luba**, the Hemba reside along the **Lualaba River** near Kongolo, Kasongo, and Manono. A Hemba Kingdom once flourished in the highlands and might have formed part of the Luba empire or might have been an offshoot of it. The kingdom came to an end before the 20th century.

**“HIBOUX, LES” [“THE OWLS”].** A shadowy paramilitary group that engaged in nocturnal terrorist acts against **opposition** leaders and their supporters during the first half of the 1990s. *Les Hiboux* were heavily armed and traveled in unregistered, expensive all-terrain vehicles, leading to the belief that they were sponsored by the **military** and supported by powerful elements in the **government**.

**HUMAN RIGHTS.** In 1885, the **Congo Free State (CFS)** became a private property of King **Leopold II** of Belgium. As a constitutional monarch, he was unable to obtain public funds to launch his colonial enterprise. In a sense, the CFS had to pay for its own colonization, but most of Congo’s present-day wealth was unavailable; the few resources immediately available to the king included **ivory** and wild **rubber**. To force Congolese to collect them, he signed a decree in December 1892 that instructed his secretary of state to “take whatever steps he may deem necessary or practical to assure the exploitation of the private domain.”

To carry out his adventure, Leopold II needed cheap or free labor. In the absence of a monetary economy, Congolese had to pay their tax either in tradable goods or in forced labor. Each village had to bring in a certain number of kilograms (kg) of raw rubber or ivory to the king’s agents or risk punishment. As each village exhausted nearby supplies of latex-bearing plants, villagers ranged farther and farther into the forests. Similarly, as each village killed off nearby elephants, men had to hunt farther afield. At the end, the expanding areas overlapped, resulting in a fierce competition for the small amount of remaining ivory or rubber. Punishment escalated as villages failed to meet their quotas. Millions of Congolese were either killed by Leopold’s agents or died from forced labor, mutilations, or cutting off hands by these agents, and from inhumane conditions suffered while gathering wild rubber or hunting elephants.

Congolese also had to transport on their heads loads of ivory, rubber, and other goods varying in size from 25 to 35 kg. Children were also involved in carrying loads of 10 kg. This transportation system, called *portage*, was a task that tested the mettle of the strongest men, many of whom died on the path, leaving thousands of skeletons along the way. According to Selwyn James, the greedy behavior of Leopold II “reduced the native population of Congo from between 20 million and 40 million to 8.5 million in 1911.”

Both external and internal pressures forced Leopold to officially cede his property to Belgium in November 1908. Some of the abuses associated with the CFS were abolished. However, the so-called reforms, although meritorious, never brought about a complete reversal of policy. The original pillars of the CFS continued in one form or another because all were based on the assumption that “Congo had inexhaustible supplies of ivory and rubber.” The same coercive system continued under Belgian rule. Resistance emerged almost everywhere in the **Belgian Congo**. Colonial rulers responded to any revolt by military operations that destroyed village after village, including not only men but also women and children. For example, in 1921 alone, 21 military operations were carried out in Belgian Congo. The colonial coercive apparatus began loosening up in the mid-1950s.

On 30 June 1960, Belgian Congo became independent. Less than two weeks later, the **Katanga Province** seceded. However, a large portion of the province inhabited by the **Luba** (Baluba) of Katanga, called *Balubakat*, opposed the secession. In October 1960, the leaders of Balubakat proclaimed the autonomous province of Lualaba. From the declaration of insurrection in early October 1960 to late 1961, the seceded government of Katanga massacred in reprisal more than 40,000 Luba who had opposed the secession. The national army also massacred hundreds of Luba of Kasai in August 1960.

The **United Nations** (UN) defeated the Katangan secession in January 1963. As the UN withdrew, new warfare emerged in western and eastern Congo. A **rebellion** led by **Pierre Mulele** broke out in January 1964 in **Kwilu** province. A few months later, another rebellion started in eastern Congo by **Gaston Soumialot**. In the second half of 1964, the eastern rebellion succeeded in eliminating **government** authority from the northeastern part of the country to North Katanga and very nearly toppled the national political structure.

On 9 August 1964, **President Joseph Kasavubu** removed **Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula**, who had been in office since August 1961, and appointed **Moïse Tshombe** as prime minister in order to quell the rebellions. Tshombe called his former Katanga soldiers back from **Angola** and also recruited white **mercenaries** to reinforce a flagging national army. Because mercenaries and the Congolese army were not known for their scrupulousness, uncounted civilians were killed as the eastern rebellion was pushed back.

The use of terror and violence as a deterrent was widespread and extensive during the rebellions. Public executions systematically eliminated most educated Congolese who were thought to have sold out Congo to the West. More specifically, the rebels killed 30,000 to 40,000 public servants and intellectuals accused of being Western puppets and enemies of the people. Other casualties included indirect deaths and women victimized by the war. Accounts of rebellions reveal the frequency of rapes in both rebel- and government-controlled areas. Rebel groups also targeted **Catholic** priests and nuns. A number of them were killed, and many nuns were raped before being killed, including Sister **Nengapeta Anuarite Marie Clémentine**, who was beatified by Pope **John Paul II** in August 1985.

By the end of December 1965, the Kwilu rebellion was over. The eastern rebellion continued afterward, but was weak enough by 1 July 1966 to pose no major threat to the central government. In total, the two rebellions caused the loss of more than 55,000 lives.

General **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** seized power in November 1965. Less than six months later, in May 1966, he sent a strong message that **opposition** would not be tolerated by publicly hanging four former cabinet members before 50,000 spectators. Under President Mobutu, the government of Congo (then **Zaire**) signed the **African Charter of Human and People's Rights** and the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Guarantees of individual freedoms and rights were also enshrined in its **constitution**. However, the government was on numerous occasions severely criticized by human rights organizations and foreign governments for human rights violations. These violations included summary execution, detention of political opponents without charge, disappearance of political **dissidents**, torture and inhumane conditions in prisons, and the existence of secret detention camps. One such center was



in Ikefa. It was a secret concentration camp located in the forest of the former **Équateur Province**. According to human rights organizations, it was built primarily to hold political dissidents, many of whom disappeared or were killed. Human rights advocates also accused the government of failing to guarantee a free and independent **judicial system** and of harassing opposition news **media**.

A number of international human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch, had, since the 1980s, provided evidence of frequent abuses of human rights under President Mobutu, including detaining, torturing, and killing political opponents as well as ordinary criminals. The government usually denied these charges and often blamed them on information that was outdated or obtained from dissidents trying to discredit it. For a brief period in the 1980s, it appeared more contrite. At a public meeting on 2 November 1986, following a month-long meeting of the **Central Committee** of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR), Mobutu acknowledged some human rights abuses had occurred. He said steps were being taken to address the problem and announced the creation of the post of State Commissioner for Citizens' Rights and Liberties. However, human rights organizations contended that despite these developments, the abuses did not stop. The post was abolished a few years later in an austerity reform.

With the advent of multipartyism in April 1990, violence and terrorism were frequently used to intimidate the opposition and press as well as instill fear in the **population**. Beginning in 1990, the government officially tolerated the activities of major Congolese human rights organizations, of which there were three: the Ligue Zaïroise des Droits de l'Homme (Zairian League of Human Rights), the Association Zaïroise de Défense des Droits de l'Homme (Zairian Association for the Defense of Human Rights), and the **Voix des Sans-Voix pour les Droits de l'Homme** (Voice of the Voiceless for Human Rights). The government, however, did not allow international human rights organizations to visit, and rejected their reports as attempts to destabilize the country. This did not prevent activists from issuing frequent and detailed reports on abuses committed under the Mobutu regime, charges that were supported by the UN Commission on Human Rights, the **European Union**, the **United States**

(U.S.) State Department, and the governments of **Belgium, France, Germany, and several Scandinavian countries.**

In the early 1990s, the Congolese government maintained that AI delegates could visit anytime they wished. However, the organization acknowledged that its investigators were prevented from traveling to Congo by diplomatic and bureaucratic obstacles. In a report issued on 16 September 1993, AI said, “Zaire is undergoing its worst human rights crisis since the end of the civil war in the early 1960s. The crisis has been marked by the ruthless brutality of government security forces . . . who have murdered or tortured thousands of civilians and members of the peaceful political opposition.” The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in 1990 published a comprehensive summary of the abuses in a 200-page volume, *Zaire: Repression as Policy*. Another prominent group, Human Rights Watch, published several reports in the early 1990s on prison conditions, violence against Luba in **Shaba**, and efforts to subvert the **democratic transition**.

Religious organizations also spoke out. In 1992, the Washington Office on Africa, affiliated with the U.S. National Council of Churches, issued a report, *Zaire Held Hostage*, in which it detailed 38 incidents or periods of abuse since 1964, as reported by a variety of human rights investigators. According to the document, nearly 3,000 people were killed or died in detention under the Mobutu government. The figures did not include the period during the rebellions of the 1960s, when **security** forces backed by foreign mercenaries massacred thousands of civilians believed to support the rebels. Nor did it include incidents of “**ethnic cleansing**” in Shaba, **Nord-Kivu**, and **Bandundu**, beginning in 1992, in which thousands of people were killed and hundreds of thousands driven from their homes and jobs. In its 1995 annual report on Congo, AI stated that hundreds of civilians had been extrajudicially executed by soldiers, many political opponents and hundreds of soldiers suspected of disloyalty had been detained without trial, scores of dissidents had “disappeared,” and torture and ill-treatment of prisoners were widespread. Tolls in many incidents were higher than actually reported because families of the victims were afraid to speak out for fear of reprisals. The government frequently defended the actions of its security forces, arguing that they were seeking to prevent violence and to preserve

law and order. No public investigation of any allegation of abuse was carried out, and if any members of the security forces were ever punished for their actions, it was in secret.

The human rights situation in eastern Congo deteriorated severely in 1995 as the result of **Hutu refugees** from **Rwanda** who arrived there in mid-1994. Attacks by Rwandan militia based in the refugee camps brought retaliation from local groups who, backed by neighboring countries, formed the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL). The AFDL launched an offensive that, in May 1997, brought the overthrow of Mobutu and the installation of the **Laurent Kabila** government. In 1997, AI helped publicize reports of massacres of 233,000 Hutu refugees from Rwanda by the **Tutsi**-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Army during the AFDL's offensive beginning in October 1996. These were serious charges against the Kabila government. For months, Kabila blocked travel to the region by UN investigators, leading to threats of international economic sanctions and a cutoff of reconstruction aid.

The Kabila government also came under criticism for banning meetings and demonstrations by **political parties** and for detaining and harassing independent journalists and church leaders. In January 1998, the government began publicly executing criminals and, by March, had put a total of 60 people to death in **Goma**, **Bukavu**, **Kinshasa**, and **Lubumbashi**. Human rights organizations expressed concerns that most of those executed were civilians and that their trials were before **military** tribunals. However, the Kabila government responded that they were repeat offenders of whom an example had to be made to curb rampant criminality in the country.

Congolese critics expressed the fear that the struggle to oust Mobutu had merely served to replace one harsh dictatorship with another. When a **Second Congo War** in less than two years began on 2 August 1998, abuses became more generalized. Human rights organizations reported numerous attacks against ethnic Tutsi, sometimes by members of the civilian population, and widespread atrocities by the military against civilians caught in zones of conflict. From the beginning of the civil war against Kabila to the signing of the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI) in late December 2002, human rights abuses had been committed by rebel groups and government troops.

Another constant was the use of children. Large numbers of children (some as young as 10) were recruited to serve as fighters in eastern Congo. Conscripting children into armed forces, rebel armies, or using them to participate actively in hostilities is recognized as a war crime under international humanitarian law. Other abuses committed during the civil war included maiming of children, abduction of children, and attacks on schools and hospitals.

**Women** were also victims of the conflict. Hundreds of thousands of women and girls were raped by soldiers, rebels, and ethnic militias. Survivors of rape gave accounts of villages subjected to repeated assaults in which many women and girls were serially raped and husbands killed. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported that in **Sud-Kivu** alone 42,000 women were treated in health clinics for serious sexual assaults in the second half of 2005. In 2007, human rights groups stated that many women appearing in clinics in eastern Congo reported having been so sadistically attacked, butchered by bayonets and internally assaulted with chunks of wood that their reproductive and digestive systems were beyond repair.

The UN further reported that in 2007 one of the newest groups in eastern Congo, called *Rastas*, was spreading fear. A mysterious gang of dreadlocked fugitives who lived deep in the forest were notorious for burning babies, kidnapping women, and literally chopping up anyone who got in their way. The *Rastas* were once part of the Hutu military who fled Rwanda after committing the 1994 genocide.

The civil war against Kabila remained the worst in the history of post-independent Congo. Although rape has always been a weapon of war, a number of researchers fear that the Congolese situation has metamorphosed into a wider social phenomenon. Attacks on women and children in Congo went on despite the presence of the largest UN peacekeeping force in the world, with more than 17,000 troops in 2007.

The **Joseph Kabila** government also has its share of human rights abuses. A 96-page report published by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in late 2008 titled “We Will Crush You,” provides stories and cases of killings, detentions without trials, and extrajudicial killings by the government of Joseph Kabila from 2006 to 2007. His government was accused of killing 500 political opponents in those years. HRW also reported the detention of more than 1,000, and claimed that

many of these had been tortured. The brutal repression began during the 2006 **elections**. Kabila seemed to set the tone and direction of the abuse by giving orders to “crush” or “neutralize” the “enemies of democracy.”

**HUNDE.** The Hunde ethnic group originated in Bunyoro, **Uganda**, between the 11th and 12th centuries. They migrated into their present space, Masisi in **Nord-Kivu**, through Bwito in northern Rutshuru. They are linguistically similar to the **Shi** group of **Sud-Kivu**. Four independent principalities co-existed for centuries in Masisi: Bunyungu, Kishali, Bafumando, and Bugado. Royal succession was not automatic as it was in most interlacustrine principalities. Although the *mwami* (prince or chief) was both temporal and spiritual leader, his power was, in reality, limited by that of the inner council, which could depose the king or prince and even kill him for succession. The group subdued easily to colonial rule.

In 1936, Albert Kalinda, a Hunde chief, agreed to receive Rwandan migrants into Masisi and signed a contract with both Rwandan and Colonial authorities to provide land to Rwandan migrants, both **Hutu** and **Tutsi**, who were settled in Gishari. Over time, these migrants came to consider themselves owners of the land although customary law meant that, as migrants, they had no right to own land. Moreover, as these migrants became the majority in Masisi, conflicts arose in 1964 and the 1990s between Hunde and the migrants, known as *Banyarwanda*. In 1993, the clashes began after local politicians urged the Hunde and **Nyanga** to exterminate the Banyarwanda, who had immigrated during the **colonial era** but, for the most part, had never been granted full citizenship. The conflict was officially ended in 1994, but the Hunde continued to clash with Tutsi elements from **Rwanda**. The Tutsi joined the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) in late 1996 in order to oust **Mobutu Sese Seko**. In August 1998, the **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila** was dominated by Congolese of Rwandan origin. **Laurent Nkunda**, who had opposed the government of the Third Republic after free elections, is a son of migrants from Rwanda in the early 1960s. His major concern was to protect Tutsi from another genocide.

**HUTU.** A socio-ethnic group that lives in Burundi, **Rwanda**, and eastern Congo. The Hutu are agriculturalists and seem to have occupied today's Rutshuru territory, **Nord-Kivu Province**, in two waves. According to a number of historians, the first wave occurred around 1,000 A.D. and consisted of migrations from **Uganda**. The second group migrated from Rwanda several centuries later, following two routes to escape the despotic rule of the Rwandan king (*mwami*). The first route was through Bufumbira and Mulera for those who relocated in Jomba; the second route was through Bugoyi for the Hutu who inhabited Gisigari.

The other group in Rutshuru is the **Tutsi**. Their presence in the area goes back to the 19th century. They migrated from Rwanda rather than from Uganda. Although they are predominantly herders of large livestock, they were also farmers in pre-colonial Rutshuru. Both the Hutu and Tutsi of Rutshuru prefer to call themselves *Banyabwisha* to distinguish their identity from later Rwandan migrants.

Another group of Hutu is located in the Masisi territory in Nord-Kivu. This group migrated into the area between 1937 and 1955 as the result of labor shortages in the **Belgian Congo**. The colonial administration of Kivu, Rwandan authorities, and the Kivu Committee signed an agreement that created the Immigration Mission of the Banyarwanda (Mission d'Immigration des Banyarwanda, MIB). The act of land cession was signed in 1936 by the colonial administration and a Hunde chief in Masisi Territory, Albert Kalinda, who received 29,600 Belgian francs in compensation for 350 square km of land (19.5 km × 18 km) in Gishari to host the first group of Rwandan migrants in 1937. From 1937 to 1945, 25,000 Rwandan Hutu moved to Gishari.

In the late 1940s, a major famine swept Rwanda, resulting in more migrations of Rwandans into Congo between 1949 and 1955. Thus, 60,000 additional Rwandan immigrants moved to the hills of Masisi. The new migrants could not be accommodated in the 350 square km allocated to them by the 1936 contract, so they were moved deep into the Hunde zone of Washali-Mokoto. In addition to these early organized migrations, Belgian rulers recruited 80,000 Rwandans to work on Congolese plantations and in the mines. As migrants moved into the Nord-Kivu district, they became a distinct group of people. The

original inhabitants of Rutshuru, known as *Banyabwisha*, slowly began taking on a different identity as the number of migrants from Rwanda increased in the 1950s. By 1960, they were all called *Banyarwanda*.

The third wave of approximately 60,000 Rwandan migrants were Tutsi **refugees** fleeing the Hutu taking power in Rwanda in 1959. By the early 1960s, people in Nord-Kivu began calling Rwandan migrants *déplacés*, meaning “displaced.” The third wave also included a large number of refugees who migrated into the area after 1960.

Resentment against the Hutu in Nord-Kivu began in 1962 when their elite refused to be part of Nord-Kivu province and requested a referendum to attach the area where most of them live, Rutshuru and Goma territories in Nord-Kivu, to Kivu Central (today’s **Sud-Kivu**). The referendum, organized in 1965, ended by attaching both territories to Nord-Kivu. Since then, the **nationality** of Banyarwanda has remained a hot issue in Nord-Kivu.

However, the conflict in Rwanda in 1994 spilled over into Congo. A civil war and inflammatory rhetoric in Rwanda, inspired in no small part by the advent of multiparty politics, led to the massacre of an estimated 500,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu in 1994 following the death of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana in a suspicious airplane accident. The advance of Tutsi-led rebels of the Rwandese Patriotic Front caused 1.2 million Rwandan Hutu, including officials, soldiers, and supporters of the former Habyarimana government to flee to eastern Congo in June 1994. In several weeks, they created some of the largest refugee camps in the world, primarily around **Goma, Bukavu**, and Uvira. The situation caused insecurity in Nord-Kivu, which, for a number of years, had been experiencing conflict between indigenous groups and Banyarwanda immigrants who had arrived from Rwanda decades before.

The violence was responsible in part for the formation of the AFDL, which, backed by Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, launched an offensive that toppled the Mobutu government in 1997. During the offensive, AFDL troops reportedly massacred thousands of Hutu refugees, leading to international condemnation and the threat of international sanctions against the new government. *See also* BAN-YAMULENGE; ETHNIC CLEANSING.

**HYPERINFLATION.** *See* INFLATION.

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**IDIOFA.** A small town of about 57,000 inhabitants in the **Kwilu Province**, Idiofa is located 100 km east of **Kikwit** between the **Kasai** and **Kwilu Rivers**. The area was a center of **opposition** to the central **government** in the 1960s and 1970s. An uprising in January 1978 was harshly put down by government troops. According to **human rights** groups, as many as 2,000 people were killed and 14 local **chiefs** were publicly executed.

**IDJWI ISLAND.** Idjwi is an island in **Lake Kivu** that measures 40 km in length with an area of 285 square km. It is the second-largest island in Africa after Ukerewe Island in Lake Victoria, and the tenth largest in the world. Idjwi belongs to the **Democratic Republic of Congo** (DRC). In 2005, the island was estimated to have a population of 180,000 Congolese and 50,000 Rwandan refugees. This is a massive increase from the estimated population of 50,000 in 1983. Rapid population growth, a declining economy, and a deteriorating environment have already converged to produce significant malnutrition in this isolated community, which mostly depends on subsistence agriculture.

**ILEBO.** A **river port** town of 73,900 inhabitants, as of 2006, formerly called *Port Francqui*, the town lies on the **Kasai River** near its confluence with the **Sankuru River**. The most important port in the region, it is also a major link to **Katanga**. Goods arriving by riverboat from **Kinshasa** are transferred to a **railway** line that travels through **Kamina** and **Likasi** to the **mining** centers of **Lubumbashi** and **Kolwezi**. It forms an important link in the **National Way**, by which a large portion of Congo's minerals are **exported**.

**ILEO, JOSEPH (ca. 1922–1994).** A political leader active in the **independence** movement and **government**, who was considered one of the grand old men of Congolese politics. Ileo headed the editorial committee of the *Conscience Africaine* newspaper that, in 1956, published the first known public demand by Congolese for political liberalization. Elected to **parliament** at independence, Ileo was considered a moderate pro-Belgian leader. Following the dismissal



of **Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba** on 5 September 1960, **President Joseph Kasavubu** named Ileo to form a new government. However, his government was not approved by the parliament, which backed Lumumba. Ileo tried a second time, but that government was “neutralized” by **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** on 14 September 1960 and replaced by the **College of Commissioners** on 29 September. The College was dissolved in January 1961 and on 6 February 1961, Ileo became prime minister at the head of a provisional government. However, he was unable to draw the major secessionist leaders into his government and stepped down on 1 August 1961 to allow the formation of the **Cyrille Adoula** government of reconciliation. He served in the Adoula government as information minister and, following the end of the **Katanga secession**, as minister of Katangan affairs. During the 1970s and 1980s, Ileo was a member of the **Political Bureau** and **Central Committee** of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR).

Following Mobutu’s announcement of the transition to multipartyism in 1990, Ileo formed the **Parti Démocrate et Social Chrétien** (PDSC). It allied with the **Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social** (UDPS) led by **Étienne Tshisekedi**, and the **Union des Fédéralistes et des Républicains Indépendants** (UFERI) led by **Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond** to form the **Sacred Union**, which eventually attracted more than 200 **opposition** parties. Although he was considered more moderate than Tshisekedi, Ileo, like Tshisekedi, resisted Mobutu’s attempts to woo him away from the Sacred Union, unlike Nguza, who was expelled from the Sacred Union after he accepted the post of prime minister in November 1991. Ileo was nominated vice president of the **Conférence Nationale Souveraine** (CNS) and later the **Haut Conseil de la République** (HCR). He died on 19 September 1994, at a clinic in Brussels at an age reported to be between 72 and 75 years. **Boboliko Lokonga** was elected president of the PDSC and assumed Ileo’s post in the HCR.

**IMMATRICULÉS.** Congolese who served in the **military**, **missions**, **industry**, and other colonial institutions. Unlike the term “*évolués*,” which carried primarily socio-economic connotations, the *immatriculés* benefited from a legal distinction accorded by the Immatriculation Decree of 1952. The decree gave them the same legal

status as Europeans and recognized them as special Africans whose children would lead future generations of Congolese, eventually to **independence**.

**IMPORTS.** *See* EXTERNAL TRADE.

**INDEPENDENCE.** *See* 30 JUNE 1960.

**INDUSTRY.** In the early years of the colonial era, few attempts were made to establish manufacturing industries because the colonial focus was on extraction of mineral and **agricultural** products. At the turn of the 20th century, some factories were established to produce beer, cement, **cloth**, soap, and **sugar**. Thus, the industrialization process of Congo started in the early 1920s. The greatest expansion began following World War II, using capital-intensive methods and expatriate management and technicians. Plants were constructed in a number of urban areas to process flour, sugar, vegetable oil, margarine, **fish**, leather goods, tobacco, chemicals, paint, **palm oil**, and **timber** products. By the mid-1950s, the percentage of imported capital and consumer manufactured goods covered by local production was on average 29 percent. However, 44 percent of imported consumer goods were covered by local manufacturing production. Since the colonial period, the manufacturing sector has historically accounted for 10 percent or less of total **gross domestic product** (GDP), most of it concentrated in **Kinshasa**, as well as in **Katanga** and **Bas Congo Provinces**. The sector primarily produces goods for local consumption, including processed foods, textiles, beer, soaps, sugar, and tobacco products. A foundry and shipbuilding enterprise was also set up in Kinshasa.

At **independence**, Congo was meeting nearly one-half of its domestic needs for manufactured goods, which accounted for nearly 10 percent of GDP. Production declined following independence because of political unrest, but regained pre-independence levels by the late 1960s. An investment code passed in 1969 allowed equal benefits for local and foreign investors.

However, the **Zairianization**, in 1973, of all foreign-owned private enterprises with gross revenues of more than 1 million **zaïres** (\$2 million) caused foreign investors to withdraw and production

to decline. **Retrocession**, announced one year later, returned partial ownership to private owners, but many foreign investors chose not to return. The fall in **copper** prices and foreign **debt** repayment problems subsequently sent the **economy** into a recession that caused domestic demand to fall. A shortage of foreign exchange also hurt production.

Despite Zairianization, efforts to launch heavier industries, such as auto assembly, tire manufacturing, and metallurgy were made. A motor vehicle–assembly plant, tire-manufacturing plant, and steel mill were brought on line in the mid-1970s. For example, General Motors–Zaire, which was jointly owned by the **United States** (U.S.) General Motors Corporation and the **government**, was established in Kinshasa to assemble cars and trucks. Production began in 1975 with a capacity of 4,000 vehicles. A consortium was formed in the 1970s to construct an aluminum complex. A subsidiary of the U.S. Good-year company, Goodyear–Zaire, also produced tires for automobiles, trucks, and bicycles at plants in Kinshasa and **Kisangani**.

During the economic recession of the 1970s and 1980s, production of General Motors averaged 10–25 percent of capacity. Like many industries, production was hindered in the late 1970s and 1980s by low demand and a shortage of foreign exchange needed to **import** equipment and materials. Production rarely exceeded 20 percent of capacity. However, these plants could not respond to economic decline. General Motors sold the enterprise to a group of Congolese businessmen in 1987. Production was irregular in the 1990s. Good-year also sold its operation to a group of local businessmen in 1987. Plans to revitalize industries were put on hold “indefinitely” in the 1980s because of continuing depressed prices on the world market.

By the early 1980s, many plants, with the exception of those in the food-processing area, were operating at 10–25 percent of capacity because of shortages of raw materials, spare parts, and fuel. In the mid-1980s, production, although still well below capacity, began to increase, primarily because of the stabilization of the **currency** and an infusion of foreign exchange from international lenders. During this period, most factories were producing at an estimated 10 percent of capacity and many **foreign investors** had sold out.

Despite substantial investment, however, most private foreign companies never produced at more than 30 percent of capacity because

of weak markets, heavy government controls, poor **transportation** networks, and a lack of foreign exchange for fuel and spare parts. During the pillages of 1991 and 1993, many plants were stripped bare and closed for a number of years. Some in consumer-oriented industries reopened relatively quickly, but continuing political uncertainties slowed the capital investment needed for solid revival. As a result, industrial contribution to GDP was negligible after the 1990s as the result of **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila**. The value-added of the manufacturing sector, which represented 11.3 percent of GDP in 1980, was only 4.8 percent in 2000, but it slightly increased in 2006 to 6.8 percent of GDP.

Small-scale companies, frequently in the informal sector and usually employing less than a dozen workers, continue to operate, making clothes, furniture, jewelry, and crafts. These are frequently subjected to extortion by **security** forces and attacks by bandits. *See also* NATIONALIZATION; PRIVATIZATION.

**INFLATION.** Inflation, a constant problem, began to accelerate in the late 1970s, reaching 101 percent in 1979. It was reduced considerably in the mid-1980s, reaching 23.8 percent in 1985, through austerity measures. However, it began to rise again in 1986 and increased by 81.3 percent in 1990. Rapid expansion of the money supply in the early 1990s led to several years of uncontrolled inflation. For example, the price level increased from 81 percent in 1990 to a then record high of 2,154 percent in 1991. The financing of government budgets through money printing only accelerated inflationary pressures. The price level jumped to 4,129 percent in 1992, declined slightly in 1993 and skyrocketed a year later to a staggering 23,773 percent. **Laurent Kabila** was able to keep prices under control. Thus, inflation averaged 266 percent per year between 1997 and 2000 with a low of 29 percent in 1998 and a high of 550 percent in 2000. With some economic improvement in 2002, inflation remained relatively low compared to previous years, averaging 19 percent per year between 2002 and 2006, reaching a high of 21.3 percent in 2006.

**INGA HYDROELECTRIC COMPLEX.** Congo's major hydroelectric complex, named after a nearby village located on the **Congo**

**River** 40 km upriver from **Matadi**. The complex is located on a stretch of the river that falls 100 meters in less than 2 km, creating 50,000 megawatts (MW) of hydroelectric potential. A bend in the river allows for construction of dams in stages without diverting the river. Studies for an **electrical power** plant were made in the 1950s, but work did not begin until 1968. The first phase of the complex, Inga I, containing six turbines generating 58 MW each, was completed in 1972. Inga II, containing eight turbines generating 175 MW each, was completed in 1982 with participation by **United States**, West German, French, and Italian companies. Construction of the **Inga-Shaba power line** allowed the transmission of up to 560 MW to **Shaba** beginning in 1983. As of 2008, construction of Inga III is not envisioned in the near future because a great deal of the 1,750-MW capacity of the first two phases is still not being used. Still, the potential of the complex continues to attract the attention of economic planners and **foreign investors**. *See* ENERGY.

**INGA-SHABA POWER LINE.** One of the world's longest, direct-current, high-tension power transmission lines, the Inga-Shaba Power Line was capable of carrying up to 560 megawatts (MW) of direct current across 1,750 km of Congolese savanna, mountain, and **rainforest** from the **Inga hydroelectric complex**, near **Matadi**, to **Haut Katanga** and **Lualaba Provinces**, where it ties into a grid powering the region's **mining** installations. The line was built at a cost of \$1 billion between 1973 and 1983. Construction was hindered by logistical problems, a lack of infrastructure, two rebel attacks in the **Shaba Wars**, and considerable cost overruns. Its two lines, each with three strands of wire, required the construction of 8,500 steel pylons, 8,000 km of permanent and temporary **roads**, and 2,000 permanent and temporary bridges. It also required the construction of special railroad cars and **river** barges to transport material and, at its peak, a fleet of six planes and two helicopters. Built by the Idaho-based Morrison-Knudsen company with large portions of work contracted to French and Italian companies, the line was completed in July 1983 and inaugurated by **Mobutu Sese Seko** on 24 November 1983.

The project was criticized from the beginning as costly and unnecessary because studies had revealed that the shortage of **electrical power** in southeastern Congo mining areas could be resolved by con-

structing several medium-sized hydroelectric plants on local rivers. The project was also criticized because initially it did not provide electricity to any areas along the way.

By the mid-1990s, lack of maintenance and a shortage of foreign exchange for spare parts had taken its toll on the line, and it was reported on a number of occasions to be out of commission. When it was functioning, it transmitted power at one-fourth of capacity. Nevertheless, the potential exists for more efficient use of the line.

The **Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)** announced in 1995 that it would include Congo in its plans to develop a region-wide electrical grid in southern Africa. A study was also made to construct a 500-MW power transmission line from Shaba 5,400 km to Aswan, **Egypt**. The government was seeking financing to build converter stations along the line to provide electrical power to cities in former **Bandundu** and **Kasai provinces**.

## INSURRECTIONS. *See* CIVIL WARS.

**INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.** The first intelligence service in Congo was called *Sûreté Nationale* (National Security). It was established by the **Belgian** colonial administration *originally* to watch potential troublemakers and was retained following **independence** as part of the Interior Ministry to control immigration, supervise resident aliens, and protect key **government** figures. The organization was transferred to the Office of the **President** shortly after **Mobutu Sese Seko** took power in 1965.

Headed by **Victor Nendaka** until 1965 and **Singa Boyembe Mosambayi** until 1969, it was feared by Mobutu until 1969, when he was able to install his allies in a reorganization during which it was renamed the *Centre National de Documentation* (CND). In 1975, all intelligence services were reorganized into internal and external sections, named the *Centre National de Renseignements et d'Investigation* (CNRI) and *Service National d'Intelligence* (SNI), respectively. In the early 1980s, the service was renamed the *Agence Nationale de Documentation* (AND). The agency was one of several intelligence services endowed with its own network of informants and **communications**. Its agents reportedly enjoyed special detention

authority and answered directly to the president. It was renamed the *Service National d'Intelligence et de Protection* (SNIP) in August 1990.

**Military** intelligence was furnished by the Service d'Action et de Renseignements Militaire (SARM). The Agence Nationale d'Immigration (ANI) was responsible for border security. The Garde Civile and **Gendarmerie Nationale** also had intelligence units. A shadowy unit called *Les Hiboux* ("The Owls"), reportedly related to the military, appeared in 1990 and engaged in kidnappings and terrorist acts against the **opposition**.

Under Mobutu, SNIP was credited with foiling at least a half-dozen **coup** attempts. Secretive and feared, SNIP used a large network of informers and its own, separate communications system to monitor the activities of **dissidents** and potential challenges to the authority of the president. In 1997, SNIP underwent a major reorganization, and its name was changed to the *Agence Nationale des Renseignements* (ANR), following the fall of Mobutu and the takeover by forces under **Laurent Kabila**. President Kabila created the ANR in May 1997 as an intelligence service of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL). His chairman, Georges Leta Mangasa, was accused of being among the 135 persons to have organized the assassination of Laurent Kabila in January 2001. He was sentenced to death with 115 other persons on 17 October 2002. The agency has been criticized by **human rights** organizations for its numerous human rights abuses.

**INTERNATIONAL AFRICAN ASSOCIATION (IAA).** A European organization created on 15 September 1876 by King **Leopold II** after a three-day conference in Brussels. According to historical documents, the IAA's goals were to build up hospitable and scientific stations up to the **Congo River**, to discontinue **slavery**, and to survey, to inquire, and to analyze the land, people, and resources. Leopold II made his move into central Africa as president of the IAA from 1876 to late 1878. On 25 November 1878, the king changed the IAA to the **Comité d'Études pour le Haut-Congo** (Committee for the Study of the Upper Congo) and hired **Henry Morton Stanley** on 10 December 1878 to explore the Congo River. The committee became the **International Association of the Congo** one year later

and its work, combined with Stanley's explorations, led the European powers to grant Leopold II sovereignty over the Congo at the **Berlin Conference** in late February 1885.

**INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE CONGO (IAC)** [ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DU CONGO]. **Leopold II** established this association on 9 October 1882 as an outgrowth of the **Comité d'Études pour le Haut-Congo** (Committee for the Study of the Upper Congo) to explore the **Congo River Basin**, encourage **trade**, and "civilize" the indigenous people in the area. The association was recognized by the **United States** government and subsequently by 13 European nations that partitioned Africa at the **Berlin Conference** in February 1885. The association adopted its own flag but was disbanded shortly thereafter to allow the formation of the **Congo Free State**. *See also* INTERNATIONAL AFRICAN ASSOCIATION.

**INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT (IBRD)**. *See* WORLD BANK.

**INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF)**. The IMF is the sister institution of the **World Bank**, formed at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1948. The IMF was originally designed to help stabilize European economies following World War II. It increasingly was called upon to assist governments of less-developed countries with cash-liquidity problems, in particular, following the leap in oil prices of the 1970s. In exchange for the implementation of economic-stabilization programs, which usually includes severe austerity measures, the IMF provides infusions of hard currency to governments needing new capital or experiencing problems repaying their foreign **debts**.

In June 1967, **President Mobutu Sese Seko** implemented a major monetary reform with the approval of the IMF to restore the confidence of foreign partners. The centerpiece of the reform was a 300-percent devaluation, which realigned the new currency, the **zaire**, on its parallel market value at the exchange rate of 1 zaire per 2 U.S. dollars. The net result of the reform was positive: **inflation** fell to 2.5 percent and the economic growth rate increased from negative growth in 1967 to 8 percent in 1968. The IMF praised the govern-



ment, and the success of the reform contributed to the credibility of the Mobutu regime.

The decline of the **economy** after the failed **Zairianization** policy led the Mobutu **government** to negotiate more than a dozen agreements with the IMF after its debt crisis began in 1975. The programs started as relatively modest “standbys” (loans) of \$150 million over one year’s time to the record (at that time) \$1.1 billion standby over three years accorded in 1981. Initially, Congo was unable to meet the programs’ targets, which included budget cuts, **currency** devaluations, and regular payments to the IMF.

In 1983, Congo met most of the targets of the current stabilization plan, including floating its currency on the free market and removing subsidies on **petroleum** and **agricultural** products. However, on 29 October 1986, the government announced that certain international organizations were “strangling” the economy and creating severe human suffering. As a result, the government limited foreign debt repayments to 10 percent of **export** revenues.

Several agreements with the IMF were negotiated in subsequent years, but the government failed to meet their targets; by the late 1980s, it had virtually ceased to service its debt to the Fund. In 1992, the IMF issued a “Declaration of Non-Compliance,” ending any further disbursements to Congo and effectively expelling it from the organization. The IMF became reengaged in Congo in 2001 after a meeting of donors on 3 July held in Paris that expressed support for a \$156 million reform and rehabilitation program to be presented by the government. In late April 2002, the IMF managing director, Horst Kohler, outlined key priorities in order for the country to rebuild confidence, normalize relations with the international community, and restart economic growth, job creation, and poverty reduction. The normalization process started after the government cleared its \$522 million arrears with the IMF, thanks to a number of bridging loans from **Belgium, France, South Africa**, and Sweden in early 2002. On 12 June, the IMF approved a \$750 million loan over three years under its Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities (PRGF). This triggered World Bank approval the following day of a \$450 million Economic Recovery Credit. In late 2005, the IMF approved the last portion of \$39 million of its PRGF plan, despite the government’s failure to

meet IMF targets on exchange rate, money supply, foreign exchange reserves, and internal debt.

By December 2005, the IMF had lent \$852.1 million to Congo under the PRGF. A year later, the IMF began to contemplate a tough line by accusing the transitional government of willingly flouting rules it had agreed to under the Staff-Monitored Program (SPM), such as sound fiscal policy to reduce the fiscal deficit from 9.1 percent of GDP in 2005 to 1.5 percent in 2006. However, nothing happened by December 2006. *See also* LONDON CLUB; PARIS CLUB.

**ISLAM.** Although eastern Congo experienced considerable Islamic influence during the 18th and 19th centuries, spread by Arab and eastern African traders, Islam never became entrenched in Congo as it did in East and West Africa. Muslims are estimated to compose 10 percent of the **population**, mostly located in **Maniema** and **Tshopo Provinces**. Congolese are free to espouse any belief, and there is no known repression of Muslims because of their **religion**. *See also* AFRO-ARABS.

**ISRAEL, RELATIONS WITH.** In the early years of the **Mobutu Sese Seko government**, relations with Israel were friendly, and Israeli advisors helped train the Congolese army. In the early 1970s, Mobutu even made some attempts to mediate the Middle East dispute. On 4 October 1973, however, following the Yom Kippur War and the Arab oil embargo, Mobutu announced before the **United Nations** General Assembly that his government was breaking off diplomatic relations with Israel because of its occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, which belonged to **Egypt**, a member of the **Organization of African Unity** (OAU). All African nations, except Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, and apartheid-ruled **South Africa**, followed his lead. Congo's relations with Israel, however, remained strong, although clandestine, and Israeli products frequently were seen on the shelves of Congolese stores during this period.

On 13 May 1982, the Congolese government announced restoration of relations, saying Israel had returned the Sinai to Egypt, as called for in the Camp David accords, and, as a result, Africa's quarrel with Israel had ended. Certain internal pressures were also at work. Mobutu hoped to benefit from Israeli military training once again and

make use of the Jewish lobby in the **United States** before the U.S. Congress, which had cut **foreign aid**. The massacre of Palestinians at the refugee camps of Chabra and Shattila that year, reportedly by Israeli-backed Southern Lebanese Christian militia, embarrassed the Congolese government. Mobutu declared that his government would not accept military equipment captured from the Palestine Liberation Organization, and it was not until August 1983 that a second African nation, Liberia, restored relations with Israel.

Congo received military assistance from Israel in the 1980s and 1990s, primarily training for the **Division Spéciale Présidentielle** (DSP) and Mobutu's personal guard. Israeli advisors also aided in training Congolese **security** services. A number of private Israeli businessmen invested in various enterprises in Congo, most notably **transportation** and **diamond** marketing. More specifically, the Israeli International Diamond Industries (IDI) was the sole buyer and exporter of Congo diamonds. However, after the assassination of **Laurent Kabila**, **Joseph Kabila** cancelled the exclusive license granted to IDI in April 2001. In late 2003, relations between Congo and Israel cooled when the Israeli government announced its intention to close a number of diplomatic missions, including its Kinshasa office, as the result of budgetary constraints. Meanwhile, a multibillion dollar project has been contemplated since mid-2005 to build a 2,000-km pipeline, called the "Solomon pipeline," to deliver much-needed water to the Middle East, especially to Israel. Israel highly depends on water from Golan Heights, and will be forced to find another source of water if Golan Heights must be returned to Syria.

**ITURI CONFLICT.** The Ituri conflict occurred between the agriculturalist **Lendu** and pastoralist **Hema ethnic groups** in the Ituri **region** of northeastern **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)**, resulting in the deaths of 75,000 people and forcing hundreds of thousands of people from their homes. Although the conflict had many phases, the most recent armed clashes ran from 1999 to 2003, with low-level conflict continuing until 2007. The conflict was vastly complicated by the presence of various armed groups that participated in the **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila**, the large amount of small arms in the region, a scramble for the area's abundant natural resources, and the ethnic tensions of the surrounding region. The Lendu ethnic group

was largely represented by the Front Nationaliste et Integrationniste (FNI; Nationalist and Integrationist Front), while the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC; Union of Congolese Patriots) claimed to be fighting for the Hema. The increased intensity of the violence was also the result of a borrowing of ethnic ideology from the **Hutu-Tutsi** standoff. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that the Lendu began thinking of themselves as kin to the Hutu, whereas the Hema identify themselves with the Tutsi. Although there is little basis to this new formation of identity, it vastly increased the imagined stakes of the conflict.

Ethnic tension between the Lendu and Hema goes back to colonial days. The Belgian government favored the Hema, resulting in education and wealth disparities between the two groups. This divergence continued into modern times. Despite this difference, the two groups have largely lived together peacefully, practicing extensive intermarriage. While the northern Hema speak Lendu, the southern Hema speak Hema. The Hema and Lendu have, however, longstanding grievances about land issues that erupted into conflict on at least three previous occasions, in 1972, 1985, and 1996. Much of the animosity revolves around the 1973 land-use law, which allows people to buy land they do not inhabit, and then force the residents to leave two years later when ownership can no longer be legally contested. Unscrupulous use of the law forced families to leave their homes because they were unaware it had been bought by someone else. Some Hema apparently attempted to take land from Lendu using this tactic in the 1990s.

The 1994 Rwandan genocide sent psychological shockwaves throughout the Great Lakes region. The murder of more than 500,000 people on the basis of ethnicity served to make people even more aware of their tribal and linguistic affiliation. The subsequent influx of Hutu refugees into the region, which led to the civil war against **President Mobutu Sese Seko**, served as further emphasis. However, it was not until the civil war against Kabila that the situation between the Hema and Lendu reached the level of regional conflict. Much of the northern Congo was occupied and under the nominal control of the invading **Uganda** People's Defense Force (UPDF) and the Ugandan-backed **Kisangani** faction of the rebel **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RDC-Kisangani) under the

leadership of **Ernest Wamba dia Wamba**. The widespread conflict was accompanied by an influx of assault rifles and other firearms. Although land disputes used to be fought with bows and arrows, the easy availability of small arms vastly increased the destructiveness of the fighting.

In June 1999, James Kazini, the commander of UPDF forces in Congo, ignoring protests by RCD-K leadership, created a new “province” of Ituri out of the former **Orientale province**. He then appointed a Hema as new governor. This apparently convinced the Lendu that Uganda and the RCD-K were backing the Hema against them, and violence erupted between the two groups. The UPDF did little to stop the fighting and, in some cases, aided the Hema. However, even as fighting intensified, the UPDF continued to train both Hema and Lendu. A number of reports by **human rights** groups indicated that Lendu trainees refused to join the RCD-K and instead set up ethnically based militias.

The fighting did not begin to slow until the RCD-K nominated a neutral replacement to head the provincial government in late 1999. By then, 200,000 people were displaced from their homes and 7,000 were killed in the fighting. An unknown number died of conflict-related disease and malnutrition, and mortality rates as high as 15 percent were recorded during two measles outbreaks in the affected regions. The fighting flared up again in 2001 after the UPDF replaced the governor with a Hema appointee. Throughout this period, the RCD-K engaged in an internal power struggle that resulted in the splitting of the organization into the RCD-K of Wamba dia Wamba and the RCD-Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML) of **Nyamwisi Mbusa Antipas**, which has prominent Hema in its leadership. Wamba dia Wamba returned to Bunia to denounce a proposed merger of the three major Ugandan-backed rebel groups, the RCD-K, the RCD-ML, and **Mouvement de Libération du Congo** (MLC) of **Jean-Pierre Bemba**, as a Ugandan imposition. The quick collapse of Wamba dia Wamba’s **military** base without Ugandan support was most probably a direct result of a perceived pro-Lendu stance. Even as the civil war against Laurent Kabila wound to an official end in 2003, a low-level conflict continued in Ituri for the next several years, with tens of thousands more people killed. The continued conflict was blamed both on the lack of any real authority in the region,

which became a patchwork of areas claimed by armed militias, and the competition among the various armed groups for control of natural resources in the area.

Half of the militia members were under the age of 18 and some were as young as eight. Human Rights Watch (HRW) documented links that AngloGold Ashanti, a subsidiary of mining conglomerate Anglo American, among others, supported the FNI. Payments were made to the FNI leadership to facilitate mining operations near the town of Mongbwalu, and gold was smuggled through Uganda to Europe and beyond. The benefits of this gold trade were shared by the companies and armed militias. Their use of murder, torture, and rape in the course of conflict is well documented. Following the release of the HRW report in June 2005, leading Swiss gold refiner Metalor Technologies agreed to stop buying gold from Uganda.

In April 2003, 800 Uruguayan soldiers under the **Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo** (MONUC) were deployed in Bunia. In the same month, an observer died in a mine explosion. One month later, two military observers were savagely killed by militia. The withdrawal of 7,000 Ugandan troops in April 2003 led to a deteriorating security situation in the Ituri region endangering the peace process. **United Nations** (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for establishing and deploying a temporary multinational force to the area until the weakened MONUC mission could be reinforced. On 30 May 2003, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1484 authorizing the deployment of an Interim Multinational Emergency Force (IMEF) to Bunia with the task of securing the airport and protecting internally displaced persons in camps and civilians in the town. Leading the operation were 1,800 French troops. A small 80-man Swedish Special Forces group (SSG) was also added. The operation, called *Operation Artemis*, was launched on 12 June, and the IMEF completed its deployment in the following three weeks. The force was successful in stabilizing the situation in Bunia and enforcing the UN presence in Congo.

In September 2003, responsibility for the security of the region was handed over to the MONUC mission. After less than two years of relative calm, the Lendu FNI and UPC militias murdered nine UN Bangladeshi peacekeepers near the town of Kafe on 25 February 2005. In response, UN forces assaulted a FNI stronghold, killing 50

people. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the leader of the UPC, and other militia leaders were arrested by Congolese authorities and imprisoned in Makala, **Kinshasa**. Lubanga was accused of having ordered the killing of the peacekeepers in February 2005 and of being behind continuous insecurity in the area. The International Criminal Court followed suit by issuing an arrest warrant for Lubanga for the war crime of “conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 15 years and using them to participate actively in hostilities.”

On 1 April 2005, MONUC reported that less than half of the 15,000 militia members had disarmed by a deadline set by the UN. On 9 October 2006, MONUC reported that 12 FNI militia soldiers were killed in clashes with Congolese army forces. One month later, the Ituri Front Patriotique de Resistance (FPR)/Patriotic Resistance Front, the last of the three militias involved in the conflict, agreed to release hundreds of child soldiers and disarm in exchange for an amnesty. Militia members were incorporated into the national **army**, and their leaders made officers in the wake of general **elections** endorsing the government of **Joseph Kabila**. The FNI became the last militia to begin turning over its weapons in April 2007, although disarmament and demobilization continued through 2008. *See also* ITURI PROVINCE; SECOND CONGO WAR.

**ITURI FOREST.** Located in **Ituri Province**, the Ituri Forest is one of the densest and least explored tropical **rainforests** in the world. It is named after the Ituri River that flows westward from the border with **Uganda**, north of **Lake Albert** to join the **Congo River** south of **Kisangani**. With an area of 63,000 square km, the Ituri Forest covers most of the northeastern corner of Congo and is inhabited by **Bantu**, **Pygmy**, Nilotic, and Sudanic peoples.

**ITURI PROVINCE.** One of the four districts of the former **Orientale Province**, in 1962–66, it was known as *Kibali–Ituri*. Ituri became a province again after the promulgation of the 2006 **constitution** with five territories: Aru, Djungu, Irumu, Mahagi, and Mambasa. The capital city of Ituri is **Bunia**. The province covers 65,658 square km of territory bordering **Uganda**. Ranging from the highlands below the **Rwenzori Mountains** along the Ugandan border to the swampy lowlands of the **Congo River Basin**, the province is rich in **timber**, **gold**,

and **fish** and reportedly contains unexploited deposits of iron ore and oil in **Lake Albert**. With an estimated population of 4.2 million in 2005, the population of Ituri is composed primarily of Alur, Bandaka, Banyari, Bira, Bombo, **Hema**, Kakwa, Kaliko, **Lendu**, Lese, Logo, Lugbara, Mabendi, Mambisa, Mboti, and Ndo-Okebo. Ituri is one of the most fertile areas in eastern Congo, and is a resource-rich province after the discovery of oil in 2005. Ituri was the scene of deadly conflict, commonly called the ***Ituri conflict***, between the Hema and the Lendu from 1999 to late 2006. *See also* ITURI FOREST.

**IVORY.** The highly valued tusks of the **elephant** were one of the riches that drew foreign traders to Congo as early as the 16th century. The existence of large, untouched ivory resources between Stanley Pool (now Pool Malebo) and Stanley Falls (now **Boyoma Falls**) was also revealed by **Henry Morton Stanley**'s journey in Central Africa. The prospect of finding ivory in the region helped to push **Leopold II** in his thrust to the Nile, and the profits derived from the sale of ivory helped to finance his colonization plans and the pioneer administration of the **Congo Free State** (CFS). Between 1889 and 1895, ivory accounted for more than half of the CFS's exports. It was not until the discovery of wild **rubber** that ivory began to decline as a major export of the CFS. Thus, by 1900, it represented only 11 percent of total exports.

The annexation of CFS to **Belgium** in 1908 began an intensive mineral exploration of the **Congo River Basin**. Ivory exports declined over the years to represent less than 1 percent of exports in the 1950s. After **independence**, the government continued to export ivory, but the bulk of it was smuggled through east Africa. Although the ivory trade was banned by international convention in the 1990s, **smuggling** continues. There are no official estimates of ivory production since the mid-1990s.

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**4 JANUARY 1959.** The date on which the popular movement for Congolese **independence** was launched. On a Sunday, following a fiery rally by **Patrice Lumumba**, recently returned from Europe, the **Alliance des Bakongo** (ABAKO) party had scheduled a pro-



independence rally in **Leopoldville** at which **Joseph Kasavubu** was to speak. The colonial authorities, fearing such a gathering would lead to violence, banned the rally and detained Kasavubu. The move sparked two weeks of civil unrest that led to the imposition of emergency **police** measures and clashes in which scores of people were killed. After order was restored, colonial authorities opened negotiations that led to the **Round Table Conferences**, during which Congolese delegates demanded immediate and complete independence. The date for independence was set for **30 June 1960**. *See also* BELGIUM.

**4 JUNE 1969.** The date on which a group of **university** and professional school **students** staged a demonstration in **Kinshasa** against the **Mobutu Sese Seko government**, primarily to protest poor living conditions and delays in payment of their stipends. The demonstration degenerated into violence and vandalism. The clashes that followed led to more than 100 deaths and the closing of the schools. Dozens of student leaders were arrested. A group of students and professors formed the Mouvement du 4 Juin (the 4th June Movement) that later evolved into the **Mouvement d'Action pour la Résurrection du Congo (MARC) opposition** group. The 4th of June became the date for demonstrations in commemoration of those killed in 1969 and marches were held in 1971, 1977, 1981, and 1982. These demonstrations were also harshly repressed by **security** forces.

**30 JUNE 1960.** The day Congo became independent and on which King **Baudouin** formally handed over power to an elected Congolese **government**, ending 75 years of Belgian rule. **Belgium** was reluctant to grant independence to its colony, however. In fact, the most progressive colonial administrators envisioned independence in 1990 at the earliest. Independence occurred after a brief transitional period that saw the emergence of more than 100 **political parties**, based primarily on **region** and **ethnic group**, and national **elections** that failed to give a clear mandate to any one party or coalition. Lack of preparation, the sudden removal of restrictions on political activities after decades of repression, and a splintered political structure resulting from interethnic and regional tensions led to a rapid erosion of central authority. The **secessions** and **rebellions** that followed were

partly responsible for the military **coup d'état** of 1965 that resulted in the single-party state. Africanists note that many African nations experienced peaceful and orderly transitions to independence, but few had such large and remote territories, such diverse **populations**, and so little time to forge them into a nation as did Congo.

In 1956, 30 June was also the date of the publication of the *Conscience Africaine* manifesto demanding greater political freedom for Congolese, and the date of publication in 1982 of a manifesto by former **Prime Minister Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond** criticizing what he called the political, economic, and moral bankruptcy of the **Mobutu Sese Seko** government and calling for free, multiparty elections. On this day in 1995, the **Haut Conseil de la République/Parlement de la Transition** (HCR/PT) voted to postpone by two years the already-delayed multiparty elections and extend to seven years the **democratic transition**. *See also* CONSTITUTION.

**JAGA.** A group of warriors from Mbata who invaded the **Kongo Kingdom** from the east in 1568 under King **Alavaro I**. Some historians believe the Jaga were distant Kongo people opposed to the Kongo king who perhaps were joined by non-Kongo peoples in an effort to take over the coastal **slave** trade. The king appealed to **Portugal** for help, and the governor of Sao Thôme, Francisco de Gouvea, arrived in March 1571 with 600 soldiers. After two years, the governor was able to expel the various Jaga formations, and the debt owed by the Kongo contributed to the increased slave trade with Portugal. The Jaga groups moved southeast, where some founded several **Yaka** chieftaincies that later opposed Belgian rule in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

**JAMAA.** A Swahili word meaning “family,” Jamaa was the name of a religious movement established in 1953 in **Katanga** by the Belgian Franciscan priest Placide Tempels. The movement combined African mysticism and **spiritualism** with Catholicism and some of the priest’s own thoughts. The doctrine stemmed in part from African roots, although the movement reportedly opposed sorcery and, instead, emphasized emotionality and mystical experiences. It also downplayed the importance of hierarchy and academia. The movement was always linked to the **Catholic Church**, but many church

leaders became wary of it. Tempels was ordered back to **Belgium** in 1962 and obliged to break ties with his followers.

**JANSSENS, ÉMILE.** The commander of the **Force Publique** at **independence** who, according to some observers, sparked the **mutiny** of the Force on 5 July 1960, by responding to soldiers unhappy over low salaries and the lack of Congolese officers by writing “After Independence = Before Independence,” in the form of a mathematical equation on a blackboard. The mutiny that followed spread to **Leopoldville** and other regional capitals and brought the first deployment of Belgian troops in Congolese history. The mutiny also brought the departure of Janssens and other Belgian officers and the appointment of a Congolese officer corps that, within weeks, would face **secessions** and insurrections.

**JAPAN, RELATIONS WITH.** Relations between Congo and Japan are based primarily on commercial ties that grew steadily during the 1970s and 1980s, then waned in the 1990s and 2000s. **Trade** was virtually nonexistent after **independence** but, by the early 1980s, Japan had become a major supplier of Congolese **imports**, such as automobiles, trucks, appliances, and electronic equipment. Japan imported some minerals and **timber** from Congo but enjoyed a large trade surplus. The Japanese carried out a modest bilateral development program, building the suspension bridge over the **Congo River** at **Matadi** in 1982–83 and assisting in the rehabilitation of **roads** and bridges in **Kongo Central** province and former **Bandundu** province. On the commercial front, a Japanese company participated in a **mining** consortium in **Shaba** and the Japan Petroleum **Zaire** company were involved in a consortium operating offshore oil wells near the mouth of the Congo River. Trade with Japan has also declined over the years, representing less than 1 percent in the 2000s.

In mid-2000s, Japan had renewed some interest in telecommunications with African countries. In early 2005, Japan signed with Congo a partnership agreement to establish a modern telecommunications infrastructure in Congo. In March, **Joseph Kabila** arrived in Japan to finalize the agreement and to improve trade relations. *See also* FOREIGN RELATIONS.

**JEUNESSE DU MOUVEMENT POPULAIRE DE LA RÉVOLUTION (JMPR) [YOUTH OF THE POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT].** The youth wing of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR)**, which was Congo's sole legal **political party** from 1967 to 1990. Under the party-state system, all "Zairians" were automatically members of the JMPR from birth until they reached the age of 30 years, at which time they automatically became members of the MPR. The JMPR was made the sole **youth** organization by decree in 1968. Other youth-oriented organizations, such as the YMCA, scouting, and church groups, were banned and their assets taken over by the JMPR. The monopoly of the JMPR over the country's youth ended with the abolition of the MPR as the sole legal party in 1990. In 1992, the **Conférence Nationale Souveraine (CNS)** returned many properties to their former owners.

**JOHN PAUL II (POPE) (1920–2005).** Pope John Paul II, born Karol Józef Wojtyła on 18 May 1920, began his papacy on 16 October 1978 and died on 2 April 2005. He visited Congo in May 1980, the first pontiff ever to do so. The visit officially ended eight years of strained relations between the Roman **Catholic Church** and the **government**, caused primarily by the **Authenticity** policies of the 1970s. **Mobutu Sese Seko**, a widower, married for the second time shortly before the visit and asked for a papal blessing of the union. The pope reportedly was dismayed by the degree to which he found African traditions had been incorporated into church liturgy and litany. However, Congo statistically was home to the largest Catholic population in Africa, and both sides appeared anxious to make the visit a success. The pope visited a second time in August 1985 and beatified a Congolese nun, Sister **Nengapeta Anuarite Marie Clémentine**, who was killed by **Simba** rebels during the eastern **rebellion** in 1964.

**JUDICIAL SYSTEM.** During the colonial era, two judicial systems existed. The first applied written law primarily to Europeans, but on occasion to Congolese. The second applied oral **customary law**, as practiced by traditional **ethnic groups**, to Africans only. Under the system, the findings of each court were subject to review by the next

higher court of a five-tier system. In 1958, a decree attempted to end distinctions between the two systems.

After **independence**, the judicial system virtually collapsed because of the departure of expatriate judges and professionals following civic unrest. The **United Nations** (UN) called in jurists from **Egypt**, Syria, Lebanon, Greece, and Haiti to preside over courts and act as attorneys. They gradually were replaced by Congolese. Under the **Loi Fondamentale** (Fundamental Law), the judiciary was independent of the **legislative** and executive branches of **government**. The provision was maintained in the **constitution** of 1964, but the **president** was granted the power to appoint all judges. In 1968, a presidential decree restructured the court system under the Code d'Organisation et de Compétence Judiciaire, allowing customary law to be valid and relevant as long as it was "compatible with public order." A decree on 11 February 1972 called for reform of the civil code to make it more authentically "Zairian." The reform was implemented on 5 May 1975. The constitution of 1974 created the **Judiciary Council**, presided over by the president. In theory, magistrates were free and independent, but they were required to be party members and owed their positions to the president.

As Congo became a party-state and the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) became the supreme body of government, the party became the source of legality and the judiciary's role evolved into one of interpreting it. The president of the Supreme Court and the attorney-general were automatically members of the **Political Bureau** of the MPR, and the heads of the regional courts belonged to regional committees of the party. The court system reflected the administrative and political organization of the country and ascended in importance in the following order: urban and rural subregional tribunals; regional tribunals; three tribunals of the first instance (appeals) in **Kinshasa**, **Lubumbashi**, and **Kisangani**; and, ultimately, the Supreme Court of Justice, based in Kinshasa. A system of juvenile courts was created by decree in 1987, but it was never fully implemented.

Although independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by the constitution, the application of justice could be influenced by the party and certain powerful individuals. Following the political reforms of 1990, some magistrates demonstrated a degree of independence, rul-

ing in several instances against the government and in favor of trade unions and the **opposition**. However, these rulings were usually overturned or circumvented through appeals or other judicial maneuvers. Magistrates staged a lengthy **strike** in 1991 over low pay and a lack of facilities. The arrival of **Laurent Kabila** to the presidency never changed the status quo because Kabila ruled by presidential decrees, which curbed the role of the judiciary branch. The transitional government, from 2003 to 2006, brought some degree of independence to the judicial system, documented in the 2006 constitution, with one remaining caveat, that the president appoints members of the judiciary system.

**JUDICIARY COUNCIL [CONSEIL JUDICIAIRE]**. The Judiciary Council was made up of a group of senior judges of Congolese courts and the Supreme Court, and was presided over by the **president**. It was created by the **constitution** of 1974 and designated one of the main organs of **government**. *See also* JUDICIAL SYSTEM.

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**KABANGA SONGA SONGA, EUGÈNE (ARCHBISHOP)**. The archbishop of Lubumbashi who issued one of the first public critiques of **Mobutism**. His pastoral letter in 1976 denounced excesses of the **Authenticity** movement and the moral decline of Congo's leaders. *See also* CATHOLIC CHURCH; RELIGION.

**KABASELE, JOSEPH TSHAMALA (1930–1983)**. Born in **Matadi**, Kabasele is popularly known as *Grand Kallé*. He is regarded by most Congolese as the father of modern Congolese **music**. He began his career by developing the seminal African Rumba and founding his band, African Jazz, which was the most popular early band on the scene. The band's personnel at various times included guitarist Dr. Nicolas Kasanda, saxophonist Manu Dibango, and singer **Tabu Pascal Ley Rochereau**. In 1960, he established his own label, Surboum African Jazz. He died on 11 February 1983 in Paris.

**KABILA, KABANGE JOSEPH (1971– ).** Born on 4 June 1971 in Hewa Bora, in Fizi, **Sud-Kivu Province**, Joseph Kabila is the son of **Laurent Kabila** and Sifa Nahanya. However, there are some doubts as to the correctness of this official version. He began his elementary schooling in public systems in Fizi and finished it in Dar es Salaam, **Tanzania**. He then attended secondary school in Mbeye, Tanzania, where he also followed a brief military curriculum. At age 25, Kabila was the commander of the army of **kadogos** when his father, Laurent Kabila, and the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour le Libération du Congo** (AFDL) launched their campaign to oust **President Mobutu Sese Seko**.

After the AFDL's victory and Laurent Kabila's rise to the presidency, Joseph Kabila spent a few months in **China** for further training at the People's Liberation Army National Defense University in Beijing. Upon his return from China, he was promoted to the rank of major general and deputy chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Congolese armed forces in 1998. Two years later, he was appointed **army** chief of staff and held this position until the assassination of his father in January 2001.

Joseph Kabila became president on 26 January 2001. As chief of staff, he was the main military leader in charge of **government** troops during the **civil war** against his father from 1998 to 2003. Nonetheless, Joseph Kabila was instrumental in ending the civil war when most belligerents signed the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI) in December 2002 in Pretoria, **South Africa**. He maintained the presidency while an interim government was set up in mid-2003 with four vice presidents (known in Congo as *1 + 4 formula*): two vice presidents from the main rebel groups, one from his previous government, and another from the unarmed **opposition**. In December 2005, a referendum approved a new **constitution**, which Joseph Kabila ratified in February 2006. The first round of presidential **elections** was held in August 2006: Kabila received 44.8 percent of the votes and **Jean-Pierre Bemba** won 20 percent. A run-off election was held in October, and Kabila won by 58.05 percent. Joseph Kabila was sworn in as the fourth president of Congo on 6 December 2006.

A few months later, in April 2007, the opposition accused President Kabila of selling Congolese land to **Angola**. The issue arose in

February 2007, when his government delivered an official protest over the expulsion of more than 8,000 Congolese migrants from Angola and the occupation by the Angolan army of several villages in the Kahemba area of **Kwango Province**. A delegation of members of the Congolese parliament led by Roger Lumbala, from the opposition **Mouvement de Libération du Congo** (MLC) party, visited the area in April 2007. Members of the delegation complained that President Kabila did not ease their task as they waited in vain for the helicopter he had promised. According to the opposition, Kabila had struck some sort of deal with the Angolan government, which coveted an area rich in alluvial diamonds.

Kabila was elected in 2008 as chair of the **Communauté Économique des États de l'Afrique Centrale** (Economic Community of Central African States). In this capacity, he was able to garner the support of member states on the process of peace in Congo.

In eastern Congo, support for Kabila had faded by late 2008 as political unrest remained a major issue, displacing thousands of people from their homes. On the socioeconomic front, President Kabila had not delivered on his promise to improve living standards. Since he was sworn in as president, the socioeconomic situation has worsened. By December 2008, a sense of dismay pervades Congo at the Joseph Kabila government's lack of progress on pressing development issues since its inauguration in early 2007, with some suspecting that former Congolese rebels, either in the government or private business, might decide that democracy is unprofitable and instigate another civil war. *See also* SECOND CONGO WAR.

**KABILA, LAURENT-DÉSIRÉ (1939–2001)**. A left-leaning leader from **Katanga** who supported **Patrice Lumumba** following **independence**, Kabila opposed the **Mobutu Sese Seko government** from remote guerrilla camps in the east. He became the country's third **president** on 29 May 1997, after a seven-month-long **military** offensive. Kabila was born on 27 November 1939, in Jadotville (now **Likasi**) in **Haut-Katanga Province**. He received his basic **education** locally and later studied in **France** and East Germany.

Kabila was the deputy commander of the Youth of the **Association des Baluba du Katanga** (BALUBAKAT) party that fought against the **Katanga secession** under **Moïse Tshombe**. He joined



Lumumba's **Mouvement National Congolais** (MNC) at independence and participated in the **Stanleyville**-based government of **Antoine Gizenga**. He was appointed to the provincial assembly for North Katanga and was chief of cabinet of Minister of Information Ferdinand Tumba. After Lumumbists formed the **Conseil National de Libération** in late 1963, he was sent in March 1964 to eastern Congo to help organize a revolution, in particular, in his native North Katanga province. In 1965, Kabila had set up a cross-border rebel operation from Kigoma, **Tanzania**, across **Lake Tanganyika**. Che Guevara assisted Kabila for a short time in 1965. Guevara had appeared in Congo with approximately 100 men who planned to bring about a Cuban-style revolution. In Guevara's opinion, Kabila, then 26 years old, was "not the man of the hour" he had alluded to, being more interested in consuming alcohol and bedding women—reasons why, according to Guevara, Kabila would sometimes show up days late to provide supplies, aid, or backup to Guevara's men. Guevara left disappointed.

When the **rebellion** was defeated in mid-1966, Kabila and his remnant of supporters moved their operation into the mountainous Fizi-Baraka area in **Sud-Kivu** and founded the **Parti Révolutionnaire du Peuple** (PRP). Although the PRP was small and relatively unknown, it retained control over a remote area west of the **Mitumba Mountains** throughout the Mobutu era. Meanwhile, in 1984 and 1985, the PRP seized the **port** town of **Moba** on Lake Tanganyika, but was driven out a few days later by a government counteroffensive. Kabila established himself as warlord in the area; by the late 1970s and early 1980s, he had amassed a considerable fortune smuggling **gold**. He had houses in Dar es Salaam and Kampala. While in Kampala, he reportedly met Yoweri Museveni, the future leader of **Uganda**. Museveni and former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere later introduced Kabila to Paul Kagame, who would become the president of **Rwanda**. These personal contacts became quite important in the mid-1990s.

On 18 October 1996, the PRP joined with three other parties to form the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL), whose troops, reportedly backed by Rwanda, **Burundi**, Uganda, and **Angola**, launched an offensive against Mobutu. Initially, Kabila was spokesman of the AFDL, but he rapidly emerged as its most visible representative. The AFDL forces

moved quickly, seizing **Bukavu, Goma, Kisangani, Mbuji-Mayi, Lubumbashi**, and **Kikwit** by April 1997. **South African** President Nelson Mandela hosted two rounds of talks between Mobutu and Kabila as AFDL troops closed in on **Kinshasa**, but these meetings were overtaken by events within Congo. Mobutu left the capital on 16 May 1997, and AFDL forces entered the following day. On 29 May 1997, Kabila was sworn in as president and announced that national **elections** would be held in 1999. However, he failed to obtain the support of major Congolese **opposition** leaders, in particular **Étienne Tshisekedi**. As a result, he formed a government composed of young technocrats, including the daughters of Lumumba and former President **Joseph Kasavubu**, as well as a number of people from the diaspora.

Kabila sought to project the image of a moderate, but his early sympathies with Lumumba and leaders of the eastern rebellion surfaced on occasion. He visited Beijing in late 1997; upon his return, Kabila announced that **China** would serve as a model for Congolese development. He delivered a speech to the nation on the anniversary of the death of Lumumba, saying his government knew who Lumumba's assassins were and urged them to come forward to accept the nation's forgiveness.

Kabila was criticized by opposition leaders as heading a government controlled by neighboring countries. He was also criticized by **human rights** organizations for banning political demonstrations and for obstructing a **United Nations** (UN) investigation into the alleged massacres of Rwandan **refugees** during the AFDL offensive. Kabila's critics called him an opportunist who was named leader of the AFDL because he was one of the few opposition leaders never co-opted by Mobutu.

Kabila's greatest challenges were to consolidate control over a vast territory and enact political and economic reforms while addressing rivalries among the various factions in the alliance that brought him to power. In western Congo, particularly in Kinshasa, he was viewed as a puppet of the Ugandan and Rwandan governments. Nevertheless, many Congolese initially accepted Kabila and were prepared to give him a chance, especially because there was little alternative, given the military strength of the AFDL and the moral bankruptcy of most Kinshasa-based opposition.

Within months, however, Kabila found himself increasingly at odds with Rwandan army officers, who had been the core leadership of the AFDL, and with the **Banyamulenge**, who had provided important initial support. These elements increasingly were resented by the local population, which considered them to be a foreign occupation force. In late July 1998, Kabila announced that the Rwandan troops had accomplished their mission and were returning home. The following week, a group of them announced an offensive to overthrow the Kabila government, which they said had become corrupt and authoritarian. On 2 August 1998, Kabila's former allies in Rwanda and Uganda turned against him and backed a rebellion of the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD). As the rebels were closing in on Kinshasa, **Zimbabwe** sent troops to Congo to support Kabila. Zimbabwe was joined by Angola and **Namibia**. Peace talks were held in Lusaka, **Zambia**, which resulted in the **Lusaka Peace Accord** in July 1999. Despite the agreement, **civil war** continued, and Kabila was shot on 16 January 2001 by his bodyguard, Rashidi Kasereka, who was also killed a few minutes later. Laurent Kabila was quickly replaced by his son, **Joseph Kabila**. *See also* SECOND CONGO WAR.

**KADHAFI.** The term used in Congo to identify people who sell gasoline on the side. This informal economy started in the mid-1970s as the result of gasoline shortages and difficult economic situations. Bureaucrats in charge of official vehicles siphon gasoline from these vehicles and give it to their friends or family members to be sold on the black market.

**KADOGO.** The term signifies in **Kiswahili** “little thing that means nothing.” It was used to describe **child soldiers** in Congo when **Laurent Kabila** recruited them to join the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) in late 1996. More than 10,000 children aged 10 to 15 joined the AFDL and traveled through the vast Congo **rainforest** to **Kinshasa** from eastern **Kivu Provinces**. Although the word “Kadogo” is new, the use of children in rebel armies is not a new phenomenon in Congo. *See also* CIVIL WARS; SECOND CONGO WAR.

**KAKUDJI, GAETAN (?–2009).** A cousin and close advisor to **Laurent Kabila** and a senior officer in the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL), which took power in May 1997. Kakudji was a spokesman for Kabila's **Parti Révolutionnaire du Peuple** (PRP) and was named governor of **Katanga** after the AFDL took **Lubumbashi** on 9 April 1997. He became interior minister in the cabinet of 3 January 1998 and remained in the government until 2001. He was elected senator for **Tanganika Province** in 2007. Kakudji died in August 2009 in Belgium.

**KALALA ILUNGA.** According to legend, Kalala Ilunga was one of the early kings of the **Luba** Empire. A nephew of **Kongolo**, he led the *Balopwe* (chiefs or kings) into the **Kasai** area around 1500; by 1550, he controlled a large portion of territory. His relative, **Kibinda Ilunga**, moved away in 1600 to found what was to become the **Lunda** Empire.

**KALEMIE.** A town on **Lake Tanganyika**, Kalemie is the capital city of the Tanganyika **Province**. It was linked to **Katanga** and the **Kasais** by the Chemin de Fer des Grands Lacs (CFL) railway that joined the Chemin de Fer Kinshasa–Dilolo–Lubumbashi (KDL) system at **Kamina**. Some coal deposits are located near the town. Major industries include a cement plant and textile factory. Kalemie's **port** makes it a center for trade across Lake Tanganyika with **Tanzania** and **Burundi**, and a small naval base supports lake patrols by the **navy** and border officials. The CFL deteriorated in the 1980s, but was refurbished in the mid-1990s by the **Sizarail** consortium of **Belgian** and **South African** companies.

**KALONJI DITUNGA, ALBERT (1927– ).** An early **independence** leader, Kalonji was president of the secessionist Independent Mining Republic of **South Kasai** from 1960 to 1962. Kalonji was born on 6 June 1927 at Kemotinne, in the former **Kasai Province**. He was educated by the Scheut Father **missionaries** and attended the Centre Agronomique de Louvain in **Belgium**. In 1949, he was named director of the Institut National pour l'Étude Agronomique du Congo (IN-EAC). He helped found the **Mouvement National Congolais** (MNC) party in 1956 but, unhappy with the rise of **Patrice Lumumba** in the

hierarchy, broke away in July 1959 with several moderate leaders to form a rival group that came to be known as *MNC/Kalonji*.

At independence, his group allied with **Moïse Tshombe** to form the main **opposition** block in the **parliament**. Amidst the collapse of central authority, Kalonji declared South Kasai an independent state and proclaimed himself *mulopwe* (king). The secession was ended in early 1962, and Kalonji was stripped of his parliamentary functions and found guilty of sedition. He went into exile in Spain in January 1963 but returned in 1964 to serve as minister of agriculture in the Tshombe government. He joined Tshombe's **Convention Nationale Congolaise** (CONACO) party and was elected to the Senate in 1965. Following the **Mobutu Sese Seko coup d'état**, Kalonji abandoned national politics.

**KALONJI MUTAMBAYI, ISAAC (1915– )**. The first chairman of the **National Conference** and one of the few Congolese politicians to serve in **government** without interruption from **independence** until the **democratic transition**. Kalonji was born on 9 September 1915, at Lusambo in the former **Kasai** Province. He was educated by Protestant **missionaries** and became an administrator at the École Moyenne de Luebo. He moved to **Elisabethville**, where he became a member of the Conseil de Centre d'Élisabethville and president of the association of Congolese businessmen and professionals, which became cells for political activity prior to independence.

At independence, he was elected to the Senate and made state commissioner for Kasai in the **Patrice Lumumba** government. He was elected vice president of the Senate in 1961 and president of the Senate in 1965. He was a member of the **Legislative Council** until 1982 and a member of the **Central Committee** of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) until the announcement of the democratic transition. When the **National Conference** convened in August 1991, Kalonji was elected chairman. Faced with the chaos caused by 8,000 pretenders to the 2,800 seats in the conference, he organized committees to adjudicate competing claims and select delegates. Following the “**pillages**” of September 1991 and under pressure from both pro-**Mobutu Sese Seko** and **opposition** groups, he resigned on 30 September and retired from politics.

**KAMANDA WA KAMANDA, GÉRARD (1940– )**. A lawyer and diplomat, Kamanda was Congo's first senior official in the secretariat of the **Organization of African Unity (OAU)**. Kamanda was born on 10 December 1940, in **Kikwit**, former **Bandundu Province**. While a **student** at **Lovanium University** in the 1960s, he was an officer of the Union Générale des Étudiants Congolais, one of the leading student organizations. After receiving his law degree, he served on the **Kinshasa** Court of Appeals, as a professor of law at the Institut National d'Études Politiques (INEP), and as legal counsel to the **president**. He was named assistant secretary-general of the OAU in 1972 and Congo's ambassador to the **United Nations** in 1981. He served as foreign affairs minister on several occasions during the 1980s and, on 3 January 1983, he became a member of the **Central Committee** of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR)**.

With the end of the single-party era in 1990, Kamanda formed an **opposition political party**, the Front Commun des Nationalistes (FCN), joined the **Sacred Union**, and was transportation minister in the **Étienne Tshisekedi** government of 1992. He was expelled from the Sacred Union in 1994 when he joined the **Léon Kengo wa Dondo** government as justice minister. Kamanda subsequently was made interior minister with the rank of deputy **prime minister** and, in 1994–95, was the major government mediator in the **Rwandan refugee** crisis in eastern Congo. He was appointed foreign affairs minister in the cabinet reshuffle of 24 December 1996. When the **Mobutu Sese Seko** government was deposed on 17 May 1997, Kamanda fled the country and, from exile, announced the formation of a resistance movement, the Conseil National de la Résistance (CNR). He returned to Congo in 2003 and ran for presidential elections in 2006 without success.

**KAMANYOLA DIVISION**. Named for a battle during the Congo **rebellions** in which hundreds of army soldiers were killed, the Kamanyola Division (originally called *Kamanyola Brigade*) was one of the most prestigious divisions of the **military**. Trained by North Korea, it participated in the operation to retake **Kolwezi** during the second **Shaba War**. The division was assigned “permanently” to the region following the war, although units were sent to bolster allies,

such as Hissen Habré, during the civil war in **Chad** in 1983 and Juvenal Habyarimana during the **Rwandan** civil war in 1990. In 1997, **Laurent Kabila** dismantled the division.

**KAMERHE, VITAL.** Kamerhe is from **Sud-Kivu Province**. After being member of a number of ministerial cabinets, he was nominated associate general commissioner of the government in charge of relations with the **Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo** (MONUC), then was put in charge of the Great Lakes region. He kept the position until his nomination as minister of press and information in the transitional government of 2003–2006. He was also general secretary of **Joseph Kabila's Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie** (PPRD) from June 2004 to late 2006. On 28 December 2006, Kamerhe was elected president of the National Assembly.

**KAMINA.** The town is an important **railway** node. Three lines of Congo railways run from Kamina toward the north, west, and south-east. It has two airports, one civilian (Kamina Airport) and another **military** (Kamina Base Airport). The Kamina base was used for military operations during the **Shaba Wars**. In the 1980s, the military base of Kamina was a major center for supplying weapons and munitions to the rebels of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de **Angola** (UNITA). After the signing of the peace agreement that ended the **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila** in December 2002, Kamina was a demobilization and reintegration center for former combatants, called *brassage*. The constitution of 2006 made the town the capital city of **Haut-Lomami Province**, effective February 2009. *See also* NATIONAL WAY.

**KAMITATU ETSU, OLIVIER (1957– ).** Kamitatu attended secondary school in Kinshasa and graduated with a degree in political science from the Université Libre de Bruxelles. He was a member of the **Mouvement de Libération du Congo** (MLC) of **Jean-Pierre Bemba** and was appointed speaker of the Transitional National Assembly from 2003 to 2006. However, he was suspended by Bemba and then founded the Alliance pour le Renouveau du Congo (ARC) party. The ARC allied with the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la**

**Démocratie (RCD)-Kisangani**–Mouvement de Libération (ML) of **Antipas Mbusa Nyamwisi** to form the Forces pour le Renouveau in order to back Nyamwisi in the 2006 presidential elections. The ARC won two seats in the parliamentary elections.

**KAMITATU MASSAMBA, CLÉOPHAS (1931–2009).** An early **independence** leader who was one of the founders of the **Parti Solidaire Africain** (PSA), which participated in the first Congolese **governments**. Kamitatu was born in June 1931 in Kilamba and was educated by the Jesuits. He led the PSA delegation to the **Round Table Conferences** and was elected a deputy to **parliament** in June 1960. He was also the first governor of the **Leopoldville** province after independence. Then, he became interior minister and subsequently planning and development minister in the governments of **Cyrille Adoula** of 1962–64. He was foreign minister in the **Évariste Kimba** government that was overthrown by the **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu coup d'état** in 1965. Following the coup, Kamitatu went into exile, where he organized the **Front Socialiste Africain** (FSA) **opposition** group and wrote a highly critical biography of Mobutu. He later accepted Mobutu's offer of **amnesty** and returned to Congo in 1983. He was turned down as a candidate in the 1988 legislative **elections**, but eventually returned to government as minister of **agriculture** in the 1980s and was appointed to the **Central Committee**. With the advent of the **democratic transition**, Kamitatu became a senior official of the **Parti Démocrate et Social Chrétien** (PDSC) led by **Joseph Ileo**, but had a falling out with the central leadership after Ileo's death and, in 1995, formed a splinter wing. He died in early 2009.

**KANANGA.** Formerly Luluabourg until 1972, Kananga was the capital of **Kasai Occidental**. It is an administrative urban center with an area of 378 square km and an estimated **population** of 1.4 million people in 2008, up from 492,156 in 1982, the date of the last official census. From the colonial era, Kananga was the administrative, political, economic, and educational center of **Kasai Province**. Its influence began to wane, however, with the creation of **Kasai Oriental region** in 1966 and the gradual transfer beginning in the 1970s of **diamond**-marketing operations to **Mbuji-Mayi** (formerly Bakwanga). By the 1980s, its infrastructure had decayed severely, and Kananga was



experiencing a severe recession. Efforts were made in the late 1980s to resolve some of these problems. The installation of a switching station along the **Inga-Shaba power line** brought an infusion of capital and some jobs. Kananga remains an important administrative, **transportation**, and milling center in the region. Kananga became the capital of **Lulua Province** in February 2009 as the result of the 2006 **constitution**.

**KANDE, DZAMBULATE (1930– )**. Journalist and **government** official who headed the Congolese Press Agency in 1964 when the **United Nations** (UN) ended its operation in Congo. Kande was born on 23 April 1930 in **Kinshasa** and studied in **Lubumbashi**, in Prague and at the École Supérieure de Journalisme in Paris in the 1950s and 1960s. He served as information minister in the **Léonard Mulamba** government formed after the **Mobutu Sese Seko coup d'état** and in several other subsequent governments. He retired from politics in 1997.

**KANYONGA, MOBATELI (? –1978)**. Secretary-general of the **Mouvement d'Action pour la Résurrection du Congo** (MARC) who, along with 18 others, was tried in absentia and received the death sentence in 1978 for conspiring to overthrow the **government**. He reportedly died shortly thereafter in a gun accident.

**KANZA, THOMAS (1933–2004)**. A diplomat, intellectual, and reportedly the first Congolese to receive a **university** degree, Kanza served as ambassador to the **United Nations** (UN) with ministerial rank in the **Patrice Lumumba** and **Joseph Ileo** governments in the early 1960s, when the debate over UN intervention in Congo was at its height. He was appointed ambassador to London in the **Cyrille Adoula** government, but resigned and joined the **Stanleyville** government during the eastern **rebellion**. He served as its foreign representative from September 1964 to 1966, when he went into exile in London. Disillusioned with Congolese **politics**, Kanza wrote a number of books that bitterly questioned the future of the Congolese state.

Kanza returned to Congo for the first time following the general **amnesty** of 1983. During the **democratic transition**, he reestab-

lished his family's political base in **Kongo Central**. He ran unsuccessfully as the pro-**Mobutu Sese Seko** candidate against **opposition** candidate **Étienne Tshisekedi**, when the **Conférence Nationale Souveraine** (CNS) chose the **prime minister** for the transitional government in 1992. During subsequent years, Kanza frequently sided with pro-Mobutu forces. After the fall of Mobutu, he was appointed minister of international cooperation in the first **Laurent Kabila** government of June 1997. He died on 25 October 2004 in London of a sudden heart attack while returning to his latest post as Congo's ambassador to Sweden.

**KASAI.** Originally one of the six colonial **provinces**, Kasai was the second richest in minerals after **Katanga** and, at its peak in the 1960s and 1970s, produced two-thirds of the non-Communist world's industrial **diamonds**. On 8 August 1960, under the leadership of **Albert Kalonji**, the southern portion of Kasai seceded and proclaimed itself the Independent Mining Republic of South Kasai. Kalonji ended the secession in early 1962. South Kasai was, however, represented when **parliament** reopened on 25 July 1961, at **Lovanium University** under **United Nations** protection. On 24 December 1966, Kasai was divided into two provinces, **Kasai Occidental** and **Kasai Oriental**, partly because of tensions between the **Luba** and **Lulua**.

#### **KASAI OCCIDENTAL PROVINCE/WEST KASAI PROVINCE.**

Kasai Occidental was a **province** dominated by the **Lulua** and Kete **ethnic groups** with an estimated **population** of 5 million people in 2005 and an area of 156,967 square km. It represented roughly half of the former **Kasai Province** that was partitioned into Kasai Occidental and **Kasai Oriental** in 1966. The capital of the province was **Kananga**. Primary economic activities include **transportation**, (primarily subsistence) **agriculture**, iron-ore **mining**, and some **diamond** trade. Like many of the more remote provinces, Kasai Occidental suffered from recession and a severe deterioration of its infrastructure in the 1980s. The **National Way** transportation route, by which a large portion of Congolese minerals are exported, crosses former Kasai province by **rail** from **Kamina** to **Ilebo** and by riverboat from Ilebo to **Kinshasa**. The 2006 **constitution** divided Kasai Occidental into two provinces, Kasai (Occidental) with **Luebo** as its

capital and **Lulua Province** whose capital is Kananga. This division became effective in February 2009.

**KASAI ORIENTAL PROVINCE/EAST KASAI PROVINCE.** Kasai Oriental, with **Mbuji-Mayi** (formerly Bakwanga) as its capital, had an estimated **population** of 7 million people as of 2005 and an area of 168,216 square km. It represented roughly half of the former **Kasai province**, which was partitioned into Kasai Oriental and **Kasai Occidental** in 1966. Kasai Oriental was the **Luba**-dominated province, divided into the urban district of Mbuji-Mayi and three rural districts of Kabinda, Sankuru, and Tshilenge. Mbuji-Mayi, with an estimated population of 1.2 million in 2005, is a major **diamond**-trading center and has considerable banking and commercial services related primarily to the diamond industry. In the 1990s, diamonds smuggled by Angolan rebels from the diamond-rich area of north-western **Angola** were marketed through Kasai Oriental in exchange for arms. The 2006 constitution divided Kasai Oriental into three provinces, Kasai Oriental, **Lomami**, and **Sankuru**. The division became effective in February 2009.

**KASAI RIVER.** Congo's second major **river transportation** route after the **Congo River**, the Kasai rises from headwaters in eastern **Angola** and flows 600 km east to **Dilolo** in **Katanga**, then 1,000 km north to **Ilebo** in the former **Kasai Occidental Province**, at which point it turns to the west and flows an additional 600 km before joining the Congo River 300 km north of **Kinshasa**. The Kasai River is navigable from Ilebo to the Congo River, and forms an important part of the **National Way** transportation route, by which a major portion of minerals from Katanga are exported. Several other important tributaries feed into the Kasai River, including the Sankuru, **Lulua**, **Kwilu**, and **Kwango** Rivers.

**KASAI SECESSION.** The Autonomous State of South Kasai or the Independent Mining Republic of South Kasai (*République Minière*) was officially established on 8 August 1960. Its capital was Bakwanga (present-day **Mbuji-Mayi**). **Albert Kalonji** was named president of South Kasai, and **Joseph Ngalula** was appointed head of government. An assembly of notables invested

Kalonji's father with the imperial title of *mulopwe* (king) on 12 April 1961. The new king immediately abdicated in favor of his son, who thereafter ruled South Kasai as *Mulopwe Albert Kalonji I*. After a bloody four-month military campaign, during which thousands of civilians were massacred, troops of the Congolese central government reconquered the region and arrested Kalonji on 30 December 1961, thus ending the South Kasai secession a few weeks later. Kalonji attempted to set up a new government following an escape from prison on 7 September 1962, but it was terminated less than a month later.

**KASAJI.** A town of about 45,000 people, as of 2006, in southern **Lualaba Province**. Kasaji lies on the **road** and **railway** between **Dilolo** and **Kolwezi**. Kasaji was one of several towns captured by guerrillas of the **Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo (FLNC)** during the first **Shaba War** in 1977.

**KASAVUBU, JOSEPH (1917–1969).** Joseph Kasavubu (sometimes spelled *Kasa Vubu*) was born in the village of Kuma-Dizi in the Mayombe district of Lower Congo. After a few years of rudimentary schooling in the Kikongo language, Kasavubu attended a *petit séminaire* from 1929 to 1936 and then a seminary in Kibwe (Kasai), from which he was dismissed in 1939 with the equivalent of an undergraduate degree in philosophy for reasons that have never been made clear. He was nevertheless permitted to take a teacher's certificate and to work as a teacher in mission schools. Kasavubu eventually broke with the missions and took a bookkeeping job with the colonial administration in 1942. His entry into public life in 1946 was sponsored by **Jean Bolikango** (later his rival for the presidency), who engineered his election as secretary and ex officio of an alumni association called the Union des Intérêts Sociaux Congolais, which was a study group formed to circumvent the colonial ban on political organizations. However, Kasavubu's real debut in politics came when he joined the **Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO)** in the early 1950s. In 1954, he was elected president of the ABAKO as a compromise candidate. Although political associations were not permitted at the time, Kasavubu transformed ABAKO in such a way as to make it a **political party** in all but name.

When overt political activity emerged in 1956, Kasavubu was ready for action. His well-organized campaign in the first municipal elections in December 1957 resulted in a sweeping victory for ABAKO in the capital city of **Léopoldville**. He was elected burgomaster (mayor) of the Dendale (now Kasavubu) commune of Leopoldville. In the late 1950s, Kasavubu became an increasingly outspoken advocate of greater political and personal freedoms for Congolese. He was imprisoned during the riots for **independence** in Leopoldville in January 1959, but was released a few months later.

ABAKO won a significant number of seats in the elections of 1960 but did not obtain a majority. Following a brief political standoff, ABAKO and the **Mouvement National Congolais** (MNC), the other major winner in the elections, agreed to a compromise under which Kasavubu, running against Bolikango, won the **presidential** vote in parliament while MNC leader **Patrice Lumumba** became **prime minister** at the head of a broad-based coalition **government**.

Under the **Loi Fondamentale** that served as a **constitution** from June 1960 to July 1964, the post of president was intended to be largely ceremonial and the powers of government were to be vested primarily in the prime minister and parliament. However, Kasavubu managed to wield considerable power by dismissing prime ministers and designating political rivals to replace them. On two notable occasions, the prime ministers wielded enough influence in parliament to block Kasavubu's designated successor, leading to political standoffs. One such standoff between Kasavubu and Lumumba in September 1960 led **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu**, then chief of staff of the **army**, to "neutralize" parliament and appoint a **College of Commissioners** to govern the country for four months. Another such crisis arose between Kasavubu and **Moïse Tshombe**, when the latter announced that he would seek the presidency—an office which Kasavubu himself had helped turn into a major power center through the 1964 adoption of a new constitution. With the two men thus bent on a collision course, Kasavubu announced his opposition to the employment of foreign mercenaries to fight the eastern **rebellion** and summarily dismissed Tshombe from the premiership.

As had been the case in 1960, however, he was unable to secure parliamentary endorsement for his handpicked successor, **Évariste Kimba** (a former associate of Tshombe), and the ensuing stalemate

was eventually resolved on **24 November 1965**, when Mobutu dismissed all civilian politicians and established direct army rule. Mobutu's own lack of a political base, however, soon led him to seek a reconciliation with Kasavubu as a means of securing legitimacy for his regime. Lacking any real alternative, the deposed president gave the new regime his measured endorsement and accepted an honorary seat in the Senate. He retired to a farm in Mayombe, where he died on 24 March 1969. His death and that of Tshombe (29 June 1969) signaled the eclipse of the first generation of Congolese politicians.

**KASAVUBU, JUSTINE M'POYO (1951– )**. Born on 14 April in Leopoldville (now **Kinshasa**), Justine Kasavubu is the daughter of the first Congolese president, **Joseph Kasavubu**. After her father's death in 1969, she went into exile with the rest of her family in Algeria, then in Switzerland. After a few years there she moved to **Belgium** where, in the mid-1970s, she completed her bachelor of sciences degree in social sciences from the Catholic University of Louvain. She worked for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva for a number of years before joining the Center for African Studies at the Université Libre de Bruxelles where she pursued research on epidemiology of natural disasters.

She returned home during the **democratic transition** and, in early 1991, she joined the **Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social** (UDPS). When **Laurent Kabila** became president in May 1997, Justine Kasavubu was appointed minister of the Department of Civil Service Personnel (Public Function). In late 1997, Kabila removed her and appointed her as ambassador of Congo to Belgium. She resigned her job a few months later as the result of disagreement with Kabila's policies.

**KASHAMURA, ANICET**. A former clerk in the colonial administration, Kashamura co-founded the Centre du Regroupement Africain (CEREA) as a **political party** in August 1958. He became one of the four members of the Executive College established by **Belgium** to oversee the transition to **independence**. Other members included **Joseph Kasavubu**, **Patrice Lumumba**, and Remy Mwamba. The CEREA became part of the coalition of nationalist movements that provided Lumumba with enough votes to become **prime minister**.

Kashamura was minister of information in the Lumumba **government**. He was dismissed along with Lumumba and **Antoine Gizenga** by **President** Kasavubu on 5 September 1960. In early 1961, Kashamura took power in **Kivu Province** in the name of Gizenga's rival central government in **Stanleyville**. He was a minister in the rival Stanleyville government in 1961 but was driven into exile when Gizenga accepted a part in the **Cyrille Adoula** government of national reconciliation. Following the takeover of Congo by the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) in May 1997, the newly installed President **Laurent Kabila** appointed Kashamura as chair of a constitutional commission to draft a new **constitution** leading to **elections** by 1999.

**KASONGO.** A city on the **Lualaba River** in southwestern **Maniema** province, Kasongo was a center for the **Afro–Arab slave** and **ivory** trade in the 19th century. It was considered the capital of the **Tippo Tip** empire in the 1870s.

**KASONGO KALOMBO.** A **Luba** king who ascended to the throne in 1860 and allied with **Afro–Arab** traders in eastern Congo against European traders attempting to penetrate the interior from the west. External pressures and internal conflicts during the late 1800s fragmented the kingdom and eroded the authority of the king.

**KASONGO NYEMBO (NIEMBO).** The last of the great **Luba** kings who held out in eastern Congo against the Belgians until 1910.

**KATANGA PROVINCE.** The mineral-rich province that drew European **explorers** into the central African interior in the 1800s and was a major cause of the **United Nations** (UN) intervention in the “Congo crisis” following **independence**. Katanga had an area of 496,965 square km and an estimated **population** of 7.6 million in 2006 (3,762,806 in 1982). The southern part of the former Katanga Province is rich in **copper**, **cobalt**, **tin**, tungsten, **gold**, and other by-products of copper ores and, until the deterioration of the **mining** industry in the early 1990s, its **exports** provided more than one-half of the **government's** revenues and two-thirds of its foreign exchange. Yet, Katanga was more closely linked historically, ethnically, and

economically to southern Africa than to **Kinshasa** and the western African coast.

When **Leopold II**'s agents laid claim to the region in the 1890s, beating the British colonizer **Cecil Rhodes**, they found local residents already hostile to outside influences. During the early years of the **Congo Free State (CFS)**, the region was run at first by the privately owned **Compagnie du Katanga** and later by the **Comité Spécial du Katanga**. In 1910, however, Leopold II placed the territory under a vice governor general, separate from the rest of the CFS. It was brought under central colonial administration in 1933, in a move that was widely resented by local and foreign residents. Periodic uprisings during the colonial era were harshly put down.

At independence, **Moïse Tshombe**'s **Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT)** swept the local elections, leading to the formation of a one-party provincial government. Unhappy with CONAKAT's representation in the central government and encouraged by private commercial interests and an organization of European residents called the **Union Katangaise**, Katanga seceded on 11 July 1960. The **Katanga secession** held world attention during the next two years as Tshombe stalled mediation efforts and frustrated UN attempts at reunification. Congo's first **prime minister**, **Patrice Lumumba**, and UN Secretary-General **Dag Hammarskjöld** died in Katanga, and thousands of **Luba** and **Lunda** were killed in interethnic fighting during the secession. After a series of mediation efforts and two military operations by UN forces (Operation Rum-punch and Operation Morthor, the latter widely condemned by some members of the international community), the Katangan secession ended on 14 January 1963.

**President Mobutu Sese Seko**, following the **coup d'état** in 1965, sought to strengthen control over the province and renamed it **Shaba** in 1971. The region regained international attention on 8 March 1977 when guerrillas of the **Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo (FLNC)** occupied a series of towns along the **railway** linking Shaba's mining centers to **Angola's Benguela Railway**. The guerrillas were primarily of the **Lunda ethnic group** and were led by **Nathaniel Mbumba**, a former officer in the **Gendarmerie Katangaise**. The gendarmerie had supported the Katanga secession. Sometimes called the "Eighty-Day War," the first Shaba invasion



was not a secession attempt but rather an effort to spark a general uprising in Congo. However, the FLNC stopped before reaching the important mining town of **Kolwezi** and was eventually driven back into Angola by the national army, backed by 1,400 **Moroccan** troops and logistical support from **France**.

In 1978, the FLNC attacked again. This time, however, it infiltrated the area around Kolwezi and on 3 May seized the city, halting work at the mines. According to **human rights** organizations, the guerrillas then went on a week-long spree of looting and violence in which 1,000 Congolese and 200 foreigners were killed. The national army, backed by 700 French Legionnaires, parachuted into Kolwezi and recaptured the city after several days of bloody fighting. More than 1,000 paratroopers from **Belgium** also dropped on the city of **Kamina** to the north. The **United States** government supplied equipment and transport that included 18 C-141 planes. The guerrillas gradually withdrew from the territory with stolen vehicles and looted goods. An **Organization of African Unity** (OAU) peacekeeping force composed of Moroccan, Senegalese, and Togolese troops was deployed while the national army units were reorganized, re-equipped, and retrained.

Charges of Angolan and **Cuban** support for the rebels brought condemnation in international forums. The two attacks also focused attention on the inability of the armed forces to defend the national territory and the high degree of political and **military** centralization of the Mobutu government. This led to a measure of liberalization in Congolese **politics** and diplomatic initiatives to resolve the differences between the Congolese and Angolan governments. Congo had supported the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) faction in the Angolan civil war and reportedly was supplying arms to the FNLA for attacks on Angolan installations. After the second **Shaba War**, however, Congo and Angola agreed to cease hostilities and stop supporting each other's **opposition** guerrillas. The two countries established diplomatic relations later that year.

In the early 1980s, a series of clashes and cross-border raids by Congolese and **Zambian** troops raised tensions in the region. However, Presidents Mobutu and Kenneth Kaunda expressed a desire for negotiated solutions to the conflicts, and a joint commission was established to resolve disputes. In 1984 and 1985, guerrillas of the

**Parti Révolutionnaire du Peuple (PRP)** based in the **Mitumba Mountains** of northern Shaba, attacked the town of **Moba** in an attempt to embarrass the Mobutu **administration**, but government troops quickly regained control of the town.

With the advent of multipartyism in 1990, political activity increased in Shaba. Many residents supported opposition parties, in particular the **Union des Fédéralistes et des Républicains Indépendants (UFERI)** of **Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond**, a former prime minister and favorite son, or the **Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS)** of **Étienne Tshisekedi**, a Luba from neighboring **Kasai Oriental Province**. Political tensions between the two groups increased in 1991, when Nguza was appointed prime minister. The Nguza government appointed the regional president of UFERI, **Gabriel Kyungu wa Kumwanza**, as governor, reportedly the first governor from the region. Kyungu advocated considerable autonomy for Shaba, which he called Katanga, and made a number of speeches advocating “Katanga for Katangans.” These heightened historical rivalries between Luba-Kasai, who had immigrated during the colonial era, and more-established ethnic groups in the region. When Nguza was dismissed in 1992 and Tshisekedi was elected prime minister by the **National Conference**, attacks began against Luba-Kasai, reportedly by militia of the UFERI **youth** wing. An estimated 500 people died in the violence, which lasted into 1993. More than 100,000 Luba-Kasai lost their homes and returned to **Kasai**. Opposition leaders charged UFERI with **ethnic cleansing** as part of an effort to consolidate its political base by expelling members of Tshisekedi’s ethnic group. In April 1995, Kyungu was dismissed amid charges of diverting income from the mines and reports he had stockpiled weapons for an eventual secession of the region. Forces of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL)**, led by PRP leader **Laurent Kabila**, took power in the region in early 1997, and Kyungu was placed under house arrest. He was released later that year and made governor once again.

In early 2005, the government reported a secession attempt in the southern part of Katanga that implicated a number of military officers and several members of the presidential guard. At least 35 civilians and almost 100 military officers were arrested. They included André Tshombe, son of the late Prime Minister Tshombe and leader of a

local political party. The majority of those arrested were members of ethnic groups from southern Katanga. However, a number of observers believed that the so-called plot was a pretext to clap down on opponents of **Joseph Kabila's Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie (PPRD)**, so that they did not challenge the incumbent president and his allies in the legislative elections. The 2006 **constitution** divided Katanga into **Haut-Katanga, Haut Lomami, Lualaba, and Tanganyika Provinces**, effective February 2009.

**KATANGA SECESSION.** The secession is Congo's best-known and most successful **civil war** and the major reason for the **United Nations (UN)** first, and for more than 30 years, only unilateral military intervention. Katanga historically was an autonomous-minded part of central Africa. Its local inhabitants resisted colonial authorities, and a number of uprisings during the colonial era were harshly put down. Katanga's geographical and ethnic ties to southern Africa and its distance from the capital of **Leopoldville** contributed to a lack of identification with the rest of **Belgian Congo**. From 1910 to 1933, the province had its own separate **administration** and vice **governor** general, appointed by the king of **Belgium**. Its mineral wealth and relatively developed infrastructure was a cause of pride. The fact that it was a major contributor to foreign exchange earnings caused resentment toward the rest of the territory.

At **independence**, **Moïse Tshombe's Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT)** swept the local elections, leading to a single-party provincial government. The causes of the Katanga secession are many. Stated simply, CONAKAT was unhappy with its representation in the central **government** because it received relatively minor representation in the first cabinet of **Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba**. Supported by private business interests and its sizable expatriate population, Katanga seceded on 11 July 1960. For three years, Tshombe stonewalled reunification attempts by Congolese leaders and the UN. At the same time tensions between the **Lunda and Luba ethnic groups** escalated into fighting, displacing hundreds of thousands of residents and requiring a major UN relief effort.

The UN carried out two military operations in Katanga, Operation Rumpunch and Operation Morthor, ostensibly aimed at removing foreign **mercenaries** who were the backbone of the Katangan military forces, but also designed to weaken the Katangan government and its foreign supporters. The Katangan government, although recognized by several countries, was unable to withstand the pressure, and the secession ended on 14 January 1963. Tshombe fled into exile and several CONAKAT leaders were appointed to **Cyrille Adoula's** government of national reconciliation.

**KAZEMBE.** A group of people, related to the **Lunda**, that resides in **Haut-Katanga** in the Luapula Valley near the border with **Zambia**. During the mid-1800s, the Kazembe had some control over the **ivory** trade, but their leader, the Mwata Kazembe, was subordinate to the paramount **chief** of the Lunda. Traders from the east eventually bypassed the Kazembe and began dealing directly with the Lunda and **Luba**.

**KENGO WA DONDO, LÉON (1935– ).** Kengo was born Leon Lubicz on 22 May 1935, at Libenge in the former **Équateur Province**. He was son of a Polish father and a **Tutsi** mother. He changed his name to Kengo wa Dondo in 1971 during **President Mobutu Sese Seko's** **Africanization** campaign. He studied law and received his doctorate in 1962 from the Université Libre de Bruxelles in **Belgium**. In April 1968, he was named prosecutor general to the **Kinshasa** Court of Appeals and in August was promoted to attorney general. He became president of the **Judicial Council** in December 1977 and a member of the **Central Committee** in September 1980. Kengo gained fame in the 1980s as the tough lawyer who prosecuted **Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond**, the **Group of Thirteen Parliamentarians**, and other Congolese political **dissidents**. He was appointed first state commissioner (**prime minister**) on 5 November 1982, entrusted with cleaning up **corruption** in government and enforcing austerity measures that were part of a package of economic reforms negotiated with the **International Monetary Fund** (IMF). Kengo was not considered a political threat because, although he was born of a Tutsi mother, his father was Polish and under the Congolese (Zairian) **constitution** both parents of the president of the republic must be Congolese.

In 1986, after two years of recession, party members argued forcefully against continued adherence to the IMF-imposed austerity measures and Kengo's policies began to lose favor. The post of prime minister was abolished in October 1986. Kengo served as foreign minister from 1986 to 1987 and as prime minister from 1988 to 1990.

With the advent of multipartyism in 1990, Kengo launched the **Union des Démocrates Indépendants** (UDI). The party was meant to be centrist, positioning itself between supporters of Mobutu and the **Sacred Union opposition**. At one point, Kengo promised that if elected president he would repay more than \$100 million he confessed he had embezzled during the 1980s, causing consternation among political leaders and a surge of approval from the general population.

In June 1994, after four years of political and economic turmoil, Kengo was elected prime minister by the acting transitional **parliament**, the **Haut Conseil de la République/Parlement de la Transition** (HCR/PT), and directed to stabilize the national economy and organize national **elections**. His efforts at economic stabilization initially received support from Congo's major foreign creditors, and later that year he paid an official visit to Europe and the **United States** (U.S.), ending several years of diplomatic isolation. At home, however, his efforts received lukewarm support from pro-Mobutu forces and virulent opposition from the Sacred Union. By 1995, inflation had returned to triple-digit levels, although Kengo was reappointed prime minister in the cabinet reshuffle of December 1996. He thus became the leader of a crisis cabinet that sought to defeat the rebellion against Mobutu. He was undermined by many Mobutu supporters because of his Tutsi origin, as **Laurent Kabila's Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) rebels were allied with the Rwandan Tutsi-dominated government. As Kabila's AFDL advanced through the country, Kengo was also criticized for not conducting the war efficiently. He resigned in March 1997. He fled the country in May 1997, on the eve of the arrival of the AFDL in Kinshasa. Kengo retired momentarily from politics and, while in Belgium in 2003, he was charged with money laundering.

He returned to Congo during the transition period and backed **Jean-Pierre Bemba** in the 2006 presidential elections. Bemba lost to **Joseph Kabila**, but Kengo was elected as a senator from **Équateur Province** in January 2007. On 11 May 2007, Kengo was unexpectedly elected as president of the Senate, defeating Léonard She Okitundu, the candidate of the majority coalition, the **Alliance de la Majorité Présidentielle** (AMP). Kengo, who ran as an independent candidate, received 55 votes to Okitundu's 49.

**KIBASSA MALIBA, FRÉDÉRIC (1939–2003).** A native of **Katanga**, Kibassa was born on 28 December 1939 in **Lubumbashi** where he was educated and, in his youth, was a well-known boxer. Kibassa began his political career as the head of the youth department in the National Executive Committee of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) in 1967. In November 1967, he was promoted from this position to three posts: as the Youth of MPR head, **Political Bureau** member, and minister of youth and sports. However, he became an **opposition** leader who was a prominent figure in the **Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social** (UDPS) party from its founding in 1982. He was elected president of the UDPS when it was formed in 1982 and was detained on numerous occasions in the 1980s for advocating a return to multipartyism. He was named minister of sports and leisure in 1988 during a brief period of *détente* with the **Mobutu Sese Seko government**.

In the early 1990s, he was one of four presidents of the UDPS, responsible for internal party matters. Moreover, he was widely viewed as the number-two man of the party, after founder **Étienne Tshisekedi**. Kibassa's residence was the headquarters of the **Sacred Union** in the early 1990s and, during periods of civil disobedience, it was the target of a number of attacks by Congolese **security** forces. His eldest son, Betho, was killed in such an attack on the night of 31 January 1993. In January 1996, a rift developed between Kibassa and Tshisekedi, in part over whether to participate in national **elections** scheduled for 1997. The dispute took on regional tones because Kibassa was from Katanga and Tshisekedi from **Kasai Oriental**.

After the fall of Mobutu in 1997, Kibassa sided at first with Tshisekedi in opposing the government of **Laurent Kabila** when it

failed to reach a power-sharing agreement with senior UDPS leaders. In November, however, Kibassa accepted the post of deputy minister of mines. He was promoted to minister of mines after the cabinet reshuffle of January 1998. He lost his position in the government after **Joseph Kabila** became president. Kibasa died in April 2003.

**KIBINDA ILUNGA.** Brother of the founder of the **Luba Empire**, **Kalala Ilunga**. In 1600, Kibinda led a group of followers from the Luba lands in southern **Kasai** to an area near the Congo–**Angola** border to found what became the **Lunda Empire**.

**KIKWIT.** A city of 550,000 inhabitants (2006) in the **Kwilu Province**. Kikwit is located on the **Kwilu River** and along the major road linking **Kinshasa** to the central part of the country. It prospered during the colonial era and was the capital of Kwilu Province in the early 1960s. However, a series of uprisings, beginning with the **Pierre Mulele rebellion** in 1964, caused Kikwit to lose favor with the central government. As a result, considerable attention was devoted to developing **Bandundu**, a small city lying down the river. During the administrative reforms of the late 1960s, Kikwit became an urban subregion, albeit an economically important one. Major economic activities in the area included **palm oil** and vegetable oil processing, **timber**, some **livestock** husbandry, and vegetable farming. In March 1995, Kikwit became the focus of an international medical alert when an outbreak of **Ebola** virus caused more than 200 deaths. Authorities, fearing the virus would spread to Kinshasa, for several weeks blockaded roads to the city, disrupting commerce and food supplies. The constitution of 2006 made Kikwit the capital of Kwilu Province, effective February 2009.

**KILO-MOTO GOLD MINES BOARD.** *See* OFFICE DES MINES D'OR DE KILO-MOTO (OKIMO).

**KIMBA, ÉVARISTE (1926–1966).** One of the founders of the **Association des Baluba du Katanga** (BALUBAKAT), Kimba was born on 16 July 1926 in N'Saka, Bukama territory. After completing his middle school education (9th grade), he enrolled in continuing education by taking night classes in sociology, economics, and politics at

the Institut St. Boniface in **Elisabethville**. In 1959, he visited West Germany, **Zambia**, South Rhodesia (now **Zimbabwe**), and Senegal. He also traveled to a number of countries, including the **United States**. He became a journalist for the *Essor du Congo*, later *Essor du Katanga*. At **independence**, Kimba was vice president of the Association of Congolese Press. He was appointed associate chief of cabinet of **Belgian** Minister Ganshof van der Meersch, who was in charge of General Affairs in Africa.

In June 1960, he was elected senator on the list of the **Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga** (CONAKAT). When Katanga seceded, Kimba became the minister of finance for the seceding state. After the defeat of the secession, he was a member of the provincial government. Following the dismissal of **Moïse Tshombe** on 13 October 1965, Kimba was asked by **President Joseph Kasavubu** to form a government. His first attempt was thwarted by Tshombe's supporters in **parliament**. His second attempt was thwarted by **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu's** military **coup d'état** on **24 November 1965**. Five months after the coup, Kimba and three associates were accused of trying to overthrow the Mobutu government in what was called the "Pentecost Plot." They were found guilty in a trial denounced in juridical circles as a sham and were sentenced to death. On 2 June 1966, despite appeals from the international community, the four were publicly hanged in **Kinshasa** before 50,000 spectators.

**KIMBANGU, SIMON (1887–1951)**. Founder of the **Kimbanguist Church**, the first African Christian church to be recognized by the World Council of Churches. He was born around 12 September 1887 in Nkamba, near Thysville (now **Mbanza-Ngungu**). The son of a traditional religious leader, Kimbangu became a Baptist in 1915 and worked as a catechist for several years before beginning his own ministry in early 1921, after he dreamed he had been appointed by God to heal and preach. At first, he worked with **Protestant** leaders, but broke away when some of them began to express disapproval over reports of his miracles. In June 1921, the colonial authorities tried to arrest Kimbangu during a religious meeting, but he escaped capture, further enhancing his reputation as a miracle worker. However, he turned himself in to authorities on 12 September. He was tried and



sentenced to death on charges of crimes against the security of the state, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by **Albert I**. Despite pleas from his followers to use his powers to escape, Kimbangu died in prison in **Elisabethville** on 12 October 1951. During his 30 years in prison, his followers continued to regard him as their spiritual leader. *See also* MESSIANIC AND SYNCRETIC MOVEMENTS.

**KIMBANGUIST CHURCH.** Formally known as the Église de Jésus-Christ sur la Terre par le Prophète **Simon Kimbangu** (Church of Jesus Christ on Earth by the **Prophet** Simon Kimbangu), Kimbanguism is considered a syncretic group, that is, one that mixes **Christianity** with traditional beliefs and practices. In August 1969, it was the first independent African church to be admitted to the World Council of Churches. The church claimed to have more than 6 million adherents in 2006, or 10 percent of the Congolese **population**, although independent observers estimated membership to be lower.

Kimbanguism is based on the Bible and the concept of spiritual salvation. Although it mixes some traditional African practices, it follows the law of Moses and calls for the destruction of fetishes and an end to sorcery and polygamy. The church was formed by Simon Kimbangu, originally a member of the British Baptist Church, following a vision in 1921. When Kimbangu was arrested in 1921, the church was pushed underground. A period of repression led to many apostles calling themselves prophets and to increased use of animist practices among some of these groups. Kimbangu died in prison in 1951 and was replaced by his son, **Joseph Diangienda**. A church council was organized in 1956 and was granted legal recognition by the colonial government in 1959.

Like many Congolese churches, Kimbanguism was restricted by the Congolese government in the early 1970s. Unlike the Roman **Catholic Church**, however, the Kimbanguist Church has never played an active public role in national **politics**. *See also* MESSIANIC AND SYNCRETIC MOVEMENTS.

**KIMPA VITA NSIMBA, NDONA BEATRIZ (ca. 1684–1706).** Kimpa Vita was born into a family of the Kongo nobility, called Mwana Kongo, and was probably baptized soon after, as the **Kongo**

**Kingdom** had been a **Catholic** monarchy for two centuries. At the time of her birth, Kongo was torn by civil war, and the kingdom was divided among rival pretenders to the throne. Kimpa Vita was trained as *nganga marinda*, a person said to be able to communicate with the supernatural world. The *nganga marinda* was connected to the *kimpasi* cult, a healing cult that flourished in late 17th-century Kongo. However, sometime around 1700, she renounced her role and moved closer to the views of the Catholic Church. Kimpa Vita denounced traditional ceremonies and ordered the banning of fetishes by the Kongo people.

Called to mission service, she went to live among colonists sent out by King Pedro IV, one of several rival rulers of Kongo, to reoccupy the ancient and now abandoned capital of São Salvador. A great deal of religious fervor existed among these colonists, who were tired of endless civil wars in the Kongo Kingdom. Kimpa Vita's religious message came as an answer to end civil wars by reunifying all provinces under the control of rival pretenders to the throne. In her message, she combined traditional African culture with Christianity. She had her first prediction in 1703 that God would punish the Kongo unless its provinces reunited under a new king because the civil wars that had plagued Kongo since the Battle of Mbwila in 1665 had angered Christ. Later that year, she fell ill and claimed that the spirit of St. Anthony possessed her. Saint Anthony was a Catholic priest and miracle worker. She also announced that the spirit of St. Anthony would allow her direct access to the other world and that she would die every Friday to be resurrected again on Monday. During her time away, she would receive instructions from God, which she would relay to the Kongo people.

Kimpa Vita's teaching was encapsulated in the "Salve Antoniana," a prayer that converted the "Salve Regina (Hail Holy Queen)," a Catholic prayer, into an anthem of the movement. Among other things, the "Salve Antoniana" taught that God was only concerned with believers' intentions not with sacraments and that St. Anthony was the greatest saint, a "second God." According to Kimpa Vita, sacraments like marriage, confession, and baptism "are meaningless to God because God knows one's intentions." She also taught that the principal characters in Christianity, including Jesus, Mary, and St. Francis, were all born in Kongo Kingdom and were, in fact, people

of Kongo. She upbraided Catholic priests for refusing to acknowledge this “fact.” Moreover, she believed that the Christ who founded Christianity and his disciples were black Africans. She placed the birth of Jesus Christ within the Kongo, with São Salvador as the biblical Bethlehem, claiming that God wanted to restore it as the capital of the Kongo Kingdom. Her message became so popular it could be called a spiritual renaissance, which threatened the influence of the Catholic Church among the African people. The movement became known as “Antonian.”

Kimpa Vita sent out missionaries of her movement, called Little Anthonies, to other provinces. They were not successful in the coastal province of Soyo, where the Prince expelled them, but they were more successful in the dissident southern part of Soyo and Mbamba Lovata where they won a large number of converts. Even though her movement integrated African culture with Christianity, Catholic priests drove her supporters away. Some were imprisoned and beaten daily for their convictions.

In 1706, Kimpa Vita gave birth to a son. She continued to emphasize the closeness of God to the African people, a message that was a unifying factor among Antonians. The establishment of the Antonian movement and its consequent success led to the arrest of Kimpa Vita, her son, and associates. She was captured near her hometown in 1706 by forces loyal to Pedro IV. She was tried under Kongo law as a witch and a heretic, with the consent and counsel of the Capuchin priests Bernardo da Gallo and Lorenzo da Lucca. Kimpa Vita and her son were burned at the stake in late 1706 in Evululu, the temporary capital of the Kongo Kingdom.

The execution of Kimpa Vita did not have the effect that the Catholic community hoped for. The Antonian prophetic movement outlasted her death. In fact, Antonianism spread from São Salvador to other provinces in Kongo. Her followers continued to believe that she was still alive, and it was only when Pedro IV's forces took São Salvador in 1709 that the political force of her movement was broken. However, some hint of the strength of her teaching may be glimpsed in the fact that 18th century Kongo religious art often shows Jesus as an African.

Moreover, for many Kongo people, the birth of **Simon Kimbangu** two centuries later was a sign that Kimpa Vita was reborn.

Thus, Kimpa Vita returned in 1887 in the body of Simon Kimbangu. “Kimbangu” is the name of the Spiritual being that Kimpa Vita and many others call upon when traditional medicines failed to cure their illnesses. For most Kimbanguists, Simon Kimbangu existed before he was born. In fact, Kimbanguism is based on the same principles that Kimpa Vita expressed more than 200 years ago. Simon Kimbangu also banned the old superstitious practices of his people and encouraged people to pray to God through Jesus Christ as a common ancestor and mediator.

**KINDU.** The capital of **Maniema Province**, Kindu is a city of about 200,000 people lying on the upper **Congo River** in eastern Congo. Historically, Kindu was an important center for **ivory** and **slave** trade during the 19th century, when **Afro-Arabs** ruled eastern Congo. The outward signs of **Islam** are still visible. Kindu is today a major station on the Chemin de Fer des Grands Lacs (CFL) **railway**, which links **Lubumbashi** and **Kamina** to **Kisangani** and to **Kalemie** on **Lake Tanganyika**.

**KINLAO.** Site of the country’s sole **petroleum** refinery, Kinlao was built in 1968 near the mouth of the **Congo River** and the town of Moanda.

**KINSHASA.** The capital of Congo, Kinshasa, formerly called **Leopoldville**, is located on the **Congo River** across from Brazzaville, **Republic of Congo**. Kinshasa was a small village when **Henry Morton Stanley** arrived in the 1880s and signed an agreement with the local **chief** allowing him to claim the area for **Belgium**’s King **Leopold II**. It grew from a city of about 402,500 inhabitants at **independence** to a megalopolis with an estimated **population** of 9.5 million in 2008 (2,124,127 in the census of 1982). Kinshasa occupies an area traditionally dominated by the Teke (Bateke) and the Humbu (Bahumbu). However, the use of **Lingala** by the **military** and the presence of sizable communities from all parts of the country have made Lingala the lingua franca.

The political and financial center of Congo, Kinshasa is the home of one-third of all of Congolese **industry**, including textiles, milling, shipbuilding, steel-making, **timber**, and **palm oil**, chemical, and food processing, as well as footwear and apparel manufacturing. An

**educational** center, Kinshasa is also home to the **University** of Kinshasa (formerly **Lovanium University**), the Institut National d'Études Politiques, a number of higher-education institutes, and many private schools. Furthermore, Kinshasa is a major trans-shipment point between the deep-water **port** of **Matadi** and the Congolese interior. The country's major international airport and **telecommunications** center are located in the city, and it has hosted numerous international meetings, including the summit of the **Organization of African Unity** (OAU) in 1967. In 1974, Kinshasa hosted the "Rumble in the Jungle" boxing match between Mohammed Ali and George Foreman, in which Ali defeated Foreman to regain the world heavyweight title. Other events include the France–African summit in 1982 and the annual international fair, called Foire Internationale de Kinshasa (FIKIN).

During the 1990s, Congo's economic crisis took its toll on Kinshasa and, following the "**pillages**" of 1991 and 1993, a great deal of industry was shut down and public services became available only intermittently. Kinshasa suffered greatly from **Mobutu Sese Seko's** excesses, corruption, nepotism, and the **civil war** that led to his downfall. However, the town is still a major cultural and intellectual center for Central Africa, with a flourishing community of musicians and artists. *See also* NATIONAL WAY; TRANSPORTATION.

**KISANGANI.** An urban district with an estimated **population** of 1.2 million in 2008 (328,476 in 1982) covering an area of 1,910 square km. Located on the confluence of the **Congo** and **Tshopo Rivers**, Kisangani lies at the farthest continuously navigable point upriver from **Kinshasa**. Kisangani is also located where the **Lualaba** River becomes the Congo River north of **Boyoma Falls**. The city is separated by 200 km of cataracts from another navigable portion of the Congo River between **Kindu** and Ubundu. Kisangani is linked by **river** to Kinshasa and western Congo, by **railway** to **Maniema** and **Tanganyika Provinces**, and by a network of **roads** to the northeastern corner of Congo and East Africa. Kisangani was known before 1966 as Stanleyville. Stanleyville was the trading station that became the major city in the area and later the capital of **Orientale Province**. It was established by **Henry Morton Stanley** at the point farthest up the navigable portion of the lower Congo River. Originally a fishing

village and minor **Afro–Arab** trading post, Kisangani became a major river **port** with the arrival of European traders in the late 1800s and was used as a base for the campaign to drive the Arab traders from the territory. During the colonial era, it was a prosperous trading center, serving the plantations and **timber** mills of the region. It was also a center for the **gold** and **diamond** trade with East Africa. Moreover, Kisangani is home to a regional **radio** station and a campus of the national **university**, University of Kisangani (formerly the Protestant University of **Zaire**).

Kisangani, then Stanleyville, was a center of **opposition** to the central **government** in the 1960s and was the seat of a parallel central government in 1961 and of the **People’s Republic of Congo** during the 1964–66 eastern **rebellion**. In 1964, rebels seized the city and later held more than 1,600 European hostages. After 111 days of negotiating, to free the hostages, Operation Dragon Rouge was launched by the **United States**, **Belgium**, and a mercenary force called “L’Ommegang” under the command of Colonel Frederic Vandewalle.

In 1966 and 1967, Kisangani was the site of Baka and **mercenaries’ mutinies**. Thus, political unrest following **independence** and the **Zairianization** of large **plantations** in the early 1970s ruined a great many private enterprises in the region. Efforts to revive them in the late 1970s were hampered by widespread shortages of **energy**, **electrical power**, and spare parts.

In the mid-1980s, the government attempted to revive **agriculture** and **industry** in the area with capital infusions into plantations, the Kilo-Moto gold **mining** operation, and several infrastructure projects. Economic production was hurt, however, by the “**pillages**” in the early 1990s, and deteriorating **transportation** links caused many of the traders to direct their activities to East Africa. In early 1997, government forces, backed by foreign mercenaries, sought to organize a major defense line against advancing troops of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL). The victory by the AFDL forces on 15 March 1997 led to the beginning of the collapse of the **Mobutu Sese Seko** government, which fell two months later with the arrival of the AFDL in Kinshasa.

Following the takeover, the government of **Laurent Kabila** announced a major program to rebuild infrastructure and industry in

eastern Congo. The city was devastated by floods, when the Congo River burst its banks in December 1997, killing more than 70 people and making 22,000 homeless. In August 1998, Kisangani fell to rebels of the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD), who occupied eastern Congo in a drive to overthrow the Kabila government. In 1999, Kisangani became the site of three open fights between Rwandan and Ugandan forces. These armed conflicts arose over the control of diamond and gold mines near the town. **Uganda** lost all three battles, leaving the town in ruins. By the time a peace agreement was signed in December 2002, Kisangani was under the control of the Rwandan-backed RCD/Goma. Kisangani is the capital of **Tshopo Province** according to the 2006 **constitution**, effective February 2009. *See also* SECOND CONGO WAR.

**KISWAHILI.** Kiswahili is the first **language** of the Swahili people (*Waswahili*), who inhabit several large stretches of the Indian Ocean coastline from Kenya to northern Mozambique, including the Comoros Islands. Although 25 million Congolese speak it as their native language, Kiswahili is a lingua franca of much of East Africa, Congo, and northern Malawi. It is also a national or official language of four nations, and is the only language of African origin among the official working languages of the **African Union**.

**KITAWALA MOVEMENT.** A syncretic movement combining African and Christian beliefs that emerged in the 1920s in the **mining** communities of **Katanga** from teachings by **missionaries** of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society (also known as Jehovah's Witnesses). Aside from the traditional teachings of equality and the imminent arrival of God's kingdom, Kitawala evolved into an anticolonial movement, whose adherents refused to pay taxes or to salute the **flag**. The movement was disavowed by the Watch Tower Church and banned by the colonial authorities, but it continued to gain support. After **independence**, it resisted at times the authority of the Congolese **government**. The appearance of a **military** unit at a meeting in **Shaba** in 1979 led to a clash in which two soldiers were killed. *See also* MESSIANIC AND SYNCRETIC MOVEMENTS.

**KITONA AGREEMENT.** Held at the military base of Kitona on 20–21 December 1961, the Kitona Agreement was reached during the fourth of five series of meetings between **Cyrille Adoula** and **Moïse Tshombe** aimed to end the **Katanga secession**. The Kitona meeting was sponsored by the **United States** (U.S.) government after President John F. Kennedy forced Tshombe to participate in another round of talks with Adoula by instructing Secretary of State Dean Rusk to refuse a Belgian request for a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) meeting intended to call for an immediate ceasefire in **Katanga** unless the **United Nations** (UN) achieved its objectives. President Kennedy appointed Ambassador Edmund Gullion as his personal representative to the meeting. Tshombe met Gullion in Ndola, **Zambia**, and the two men flew to Kitona in a special U.S. plane. The result of the meeting was an agreement between Adoula and Tshombe, according to which the two men accepted the unity of Congo. Tshombe pledged to implement all UN resolutions and end the secession. However, Katanga authorities never implemented the agreement.

**KIVU.** One of the original six **provinces**, Kivu emerged as Costermansville Province following the administrative reform of 1933. Located in eastern Congo, bordering the smaller **lakes** of the **Great Rift Valley**, it was divided in May 1988 into three provinces: **Nord-Kivu**, **Sud-Kivu**, and **Maniema**. A region of primarily mountainous and forested terrain, Kivu is one of the most densely populated **regions** of the country, with an estimated **population** of more than 8 million in the early 2000s (4,361,736 in the 1982 census) inhabiting an area of 256,662 square km. The region is rich in **tin**, tungsten, iron ore, and **gold**. Large deposits of natural gas were discovered in the 1970s below **Lake Kivu**. In addition, the high altitude and temperate climate are excellent for growing tea, tobacco, **sugar** cane, Arabica **coffee**, and strawberries. Plantains, bananas, and vegetables are also grown by small farmers. The lakes, except for Lake Kivu, provided freshwater **fish** and there is some **livestock** herding. Tin mines operate as well, despite the collapse of tin prices in the 1980s.

During the **Mobutu Sese Seko** years, Kivu was neglected by the authorities in **Kinshasa**. The Kivu region, particularly the cities of



**Goma** and **Bukavu**, received more than 1 million **refugees** in mid-1994 during **Rwanda's** civil war, creating a major humanitarian crisis. In mid-1996, tensions escalated into fighting between **Banyamulenge** immigrants from Rwanda, Congolese government troops, and **Hutu** militias hidden within Rwandan refugee camps. In October 1996, the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL), launched an offensive aimed at overthrowing the Mobutu **government**. By March 1997, it had seized a 1,000-km stretch of territory that included most of Kivu and, with support from Rwanda, **Burundi**, **Uganda**, and **Angola**, took over the government on 17 May 1997, one day after Mobutu fled into exile.

The **Laurent Kabila** government, installed 12 days later, announced a program to revitalize the economies of Kivu and other eastern regions and to rebuild their **transportation** links with East Africa. However, a rebellion led by the Banyamulenge and backed by Rwanda and Uganda broke out in early August 1998 and quickly recaptured most of the region. A tentative peace agreement was signed in Lusaka in July 1999 that resulted in the formation of a transitional government in August 2003. As of late December 2008, the Kivu area remains politically unstable as the result of warlord activities despite free and fair elections that occurred in 2006–2007. *See* LUSAKA PEACE ACCORD; SECOND CONGO WAR.

**KLEPTOCRACY.** The term refers to “rule by thieves.” This is the highest level of corruption, that is, the use of public office for private gain. Although corruption in Congo goes back to the **Congo Free State** (CFS), **President Mobutu Sese Seko** institutionalized it when, on 20 May 1976, in a major stadium speech before 70,000 Congolese and millions of others listening on radio, he gave his countrymen the following advice: “If you want to steal, steal a little in a nice way, but if you steal too much to become rich overnight you will soon be caught.” Mobutu set a bad example for the nation. Data from the **central bank** revealed that Mobutu had personally spent on average more than 35 percent of the national budget on himself from 1972 to the late 1980s. He controlled 90 percent of government spending during 1991–96. Evidence has shown that Mobutu siphoned off public funds, mainly to Switzerland, to build a personal fortune to the point

that, according to the Western mass media, he was one of the wealthiest men in the world.

By 1967, two years after Mobutu had been in power, corruption had already reached a spectacular scale through embezzled funds that were never recovered. In 1970, it was estimated that misappropriation of state resources represented almost 60 percent of the national budget. Mobutu's strategy of co-opting **dissidents** as early as 1966 and appointing them to positions of power is illustrative. The major source of patronage was a position in the executive branch or state-owned companies. Mobutu's key strategy was the frequent reshuffling of the **government**, a strategy that inspired fear and insecurity among officials, because retaining posts depended neither on effectiveness nor efficiency, but on Mobutu's willingness to keep an appointee on the job. From November 1965 to April 1997, Mobutu reshuffled the government more than 60 times. This manipulation resulted in frequent embezzlements and mismanagement of the public domain, and state jobs became the means for personal enrichment.

Another Mobutu strategy was a policy of "musical chairs" that reintegrated disgraced members of the single party to government posts. Mobutu used this co-optation of opponents when he could not kill them. Most public officials knew that, regardless of their inefficiency and corruption, they could re-enter the government in time. To hold a government position required neither a sense of management nor good conscience; for many, effectiveness and good conscience were major obstacles to political advancement. Mobutu demanded absolute personal allegiance in return for all opportunities to accumulate wealth.

The apex of kleptocracy was the **Zairianization** policy that handed over nationalized foreign businesses to members of the ruling group and their families. Moreover, **foreign aid** was also embezzled, in many cases never reaching its intended targets. Regional governors were also bribed daily, receiving more than \$50,000 a month in kickbacks. Huge contracts with foreign firms for projects provided other occasions for illicit payments, often averaging 20 percent of initial investments.

The institutionalization of corruption survived because, out of greed and fear for survival, those at the top locked subordinates into

the practice in a systematic, normative way, in which wrong-doing was the rule. Bureaucrats at all levels developed strategies for embezzling large sums through the use on state payrolls of names of people who had resigned, retired, and even died.

After **Laurent Kabila** was sworn in as president in late May 1997, Congolese and the West expected change after three decades of kleptocracy and hoped for clean management. However, all hopes were dashed by Kabila's leadership style. A few months after he was sworn in as president, Kabila and his collaborators began to cut corners, reminiscent of Mobutu's kleptocratic regime. In one instance, government officials placed an order for \$2 million in electrical equipment and asked to be billed \$4 million, allowing them to pocket the difference. Foreign businesses were also told that to get government approval for their investments, they had to deposit large payments in newly created bank accounts whose shareholders were Kabila's close associates. Kabila spent more than 60 percent of the government budget on personal expenses annually. His son **Joseph Kabila** continued the practice.

Corruption worsened during the transition of 2003–2006. In the first year of the transition, politicians, military officers, businessmen, and bureaucrats all exploited their limited time in office by plundering state resources at more rapid rates. In late 2004, an audit report was made public that resulted in President Joseph Kabila's decision to suspend six ministers on 25 November 2004 for having embezzled millions of dollars.

While the **economy** worsened, with most workers in the capital city earning \$15 a month or less and many unpaid for up to three years, managers of state companies were earning at least \$25,000 a month. For example, a government-commissioned audit revealed in late 2004 that the head of the state oil-importing company, Cohydro, received a \$68,000 holiday allowance. This was on top of a monthly wage of \$17,000. His counterpart at the diamond valuing company was paid \$25,900 a month.

Moreover, during the transition, payments of civil servants and soldiers regularly evaporated before reaching their intended recipients. Approximately \$8 million dollars earmarked for military pay were embezzled every month from 2003 to 2006. The government inflated the number of the national army to 350,000 troops in August

2005, while the **Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo** (MONUC) declared that the real number was only 152,000 troops. Half of the military wages asked for were thus fictitious, and a few members of the government pocketed the difference. Some estimates even showed that a staggering 41 percent of government spending took place outside proper budgetary processes, and the presidency exceeded its budget by 89 percent while Vice President **Jean-Pierre Bemba** spent more than seven times his allocation. The practice continued even after free elections in late 2006.

Students of corruption in Congo have established a taxonomy of major types of corrupted behavior in the routine course of government business. In the judiciary, justice goes to the highest bidder. One can pay public employees to have documents removed from government files, to issue official stationery and seals, to provide a letter of recommendation, or even to get a job. Once employed, one might have to pay to get a salary, housing, a driver's license, or other benefits to which one is entitled. Taxi drivers need not pay taxes because they can always do business by paying a specific sum of money to gendarmes posted along their business route. These gendarmes report to their commanding officers, who usually share daily collection with their superior officers, from the lieutenant to the colonel. Daily collections represent four to five times the monthly salary of a colonel.

Economic mugging and palm greasing have become a way of life since Mobutu institutionalized corruption. For a foreign visitor, especially a white visitor, it begins at the airport, extends to cab drivers, hotel clerks, translators if needed, and anyone on the street. Without a bribe, clearing the customs post becomes a nightmare, getting a taxi becomes prohibitive, getting a hotel room is impossible because no room is available. With money, however, everything is possible.

**KOLWEZI.** A city in the southern part of the former **Katanga province** with an estimated **population** of 1.1 million people as of 2008, Kolwezi lies between **Lubumbashi** and **Dilolo** on a mineral lode along the northwestern edge of the **Zambian copper** belt. The city was created in 1937 to be headquarters for the Western **mining** group of the **Union Minière du Haut Katanga** (UMHK). Thus, Kolwezi is primarily a mining town. Its **economy** was dominated by the **Générale des Carrières et des Mines** (GECAMINES) company, which

was responsible for operating one underground and several open-pit mines.

Kolwezi came to the front pages of the world's newspapers largely because of the **Shaba Wars**. On 18 March 1977, guerrillas of the **Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo (FLNC)** invaded **Shaba** from **Angola** and advanced to the outskirts of the city. They withdrew without attacking, however, in the face of a government counteroffensive. On 3 May 1978, they again infiltrated the area from the south, this time occupying Kolwezi on 12 May. Amid reports that guerrillas were engaging in widespread looting and killing, a military operation was launched in which 1,700 Belgian, 700 French, and several thousand Congolese paratroopers landed in the area. After two weeks of fighting, they drove the guerrillas out and rescued the population, including 2,000 Europeans, but not before 1,000 Congolese and 200 foreigners were killed.

Most **industries** in Kolwezi were related to mining operations, including a series of hydroelectric installations outside the city and a **railway** depot on the line linking Lubumbashi to Angola's **Benguela Railway**. A milling plant is located in the city, and some herding and vegetable farming is practiced on the outskirts. However, economic activity in the area has been severely reduced since the mid-1990s by the insolvency of GECAMINES and the collapse of most mining operations. Kolwezi became the capital of **Lualaba Province** in February 2009 in application of the 2006 constitution.

**KONDIMA NA KOLINGA.** *See* MESSIANIC AND SYNCRETIC MOVEMENTS.

**KONGO.** An **ethnic group** that lives in western Congo, southern **Congo-Brazzaville**, and northern **Angola**, near the Atlantic coast. The Kongo people were among the first to come into contact with European **explorers**, traders, and **missionaries**. The **Kongo Kingdom** was a flourishing empire in 1483 when **Diogo Cão** first sailed up the mouth of the **Congo River** and landed in an area near **Boma**, eight years before Christopher Columbus reached America. The kingdom decayed in the 17th century, possibly because of competition between European powers and the rise of the **slave** trade that upset the balance of power among the various tribes and chieftaincies.

However, the linguistic and cultural influence of the group continued to be felt. A matrilineal people with a highly organized judicial and political hierarchy, the Kongo were spread as far east as the plains of **Kinshasa** and their language, Kikongo, became one of Congo's four national **languages**.

The Kongo people's access to **educational** opportunities and their proximity to major cities such as Kinshasa and **Matadi** contributed to their large representation in the colonial **civil service** and among the class of *évolués*. The Kongo were among the earliest and most influential advocates of greater personal freedom for Congolese and, later, of **independence**. They were considered by colonial authorities to be among the more radical pro-independence groups and one of the most anti-**Belgium**. Their leaders formed the **Alliance des Bakongo** (ABAKO) in 1950 to protect their **culture** from influences of the **Ngala** and **Luba**, who began arriving in **Leopoldville** following World War II. The association later became the ABAKO **political party**, which was one of the first groups to press for **labor** rights, political freedoms and, ultimately, independence. ABAKO produced Congo's first **president**, **Joseph Kasavubu**.

Following independence, Kongo *cadres* continued to dominate the **government** and civil service, occupying more than one-third of the administrative positions. Demographic studies in the 1980s revealed that up to one-third of the **population** of Kinshasa traced its origins to the Kongo, and one-fifth of these were Kongo of Angolan origin.

**KONGO CENTRAL.** Kongo Central was a district of **Leopoldville Province** at **independence** in **June 1960**. It became **Bas-Congo Province** in 1962 and was renamed **Bas-Zaïre** from 1971 to 1997. The name was changed back by the **Laurent Kabila government** after the fall of **Mobutu Sese Seko** in 1997. The 2006 constitution changed the name to Kongo Central.

Kongo Central is Congo's most developed province, after the capital **Kinshasa** and the southern part of the former **Katanga** province. Kongo Central is the westernmost province, covering territory roughly from Kinshasa to the Atlantic Ocean. It thus provides Congo with a coastline of 15 miles (24.14 kilometers). Kongo Central was already a densely populated area with a structured society and an educated *élite* when the Portuguese arrived in 1483 and made contact

with the **Kongo Kingdom**. The residents were farmers, herders, and merchants who traded with other people farther inland. Considerable contact with **missionaries** and educators from Europe and the Americas over centuries contributed to the region's susceptibility to **mes-sianic movements** and its status at independence as one of the largest sources of professional and skilled **labor**. It was also one of the most politically active provinces and one of the earliest to form associations to lobby against discrimination and other colonial inequities.

Kongo Central boasts three ports, **Banana**, **Boma**, and **Matadi**, which are major gateways for Congo's **external trade**. The province produces manioc, maize, **palm oil**, **sugar cane**, **coffee**, and some cocoa. It is a major producer of **livestock** and a major supplier of **food** for Kinshasa. The **Mayombe Forest** contains 20 million hectares of tropical hardwood trees, a major source of **timber** exports. **Petroleum** wells and a refinery off the Atlantic coast also provide jobs and cash for local markets. The province produces one-third of Congo's manufactured goods and is home to industries in the metal, woodworking, cement, textile, and sugar refining sectors. The constructions of the **Inga Hydroelectric Complex** 40 km upriver from Matadi contributed to economic development in the area. In the 1970s, the Mobutu government, seeking to utilize a surplus of **electrical power** and take advantage of **transportation** links and human resources in the region, proposed a free trade zone in the Inga area. The project initially attracted only modest interest from foreign investors. The idea of expanding Inga reemerged again after presidential elections held in 2006, as foreign investors showed interests in exporting electricity to Egypt and even Western Europe.

**KONGO, KINGDOM OF.** Founded perhaps in the 13th century by Nimi Lukeni, the Kongo Kingdom was the first Congolese nation to make formal contact and to develop economic and cultural exchanges with Europe. At its peak, from the 1400s to the 1600s, the kingdom stretched from the Atlantic coast to the **Kwango River** in the east and the **Kwilu River** in the north. The kingdom was primarily a loose confederation of six provinces that included Mbamba, Soyo, Mpangu, Mbata, Nsundi, and Mpemba. These provinces were ruled under subkings and hereditary **chiefs** who paid homage in varying

degrees to the central king, in the mythical birthplace of all Kongo, the **Mbanza Kongo dia Ntotila** (Great City of the King).

The Portuguese explorer **Diogo Cão** encountered the Kongo in 1483 when he arrived at the mouth of the **Congo River** when Muzinga Nkuwu was the *manikongo* (title holder). Missionaries soon gained converts, including the king, who took the name Ndo Nzao (Don João), after his Portuguese counterpart. His wife became Ndona Leonor, the name of the Portuguese queen. The oldest son of the king, Mubemba a Muzinga, was baptized as Ndo Funsu or **Afonso I**. Afonso I established considerable exchanges with **Portugal** and other European powers. He sent ambassadors to Lisbon, the Holy See, and the Netherlands and asked for **missionaries**. Trading posts were set up to ship **ivory** and **gold** to Europe, but **slaving** eventually became the dominant **trade**. In 1570, the kingdom was threatened by **Jaga** invaders from the east, but Portuguese troops restored the reigning king, **Alvaro I**, to the throne. In the early 17th century, Dutch and other European traders and explorers began to arrive. The Kongo allied with the Dutch but were defeated by the Portuguese at the battle of Ambuila in 1665. The king was assassinated, and Christian practices faded. By the end of the 17th century, Portuguese presence in the region had been reduced to a few coastal trading posts. In 1883, as European powers began making territorial claims in Africa, the Kongo kingdom was attached to **Angola**. The territory was later partitioned between Portugal, **France**, and **Belgium's** King **Leopold II**.

**KONGOLO.** Chief of the legendary *Balopwe* (chiefs) nobility, who migrated into the **Congo River Basin** from the north around 1500 and founded the **Luba** Empire.

**KONGOLO, MWENZE JEANNOT (1961– ).** A senior official in the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL), Kongolo was appointed interior minister in October 1997 in the **Laurent Kabila government**, after the fall of **Mobutu Sese Seko**, and appointed justice minister in January 1998. A native of **Katanga**, Kongolo studied in the **United States** and worked in the office of the attorney general of Pennsylvania until he joined the



AFDL in 1996. He was removed from the government when **Joseph Kabila** became president in January 2001. Kongolo was elected senator for the **Tanganyika Province** in 2007.

**KUBA.** A **Bantu** group driven east, according to some ethnologists, by the **Jaga** invasion of the **Kongo Kingdom** in the 16th century. The Kuba established themselves between the **Sankuru River** and **Lulua River** in an area bounded by **Luebo** and Mweka to the south and **Ilebo** to the east. The Kuba were primarily cultivators and artisans noted for their tapestries and carvings of angular, diagonal designs. They were ruled by a king whose successor was chosen from among his nephews. The kingdom reached its zenith in the 18th century and remained stable until the 19th century, when revolts in the east nearly instigated a civil war. The revolt was quelled harshly by colonial authorities in the early 1900s. According to historian Jan Vansina, Kuba society was the “most complexly organized state with the possible exception of the **Lunda**.” The Kuba had a hierarchy of higher and lower **chiefs** and a high degree of differentiation between them. The Kuba “cluster” included the Lele, Njembe, and a number of groups ruled by the Bashongo.

**KUSU.** A **Bantu**-speaking group that lives along the **Lomami River** in a remote part of **Maniema Province** between Kibombo and Lubao. Congolese ethnographers consider the Kusu to be part of the **Mongo** group. Some experts believe the Kusu and the **Tetela** sprang from the same group but grew apart as the Kusu came under the cultural influence of the **Afro-Arab** traders, while the Tetela rejected them. **Tippo Tip** used the term “Kusu” to describe the people he met during his trading expeditions in eastern and southern Congo. The Kusu were unquestionably influenced by the Afro-Arabs. Many adopted their **dress**, converted to **Islam**, and adopted **Kiswahili** as their lingua franca. The Belgians called them the *Arabisés* (Arabized). After driving Arab traders from the region in the late 1800s, Belgian authorities drew a provincial borderline between the Kusu and Tetela zones of influence, placing the Kusu in **Kivu** Province and the Tetela in **Kasai** Province.

**KWA RIVER.** The name sometimes given to the lower **Kasai River**, between the area where it joins the Lukemie River at Mushie and its confluence with the **Congo River** 100 km downstream.

**KWANGO PROVINCE.** On **30 June 1960**, Kwango was a district of **Leopoldville** Province. The law of 27 April 1962 expanded the number of provinces, and Kwango became a province after the promulgation of law adopted by the parliament on 14 August 1962. The centralization of administrative power under **Mobutu Sese Seko** reduced the number of provinces, and Kwilu was made a district of **Bandundu Province** in April 1966. It remained a district until the promulgation of a new constitution in February 2006. The province became effective in February 2009, with Kenge as its capital.

**KWANGO RIVER.** A major **river** in western **Congo** that rises in central **Angola** and courses north 1,300 km before flowing into the **Kasai River** near the town of **Bandundu**.

**KWILU PROVINCE.** A former district of **Leopoldville** Province, Kwilu became a province on 14 August 1962 after the promulgation of the law on decentralization on 27 April 1962. From 1966 to 2006, Kwilu was a district of **Bandundu** Province. It became a province in February 2009 after the promulgation of the 2006 constitution. Kwilu has five territories: Bagata, Bulungu, Gungu, Idiofa, and Masi-Manimba. With **Kikwit** as its main urban center and capital, Kwilu Province is relatively densely populated. Its estimated 4 million inhabitants occupy an area of 78,019 square km and live primarily by **fishing**, hunting, and **agriculture**. There is some **timbering**, oil palm cultivation, and produce farming. Other than vegetable oil processing plants, however, there is little **industry** and few attempts were made to develop an economic infrastructure because of local **opposition** to the **Mobutu Sese Seko** regime. In January 1964, a **rebellion** began, led by **Pierre Mulele** with backing from **China**. In 1978, another uprising was reported near **Idiofa** in which thousands of people reportedly were killed and following which 14 local **chiefs** were publicly executed. In March 1995, an outbreak of **Ebola** virus centered in Kikwit and caused 244 deaths.

**KYUNGU WA KUMWANZA, GABRIEL (1938– ).** The governor of former **Shaba Region**, whose calls of “**Katanga** for Katangans” in the early 1990s are blamed for the expulsions of **Luba** immigrants from **Kasai** beginning in August 1992. Kyungu was born on 24

October 1938, in Ankoro, Katanga, where he received his primary **education**. He then attended secondary school in **Lubumbashi**. He was a teacher, union leader and, following **independence**, functionary in the **Office National des Transports (ONATRA)** and the **Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Zaïrois (SNCZ)**.

Kyungu was one of the **Group of Thirteen Parliamentarians** who first called for multipartyism in an open letter to **Mobutu Sese Seko** in 1980. He was detained on numerous occasions during the 1980s for supporting the illegal **Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS)** **opposition** party. With the advent of multipartyism in 1990, he joined the **Union des Fédéralistes et des Républicains Indépendants (UFERI)** party of **Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond** and was elected the party's regional president. He was appointed governor of Shaba when Nguza was named **prime minister** in November 1991.

As governor, Kyungu espoused autonomy for the **region**, which he preferred to call Katanga, and the removal of immigrants, many of whom had settled before or during the colonial era. He also argued that revenues from the region's **mining** industry should remain in the region. He was dismissed on 19 April 1995, and placed under house arrest amid allegations of fraudulent reporting of **cobalt** production and reports in **Kinshasa's** newspapers that his group was stockpiling weapons to back a secession of the region. He publicly expressed support for the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL)** as its troops approached Lubumbashi during the offensive that overthrew Mobutu. However, the AFDL viewed him as a supporter of Mobutu, and he was placed under house arrest for several months. Kyungu was appointed governor once again on 27 March 1997, after he pledged to strengthen **security** in order to halt a wave of looting in the area. He was nominated ambassador to Kenya in 1998. He was elected to the provincial assembly of Katanga, where he was chosen as president in 2007. *See also* ETHNIC CLEANSING.

– L –

**LABOR.** Labor in Congo was historically one of the more abused sectors of society and a major proponent of change. During the **Congo**

**Free State** (CFS) era, private companies and **government** operators were given virtually free rein to obtain cheap labor. In the late 1800s, the labor tax law allowed operators to require local citizens to work or collect **rubber** and **ivory** for the authorities without remuneration. Failure to meet quotas led to beatings and executions. It also resulted in some areas of the amputation of hands by **security** agents to prove they had punished workers in uncooperative villages. Outrage in Europe and America over these practices led to reforms in 1906 that limited the labor tax to 40 hours per month, a practice that was not always observed. In 1910, following the **Belgian** parliament's annexation of the CFS, largely because of the outcry over such abuses, the labor tax was abolished. However, the use of forced labor continued unabated. Workers were often taken or hired from villages, housed, fed, and clothed. These "expenses" were then deducted from their earnings, leaving workers with little money to make ends meet.

In 1925, the **Union Minière du Haut-Katanga** (UMHK), in an effort to build a permanent work force, established policies that improved working conditions. A labor association for whites only, the Association des Fonctionnaires et Agents de la Colonie (AFAC) was created in 1926. In 1946, the government for the first time authorized unions for Congolese, but these were strictly monitored through a system of councils. In the 1950s, several trade unions arose in urban areas. They were given true bargaining powers in 1957, the same year that multiracial unions were legalized. The Social Pact of 1959 gave full freedom to all unions, which soon became a major force leading the drive for political freedom and, eventually, **independence**.

Following independence, three major trade unions emerged: the moderate Union des Travailleurs Congolais (UTC), the socialist-oriented Fédération Générale du Travail du Kongo (FGTK), and the "liberal" Confédération des Syndicats Libres du Congo (CSLC). A small communist Confédération Générale de Travailleurs Congolais (CGTC) was also formed. Membership in 1966 ranged from 50,000 for the CSLC to 100,000 for the UTC.

In 1967, the unions were merged into the UTC, which became the Union Nationale des Travailleurs Zaïrois (UNTZA) in 1971. Although some labor leaders protested the loss of their autonomy, the government argued that numerous unions were a divisive force in the labor movement, which instead should be devoting its energies

to motivating greater productivity and support for government policies. With the ascendancy of the party over state, lines between labor and government became blurred. The senior leadership of the UNTZA was appointed to government policymaking bodies such as the **Political Bureau** of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR). There were occasional labor protests, particularly in the **transportation** and **banking** sectors, and there were occasional **strikes** for better pay and working conditions. These were often harshly repressed.

Within days of **Mobutu Sese Seko's** April 1990 speech authorizing political pluralism, the UNTZA leadership met and voted to disassociate itself from the MPR. Some leaders tried to revive those unions that had existed in the 1960s. A number of unions were formed to represent professional groups, most notably **civil servants**, public-sector physicians, and **university** professors. During the early 1990s, labor protests increased markedly as unions tested their new-found freedom and workers vented frustration over low **wages**, declining benefits, and poor working conditions. Public-sector workers, whose wages at times had been reduced by **inflation** to less than \$1 per month, staged numerous strikes, some of which lasted months. They extracted some concessions from the government. Nevertheless, through the early 1990s wages remained low, averaging \$15 per month at the bottom of the salary scale and less than \$100 per month for professionals.

In 1990, the government reported 1.07 million people employed in the formal **economy**. It listed traditional farming as the largest sector, with 24 million workers laboring on 4 million farms of an average size of 1.5 hectares. The International Labour Organization (ILO) depicted Congolese labor in a broader manner, using the United Nations definition of "economically active" people as those who furnished labor to produce goods and services for market, barter, or personal consumption, and including individuals in the **military** and the **unemployed** but excluding **students** and housewives. Using its definition, the ILO reported that, in 1990, 37.5 percent of the Congolese **population**, or 14 million people, was active, down from 40.3 percent in 1980 and 42.4 percent in 1975. The participation rate in 1990 was classified as 49 percent for males and 26.3 percent for females. Fourteen percent of children aged 10 to 14 were reported to

be active. In the 2000s, this rate has averaged 76 percent a year according to the **World Bank**.

**LACERDA E ALMEIDA, JOSÉ.** A Portuguese **explorer** who led the first scientific exploration of the **Congo River Basin** in 1789. He went as far inland as **Katanga**, where he heard stories of rich deposits of **copper** and other minerals, leading other Europeans to explore the interior.

**LAKE ALBERT.** Called Lake **Mobutu Sese Seko** by Congolese cartographers during the 1970s and 1980s, Lake Albert lies on the **Great Rift Valley**, at an altitude of 618 m, north of the **Rwenzori Mountains** along Congo's border with **Uganda**. The country's second-largest lake and the 30th-largest natural lake in the world, it is 160 km long and 50 km wide, covering 5,300 square km to a maximum depth of 50 meters. With **Lake Edward**, it forms the headwaters of the White Nile River. Lake Albert contains oil reserves estimated at less than 100,000 barrels a day for about 10 years when production starts. Tensions between Congo and Uganda in early August 2007, largely over the ownership of small Rukwanzi Island, resulted in an armed clash that killed a British geologist working for an oil prospector.

**LAKE EDWARD.** Called Lake Idi Amin Dada by Congolese and Ugandan cartographers in the 1970s, Lake Edward lies on the **Great Rift Valley** at an altitude of 912 m, south of the **Rwenzori Mountains** and north of **Rwanda**, along Congo's border with **Uganda**. Eighty-eight kilometers long and 40 km wide, it covers 4,403 square km and, with **Lake Albert**, forms the headwaters of the White Nile River. Lake Edward lies completely within the Virunga National Park (Congo) and the Queen Elizabeth National Park (Uganda) and does not have extensive human habitation on its shores, except at Ishango (Congo) in the north, home to a park ranger training facility. About two-thirds of its waters are in Congo and one-third in Uganda. Apart from Ishango, the main Congolese settlement in the south is Vitshumbi, while the Ugandan settlements are Mweya and Katwe in the northeast, near the crater lake of that name, which is the chief producer of salt for Uganda. The Mweya Safari Lodge is the main tourist facility, serving both Lake Edward and Lake Katwe. The

nearest cities are Kasese in Uganda to the northeast and **Butembo** in Congo, to the northwest, which are respectively about 50 km and 150 km distant by road.

**LAKE KIVU.** One of Congo's largest lakes, Lake Kivu is 100 km long and 50 km wide and has a large island at its center, **Idjwi**. Lying in the **Great Rift Valley** at an altitude of 1,460 m, Lake Kivu drains through the **Ruzizi River** into **Lake Tanganyika** via a tributary of the **Congo River** into the Atlantic Ocean, while the neighboring **Lake Albert** and **Lake Edward** drain via the Nile River system into the Mediterranean Sea. The cities of **Goma** and Gisenyi, **Rwanda**, lie on Lake Kivu's northern shore, while **Bukavu** lies on its southern shore. The lake contains high levels of methane gas, which prevent the development of any **fish** or other animal life in its waters. Natural gas reserves below the lake are estimated at 60 billion cubic meters. Until 2004, extraction of the gas was done on a small scale, with the extracted gas being used to run boilers at the Bralirwa brewery in Gisenyi. As far as large-scale exploitation of this resource is concerned, the Rwandan government has negotiated with a number of parties to produce methane from the lake.

**LAKE MAI-NDOMBE.** Known until 1972 as Lake **Leopold**, Mai-Ndombe means "black water" in **Lingala**. A relatively shallow lake lying in a marshy area near the center of the **Congo River Basin** in a remote and sparsely populated area of **Mai-Ndombe Province**, Lake Mai-Ndombe is 130 km long and about 40 km wide, although its boundaries vary with the seasons. The lake is known to double or even to triple in size during the rainy season.

**LAKE MWERU.** Located on the border between **Zambia** and Congo, Lake Mweru is 130 km long and 50 km wide. It is fed by the Luapula River and drained by the Luvua River, which flows into the **Lualaba River** and eventually into the **Congo River**. It is the second-largest lake in the Congo's drainage basin and is located 150 kilometers west of the southern end of the largest, **Lake Tanganyika**. Many **fishing** villages dot Mweru's shores, and the main towns on the Congo side are Kilwa, Lukonzolwa, and Pweto. The lake was affected by the

**civil war** against **Laurent Kabila** in 1998–2003, from which it is still recovering as of late 2008. Many of the **refugees** who entered Zambia at Pweto were accommodated in camps in Mporokoso and Kawamba districts.

**LAKE TANGANYIKA.** Considered the seventh-largest natural lake in the world, Lake Tanganyika is 670 km long and 100 km wide at its widest point, covering 32,900 square km. The lake lies in the **Great Rift Valley** at an altitude of 772 m, with a maximum depth of 1,435 meters. The major inflows are the **Ruzizi River**, entering the north of the lake from **Lake Kivu**, and the Malagarasi River, which is **Tanzania's** second largest river, entering the east side of Lake Tanganyika. The lake has one major outflow, the **Lukuga River**, which empties into the **Congo River** system and then into the Atlantic Ocean. Lake Tanganyika was first reached by Europeans in 1858, when British **explorers** Richard Burton and John Speke arrived from the East African coast. It enjoys a relatively temperate climate. Good rainfall and fertile soils help make the area around the lake one of the most densely populated in Africa. Lake Tanganyika formed part of the **Eastern Way transportation** route, through which minerals from **Katanga** were exported by **rail** to **Kalemie**, across the lake to Tanzania, and by rail once again to the port of Dar es Salaam.

From 2004 to 2009, at the cost of \$27 million, the lake was the focus of a massive Water and Nature Initiative by the International Union for the Conservation of Natural Resources. The initiative monitored the resources and state of the lake; set common criteria for acceptable level of sediments, pollution, and water quality in general; and designed and established a lake basin management authority.

**LAKE TUMBA.** A small lake that measures 40 km long and 40 km wide, Lake Tumba is located in a marshy area of the central **Congo River Basin** near the **Congo River** about 80 km downriver from **Mbandaka**. The lake hosts 114 species of fish.

**LAKE UPEMBA.** A marshy lake, Lake Upemba is located in a swampy area near Bukama in **Haut-Lomami Province**. It lies near the **Lualaba River**, which is the headwater of the **Congo River**.



**LAND LAW AND TENURE.** According to the Congolese **constitution**, land technically belongs to the state, which grants or makes it available to individuals, private groups, or publicly owned organizations. The constitution also guarantees individual and collective rights to property that has been acquired by **customary** (traditional) **law** or statutory (written or modern) law. Most land is thus held by population groups under traditional tenure laws that predate colonialism and statutory law. Aspects of ownership vary, but they are generally communal. In other words, the land is owned by the village, the chieftaincy, or a descent group. The one exception is in urban areas, where statutory laws have been applied for longer lengths of time and disputed titles have been settled to some degree.

Historically, land tenure was controlled most often by lineages that acted as agents in distributing the land to families. Individuals often had a right to the fruits of the land accorded to them and could pass it on to their descendants, but they were not authorized to sell the land or transfer it outside the lineage group. According to most economists at the **World Bank**, the lack of outright ownership discourages farmers from investing in land improvements that would have raised productivity. This view is questionable because traditional land tenure provides insurance against any large landowner selling off land and leaving the larger community helpless.

Early colonial authorities did not understand land ownership by clans and lineages. The **Congo Free State** (CFS) initially laid claim to all land not inhabited or under cultivation. A decree in 1906 liberalized the law to allow villages and communities to own three times the land under cultivation in order to allow for crop rotation. Early CFS legislation allowed Africans to buy and sell land, but the practice never became common. Sales were made to Europeans, but Africans saw the sale as more of a lease; that is, as compensation for temporary use of the land that eventually would revert back to its owner. In 1938, the colonial government ended sales of land by Africans to private parties, because land rights could be transferred only to the state and only the state could lease or sell land to private individuals. In 1953, legislation was proposed allowing Africans in urban areas to purchase land, but only three **provinces** implemented the proposals. The potential did exist for Africans to obtain legal ownership under the *paysannat indigène* system suggested by **Leo-**

**pold III** in 1933, before he became king. The program was aimed at improving **agricultural** productivity, but it did not begin until the 1950s and ended following **independence**.

In June 1966, the **government** enacted the **Bakajika Law**, which granted the state ownership of all wealth above and below the ground. At the peak of **Zairianization**, the government claimed ownership of all land through a constitutional amendment enacted on 31 December 1971 and the General Property Law of July 1973. Under the law, individual rights to land were accorded through concessions by the government or through customary land rights. The changes caused considerable confusion, since only a small portion of land was registered, and previous laws and customs continued to be observed. The absence of adequate recordkeeping and a high incidence of forged and false claims create a system in which bribery and political influence are frequently required to settle land disputes.

**LANGUAGES.** The languages spoken in Congo come from four major sources. Most indigenous languages are related to the **Bantu** root, which is classified as a branch of the Benue–Congo group. Of the estimated 200 languages and 450 dialects spoken in the country, Bantu-related tongues are spoken by an estimated 80 percent of the people.

Bantu-speakers moved into the area from the north during the first millennium A.D. and from there spread across the continent. Sometime during the second millennium A.D., probably between 1500 and 1600, people speaking languages of the Adamawa–Eastern and Sudanic groups migrated into northern Congo, either driving out earlier settlers or assimilating them. The arrival of Belgian traders, **missionaries**, and colonial officials in the 1800s brought French, which became the official language. French is still used in all formal academic, business, diplomatic, legal, and political transactions, and in many social encounters.

Congo also has four “national” languages, Kikongo, **Lingala**, **Kiswahili**, and Tshiluba, which are lingua franca in their respective regions. Lingala, a **trade** language used along the **Congo River**, has long been the language of the **army**. Its use by soldiers who frequently were assigned to regions other than their home areas led to its grudging recognition as the second language of government.

Kikongo is the language of the **Kongo** people and the lingua franca of **Kongo Central Province**. Its use extends from the Atlantic Ocean to **Kinshasa** and as far east as **Kikwit**. Although it is spoken in a relatively small geographical area, the density of the population in western Congo and the use of Lingala in neighboring **Congo-Brazzaville** contributes to its importance. Tshiluba, the language of the **Luba ethnic group**, is the lingua franca of most of former **Kasai** Provinces and part of **Tanganyika** Province. Kiswahili, actually a dialectal version of the tongue used in East Africa, is the lingua franca of the eastern part of the country and is heard in the former **Orientale** and **Katanga** Provinces, as well as in **Maniema**, **Nord-Kivu**, and **Sud-Kivu** Provinces.

Missionaries seeking to produce vernacular versions of the Bible in the early 1900s developed written forms of a number of languages and encouraged the adoption of standardized dialects. Pidgin forms, particularly of Lingala, were widely used and all but those Congolese hailing from the most remote villages appeared able to communicate using some combination of the various tongues. *See also* FIOTE.

**LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL [CONSEIL LÉGISLATIF]**. This was the official name of Congo's national assembly, or **parliament**, from 1972 to 1993. All of its 310 members belonged to the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) party, although they competed for their seats against other members in their districts. Under the **constitution** of 1974, which created the party-state, the Legislative Council lost most of its powers to the **Central Committee** of the MPR and became an organization primarily of young party *cadres* whose sessions were devoted primarily to rubber-stamping party initiatives. With the advent of multipartyism in 1990, the Legislative Council was officially abolished and replaced by the **Haut Conseil de la République** (HCR). In 1992, however, when the HCR drafted a constitution removing many of the laws and tenets of **Mobutism** and elected **opposition** leader **Étienne Tshisekedi** as **prime minister**, **Mobutu Sese Seko** reconvened the Legislative Council and ordered it to draft another constitution. The move was denounced as illegal by the opposition and some foreign governments, and led to a period of political stalemate characterized by two rival governments. In late 1993, a compromise was reached and the Legislative Council was

merged with the HCR to form the **Haut Conseil de la République/Parlement de la Transition** (HCR/PT). This organ was to oversee the transitional period, draft a constitution, and organize national elections. *See also* DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION; LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM.

**LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM.** Since **independence**, the legislature has remained one of several major branches of the Congolese **government**. Under the **Loi Fondamentale** (Fundamental Law) in effect from June 1960 to July 1964, Congo had a bicameral legislature, which elected the **president** to serve as head of state. The **prime minister** and ministers were also chosen by **parliament** and could be removed by it. However, the Loi Fondamentale failed to adequately specify the powers accorded to the president and prime minister and, as a result, it led to a number of constitutional crises, two of which prompted military interventions, in 1960 and 1965.

Under the **constitution** of August 1964, attempts were made to further define the powers of the two offices. The president was given the power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister with the approval of parliament. Following the **coup d'état** that brought **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** to power, the president was granted wide powers of decree and, with the creation of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) as the sole legal party, the presidency assumed many legislative powers. Parliament was reduced to a consultative body and subsequently was suspended. The constitution of June 1967 granted the president even greater powers, allowing him to govern by executive order, which carried the force of law. The bicameral parliament was also replaced by a single chamber called the National Assembly.

On 19 July 1972, as part of the **Authenticity** program, the assembly was renamed the **Legislative Council**. In August 1974, following a meeting of the **Political Bureau** and the Legislative Council, a new constitution was enacted that incorporated all changes and ordinances instituted since the 1967 constitution. Under the 1974 constitution, the Legislative Council was subordinate to the party, the president, and his appointed ministers. The Legislative Council remained one of the five organs of government, but Mobutu was automatically president of all five organs, and the party became the

supreme institution of state. Members of the Legislative Council had the right to initiate laws “concurrently” with the president.

In the late 1970s, following the **Shaba Wars** and amid pressure from the international community for greater political freedom, a measure of liberalization was enacted. The Legislative Council regained some of its lost powers. The post of prime minister, renamed first commissioner of state, was restored. The Legislative Council was allowed to summon ministers for questioning on budgetary matters. Multiple candidates for legislative seats were allowed within the party structure. By the end of 1980, however, most of these measures had been reversed except for the provision allowing multiple candidates in legislative **elections**.

The influence of the Legislative Council was further reduced by the creation on 2 September 1980 of the MPR **Central Committee**, whose 120 members were chosen by the Political Bureau of the party. The Central Committee eventually assumed most real legislative functions and became the body of “consultation and debate” of the party-state. The Legislative Council’s role became primarily one of approving party initiatives. Elections for five-year legislative terms were held in September 1982, during which multiple candidates, proposed at the local level with Political Bureau approval, were allowed. More than three-fourths of the incumbents were turned out and replaced by a youthful body whose average age was 35 years. Elections were held again in September 1987. By then the most influential politicians had moved to the Central Committee. The legislative branch was thus steadily weakened as the presidency and party assumed greater powers.

Following Mobutu’s announcement of the transition to multiparty politics on **24 April 1990**, the Legislative Council was suspended and the **National Conference**, convened in 1991, took over the task of debating and legislating the **democratic transition**. The National Conference proclaimed itself the **Conférence Nationale Souveraine** (CNS) in April 1992 and determined that its decisions would be sovereign and, by law, would be carried out by the executive. This act brought a protest from Mobutu, who accused the body of staging a “civilian” coup d’état. The CNS drafted a constitution that considerably reduced the powers of the presidency in favor of a prime minister elected by the legislature.

The CNS concluded its work in December 1992 and established the 453-member **Haut Conseil de la République** (HCR) to take over legislative duties and oversee multiparty elections. By then Mobutu had decided that the process was under **opposition** control and reconvened the Legislative Council to draft another constitution. A political standoff ensued, characterized by two rival governments. It ended in late 1993 with an agreement to merge the HCR and the Legislative Council into a transitional body of 745 members called the **Haut Conseil de la République/Parlement de la Transition** (HCR/PT). This body was to oversee the transition, draft a constitution, and organize elections by July 1995. However, political infighting and the economic crisis slowed its work and, in June 1995, it voted to extend the transitional period until 9 July 1997 and postpone elections by two years. This timetable was disrupted by the offensive of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL), which took power in **Kinshasa** in May 1997.

**Laurent Kabila** became president on 29 May 1997 and announced elections would be held in 1999. However, these elections were never held, as Kabila fought a **civil war** that broke out in early August 1998. After the signing of the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI) in late December 2002, the transitional legislature drafted a constitution that was approved by referendum in 2005 and was promulgated in early 2006. The new constitution reestablished a bicameral system composed of the National Assembly and the Senate, both with legislative powers to make laws. According to the new constitution, Congo is a semipresidential system, and the government emanates from the majority in the National Assembly.

**LELE.** A small but independent **ethnic group** of the **Kuba** cluster living in **Kasai Occidental**. Organized into relatively autonomous villages, often in conflict with each other, the Lele were believed to have been moved by war to the less fertile areas of Kasai between the **Lulua River** and Loango River. They were among the groups that most strongly resisted Belgian colonial administration.

**LENDU.** The Lendu represent one of several groups that live in **Ituri Province**. The Lendu immigrated to the province in the late 18th

century. The Lendu include a southern group called Lendu-Bindi or Ngiti, and the northern Lendu who include Pitsi, Djatsi, and Tatsi. The Lendu are mostly agriculturalist and claim first occupancy of land in the Djugu territory. They were involved in the **Ituri conflict** with the **Hema**. The center of conflict is the Djugu territory of 8,730 square kilometers. It includes five subdivisions or collectivities: Lendu-Pitsi, Lendu-Djatsi, Lendu-Tatsi, Hema-Banyagwi, and Hema-Badjere. With a total population of 1.2 million. Djugu is the most populated area of Ituri. Djugu also has many coffee plantations in the Kpandroma area. The Lendu and Hema occupy the most fertile and resource-rich highlands of the Ituri province. Other livelihoods include herding livestock and fishing in **Lake Albert**. To this agricultural wealth is added the gold resources of the **Office des Mines d'Or de Kilo-Moto** (OKIMO). The Lendu's principal center of exploitation is Mongbwalu, with social headquarters at Bambumines/Camp Yalala in the Djugu territory.

**LEOPOLD II (1835–1909).** The second king of **Belgium**, who financed the first explorations of Congo and engineered the territory's exploitation following the European partition of Africa in 1885. Leopold II began seeking a source of raw materials for his nation soon after acceding to the throne in 1865. Hearing reports of great mineral wealth in Africa, he formed the **International African Association**, over which he presided from 1876 to 1878, to encourage exploration on the continent. After **Explorer Henry Morton Stanley's** highly publicized expedition to "find" **David Livingstone**, Leopold recruited Stanley in 1878 and financed an expedition to explore the **Congo River**. The first mission was nearly disastrous, but Stanley established that most rivers in central Africa drained through the Congo River system into the Atlantic Ocean and not through the Nile River into the Mediterranean Sea, as believed by many at the time.

Stanley undertook a second expedition to obtain treaties with as many local **chiefs** as possible and to scout for **trading** stations up the river. He returned in 1884 with 250 treaties, which Leopold took to the **Berlin Conference** to bolster his claim of being actively engaged in the exploration and "civilization" of central Africa. The conference concluded in February 1885 by recognizing the treaties

signed and forming the **International Association of the Congo** as an independent state with Leopold as its sovereign. In order to pay for the administration of what in 1886 became the **Congo Free State (CFS)**, Leopold granted to private companies large trading concessions called “trusts,” which became virtual monopolies. The king also passed a forced **labor** tax that allowed a number of companies, especially **concessionary companies**, to require Congolese to work for them or supply **rubber** or **ivory**.

The brutality with which these companies collected “taxes” led to a public outcry in Europe and America that forced a reluctant Belgian parliament to annex the CFS in 1908 as a colony, the **Belgian Congo**. Leopold II, who died the following year, is credited with pioneering the establishment of an **administration** and **transportation** network in the territory. However, he is more frequently remembered as the wily monarch who, because of personal ambition, allowed a regime of terror, **human rights** abuse, and uncontrolled exploitation to develop in what would one day become the **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)**. In the financial transactions between Belgium and the CFS, which were separate states until 1908, King Leopold II paid 40 million francs in gold to the CFS and received more than 60 million francs in return. According to a number of Belgian historians, King Leopold repatriated his fortune in building large projects in Belgium and in buying real estate in Europe. He was succeeded by his nephew, **Albert I**.

**LEOPOLD III (1901–1983)**. Fourth king of **Belgium**, from 23 February 1934 until 16 July 1951, Leopold III assumed the throne after his father **Albert I** died in a mountain-climbing accident. During World War II, Leopold declared Belgium neutral and refused to join the parliament of a government-in-exile. He surrendered to the Third Reich and spent most of World War II under house arrest in Germany and Austria. Following the war, Leopold III was accused of treason by liberal and socialist members of the Belgian parliament. He lived in exile in Switzerland for a number of years until an agreement was reached whereby he abdicated in favor of his son, **Baudouin**, in order to allow the royal family to return to Belgium. Leopold III did not possess the presence or consuming desire for power of his great uncle, **Leopold II**.



Leopold III's major contribution to Congolese affairs came in 1933 when, before becoming king, he proposed a system whereby Congolese could obtain legal ownership of land by cultivating it, even irregularly, and even if it was allowed to lay fallow for a number of years. The purpose of the proposal was to counter a law in force at the time by which the state assumed ownership of virtually all land not under cultivation. Leopold's proposal, called *paysannat indigène*, was instituted after World War II. *See also* LAND LAW AND TENURE.

**LEOPOLDVILLE.** *See* KINSHASA.

**LEOPOLDVILLE ROUND TABLE.** The first of five meetings that aimed at ending the **Katanga secession**. The Leopoldville meeting was held in January and February 1961 and preceded the **Tananarive Conference** in Madagascar in March, the **Coquilhatville Conference** in May, the **Kitona** talks in December 1961, and the **Leopoldville talks** in March–June 1962. None produced an end to the secession.

**LEOPOLDVILLE TALKS.** The last of the five meetings between **Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula** and **Moïse Tshombe** to end the **Katanga secession**, these talks were held between 18 March to 26 June 1962 in **Leopoldville** under the auspices of the Officer-in-Charge of the **United Nations** (UN), Robert Gardiner from Ghana. The first phase of negotiations lasted until 17 April, when Adoula presented to Tshombe a series of “draft proposals” to be signed by both parties. A second round of meetings began on 18 May to discuss the issue of Katanga integration, but the meetings ended in deadlock on 26 June 1962. The result was the escalation of UN military operations later in 1962 to end the Katanga secession.

**LIA.** An **ethnic** subgroup of the **Mongo** that lives between the Tshuapa and **Lomami Rivers** in the southeastern corner of **Équateur Province**. The Lia are said to differ from most of the Mongo linguistically, culturally, and politically. They are headed by a hierarchy of sacred **chiefs** and subchiefs.

**LIBYA, RELATIONS WITH.** Relations between Congo and Libya were historically poor, and Libyan leader Muammar Khadhafi and

**Mobutu Sese Seko** were intense rivals virtually since they came to power. Mobutu visited Libya in 1973 as part of a tour of **Arab countries** after he announced he was breaking relations with **Israel**. However, the two leaders backed opposing factions in the **Angolan** civil war and sided with opposing camps in the dispute over Western Sahara. Relations deteriorated further when the Mobutu **government** recognized Israel in 1982. In 1983, when Libya occupied northern **Chad's** Aouzou Strip, Mobutu sent troops to Ndjamena to bolster the government of Hissen Habré. Khadhafi publicly called for the "elimination" of Mobutu in 1985. Discussions on normalizing relations began in the early 1990s but no major progress was made.

**Laurent Kabila**, who became president in 1997 after the fall of Mobutu, enjoyed good relations with Libya because of close ties to radical African leaders dating back to the 1960s. Kabila visited Libya on several occasions, and Khadhafi tried to mediate the rebellion by the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD)** that broke out in August 1998. One of Khadhafi's efforts was the Sirte agreement convened on 18 April 1999. The attendees agreed in principle to a ceasefire, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Congo, and the deployment of a neutral African peacekeeping force to help guarantee the security of Congo's neighbors. Khadhafi announced in late May that he had sent troops to **Uganda** to prepare the way for an African peacekeeping force in line with the Sirte agreement. The deal never specified the details of troop withdrawals and remained a dead letter. Moreover, the rebel groups never signed the agreement, and more critically, the **Rwandan** endorsement was missing. However, Presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Benjamin Mpaka of **Tanzania**, and Pasteur Bizimungu of Rwanda, as well as Vice President Paul Kagame held a mini-summit in Dar-es-Salaam on 1 June 1999 and issued a communiqué reaffirming their commitment to the principle of the Sirte peace agreement. They decided to set up a committee of experts to work on the practical ways and means of implementing the agreement. The Sirte agreement can be viewed as a precursor to the **Lusaka Peace Accord** of July 1999.

In the early 2000s, the representatives of the two countries met in Kinshasa to assess the possibility of exporting water from Congo to Libya. On 26 April 2003, authorities of Tripoli and Kinshasa ended their meeting with the signing of a cooperation agreement on electricity

and the drainage of the waters of the Congo's Anja Dam to Libya. The details of the project were not made public, however.

**LIGNES AERIENNES CONGOLAISES.** The name given to the national airline in November 1997 by the **Laurent Kabila government** after the fall of **Mobutu Sese Seko**. The airlines replaced **Air Zaïre**, which was declared bankrupt in 1995. *See* AIR TRANSPORTATION.

**LIGUE DES JEUNES VIGILANTS (LJV) [LEAGUE OF VIGILANT YOUTH].** A radical **youth** group formed on 9 January 1966 in **Kinshasa** to struggle for "national consciousness" and against imperialism. It declared its ideology to be **nationalism** and economic independence. It was a precursor to the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) and an early sign of the nationalistic trend that emerged in the late 1960s and culminated in **Zairianization** in 1973.

**LIKASI.** A small city in the **Haut-Katanga province**, Likasi is an urban district of 235 square km with an estimated **population** of less than 350,000. It is the site of a chemical plant that produces sulfuric acid primarily for refineries of the **Générale des Carrières et des Mines** (GECAMINES). Milling, cement, and coal **mining** operations are located nearby. It was the scene of some of the worst violence against **Luba-Kasai** during the episode of **ethnic cleansing** in **Shaba** in 1992.

**LINGALA.** One of four national **languages**, Lingala is used widely in **Kinshasa** and in the northwestern Congo, as well as by the **military** throughout the country. Lingala is a **trade** language that came into use before **independence** along the **Congo River**. It was the only African language used publicly by **Mobutu Sese Seko**.

**LISALA.** A city of about 160,000 inhabitants lying in **Équateur Province**, Lisala is also known as the city where **Mobutu Sese Seko** was born and received his early **education**. It is a **river port** that serves as a processing and **transportation** center for **plantations** in the

surrounding area where **food** crops, **palm oil**, **rubber**, **coffee**, cocoa, and rice are grown.

**LITERATURE.** Congolese literature has flourished only in the post-colonial period because the harsh Belgian colonial system prohibited all forms of free expressions. Congolese writer and critic Mukala Kadima-Nzuji describes this situation in the following terms: “Ever since the end of the 19th century when it was savagely exploited by Europe and annexed in 1908 by **Belgium**, Congo has undergone almost a century of violence characterized by the annihilation of all that is human for the goal of economic development.” This comment helps to explain why successive **governments** have severely restricted the people’s rights and opportunities. Despite such an oppressive environment, Stefano Kaoze emerged as one of the first Congolese to have been ordained as a priest and to have written in French. His essay *La Psychologie des Bantu* (*The Psychology of the Bantus*) was published in 1910.

However, it was primarily the atmosphere of freedom at the end of World War II and the creation of the monthly *La Voix du Congolais* (*The Congolese Voice*) in 1945 that marked the beginning of a truly Congolese literature. After half a century of **missionary** publications about rural life, often in Congolese languages (**Lingala**, **Kiswahili**, Tshiluba, and **Kikongo**) *La Voix du Congolais* demonstrated a political and cultural awareness on the part of the Congolese. Two figures left their mark on this period: *Antoine-Roger Bolamba* (later known as Bolamba Lokolé) in 1972 and Paul Lomami-Tshibamba. A group of writers followed these pioneers, including Désiré-Joseph Basembe and Albert Mongita, whose first work was a play in 1956, and **Patrice Lumumba**, who wrote a few political works before being assassinated shortly after independence.

In 1962, a literary center, *Romans d’Inspiration Africaine* (*African-Inspired Novels*), was set up at the **Lovanium University**, creating a favorable environment for the emergence of a new generation of writers. The best known authors are Lisembé (Philippe) Elebe, Timothée Malembe, V. Y. Mudimbe, (Edmond) Withankenge Walukumbu-Bene, Kayembe Mubadiate Buabua, and Zamenga Batukezanga.

During the 1980s, several new authors emerged; probably the best known are Pius Ngandu Nkashama, Kama Kamanda, and the playwright Kashi M'Bika Katende. In his *Notre Librairie* (Our Bookstore) published in early 1990s, the author and literary critic George Ngal describes the vitality of these Congolese authors and their grasp of Congolese life. In the early 2000s, Congolese authors who remained in Congo were still struggling.

Congolese female writers should also be mentioned, especially in poetry. The first poems of Madiya Clémentine Nzuji were published in 1967, those of Ikole (Ivonne Marie-Claire) Botuli-Bolumbu in 1972, and those of Lima-Baleka Bosek'Ilo in 1973. Christine Kalondji also published an excellent short story in 1973. Three years later, Congolese readers welcomed two short stories by Tol'ande Elisabeth. In 1986, Ntumb Diur started writing for the theater the *Zaïna qui hurle dans la nuit* (*Zaïna who roars in the night*) and Kabika Tshilolo wrote a novel. In 1991, Léonie Abo published her autobiography about the story of the peasant uprising of 1963–66 and the massacres committed by **Mobutu Sese Seko's army**, as seen through the eyes of a **woman** resistance fighter. Three more women published in the late 1990s: a novel on immigration by Maguy Rashisi-Kabamba, a novel on refugees by Amba Bongo, and **Justine Mpoyo Kasavubu** on her memoirs.

**LITHO MOBOTI NZOYOMBO (1924–1982).** Uncle of **Mobutu Sese Seko** and head of the family clan who, at his death on 25 February 1982, was one of the wealthiest and most powerful men in Congo. Litho was born on 22 June 1924 at Kawele in **Équateur Province**. He studied at the **Catholic Church** mission of Molegbe and, prior to **independence**, worked as an agronomist with the Institut National pour l'Étude Agronomique du Congo (INEAC). He was a state secretary in charge of planning for the presidency from 1964 to 1965. From 1965 to 1970, he served as minister of finance and subsequently as minister of **agriculture**. The owner of a major group of **plantations** and food-processing companies, Litho was also president of the Congolese subsidiaries of a number of multinational companies. He was elected to the **Legislative Council** in 1977 and was appointed to the **Central Committee** of the **Mouvement Popu-**

**laire de la Révolution** (MPR) in 1980. He remained in the Committee until his death two years later.

**LIVESTOCK.** The raising of livestock is carried out primarily in the savanna and highland areas of former **Katanga, Orientale, Bas-Congo, and Kivu Provinces**. The wet areas of the **Congo River Basin** are not conducive to animal husbandry because of the presence of the **tsetse fly** and numerous other parasites and diseases.

At **independence**, cattle numbered 1 million head. The number dropped by 20 percent during the early 1960s but returned to pre-independence levels in the mid-1970s. In 1985, the Congolese government reported that the country produced 50,000 tons of butchered meat, whereas demand was 110,000 tons. One-fourth of the shortfall was met by **imports** and the remainder by substitution, primarily of **fish** and bush-meat.

Most traditional herding is carried out in **Ituri, Nord-Kivu, and Sud-Kivu** Provinces. Commercial herding is more prevalent in a number of provinces including the former **Bandundu, Katanga, and Kasai Occidental** Provinces, as well as in **Nord-Ubangi** Province. An estimated 3 million head of sheep and goat are raised, primarily by small-herd owners. Hog production, primarily in Bandundu and Bas-Congo, reached 800,000 heads in the 1980s. There is also some commercial raising of chickens and ducks near urban centers, such as the “model” farm at N’Sele outside **Kinshasa**. Following **Zairianization** in 1973, large foreign-owned ranches were placed under control of a **government** agency, the **Office National pour le Développement de l’Élevage** (ONDE), and small ranches were leased to Congolese. Under **Retrocession** one year later, however, some ranches were returned to their previous owners.

**LIVINGSTONE, DAVID (1813–1873).** A Scottish **missionary** and **explorer** who was one of the first Europeans to travel through southern and eastern Africa, Livingstone began his explorations searching for the source of the Nile River. He was one of the first Europeans to reach what is now Congo. He crossed **Lake Mweru** and Lake Bengweulu in 1867–1868 and traveled on the **Lualaba River** to reach **Nyangwe** in 1871. His disappearance for two years in the late

1860s was one of the major reasons for the first expedition by **Henry Morton Stanley**. During this trip, Stanley developed the theory that the Lualaba River, which Livingstone thought to be the headwater of the Nile, was in fact the headwater of the **Congo River**. Stanley met Livingstone at **Ujiji**, on the eastern shore of **Lake Tanganyika**, in 1871, on his way to the Congo River. Livingstone died two years after meeting Stanley without ever leaving Africa.

**LOBITO.** A port city on **Angola's** Atlantic coast, 30 km north of Benguela, Lobito is on a major **export** route for minerals from **Katanga** until the **Benguela Railway** was closed by Angolan rebels in 1975.

**LOI FONDAMENTALE [FUNDAMENTAL LAW].** A charter passed by the parliament of **Belgium** on 19 May 1960 to serve as a temporary **constitution** for Congo during its first years of **independence**. The Loi Fondamentale, which drew heavily from the Belgian system of **government**, provided for a **president** as chief of state and a **prime minister** as chief of government, both elected by a bicameral legislature. However, in its effort to provide checks and balances, the charter failed to adequately define the division of power between the executive and **legislative** branches of government. Moreover, it failed to recognize that in Belgium the king is a figurehead, while the prime minister is from the majority party in the parliament. These deficiencies, combined with rising interregional and interethnic tensions, contributed to the political crisis following independence. The Loi Fondamentale was replaced by the first constitution on 1 August 1964.

**LOMAMI PROVINCE.** A district of the former **Kasai Oriental Province**, Lomami became a province in February 2009 as the result of the 2006 **constitution**. Kabinda and Tshilenge are the two territories of the province. The capital of Lomami Province is Kabinda.

**LOMAMI RIVER.** A tributary of the **Congo River**, the Lomami rises in **Haut Lomami Province** near **Kamina** and meanders north, almost parallel to the **Lualaba River**, for more than 1,500 km before joining the Congo River 100 km downriver from **Kisangani**.

**LOMÉ CONVENTION.** An agreement between the **European Union** (EU) and nearly 80 developing nations of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP) to foster greater economic cooperation by lowering tariffs and other market restrictions between the developing nations and the EU. The Lomé Convention also included provisions for developmental assistance. The first convention was signed in Lomé, **Togo**, in 1975 and came into force on 1 April 1976. It replaced earlier agreements reached in Yaoundé, Cameroon and Arusha, **Tanzania**. Congo was an original signatory. The agreement allowed many **agricultural** products from ACP countries to be exported duty-free to the EU. An **export** stabilization program (STABEX) attempted to compensate countries hurt by the removal of **price controls** and exposure to more competitive economies. Subsequent conventions, signed in 1979, 1984, and 1989, expanded the programs to include virtually all exports to the EU from ACP countries. Another agreement was reached at Cotonou, Benin, in 2000. *See also* ECONOMY; FOREIGN AID.

**LONDON CLUB.** The unofficial name of the group of approximately 100 major commercial and private banks that negotiate requests for external **debt** and payment rescheduling by countries in arrears on their debt repayments. According to **World Bank** figures, in 1980 Congo owed \$1.4 billion, or nearly one-third of its total external debt, to private creditors. In 1993, this debt had declined to \$836 million, whereas total foreign debt had risen to \$11.2 billion. The change represented a massive shift of the government's debt from private creditors to multilateral lending institutions and donor governments. *See also* PARIS CLUB.

**LOOTINGS.** *See* PILLAGES.

**LOVANUM CONFERENCE.** A conference occurring from 22 to 23 July 1961 following the **Coquilhatville Conference** of May 1961. Despite ideological differences among the members of the parliament during this period of Cold War rivalries, the delegates accepted **Cyrille Adoula** as the new **prime minister**; he was sworn in on 2 August 1961. The Adoula **government** reflected the careful balance



and compromise of the conference. It included two vice prime ministers, **Antoine Gizenga** (Stanleyville government) and **Jason Sendwe** (Association des Baluba du Katanga, BALUBAKAT), 23 ministers, and 15 state secretaries. Sixteen of the ministers were associated with the **Patrice Lumumba** bloc in September 1960. The Lovanium Conference ended 11 months of chaos that followed the dismissal of Lumumba as prime minister on 5 September 1960.

**LOVANUM UNIVERSITY.** The original name of Congo's first **university**, Lovanium was founded in 1954 by **Catholic Church missionaries** on hills overlooking **Kinshasa**, then called **Leopoldville**. The university was nationalized in 1971 following **student** unrest and became the Kinshasa campus of the **Université Nationale du Zaïre** (UNAZA). It was returned to the church in the mid-1990s as the University of Kinshasa.

**LUALABA PROVINCE.** A new province of Congo, Lualaba Province was established in February 2009 as the result of the 2006 **constitution**. Lualaba is one of the richest provinces of Congo, forming part of the copper-belt region. The capital of the province is **Kolwezi**. The area was the setting of the **Shaba Wars** in 1977 and 1978.

**LUALABA RIVER.** The name often given to the headwaters of the **Congo River**, the Lualaba rises in the **Katanga** plateau at an altitude of 1,500 m above sea level and flows 1600 km north to **Kisangani**. Although some international cartographers differentiate between the Congo and Lualaba Rivers, official Congolese maps consider the Lualaba to be the upper extension of the Congo River. Rice and other **food** crops are cultivated along its banks and two **electrical power** plants near **Kolwezi** furnish 250 kW each to the **Lualaba Province** and its **mining** installations. The Lualaba is navigable from Bukama to **Kasongo** near the border between Katanga and **Sud-Kivu**, and from **Kindu**, in **Maniema** Province, to Ubundu in **Tshopo Province**. **Railways** circumvent the unnavigable stretches of the river.

**LUAMBO MAKIADI, FRANÇOIS (1938–1989).** Widely referred to as Franco, Luambo was born on 6 July 1938 in the village of Sona Bata in the **Kongo Central Province**. His parents moved to **Leopol-**

**dville** while Franco was still a baby. He built a rudimentary guitar at the age of seven, which he played to attract customers to his mother's stall. His talent was recognized by guitarist Paul Ebengo Dewayon who taught Luambo how to play. In 1950, Luambo made his professional debut as a member of Dewayon's band. Three years later, the young guitarist recorded his first single titled *Bolingo na ngai na Béatrice* (My love for Beatrice) with Loningisa Studio. The band leader, Henri Bowane, shortened his first name, François, to Franco, a tag that would stay with Luambo for the rest of his life. In 1955, Franco formed a band with Jean Serge Essou that debuted in the OK Bar in Leopoldville. The following year, the band was named OK Jazz and later Tout Puissant OK Jazz. The band evolved from six members to almost 30 by the 1980s. Franco and OK Jazz dominated Congolese music for more than 30 years, and he is credited with having produced more than 80 albums. Franco died on 12 October 1989.

**LUBA.** A large cluster of tribes residing in the former **Kasai** and **Katanga Provinces**, the Luba group inhabits territory stretching from the **Kasai River** around **Kananga** and **Mbuji-Mayi** in the west to the **Lualaba** and **Lufira Rivers**. The Luba are primarily patrilineal and speak Tshiluba, one of Congo's four national **languages**. Jan Vansina divides the Luba into three clusters: the Luba-Shaba or Luba-Katanga (which include the Kanioka, Lakundwe, and Lomotwa), the Luba-Kasai (which include the **Lulua**, Luntu, Binji, Mputu, and North Kete), and the **Songye** (which include **Bangu-Bangu** and, perhaps, the **Hemba**).

According to legend, the Luba began organizing under local **chiefs** in the 15th century. They were invaded by a foreign **Bantu**-speaking group from the north called the *Balopwe* (rulers or chiefs), which, led by **Kongolo**, founded a Balopwe-dominated empire, with its capital at Mwibele. At its peak in the early 1600s, the group controlled considerable territory, including most of Katanga and southern Kasai. The empire was divided into provinces that were subdivided into chiefdoms, or groups of villages. The king retained a great deal of power over appointments and tribute. Occasionally, deposed or disgruntled chiefs would leave with their followers to form a new state. One such split led to the formation of the **Lunda** Empire. Shifts in

population and increased **trade** led to a consolidation of the empire in the late 1700s and early 1800s. The Luba Empire began to decline in the late 1800s with the rise of the **Chokwe**, who raided many of its settlements.

During the colonial era, however, many Luba moved to urban areas and **missionary** centers to take advantage of **education** and **employment** opportunities. A large number of them rose to positions of responsibility in business and the **civil service**. Nevertheless, colonial authorities considered them as a source of dissent and, as a result, supported ethnic rivals such as the Lulua. The Luba fought a bitter land war with the Lulua in 1959–60.

The Luba's ethnocentricity and upward mobility caused resentment among other Congolese. In 1992–93, hundreds of thousands of Luba-Kasai were expelled from **Shaba** by local militia in an episode of politically motivated **ethnic cleansing**. The installation of **Laurent Kabila** following the fall of Mobutu in May 1997 brought the first Luba to the **presidency** of the country.

**LUBUMBASHI.** The capital of **Katanga Province**, Elisabethville, now called Lubumbashi, was best known internationally as the capital of secessionist Katanga in 1961–63. Lubumbashi is the capital of **Haut-Katanga** Province and Congo's second most important city after **Kinshasa**. A company town long dominated by the **mining industry** and the **Général des Carrières et des Mines** (GECAMINES), Lubumbashi is an administrative unit with an estimated **population** of 1.7 million people in 2008. The city is surrounded by open-pit and underground mines, and is home to a **copper** refinery and related metallurgical plants. As the second-largest industrial center in the country with the second-highest per capita income, Lubumbashi is also a manufacturing center for the cigarette, **cloth**, shoe, metalwork, **palm oil**, and food processing industries.

The city is linked to the Atlantic Ocean by the **National Way** across Congo and by the **Benguela Railway** through **Angola**. It is also linked by **railway** through **Zambia** and Zimbabwe to Indian Ocean ports in **Tanzania**, Mozambique, and **South Africa**. In many ways closer to southern Africa than to central Africa in geography, traditional **trade** routes, and cultural temperament, Lubumbashi has often felt ignored by the **government** in Kinshasa, which it fre-

quently perceives as a remote capital that profits from its wealth but provides few services in return. After the fall of **Mobutu Sese Seko** in May 1997, the government of **President Laurent Kabila**, which was dominated by easterners, pledged to rebuild industry and infrastructure in eastern Congo and restore Lubumbashi's importance as the economic capital of the region.

**LUEBO.** A major town on the **Lulua River** in the former **Kasai Occidental Province**, Luebo is a regional educational and commercial center. It is the capital of **Kasai** Province after the promulgation of the 2006 constitution. The province became effective in February 2009.

**LUFIRA RIVER.** A 500-km-long tributary of the **Lualaba River**, the Lufira rises in the highlands between **Lubumbashi** and **Likasi** near the **Zambian** border and flows north, joining the Lualaba River below Bukama. Two hydroelectric complexes located near Likasi supply **electrical power** to Lubumbashi, Likasi, and **Kolwezi**.

**LUKUGA RIVER.** Issuing from the western shore of **Lake Tanganyika** at **Kalemie**, the Lukuga flows 320 kilometers west to the **Lualaba River** 40 kilometers north of Kabalo. It is the only outlet of Lake Tanganyika to the Lualaba River that takes water from **Lake Kivu** into the **Ruzizi River** and Lake Tanganyika. There are low-grade coal deposits along its tributaries, north of Kalemie and Moluba.

**LULUA.** An **ethnic group** related to the **Luba** cluster that lives in **Lulua Province**. According to historical evidence, until the European penetration in the former **Kasai Province**, virtually no cultural or linguistic differences existed between the Luba and Lulua groups. Both were seen as belonging to the Luba group. The name Lulua was apparently adopted by the German **explorer** Hermann Von Wissmann around 1885 to designate a group of Luba located on the western bank of the **Lulua River** who were called *Bashilenge* by the neighboring **Chokwe**. They retained the name Lulua after 1885 to distinguish themselves from those Luba who followed the European colonizer into the northern part of Kasai. As pointed out by Jan Vansina, "what we have here is a new tribe that was born after 1885."

The Lulua supplied **Angolan slave** and **ivory** traders in the 19th century and provided land to their Luba brothers who were escaping the slave trade. However, as the flow of Luba increased into Lulua lands, animosity began to build. Meanwhile, the Luba also dominated most colonial clerical jobs, especially in 1950, when **Kananga**, then **Luluabourg**, became the capital city of Kasai Province. By the time the Lulua had the opportunity to move into urban sectors in large numbers after World War II, land was already scarce and a large number of Luba were already in powerful clerical positions in the colonial administration.

After World War II, however, the Lulua began to organize politically, forming the **Association des Lulua-Frères** in 1953 to defend their interests, primarily in urban centers. In 1959, the Lulua convened a conference during which they called for autonomy rather than **independence**. Some historians have charged that colonial authorities encouraged historical tensions between the Lulua and Luba. These tensions, centered primarily around traditional land disputes, erupted into violence in October 1959, resulting in massacres of villages, the displacement of tens of thousands of people, especially Luba, and the destruction of millions of dollars worth of property and crops. The famine that followed obliged the **United Nations** to mount a million-dollar relief effort in the region in 1960–61.

**LULUA PROVINCE.** First created in 1962 from Kasai **Province** as Luluabourg Province, Lulua was incorporated into **Kasai Occidental** in 1966 under the **Mobutu Sese Seko** regime. It became a province in February 2009 as the result of the 2006 **constitution**. The capital is **Kananga**.

**LULUA RIVER.** A large, but mostly unnavigable **river** that originates near the **Zambian** border east of **Dilolo** and flows 900 km north and west, joining the **Kasai River** between **Luebo** and **Ilebo**.

**LULUABOURG.** *See* KANANGA.

**LUMUMBA, FRANÇOIS EMÉRY (1952– ).** The son of **Patrice Lumumba**. As one of the exiled leaders of the Lumumba wing of the **Mouvement National Congolais** (MNC) from the mid-1960s,

Eméry was perhaps best remembered for an article he wrote in *Afrique-Asie* magazine commemorating the 17th anniversary of his father's death, in which he called for the overthrow of **Mobutu Sese Seko**. Following the political liberalization of 1990, Eméry returned to **Zaire** for a visit and received an emotional welcome. Most of the Lumumbist parties later joined the **Parti Lumumbiste Unifié** (PALU) under **Antoine Gizenga**.

**LUMUMBA, PATRICE EMÉRY (1925–1961).** Congo's first **prime minister** and a principal advocate of pan-Africanism, Lumumba died under mysterious circumstances less than one year after **independence**. Fluent in French, **Lingala**, and **Kiswahili**, Patrice Lumumba was a fiery orator who inspired strong feelings of **nationalism** on a continent that still bore the psychological scars of the "colonial yoke." However, his rhetoric and political overtures to Soviet-bloc nations at the height of the Cold War caused fear among groups with vested interests in Congo, including Western governments, private businessmen, and moderate African leaders. His assassination in January 1961 aroused anger and consternation, particularly in the socialist world.

Lumumba was born on 2 July 1925, in the village of Onalua in the **Sankuru** district of the former **Kasai Province**. Of the **Tetela ethnic group**, he received his primary **education** at a local **Protestant missionary** school and attended post office training school in **Leopoldville**. As an adult, he moved to **Stanleyville**, where he became president of the local club of *évolués*. He was provincial president of the **Association de Personnel Indigène de la Colonie** (APIC) and a regular contributor to various magazines. In 1956, he was convicted, reportedly for political reasons, of theft and spent one year in prison. He was freed in 1957 with his reputation considerably enhanced. Lumumba worked for a local brewery for two years, rising to the position of commercial director.

In December 1958, he attended the first **Pan-African Conference** in Accra, Ghana, where he met Kwame Nkrumah and became further acquainted with the concepts of Pan-Africanism and "active neutralism." He was the first Congolese leader to openly call for independence at a political rally on 28 December 1958. He helped found the **Mouvement National Congolais** (MNC) and attempted to make it

a nationally based **political party** by attracting a variety of regional and ethnic leaders. He achieved some success, but fighting between the **Luba** and **Lulua** tribes caused a split in the Kasai-based wing of the party, and personality conflicts caused some leaders, especially **Albert Kalonji**, to break away to form their own political parties.

On 31 October 1959, riots erupted in Stanleyville after an MNC meeting. Lumumba was arrested the next day and accused of having provoked them. However, he was released in January 1960 in order to attend the **Round Table Conference** in Brussels. The MNC scored significant victories in the **elections** of May 1960, but did not win an absolute majority. Lumumba succeeded in forging a compromise **government**, in which he became prime minister and defense minister, while **Joseph Kasavubu** of the **Alliance des Bakongo** (ABAKO) party was elected **president**. The agreement lasted only two months, during which time the central government's authority seriously deteriorated and **Katanga Province** and the **South Kasai** region seceded. In late August, Lumumba declared martial law and imprisoned a number of his rivals. He also issued a request for aid from Soviet-bloc nations to help put down the **Katanga secession**. The request caused consternation in Western capitals and led Kasavubu to dismiss him. However, Lumumba refused to accept his dismissal. Rather, he and his cabinet accused Kasavubu of treason and voted to dismiss him, precipitating a constitutional crisis. The head of the army, **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu**, announced in mid-September that he was "neutralizing" the government for six months. He appointed a group of young intellectuals, called the **College of Commissioners**, as a caretaker government to govern in the interim.

When the **United Nations** (UN) voted to seat the Kasavubu delegation in the General Assembly, Lumumba, with **Antoine Gizenga** and **Anicet Kashamura**, decided to move the MNC's base to Stanleyville. Gizenga and Kashamura arrived, but Lumumba never did. He left Leopoldville on the night of 26–27 November. Traveling by **road** toward the region, he was captured in western **Kivu** by the Congolese **army**. He was imprisoned first at Camp Hardy in Thysville, now **Mbanza-Ngungu**, in **Kongo Central**. However, authorities feared he would spark an uprising among the soldiers at the camp and, in what most historians believe was a calculated move aimed at his elimination, ordered him to be flown on 17 January

1961 to **Elisabethville**, where his archenemy **Moïse Tshombe** was based. According to reports compiled by investigative commissions, he was guarded during the flight by Luba soldiers, who considered him responsible for the massacre of Luba by Congolese troops a few months earlier. Lumumba and his two companions, ex-Senate Vice President Joseph Okito and ex-Minister of Youth and Sports Maurice Mpolo, were severely beaten during the flight.

The Katangan government announced on 13 February that Lumumba had been killed by “angry tribesmen” following an “escape attempt.” However, Mobutu in a 1985 interview said Lumumba was killed on 17 January in Elisabethville and was not killed by soldiers and that a Belgian journalist witnessed the execution. Although Mobutu, as **armed forces** chief of staff, reportedly ordered Lumumba flown to Elisabethville, he denied responsibility for the murder, saying it occurred in secessionist Katanga.

Lumumba’s death caused an international outcry. It caused the **Soviet Union** and a number of East European states to withdraw recognition of the Leopoldville government, refuse to finance the UN operation in Congo, and begin covert programs supporting various **rebellions** in the country, such as the 1964 rebellions that eventually were suppressed in 1966. Today, Lumumba is still a hero and a martyr for Congolese, and many Africans still believe in his dream of an Africa united in the pursuit of its own political interests and economic development.

**LUNDA.** An **ethnic group** related historically to the **Luba**, the Lunda live in **Haut-Katanga** and **Lualaba Provinces**, northern **Zambia**, and western **Angola**. In Congo, Lunda-related people also live in an area between the Lubilash and **Kasai Rivers**, in the southwestern part of the former **Kasai** province and the southeastern tip of **Kwango Province**. The Lunda Empire was formed by a group led by **Kibinda Ilunga**. The empire split from the Luba in the 1550s. It flourished during the 17th and 18th centuries and expanded south to straddle what became Congo’s border with Angola and Zambia. Unlike the Luba, the Lunda sought to expand their empire by absorbing other peoples. They organized a political structure with related hierarchies and, by the end of the 17th century, had created the position of paramount king, the **Mwant Yaav** (Lord of the Viper). During the



18th century, the Lunda expanded their empire in search of **copper**, salt, **slaves**, and **ivory**. The empire began to decline in the mid-19th century. It was attacked by the **Chokwe**, who at one point took the Lunda capital.

Following World War II, a Lunda political organization began to coalesce, formed in part to counter Luba and Chokwe interest groups. It came to be known as the **Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga** (CONAKAT) party, headed by **Moïse Tshombe**. The **elections** of May 1960 gave CONAKAT an absolute majority in the Katangan provincial assembly and led to the formation of a one-party government in **Katanga**. However, the Lunda felt excluded from power in the central **government** in **Leopoldville** and eventually opted to support the Katanga secession.

The Lunda were a major source of **opposition** to the **Mobutu Sese Seko** government. A large number of Lunda **refugees** and a few members of the **Gendarmerie Katangaise** staged the **Shaba** invasions in 1977 and 1978 from bases in Angola. Lunda villages afterward suffered reprisals by Congolese **armed forces**. Some Lunda leaders were involved in the expulsions, or **ethnic cleansing**, of Luba-Kasai in 1992–93, which displaced hundreds of thousands of longtime residents of Shaba. Many joined the 1996 rebellion led by **Laurent Kabila**, whose father was a Luba and mother was a Lunda. However, Kabila, once in power, appointed a number of Luba from Katanga to major military and ministerial positions at the expense of Lunda. **Joseph Kabila** followed the same policy. In the military, there are few chances for promotion for Lunda officers. Since his election in late 2006, Joseph Kabila has blocked attempts by the Lunda and other peoples from Haut Katanga and Lualaba Provinces to challenge any mining agreement contracted by the central government.

**LUNDA BULULU, VINCENT (1942–)**. The first **prime minister** of the **democratic transition**, Lunda was appointed by **Mobutu Sese Seko** following the announcement of multipartyism in April 1990. He resigned in March 1991 to pave the way for the appointment of **Crispin Mulumba Lukoji**, a technocrat from the south whose **government** was meant to appease **opposition** groups rallying around **Étienne Tshisekedi**. Lunda joined rebels of the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD) in August 1998, and in Janu-

ary 1999 was appointed a vice president of the group. He was elected senator in 2007.

**LUNDULA, VICTOR.** An uncle of **Patrice Lumumba**, Lundula was a former staff sergeant in the colonial **Force Publique**. A leader of the **Mouvement National Congolais** (MNC), he was appointed as Congo's first chief of the **armed forces** following the mutiny of the Force Publique in July 1960. Lundula was dismissed by **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** in September 1960 and placed under house arrest, but broke out and managed to reach **Stanleyville**, where he was made commander of the armed forces of the **Antoine Gizenga government**. He later transferred his loyalties back to the central government as part of a reconciliation negotiated by **Cyrille Adoula**. He was an advisor to the Defense Department from 1962 to 1964 and was elected senator from Sankuru district in 1965. Following the Mobutu **coup d'état**, he occupied a number of defense-related posts. Lundula died in the early 1980s.

**LUNGU.** A relatively small **ethnic group** that resides near the **Bemba** and **Kazembe** tribes in an area near **Lake Tanganyika**. The Lungu were known for their close relations in the late 1800s with **Tippo Tip** and the **Afro-Arab** traders.

**LUSAKA PEACE ACCORD.** On 10 July 1999, the major belligerents in the **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila**, which started on 2 August 1998, met in Lusaka and signed a peace agreement known as the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement after interminable discussions at the ministerial level. This was the first genuine document to offer hope of a ceasefire since the outbreak of the anti-Kabila revolt. The first part of the accord emphasized the military component of the conflict, including a ceasefire, deployment of a **United Nations** force, the neutralization of "negative forces" (understood as **Rwandan** and **Ugandan** rebels operating in Congo), the withdrawal of foreign armies, and coordination efforts through the creation of a Joint Military Commission. The second part provided the political component: the organization of a **Dialogue Inter-Congolais** (Inter-Congolese Dialogue) aims to provide the terms of the transition to democratic institutional arrangements and the re-establishment of state authority

throughout the entire national territory. The last part focused on the social component, encouraging belligerents to cease violence against civilians and open corridors through which international assistance could reach vulnerable people. *See also* SECOND CONGO WAR.

**LUVUA RIVER.** A tributary of the **Lualaba River**, the Luvua River issues from the northern end of **Lake Mweru** on the **Zambia–Congo** border. It flows about 350 kilometers northwest past Kiambi to the confluence with the Lualaba River opposite the town of Ankoro. The river is navigable by shallow-draft boats for 160 kilometers in its lower course below Kiambi. Rapids block its middle course. The falls are harnessed at Piana Mwanga to generate electricity for the mines of Manono and Kitotolo.

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**11–12 MAY 1990.** The night on which Congolese troops invaded the **Lubumbashi** campus of the **Université Nationale du Zaïre** (UN-AZA), entering dormitories and assaulting **students**. The students were staging protests to demand larger study grants, better conditions, and **Mobutu Sese Seko**'s resignation. On the night of 11 May, having cut off electricity to the campus, special guards attacked students with bayonets and machetes. The password *lititi ya mboka* (herb from the village) was given to students from Mobutu's **Équateur Province** to protect them from the guards. The government reported that one person was killed in the attack, but refused to allow an international inquiry. According to **human rights** organizations, 290 students were massacred by Mobutu's guards. The incident led to the suspension of nonhumanitarian aid by the European Community (now **European Union**, EU), the **United States**, and Canada and marked the beginning of the final withdrawal of Western support for the Mobutu regime.

**MABI MULUMBA (1941– ).** Born on 22 April 1941, Mabi graduated from the University of Liège with a doctorate degree in business administration. He became professor of economics at the University of Kinshasa. He was appointed finance minister in October 1986,

**prime minister** (first commissioner) from 22 January 1987 to 7 March 1988, and then president of the Cour des Comptes. Mabi advocated reducing payments on the external **debt**. With Mabi's appointment, the **government** announced it was limiting repayment of the country's debt to 10 percent of **export** earnings and 20 percent of government revenues. Mabi's appointment ended a period during which Congo attempted to abide by **International Monetary Fund** (IMF) stabilization measures and, under Prime Minister **Kengo wa Dondo**, set aside as much as 50 percent of government revenues for debt servicing. Mabi lost credibility a few years later, when **inflation** returned and Congo was once again obliged to seek debt relief. Mabi was elected senator in 2007.

**MAHDI (1844–1885)**. Born in 1844 as Muhammad Ahmad ibn as Sayyid Abd Allah, Muhammad was a religious leader, in Sudan, who, in 1881, proclaimed himself the Mahdi—the prophesied redeemer of Islam who will appear at the end of times—and declared a jihad (holy war) against Egyptian and British authorities in the 1880s. The Mahdi died in 1885 of typhus. His supporters controlled trade in northern Congo until 1890, when they were driven out by European forces fighting to end the **slave** trade.

**MAHELE LIEKO BOKOUNGO (GENERAL) (1941–1997)**. Born in **Équateur Province** of the Mbuza tribe, Mahele was trained as a carpenter. He was recruited into the **army** after the **coup d'état** in 1965 and served for a time as **Mobutu Sese Seko**'s personal bodyguard. He received **military** training in **France**, **Israel**, and **Belgium**, and fought against eastern-based rebels in the 1980s. As head of the **Division Spéciale Présidentielle** (DSP), he led the contingent sent to **Rwanda** in 1990 following the outbreak of **civil war** there. As **armed forces** chief of staff, he gained respect among the populace when he ordered troops to fire upon elements of the army when they looted **Kinshasa** during the “**pillages**” of 1993. However, he was dismissed on 2 October 1993 after criticizing the armed forces before the **National Conference**.

Mobutu named him chief of staff again on 19 December 1996, to reorganize the armed forces after their losses, in late 1996, in eastern Congo to rebels of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour**

**la Libération du Congo** (AFDL). Mahele reportedly accepted on condition he be given command over all **military** contingents, in particular the DSP, which answered directly to Mobutu. Mahele tried unsuccessfully to counter the rebel offensive, particularly at **Lubumbashi**. On the night of 17 May 1997, after Mobutu left Kinshasa, as rebels closed in on the capital, Mahele went to Camp Tshatshi, headquarters of the DSP. He urged the troops to help prevent civilian casualties by laying down their arms. He was shot by soldiers who viewed him as a traitor. After the rebels took over, he was buried with full military honors and was widely credited with having avoided a bloodbath in Kinshasa.

**MAI-MAI.** The word Mai-Mai emerged during the 1964 **rebellion** in Congo. The name is a corruption of the **Kiswahili** word for water, *maji*. Rebel troops believed in the power of magic. They wore war charms that they believed protected them against bullets. Thus, they attacked the national **army** with spears, bows and arrows, and a few firearms by chanting “**Mulele** Mai Mulele Mai,” meaning “Bullets are water, Mulele protects us.” They were subdued by **mercenary-backed government** forces after the **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu coup d’état**.

The Mai-Mai rebels of the 1990s also wore war charms reminiscent of early rebellions in Congo and sprinkled their bodies with water before combat to protect themselves against bullets, which were, according to the rebels, transformed into rain drops. Historically, the group was an expression of discontent in marginalized communities in **Kivu**. They surfaced in the early 1990s during a period of ethnic hatred in Kivu against people of Rwandan origin. They fought with troops of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) when their offensive against the Mobutu government began in October 1996. After the AFDL took **Kinshasa** and installed **Laurent Kabila** as **president**, however, the Mai-Mai began to object to the continued presence of foreigners in eastern Congo, particularly ethnic **Tutsi** fighters from **Rwanda**, whom they viewed as an occupation force. Clashes between the Mai-Mai and AFDL forces began in mid-1997 and continued until late July 1998, when President Kabila ordered all foreign troops to leave Congo. The Mai-Mai militias sided with the Kabila government and against the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD) when

the RCD launched its rebellion in early August 1998. After the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI) was signed in December 2002 in Pretoria, **South Africa**, many Mai-Mai leaders became integrated into the national army. However, the Mai-Mai reemerged in 2004–2008 to fight against the troops of **Laurent Nkunda**.

**MAI-NDOMBE PROVINCE.** A district of the former **Bandundu Province**, Mai-Ndombe became a province in February 2009 according to the 2006 constitution. The capital of the province is Inongo. *See also* LAKE MAI-NDOMBE.

**MAKANDA KABOBI INSTITUTE.** The academic and ideological training center of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) party and repository of many **government** records, the Makanda Kabobi Institute was founded in August 1975 to train party *cadres* and encourage the study of party doctrine and **Mobutism**.

**MALEBO POOL.** Formerly called Stanley Pool, Malebo Pool is a stretch of the **Congo River** 25 km wide that extends from **Kinshasa's** Mont Ngaliema nearly to N'Sele, 80 km upriver. It is caused by a back-up of water from the cataracts that begin below Kinshasa. Brazzaville, the capital of the **Republic of Congo**, lies across the pool.

**MALNUTRITION.** The **United Nations** Development Program (UNDP) estimated in the early 1990s that 15 percent of all Congolese infants were underweight, defined as weighing less than 2.5 kg, and 27 percent of all children between the ages of two and five years were stunted, defined as significantly below the standard average weight for children their age. The situation deteriorated further as the result of the **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila** that began in August 1998. A large number of children died from malnutrition. International donors worked with local churches and charity groups to distribute food in the poorest sections of major cities, but the incidence of disease and death rates rose in the late 1990s and 2000s in both war and non-war zones because of the reduced caloric intake of many inhabitants. *See also* DIET; FOOD SUPPLY.

**MALUKU STEEL MILL.** Part of the ambitious plans of the late 1960s to bring heavy **industry** to Congo, the mill was meant to exploit iron ore deposits from Banalia, Isiro, and **Luebo** and make Congo a steel exporter. The plant was built at a cost of more than \$250 million near Maluku, a town 100 km upriver of **Kinshasa** near N'Sele. Constructed with Italian and German participation, the development project was completed in 1975 and was billed as a major technological achievement. However, the lack of infrastructure to exploit domestic iron ore reserves obliged the plant to operate with imported scrap metal. Production never exceeded 10 percent of its 250,000-ton capacity and ceased in the 1980s.

**MALULA, JOSEPH (CARDINAL) (1917–1989).** Born on 12 December 1917, Malula attended primary school in **Leopoldville**, under the direction of Fr. Raphaël de la Kétuhulle, more commonly known as Tata (father) Raphaël. From 1931 to 1934, he attended the Minor Seminary in Mbata Kiela and then the Minor Seminary of Bolongo in Lisala until 1937. Malula studied philosophy (1937–40) and theology (1940–44) at the Major Seminary of Christ-Roi in Kabwe. He served as a professor at the Minor Seminary of Bokoro from 1944 to 1946 as well. Malula was ordained to the priesthood by Bishop Georges Six on 9 June 1946. He then resumed teaching at the Minor Seminary and served as vicar and pastor at several parishes in Léopoldville. On 18 July 1959, Malula was appointed auxiliary bishop of Leopoldville and titular bishop by Pope John XXIII. Archbishop of Kinshasa and the first Congolese head of the country's Roman **Catholic Church**, Malula was elevated to cardinal by Pope Paul VI on 28 March 1969.

Malula encouraged the **Africanization** of church litany and hierarchy, but was best known for his criticism of Congolese society under **Mobutu Sese Seko**. He suffered reprisals from the **government** in the 1970s because he opposed some aspects of **Zairianization**, in particular the dropping of Christian names and the government use of secularized religious songs. He fled the country after his residence was ransacked by soldiers in 1972, and later decried **corruption** and moral decay in society. With Pope **John Paul II**'s visit in 1980, a reconciliation was sealed with the government. Malula continued his criticism, but this was usually tolerated. After his death on 14 June

1989, he was replaced by Monsignor **Frédéric Etsou**, former bishop of **Mbandaka**.

**MALU MALU, APOLLINAIRE MUHOLONGU (1962– )**. Born in Muhangi, **Nord-Kivu**, Malu Malu is a cleric from the **Nande** ethnic group. He received his doctorate in political science in 1988 at the University of Grenoble II, **France**. From 1993 to 1996, he was priest at the Monestier-de-Clermont parish, in the Grenoble Diocese. When he returned home in 1997, he became vice rector and rector of the Catholic University of Graben, **Butembo**, Nord-Kivu. In 2004, he was nominated as the chair of the **Commission Électorale Indépendante** (Electoral Independent Commission, CEI) in charge of supervising voters' registration and organizing free elections at all levels. Despite criticism, the CEI was able to organize presidential, legislative, provincial, and local elections from 2006 to 2009. *See also* CATHOLIC CHURCH.

**MAMVU**. A **Bantu ethnic group** speaking a **language** of central Sudanic origin, the Mamvu live in **Haut-Uele Province** between Isiro and the border with **Sudan** and **Uganda**. Unlike other groups from northern Congo, such as the **Mangbetu** and **Zande**, who assimilated other peoples and created states with nobles and commoners, the Mamvu remained relatively decentralized.

**MANGBETU**. A group of Congolese speaking a **language** of central Sudanic origin, the Mangbetu migrated into the **forest** of the northern and northeastern **Congo River Basin** in the 1700s and currently live between the **Ituri** and **Uele Rivers** near Poko, Isiro, and Rungu. They assimilated other **ethnic groups** and established relatively hierarchical societies with aristocracies and commoner groups.

**MANIEMA PROVINCE**. A relatively sparsely populated **province** in eastern Congo that was a subregion of **Kivu** until the administrative reorganization of May 1988. With an estimated **population** of 1 million people living in an area of 132,250 square km, Maniema is rich in iron and **tin**, and its soil is fertile, allowing the cultivation of many cash crops. However, the remoteness of the **region** and a deteriorated



**transportation** infrastructure has hindered development of the area. The capital of Maniema is **Kindu**.

**MANUFACTURING.** *See* **INDUSTRY**.

**“MARCHE D’ÉSPOIR” [MARCH OF HOPE].** On 24 April 1990 when **President Mobutu Sese Seko** liberalized his personal rule, several **political parties** emerged, insisting on the organization of a **National Conference** that was to set up new institutional arrangements. After several false starts, the National Conference opened on 7 August 1991. In mid-January 1992, **Prime Minister Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond** called off the National Conference indefinitely. Then, on 16 February, the clergy organized a peaceful demonstration, called “March of Hope” or “Christian March,” for the resumption of the National Conference. Fifty-two people were killed and more than 500 were wounded as Mobutu Sese Seko’s presidential guards fired on unarmed civilians holding Bibles and rosaries. Despite Mobutu’s efforts to suspend the National Conference indefinitely, this march and pressures from the Catholic clergy forced Mobutu to reopen the conference a few weeks later. *See also* **CATHOLIC CHURCH**.

**MARXISM.** Marxist ideology enjoyed considerable popularity in Congolese **universities** in the 1970s, although most citizens seem uncomfortable with Marxism’s subordination of family and **religion** to the state. A number of left-leaning **opposition** groups have tended to choose a nonaligned or **socialist** ideology. However, a few groups embraced Marxism–Leninism or Maoism, most notably the followers of the eastern **rebellion** and of **Pierre Mulele**, based in **Kwilu** in 1964. Some exiled Congolese from the rebellion maintained close ties with the **Soviet Union** until its demise in the early 1990s.

**MATABISH.** A **Lingala** expression meaning “tip” or “bribe.” Similar to “dash” in Anglophone Africa and “baksheesh” in the Arab world, *matabish* is the way many **unemployed** and underemployed Congolese make ends meet. It is often a present given in return for small favors, odd jobs, and errands. It can also facilitate access to **gov-**

**ernment** services or provide speedier passage through the official bureaucracy. *See also* KLEPTOCRACY.

**MATADI.** Congo's major ocean **port** lying 200 km up the **Congo River** from the Atlantic Ocean, Matadi is the political and economic capital of **Kongo Central Province**, the third-wealthiest in the country after **Kinshasa** and the former **Katanga Province**. Matadi district covers an area of 110 square km and is home to an estimated **population** of more than one-half million people in the early 2000s (146,930 in 1982). Lying just below the cataracts that render the Congo River unnavigable to Kinshasa, Matadi is the major transshipment point for goods traveling by rail to the capital. Consequently, it is the gateway to the country's **National Way**, an internal **transportation** network of 14,000 km of **rivers** and 5,000 km of **railways**. Aside from the port installations and a major naval base, Matadi is the site of ship-repairing facilities, a major flour mill, and the only bridge over the Congo River. Also nearby are a cement factory, **sugar** processing plant, and the **Inga hydroelectric complex**.

**MAWAPANGA, MWANA NANGA (1952– ).** Minister of finance in the first **government** of **Laurent Kabila**, Mawapanga was a researcher at the University of Kentucky and a leader of the Congolese expatriate community in the **United States**. He visited Kabila in eastern Congo in 1996 and joined the **Alliance des Forces Démocratique pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL). He was appointed finance minister in May 1997 after the fall of **Mobutu Sese Seko**. In late 1997, he was accused of improprieties in negotiating joint ventures with foreign investors aimed at revitalizing the **mining** industry in the former **Katanga Province**. He subsequently was vindicated, and continued to pursue a policy aimed at stemming **inflation** through the control of monetary growth and rebuilding the Congolese **economy** through **foreign investment**. He was later appointed to the Agriculture Department and then as ambassador to Zimbabwe.

**MAYOMBE FOREST.** The **forest** is located in **Kongo Central Province** and contains significant reserves of **timber**, minerals, and soils suitable for **agriculture**. Ecologists in the mid-1990s began to voice

concern that heavy timbering was encroaching on the forest and threatening many life forms in the area.

**MAYOMBE MOUNTAINS.** This is a small mountain chain in **Kongo Central** province between **Kinshasa** and **Matadi**. The rugged terrain contributes to the cataracts that make the **Congo River** unnavigable between the two cities.

**MBALA.** One of several groups of the **Bantu** family that lives in the western part of southern Congo between the **Kwango** and **Kasai Rivers**. The Mbala speak a **language** related to the **Kongo** group and are primarily located along the **Kwilu River** around **Kikwit**. Although critical of the **Mobutu Sese Seko government**, most of the Mbala opposed the Kwilu **rebellion** in 1964 because they perceived it to be led primarily by the rival **Mbunda** and **Pende ethnic groups**.

**MBANDAKA.** The capital of **Équateur Province** and major city of northwestern Congo, Mbandaka (formerly Coquilhatville) is an urban district with an estimated **population** of 850,000 in 2008 (153,440 in 1982) covering an area of 460 square km in the southwestern corner of the province. Lying near the confluence of the **Congo**, **Ubangi**, and **Tshuapa Rivers**, Mbandaka is a major **port** for the northern river system. Low-lying land in the area makes farming and herding difficult, although some **agricultural** activity, particularly upriver, has been successful. **Petroleum** deposits were discovered in the area in the early 1970s. Exploration was begun on several occasions by multinational oil companies, but to date no commercially exploitable deposits have been found.

**MBANZA.** Sometimes called “Mbanja” by ethnographers, the Mbanza form one of the larger groups that speak **Banda**, an Adamawa-Eastern **language**. They live in **Équateur Province**, primarily between the **Congo** and **Ubangi Rivers**.

**MBANZA KONGO DIA NTOTILA (GREAT CITY OF THE KING).** The mythical capital of the **Kingdom of Kongo** from which, according to legend, all **Kongo** people are descended. The capital was located in northwestern **Angola** around the area that became **São**

**Salvador** in the 1530s. It remains a place for which Kongo people often express nostalgia and longing.

**MBANZA-NGUNGU.** Formerly Thysville, Mbanza-Ngungu is located in the **Kongo Central Province**. With an estimated 750,000 inhabitants in 2007, it is one of the most densely populated cities in the province. The city lies on the **road** and **railway** linking **Matadi** to **Kinshasa**. A farming and herding center, it is a major source of the **food supply** for the Kinshasa area. The city is perhaps most frequently remembered as the site of the **army mutiny** against Belgian officers five days after **independence**. The violence led to the rapid promotion of Congolese into the officer corps and the appointment of **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** as army chief of staff.

**M'BILIA BEL (1959– ).** One of the Congolese Soukous singers, M'bilila Bel became successful in the early 1980s when she recorded and toured with **Pascal Tabu**, alias Rochereau. She began her performing career at the tender age of 17, singing backup for Abeti Masikini and later with Sam Mangwana. She burst onto the music scene when she joined Tabu's Afrisa International in 1981. Her first song with Afrisa, released in early 1982, was *Mpeve Ya Longo* (Holy Spirit in Kikongo). The song received rave reviews, especially among **women** in Congo. By the mid-1980s, Mbilila Bel had officially married Tabu Ley. The birth of her first child prompted her to take a break from performing. After an album with Ley in 1987, she moved to Paris. Between 1989 and 1990, she went on to tour the **United States**, **Great Britain**, and West Africa.

In 1987, Tabu Ley recruited another female artist, Kishila Ngoyi (known as Faya Tess), to accompany Mbilila Bel. It was against this backdrop that Afrisa embarked on a tour to Kenya, **Tanzania**, and **Rwanda**, culminating in a number of successful albums. Following the departure of Mbilila Bel, the popularity of Afrisa International as a band plummeted substantially. With the exception of her debut album, *Phénomène*, Mbilila Bel's career also went into a downward spiral when she left Afrisa. However, she bounced back in 2008 with a new album entitled *Bellissimo* ("very beautiful" in Italian) that received excellent reviews.

**MBOMU.** The name given to commoners in **Zande** society, as opposed to aristocrats who were called **Vongara**. The Mbomu were primarily hunters from **Sudan** who migrated into northern Congo in the 18th and 19th centuries and intermarried with local **Bantu** inhabitants.

**MBUJI-MAYI.** The capital of **Kasai Oriental Province**, Mbuji-Mayi is the commercial center for most of the country's **diamond trade**. Formerly known as Bakwanga, and once the capital of the secessionist state of **South Kasai**, Mbuji-Mayi has experienced explosive growth since the mid-1970s, when a great deal of the **banking** and commercial activities related to the diamond industry moved in from **Katanga**. A town covering an area of 64 square km, Mbuji-Mayi's **population** grew from 39,038 in 1959 to 334,875 in 1982 and to an estimated population of 2.5 million people in 2008. The city at various times also attracted a considerable number of **Luba** immigrants fleeing ethnic tensions in western Kasai and Katanga.

**MBUMBA, NATHANIEL (BRIGADIER GENERAL).** Leader of the **Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo (FLNC)** that launched incursions into southern **Shaba Region** in 1977 and 1978. Mbumba was an officer of the **Gendarmerie Katangaise** that supported the **Katanga secession** in the early 1960s. Some of its members who returned to Congo to quell the eastern **rebellion** under **Moïse Tshombe** mutinied in 1966 and 1967 in the former **Kivu** and **Orientale Provinces**. During this period, Mbumba expressed support for Tshombe. However, during the Shaba uprisings, Mbumba said he wished only to bring about the fall of **Mobutu** and the advent of **democracy**. In the 1980s, he was offered **amnesty** on several occasions but remained in exile and appeared to enter retirement in the 1990s.

**MBUNDA.** A **Bantu** people living in the lower **Kasai** area along the **Kwilu River** near **Idiofa**, the Mbunda helped stop the **Chokwe** expansion in 1885. They were among the most ardent supporters of **Pierre Mulele** who, with the **Pende**, helped launch the Kwilu **rebellion** and the terrorist attacks in **Leopoldville** in 1964.

**MEDIA.** Most Congolese receive information by word of mouth and by radio, which historically has been the most accessible and most

popular of the news media. There were an estimated 4 million radio sets in Congo in the mid-1990s, and the number jumped to 9 million in 2007. The **government**-owned station, called La **Voix du Zaïre** from 1976 until 1997, when it was renamed La **Voix du Peuple**, broadcasts daily from **Kinshasa** in French and the four national **languages**. Its transmissions were sent via satellite to eight provincial stations.

Historically, news content has been tightly controlled by the government and, as a result, many listened to shortwave and satellite programs of international broadcasters such as Voice of America, Radio France Internationale, and the British Broadcasting Corporation. In the mid-1990s, the government began to license some small local stations operated by religious and civic groups. A few years later, it allowed private stations to rebroadcast international programs and develop their own news reporting. By 1997, several major stations were operating in Kinshasa such as Sango Malamu, Elikya, and Radio Message de Vie. A number of international broadcasts, in particular the Voice of America, Radio France Internationale, British Broadcasting Corporation, and the national stations of Switzerland, Germany, Canada, **Egypt**, and **South Africa**, also provide international news that is closely followed by many.

Television and printed publications reach a more limited audience, primarily the urban-based upper **classes**. There were an estimated 65,000 television sets in the country in mid-2006. International television broadcasts, mostly from Europe, have been received by satellite since 1990, and some of these are retransmitted locally. Private broadcasting stations were allowed in 1995 and within two years, nearly two dozen stations were in operation. Several private stations began rebroadcasting international stations. Pressure continued on radio and television, nevertheless, to avoid antigovernment reporting and rebroadcasts of international stations were briefly prohibited in late 1996.

Prior to **independence**, several newspapers, some financed by church groups, published in the colony and for the most part continued to do so during the First Republic. During the years of single-party rule, however, heavy government control of the media and self-censorship by journalists restricted domestic news to information viewed as favorable to the government. In the 1970s, the media

contributed extensively to the personalization of **Mobutu Sese Seko's** power. During that period, two major newspapers were published in Kinshasa: *Salongo*, the party/government daily, and *Elima*, which closely followed the government line. A number of weekly magazines were devoted to current affairs, society, and **culture**, most notably *Zaire* magazine. **Lubumbashi** and **Kisangani** each had a newspaper, *Mjumbe* and *Boyoma*, respectively, which sought to publish on a daily basis.

The Voix du Zaïre complex was inaugurated on 24 November 1976 and broadcast in French and the four national languages: Kikongo, **Lingala**, **Kiswahili**, and Tshiluba. The regional stations broadcast in other local languages as well. In the 1990s, the Voix du Zaïre began to receive television and radio feeds primarily from Europe, which it rebroadcast to subscribers. By the 1990s, wealthy residents had purchased satellite dishes and received a variety of direct transmissions from around the world.

The advent of multiparty politics produced a growth industry in the printed media reflecting that of the **political parties**. Media-watchers in the early 1990s counted more than 120 printed publications and, by late 1996, more than 400 appeared intermittently. Most published one to several times per week as funds and newsprint allowed, but about one dozen aspired to publish on a daily basis. *Salongo* continued to follow the pro-Mobutu line. *Elima*, however, became a strong government critic. A number of new publications that criticized the government appeared. Some of the most notable were *Le Potentiel*, *Référence Plus*, *Le Palmarès*, *Le Phare*, *Umoja*, *Forum*, *Le Standard*, *La Cité Africaine*, *Le Grognon* (satirical), *Libre Expressions*, *La Société*, *Le Soir du Galibot*, *Perspectives Africaines*, *Le Compatriote*, *Graben*, and *La Tempête des Tropiques*. *Le Soft* focused primarily on economics and business. In Lubumbashi, three major publications appeared: *Le Lushois*, *l'Espoir*, and *Le Communicateur*. The government-controlled national news agency, Agence Zaïre-Presse, published a daily summary of government activities until the mid-1990s, when financial problems caused it to close.

Virtually all members of the printed media in the early 1990s were strongly opposed to the Mobutu government and engaged in strongly worded, often personal attacks against the **president** and his supporters. Several dozen journalists were detained during a crackdown

in 1992–93. The editor-publisher of *Elima*, Essolomwa Nkoy ea Linganga, was detained in 1991. In 1992, the offices and presses of *Elima*, *La Référence*, *Le Phare*, and *Le Potentiel* were attacked, as was the home of *Umoja* editor Léon Moukanda Lunyama. The editor of *Le Phare*, Mukengeshayi Kenge, was arrested in 1993.

During the early 1990s, the government also retained control over the broadcast media and, as a result, some of the best reporting on the **National Conference** and the **opposition** came from broadcasts by **Congo-Brazzaville**–based radio and television, which could be received in Kinshasa. In 1992, a group of journalists at *La Voix du Zaïre* led a revolt against government censorship of radio and television newscasts, citing that coverage of the proceedings of the National Conference should include opposition activities and positions. For a time, this demand was accommodated. However, the **military** later occupied the station, taking it off the air and initiating rumors of a coup attempt. When broadcasts resumed, increased government control was evident.

In the mid-1990s, several dozen private FM radio stations were licensed in major cities. Private television stations were also allowed. These largely avoided reporting on domestic **politics** until the late 1990s, when they began rebroadcasting news and programs relayed by international broadcasters, supplemented by their own staff reporting.

Government control of the news media historically has been heavy. Opposition forces led by **Laurent Kabila**, who took power in May 1997, indicated tolerance for a free press and news media. However, it became clear that the new government did not care for attacks against its leaders. In subsequent months, a number of editors were arrested for criticizing the government or, in one case, forecasting its imminent demise. In June, the Kabila government nationalized *Tele Kin Malebo*, a popular private television station, because the station had been established with equipment purchased by the government or the *Voix du Zaïre* complex and therefore belonged to the people. The Kabila government periodically used legal means to pressure local media when it became too independent. In February 1999, it announced a major inspection of the registration documents and broadcast schedules of local radio stations.

In 2000, Minister Sakombi Inongo put under state supervision the Radio Television Kin Malebo (RTKM), owned by Aubin Ngongo



Luwowo, a former minister of Mobutu Sese Seko, and Canal 1 Kin as well as Canal Kin 2, owned by **Jean-Pierre Bemba**, leader of the **Mouvement de Libération du Congo**. The first was suspected of having used public funds to set up his station and was requisitioned by the **Office des Biens Mal Acquis (OBMA)**. The second two stations were accused of being owned by a rebel leader. These stations were renamed **Radio Télévision Nationale Congolaise (RTNC)** 4, and a new program schedule, based on promoting the Kabila regime, was imposed on them by the minister of information. In October 2001, the new minister of information, Kikaya bin Karubi, returned the channels to their respective owners. Direct governmental interventions in radio station programming were constant during the civil war, 1998–2003. The government relaxed some of its restrictions during the transition, 2003–2006. More than 30 radio broadcasting stations began to operate since the transition.

**MENDE OMALANGA, LAMBERT.** Leader of an offshoot of the **Patrice Lumumba** wing of the **Mouvement National Congolais (MNC)**, Mende is the president of the Convention des Congolais Unis. He was one of the founders of the **Sacred Union** and a visible force in the hardline **opposition** of the 1990s. However, he left the radical opposition to join the **government** of **Léon Kengo wa Dondo** on 24 December 1996, as vice prime minister and minister of **transportation** and **communications**. He was elected deputy or member of the parliament from the electoral district of Lodja, **Sankuru Province**, in 2006 before joining the government of **Antoine Gizenga** in February 2007 as minister of hydrocarbons.

**MERCENARIES.** A term first employed by **Léon Roget** when he was sent to organize the **Force Publique** in 1886 in the **Congo Free State**. A mercenary represents the foreign professional soldier who, for money, is willing to participate in invasions and coups against or on behalf of established governments. **Moïse Tshombe** is generally cited as being the first African leader to employ mercenaries in order to bolster his forces in the secessionist **Katanga** state. Upon becoming **prime minister** in 1964, Tshombe hired mercenaries to help quash the eastern **rebellions**. **Mobutu Sese Seko** also hired mercenaries to crush rebellions in the east in 1966–67. He hired them

again in 1996 in a futile attempt to defend **Kisangani** from advancing troops of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL).

**MERCHANT MARINE.** Congo has a small merchant marine operated by the state-owned *Compagnie Maritime du Congo* (CMC). The company operates a number of routes linking **Matadi** primarily to ports in West Africa and Europe. However, a lack of funds and deteriorating equipment by the mid-1980s has considerably reduced operations.

**MESSIANIC AND SYNCRETIC MOVEMENTS.** Ancestor worship is a central religious phenomenon in Congo and a fundamental aspect of African culture. However, the contact between European Christianity and African belief systems created a symbiosis that was both messianic and syncretic. Historically, it started with the sporadic evangelization of the Bakongo. From the late 15th to the 17th centuries, **Portuguese**, Italian, and Spanish missionaries introduced Roman **Catholicism** into the **Kongo Kingdom**. At the beginning of the 18th century, an Italian Capuchin monk tried to take control over missions of the former Kingdom of Congo. He found there a princess, **Kimpa Vita Nsimba Ndona Beatriz**, who claimed to be possessed by Saint Anthony and to be in contact with heaven. She also claimed that her mission was to find the man who would bring an end to wars and restore the Kongo kingship. The movement ended when the prophetess was condemned and burned for heresy. However, her followers went underground.

The first sect to emerge in the **Belgian Congo** was the Lukoshi (Lukusu or Nkisi-Lukoi), which spread in **Kasai** among the Bashilele peoples. The sect was associated with worship of ancestors and used charms against evil. The Lukoshi later became the cult of the "Talking Serpent" or "snake man" who had an unmistakably anti-European intent. The serpent was expected to bring forth prophets and messiahs to fight the white masters and chase them forever from the land of the ancestors. The advent of a messiah or liberator was to be preceded by extraordinary events, such as the collective rising of the dead, the eclipse of the sun, the appearance in every village of a black talking dog, and the coming of a man, "part white and part black." The

natives were to acquire invincible power by drinking a special magic potion from special magic cups. However, no cataclysm occurred and the sect vanished.

During the inter-war period, 1918–39, four types of churches emerged in both rural and **mining** areas of Belgian Congo. They included messianic, separatist, nativistic, and reformatory churches. Messianic movements are the product of a clash of civilizations or acculturation as the result of contact of two cultures. Many types of reactions emerge from this contact, especially resistance to the alien culture. Under this view, acculturation manifests itself by a violent movement of antagonism to foreign values. It was among the Kongo people, in the context of Protestant evangelization in Manianga land (today **Kongo Central Province**), that the first **prophet, Simon Kimbangu**, appeared during the first quarter of the 20th century. Kimbangu found the way of faith in 1914–15. In 1917, he had a vision in which he was called to preach. Three years later, he and a few others started to act as prophets, preaching and healing the sick, thus setting the future course of Kimbanguism. Kimbangu's acts of preaching and healing through the laying on of hands aroused massive attention, yet quick repression by colonial authorities soon followed. In his healing practices, Kimbangu also created a nativistic church because he expressed a fundamental dissatisfaction with Christian symbolism and with the way Christianity confronted the supernatural. By turning to tradition for effective ritual and more penetrating belief, he was preoccupied with easing the multitude of physical and spiritual ills that afflicted Africans, and he and his followers accomplished this through ecstatic techniques and highly emotionalized ritual. The spirit of the movement persisted even when, from the 1920s on, Kimbangu was imprisoned and his followers sent into exile. The spread of Kimbanguism and its break from main Christian rituals gave it a separatist tone.

Other prophets followed in Kimbangu's name. They were organizational and nationalist, even though they kept alive the millenarian vision. For example, the Salvation Army Convert, Simon Mpadi, left the Army in 1939 to create his own radically anticolonial *Mission des Noirs* (Mission of Blacks), better known as *Ngunzism* (from Ngunza or Savior). Mpadi's followers were also called *Khakism*, after the uniform they wore. He called himself "the chief of the apostles,"

and linked his teachings to those of Kimbangu. Among the enemies of the prophet were Protestant and Catholic missions. He opposed marriages with Christians. Mpadi was even accused of fomenting the strikes of November 1945 in **Matadi**. His movement was both syncretic and messianic. The movement was also political because it intended to have a Church and a state for blacks that would exclude all whites. It was thus a separatist and reformatory movement because it preserved a strong sense of the viability of the traditional African religious attitude with its associated symbols.

In eastern Belgian Congo, another separatist church spread from southern Africa, the Watchtower Society of Jehovah's Witnesses. It was transformed to local needs and became **Kitawala** (to reign). The Watchtower spread in **Katanga** in 1920s and was quick to catch on with various **ethnic groups**. Its leaders instructed their followers to refuse paying taxes and to boycott work imposed by the colonial administration. Moreover, they insisted on fighting against repressive colonial justice. They also preached the departure of whites and the arrival of Americans. The new ideas spread quickly in **Équateur Province**, where the Kitawala functioned under different denominations such as Kodima na Kolia (to accept and to love). The spread of Kitawala in Équateur was so threatening to colonial authorities that, in 1937, they decided to regulate all religious movements, called "hierarchical organizations," in the Belgian Congo.

A resurgence of Kimbanguism appeared again in 1940 in the form of *Mvungi* (shepherd or pastor) and *Tonsi* (drop) as Congolese reacted to the dramatic suddenness of Adolf Hitler's occupation of **Belgium**, a development that temporarily removed that country from the scene as an active colonial power. The *Mvungi* movement began among the Yaka people on the banks of the **Kwango River**. It had much in common with Kimbanguism, although the Kimbangu's name was never invoked. Through the intermediary of the Baptist Mvungi, God was to bring a new dispensation, reappearing in all his glory to call back the dead, who would come bearing great riches for their people. The white men would vanish at Jahveh's command, said the prophecy.

Whereas Mvungi had arisen on the Kwango River, Tonsi started in West Angola in 1940. It migrated to Thysville (now **Mbanza-Ngungu**), Madimba, and Kimbabi, where the new name was adopted.

The ritual consisted of pouring three drops of a holy liquid upon the tongue and forehead of the initiated: the first drop symbolized and replaced the rite of baptism, the second stood for confirmation, and the third, called “the drop of blood,” enlightened the spirit of the receiver, enabling the initiated to evoke the dead and to enter into communication with them. The invocation accompanying the three-fold ritual addressed the extraordinary trinity of Tata Mupepe (Father Spirit), Tata Kimbangu (Father Kimbangu), and Tata Alamni (German Father), in which the Christian elements of the Trinity itself and of the Divine Father were combined with a political element—the German Father—included as a tribute to the Germans, who had invaded Belgium.

Congolese religious movements played a number of roles in the colonial era. First was a spiritual function that consisted of satisfying a societal need of the unknown. Second, they fulfilled social and integrating functions that were manifested in their efforts to link new or emerging social interactions within social settings that became divided between the traditional and modern worlds. Here ritual was critical to restoring social and psychological equilibrium. Politically, religious movements were forces against colonialism.

The decolonization period saw a revival of Kitawala. Disappointed in their wait for a golden age, some groups of Kitawala, called Belukela, sought a new orientation for the movement in June 1960. The Belukela movement got its name from its founder, Belukela Ismael, in **Stanleyville**. The group was made up of Kitawala members who went underground during the colonial period. **Independence** gave them the freedom to practice their beliefs, and they allied with the **Mouvement National Congolais** (MNC) of **Patrice Lumumba** in 1959. They became the movement’s most zealous propagandists. The Belukela group served as a catalyst and as logistic support to emerging nationalism. Its mission was well-defined: to replace the existing dominant religions during the colonial period and to present itself as a new religion. Sect members wanted a national religion created by Congolese and entirely put within the reach of all, within the new independence context. They became involved in the political process and placed all their hopes in Lumumba, the new **prime minister**. His sudden assassination in early 1961 plunged the group into total disarray.

During **Authenticity**, the force of religious movements was largely appropriated by **Mobutu Sese Seko's Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR)**, representing the party-state, which sought to play the role of vanguard in the enterprise of African nationalism and the post-colonial recovery of cultural identity. Since the decline of the Authenticity project in the 1980s and economic decline in the 1990s, hundreds of independent churches have mushroomed throughout Congo to cope with economic crisis and to preach for a better "after life" to millions of people. Unlike African churches in the colonial era, which were both anticolonial and spiritual, post-colonial African churches in Congo stress faith in Christ over faith in anti-establishment groups.

**METALLURGIE HOBOKEN-OVERPELT (MHO).** A Belgian refining corporation that during the colonial era was a major customer for raw and semirefined minerals marketed by the **Générale des Carrières et des Mines (GECAMINES)**, in particular **copper, cobalt, and zinc.**

**MIDDLE CLASS.** Congo, like many developing nations, has a small middle **class**, which despite a severely reduced standard of living, retains some influence in the affairs of the nation. Following World War II, Congolese in clerical and low-level administrative positions, part of the **évolué** group, began pressing for better **wages** and working conditions. They founded a number of study groups and **labor** organizations. Two of the most prominent were the **Association de Personnel Indigène de la Colonie (APIC)**, which grouped **civil service** workers, and the **Association des Classes Moyennes Africaines (ACMAF)**, which was composed primarily of small merchants and farmers and sent representatives to the consultative councils of the colonial government.

Following **independence**, the middle class grew rapidly as Congolese took over senior administrative and professional positions vacated by expatriates. Except for a period of prosperity in the early 1970s, however, deteriorating economic conditions and high **inflation** steadily eroded the purchasing power and income of the middle class. As a result, by the 1980s, the middle class of salaried workers, professionals, and small businessmen was living close to subsistence

levels. By 2006, teachers and professors could not afford telephones or cars unless they were furnished by the **government**, and many were obliged to engage in secondary **employment**, often in the informal sector, in order to make ends meet. *See also* POVERTY.

**MIGRATION.** Historically, the people of Congo were largely migratory. Families, lineages, and entire villages would move to find better farming, hunting, herding land, or sometimes for political or spiritual reasons. In some societies, power disputes would be resolved by one of the aspirants leaving with family and supporters to found a new village or kingdom. During the colonial era, people migrated toward centers of **industry** and farming in search of jobs. For example, large numbers of **Kongo** people moved to the capital of **Leopoldville**. Many **Luba** left **Kasai** for the **mining** centers of **Katanga**. People from **Rwanda** moved into eastern Congo to work on the **plantations**. The colonial authorities sought to halt migrations of traditional rural groups, since nomadic people were harder to tax and introduce to cash crops. Most Africans in the colony had to obtain permission to change residence.

Migrations to the cities by people seeking jobs, **education**, and social services began in the 1930s, but intensified following **independence**. Part of this was due to **urbanization**. From 1970 to 1975, 30 percent of the **population** was classified as urban. According to the **World Bank**, the number of urban dwellers declined to 28 percent from 1982 to 1995, but increased slightly to 29 percent in 1996–98 and remained on average at 31 percent between 1999 and 2004. By 2006, urban population represented 33 percent of the total.

Although migration to cities increased substantially, movements in the 1990s and 2000s were mostly the result of ethnic conflicts or ethnic cleansing in Kivu and Katanga areas, and the civil war against Laurent Kabila. These conflicts displaced whole groups, often numbering hundreds of thousands, and sometimes millions, of people especially from 2001 to 2003.

**MILITANTS.** A term used in many countries to denote active members of a **political party**. From the early 1970s, however, **Mobutu Sese Seko** used the term frequently in his speeches to address Congolese citizens, to emphasize the membership of all citizens in the **Mouvement**.

**ment Populaire de la Révolution (MPR).** It underscored what was seen as the continuing struggle to end tribalism, regionalism, and factionalism, and to erect in its stead a new state, independent, self-sufficient, and authentic.

**MILITARY.** Congolese military traces its history back to October 1885, when King **Leopold II** created the **Force Publique**. This force was a feared corps, officered by Europeans, which in the 1890s drove the **Afro-Arab** traders out of eastern Congo and established control over **Katanga**. According to historians, conditions were harsh in the corps, and three **mutinies** occurred by 1900. During World War I, the Force Publique was reinforced with Belgian soldiers and sent to Cameroon and Tanganyika to join the Allied war effort against Germany. It was highly commended. During World War II, after **Belgium** surrendered to Nazi Germany, the corps was sent to Ethiopia. In 1942, it went to Nigeria as part of the West African Frontier Force, and also fought in Egypt. Four thousand Belgian troops remained in Congo following World War II, primarily as officers. In the 1950s, the colonial **administration** launched a system designed to prepare young Congolese for officer commissions.

At **independence**, however, when the Force Publique became the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC), there were no Congolese above the rank of master sergeant. Following independence festivities, some grumbling arose in the corps over low pay and the lack of promotion opportunities. Five days after independence, on 5 July 1960, Belgian commander Emile Janssens responded by summoning the men and writing on a blackboard the famous phrase: “After Independence = Before Independence.” The mutiny that followed spread rapidly. The attacks committed primarily against Belgians caused panic among the European population and prompted the Belgian government to send paratroopers to a number of cities to restore order. The **government** of **Patrice Lumumba** quickly raised salaries, sent most Belgian officers home, and promoted former Master Sergeant **Victor Lundula** to general and commander of the army. Former Master Sergeant **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** was promoted to colonel and made chief of staff.

The new commanders visited garrisons around the country to quiet troops. They succeeded in large part, but the task of reorganizing



forces in the face of new challenges proved more difficult. Ethnic tensions were rising within the corps, as in the country in general. The subsequent instability brought many foreign soldiers to Congo, including **United Nations** (UN) troops from African, Asian, European, and American nations as well as foreign **mercenaries**. By late 1965, although the secessions in Katanga and **South Kasai** had ended and UN troops had left Congolese soil, the country still faced a **rebellion** in eastern Congo and **Kwilu**, guerrilla bomb attacks and organized banditry in **Leopoldville**, and yet another political crisis caused by a standoff between **President Joseph Kasavubu** and **Prime Minister Moïse Tshombe**. In the face of these events, official Congolese history recounts that the military senior command met on the night of **24 November 1965** and asked Mobutu to take charge of the government. The bloodless **coup d'état** carried out that night appeared to have the backing of most senior officers in the army.

Following the coup, greater efforts were made to improve the effectiveness of the military. Training programs were increased, and a National Security Council was established in 1969. Several components of the military were created. First was the Congolese air force, that is, a small branch of the military with less than 2,000 active members. Its primary mission was to provide close air support in skirmishes and transportation for the much larger ground forces. From the 1970s to the late 1980s, the force consisted of one fighter squadron of French-supplied Mirage Vs; one counterinsurgency squadron of Italian-supplied Aermachi MBs and **United States** (U.S.)-furnished ATs; one helicopter squadron of French Alouettes, Pumas, and U.S. Bell 47 helicopters; and a transport wing of U.S.-made aircraft that included several C-130s. In the 1990s and 2000s, maintenance problems and a lack of spare parts kept most of the fleet grounded.

The second component of the military included a 1,600-member navy engaged primarily in coastal, border patrols along the Atlantic Ocean in the west and the **Great Lakes** in the east before the **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila**. The largest ship, commissioned as the *Zaire*, was a 70-ton vessel based at **Matadi**. In the 1980s, the remainder of the fleet comprised two dozen light patrol vessels, primarily of French, Chinese, U.S., and North Korean manufacture. The main base is at **Banana** on the coast and includes a training facility. Other

bases are located at **Boma** and **Kinshasa** on the **Congo River** and at **Kalemie** and **Moba** on **Lake Tanganyika**. The U.S. government launched a bilateral aid program with the navy in 1977 that included the supply of patrol boats, spare parts, and some training. The program was suspended in the early 1990s.

Both the air force and navy were dominated by the third component, the army. The army formerly included the **Gendarmerie Nationale** of 20,000 persons that exercised **police** functions in the country since it absorbed the national police in 1972. The army was divided during the Mobutu's period into five infantry brigades, a counterinsurgency/commando brigade, an airborne brigade, and an elite presidential guard, the **Division Spéciale Présidentielle** (DSP). Military training was received at different times from Belgium, **France**, the U.S., **China**, North Korea, and **Israel**. The army's equipment reflects these diverse military assistance programs.

The ANC was renamed the Forces Armées Zaïroises (FAZ) when Congo became **Zaire** in 1971. Mobutu expanded the size of the FAZ and the number of junior officers, all of which had prestige and remuneration repercussions. He also accelerated the level of education and training of the officer corps by sending hundreds of military officers and high school graduates to the best military schools in the West. His effort to create a professional military was aimed at making it an apolitical institution. Despite the **Authenticity** campaign, which also extended to lifestyle, the military kept its uniform and culture.

In November 1973, Mobutu nationalized all small and medium foreign businesses by giving them to a small group of civilian supporters. The military was, however, excluded from the spoils, and not surprisingly, young educated officers resented it. In July 1974, Mobutu made the chiefs of staffs of the armed forces members of the **Political Bureau** of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR), a move he called "a reeducation of military officers to serve the people." A year later, he initiated several other measures to subdue junior military officers because he feared they were preparing a coup. He uncovered a supposed plot by these officers and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to assassinate him. Although no convincing evidence had ever been supplied to document his allegations, several military officers (mostly educated in the U.S.) were purged and condemned to death. Those ousted in 1975 were not only

among the best-educated officers, but were also **Tetela** and **Kusu** from **Kasai Oriental**, as well as **Nande** and **Shi** from **Kivu**.

Just as Mobutu seemed firmly in control in March 1977, the **Front National de Libération du Congo** (FNLC), composed of 2,000 former Katangan soldiers living in **Angola**, invaded Katanga province. The national army responded slowly, and 1,500 **Moroccan** troops were flown in on **Egyptian** planes to help them repel the incursion in what came to be known as the **Eighty-Day War**. One year later, the insurgents returned, this time to seize the important **mining** town of **Kolwezi**, causing most mining operations to shut down, and calling for the end of the Mobutu government. French and Belgian paratroopers in U.S. military planes were sent to the region. Congolese paratroopers landed in Kolwezi and distinguished themselves in a bloody battle to regain control of the airport. A Pan-African peacekeeping force of Moroccan, Senegalese, and Togolese troops remained for several months after “**Shaba II**” and France, Belgium, and North Korea began new training programs with Mobutu’s demoralized soldiers.

Although Mobutu acknowledged the impact of low morale on his army’s performance in both Shaba Wars, he purposely ignored the issue and purged the military command after uncovering another alleged plot to assassinate him. He also reduced military strength by almost 25 percent to eliminate “disloyal elements” from several provinces. By 1980, 90 percent of the Defense Ministry’s personnel were from the Mobutu’s **Équateur Province** and his **Ngbandi ethnic group**. Moreover, Mobutu created the Brigade Spéciale Présidentielle after Shaba II that was mostly trained by Israel.

During the Mobutu years, the military was called to respond to surprise attacks by small **opposition** groups that continued to operate in remote areas of the country. Examples include the seizure for two days of a garrison at **Moba** on **Lake Tanganyika** in 1984 and again in 1985 by about 50 guerrillas of the **Parti Révolutionnaire du Peuple** (PRP) and attacks by fighters of the **Parti de Libération Congolaise** (PLC) in northern Kivu and northeastern **Haut-Zaïre** that intensified in 1992.

Following border clashes between Congolese and **Zambian** soldiers in Shaba **Region** in 1983–84, the Mobutu government created a new corps, called the Garde Civile or Civil Guard, which would be

responsible for border **security**, combating **smuggling**, controlling terrorism, and “restoring public order.” West Germany and Egypt assisted with training. Military analysts estimated in the early 1990s that the Guard numbered 10,000 members, based primarily in urban centers to suppress demonstrations and **strikes**.

In the years following independence, the officer corps was dominated by soldiers from southern Congo, but since the 1970s the army has attracted troops from all over the country. A conscious attempt was made during the 1970s to assign soldiers and officers to areas outside their home regions. The policy was aimed at preventing the development of regional power bases, but it also contributed to incidents of abuse of the local population and was eased in the 1980s.

Organizationally, the chief of staff of the armed forces reports through the minister of defense to the president, who is the commander-in-chief. Mobutu held the portfolio of minister of defense from 1969 until 1993, when he acceded to opposition demands and allowed the prime minister to name a civilian to the post.

The infantry brigades have operated primarily in the southern and eastern areas of Congo. The airborne brigades are deployed primarily at Kinshasa’s **Ndjili Airport**, and the presidential guard was billeted near the presidential palace. This elite security unit guarded Mobutu and was the most loyal of Congo’s security forces. The DSP was also a division loyal to Mobutu. Formed from the Brigade Spéciale Présidentielle, the DSP was trained initially by Israeli officers. Created primarily of soldiers from the president’s Ngbandi ethnic group and usually led by a close relative of the president, the DSP was the best and most regularly paid of the security forces. It was based at a camp surrounding the presidential palace. Its forces were used on numerous occasions to quash demonstrations, harass the opposition, and crack down on student demonstrations. One that caused an especially virulent outcry was an attack on **student** dormitories at the University of **Lubumbashi** on **11–12 May 1990**. Intended as a disciplinary act, the operation caused scores of deaths. One of its most notorious units, “**Les Hiboux**,” or “The Owls,” carried out a campaign of terrorist attacks against the opposition during the 1990s.

The purpose of the military, as written in the **constitution** since 1960, is to defend the territory against external aggression and to maintain internal order. Although the military was mostly used

during this period to quell civil disturbances, it also came to be known for its excesses. For example, on 23 September 1991, forces based at the aeronautics school at Ndjili Airport rampaged over late pay and launched several days of intense “pillages” or looting in which other soldiers and members of the general population eventually joined. Officially, 30 people were killed. Most factories and major businesses were stripped of their stock and equipment. Many small businesses and private residences were also looted. French and Belgian paratroopers landed and evacuated 10,000 expatriates. In October, similar incidents occurred in Lubumbashi, **Mbuji-Mayi**, and several other cities.

An antigovernment demonstration in Kinshasa on 16 February 1992 was attacked by the military and resulted in 46 deaths. **Human rights** organizations frequently accused the military of preying on the populace, in general, and targeting members of the opposition, in particular, while being incapable of defending national borders.

On 23 January 1993, soldiers angry because merchants refused to accept a new 5 million zaire note, which the opposition had called on the populace to boycott, rampaged and killed several of these merchants. The incident degenerated into another round of “pillages,” this time focused in working-class neighborhoods in central Kinshasa. It led to another evacuation of expatriates and seriously damaged the country’s economic production. Some 80 percent of industrial productive capacity was destroyed or crippled. Employment and economic activity was reduced by 80 percent.

By the mid-1990s, the Congolese military was viewed by the populace as the main cause of criminality and violence in the country. Armed groups in uniform set up barricades and extorted money or valuables from motorists. Businesses were obliged to “donate” goods or money to soldiers, often at gunpoint. Many citizens sympathized with the plight of the soldiers who, like themselves, were rarely paid, and they tended to blame their behavior on the government and the political paralysis caused by bickering within the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL), which began in October 1996. As a result, casualties were light except in a few early battles.

The leader of the AFDL, Kabila, was sworn in as president in late May 1997. His first act was to disband the DSP. A number of its

senior officers reportedly were executed. President Kabila changed the name of the armed forces from Zairian Armed Forces to Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC) when Zaire became the **Democratic Republic of Congo** (DRC). In late 1997, the Kabila government abolished the Civil Guard and Gendarmerie Nationale and, with **South African** assistance, recreated a national police force.

When the AFDL took power in May 1997, many elements of the FAC were incorporated into the new military structure. A young AFDL general named Masasu Ngilima was appointed armed forces chief of staff. Still, tensions remained high between various elements within the military, and the detention of Masasu in November 1997 caused a day of shooting in which three people were killed. Kabila announced a reorganization of the military on 2 December 1997. Soldiers in Matadi and Boma looted stores on 22 January 1998, after their pay was reportedly diverted by superior officers.

The **civil war** against Laurent Kabila in August 1998 was another test of the military. Unable to secure national borders, the Kabila regime was rescued by Angolan, **Namibian**, and **Zimbabwean** troops. Kabila's undisciplined and incompetent army put up little resistance against rebel forces. At the first sign of the rebels' advance, Kabila's soldiers fired off their rounds in the air, stripped their uniforms, and ran away. They were also notorious for selling their arms for money, looting stores, and raping women. Because of their ineffectiveness, the Kabila army was replaced by forces of the **Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo** (MONUC). MONUC became as ineffective as the national army to the extent that **European Union** had to dispatch a force to **Ituri** to protect not only MONUC personnel, but also to save thousands of internally displaced people facing starvation.

The **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI) signed in December 2002 by the belligerents called for the organization of the army through disarmament, demilitarization, and reintegration of rebel groups. The national army became a huge, expensive force of more than 150,000 soldiers in 2006 as a result of military integration, called *brassage*. Both rebels and Kabila's untrained soldiers inflated the size of the army yet remained ineffective, as illustrated by their poor performance against forces of the renegade General **Laurent Nkunda** from 2006 to 2008.

The military in Congo is best characterized as an occupation force, patrolling towns and countryside not to maintain order, but to rob, loot, rape, and hold people for ransom. Built as an institution to preserve law and order, the military has come to mirror the anarchy of the government in general, and it was the first institution to undermine state authority. *See also* CONSCRIPTION; KLEPTOCRACY; MILITARY ASSISTANCE; SECOND CONGO WAR.

**MILITARY ASSISTANCE.** Since **independence**, Congo has received military assistance from many foreign governments. **Belgium** was the main military partner. However, by the mid-1960s, agreements for equipment and training had been signed with the **United States**, **Italy**, **Israel**, and **Great Britain**. In the 1970s, **France** became an increasingly important partner, and programs were also launched with North Korea, the People's Republic of **China**, and **Egypt**. **Morocco** and several other African countries sent troops during the **Shaba Wars**. By the 1990s, Congo was receiving little foreign military assistance because of **human rights** abuses and lack of progress on democratic and economic reforms. Following the departure of **Mobutu**, several Western governments offered to help the government of **Laurent Kabila** rebuild the Congolese military, but this aid was stalled by the Kabila government's lack of cooperation with investigations into alleged massacres in eastern Congo in 1996–97. The Kabila government received military support from **Angola**, **Chad**, **Namibia**, and **Zimbabwe** when a **rebellion** backed by **Uganda** and **Rwanda** broke out in 1998. The only countries to provide the government assistance were Angola and Zimbabwe from 1998 to 2003. From the transition, 2003–2006, to the election of **Joseph Kabila** as president, no country has since made a firm commitment to train the military or to provide it equipment. By December 2008, only the **Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo** (MONUC) has been training Congolese soldiers. The first country to restart some type of military cooperation since the civil war against Laurent Kabila was China in late 2008. *See also* MILITARY.

**MILITARY SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.** *See* INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.

**MINING.** Congo is one of the richest countries in Africa in terms of mineral resources. The most important minerals are **copper, diamonds, cobalt, and zinc**. There are also deposits of **gold**, cassiterite, manganese, cadmium, germanium, silver, wolframite, and **columbium-tantalum (coltan)**. Copper, cobalt, zinc, manganese, and germanium are found in the southeastern Congo, mainly in **Haut-Katanga** and **Lualaba Provinces**. Diamonds are located mainly in the former **Kasai** Province, particularly around the towns of **Mbuji-Mayi** and **Tshikapa**, although some mining activities are conducted in **Kwango** and **Tshopo** Provinces. Gold is exploited in **Ituri, Nord-Kivu, and Sud-Kivu** Provinces, while cassiterite, wolframite, and coltan are mainly exploited in the two **Kivu** provinces.

Tales of distant kingdoms resplendent with copper, gold, and diamonds motivated **Afro-Arabs** and later European **explorers** to venture into **Katanga** in the 1800s. According to a number of historians, Africans knew of copper ore deposits long before the arrival of European explorers in Katanga in the 1890s. Reports reaching the coast of great mineral wealth are credited with encouraging some of the first explorations into the interior. The deposits found in Katanga initially were judged to be too small for commercial exploitation until the late 1880s, when **Leopold II** established the **Comité Spécial du Katanga** in 1890, one of the first of several powerful “trusts” that were given virtual monopolies over tracts of territory in exchange for royalties.

Ore discoveries in 1901 led to the construction of a **railway** and, in 1908, to the creation of the **Union Minière du Haut-Katanga** (UMHK). The first smelting plant began operation in 1911, producing 1,000 tons of copper. Production reached 100,000 tons in 1928. Diamond and gold mining began in the early 1920s. Earnings from the **Belgian Congo’s** minerals supplemented the Belgian government’s foreign exchange reserves during the colonial era, supported the **government** during the two world wars, and provided the **uranium** used to build the first atomic bomb.

Since the early 1900s, mining has been a source of a great deal of Congo’s wealth. Historically, the mining sector contributed an average of one-third of its **gross domestic product (GDP)**, more than three-fourths of its **export** revenues, and one-half of its government



revenues. For example, during the first decades after **independence**, mineral exports provided the Congolese government with two-thirds of its foreign exchange. The **Bakajika Law** of June 1966 granted all mineral rights to the state, and the large mining companies were **nationalized**, beginning with the UMHK, which became the **Générale des Carrières et des Mines** (GECAMINES). Private companies were contracted to operate the companies in return for a portion of revenues.

The rapid rise in mineral prices, particularly for copper and cobalt, in the mid-1970s created an economic boom. This was followed by a series of recessions, when prices fell in the late 1970s. The decline of export revenues as the result of falling prices was compounded by prohibitive transportation costs. Evacuation of Congolese minerals has always been a problem: the **National Way** is a tortuous route via rail and **river** to the **port** of **Matadi**, but it lies completely within national territory. The most economical route, the **Benguela Railway** that links Katanga to the **Angolan** port of **Lobito**, was closed in 1975 by the Angolan civil war. Other routes, to the **Tanzanian** port of Dar es Salaam, the Mozambican port of Beira, and the **South African** port of Durban, were disrupted by railway inefficiencies, port congestions, and political issues.

In the late 1970s, the government entered into a number of joint mining ventures with private foreign companies and also allowed private traders to participate in the marketing of gold and diamonds. Nevertheless, government participation in the mining sector remained limited, and production was dominated by a few companies. GECAMINES, the country's largest company, dominated the mining of copper, cobalt, and most minerals in Katanga Province, and the **Société Minière de Bakwanga** (MIBA), the country's second-largest company, dominated the formal diamond mining industry. In addition to its major mineral products such as copper, cobalt, diamonds, uranium, **tin**, and gold, Congo has also produced **petroleum**, lithium, monazite, and iron ore.

Congo contains deposits of coal estimated at 60 million metric tons. However, many of the deposits are of relatively poor quality and are located in isolated areas where **transportation** costs are prohibitive. The country produced 126,000 tons of low-grade coal in the late 1980s, primarily in Katanga. High-quality coke and coal used

for mineral processing is imported from **Zimbabwe**. Imports averaged 130,000 tons per year in the 1980s, but declined significantly in the 1990s with falling production by the large mining companies. Following the completion of the **Inga Hydroelectric Complex** and **Inga-Shaba power line**, **electrical power** has become the preferred form of industrial power.

As the mining infrastructure deteriorated in the 1980s because of poor maintenance and a lack of new investments, copper was supplanted first by cobalt and subsequently by diamonds as the major foreign exchange earner. With the economic crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s, production of all minerals except for diamonds declined dramatically. The state-owned mining companies, beset by falling production, decaying equipment, and a lack of new investment, were considered insolvent by the mid-1990s. By 1995, **agriculture** had become an equal contributor to GDP. Thus, the mining industry had declined to such an extent that agriculture replaced mining as the country's top exporting sector for the first time since independence.

Intense international pressure to privatize GECAMINES prompted the government to reduce operating costs by merging the different branches of the company in 1995. However, subsequent negotiations regarding this privatization were abandoned. Following the fall of **Mobutu Sese Seko** in 1997, the government of **Laurent Kabila** negotiated a number of new joint ventures with foreign companies to rebuild the mining industry. In early 1998, the government decided to cancel more than 15 mining contracts, owing to the failure of foreign enterprises to invest in these projects. Moreover, the **civil war** against Kabila, which began in August 1998, acted as a deterrent to most foreign investors as the northeastern mining sector came under the control of rebel groups and their foreign allies, **Rwanda** and **Uganda**, and the southern mining area (southern Katanga and Kasai) was controlled by the government and its major ally, Zimbabwe. Three **United Nations** reports published in 2001–2002 accused rebel groups, as well as foreign countries fighting in Congo, of illegal exploitation of mineral resources during the war.

Despite the promulgation of a new mining code to attract foreign investors, the Congolese mining sector is being exploited erratically, and artisanal mining remains quite predominant across the vast

Congolese territory since the **Second Congo War** started in August 1998. In late 2006, the legislature recommended that no further partnership agreements be signed between the GECAMINES and foreign mining companies, on the grounds that the joint ventures resulted in a reduction in profits for the loss-making GECAMINES. In short, good governance in the mining sector increasingly remains a major concern of foreign investors, aid donors, and the Congolese legislature. *See also* ALUMINUM.

**MINISTRIES.** In early Congolese **governments**, the executive branch was divided into ministries, but these were renamed “**departments**,” headed by “state commissioners,” on 5 January 1973 as part of a gradual process of introducing an authentic Congolese form of government. Departments were renamed ministries again in 1997, after the installation of the **Laurent Kabila** government.

**MISSION DE L'ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO (MONUC) [MISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN CONGO].** In January 2009, the MONUC had 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police, and 1,050 personnel of formed police units (representing 58 countries), with an annual budget of \$1.2 billion. The MONUC had its headquarters (HQ) in **Kinshasa** (main HQ and Western Brigade), **Kisangani** (Eastern Division), **Bunia** (Ituri Brigade), **Bukavu** (Kivu Brigade South), and **Goma** (Kivu Brigade North). It also had a number of field offices mostly located in eastern Congo.

The UN Security Council Resolution 1291 of 24 February 2000 established MONUC to facilitate the implementation of the **Lusaka Peace Accord**, signed on 10 July 1999 to end the **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila**, a conflict that many commentators called “Africa’s First World War.” The civil war against Laurent Kabila resulted in a process of severe militarization of Congolese society with the increased presence of foreign armed groups, the massive recruitment of children, and the creation of self-defense militias, along with an increase in the illicit traffic of light weapons. The UN Security Council, in collaboration with the **African Union** (AU), was thus called upon by the peace accord to constitute, facilitate, and deploy peacekeeping forces in Congo to ensure the

implementation of the accord and to pursue all armed groups that threatened peace and stability.

However, Laurent Kabila refused to authorize MONUC forces in Congo unless the governments of **Rwanda** and Uganda withdrew their troops. Other groups followed suit, refusing to implement the peace accord. Although the agreement was violated on several occasions by the protagonists, the accession of **Joseph Kabila** to the presidency in January 2001 following the assassination of Laurent Kabila gave new impetus to the peace process. By moving quickly in the peace process, Joseph Kabila was able to create confidence within the international community for the deployment of MONUC, which became the largest and most expensive mission in the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO).

MONUC was undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Its mandate authorized it to use all means deemed necessary, within the limits of its capabilities and in the areas of deployment of its armed units, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, and to contribute to the improvement of security conditions. The MONUC's mandate included four phases: the first phase involved forcibly implementing the Lusaka ceasefire agreement; the second involved its monitoring and reporting of any violations through the proper channels; the third centered on the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration process of foreign rebel groups operating in Congo; and the last phase included facilitating the transition toward the organization of credible elections.

In its early years, from 2001 to 2006, MONUC's political and military tasks proved extremely difficult to fulfill, especially since it was often forced to work through a weak and fractious transitional government and army. It was also plagued by insufficient troop numbers, inadequate equipment, and an ambiguous concept of military operations, and its reputation suffered from sexual abuse scandals in 2004 and from trading guns for **gold** with the militia groups its forces were meant to disarm. Even in those areas where MONUC had the resources to act, it often failed to protect civilians, most obviously during the May 2002 massacre in Kisangani that involved then-Colonel **Laurent Nkunda**, the fighting in Bunia in 2003 between **Hema** and **Lendu** militias, and the mutiny in Bukavu in May 2004 led by Colonel Jules Mutembuzi and Laurent Nkunda.

Despite these setbacks, MONUC was quite successful in maintaining order during and after the elections of 2006–2007. MONUC, whose principal mission was to contribute to the maintenance of peace in Congo, set up the Electoral Division in September 2003 in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1493 adopted on 28 July 2003. This success encouraged MONUC, in coordination with other organizations of the UN and nongovernmental organizations, to undertake the supervision of the nationwide elections during the transitional period. This was a major undertaking in a country the size of Western Europe and one without adequate infrastructure.

By December 2008, MONUC's mandate had expanded greatly since its inception in 1999. Its role had grown from ceasefire observation to encompass supporting a transitional government; assisting in security sector reform; disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating Congolese rebel armed groups; aiding in the re-establishment of a state based on the rule of law; monitoring the arms embargo; protecting civilians in imminent danger; and providing election support. After the elections in 2006–2007, and because of increasing conflict in **Nord-Kivu** and **Sud-Kivu**, MONUC's mandate was extended to 2009 to deal with rebel groups and militias in eastern Congo. *See also* SECOND CONGO WAR.

**MISSIONARIES.** Missions and missionaries have played a prominent role in the **education** of many leaders and in drawing world attention to **human rights** abuses in Congo, first with the campaign against **slavery** during the 1800s, later with the campaign against abusive **labor** practices in the **Congo Free State** and the **Belgian Congo**, and more recently with reports of abuses of power by the Congolese **government**. Missionaries have been praised for introducing **Christianity**, education, and **health care** facilities, and criticized for helping colonialists de-Africanize the Congolese people.

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the missionaries exerted a significant influence. Missionaries first arrived in the Kongo area of what is now **Kongo Central** in the 1480s, brought by the **Portuguese** expeditions. The Roman **Catholic Church** flourished for a time in the **Kongo Kingdom**, but it did not spread far and began a 200-year decline in the 1600s.

Organized Roman Catholic and **Protestant** missionary activities returned in the 1870s and, by World War II, the missions had become major providers of education and **health** services in the colony, sometimes subsidized by the colonial **administration**. Some of the earliest efforts to standardize Congolese **languages** and adapt them to written form were made by missionaries seeking to translate the Bible, hymnals, and liturgy into African languages. At **independence**, 65 percent of Congolese identified themselves as Christian, and the country's official literacy rate was 60 percent, one of the highest in Africa.

The first Congolese priests and pastors were ordained in the 1910s, but in the 1960s, considerable efforts were made to increase Congolese leadership and influence in the church and to Africanize litany and ceremony. The first secretary-general of the **Église du Christ au Congo**, later Église du Christ au Zaïre, which grouped most Protestant denominations in the country, was elected shortly after independence. The first Roman Catholic cardinal was installed on 28 March 1969.

The rise of **nationalism**, **Authenticity**, and party dominance in the early 1970s heightened tensions between church and state. Congolese were ordered to abandon their Christian names and replace them with "authentic Zairian" ones. The **universities** operated by Catholic and Protestant groups were nationalized in 1971. Religious observances were removed from government ceremonies, and an attempt was made to ban religious teachings in the schools. An exodus of expatriate missionaries began.

In the 1980s, however, relations improved. Missions were still actively engaged in building and running schools, hospitals, printing presses, and some agricultural projects, and had become major distributors of **foreign aid** such as food and disaster relief supplies. The deterioration of many government-funded social services increased reliance on church-supported institutions. Moreover, by the 1990s and into the early 2000s, many schools, hospitals, and entire mission stations were run entirely by Congolese staff, which sought heroically in some cases to cope with the lack of funds and the needs of a population suffering increasing economic hardship.

**MITTERAND, FRANÇOIS (1916–1996).** The president of **France** from 1981 to 1995, Mitterrand was France's longest-governing head

of state. Better known for his efforts to unify Europe, Mitterrand also presided over France during the sometimes torturous efforts at democratization in French-speaking Africa. A socialist, he campaigned on a platform of opposing Africa's dictators, but following his investiture quickly acknowledged that France's foreign policy and business interests required cooperation with them. He attended the France–Africa Summit in **Kinshasa** in 1982 and subsequently paid several official visits to Congo (then **Zaire**). In the early 1990s, Mitterrand's government joined the **United States** and **Belgium** in applying diplomatic pressure on the **Mobutu Sese Seko** government for economic reforms and more progress on the **democratic transition**. However, these policies were moderated in the mid-1990s because of what was seen as a need to address Congo's economic crisis and disappointment over what was viewed as intransigence by hardline **opposition** leaders in the **Sacred Union**. Guarded support was expressed for the economic reforms of **Léon Kengo wa Dondo** and thanks were expressed for Congolese help in the international effort to resolve the **Rwandan refugee** crisis in eastern Congo in 1994–96.

**MITUMBA MOUNTAINS.** A mountain range that stretches along the Western **Great Rift Valley** in **Burundi** and Eastern **Congo-Kinshasa**, west of **Lake Tanganyika**. The two main peaks, Mount Kahuzi (3,308 m) and Mount Biéga (2,790 m), are both extinct volcanoes. The range is largely inaccessible except by foot. The **Parti Révolutionnaire du Peuple** (PRP) **dissident** group controlled a significant amount of territory in the mountains from the late 1960s to the late 1990s, and the area was the scene of some important early victories by the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) when it launched its offensive to overthrow **Mobutu Sese Seko** in late 1996.

**MOBA.** A small town of about 60,000 inhabitants on **Lake Tanganyika** in northeastern **Katanga Province**, Moba (former Baudouinville) was the site of a **military** garrison that was attacked in October 1984 by guerrillas of the **Parti Révolutionnaire du Peuple** (PRP). The attack caused an estimated 50 deaths. The Congolese army recaptured

the town two days later, and most of the guerrillas disappeared into the surrounding countryside. The **government** accused **dissidents** living in **refugee** camps across the lake in **Tanzania** and **Burundi** of responsibility. Tanzania acknowledged that a camp of Congolese existed in its territory but denied they were responsible for the attack. A second attack by the PRP in June 1985 was less successful. In early 1997, Moba was one of the first towns to fall to forces of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL), of which the PRP was a member, when they advanced into **Shaba**. It was the scene of sporadic battles when rebels of the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD) launched their offensive in August 1998.

**MOBUTISM.** At the height of the single-party system, Mobutism was proclaimed the official ideology of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) party and of the Congolese state. Official party documents described the doctrine as the “thought and vision of **Mobutu Sese Seko**.” It encompassed all the policies and ideological thoughts of Mobutu, whether, for example, the **Zairianization** of private companies in 1973 or their **Retrocession** in 1975, whether the centralization of political power in the 1970s or the decentralization of local **politics** in the 1980s. With the advent of multipartyism in 1990, use of the term declined and sometimes became a source of derision. In the early 1990s, **President** Mobutu was accused of encouraging the creation of hundreds of **political parties** in order to splinter the **opposition** and confuse the electorate in what was called, “multi-Mobutism.”

Despite the contradictions, Mobutu and Mobutism are likely to be remembered for several notable influences: the political unification of the country in the late 1960s, the policies of **Authenticity** and **nationalism** in the early 1970s, the mismanagement and the failure of economic policies in the late 1970s, the half-hearted corrections of the 1980s, and the Machiavellian obstruction of the **democratic transition** in the 1990s. Mobutu dominated national politics during the first quarter-century of Congo’s nationhood and virtually until his death, and as a result, Mobutism will be an important topic for students of modern African history.



**MOBUTU, BOBI LADAWA.** Bobi was the second wife of **Mobutu Sese Seko**. Mobutu married her in 1980 following the death of his first wife, **Mobutu Gbiatibwa Gogbe Yetene**. From **Équateur Province**, Mama Bobi, as she was known, was involved in work with **women**, handicapped persons, and other social services. She accompanied Mobutu into exile and was at his bedside in Rabat, **Morocco**, when he died of cancer on 7 September 1997.

**MOBUTU, GBIATIBWA GOGBE YETENE (?–1977).** First and much-loved wife of **Mobutu Sese Seko**, Mama Mobutu was from the former **Équateur Province**. She married Mobutu on 26 July 1955. They had 10 children before her death on 22 October 1977.

**MOBUTU, NZANGA NGBANGAWE FRANÇOIS JOSEPH (1970– ).** Nzanga Mobutu is the eldest son of **President Mobutu Sese Seko** and his then-mistress, and later second wife **Mobutu Bobi Ladawa**. Nzanga studied in Belgium, France, and Canada before returning to the country in the mid-1990s to become an advisor to his father before fleeing into exile when rebel leader **Laurent Kabila** became president in May 1997. He is the chairman of the Union des Mobutistes Démocrates (UDEM), a collection of political parties and civil society associations and nongovernmental organizations advocating the restoration of peace, national unity, and territorial integrity. He is most popular in the northwestern **Équateur Province** from whence his father hailed.

In the 2006 presidential elections, he ran as a candidate and placed fourth, with about 4.8 percent of the vote. Following the first round of voting, Mobutu entered into a platform political coalition with incumbent President **Joseph Kabila** to try to rally votes from the **Équateur** region, where **Jean-Pierre Bemba** was favored to win. The coalition also involved the **Parti Lumumbiste Unifié (PALU)** of **Antoine Gizenga**. His younger brother, Albert Philipe Giala Kassa Mobutu (b. 1972), and eight other UDEM candidates were elected to the National Assembly in the 2006 elections. Mobutu was named minister of state for agriculture when Gizenga's government was announced on 5 February 2007, ranking second in the government after Gizenga. When Gizenga was succeeded by **Adolphe Muzito**, Mobutu was appointed as deputy prime minister in charge of basic

social needs on 26 October 2008. He is married to Cathy Bemba, a sister of Jean-Pierre Bemba, with whom he has had three children.

**MOBUTU PLAN.** A plan announced by **Mobutu Sese Seko** in November 1977 that aimed at revitalizing the national **economy**. Inspired by the Marshall Plan to reconstruct Europe following World War II, the Mobutu Plan came after the first **Shaba War** and amid international attention on the country's worsening **inflation** and indebtedness. It called for new investments to foster **agricultural** development and improve **transportation** and **communication** infrastructures. It also called for some decentralization of economic policymaking. The plan was to cover the period 1978–82, but became a rhetorical peg on which to hang subsequent economic proposals. The term fell into disuse in the 1980s and was officially forgotten during the economic collapse of the 1990s.

**MOBUTU SESE SEKO KUKU NGBENDU WA ZA BANGA (JOSEPH-DÉSIRÉ) (1930–1997).** One of Africa's longest-ruling heads of state, Mobutu was close to power in the early years following **independence** and dominated national political life after the **coup d'état** that brought him to power on **24 November 1965**. His rule was characterized by the heavy centralization and personalization of power. His style of authoritarianism included rewards for those who supported him, punishment for those who opposed him, and forgiveness for **dissidents** who returned to the fold. He is credited with forging a nation from a territory characterized at independence by administrative collapse, secessionism, and ethnic and regional rivalry. He was criticized for allowing a political élite to plunder the public wealth, for centralizing power in the hands of a few cronies, and for failing to prepare his political succession. Nevertheless, he dominated political life during the country's first 35 years and he will be remembered by history.

Mobutu was born Joseph-Désiré on 14 October 1930, at **Lisala**, in the former **Équateur Province**. His maternal family, of the **Ngbandi ethnic group**, was originally from **Gbadolite**, a town by the **Ubangi River** across from the **Central African Republic**. Mobutu's father, Gbemani Albéric, was a cook who reportedly died when Joseph-Désiré was eight years old. Young Mobutu attended primary school

at **Mbandaka** and entered the **Force Publique** on 14 February 1950. He began writing articles under the pseudonym “de Banzy” (from Banzyville now Mobaye) for *L’Avenir* and *Actualités Africaines*, two periodicals published in **Leopoldville**. He left the military on 31 December 1956, and worked as a journalist for *L’Avenir Colonial Belge* and *Actualités Africaines*. He subsequently went to Brussels, **Belgium**, to take courses at the Institut Supérieur d’Études Sociales and work at the Maison de la Presse. Mobutu met **Patrice Lumumba** and joined the **Mouvement National Congolais** (MNC) in 1958, and he attended the **Round Table Conference** in January 1960. When Lumumba became **prime minister** at independence, Mobutu was appointed his state secretary.

After the mutiny of the Force Publique on 5 July 1960, Mobutu was appointed army chief of staff with the rank of colonel three days later. He undertook a tour of army garrisons around the country in an effort to pacify the troops. On 14 September 1960, during a standoff between Lumumba and **President Joseph Kasavubu**, Mobutu announced he was “neutralizing” the political leaders and formed the **College of Commissioners**, composed of young intellectuals, to govern the country for six months. The College returned power to the constitutional **government** in February 1961.

On 24 November 1965, during a similar crisis between Kasavubu and Prime Minister **Moïse Tshombe** and in the face of new **rebellions** in eastern Congo, Mobutu took power in a bloodless coup d’état. Officially, he was “called upon by the military high command” to assume the leadership of the country. He said he would govern for five years under emergency measures, then hold **elections**. Over the next few months, the political system was gradually dismantled, **parliament** was suspended, and Mobutu gained the power to rule by decree. The **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) party was formed in 1966 with Mobutu as president, and the concept of a Congolese revolution was developed. A program of **Authenticity** was launched, and former colonial names were changed to “authentic” ones. The Congo became the **République du Zaïre**. The MPR became the only legal party and, subsequently, the supreme organ of state.

With the promulgation of the third **constitution** in 1974, Zaire became a party-state. Power increasingly was centralized in Mobutu,

who presided over all organs of government, including the **legislative** and **judicial systems**, and he had the power to appoint and dismiss virtually all leaders of party and government. He ran unopposed in presidential elections in 1970, 1977, and 1984, and each time was elected by more than 99 percent of the vote. On 11 December 1982, he was given the title of field marshal.

With the fall of **copper** prices in 1974, the national **economy** began to decline. In the 1980s, the government launched a series of monetary and fiscal reforms that, for a time, reduced **inflation** but also caused a severe recession. In 1986, the government limited payments on the external **debt**. The late 1980s were characterized by deteriorating relations with foreign creditors, rising inflation, and falling standards of living among the people.

On **24 April 1990**, in the face of growing domestic and international pressure, Mobutu announced the end of single-party rule and the beginning of a one-year transition to multiparty **democracy**. A period of **hyperinflation** and civil unrest caused a severe drop in economic production. The frequently extended **democratic transition** was characterized by periods of confrontation and intransigence followed by mediation and compromise. During that time, **opposition** leaders were co-opted to assume political posts to “resolve the Congolese crisis,” only to be dismissed later in failure and political disgrace. Mobutu was accused of fomenting the instability in order to sabotage the transition and prove that political pluralism was bad for the country. As throughout his career, he displayed an acute sense of both domestic and international **politics** and genius at manipulating them to his advantage. Although frequently criticized and later ostracized by Western governments for his policies, he frequently obliged them to work with him. For example, he provided staging bases to support **Angolan** rebels during the Angolan civil war in the 1980s and, in 1994, he allowed foreign troops to use military bases to deliver emergency relief to 1 million **refugees** fleeing the civil war in **Rwanda**.

In August 1996, amid rumors of failing health, Mobutu flew to Europe. He underwent prostate surgery in Lausanne, Switzerland, on 22 August 1996 and began treatment for cancer. The interethnic conflict in Rwanda had spilled over into eastern Congo, but Mobutu’s government seemed powerless to counter it. Attacks against ethnic

**Tutsi** by remnants of the Rwandan **Hutu** militia led to retaliation. On 18 October, the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) launched an offensive, which in four months seized control of a 1,000-km-long stretch of territory along Congo's eastern border. Mobutu returned to Kinshasa on 17 December 1996. He reshuffled the cabinet, naming **Léon Kengo wa Dondo** prime minister, and purged the **military** high command. The AFDL offensive continued, facing only modest resistance in **Kisangani** and **Lubumbashi**.

As the AFDL forces moved closer to **Kinshasa**, African leaders organized a series of mediation talks in Pointe-Noire, **Congo-Brazzaville**, which Mobutu and AFDL leader **Laurent Kabila** attended. On 16 May 1997, as AFDL troops approached the capital and announced the formation of a new government, Mobutu and his entourage left Kinshasa for **Togo** and five days later arrived in **Morocco**, where King **Hassan II** offered him asylum. Reportedly, no other country did so.

The rebels entered the capital on 17 May 1997. During the following weeks, defectors from the Mobutu entourage told stories of an ailing former leader, bitter at what he viewed as betrayal by his supporters and his people. Mobutu underwent surgery for "serious internal bleeding" on 27 June. On 1 July 1997, he was admitted to Mohammed V Military Hospital in Rabat, where he died on 7 September 1997, at 9:30 p.m. with his family by his side. He was buried in Morocco. *See also* KLEPTOCRACY; MOBUTISM; MOBUTU BOBIL LADAWA; MOBUTU GBIATIBWA GOGBE YETENE; MOBUTU NZENGA NGBANGAWE FRANCOIS JOSEPH.

**MOKOLO WA MPOMBO, EDOUARD.** An official frequently in and out of **government** during the cabinet reshuffles of the 1980s, Mokolo was appointed state commissioner for foreign affairs in 1985, but was moved to the Department of Higher Education and Science in a reshuffle in April 1986. Mokolo was elected senator in February 2007. He was elected first vice president of the Senate in May 2007.

**MONGALA.** A district of the former **Équateur Province**, Mongala became a province in February 2009 as the result of the 2006 **constitution**. The capital of Mongala is Lisala.

**MONGO.** A large **ethnic group** that is considered a major cluster, or subgroup, of the **Bantu** family. Primarily a people of the **forest**, the Mongo live in most of the **Congo River Basin** and part of the southern uplands, in a vast area bordered by the Lulonga River in the north, the Sankuru River in the south, the confluence of the **Congo River** and Momboy River to the west, and the confluence of the **Lualaba River** and Lukuga River to the east. The Mongo **language**, a major lingua franca in northwestern Congo, is remarkably homogeneous, lending weight to the legend that the Mongo are descendant from one man. In Mongo societies, which can be either matrilineal or patrilineal, **chiefs** are usually chosen on the basis of wealth, rather than kinship. The village is usually the core group, formed around a lineage of which the chief might also be the chief of other client lineages.

**MONSENGWO PASINYA, LAURENT (ARCHBISHOP) (1939– ).**

Archbishop of **Kisangani** and president of the Episcopal Conference of Congo, Monsengwo was elected chairman of the **National Conference** on 12 December 1991, following four months of political turmoil and confrontation that prevented the conference from taking any meaningful action and was partly responsible for several periods of social unrest. With a combination of doggedness and parliamentary finesse that he credited to his experience as moderator of the Episcopal Conference, Monsengwo steered the National Conference through 12 months of stormy debate. It produced several dozen reports on the state of Congolese society after three decades of **independence** and drafted a **constitution** that repealed many of the laws established under the **Mobutu Sese Seko government**. When the National Conference disbanded in December 1992, Monsengwo was elected president of the **Haut Conseil de la République (HCR)** that replaced it and was charged with overseeing the transition to multi-party **democracy**. On 1 July 1995, the supporters of Mobutu and the **opposition-led Sacred Union** both accused him of favoring the other side and entered into an unlikely alliance that ousted him from the chairmanship. He returned to his archdiocese in Kisangani.

**MOREL, EDMUND DENE (1873–1924).** Born on 10 July 1873 as Georges Eduard Pierre Achille Morel de Ville, Morel was a British

author who wrote extensively on the atrocities and **labor** abuses in the **Congo Free State** (CFS). His work led the British government in 1897 to instruct its consul general in **Leopoldville** to draft a report on labor practices in the CFS. The report aroused public anger and eventually led to the Belgian parliament's annexation of the territory, marking the end of the CFS and the beginning of the **Belgian Congo**. Morel died on 12 November 1924.

**MOROCCO, RELATIONS WITH.** Relations between Congo and Morocco were close virtually from **independence**, strengthened by **Mobutu's** friendship with King **Hassan II** and by a similarity of policies on a variety of regional and global issues. Morocco sent 1,500 troops to **Shaba** in April 1977 to help repel an invasion by the **Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo** (FLNC) in the first **Shaba War**. Moroccan troops returned to Shaba in 1978 as part of a peacekeeping force to help maintain order following the second Shaba War. Mobutu supported Morocco in the Western Sahara dispute and suspended its participation in the **Organization of African Unity** when Morocco withdrew in 1984 because of the admission of the Polisario Front's Saharan Republic. When Mobutu fled Congo on 17 May 1997, as **opposition** forces prepared to enter **Kinshasa**, he was granted asylum in Morocco, where he died on 7 September 1997. Since then relations between Morocco and Congo have remained normal. In early 2000, Moroccan Airlines was allowed to start service at the **N'djili** International Airport.

When Congo announced that it was ready to receive **United Nations** peacekeeping troops, Morocco was among the first few countries to make up the 5,500 UN troops in the early 2000s. In mid-2005, Morocco and Congo began talks of increasing trade between the two countries, and in March 2006 King Mohammed VI visited Kinshasa. The visit ended with the signing of bilateral accords covering a number of areas of cooperation between the two countries. During the same visit, King Mohammed decorated **President Joseph Kabila** with the Moroccan highest distinction, the Wissam Al Mohamedi Chain.

**MOUVEMENT D'ACTION POUR LA RÉSURRECTION DU CONGO (MARC) [ACTION MOVEMENT FOR THE RESURRECTION OF CONGO].** A Brussels-based **opposition** group headed by Munguya Mbenge, a former commissioner in **Shaba** Re-

gion, MARC evolved out of the “Mouvement du 4 Juin” (“Fourth of June Movement”) that was formed following **student** unrest in the late 1960s. MARC was accused of fomenting several uprisings and, in March 1978, a military tribunal sentenced 19 alleged plotters to death, five of them in absentia. Thirteen of those found guilty were executed on 17 March 1978.

**MOUVEMENT DE LIBÉRATION DU CONGO (MLC) [MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF CONGO].** The MLC was created in November 1998 by **Jean-Pierre Bemba** and operated in the former **Équateur Province**, where it began as a rebel group against President **Laurent Kabila**. Although it claimed to be an independent rebel group, it was mostly dominated by **Mobutists**. It subsequently took part in the transitional government and is now the main opposition party. During the war, the MLC was backed by the government of **Uganda** and controlled much of the north of the country, in particular the province of Équateur. Its leader, Bemba, became vice president following the 2002 peace agreement called the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI). The town of **Gdadolite** was the headquarters of the MLC. The MLC was the primary instrument of Uganda during the war, as the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD) was dominated by **Rwanda**. As part of the AGI, Brigadier General Malik Kijege of the MLC was appointed head of **military** logistics, while Major General Dieudonné Amuli Bahigwa was named head of the navy.

Bemba, as the MLC candidate, was second in the 2006 presidential **elections**, and the party gained 64 out of 500 seats in the parliament—the second highest number for any **political party**. In the 19 January 2007 Senate elections, the party won 14 out of 108 seats. Fighting broke out in **Kinshasa** in March 2007 between the army and Bemba’s guards, who were supposed to have been integrated into the army, but had not because of concerns about Bemba’s security. The army prevailed in the fighting, and Bemba took refuge in the **South African** embassy. On 13 April 2007, the MLC party suspended its participation in the National Assembly (but not in the Senate) due to what it described as a “climate of permanent insecurity.” Twelve days later, the party ended its boycott of the National Assembly after **Joseph Kabila** agreed to meet with representatives of the opposition.



**MOUVEMENT NATIONAL CONGOLAIS (MNC) [NATIONAL CONGOLESE MOVEMENT]**. One of the major **political parties** at **independence**, the MNC was formed by Congolese *évolués* in **Leopoldville** in October 1958. The founders included **Patrice Lumumba**, **Joseph Ileo**, **Joseph Ngalula**, **Gaston Diomi**, **Arthur Pinzi**, and **Cyrille Adoula**. One of the few parties at independence that eschewed regionalism and attempted to develop a national base of support, the MNC tried to develop a cogent ideology and took its inspiration from African **nationalists** such as Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah and Guinea's Ahmed Sékou Touré. It sought to establish a nationalistic program of economic, political, and cultural development and supported the concept of Pan-Africanism. By 1959, however, the MNC had begun to splinter. **Albert Kalonji** left following the massacres of **Luba** in **Katanga** with a group that came to be called the MNC/Kalonji. Other leaders left to form their own parties. During the **elections** prior to independence, the MNC and **Alliance des Bakongo** (ABAKO) parties received the largest number of votes, but neither received an absolute majority. Lumumba eventually brokered a compromise whereby he became **prime minister** and the ABAKO candidate, **Joseph Kasavubu**, became **president**. The MNC, which expressed nationalistic and anticolonial sentiments that were applauded by Soviet-bloc governments and viewed with anxiety by Western governments, was radicalized following the assassination of Lumumba in early 1961. It became the major force behind the eastern **rebellions** from 1964 to 1966, and although it was splintered and weakened by the end of the decade, it remained a prominent **opposition** group in exile.

With the announcement of the **democratic transition**, a number of former leaders of the MNC resurfaced and formed parties claiming to be the legitimate heirs to the Lumumba legacy. Some joined the **Sacred Union**, but others rejected it as containing too many leaders who had collaborated with **Mobutu Sese Seko** in the past. In the mid-1990s, a number of them regrouped to form the **Parti Lumumbiste Unifié** (PALU) headed by **Antoine Gizenga**. *See also* KASHAMURA ANICET.

**MOUVEMENT POPULAIRE DE LA RÉVOLUTION (MPR) [POPULAR MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTION]**. Congo's sole legal **political party** from 1970 until 1990, the MPR was es-

established six months after the **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu's coup d'état** and steadily grew in power until it became the supreme organ of state in 1974. The party's early roots lay in the Corps des Volontaires de la République, a group of young intellectuals called to service by Mobutu in January 1966. The MPR was formally constituted on 17 April 1966. The party's ideology was outlined following a meeting at N'Sele, outside **Kinshasa**, which eventually became party headquarters. The **N'Sele Manifesto**, issued on 20 May 1967, proclaimed an official ideology of **Authenticity** and **Mobutism**, which was defined as "authentic Zairian **nationalism**" and that condemned regionalism and **tribalism**. The manifesto proclaimed a policy of "positive neutralism" in world **politics** and espoused a path between capitalism and **communism** characterized by the phrase "neither to the right nor to the left, but forward." The manifesto also established national objectives of fostering economic independence, strengthening the central **government's** authority throughout the country, building Congo's international prestige, and working for the social and economic development of the Congolese people.

The MPR was declared the supreme organ of state and sole legal party on 23 December 1970, and was fused with the government in 1972. The **constitution** of 1974 formally established the party-state and codified the concentration of power in the **president**. It instituted the "unity" of party, people, and government and eliminated any real separation of powers. The party's youth wing, the **Jeunesse du Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (JMPR), was particularly militant. From birth, all citizens were automatically members of the JMPR and, at 30 years of age, everyone became a member of the MPR and remained so until death.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the lines between party and state were completely blurred. The **Political Bureau**, a body of several dozen senior leaders, was the senior policymaking body. The Congress of the Party was a larger forum for discussion and debate that met every five years. The **Legislative Council** of 310 members ratified laws proposed by the Political Bureau. The **Executive Council** composed of heads of **departments** (ministries) and the first state commissioner (**prime minister**) formed the executive branch and oversaw the **administration** of government. The **Judicial Council**, composed of presidents of the highest courts, interpreted the law. In

1980, the MPR **Central Committee**, consisting of 120 senior party members, was created and began to emerge as the de facto **parliament**, with a mandate to review and carry out the initiatives of the Political Bureau. As a result, the Legislative Council lost most of its power. Mobutu presided over all of the organs. Party congresses were held in 1970, 1977, and 1984 to nominate Mobutu as the sole candidate for presidential **elections** in those years.

Originally, all members of the Political Bureau were nominated by the president. The Political Bureau then selected members of other institutions and nominated the sole candidates for the Legislative Council. The president, as chief executive, chose state commissioners, state governors, and other senior members of the executive. However, a degree of liberalization was introduced in 1978. A portion of the membership of the Political Bureau was chosen by party members, and multiple candidates within the party were allowed in the legislative elections. However, the size of the Political Bureau was changed to maintain a majority of presidential appointees and the legislative candidates, although chosen by local party cells, were subject to review by senior party officials. The election role of the members of the Political Bureau was later abolished, and the Central Committee, whose members were appointed by the Political Bureau, assumed most of the lawmaking duties formerly held by the Legislative Council. In January 1985, in a move aimed at eliminating “conflicts of interest,” a by-law was adopted forbidding members of the Political Bureau and Central Committee from holding an office in the executive or legislative bodies. Most officials chose to retain their party posts.

The avowed purpose of the MPR was to mobilize and educate the masses and to build support for government policies and actions. Another major goal was to foster unity, which after the fragmentation of the early 1960s, remained a major concern. However, the MPR did not spring from popular roots but was created and imposed from the top. The main result, according to critics, was to institutionalize a political system that received little input from the masses and concentrated political and economic power in the hands of a small élite. The system was also blamed for contributing to the institutionalization of **corruption** and political patronage.

With the end of single-partyism announced by Mobutu in a speech on **24 April 1990**, more than 200 parties formed and the MPR, for a time, changed its name to the *Mouvement Populaire pour le Renouveau* (Popular Movement for Renewal) and was separated from government. It also underwent a measure of internal turmoil characterized by competition for leadership positions vacated by members joining the **opposition** and by conflicts along regional and generational lines. Mobutu, in an attempt to position himself above partisan politics following his April 1990 speech, resigned as president of the party for a time. He reassumed the post one year later.

Following the exile and death of Mobutu in 1997 and the installation of **Laurent Kabila** as president, MPR activities were proscribed, along with those of all political parties that had collaborated with Mobutu. *See also* DISSIDENTS; LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM; MAKANDA KABOBI INSTITUTE.

**MPINGA KASENDA (1937–1994).** A former **prime minister** and senior party official, Mpinga was born on 30 August 1937 at Tshilomba in **Kasai Oriental Province**. He received a degree and later a doctorate in political science from **Lovanium University**. A professor at the **Université Nationale du Zaïre**'s **Kinshasa** campus during the early 1970s, he became a member of the **Political Bureau** of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) party in 1972 and, in 1974, director of the **Makanda Kabobi Institute**, the MPR party school. He served as first state commissioner from 1977 to 1979 and became permanent secretary of the Political Bureau in 1979 and a member of the **Central Committee** on 2 September 1980. He was named defense minister in the **Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond** government of 1992 and foreign minister in the **Faustin Birindwa** government of 1993. Mpinga was killed in May 1994 in a plane crash.

**MULAMBA NYUNY WA KADIMA, LÉONARD (GENERAL) (? –1969).** Mulamba was appointed **prime minister** on 28 November 1965, following **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu**'s **coup d'état**. Mobutu dismissed Mulamba and abolished the post on 26 October 1966 by citing Mulamba's lax attitude toward the **mutiny** of the **Baka regiment** in **Stanleyville**. The duties of head of government were assumed by the **president**.

**MULELE, PIERRE (1929–1968).** Born on 11 August 1929, Mulele was a Chinese-trained guerrilla who led the **Kwilu rebellion** and brought urban guerrilla terrorism to Congo for the first time. At **independence**, Mulele was the head of the **Parti Solidaire Africain** (PSA) and minister of **education** in the **government** of **Patrice Lumumba**. He left the country following Lumumba's death and went to **China** where he received military training. Mulele and his supporters, who espoused a Maoist form of peasant revolution, began their operations in January 1964 in Kwilu. They destroyed many administrative and **missionary** institutions and set bombs that terrorized **Leopoldville** for a number of months. When the rebellion was put down in 1965, Mulele went into exile in Brazzaville, People's Republic of Congo (presently **Republic of Congo** or **Congo-Brazzaville**). Offered amnesty by the **Mobutu Sese Seko** government, he returned to **Kinshasa** on 29 September 1968, where he was summarily tried for treason and executed on 8 October 1968. Following his execution, the Brazzaville government broke relations with the Mobutu government.

**MULUMBA LUKOJI, CRISPIN (1943–1997).** The second **prime minister** of the transitional period, Mulumba was named to that post on 15 March 1991, following the resignation of **Lunda Bululu**. He oversaw the opening of the **National Conference** in August 1991. An academic from southeastern Congo, his appointment was seen as a move to undercut support for **opposition** leaders **Étienne Tshisekedi** and **Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond**. However, he quickly fell out of favor with the opposition, which accused him of being pro-**Mobutu Sese Seko**. He resigned on 30 September 1991, amid civil unrest and a political stalemate over the **democratic transition**. He died of a heart attack in Johannesburg, **South Africa**, on 3 March 1997.

**MUNGUL DIAKA, BERNADIN (1933–1999).** At **independence**, Mungul was a supporter of Patrice **Lumumba** who became **Antoine Gizenga's** ambassador to **China** during the **Stanleyville government** in 1961. He was provincial minister of **Kwilu Province** in 1962–63, minister of the **middle classes** in the **Léonard Mulumba** government, and ambassador to Brussels in 1966–67. He was **education** minister when he resigned from the government in July 1968

and went into exile. He sought asylum in Brussels in the mid-1970s and led a group of exiled **dissidents** until he returned to Congo under the general **amnesty** of 1983. With the advent of multipartyism, Mungul formed a small party. He was appointed **prime minister** in October 1991 after **Mobutu** refused to accept the first **Étienne Tshisekedi** government but was replaced by **Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond** in November. In the mid-1990s he served as governor of **Kinshasa**.

**MUNGUYA, MBENGE DANIEL.** Commissioner (governor) of **Shaba Region** during the 1977 invasion by the **Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo** (FLNC), Munguya fled into exile. He was tried and convicted in absentia of collaborating with the FLNC. *See also* MOUVEMENT D'ACTION POUR LA RÉSURRECTION DU CONGO.

**MUNONGO MWENDA MSIRI SHYOMBEKA, GODEFROID (1925–1992).** **Moïse Tshombe's** interior minister in the secessionist **Katanga** government, Munongo was head of **security** and one of the most feared members of the Katangan regime. The son of a traditional **chief** of the **Yeke ethnic group**, Munongo was born on 20 November 1925, in Benkeya, and received his **education** at **missionary** schools in Katanga. He became a provincial judge in 1954 and was elected the first president of the **Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga** (CONAKAT) in 1959. When Tshombe became **prime minister** after the **Katanga secession** ended, he joined the **government**, but was dismissed in a cabinet reshuffle on 9 July 1964. Following **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu's coup d'état**, he was arrested in a general crackdown on 26 December 1966, and subsequently spent several years in detention. He reemerged in **politics** in 1991 as the leader of a group of traditional chiefs accredited to the **National Conference**.

**MUSIC.** One of Congo's greatest contributions to contemporary African **culture** has been its music, particularly the orchestra music that developed in the 1960s. The first Congolese musicians to gain popularity throughout the territory, in the 1940s and 1950s, were troubadours who traveled and performed primarily in the remote provinces. Among the early troubadours was **Antoine Wendo**, born in 1925,

who gained recognition with his recording of *Liwa ya Paul Kamba* (Death of Paul Kamba). He traveled as a soloist in the **Kasai, Oriental**, and **Mai-Ndombe** areas. Other soloists included Paul Kamba, Tête Rossignol, Polidor, Jean Bosco, and Colon Gentil. As the music developed, the solo acts became groups, adding African drums and acoustic guitars. Antoine Kasongo, Tekele Monkango (perhaps the first female music star), and Odéon Kinois were among the first leaders of groups. The second generation left traditional music for new forms and added more instruments.

The first recordings of Congolese music were reportedly made beginning in 1947 by colonial museums. **Kabasele Joseph Tshamala**, another founding father, formed the African Jazz Orchestra around 1953 and made a few records. **François Luambo Makiadi (Franco)**, born in 1938, formed the OK Jazz Orchestra and played cha-chas and rumbas before they became popular. Beginning in the late 1950s, the influence of Cuban and Latin music began to be felt, and a number of Latin American records were adapted and recorded by Congolese groups. These included Kay-Kay, Son, Tremendo, L'Amor, and Lolita. The Latin influence led to the composition of songs with Latin rhythms and Congolese lyrics, including such classics as "Indépendance Cha-cha" by **Tabu Ley Pascal (Rochéreau)** to commemorate **independence**, and "Cha-cha-cha de Amor" by Franco. Congolese musicians eventually adopted the term "jazz" to describe their music. According to musicologist Michel Lonoh, the first instance of the use of the term "Congo Jazz" occurred in the song called "Pasi ya mokili et Congo Jazz akei" (roughly translated "Heartache for the homeland and Congo Jazz took off").

By the mid-1960s, the term "Congo Jazz" was generally used to describe Congolese orchestral music, with Franco's OK Jazz, Rochéreau, and Docteur Nico among the most popular musicians. By the late 1960s, the soukouma style of music had entered the lexicon and gradually became the dominant form. By this time, Congolese music was among the most popular in Africa. By the late 1970s, the number of bands had multiplied and considerably diversified, and the music had entered the lexicon and gradually became the dominant form. Some leaders incorporated disco, jazz, and blues into their compositions. In the 1980s, reggae, Antilles, and rap rhythms grew in popularity. Still other musicians favored ballads and more traditional

music forms. Many **languages** were used in the lyrics, but **Lingala** remained the most common.

Congolese music was primarily dance music, favored in the large, traditional open-air dance clubs where orchestras play and beer flows often until dawn. **Kinshasa** was one of the earliest recording centers in Africa. However, economic difficulties caused a decline in the late 1970s, while other African cities like Abidjan, Lagos, Johannesburg, and Nairobi became popular recording sites. Congolese orchestras frequently performed and recorded in Paris, Brussels, and London and gained considerable popularity in major cities and on college campuses in the United States.

Congo Jazz was the name given to the rhythmic music popularized by urban orchestras in Congo, beginning in the late 1950s, that became popular throughout Africa. In the late 1960s, Congo Jazz evolved into soukouma and then diverged into many different forms, some taking inspiration from reggae, disco, or soukous. Others delved into indigenous languages, melodies, and rhythms. *See also* M'BILIA BEL; OLOMIDE ANTOINE KOFFI; WEMBADIO JULES SHUNGU PENE THABANI KIKUMBA.

**MUTINIES.** **Military** service began in Congo on 30 October 1885 by a decree of King **Leopold II**, who created the **Force Publique** (FP). Three mutinies occurred in the **Congo Free State** (CFS). The first was the Revolt of Batetela that broke out on 4 July 1895 in **Lulua-bourg** as the result of late **food supply** and pay arrears. Although many of the mutineers were of the **Tetela** group, the appropriate appellation should be the revolt of the *aribized* because most mutineers had become Muslim through **Afro-Arab** trade in the area. The mutineers started by killing their Belgian commanding officer on 5 July. They then left their compound and headed toward Ngandu, their former village of origin. After a number of operations against the mutineers, the FP defeated them in November 1896 at Bena Kapwa.

The second mutiny is known as the "Revolt of Expedition Dhanis." In November 1895, the superior commander of **Orientale Province** and the Districts of Uele, **Francis Baron Dhanis**, headed an expedition to the Upper Nile to occupy the enclave of Lado, in southern **Sudan**. After three months, in late afternoon on 14 February 1897, a revolt broke out among the Tetela and **Kusu** in **Ituri** in which



the mutineers killed their white officers. The mutineers defeated a number of FP battalions, and their courage provoked massive desertions from the ranks of troops. It took the CFS almost 24 months, from 1897 to 1901, to defeat the Ndirfi mutineers. However, the last pockets of resistance were not eliminated until 1908. The mutineers received more recruits from the native population and acquired weapons from **Angola** in exchange for ivory and slaves.

The last mutiny under the CFS was the mutiny of Shinkakasa, in **Bas-Congo**. In May 1891, the CFS government decided to build a fort at the port of **Boma** to stop any war vessel entering the Congo estuary and violating territorial waters. Most soldiers working on the fort had completed their seven-year military service and were ready to go back home. They mutinied on 17 April 1900, and the FP crushed the uprising on 9 May 1900.

The causes of these early mutinies are many. According to official Belgian sources, the first cause was a lack of discipline. Second was the troops' discontent with their treatment by white officers. Third was fatigue as the result of months of military campaigns without enough food. After the annexation of the CFS to **Belgium**, the colonial government reorganized the army to make it more professional. Nonetheless, it remained more or less an instrument of colonial coercion, crushing riots, strikes, and all Congolese actions that threatened colonial order.

In early 1960, there was a growing malaise among troops about the obstinate refusal of General **Émile Janssens** to permit any acceleration of the plodding **Africanization** program, which would have produced the first Congolese officers in 1963. Four days after the proclamation of **independence**, the army mutinied. **Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba** appointed former Master Sergeant **Victor Lundula** and former Master Sergeant **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** to commander and chief of staff of the **army**, respectively, to deal with the Africanization of the army. Despite a quick Africanization, mutinies spread in major military camps. **Katanga Province** seceded on 11 July 1960 and was followed by **South Kasai**.

After Mobutu took power in November 1965, he decided to reform the army by integrating mercenaries and former Katanga soldiers, who had fought the **rebellions**, into the national army. As he was reforming the army, a mutiny broke out in **Kisangani** on 24 July 1966

that involved the Baka Regiment, which was a unit of the national army made up of 2,000 Katangan soldiers under Colonel Ferdinand Tshipola. The mutiny ended on 25 September 1966 with more than 3,000 deaths. Nine months later, on 5 July 1967, another mutiny began in Kisangani that was instigated by 11 white mercenaries under the leadership of **Jean Schramme** and 100 Katangan soldiers. Within a week, the mutineers were joined by 150 mercenaries, 600 Katangan soldiers, and 400 renegades from the former rebel army. The mutiny ended on 5 November 1967.

After less than 25 years in power, Mobutu decided on **24 April 1990** to liberalize his political regime. The **opposition** requested the organization of a **National Conference** to set new institutions for the third republic. After false starts, the conference opened on 7 August 1991, but Mobutu flooded the conference with his supporters, resulting in a walk-out by the opposition. For several weeks, tension mounted, and on 23 September 1991, dissatisfied soldiers in Kinshasa mutinied and went on a looting spree or “**pillages**” that spread throughout the country. Another looting (pillages) occurred on 28 January 1993 when merchants refused to honor large **zaire** bills that the opposition asked them to boycott. Casualties totaled 100 people, including Philippe Bernard, the French ambassador to Congo. *See also* CIVIL WARS; SECOND CONGO WAR.

**MUTSHATSHA.** A small town in western **Katanga Province** lying on the **railway** connecting Katanga’s **mining** centers to **Angola’s Benguela Railway**, Mutshatsha gained renown in 1977 as one of the most important conquests of the **Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo (FLNC)** during the first **Shaba War**.

**MUTUMBULA.** The word refers to the “white man who eats black.” During World War II, especially in 1941, rumor was spreading in the region of **Kasai**, including the region of **Kuba**, about European sorcerers or white men eating blacks. The word is probably of Yombe origin (*matumbula*). The rumor was that either Europeans or Africans in their pay were kidnapping blacks, fattening, killing, and eating them. The government tried to explain that the rumor was false but without success. Unlike cult diffusion, the rumor was linked to racial tensions during the period of war efforts. Each wave of rumors

reflected additional tension and when the tension declined, the rumors also evaporated. Because the tension between Africans and Europeans was strongest along the **railways** where many disappearances occurred, either because of great mobility of people along Congolese railways or because of a certain traffic of young girls who were kidnapped to be married elsewhere, it was natural to find that rumors of *mitubula* (plural) circulated most in these regions. Nonetheless, this myth of the white eating black moved even farther into regions without railways in the **Kivu** areas where people used the term *kahama* (hammer). The rumor ended only in 1959.

**MUZITO, ADOLPHE (1948– )**. Born in **Bandundu Province**, Muzito received his bachelor of arts degree in economics from the University of Kinshasa. He worked in the administration for a number of years before joining the **Parti Lumumbist Unifié** of **Antoine Gizenga** in the late 1990s. Muzito was minister of budget under the **government** of Gizenga from 2007 to 2008 and was appointed **prime minister** by **Joseph Kabila** on 10 October 2008.

**MWANT YAAV**. Usually written Mwata Yanvu, the Mwata Yanvu (meaning “King of Vipers”) is the traditional paramount **chief** of the **Lunda**, their political and religious ruler, and a strong force in **Katangan** politics.

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**24 NOVEMBER 1965**. The day the military took power in Congo in a bloodless **coup d'état** and asked then Lieutenant Colonel **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** to assume presidential powers. The coup ended a fractious multiparty **democracy** and brought to power a man who became one of Africa's longest-governing heads of state. The takeover was decided in the early hours of Wednesday, 24 November, during an all-night meeting of the **military** high command that had gathered in **Leopoldville**, ostensibly to commemorate Congolese soldiers who had died fighting the **rebellions**. In the face of an upsurge of rebel activity in the east and yet another political standoff between **President Joseph Kasavubu** and **Prime Minister Moïse Tshombe**, the 14

senior officers who made up the high command were summoned by armed forces chief of staff Mobutu to discuss a military takeover.

The 14 who signed the proclamation of the coup became known as the Companions of the Revolution. This group included Generals Mobutu and **Bobozo Salelo Louis**; Colonels Masiala Kinkela Kulu Kangala, **Mulamba Nyuny Wa Kadima Leonard**, Nzyoyigbe Yeu Ngoli, Itambo Munkina Wa-Kambala, and Bangala Oto Wa Ngama; and Lieutenant Colonels Ingila Grima, Tshatshi Ohano, Moyango Bikoko Ebatamungama, Singa Boyenge Mosambayi, Basuki Belenge, Malila Ma-Kende, and Tukuzu Gusu-Wo Angbanduruka. Among other things, their proclamation dismissed President Kasavubu and prime minister-designate **Évariste Kimba** and underscored that the coup was not aimed at creating a military dictatorship.

Under Mobutu, 24 November was declared the Republic of **Zaire's** National Day and was celebrated with greater pomp than any other day, including **Independence Day**. Because it was the national holiday, it was often the date for the inauguration of important development projects, such as the **Voix du Zaïre telecommunications** facility in 1976, the **Inga-Shaba power line** in 1983, and the bridge over the **Congo River** at **Matadi** in 1984.

Earlier, 24 November 1964 was the day that Belgian paratroopers, using **United States** planes, dropped on **Stanleyville** to free 10,000 Congolese and 1,000 foreigners held hostage by secessionist forces during the eastern rebellion. The decree that lifted the restriction on **opposition** parties and officially ended the single-party state was signed on 25 November 1990, a pointed deviation, given Mobutu's well-known fondness for the 24th.

**NAME CHANGES.** A number of name changes have been carried out during the history of Congo, affecting the name of the country, **provinces**, cities, and even of the citizens themselves. In 1885, the vast territory with hundreds of ethnic "nations" was given the name **Congo Free State (CFS)**. In 1908, the CFS became the **Belgian Congo**.

At **independence**, the country was named the **Republic of Congo**, but with the promulgation of the first **constitution** in 1964, it was renamed the **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)**. In an effort to foster a greater sense of nationhood, Belgian names adopted during

the colonial era were abandoned in favor of Congolese names. On 3 May 1966, Leopoldville became **Kinshasa**, Elisabethville became **Lubumbashi**, and Stanleyville became **Kisangani**, among others (see Guide to Name Changes).

Following the launch of the **Authenticity** movement, the country became the **République du Zaïre** on 27 October 1971. As part of the movement, countless streets, bridges, and buildings were renamed to honor Congolese heroes and leaders. The process culminated in May 1972, when Zairians were ordered to drop their Christian surnames and adopt Zairian ones instead. For example, **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** became Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga.

With the decline in popularity of the Mobutu **government** in the 1980s, many Congolese, especially **opposition** leaders, resumed using their Christian names in public. When Mobutu announced the end of single-party rule and the transition to multiparty democracy in April 1990, the practice spread and came to represent a statement of political affiliation. It was also seen as an expression of dismay by some Congolese over the loss of ethics and morality that had occurred during the Mobutu years. Most Mobutu supporters continued to use their “authentic” names in public. Opponents used their Christian names, and those who wished to remain neutral used both.

When the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) took Kinshasa on 17 May 1997, it indicated a desire to remove all symbols of Mobutu, whose regime was viewed as illegal. When AFDL leader **Laurent Kabila** took the oath of office on 29 May, he announced that Zaire would henceforth be called by its previous name, the DRC; the **zaire currency** would be replaced by the Congo franc; and the national **flag** and anthem adopted under Mobutu would be replaced by those of the First Republic.

The names of most cities and regions were not affected, except for **Bas-Zaïre**, **Shaba**, and **Haut-Zaïre** Regions, which were changed back to **Bas-Congo**, **Katanga**, and **Orientale**, respectively. The names of many companies and public institutions, however, were changed if they were associated with the Mobutu era.

These changes were quickly accepted by the international community and most Congolese, but the adoption of “Congo” brought a return to the old confusion with **Congo-Brazzaville**, the former French colony across the **Congo River**. Many distinguish the two

by adding the name of the capital, as in Congo-Kinshasa and Congo-Brazzaville. This book tends to use the name in use at the time of the reference for events or policies, whether it is Congo Free State, Belgian Congo, Congo, or Zaire. In more general references, it uses Congo, Congo-Kinshasa or, upon second reference, Congo, and refers to people as Congolese.

**NAMIBIA, RELATIONS WITH.** The government of Congo supported Namibia's struggle for independence against the apartheid regime of **South Africa** and quickly recognized the government when it achieved independence on 21 March 1990. Namibia supported the **Laurent Kabila** government in 1998 when it faced a rebellion by the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD). Relations remained warm even after the death of Laurent Kabila.

**NANDE.** The Nande or Banande are agriculturalists of Bantu origin. They migrated to their present area, **Beni** and Lubero territories in **Nord-Kivu**, in the 15th century as the result of political changes that took place in the region of Kitara-Bunyoro, **Uganda**, in the late 14th century. The Nande found the area already occupied by **pygmies** and other agriculturalists, as well as by pastoralist Bahera who were easily assimilated. The Nande ethnic group comprises a dozen of Bantu groups or clans: Bamate, Batangi, Baswanga, Bashu, Banyisanza, Basongora, Bahera (mostly pastoralist), Bahambo, Bamoro, Bahambura, and Bahunde. The first six groups own their own land. The other groups were assimilated and have no chieftaincy, but all these groups speak Kinande.

The Nande area was a confederal system of six autonomous principalities with sophisticated burial and enthronement ceremonies of their **chiefs**, which were performed by the Batangi councilors. The *mwami* (prince or chief) was the ruler, and the confederal system was developed to adapt to the size of the population and the capacity to feed the community. The initial dynastic lineage was always divided in parallel autonomous lineages to respond to human and ecological needs.

Despite differences among Nande clans, they have similar laws, customs, mores, and traditions that make them almost homogenous or an "ethnic-nation." Another historical bond is their land, which

keeps them together and gives them a common memory. The Bashu still pay an annual tribute today to the chief of Basongora, while the Baswanga pay tribute to the Bashu chief; there was a time when the Bamate paid their birthright to their elders, the Batangi.

The Nande group constitutes the majority of population in Nord-Kivu and has dominated politics in the province since 1960. It is the traditional rival of the **Banyarwanda** since 1962, when Banyarwanda legislators refused to be part of Nord-Kivu. Since then, relationships between the Nande and the Banyarwanda have remained antagonistic.

**NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.** *See* LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

**NATIONAL CONFERENCE.** *See* CONFÉRENCE NATIONALE SOUVERAINE.

**NATIONAL WAY [VOIE NATIONALE].** The National Way is the name given to the only **transportation** route located entirely on Congolese territory, linking the **mining** areas in former **Katanga Province** to the Atlantic Ocean. Established in 1928, the National Way was intended to replace **export** routes through **Tanzania** and Mozambique to the ports of Dar es Salaam and Beira. A torturous route of 2,750 km, the National Way involves transporting mineral products by **railway** from Katanga to the **port** of **Ilebo** (formerly Port Francqui) on the **Kasai River**, by river to **Kinshasa**, and by rail once again to the ocean port of **Matadi**. Although the route required two to six months' transshipment time, it became vital to Congo's mineral exports after 1975 when the **Angolan** civil war closed the **Benguela Railway**, which had been the most direct route from Katanga to the Atlantic Ocean. The National Way, although more costly and time-consuming than the **Southern Way** through **Zimbabwe** and **South Africa**, was politically preferable because it was entirely within Congolese territory. According to government figures, 45 percent of **Shaba's** minerals were exported via the National Way in 1985. By the 1990s, however, the National Way was used only intermittently because of deteriorating **river** and railway service, and the most efficient transportation link between Shaba and western Congo was by air **transportation**.

**NATIONALISM.** The nationalist movement began in the 1950s when colonial authorities allowed Congolese to form **trade unions** and ethnic “interest” groups. **Political parties** began to form in the late 1950s. Most of them advocated some form of **independence**. Immediately following independence in 1960, Congo was wracked by ethnic and regional divisions. The colonial restrictions on political activity had suppressed political parties and the development of a sense of nationhood. Once allowed to form, parties grew initially out of ethnic interest groups, except for the **Mouvement National Congolais** (MNC) and a few others that attempted to attract members from all over the country.

In addition, the **government**, modeled on the Belgian system, sought to provide checks and balances by spreading power between the **president** and **prime minister** and the two houses of the **legislature**. However, this caused further weakness and divisiveness. As a result, one of the major goals of the **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** government following the 1965 **coup d'état** was to unite the Congolese and instill in them a sense of nationhood. The **N'Sele Manifesto**, the Magna Carta of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR), specifically noted the need to eliminate tribalism and regionalism.

The early years of the Mobutu government were characterized by rising nationalistic sentiment that, in the mid-1970s, led to the establishment of the party-state and the emergence of the **Authenticity** movement and **Mobutism**. Feelings of national pride and strength were boosted by the rise in Congo's economic fortunes. In the late 1970s, however, the decline of the Congolese **economy**, the **Shaba wars**, the emergence of **dissident** groups, and growing resentment by the people against the political oligarchy contributed to a creeping disillusionment with the ideals of the early Mobutu years. The political reforms of April 1990 brought multiparty politics and an increase in political rivalries based on personality, **region**, and ethnic affiliation. Many in the **opposition** advocated a less-centralized system of government, most often modeled on a **federal** system. An increase in interethnic tensions in the east and the rise of a rebel group that, in 1997, took control of the country shook the central government. Nevertheless, the sense of nationhood and national identity among most citizens remained strong, especially after the **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila**.



**NATIONALITY LAWS.** The idea of Congolese nationality emerged from the needs of King **Leopold II** of Belgium to secure subjects in his private domain, the **Congo Free State (CFS)**, in order to exploit it. On 27 December 1892, he signed a decree defining Congolese nationality. According to Article 1 of the decree, “an individual acquires the Congolese nationality by birth on the territory of the state of Congolese parents, by naturalization, by presumption of the law, and by option.” Article 4 states that “is Congolese, a child born on the Congolese soil of the state of legally unknown parents or without known nationality.” Finally, Article 5 emphasizes that “a child born in the CFS from non-Congolese and who remains in the Congo can upon request become Congolese once he is no longer a minor. If the child remains in Congo during the year of his adulthood and three preceding years, he is considered automatically Congolese, unless a contrary voluntary declaration is made.” Thus, the king gave more weight to the doctrine of *jus soli* doctrine, place of birth, than that of *jus sanguinis*, blood doctrine or ancestry. This is understandable, given the nature of the CFS that the king wanted to populate to get both free labor and taxable subjects.

It was not until the promulgation of the Electoral Law on 23 March 1960 that Leopold’s decree was changed in preparation of new institutions of an independent Congo. According to Article 6 of the law, Congolese nationality “was bestowed on anyone who was born of Congolese parents or of a Congolese mother.” The same article also stated that people from Rwanda–Urundi residing in Congo before March 1950 had the right to vote. This article automatically made all immigrants from **Rwanda** Congolese residents.

Four years later, the 1964 Luluabourg **constitution** made Congolese nationality more restrictive. Article 6 stated that Congolese nationality was exclusive to those people whose ancestors were members of any **ethnic group** that had lived in the **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)** before 18 October 1908, unless they made a special request within 12 months to change their nationality. This article completely denied most Rwandan immigrants Congolese nationality.

In 1969, **President Mobutu Sese Seko** appointed a **Tutsi, Bisengimana Rema Barthélemy**, as the director of the Bureau du President (Office of the President). Three years after his nomination,

Bisengimana advised Mobutu to sign the decree-law No. 72-002 that conferred Congolese nationality on all immigrants from Rwanda and **Burundi**. More specifically, Article 15 of the law conferred on all people from Rwanda and Burundi Congolese citizenship if they were in Congo before January 1950 and they continued to reside in Congo since. This decision affected more than 190,000 people in Masisi and, to a lesser degree, people of Rutshuru, **Goma**, and Walikale in **Nord-Kivu Province**.

However, in 1977, Bisengimana was accused of pocketing more than his share of commissions from a **Kisangani**-based textile plant. After his removal from the Office of the President, **Kivu** politicians lobbied in parliament to annul the 1972 law. In June 1978, the **Legislative Council** decided to revisit Article 15 of the 1972 law. Contradictory memoranda on the nationality issue from different groups of Nord-Kivu were sent to President Mobutu. The rumor of possible denationalization of Banyarwanda caused panic in late 1970s, and most Banyarwanda rushed to buy and appropriate land in Nord-Kivu, especially in Masisi and Walikale. From 1978 to 1981, more than a thousand demands for land concessions were registered in Nord-Kivu. This period also coincided with a large number of complaints on land spoliation as the **Hunde** and **Nyanga** protested that their land had been taken away or occupied by immigrants from Rwanda.

The issue of nationality became even more acute after a legislator from Walikale, Mihia Bamwhisho, complained about the cession of 230,000 hectares of land, or one-tenth of the Walikale territory, to a Rwacico enterprise that belonged to Cyprien Rwakabuba, a Tutsi. The Minister of Immobilized Titles and Land annulled the concession after the Legislative Council recommended that the land cession be voided. After solving this land issue in Walikale, legislators from Nord-Kivu introduced a bill on nationality in the parliament. The result was the promulgation of a new law, No. 81-002, on 29 June 1981 that explicitly canceled the nationality of Rwandan immigrants, except for the native **Banyabwisha**. Article 15, however, provided President Mobutu some discretionary power to grant Congolese nationality to “anyone on the basis of past services to the nation” after consultation with the **Central Committee** of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (paragraph 3). In the context of the new law, new identity cards were issued, and a decree was promulgated

to carry out a census in 1982. However, the cards were never sent to Nord-Kivu. Because the 1981 law was never implemented, and given the porous borders between Congo and Rwanda, illegal migrations continued unabated in Nord-Kivu.

In early 1990, Mobutu appointed a Nande, Jean-Pierre Kalumbo Mboho, as governor of Nord-Kivu. In March 1993, the governor launched a program of “**ethnic cleansing**” aimed at driving all Rwandan immigrants back to Rwanda. He was suspended in July, but his speeches led to clashes in Walikale in which hundreds of villages were destroyed. The Walikale **civil war** lasted almost three weeks before it extended into Masisi territory. The violence continued until 31 August 1993, and 7,000 to 30,000 people were killed, with 350,000 people internally displaced.

In early July 1993, President Mobutu visited Goma and invited all parties to discuss the issues of contention and to end the violence. He also dispatched 140 troops of his Presidential Special Guards to reinforce the peace process. Peace could perhaps have been negotiated and even implemented, but the influx of 1.2 million Hutu refugees from Rwanda in mid-June 1996 wrecked any hope of pacification. More than 800,000 of these refugees were relocated in Nord-Kivu along the Rwandan border. The influx of Hutu refugees and militias also changed the ethnic configuration of Nord-Kivu Province. The increase in the Hutu population created a new majority in Nord-Kivu, posing a threat to the democratization process should elections take place while refugees were still in Congo. Hunde, **Nande**, and Nyanga politicians, now outnumbered by the Hutu, panicked, lobbying the **Haut Conseil de la République/Parlement de la Transition** (HCR/PT) to implement the 1981 nationality law. More specifically, Anzuluni Bembe, deputy president of the HCR/PT whose constituency was in Uvira, brought the nationality issue to the parliament, which passed a “Resolution on Nationality” in April 1995 that denied Congolese residency status to Rwandan immigrants.

To follow up, Bembe created a commission presided over by Manbeweni Vangu, the Vangu Commission, to investigate the feasibility of implementing the nationality law in both Nord-Kivu and **Sud-Kivu**. The Vangu Commission concluded in its report that all citizens of Rwandan origin living in Congo should return to Rwanda. The word from politicians and other ethnic groups of Kivu was

simple, “before the end of 1995, all people of Rwandan origin must get out.” The HCR/PT also promulgated the “Resolution on Refugees and Displaced Populations in Nord-Kivu and Sud-Kivu Provinces” that required the repatriation of all peoples of Rwandan origin and all Hutu refugees who had entered Congo in June 1996.

On 8 October 1996, the deputy governor of Sud-Kivu, Lwabanji Lwasi, gave the Tutsi living there, called **Banyamulenge**, an ultimatum: leave Mulenge in what he called a “cleansing of the plateau.” He gave them eight days to vacate Congo, but the Banyamulenge refused to leave and turned to the Tutsi-dominated government of Rwanda for help. This call for help suited the Rwandan government, which needed to deal with repeated incursions of former Rwandan soldiers into Rwanda from refugee camps in Congo. In September 1996, the Rwandan army and armed elements of Banyamulenge attacked Mobutu’s army and the former Rwandan soldiers in Sud-Kivu. A week later, several anti-Mobutu groups joined the Banyamulenge-led rebellion and formed the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) in order to oust Mobutu.

In mid-November, the Rwandan army attacked the refugee camps around Goma from all sides leaving a small eastern corridor toward Rwanda for refugees to escape. Some 660,000 refugees returned to Rwanda. Having gained partial control of its borders, the Rwandan government decided to give the Tutsi–Banyamulenge war a national character in order to topple Mobutu. The Rwandan government agreed to let **Laurent Kabila**, a veteran **dissident**, be the spokesman of the rebel movement to minimize the Banyamulenge’s role in the anti-Mobutu civil war.

Encouraged by the weak defense of the Congolese **military** and the lack of leadership by Mobutu, who was dying of cancer, the AFDL pushed west and took **Kinshasa** on 17 May 1997, one day after Mobutu fled into exile. Kabila became president on 29 May 1997. He pledged to solve the issue of nationality of people of Rwandan origin living in Congo because of their help in ousting Mobutu. However, Kabila never delivered on his promise. In subsequent months, popular resentment in Kinshasa grew against the foreign troops, who came to be regarded as an occupation force.

In late July 1998, Kabila asked all foreign troops to leave. Kabila’s decision, and atrocities against Tutsi in various parts of the country,

sparked a **rebellion** in early August 1998, backed by Rwanda and **Uganda**. Rebel leaders created the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD), which was mostly dominated by the Tutsi, who claimed to be fighting to regain their rightful Congolese nationality.

Less than two years after the signing of the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI) in December 2002, in **South Africa**, the Congolese transitional legislature passed the 2004 law on nationality. The law, which was approved in November, granted citizenship to all ethnic groups that were in Congo at independence in June 1960. While many Hutu and Tutsi would qualify, there is intense debate about the many illegal immigrants from Rwanda who arrived shortly after independence. *See also* SECOND CONGO WAR.

**NATIONALIZATION.** Nationalization of Congolese **industry** began in 1966 with the **government** takeover of the **Union Minière du Haut-Katanga** (now called the **Générale des Carrières et des Mines**, or GECAMINES) **mining** company. It reached its peak in November 1973 with the **Zairianization** of large foreign-owned businesses. The deterioration of the commercial sector, combined with a declining **economy** due to falling **copper** prices, led in 1974 to a partial privatization called **Retrocession**. Further privatization of certain sectors, including **agriculture**, **transportation**, and **diamond** and **gold** trading, was enacted during the 1980s. In the 1990s, the government announced partial privatization of state-owned **river** and **railway** transportation companies.

**NAVY.** *See* MILITARY.

**NDEMBO.** An **ethnic group** in **Lualaba Province** that is related in **language** and descent groups to the **Lunda**. However, it tends to side with the **Chokwe** in opposing the Lunda in modern-day politics.

**NDJILI AIRPORT.** Congo's largest airport, located near the suburb of Ndjili on the northern outskirts of **Kinshasa**, Ndjili Airport is the home base for a significant portion of the country's air force. It is also headquarters of the national carrier, **Lignes Aériennes Congo-**

**laïses** (formerly **Air Zaïre**), and several private carriers. It has been serviced by a number of international carriers, including Air Afrique, Air France, Alitalia, Cameroon Airlines, Ethiopian Airlines, Moroccan Airlines, Sabena, South African Airlines, and TAP. The airport was one of the stops on PanAm's West African coastal route from New York to Johannesburg until the 1980s. On **23–24 September 1991**, elements of the **Centre d'Entraînement des Troupes Aéronautiques** (CETA), the military air training facility, looted containers to protest late and low wages. The looting, which came to be known as the "**pillages**," spread throughout Kinshasa and brought a major military intervention by **Belgium** and **France** to evacuate 10,000 expatriate residents.

**NDOLA.** A **mining** town in **Zambia's copper** belt that has considerable commercial ties with **Lubumbashi**. Ndola was the destination of **United Nations** Secretary-General Dag **Hammarskjöld's** plane when it crashed over **Katanga** in 1961, killing all occupants.

**NDOLO AIRPORT.** **Kinshasa's** first commercial airfield, Ndolo is located in the heart of the city in Ndolo commune, a few minutes from downtown Kinshasa. With the opening of **Ndjili Airport** in 1960, Ndolo became a domestic airfield used primarily by private and military aircraft. On 8 January 1996, an overloaded cargo plane crashed upon takeoff into a large market near the end of the runway. More than 300 people were killed, most of them women and children working at the market, making it Congo's worst aviation accident. The four Russian crew members survived. The airport was closed for two years after the incident, but has since been reopened. It is used for commercial domestic airlines.

**NDOMBASI, ABDOULAYE YERODIA (1933– ).** Born on 15 January 1933, Ndombasi was minister of foreign affairs under **President Laurent Kabila** from 14 March 1999 until late 2000. In June 2003, he became one of the four vice presidents of Congo under the transitional **government**, as mandated by a peace settlement with rebel groups and opposition parties. He was nominated by **Joseph Kabila** as vice president to represent the government. In 1998, he publicly encouraged the Congolese population to kill members of a rebellion

against the government, primarily **ethnic Tutsi**. Yerodia was involved in a precedent-setting case by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In response, **Belgium** issued an international arrest warrant based on a new Belgian law (known as the Belgian Universal Jurisdiction Law, since repealed) allowing Belgian courts to prosecute international crimes, charging Yerodia with inciting genocide. The Congo government responded by filing an application against Belgium to the ICJ, claiming that Belgium did not have jurisdiction and that Yerodia, as minister of foreign affairs, enjoyed diplomatic immunity. This case, known as the Arrest Warrant Case, was decided in Congo's favor. During the proceedings of the case, Congo dropped its jurisdictional arguments, and the case was decided solely on Yerodia's diplomatic immunity as foreign minister.

**NENDAKA BIKA, VICTOR (1923–2002).** An influential figure in numerous Congolese **governments** and a leading member of the **Binza Group**, Nendaka was vice president of the **Patrice Lumumba** wing of the **Mouvement National Congolais** (MNC) and head of the **Sûreté**, secret **police**, from September 1960 until 1965, when he became interior minister in the **Moïse Tshombe** and then the **Évariste Kimba** governments. After Kimba failed to obtain a vote of confidence for his government on 14 November 1965, Nendaka was asked to form a government, but was prevented by the military **coup d'état** by **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** on **24 November 1965**. He was named minister of **transportation** and **communications** after the coup, then finance minister from 1967 until August 1969, and subsequently ambassador to West Germany. Nendaka was recalled in 1970 and placed under house arrest. He was accused, along with former foreign minister **Justin Bomboko**, of plotting the assassination of the **president** and sent into internal exile. However, he was rehabilitated in 1977 and became a delegate to the **National Conference** in 1991–92.

**NENGAPETA, ANUARITE MARIE CLÉMENTINE (THE BLESSED ONE) (1939–1964).** Sister Anuarite was born on 29 December 1939 in Wamba, **Haut-Uele Province**. She received baptism together with her mother and two sisters in 1943. In February 1953, she received her education with the Sisters of *Jamaa Takatifu* (Holy

Family) in Bafwabaka. In 1956, she earned a teacher's diploma and began her novitiate with the Sisters and was also an active catechist. After many years at the convent, Anuarite took her vows on 5 August 1959 and became Sister Marie Clémentine. In 1964, the eastern rebellion broke out, and in a few months, occupied most of the eastern provinces. The rebels opposed Westerners and all Western symbols, including monks and nuns. On 29 November 1964, when the rebels arrived at the Bafwabaka convent, they arrested 46 nuns, loaded them onto a truck, and took them to Wamba. One of the rebel officers, Colonel Olombe, wanted Anuarite for himself. She categorically refused and continued to resist courageously. Her words and prayers only heightened the colonel's fury. He ordered his men to beat Sister Anuarite. Between the blows, Anuarite had the strength to say "I forgive you for you know not what you do." In a new fit of rage, Colonel Olombe called his men over and ordered them to stab Anuarite with their bayonets. Olombe then took his revolver and shot her in the chest. Anuarite died on 1 December 1964. On 15 August 1985 in Kinshasa, Pope **John-Paul II** beatified Sister Anuarite as The Blessed One.

**NETO, AGOSTINHO (1922–1979).** *See* ANGOLA.

**NGALA.** An artificial ethnic group of northwestern Congo, supposed to live between the **Congo** and **Ubangi Rivers**, whose **language**, **Lingala**, is one of the country's four national languages. The origins of the myth of Ngala are not entirely clear. **Henry Morton Stanley**, the first European visitor to the region, first used the name Ngala. He drew attention to the Bangala, whom he termed the "Ashanti of Congo," and then he remarked that they only amounted to a string of villages extending 16 km (10 miles) along the Congo River banks. Nonetheless, the legend was consolidated by the adoption of Lingala as a language for the army and for communicating with the population. In a thorough ethnological study of the region of former **Équateur Province**, which was believed to have been home of the Bangala, the Belgian ethnographer Henry Burssens wrote the following in 1958: "We believed for a long time in the existence of a people called the Bangala, speaking Lingala and possessing very definite ethnic and cultural characteristics . . . We know today with



certainty that, in all the Belgian Congo, there exists no ethnic group bearing this name.”

The Ngala gained importance in the minds of many for three reasons. First, Lingala, which is based on the traditional Ngala tongue, came into increasing use beginning in the mid-1800s as the **trade** language of the lower Congo River. Second, it became the language of the **military** and the lingua franca in **Leopoldville** during the colonial era. Finally, **Mobutu Sese Seko** used Lingala (as opposed to other national languages) to address the Congolese. To the rest of Africa, Lingala is probably best known as the language of the continent’s vibrant **music**, which gained popularity beginning in the 1960s.

**NGALULA MPANDAJILA, JOSEPH (1928– ).** One of the founding fathers of the **Mouvement National Congolais** (MNC). He attended the **Pan-African Conference** in Accra in December 1958 with **Patrice Lumumba** and, upon his return, addressed a rally at which the first calls for **independence** were heard. When the MNC split, Ngalula followed **Albert Kalonji**’s wing and became vice president and prime minister of the secessionist Mining State of **South Kasai**. Following the end of the South Kasai secession, he returned to **Leopoldville** and was appointed minister of **education** in the first and second **Cyrille Adoula governments**. He was dropped from the government in 1963. However, Ngalula remained in Congolese politics and came to attention once again in the 1980s as a signatory of the open letter by the **Group of Thirteen Parliamentarians** to **Mobutu Sese Seko** and one of the founders of the **Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social** (UDPS). He was tried, imprisoned, banished, and pardoned several times during the mid-1980s for advocating the creation of a second **political party**. With the advent of multipartyism in 1990 he joined the **opposition-led Sacred Union**. He was elected senator in 2007.

**NGBANDI.** A Sudanic group that lives in northwestern Congo between the **Congo** and **Ubangi Rivers** east of Busingu. The Ngbandi are one of the major **ethnic groups** speaking an Adamawa-Eastern **language**. The most famous Ngbandi son was **Mobutu Sese Seko**, who traced his parental and ancestral origins to the group living

around **Gbadolite**. Mobutu, however, was born in **Lisala** and grew up among the **Ngombe** people near **Mbandaka**.

**NGELENGWA MWENDA, MSIRI (?–1891).** In the late 1840s, a certain Kalasa Mazwiri, a leader of caravans and a sub-chief of the Nyamwezi people of eastern shore of **Lake Tanganyika**, made blood covenants in his trips to southern **Katanga** with important local **chiefs** such as Mpande, Katanga, and Sambwe. He bought **copper** and left there some of his men, known as **Yeke**. On his next trip, he came with his second son, Ngelengwa Mwenda or Msiri. Around 1856, Msiri settled near Chief Katanga with the Yeke. He married Katanga's daughter and established himself in the chief Katanga's land by offering mercenary services to opposing political factions. Helped by the Ovimbundu traders from **Angola**, he intervened in disputes among different chiefs in the region. The most successful of these ventures was his interference in the dispute among pretenders to the throne of **Kazembe** Kingdom at the death of Kazembe X in 1862. Some alienated ethnic groups in the upper Katanga also joined Msiri and his Yeke to overthrow the ruling family of Kazembe. Between 1865 and 1871, Msiri had incorporated all the possessions of Kazembe west of the Luapula valley in his estate. He took the title of king after his father's death in late 1870 and founded the state of Garenganze, with its capital at Bunkeya. He expanded his prestige in the region and gained popular support as the result of his victory, ending Kazembe's predatory rule. People believed that they would have a better life under him than under the **Lunda**, and most of Kazembe's estates passed easily to Msiri's possession.

However, popular support for Msiri rapidly dissipated after he exploited the local population in much the same way as his Kazembe predecessors. In 1886, Msiri's power began to crumble as the Sanga people, led by chief Mpande, revolted against his predatory rule. Msiri's abuse of power later precipitated mass defections to the Belgians. Eager to keep their independence, the Sanga also rebelled against the Belgians. The extent of Sanga popular dissatisfaction can be measured by the fact that they fought more than five years against Msiri and then another nine years against the army of King **Leopold II** before they surrendered. Msiri was killed by a Belgian officer.

**NGOMA, ARTHUR Z'AHIDI (1947– ).** One of the four vice presidents during the transition, 2003–2006, Ngoma previously worked as a university lecturer and for the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). He was imprisoned in 1997 and then went into exile for a brief period. He led the rebel group **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD), but left it in 1999. He ran for **president** of Congo in 2006 as the candidate of the Force du Future party and received 0.34 percent of the vote.

**NGONGO LUTETE (ca. 1863–1893).** Ngongo Lutete or Luteta was a Tetela and a slave during the **Afro–Arab trade** period, but gained his freedom before reaching the age of 15. He created his own army and was one of the lieutenants of Afro–Arab **Tippo Tip**. He became **chief** in the region of **Sankuru**. However, he turned against the Afro–Arabs in the service of **Leopold II**. He fought in the campaign to drive Afro–Arab traders from eastern Congo in the 1890s and, with the help of the Sambala people, pacified and occupied the **Maniema** region west of **Kivu**. He was, however, executed at Ngandu by Belgian officer Jean Scheerlinck of the **Force Publique**.

**NGOUABI, MARIEN (1938–1977).** *See* CONGO REPUBLIC (BRAZZAVILLE), RELATIONS WITH.

**NGUZA KARL-I-BOND, JEAN (1938–2003).** A leading political leader from **Katanga** related to the **Lunda** paramount **chief** and a nephew of **Moïse Tshombe**, Nguza spent his career alternating from a staunch supporter of **President Mobutu Sese Seko** while in **government** to an outspoken critic when out of power. He was popular among Western governments and one of the most prominent exiled **dissidents** in the early 1980s until he returned to Congo under the **amnesty** of 1983.

Nguza was born 4 August 1938, in Musumba, near Kapanga in western Katanga. At an early age, he moved to **Likasi**, where he attended primary school with the Xavier Brothers and then attended secondary school in **Elisabethville** under the Benedictine Fathers. He graduated from **Lovanium University** in July 1965 with a degree in international relations and entered the diplomatic

corps. Nguza served as the second-ranking diplomat at the Congolese mission to the **United Nations** (UN) until his appointment as a foreign minister on 24 February 1972. He was replaced in a cabinet reshuffle on 8 March 1974, but returned to the post on 4 February 1976, during a period when he was touted in the Western news media as a possible successor to Mobutu. He was arrested on 13 August 1977, accused of having prior knowledge of the first **Shaba War**, and dismissed as foreign minister six days later. Nguza was sentenced to death for treason, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. He was freed one year later, appointed foreign minister once again on 6 March 1979, and promoted to **prime minister** shortly thereafter.

In April 1981, Nguza resigned and went into exile, accusing the Mobutu government of **corruption**, authoritarianism, and abuse of power. He published a book in 1982 that documented some of his charges, detailed his trial and torture in 1979, and advocated a return to multiparty **democracy** in Congo. He launched a tour of Europe and North America, during which he testified before the **United States** (U.S.) House of Representatives Africa Subcommittee. He continued to be an outspoken leader of the exiled **opposition** until he, along with other dissidents, was muzzled by the Belgian government in a move to improve relations with the Mobutu government. In June 1985, Nguza accepted the amnesty of 1983 and returned to Congo. He was appointed ambassador to the U.S. in September 1986.

A few days after Mobutu's announcement of the transition to multipartyism in 1990, Nguza announced that he was forming an opposition party and would run for president. He founded the **Union des Fédéralistes et des Républicains Indépendants** (UFERI), which became one of the three major parties in the **Sacred Union** in 1991. Nguza supported the **Étienne Tshisekedi** government of October 1991, which was never formally installed. However, after Tshisekedi's dismissal, Nguza accepted the post of prime minister and formed a government on 28 November, for which he was expelled from the Sacred Union. While prime minister, he formed a "moderate" coalition of about 30 parties called the **Alliance des Forces Patriotiques**. He was, however, condemned as a traitor by the opposition and was replaced when the **Conférence Nationale Souveraine** (CNS) elected Tshisekedi prime minister in August 1992.

With the UFERI's power base reduced primarily to Shaba Region, its militants, led by then Governor **Gabriel Kyungu wa Kumwanza**, began a campaign of **ethnic cleansing** under the rallying cry of "Katanga for Katangans." From 1992 to 1993, tens of thousands of **Luba-Kasai**, viewed as supporters of Tshisekedi's **Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social** (UDPS), were expelled and their homes and businesses destroyed or taken over by UFERI supporters. According to the opposition, the expulsions were instigated by Nguza in order to consolidate his political power base and were supported by Mobutu, who saw it as a way to split the opposition in the south-east. Nguza returned as defense minister in the **Faustin Birindwa** government of 1993, but was excluded from the **Léon Kengo wa Dondo** government that replaced it in 1994. He suffered a stroke in 1995 and received extensive treatment in **South Africa**. He returned to Congo the following year but was excluded from the government of **Laurent Kabila** that took power in May 1997 because of his longstanding connections to Mobutu and largely discredited political class. Nguza died on 28 July 2003.

**NKUNDA, LAURENT (1967– )**. Son of **Tutsi** parents who migrated from **Rwanda** in the early 1960s, Nkunda graduated with a bachelor of science degree in psychology at the **University National of Zaire**. Nkunda joined the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Force (RPF) in early 1994 that was fighting against the former Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF). After the RPF defeated the ex-RAF to become the new government of Rwanda, Nkunda returned to Congo. During the **civil war** against **Mobutu Sese Seko**, he joined the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) alongside **Laurent Kabila**. He later joined the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD) against the Kabila government in August 1998 and became a major, fighting on the side of Rwanda, **Uganda**, **Burundi**, and other Tutsi-aligned forces. In 2003, with the official end to war, Nkunda joined the new integrated national army of the transitional government of Congo as a colonel and, in 2004, was promoted to general. However, he soon rejected the authority of the government and retreated with some of RCD-Goma troops to the Masisi forests in **Nord-Kivu**. Nkunda claimed to be defending the interests of the Tutsi minority in eastern Congo who were

subjected to attacks by former Hutu soldiers. During the government of transition in 2003–2006, Nkunda was a major destabilizing factor in Nord-Kivu.

In August 2007, the area under Nkunda's control lay north of **Lake Kivu** in Nord-Kivu, in the territories of Masisi and Rutshuru. In this area, Nkunda established his headquarters and a political organization known as the **Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple**. In fighting that began on 27 October 2008, known as the 2008 Nord-Kivu fighting, Nkunda led Tutsi rebels who opposed both the Congolese army and the **Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo** (MONUC) forces of 17,000 troops. The fighting uprooted 200,000 civilians in late 2008, bringing the total of people displaced by the Kivu conflict to 2 million, causing civil unrest, large food shortages, and what the **United Nations** called "a humanitarian crisis of catastrophic dimensions."

Nkunda had been accused by a number of organizations of committing **human rights** abuses. He was indicted for war crimes in September 2005, and was under investigation by the International Court of Justice for crimes against humanity. Human rights organizations accused Nkunda's troops of abducting children as young as 12 and forcing them to serve as **child soldiers**. Nkunda's troops had also been alleged to have committed acts of murder, rape, and pillaging of civilian villages.

In May 2002, he was accused of massacring 160 people in **Kisangani**, prompting UN Human Rights Commissioner, Mary Robinson to call for his arrest following the abduction and beating by his troops of two UN investigators. Meanwhile, Congolese in Nord-Kivu viewed him as a Tutsi refugee because his parents migrated into the area in the early 1960s. Nkunda was arrested on 22 January in Rwanda as he tried to resist a joint Rwandan–Congolese military operation against former Hutu soldiers still operating in eastern Congo.

**NKUTSHU.** *See* KUSU.

**NORD-KIVU.** A **province** of eastern Congo, Nord-Kivu was a district of **Kivu Maniema** at **independence** in June 1960. It was a province from 1962 to 1966 as a result of an April 1962 law on decentralization. It remained a subregion or district of Kivu Province until that province was divided by the administrative reform of May 1988 into

**Maniema**, Nord-Kivu, and **Sud-Kivu**. Nord-Kivu contains some of the country's most fertile soil and its most temperate climate. It produces vegetables, **timber**, **coltan**, **gold**, and **tin**. With an estimated **population** of 3.9 million in 2007 (1,861,960 in 1982) living in an area of 59,563 square km, Nord-Kivu is one of the most densely populated areas of Congo. Nord-Kivu is home to a number of ethnic groups that include the **Hunde**, **Hutu**, **Nande**, **Nyanga**, Tembo, and **Tutsi**. Hutu and Tutsi are usually called **Banyarwanda** by the other groups.

In March 1993, tensions began to rise between Banyarwanda or Rwandan immigrants, who had settled during the colonial era, and Hunde and Nyanga. Violence erupted after then Governor Jean-Pierre Kalumbo Mboho began calling on Hunde and Nyanga groups to exterminate the Banyarwanda. He was suspended in July, but his speeches led to clashes in which hundreds of villages were destroyed, an estimated 7,000 to 30,000 people were killed, and about 350,000 people were made homeless. This **ethnic cleansing** was sparked by politicians who wished to consolidate their political base by expelling or exterminating groups seen as opposed to them.

A year later, the region was saddled with more than 800,000 Hutu **refugees** fleeing interethnic fighting in **Rwanda** and, to a lesser degree, **Burundi**. The influx severely strained services and infrastructure around the urban centers of Goma and caused resentment among the local population, which was already suffering from the effects of Congo's economic crisis. Political and **military** activity in refugee camps by leaders of the ousted Rwandan government of the late President Juvenal Habyarimana created tensions in the region and strained relations between Congo and the new government in Rwanda.

In September 1996, a group of **Banyamulenge**, led by veteran **dissident Laurent Kabila** and reportedly backed by forces of the new government in Rwanda, attacked Hutu-dominated militias in Rwandan refugee camps. The attacks caused 660,000 refugees to return to Rwanda in November and led to the occupation by the Kabila forces of Goma, Bukavu, and Uvira. Encouraged by the ease of their victories, the Kabila forces, called the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL), continued their offensive against the **Mobutu Sese Seko government** and took the entire country by May 1997.

In early August 1998, a civil war broke out in Goma against Kabila, led by the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD), Rwanda, and **Uganda**. Having its headquarters in Goma, the RCD had to confront a large number of militias, including the **Mai-Mai**, former Rwandan Hutu soldiers, and various ethnic militias. As a result, more than 1.5 million people (out of a total population of 3.5 million) were killed in Nord-Kivu alone and hundreds of thousands were displaced in the province in 1998–2002. The deteriorating health and school infrastructure left by Mobutu collapsed during the civil war against Kabila, leaving the youth and citizens without hope.

Despite the signing of the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en Démocratique République du Congo** (AGI), a number of military commanders refused to join the process. The most notable example occurred on 26 May 2004 when General **Laurent Nkunda** was appointed regional military commander of **Kasai Oriental** after the installation of the transitional government in mid-2003 and declined the offer for personal security reasons. His troops occupied Bukavu in May 2004. In early 2006, his rebel forces attacked and occupied Rutshuru territory, in Nord-Kivu, after routing the Congolese army stationed in the area. For almost two years, Nkunda made Nord-Kivu province ungovernable because his insurgency also prompted the revival of **Mai-Mai** groups that had been attacking Nkunda positions. In January 2008, most armed groups operating in Nord-Kivu and Sud-Kivu signed a peace agreement, called *Amani* (peace), to end hostility. However, conflict resumed again in October 2008, resulting in 1,500 people dead and more than 70,000 homeless in less than three months, from October to December 2008. Nkunda was arrested in January 2009 in Rwanda. *See also* SECOND CONGO WAR.

**NORD-UBANGI.** A former district of **Équateur Province**, Nord-Ubangi became a province in February 2009 according to the 2006 **constitution**. The province includes four territories: Businga, Bosobolo, Mobayi-Mbongo, and Yakoma.

**N'SELE MANIFESTO.** The N'Sele Manifesto was issued on 20 May 1967, following a lengthy meeting of the **Binza Group**, the Corps des Volontaires de la République, and other intellectuals at N'Sele.



The result was the creation of a model farm 60 km upriver from **Kinshasa** that also became the headquarters and retreat of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR). The manifesto became the basis for the centralization of power in the person of **Mobutu Sese Seko** and the one-party state, aimed at ending the bickering and political infighting that had characterized the post-**independence** era. The N'Sele Manifesto advocated a revolution to chart a new course for Congo. It called for "positive neutralism" in world affairs and set as national objectives economic independence, stronger **government** authority throughout the territory, actions to increase the nation's prestige abroad, and the promotion of economic and social development for the Congolese people. It laid down the major themes of what came to be known as **Mobutism**.

**N'SINGA UDJUU ONGWAKEBI UNTUBE, JOSEPH (1934– ).**

A technocrat who, during the 1980s, was first state commissioner and member of the **Political Bureau** of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR), N'Singa was born on 29 September 1934 at Nsontin in the former **Bandundu Province**. He studied theology for one year, but received a law degree from **Lovanium University** in 1963. A provincial official in the Lac Leopold II administrative district from 1963 until 1966, he became a member of the central **government** in 1966 and was justice minister from 1967 to 1968. He subsequently served in ministerial-level positions in the Interior Ministry and the Presidency. He was appointed first state commissioner on 22 April 1981. He left the government on 5 November 1982 and was appointed to the Political Bureau on 3 January 1983. With the advent of multipartyism, he joined the **opposition** and became justice minister in the **Étienne Tshisekedi** government of 1992, foreign minister in the **Faustin Birindwa** government of March 1993, and transportation minister in the **Léon Kengo wa Dondo** government of 1994.

**NTOMBA.** A relatively large subgroup of the **Mongo** ethnic cluster that lives along the Maringa River between Bansankusu and Djolu in northwestern Congo. Ethnographers have also identified a Ntomba-related group living southeast of **Lake Mai-Ndombe**. The Ntomba differ from most Mongo peoples in **language** and hierarchical system. Their **chiefs** are considered sacred.

**NYAMURAGIRA.** *See* VOLCANOES.

**NYAMWEZI.** *See* YEKE, KINGDOM.

**NYAMWISI, ANTIPAS MBUSA (1959– ).** Born on 15 November 1959, Nyamwisi is a **Nande** from **Beni** in **Nord-Kivu Province**. He started his political career as a rebel leader of the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD). Nyamwisi fought with the RCD against the government of **Laurent Kabila**. In 1999, he left the RCD with **Ernest Wamba dia Wamba** to form the RCD-Kisangani. Nyamwisi later took over the RCD-K from Wamba after they were driven from **Kisangani** by RCD-Goma, and renamed it RCD-K-Mouvement de Libération (RCD-K-ML). After the signing of the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI) in December 2002, the RCD-K-ML was accorded 15 seats in the Transitional National Assembly and participated in the transitional government headed by **Joseph Kabila**, in which Nyamwisi was appointed minister for regional cooperation. Nyamwisi ran in the 2006 presidential elections but decided to stand aside in favor of Kabila before the election. He nonetheless won 96,503 votes, and his party won 26 seats in the simultaneous election to the National Assembly and seven out of 108 seats in the subsequent indirect **elections** to the Senate. He joined the **government** of **Antoine Gizenga** as foreign minister in February 2007. In the government of **Prime Minister Adolphe Muzito**, appointed on 26 October 2008, Nyamwisi was moved to the post of minister of decentralization and urban and regional planning.

**NYANGA.** An **ethnic group** living in **Nord-Kivu Province** that clashed with the **Banyarwanda** during a period of **ethnic cleansing** in March 1993 after local politicians called upon them to exterminate Banyarwanda in an effort to drive them from the region. The Nyanga had settled in the region before the arrival of the Banyarwanda, who arrived in the area in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The Nyanga felt that Rwandan immigrants had usurped jobs and land.

**NYANGWE.** A small trading city, now called *Kibombo*, on the **Lualaba River** in **Sud-Kivu Province** that was a major base for

**Afro–Arab** traders in the 19th century. **David Livingstone**, searching for the headwaters of the Nile, was the first European to reach Nyangwe in 1871. Verney Lovett Cameron reached the town in 1874, two years before **Henry Morton Stanley**, and by measuring the flow of water, deduced that the Lualaba formed part of the headwaters of the **Congo River** and not of the Nile as Livingstone had supposed. Afro–Arab influence diminished following the anti-**slavery** campaign by Commander **Francis Dhanis** in the 1890s. The Arab traders were driven away in 1893, and the city was taken over by **Belgian** authorities.

**NYIRANGONGO.** *See* VOLCANOES.

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**OFFICE DE GESTION DE LA DETTE PUBLIQUE (OGEDep)** [OFFICE FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF THE PUBLIC DEBT]. A **government** agency created in January 1977 after Congo (then **Zaire**) fell seriously behind in its external **debt** repayments. Its purpose is to oversee debt repayments and participate in government negotiations with foreign creditors. In the 1980s, OGEDep was quite successful in its negotiations with foreign creditors, to the extent that the **Paris Club** agreed to reschedule \$3.6 billion. The **London Club** also rescheduled \$500 million in the 1980s.

The most important negotiation was the Paris Club “Toronto Terms” agreement that consolidated \$1.3 billion covering the period of 30 June 1983 to 23 June 1989. This consolidated amount represented an annual net cash flow savings of \$26 million a year and a decrease in the present value of the scheduled debt service of \$197 million, according to the **World Bank**. Under the Toronto Terms agreement, concessional debt was also rescheduled at concessional terms with a 25-year maturity and a grace period of 14 years.

In the 1990s, OGEDep was less fortunate in its negotiations with foreign creditors as the West tried to isolate the **Mobutu Sese Seko** regime that was stalling the **democratic transition**. When **Laurent Kabila** assumed power in May 1997, he requested that foreign debt be forgiven because Mobutu and his cronies never used it to build infrastructure and develop Congo. However, foreign creditors dis-

agreed, and Kabila launched talks aimed at renegotiating foreign debt on more favorable terms. After his death, a meeting on 3 July 2001 in Paris expressed support for a \$156 million reform and rehabilitation program presented by the government of **Joseph Kabila**.

Following an arrangement with the **International Monetary Fund (IMF)** and the World Bank on 13 September 2002, Paris Club creditors reached an agreement with the OGEDEP on rescheduling the country's external public debt. The agreement covered \$8.98 billion. Of the total, arrears on the principal and late-payment interest as of 30 June 2002 accounted for \$8.5 billion, while repayments of the principal and interest due between 1 July 2002 and 30 June 2005 accounted for \$490 million. The agreement was concluded on "Naples" terms; that is, the pre-cutoff-date Official Development Assistance (ODA) loans were to be repaid over 40 years, with a grace period of 16 years at a rate of interest as advantageous as the concessional rate. Due dates for pre-cutoff-date commercial credits were treated in such a way as to achieve a 67 percent reduction, taking into account previous debt treatment arrangements by the Paris Club. The remainder was rescheduled over 23 years, including a six-year grace period at market rates of interest.

This resulted in the immediate cancellation by Paris Club creditors of \$4.6 billion of the Congo's external debt. These measures reduced the debt service due to Paris Club creditors between 30 June 2002 and 30 June 2005 from \$9.1 billion to \$380 million. The remainder represented part of the interest due on the rescheduled amounts and service on the post-cutoff-date debt from 2003. The settlement of arrears enabled international financial institutions to renew assistance to Congo and put the country on fast-track access to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, which started in April 2003. Providing rapid access to the HIPC Initiative has since remained a crucial feature of the international community's strategy to reduce the burden on the Congo's finances and to pave the way for economic recovery and improved social conditions for the Congolese population.

**OFFICE DES BIENS MAL-ACQUIS (OBMA) [OFFICE OF ILL-GOTTEN GAINS]**. An agency established following the takeover by **Laurent Kabila** in 1997 and headed by a leader of the **Alliance**

**des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL)**, Jean-Baptiste Mulemba. Its purpose was to investigate and prosecute corrupt officials from the **Mobutu Sese Seko** era and seek the return of state assets. These included government loans that were never repaid, taxes and duties that were never collected, funds transferred to private accounts, and state property that had disappeared. More than 30 former officials and businessmen were arrested on **corruption** charges following the Kabila takeover. The first official to be brought to trial was the former head of the bankrupt national airline, **Air Zaïre**, beginning in December 1997. The OBMA was dismantled in 2002.

**OFFICE DES MINES D'OR DE KILO-MOTO (OKIMO) [KILO-MOTO GOLD MINES BOARD]**. Known more commonly as “Kilo-Moto,” OKIMO was the major **gold mining** company in Congo, employing 5,900 people, of which less than 10 percent were expatriate. State-owned since **Zairianization** in 1973, the company is located in **Ituri Province** (former district of **Orientale Province**), where it works both subterranean and alluvial deposits with an estimated 100 tons of reserves in an 83,000-square-km concession around Bunia and Isiro. An additional mine, called *Adidi*, began operating in 1973 at Mongbwalu. A Brazilian company reportedly discovered sizable deposits in the area in 1986 and was awarded a contract in 1988 to rehabilitate some of the mines. However, the economic problems of the early 1990s caused production to fall to negligible levels by the mid-1990s. Artisanal mining continued in the area and often exceeded total official production. Most gold produced in this manner was smuggled to East African nations in exchange for hard **currency** or consumable goods. After the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL)** took control of the region in late 1996, it negotiated contracts with several foreign companies to revitalize production. During the **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila** in 1998–2003, OKIMO was run by the government of **Uganda** and Ugandan-backed rebel groups. In September 2004, OKIMO’s three former management teams (one appointed by Laurent Kabila and two by Uganda/rebel groups) merged under the leadership of a new chairman executive officer. From 2004 to 2008, the OKIMO received \$2.5 million a year for leasing rights to a number of its concessions.

**OFFICE DES ROUTES [HIGHWAY BOARD].** A **government** agency established in 1972 to build and maintain Congo's **roads**, the Office des Routes began a three-year program in 1985 to rehabilitate existing roads, in particular the highway linking **Kinshasa** and **Matadi**, and to construct new roads, including a new highway from **Kisangani** to **Bukavu**. By the 1990s, embezzlement and lack of funding had severely crippled the organization, and lack of maintenance had caused severe deterioration of the country's road system, to the extent that Congolese call the agency the Office des Troux (Office of Potholes). *See also* TRANSPORTATION.

**OFFICE NATIONAL DE CAFÉ (ONC) [NATIONAL COFFEE BOARD].** The **government's** national **coffee** marketing board, the ONC exported 104,000 tons of coffee in 1992, up from 74,000 tons in 1980, making it the country's largest exporter of agricultural products. **Exports** declined in subsequent years, but a rise in the price of coffee increased revenues to \$400 million in 1994. Of 11 state marketing boards created between 1971 and 1974, the ONC was the only one still operating in the 2000s.

**OFFICE NATIONAL DE PÊCHE (ONP) [NATIONAL FISHERIES BOARD].** The **government** agency that promoted **fishing** in the country and, in some cases, marketed the products of state and privately owned fisheries and fish-processing plants.

**OFFICE NATIONAL DES TRANSPORTS (ONATRA) [NATIONAL TRANSPORT BOARD].** The state-owned company that dominated **river** transport in Congo, ONATRA was known during the colonial era as the Office d'Exploitation des Transports Coloniaux. It was created in 1935 as a **government**-sponsored agency to operate river and seaport facilities and to control all water transport in the colony, except that of the upper **Congo River** and **Lake Tanganyika**. It was renamed Office des Transports du Congo (OTRACO) at **independence** and became the Office National des Transports du Zaïre (ONATRA) upon its **nationalization** in the early 1970s. ONATRA also operated passenger service along the Congo, **Kasai**, and **Ubangi Rivers**. At its peak in 1972, ONATRA operated 700 barges, 100 tugboats, and 40 other vessels on Congo's principal waterways.

ONATRA's monopoly of river **transportation** was abolished by government decree in 1977.

In the 1980s, economic recession and a shortage of foreign exchange and operating capital caused problems, but for a time the company kept most of its fleet in operation despite shipping delays and pilferage of valuable cargo. By the mid-1990s, however, aging equipment and a lack of funds had virtually halted river transport by ONATRA. An audit ordered by the **Léon Kengo wa Dondo** government in February 1995 discovered that large stipends were being paid to directors while worker salaries were as much as six months in arrears and there were insufficient funds to purchase fuel. Charges were brought against several directors. Plans were formulated in early 1996 to revitalize the company through partial **privatization**. In the 2000s, ONATRA was operating only two ships in the Congo River.

**OFFICE NATIONAL DU SUCRE (ONS) [NATIONAL SUGAR BOARD]**. A **government** agency established by decree on 1 January 1974 as part of **Zairianization**. It included all **sugar** refineries and most of the large cane **plantations** in the country. The ONS was disbanded on 8 May 1978, and a sugar development board called Projets Sucriers au Zaïre (PSZ) was established. The agency recovered its original name after the fall of **Mobutu Sese Seko** in 1997. Since 2000, most of its projects to invest in more sugar plants have remained on hold for lack of investors.

**OFFICE NATIONAL POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DE L'ÉLEVAGE (ONDE) [NATIONAL LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT BOARD]**. A **government** agency that took over ownership and operation of many large ranches following **Zairianization** in 1973. Under **Retrocession**, some of the ranches were returned to their former owners. Others were entrusted to private operators while the government retained ownership. *See also* LIVESTOCK.

**OLOMIDE, ANTOINE KOFFI (1956– )**. Born in **Kisangani** on 13 August 1956 to a Congolese mother and a Sierra Leonean father, Olomide grew up in **Kinshasa**. He went to Paris to study and, while in France, began playing the guitar and writing songs. When he re-

turned to Congo he became a member of Viva la Musica, the band of **Wembadio Jules Shungu Pene Thabani** (also known as Papa Wemba). Olomide popularized the slower style of soukous that had fallen out of fashion. He has won a number of musical awards in **South Africa**, and he is one of the best artists in central Africa.

**ONDEKANE, JEAN-PIERRE (1962– )**. A career military officer, born 1 January 1962 in **Mbandaka** and raised in the former **Katanga Province**, Ondekane rose through the ranks of the **Mobutu Sese Seko army** to become commander of government troops in **Lubumbashi**. However, he joined the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) when it took Lubumbashi in 1997. He was made commander of AFDL forces in **Goma**. In August 1998, he joined the **rebellion** of the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD) and was commander of the RCD's military forces. He was appointed minister of national defense and demobilization in the transition government, 2003–2006. He was removed from office in January 2006 by **Joseph Kabila**. Ondekane managed the demobilization fund, and in nine months he salted away more than \$10 million of **United Nations** and international donor community funds.

**OPÉRATION DRAGON ROUGE**. Code name for the joint Belgian–United States parachute drop operation on **Stanleyville** on 24 November 1964, which successfully rescued expatriate hostages held in the eastern **rebellion**.

**OPPOSITION**. Opposition **political parties** proliferated during the first five years of Congo's **independence**. They were suspended along with all political activities, however, following the **coup d'état** that brought **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** to power in 1965. They were outlawed in 1970 by the decree making the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) the sole legal party. According to the 1974 **constitution**, attempting to form a second party was considered treason. As a result, during the 1970s and 1980s, most opposition to the **government** was based abroad.

In 1980, however, the **Group of Thirteen Parliamentarians** issued an open letter to Mobutu calling for multiparty democracy.



Some of these, including **Étienne Tshisekedi** and **Joseph Ngalula**, founded a second party in 1982, the **Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social** (UDPS). They were tried in 1983 and sentenced to prison terms ranging from 15 years to life. They were later pardoned, but spent most of the 1980s in various forms of detention.

With Mobutu's announcement of the **democratic transition** on **24 April 1990**, opposition parties once again began to flourish. More than 200 had formed by mid-1991, many of them grouped in the **Sacred Union** alliance. Their number exceeded 400 by the mid-1990s. During the 1990s, most opposition leaders displayed a degree of opportunism that earned them the disdain of many citizens. Except for a few, they took turns in and out of power, and they engaged in exercises of infighting and shifts of alliance that stalled governance and diverted public attention from the country's growing crises.

When the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) took power in May 1997, it banned activity by all parties, arguing that whether in power or not they were part of the corrupt system established by Mobutu. Some parties, most notably the hardline wing of the UDPS and the **Parti Lumumbiste Unifié** (PALU) led by **Antoine Gizenga**, continued to publicly oppose the government. Their meetings were dispersed by **security** forces, and a number of their leaders were detained on various occasions. Tshisekedi was detained briefly in 1997 and again in February 1998. Upon his second arrest, he was sent into internal exile in his home village.

Dissatisfaction with the AFDL led some **Banyamulenge** who had helped overthrow Mobutu to launch a **rebellion** from eastern Congo on 2 August 1998. They reached the outskirts of **Kinshasa** in September but were driven back. In December 2002, rebel leaders and the government signed an inclusive peace agreement, the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI), leading to a transitional government from 2003 to 2006, and free elections in late 2006. However, in **Nord-Kivu**, a number of **Banyarwanda** officers refused to be integrated into the national army and began opposing the government. Their leader, General **Laurent Nkunda**, asserted that his forces were protecting the interests of the **Tutsi**. By late 2008, Nkunda and his men were still in control of a number of areas in Nord-Kivu. However,

Nkunda was arrested in Rwanda in late January 2009. *See also* DISIDENTS.

**ORBITAL TRANSPORT UND RAKETEN GESELLSCHAFT (OTRAG).** A West German company that signed a contract with the **Mobutu Sese Seko government** on 25 March 1976, reportedly for \$50 million, giving the company virtually complete control over 150,000 square km of a remote northeastern corner of **Shaba Region**. The avowed purpose of the lease was to allow the company to develop and test commercial rockets. However, the secrecy that surrounded the project raised suspicions in the international community and the news **media**. In addition, some of Congo's neighbors, in particular **Tanzania**, expressed strong disapproval of such a project near their borders. The contract was canceled in 1979.

**ORDRE NATIONAL DU LÉOPARD [NATIONAL ORDER OF THE LEOPARD].** The major national order of merit, with varying degrees of elevation, that **Mobutu Sese Seko** established in the late 1960s to honor esteemed national and foreign leaders. The order is named for the national animal of Congo, which is highly respected in traditional society for its speed and hunting prowess.

**ORGANISATION COMMUNE AFRICAINE ET MALGÂCHE (OCAM) [AFRO-MALAGASY COMMON ORGANIZATION].** One of the first Pan-African organizations, created as African nations attained **independence** in the early 1960s to press for economic integration and development on the continent. With the development of regionally oriented economic organizations, however, OCAM gradually declined in membership and influence. Congo, a founding member, withdrew in 1972. The organization was dissolved in 1984.

**ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY.** *See* AFRICAN UNION.

**ORIENTALE PROVINCE.** A former Congo northeastern **province**, Orientale was the largest province with 503,232 square km and an estimated **population** of 7 million in 2005 (4,524,467 in 1982). Orientale is rich in **timber, rubber, coffee, fish, gold**, and iron ore as well as hydroelectric and agricultural potential. There is some cattle

and goat herding. However, the province is remote, and many areas are inaccessible if they are not located near one of several navigable **river** networks. The **road** network is poorly maintained and supplies, particularly fuel and spare parts, are often difficult to obtain. As a result, **industry** has been stagnant, except for areas bordering East Africa, which is the province's historical trading partner.

Some parts of the province lie in the Sudanese savanna and the **Great Rift Valley** highlands, but most of the territory lies in the **Congo River Basin**, where **forests** tend to isolate communities and make them self-reliant and independent from the central **government**. It was renamed **Haut-Zaire** in 1971. The region was the scene of three **civil wars** between 1964 and 1967 and sporadic antigovernment activity by armed guerrillas in the 1990s.

The area was economically depressed by **Uganda's** civil war from the 1970s until the late 1980s, by the civil war in **Rwanda** from 1990 until 1994, and by the civil war against **Laurent Kabila**, from 1998 to 2003. The **constitution** of 2006 divided the province into **Bas-Uele, Haut-Uele, Ituri, and Tshopo Provinces**. These provinces became effective in February 2009.

"OWLS, THE." *See* "HIBOUX, LES."

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**PALM OIL.** At **independence**, Congo was Africa's second largest exporter of palm oil after Nigeria. It produced 245,000 tons in 1959, of which 75 percent was exported, accounting for 12 percent of total **export** revenues. However, by 1980, production had fallen to 168,000 tons, according to **World Bank** figures, of which 10,000 tons were exported, accounting for less than 2 percent of total export revenues. By 1990, production had risen to 180,000 tons, of which little was exported through official channels, although some reportedly was **smuggled** to neighboring countries for foreign exchange. Production was 184,000 tons in 1993. In subsequent years, production began to decline, and by 1998 it was 157,000 tons, according to data from the Food Agriculture Organization. Despite the **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila**, production averaged 157,000 tons in 1999–2000. In

2001, production plummeted to its lowest level since 1960, to 70,000 tons, but it increased slightly to 81,000 in 2002–2003.

**PALU.** The site of the first Belgian settlement on **Lake Tanganyika**, established in May 1883. It was used primarily as a base to drive **Afro–Arab** traders from the territory, establish Belgian sovereignty over the eastern Congo, and explore the mineral riches of **Katanga**.

**PAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE.** Officially called the All African People's Conference, the meeting came to be more commonly known as the Pan-African Conference because of the concept of Pan-Africanism that it helped to launch. The conference was held in December 1958 in Accra, capital of newly independent Ghana. **Patrice Lumumba**, **Joseph Ngalula**, and **Gaston Diomi** attended. **Joseph Kasavubu** was prevented from going by colonial authorities. There these representatives came into contact with the **nationalist** ideas of such leaders as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Gamal Abdel Nasser of **Egypt**, and Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea. They also became aware of growing demands for independence by Africans in the French colonies, of **Charles de Gaulle's** offer of autonomy to France's African colonies, and of the relative isolation of the Belgian colonies.

The Congolese representatives, particularly Lumumba, returned home fired with a passion for **independence**. He first called for independence during a speech at a rally on 28 December 1958. A pro-independence rally on **4 January 1959** was disrupted by the colonial authorities who prevented Kasavubu from speaking. It sparked two weeks of rioting that led within a year to the decision by the Belgian government to grant independence to the **Belgian Congo**.

**PARIS CLUB.** The name given to a group of government creditors that, since 1962, has met regularly to discuss the external **debt** of developing nations. The club works in conjunction with the **International Monetary Fund** (IMF) and the **London Club** of private creditors to reschedule the foreign debts of financially strapped governments. Congo's debt to Paris Club members rose steadily during the 1970s and, by 1980, had reached \$2.3 billion, or nearly one-half of its total foreign debt. By 1993, the debt to Paris Club creditors had risen to \$5.7 billion, according to the **World Bank**, while external

debt had reached \$11.2 billion. Although some governments wrote off portions of Congo's debt, it continued to rise because of the **government's** failure to make payments on principal or interest. When **Laurent Kabila** assumed power after the departure of **Mobutu Sese Seko** in May 1997, he launched talks aimed at renegotiating the debt on more favorable terms.

A meeting on 3 July 2001 in Paris expressed support for a \$156 million reform and rehabilitation program presented by the government of **Joseph Kabila**. During the **Second Congo War**, some revenue collected in Congolese francs reportedly went east, to rebel-held parts of the country, where the local currency fetched 33 percent more in dollars. The **United Nations** (UN) Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC submitted three reports from 2001 and 2003 to the UN Security Council that accused foreign countries involved in the war, a number of Congolese officials, and multinational corporations of illicit trafficking of Congolese minerals that deprived the state of substantial sources of revenue.

**PARLEMENT DE LA TRANSITION (PT).** *See* HAUT CONSEIL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE/PARLEMENT DE LA TRANSITION (HCR/PT).

**PARLIAMENT.** Since **independence**, the **government** of Congo has included a parliament, although it has been called by different names and its power has varied considerably. Under the **Loi Fondamentale** (Fundamental Law), which acted as a **constitution** from June 1960 until July 1964, the parliament consisted of two chambers: a chamber of deputies and a senate. The **prime minister** was head of the government and responsible to parliament, but he could also be dismissed by the **president**, who was head of state. The system was aimed at providing checks and balances to power in the government, but it caused a number of political stalemates. The first, in 1960, led **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** to suspend parliament and appoint a **College of Commissioners** to govern for six months. The second, in 1965, was cited as a major reason for the **coup d'état** that brought Mobutu to power for 32 years.

Under **Mobutism**, the two chambers of parliament were combined into one and renamed the National Assembly. With the decree of the single-party system in 1970, the assembly's power and influence began to wane. It was formally subordinated to the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) party, and its name was changed to **Legislative Council** when the party-state was established in 1972.

In 1992, the **Conférence Nationale Souveraine** (CNS), which was controlled at the time by anti-Mobutu groups, drafted a new constitution and established the **Haut Conseil de la République** (HCR), which was to act as a transitional parliament until national **elections** could be held. Mobutu countered, however, by convening the Legislative Council, which had been moribund since the beginning of the **democratic transition** in 1990. He directed it to draft an alternate constitution and oversee the transition. The country lived with two rival parliaments until 1993, when they were merged into the **Haut Conseil de la République/Parlement de la Transition** (HCR/PT). The stalemate between pro-Mobutu and **opposition** forces continued until the offensive by the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) drove Mobutu into exile in May 1997.

The **Laurent Kabila** government, which was installed after the fall of Mobutu, pledged to draft a new constitution and hold elections by 1999 for a national parliament and local assemblies. In August 1998, some former members of the AFDL and Mobutists began a **civil war** and created the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie**, and Kabila continued to rule without a parliament. The government and the belligerents signed the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI) in December 2002 and established transitional institutions, including a two-chamber Transitional National Assembly. The transition lasted three years, from June 2003 to June 2006, until the organization of parliamentary elections in 2006. The 2006 constitution provides for two houses, the lower house or National Assembly whose members are popularly elected for five-year terms without limit, and an upper house, the Senate, whose members are indirectly elected from provincial assemblies for five-year terms without limit.

**PARTI DE LIBÉRATION CONGOLAISE (PLC) [PARTY OF CONGOLESE LIBERATION].** A group formed in 1984 that

staged attacks in northeastern Zaire from bases in the **Rwenzori Mountains** into a no-man's land between the Zairian and **Ugandan** borders. It registered as a **political party** after the end of single-party rule in 1990.

**PARTI DÉMOCRATE ET SOCIAL CHRÉTIEN (PDSC) [DEMOCRATIC AND SOCIAL CHRISTIAN PARTY]**. One of the first **opposition** parties to be launched following **Mobutu Sese Seko's** speech of **24 April 1990** announcing the end of single-party rule. The PDSC was founded by **Joseph Ileo**, a veteran politician who was one of the first to publicly speak out for Congolese political freedom in 1956. He was **prime minister** of the provisional **government** formed after Mobutu "neutralized" the government in 1960. During the single-party era he was a member of the **Political Bureau** and **Central Committee** of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR). The PDSC adopted a social-democratic platform with an emphasis on morality and Christian values, which its leaders felt had eroded during the era of secular single-party rule. The PDSC sought to extend its support beyond any single region or **ethnic group**, and succeeded in attracting prominent politicians from many parts of Congo. It was one of the three major parties that formed the **Sacred Union** opposition alliance in mid-1990. Although more moderate than the **Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social** (UDPS), it allied with it in the early 1990s to oppose the governments of **Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond**, **Faustin Birindwa**, and **Léon Kengo wa Dondo**, which were viewed as puppets manipulated by Mobutu. Upon Ileo's death in September 1994, **André Boboliko** assumed the presidency of the PDSC and was confirmed at the party's national convention in September 1995.

**PARTI DU PEUPLE POUR LA RECONSTRUCTION ET LA DÉMOCRATIE (PPRD) [PEOPLE'S PARTY FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEMOCRACY]**. President **Joseph Kabila** established the PPRD so that he could run as an independent candidate in the 2006 presidential **elections**. A number of **political parties** joined the PPRD to create the **Alliance de la Majorité Présidentielle** (AMP) that facilitated the victory of Kabila in the presidential elections. His political party was able to secure 111 out of 500 seats

in the lower house of parliament, becoming the largest party in the **parliament**. However, the PPRD was not able to obtain a majority to form the **government**. The AMP helped to secure a majority in which **Antoine Gizenga** was nominated as **prime minister**. In the 19 January 2007 Senate elections, the PPRD won 22 out of 108 seats and the AMP won 51 seats in the Senate. However, the alliance failed to gain the presidency of the Senate, and minority groups were able to secure it in May 2007 with **Léon Kenge wa Dondo** as president of the Senate.

**PARTI LUMUMBISTE UNIFIÉ (PALU) [UNIFIED LUMUMBIST PARTY]**. A union of Lumumbist splinter parties, descended from **Patrice Lumumba's Mouvement National Congolais (MNC)**, PALU was formed by **Antoine Gizenga** after his return from exile following the announcement of the **democratic transition** in 1990. In July 1995, a march by PALU supporters to the People's Palace in central **Kinshasa** was attacked by **security** forces. Ten people were killed and Gizenga was subsequently detained for five days. Gizenga remained a vocal critique of all incumbent **governments** until legislative elections in late 2006. He was third in the 2006 presidential elections. He backed the incumbent **President Joseph Kabila** in the runoff election, and was subsequently appointed **prime minister** in December 2006. PALU also won 34 out of 500 seats in the 2006 parliamentary elections, but obtained only two seats of 108 seats in the Senate in January 2007. Gizenga resigned as prime minister on 25 September 2008 for reasons related to age and health, and on 10 October 2008 Kabila appointed another member of PALU, **Adolphe Muzito**, to succeed him.

**PARTI RÉVOLUTIONNAIRE DU PEUPLE (PRP) [PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY]**. The only known armed resistance to the **government** based inside the country after the **rebellions** of the 1960s were suppressed. After the defeat of the eastern rebellion in 1966, **Laurent Kabila** formed the PRP, which established guerrilla bases in the remote **forests of Sud-Kivu**, west of the **Mitumba Mountain** range. In 1975, PRP guerrillas kidnapped four foreign students from a **Tanzanian** wildlife refuge. They were later released. A reporter for *New African* magazine visited the area and wrote in 1982



that the guerrillas had established a rudimentary social and economic infrastructure and provided indoctrination along **communist/socialist** lines to people living in the areas under their control.

In November 1984, PRP guerrillas briefly occupied the **port** town of **Moba** in northern **Shaba Region**, calling for the Congolese to rise up and overthrow the **Mobutu Sese Seko** government. The Congolese army retook Moba two days later. Official casualty figures were never released but were estimated at between 10 and 50 dead. The government accused Congolese exiles living in neighboring Tanzania and **Burundi** of responsibility. The PRP denied the charge, saying it was based entirely within Zaire. The guerrillas staged a second attack on Moba in June 1985 as Zaire was celebrating the 25th anniversary of its **independence**. The second attack, however, was quickly repelled. The PRP's ideological roots were socialist and **nationalist**.

The PRP resurfaced in October 1996 as one of four members of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL), headed by Kabila. The alliance launched an offensive aimed at overthrowing the Mobutu government and establishing **democracy** in the country. Bolstered by disciplined troops from **Angola**, **Burundi**, **Rwanda**, and **Uganda**, it met with little resistance as it took over the country and arrived in **Kinshasa** on 17 May 1997, one day after Mobutu had fled into exile. Kabila was sworn in as **president** on 29 May 1997.

**PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN (PSA) [AFRICAN SOLIDARITY PARTY]**. A left-leaning party founded by Sylvestre Kama in February 1959. **Antoine Gizenga** became its general president in early 1960. The PSA sent delegates to the **Round Table Conference** in 1960. At **independence**, the PSA joined with **Patrice Lumumba's Mouvement National Congolais (MNC)** to form the first Congolese **government** and received three portfolios, including that of vice **prime minister**. Its ministers were dismissed with Lumumba on 5 September 1960. They left **Leopoldville** to form a rival government in **Stanleyville**, following the **United Nations** recognition of the **Joseph Kasavubu** government and the assassination of Lumumba. The PSA was included in the reconciliation government of **Cyrille Adoula**, with first Gizenga then **Cléophas Kamitatu** holding the most senior portfolio. **Pierre Mulele**, a former secretary-general of

the PSA, left for military training in the People's Republic of **China**. He went to **Congo-Brazzaville**, where he joined the Brazzaville-based Conseil de Libération du Congo and launched the **Kwilu rebellion**, which carried out a series of terrorist attacks in Leopoldville. Adoula was ousted when **Moïse Tshombe** was appointed by Kasavubu, and many PSA leaders went into exile.

The PSA was banned along with all political parties following the **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu coup d'état**. Mulele was executed for treason in 1968 after accepting an offer of amnesty and returning to Kinshasa. Gizenga returned from exile after the political liberalization in April 1990 and formed the **Parti Lumumbiste Unifié** (PALU). Kamitatu joined the **Parti Démocrate et Social Chrétien** (PDSC).

**PATERNALISM.** The term often used to characterize **Belgium's** policy toward its African colonies and in particular the **Belgian Congo**. Belgium considered Africans to be like children, well-intentioned but prone to excesses and not to be entrusted with too much responsibility or authority. They were to be "civilized" and given basic literacy and **health care**. They were to be taught moral and **Christian** values and gradually granted increasing responsibilities. According to the policy, brighter Congolese could aspire to positions such as office clerk, teaching assistant, or assistant nurse. In 1959, colonial authorities felt political **independence** and the assumption of senior leadership positions by Congolese were at least one generation away. As a result, with the advent of independence, few Belgians believed the Congolese would be able to govern their country and predicted chaos. Their rapid abandonment of the former colony helped fulfill the prediction.

**PENAL CODE.** Before the colonial era, **customary law** was the basis of punishment for most crimes among the various **ethnic groups**, and foreigners did not tamper with it. With the creation of the **Congo Free State**, however, traditional law came under criticism as savage and brutal. As a result, a penal code was adopted in 1888. Based on the Belgian penal code, it remained in force until a new code was enacted in 1940. The code permitted the death penalty for premeditated murder and certain crimes against the state. Lengthy prison terms were given to those convicted of serious crimes such as involuntary

murder, kidnapping, rape, and aggravated assault that caused disability. Theft, arson, fraud, and embezzlement could also draw serious prison terms and fines. However, considerable latitude was given to judges to take into account mitigating circumstances, the extent of damages, the age of the offender, and the offender's previous record. Customary law continued to be used in many cases in which the crime did not involve Europeans.

In 1963, certain crimes were established in the area of state security and public order. The Code d'Organisation et de Compétence Judiciaire (Code of Judicial Organization and Competence) enacted on 10 July 1968 called for the unification of the customary and "official" systems and the abolition of the customary courts. The 1974 **constitution** established a national **judicial system** that paralleled the administrative structure. An order establishing a system of juvenile courts was issued in 1987. In the 1970s and 1980s, some changes were enacted that reduced penalties for certain offenses and placed more emphasis on rehabilitation. However, penalties were increased for "political crimes." The death penalty was applied in many cases to those convicted of treason or subversion. Conviction on charges of plotting against the state could draw lengthy prison terms.

The code continues relatively unchanged today. In principle, an accused has the right to defense counsel and a public trial, and an individual arrested is to appear before a magistrate within 48 hours. However, **human rights** organizations charge that these guarantees are frequently not observed. They note that some prisoners languish for months before appearing in court and others are released without trial upon payment of a bribe. The right of appeal is guaranteed in capital cases, except those involving state security, **smuggling**, and armed robbery. These come before a special Court of State Security that is frequently used to try political **dissidents**. Military courts can try civilian cases during states of emergency, and their rulings cannot be appealed. According to the constitution, the death penalty may be imposed for the crime of murder and other, extremely serious offenses, usually involving the death of the victim or victims. *See also* PENAL SYSTEM.

**PENAL SYSTEM.** Congo inherited at **independence** a harsh penal system from the Belgian colonial authorities. However, conditions

became harsher under **Mobutu Sese Seko**, and **human rights** organizations repeatedly criticized the country's penal system for being poorly funded, harsh, and corrupt. Neglect and maltreatment of prisoners were widespread. Beatings were common, as was death by disease and starvation. Some efforts were made to isolate juvenile offenders from adults, but a common practice was to induct young, chronic offenders into the **military**. Dissidents accused the Mobutu **government** of building several secret prisons and "reeducation camps" in remote areas for habitual offenders and political opponents. Some reported spending time in a detention center called "Kota-Koli" near Mobutu's hometown of **Gbadolite** and a labor camp called Ikafela in the northwestern forest. **Laurent Kabila** closed these remote prisons, but kept the same penal system.

Most observers agree that the harshness of the penal system in the case of all but political **dissidents** is due primarily to poor management, **corruption**, and a lack of funds. Most inmates, in order to survive for any length of time, depend on their families to provide food, clothing, and medicine, which are usually transmitted through prison officials for a fee or apportion of the provisions. The prison system is administered by the minister of justice and keeper of the seals. Most prisons are located in urban areas, and three of the largest are in **Kinshasa**: Makala, Ndolo, and Lingwala prisons.

**PENDE.** A cluster of **Bantu**-speaking people that lives between the **Kwilu** and **Kasai Rivers** south of Gungu in southern portions of **Bandundu** and **Kasai Provinces**. One of four diverse **ethnic groups** living in the area, the Pende joined the Mbun and Njembe in the 1880s to stop the expansion of the **Chokwe** nation. The Pende revolted in May 1931 as the result of depressed prices of palm fruits and the colonial decision to increase taxes. They attacked the installations of the Huilleries du Congo Belge and killed most of its agents. They used war charms that they believed made them invulnerable to colonial army bullets. However, when the revolt ended, 550 Pende were killed by the army. Closely related to the Mbun, the Pende supported the **Pierre Mulele** rebellion in Kwilu in 1964–65. They confronted the army by using war charms reminiscent of their revolt in 1931. They have remained calm since the rebellion.

**PETRO-CONGO.** The government-owned **petroleum** company (called *Petro-Zaïre* until 1997) that was formed following the **nationalization** in December 1973 of the five private oil companies operating in Congo. A settlement was reached in 1978 through which the companies were allowed to operate under a partnership with the state, in which the state retained one-half ownership. Petro-Zaïre enjoyed a monopoly on importation and distribution of refined petroleum products until reforms in 1985 that removed **price controls** and allowed competition from foreign companies.

**PETROLEUM.** Congo has proven deposits of petroleum reserves estimated at 150 million barrels and unexploited deposits in remote parts of the country that have prompted exploration by international oil companies. To date, all of the country's exploitable petroleum has been located in the central African basin that has also made **Angola**, **Congo-Brazzaville**, and Gabon major oil producers. The coastal and offshore reserves of the **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)** are limited because of its small, 37-km-long coastline. Nevertheless, 70 percent of production in the 1990s was offshore and the remainder near the coast.

Petroleum exploration began in 1956, and commercially exploitable deposits were discovered off the Atlantic coast in 1970 and 1972. Production began offshore in 1975 and onshore in 1979. By the end of 1983, six fields had been discovered, of which four were in production. By 1985, total production reached 30,000 barrels per day but declined to 25,000 barrels per day by 1995. In the 1980s, positive seismic tests led to exploratory drilling near **Mbandaka** in **Équateur Region**, but no commercially exploitable fields were found and drilling was halted in 1984. Seismic explorations were also undertaken in the lakes of the **Great Rift Valley**, leading to the discovery of considerable deposits of natural gas under **Lake Kivu** and oil in **Lake Albert**. However, these have yet to be exploited because of the great depth of Lake Albert and its distance from major markets.

Production was carried out by **United States**, Japanese, and Belgian companies in partnership with the Congolese government. At its peak in the mid-1980s, Gulf-Chevron operated 38 wells in Congo through its subsidiary **Gulf Oil Zaïre**. Sixteen of these were wildcat operations. Production was 22,699 barrels per day in 1993, but the

discovery of a new field was expected to raise production by 5,900 barrels per day, leading the company to announce a \$500 million exploration program in 1995. Zairep, which operated onshore with Belgian participation, announced an \$80 million exploration program for 1995.

A refinery, built with Italian participation in 1968 to process imported oil, refines some domestic crude oil. Called the **Société Congo-Italienne de Raffinage** (SOCIR), the plant has a refining capacity of 17,000 barrels per day. However, because of the high sulfur content of domestic petroleum, very little local crude can be refined by SOCIR. As a result, locally produced crude is exported and lighter crude, primarily from Nigeria, is imported for refining.

Two above-ground pipelines, the first built in the 1920s and the second completed in the 1950s, carry oil from **Matadi** to **Kinshasa**. A government agency, Petro-Zaire, now **Petro-Congo**, distributed refined petroleum products through private dealers until 1985, when it lost its import monopoly. In the early 1990s, **inflation** and a collapsing **currency** caused severe fuel shortages, leading the government of then **Prime Minister Étienne Tshisekedi** to seize the assets of oil companies. However, they were returned a few months later. Since then, multinational petroleum corporations dominate the market in Congo.

Meanwhile, production of crude oil has slightly increased over the years from 25,347 barrels a day in 1994 to its highest level ever of 29,334 barrels a day in 1996, according to U.S. Bureau of Mines data. From 1997 to 1999, production averaged 25,690 barrels a day. Production declined in the 2000s, from 23,288 barrels a day in 2000 to 23,014 barrels in 2002. The discovery of a number of wells had slightly increased production from 25,025 barrels a day in 2003 to almost 28,000 barrels a day in 2005, the last year for which data are available.

**"PILLAGES."** Literally translated, "lootings," *les pillages* is the name by which Congolese refer to the incidents of looting and violence that occurred in major Congolese cities on several occasions, beginning on **23–24 September 1991** in **Kinshasa** and spreading throughout the country. Another massive *pillage* occurred on 28 January 1993, when 100 people died, including the French ambassador. The

incidents caused the evacuation of 10,000 expatriates and serious damage to commercial and industrial installations throughout the country. The *pillages* were a major factor in the 25 percent decline in **gross domestic product** the following two years. The culture of *pillages* has remained part of armed groups and the national army since January 1993, especially during the **civil wars** against **Mobutu Sese Seko** by the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** in 1996–97, and against **Laurent Kabila** in 1998–2003.

**PINZI, ARTHUR.** A Congolese politician prominent in the pro-**independence** movement, Pinzi participated in the drafting of the *Conscience Africaine* manifesto in 1956. He helped found the **Mouvement National Congolais** (MNC) in 1958 but split away before independence to form his own party. Elected mayor of Kalamu commune in 1958, Pinzi joined the **Alliance des Bakongo** (ABAKO) and was elected to the **parliament** on its ticket in 1960. He served as finance minister in the **Cyrille Adoula government** from 2 August 1961 to 10 July 1962.

**PLANTATIONS.** Large commercial plantations began in the 1800s in Congo and were considered to be the primary source of its wealth after the end of the **slave** trade and before the beginning of **mining** operations in **Katanga**. During the colonial era, hundreds of plantations were established, usually on land grants, for the cultivation of **rubber, timber, sugar cane, palm oil, coffee**, tea, and cocoa and for the raising of **livestock**. Following **independence**, many plantations fell into disuse. Others slowly declined because of **transportation** problems, lack of **government** incentives, and a shortage of foreign exchange for inputs. Government statistics indicate that more than 1,500 single-crop plantations of 100 to 1,000 hectares were operating in 1970. By 1980, the number of commercial operations had declined by half. However, in 1983, new government policies and a liberalization of domestic prices for **agricultural** products had encouraged a modest upturn, particularly in western Congo and in the former **Shaba Region**. The decline of the mining sector in the 1990s had added further impetus to the sector, although poor infrastructure

continues to hinder growth. However, many plantations had deteriorated in eastern Congo as the result of the **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila** in 1998–2003 and the lack of political stability during the transition, 2003–2006 and beyond.

**POLICE.** During the early colonial era, police duties were carried out by the **Force Publique**. Following World War I, a subunit of the Force called the **Troupes en Service Territorial** was formed to police the territory. Following **independence**, the police force of about 3,000 officers largely disintegrated. Nigerian police were brought in to train a new Congolese force, the **Gendarmerie Nationale**, under a **United Nations** (UN) program using equipment and funds supplied by the **United States** (U.S.). In 1966, the **government** enacted a series of laws bringing police operations under the Interior Ministry in a national system called the Police Nationale. This force of 25,000 was charged with **crime** prevention, the apprehension of offenders, the protection of citizens, and the maintenance of law and order. It was divided into regional units responsible to the local authorities. Training centers were established with Belgian and U.S. assistance in **Kinshasa** and **Lubumbashi**.

On 1 August 1972, in a move reflecting the growing trend toward centralization of powers, the Police Nationale was dissolved by decree and reabsorbed into the Gendarmerie Nationale. The move brought policing activities under the Defense Department and diluted the influence of local authorities over garrisons in the regions. In 1976, the head of the gendarmerie gained the same rank as the chiefs of staff of the army, **navy**, and air force, and was answerable only to **President Mobutu Sese Seko**, who held the defense portfolio and was commander-in-chief. The gendarmerie began to suffer from a lack of resources following the creation in 1984 of a civilian police force, called the **Civil Guard**, which was trained by Germany and **Egypt**.

The Civil Guard was used extensively to repress the **opposition**, and after the fall of Mobutu in May 1997, the **Laurent Kabila** government abolished the Civil Guard and, with **South African** aid, formed a new national police force.



**POLITICAL BUREAU.** From 1970 until the political reforms of April 1990, the Political Bureau of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) was the most powerful organ of state and ranked immediately below the **president**. Composed of an elite group of veteran political leaders appointed by the president and viewed as close to him, the Political Bureau controlled most of the political process in Congo (then **Zaire**). According to the **N'Sele Manifesto**, the Political Bureau “creates policy initiatives that are examined by the Congress of the Party.”

During a period of political liberalization in the late 1970s, the composition of the Political Bureau was altered to allow some of its members to be elected by party members. **Mobutu Sese Seko** announced on 1 July 1977 that 12 members would be appointed and 18, two from each region, would be elected. However, the number of appointees was soon increased to 18 with Mobutu, as president of the bureau, holding the tie-breaking vote. By 1980, when the size of the bureau was reduced to 20, the president once again was appointing all its members.

Originally, the Political Bureau chose all candidates for the **Legislative Council**. However, following the liberalization of the 1970s, local party cells were allowed to propose a number of candidates for each given seat in their respective districts. The Political Bureau then “vetted” these candidates. In the legislative elections of 1982, one-half of the candidates proposed by the local cells were approved.

According to the **constitution** of 1974, the Political Bureau could dismiss the president for “deviation from the doctrine” of **Mobutism**, but the “Founder” of the MPR (Mobutu) could not be dismissed. The president had the power to dismiss members of the bureau, but no more than one-third of them during any one term. Under the single-party system, the Political Bureau also controlled the succession process. Should the office of the presidency become vacant, the oldest political commissioner was to assume the office temporarily. The bureau was to schedule an **election** within 30–60 days and nominate the candidate for the presidency. The Political Bureau continued to exist following the transition to multipartyism in 1990, but it was weakened by the departure of many members who left to form their own **political parties** or join the **opposition**. With the appointment of the

first government of the **democratic transition**, it ceased to hold any official governing function. *See also* CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

**POLITICAL PARTIES.** Political parties proliferated during the first five years of Congolese **independence**, exceeding 120 in number, but were outlawed in 1970 when the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) was made the sole legal party. A number of parties continued to oppose the **Mobutu Sese Seko government**, usually from exile. Two parties that remained based in Congo (then **Zaire**) during the Mobutu years were the **Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social** (UDPS), which was formed in 1982 by **Étienne Tshisekedi**, and the **Parti Révolutionnaire du Peuple** (PRP), headed by **Laurent Kabila**, which held a small mountainous area in eastern Congo from the mid-1960s and staged two attacks in **Moba** in 1984 and 1985. After Mobutu announced the **democratic transition** on **24 April 1990**, the number of political parties grew rapidly and, by the mid-1990s, had exceeded 400.

However, the military offensive that sent Mobutu into exile and brought Kabila to power in May 1997 also signaled a potential change in the country's **politics**. Kabila said political parties would be suspended until national **elections**, which he promised to hold in 1999. However, Kabila banned all political parties after the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD) declared war on his regime in August 1998. Although he relaxed restrictions on political parties in 1999, a number of restrictions remained. In the context of war and anarchy, political parties remained subject to repression despite their opposition against the war.

After the assassination of Laurent Kabila, **Joseph Kabila** showed some degree of tolerance, and the signing of a global peace agreement in late December 2002 that brought rebel groups to power in mid-2003 totally liberalized the role of parties in the Congolese political discourse. In 2006–2007, more than 100 political parties ran in presidential and legislative elections. *See also* ALLIANCE DES BAKONGO (ABAKO); ALLIANCE DES FORCES DÉMOCRATIQUES POUR LA LIBÉRATION DU CONGO (AFDL); ALLIANCE DES FORCES PATRIOTIQUES (AFP); ALLIANCE DE LA MAJORITÉ PRÉSIDENTIELLE (AMP); ASSOCIATION

DES BALUBA DU KATANGA (BALUBAKAT); CONCLAVE, FORCES POLITIQUES DU; CONFÉDÉRATION DES ASSOCIATIONS TRIBALES DU KATANGA (CONAKAT); CONVENTION NATIONALE CONGOLAISE (CONACO); DISSIDENTS; FÉDÉRATION KASAÏENNE; FRONT POUR LA LIBÉRATION NATIONALE DU CONGO (FLNC); LIGUE DES JEUNES VIGILANTS (LJV); MOUVEMENT D'ACTON POUR LA RÉSURRECTION DU CONGO (MARC); MOUVEMENT NATIONAL CONGOLAIS (MNC); OPPOSITION; PARTI DE LIBÉRATION CONGOLAISE (PLC); PARTI DÉMOCRATE ET SOCIAL CHRÉTIEN (PDSC); PARTI LUMUMBISTE UNIFIÉ (PALU); PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN (PSA); RASSEMBLEMENT DES DÉMOCRATS LIBÉRAUX (RDL); SACRED UNION; UNION DES DÉMOCRATES INDÉPENDANTS (UDI); UNION DES FÉDÉRALISTES ET DES RÉPUBLICAINS INDÉPENDANTS (UFERI); UNION KATANGAISE; UNION MONGO (UNIMO); UNION POUR LA RÉPUBLIQUE ET LA DÉMOCRATIE (URD).

**POLITICS.** Political activity was strictly prohibited during the colonial era, but following World War II, it began to develop through **trade unions**, alumni groups, **ethnic group** associations, and “study” groups. The ban on politics was lifted in preparation for local **elections** in 1959, and **political parties** grew quickly in number, many of them developing from ethnic associations. Some attempts were made to form nationally based political parties, but policy disputes and personal rivalries led many to splinter. At **independence**, an estimated 125 parties were in existence. During the legislative elections of 1965, a number of attempts were made to form broad coalitions with names like Rassemblement des Démocrates Congolais (RADECO), Comité Démocratique Africain (CDA), Front Commun National (FCN), and **Convention Nationale Congolaise** (CONACO). CONACO won a majority of the seats in the 1965 elections. However, the apparent trend toward political consolidation was cut short by the **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu coup d'état** of **24 November 1965** after which all political activity was banned.

In December 1966, the Corps des Volontaires de la République (CVR), echoing widespread popular dissatisfaction with political

partisanship, called for an end to all political parties in order to allow the formation of a single party. The **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) was formed in 1967 and began to organize while other parties remained banned. The MPR was formally enshrined as the sole legal party in 1970, and its supremacy over the affairs of state and the lives of all Congolese (then Zairians) was formalized by the **constitution** of 1974.

In 1977, a degree of liberalization was enacted, permitting multiple candidates within the MPR for legislative seats and the election of some previously appointed members of the **Political Bureau**. These measures led to the infusion of some new blood into the political hierarchy and the elimination of some old guard. By 1980, however, most of the measures had been discarded or circumvented. In 1982, the **Group of Thirteen Parliamentarians** announced the formation of a second political party, an act of treason at that time. They were convicted and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. During the 1980s, they continued to advocate a return to multipartyism, while various other groups opposed the Mobutu government from exile.

On **24 April 1990**, in the face of rising domestic and international pressure, Mobutu announced the end of the single-party system and declared that three political parties would be allowed. Mobutu said a one-year transition would be observed, to be followed by elections. According to a number of observers, the president believed he could continue to control the process and remain in power. However, it quickly became evident that he had opened a Pandora's box, as many prominent members of the MPR defected and many exiled **opposition** leaders returned to form their own parties. Everyone except MPR stalwarts began to press for the removal of all restrictions on political activity. Mobutu eventually acquiesced, and the restrictions were officially lifted on 25 November 1990. The government sought to control the creation of parties by restricting registration, but that too was eventually abandoned. Meanwhile, opposition leaders began pressing for a **national conference**, modeled after those being held in a number of West African nations. The purpose was to sweep away laws that concentrated power in the **presidency**, draft a new constitution, and organize elections under an independent authority.

The National Conference was convened on 7 August 1991, initially for a period of one month. However, political stalemate and infighting delayed completion of its work until December 1992. Through most of the 1990s, confrontation between pro-Mobutu forces and the opposition stalled the **democratic transition**. On 30 July 1995, it was extended for a third time, until 9 July 1997, by which date elections were to be held. However, the opposition maintained that any elections held within this timeframe would be compromised by Congo's lack of infrastructure and Mobutu's continued control over the state and **security** apparatus. By the mid-1990s, political organizations appeared to have coalesced around three tendencies or alliances: the **Forces Politiques du Conclave** (FPC), which grouped pro-Mobutu parties; the **Sacred Union**, which grouped the hardline opposition; and the **Union pour la République et la Démocratie** (URD), which aspired to represent centrist parties.

Mobutu's mandate was due to expire in December 1991 but was extended until the end of the transition. He appeared content to continue as head of state and to preside over the fractious process, but his health deteriorated and he underwent prostate surgery in Switzerland in August 1996. A group of small opposition parties in October announced the formation of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) and launched an offensive to overthrow Mobutu and change the system. The AFDL forces advanced rapidly from the eastern border area and entered **Kinshasa** on 17 May 1997, one day after Mobutu fled into exile. **Laurent Kabila** was sworn in as president on 29 May 1997. He suspended political parties that had not participated in the AFDL, leading to anger from opposition groups over the lack of appreciation for their struggle against Mobutu. Kabila said he wanted to reform the entire system that had been corrupted by decades of authoritarian rule. The new government promised it would hold elections in 1999 but said meetings and demonstrations by political parties would be banned until then.

From May 1997 to mid-1998, the political goal of the AFDL was to increase revenues and rebuild state capacity to consolidate its authority and control over coercive forces throughout the national territory. However, the AFDL coalition experienced domestic criticism and internal divisions. In particular, non-**Tutsi** Congolese resented the prominence of **Banyamulenge**, **Banyarwanda**, and

**Rwandan** advisers in senior positions, believing that their presence compromised Congo sovereignty and blocked their political career aspirations. In late July 1998, President Kabila ordered all foreign troops to leave. He also refused to cooperate with the Rwandan government in arresting those militias and former Rwandan soldiers who committed the genocide and were still launching attacks on Rwanda from bases within Congo. Tensions erupted within the AFDL into clashes between Tutsi and non-Tutsi troops in barracks in Kinshasa, **Bukavu**, and **Goma** in early August 1998. Efforts to peace led to the **Lusaka Peace Accord** in July 1999. The agreement confirmed de facto partition of Congo into three parts according to the three major rebel groups and the government: the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie/Rwanda** zone, the **Mouvement de Libération du Congo** (MLC)/**Uganda** zone, and the government/Angola/Zimbabwe zone. It also emphasized the deployment of **United Nations** (UN) forces, the neutralization of “negative forces,” such as Rwandan and Burundian rebels operating in Congo, and the withdrawal of foreign troops. In addition, it called for a political solution through the **Dialogue Inter-Congolais** (DIC) aimed at settling the terms of the transition to democratic government and to the restoration of state authority throughout the entire Congolese territory.

The assassination of Laurent Kabila on 16 January 2001 left the country in total economic chaos, half-occupied by foreign troops and rebel groups. On 26 January 2001, **Joseph Kabila** succeeded his father, and the DIC effectively started in Sun City, **South Africa**, in February 2002. Pressures from the international community and South African President Thabo Mbeki, in particular, helped to salvage the DIC, which was permanently threatened with collapse by self-interested spoilers and belligerents. The result was the signing on 17 December 2002 in Pretoria, of the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI). Another peace agreement followed on 2 April 2003 in Sun City; this accord sought to restore democracy and stability to Congo. The AGI resulted in the formation of a national transitional government that included Joseph Kabila as president, four vice presidents—known in Congo as 1 + 4—and 35 ministers with their deputies. The transition lasted from mid-2003 to mid-2006 and was followed by free elections.

Thirty-three presidential candidates contested for the highest office in July 2006. Joseph Kabila received 44.81 percent of 17.9 million registered voters and **Jean-Pierre Bemba** won 20.03 percent in the first round. In the second round held on 28 October, Kabila won with 58 percent against the challenger with 42 percent. Meanwhile, the incumbent president, who narrowly failed to be elected in the first round, also failed to secure a majority in the National Assembly. His party, the **Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie** (PPRD), only gained 111 out of 500 parliamentary seats. However, the pro-Kabila coalition achieved a total of 224 seats. The final results indicated that Bemba's party won 100 seats and the **Parti Lumumbist Unifié** (PALU) of **Antoine Gizenga** won 34 seats. The alliance, called **Alliance de la Majorité Présidentielle** (AMP) between the presidential coalition and the PALU, was necessary, and Gizenga was appointed **prime minister**. In late 2008, Gizenga resigned stating his age as a hindrance to his performance and was replaced by another PALU member **Adolphe Muzito**. *See also* CIVIL WARS; SECOND CONGO WAR.

**POLITIQUE DES GRANDS TRAVAUX [GREAT WORKS POLICY]**. A program launched by the **Mobutu Sese Seko government** in the early 1970s when, buoyed by high mineral prices and encouraged by international lending institutions, Mobutu sought to institute the equivalent of an industrial revolution in Congo. A number of grandiose projects were initiated, including the **Inga hydroelectric complex**, the **Inga-Shaba power line**, the **Voix du Zaïre** radio/television complex, and the **Maluku** steel mill, among others. When completed, these projects struggled to maintain solvency because of high costs for maintenance and raw materials, and they severely increased the government's foreign **debt** burden.

**POPULATION**. The population of Congo was estimated at 15 million at **independence** in 1960. The last nationwide census, for the 1982 **elections**, estimated a total population at 29,198,334 while the **World Bank** listed it at 29,756,068. The population growth rate from 1980 to 1990 was estimated by the World Bank to be 3.02 percent per year. By 2005, the Congolese population almost doubled from 1982 to represent 58,740,547 people. The latest number is 62.5 million in

mid-2007, according to a **United Nations** estimate. The overall percentage of females was 50.5, but in urban areas males outnumbered females. In 2007, an estimated 47 percent of the population was under 15 years, while 2.5 percent was above 65 years. Life expectancy at birth was 54 years, up from 49 years in 1982 and 42 years in 1960.

In the 1990s, an estimated 28 percent of the population lived in **urban** areas. However, urban population has remained below 32 percent from the 1990s to the 2000s. **Kinshasa**, with an estimated population of 9.5 million in 2008, is the largest city. The fastest-growing cities since independence have been Kinshasa, **Mbuji-Mayi**, **Bandundu**, **Kikwit**, and **Butembo**. Average population density in 1990 was 17 persons per square km, up from 9.2 in 1970. Population density is considered low by global standards, but high in comparison to most central and southern African nations.

Rural population density varies considerably, from one to two persons per square km in the **Congo River Basin** to more than 30 in parts of the **eastern highlands** and western **Kongo Central Province**. The higher population densities tend to be located in areas where soil fertility, rainfall, and climate are conducive to farming. The less-populated areas tend to be in the low wetlands, where soils are unable to support intensive farming. Eighty percent of the Congolese population belongs to the **Bantu** family of **ethnic groups**. The remainder is divided between peoples of Sudanese, Nilotic, and European origins. More than 250 **languages** and 400 dialects have been identified among the population of the Congo.

**PORTERAGE.** Human bearers provided the means of **transportation** during the **Congo Free State** (CFS) and early **Belgian Congo**, before roads were built. According to **Henry Morton Stanley**'s memoirs, a man was supposed to carry a maximum load of 30 kg (65 lbs). Children were also involved in portering, carrying loads of 22 lbs. The increase in the numbers of porters was commensurate with increasing control over the territory. The recruitment of local porters began between 1879 and 1883. These years represented the period of Stanley's first two trips up the **Congo River**. The **Comité d'Études pour le Haut-Congo** (Committee for the Study of the Upper Congo) that was sponsoring his expedition sent 78,853 kg (173,838 lbs) of material, calculated in the records as representing 1,629 loads.



Because the standard portorage load of 30 kg per carrier comes to only 48,870 kg, which is about 62 percent of the total, it is obvious that some (or all loads) were considerably heavier than 65 lbs, possibly weighing as much as 107 lbs.

The construction of the **railway** to Leopoldville, begun in 1889 and finished in March 1898, put another burden on the **Kongo** people. When ships unloaded their cargos, it sometimes required as many as 100,000 porters to transport loads from a single steamer to the Stanley Pool (now **Malebo Pool**). In 1892, it was affirmed “without exaggeration” that 40,000 men were engaged in portorage.

The historical volume of exports gives a clue to number of men and man-hours involved in portorage. For example, exports of all kinds rose from 4,076 metric tons in 1887 to 8,722 in 1898, with an average of 6,826 tons per year over a 12-year period. The volume of rubber exports from the Stanley Pool rose from zero in 1883 to 30 tons in 1887; from that year to 1891, exports rose to 131 tons. There was a dramatic jump in 1886, when 1,317 metric tons were exported, implying portorage of 43,900 loads.

No figures for the export of **ivory** were available until 1887, when more than 40,000 kg were shipped out, although ivory was obtained throughout this period in large quantities. There was a marked jump in 1889, when the export went from 5,824 kg to 45,252 kg. It then rose by 38 percent to 118,739 in 1892 and to more than 290,000 in 1895.

To this can be added the 10 years of railway construction. The enormity of the cost in human effort, with each man carrying 30 kg or more on his head, is represented in the total quantity of exports over the 12-year period of 1887–98: 2,730,533 man-loads. According to some historians, porters had to cover from 368 to 400 km in 15 to 20 days on an impossible caravan path obstructed by huge boulders and scattered with small, sharp pebbles. Portorage was a task that tested the mettle of the strongest men, many of whom died on the path, leaving by 1898 thousands of skeletons along the way.

During the CFS, pay was small and often arbitrary. Physical restraints were often used, linking men together in portorage trains. These restraints reinforced the view that this form of wage **labor** was **slavery**.

Porterage monopolized the available workforce. Everything required by the Europeans for their upkeep and work in Stanley Pool had to be carried on Congolese heads through the Lower Congo. Porterage did not cease when the railway from **Matadi** to **Kinshasa** was completed in 1898, but continued into the 20th century in those regions where railways did not reach.

**PORTS.** Congo has three ports for oceangoing vessels, **Matadi**, **Boma**, and **Banana**, all lying on the lower part of the **Congo River**. Banana, nearest the Atlantic Ocean, is linked to Boma and Matadi by **road**. Matadi is linked to the rest of the country primarily by **rail** and **river transportation** networks.

The major river ports on the Congo River are **Kinshasa**, **Mbandaka**, **Bumba**, **Kisangani**, Ubundu, and **Kindu**. **Bandundu** and **Ilebo** lie on the **Kasai River**. Zongo is on the **Ubangi River**. Kongolo and Bukama lie on the **Lualaba (Upper Congo) River**. The major lake ports are **Kalemie** on **Lake Tanganyika**, and **Goma** and **Bukavu** on **Lake Kivu**.

**PORTUGAL, RELATIONS WITH.** Relations between Congo and Portugal date back 500 years, to the 1480s when **Diogo Cão** and other Portuguese **explorers** sailed up the mouth of the **Congo River** and encountered people of the **Kongo Kingdom**. Initially, relations were close. The Kongo kings asked for **missionaries**, technical advisors, and, occasionally, military assistance. In exchange, they offered **trade** concessions, **ivory**, and **slaves**. Subjects of the kingdom went to Portugal to study and represent the kingdom at the Portuguese royal court.

The relationship became primarily a commercial one in the early 1600s, as the Kongo Kingdom began to decay and other European maritime powers started to compete for the region's resources. The arrival of the Belgians following the **Berlin Conference** of 1885 completed the displacement of the Portuguese as the primary European power in Congo. However, relations continued to be close because of the proximity of the Portuguese colonies of **Angola** and Cabinda and the large number of Portuguese traders and merchants who had established themselves in the territory.

Following **independence**, the Congolese **government** began to support openly the Angolan struggle for independence, and the population of Angolan **refugees** in the country grew steadily. These factors strained relations with Portugal. In a speech before the **United Nations** in 1973, **Mobutu Sese Seko** condemned Portugal for blocking independence in Angola and its other African colonies. Later that year, the Portuguese embassy in **Kinshasa** was besieged by an angry mob. The embassy was closed, and the Portuguese diplomats went home. **Zairianization** policies that began that year also dispossessed many Portuguese traders, farmers, and businessmen, further straining relations.

Following Angola's independence, relations began to improve, and the return of properties nationalized under Zairianization brought some Portuguese back. In the mid-1980s, relations were considered excellent. Mobutu paid a visit to Portugal in 1984, and President Ramalho Eanes reciprocated that same year. During the “**pillages**” of 1991–92, some Portuguese merchants sustained heavy losses. A significant number left, but many others rebuilt and continued the centuries-old relationship. Trade between Portugal and Congo has remained quite small since independence.

**POVERTY.** Although Congo is considered one of the wealthiest nations in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of mineral and human resources, poverty is widespread and affects all but a small elite. According to **United Nations** figures, 80 percent of the **population** lived below the poverty level during the economic crisis of the 1990s. This number increased rapidly during the **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila** in 1998–2003. Per capita income, which rose to \$200 per year in the early 1970s, fell to \$130 by the mid-1990s. It plummeted to \$65 in 2000, but increased again to \$141 in 2006, according to the **World Bank**. These figures place the country among the most impoverished nations in the world. Subsistence **agriculture** is a way of life for most rural dwellers, who constitute 60 percent of the population, but urban dwellers often maintain gardens to supplement their incomes. During the early 1990s, **inflation** and recession reduced **wages** among public sector workers to \$5–25 per month. The economic hardships of most citizens contrasted sharply with the conspicuous consumption of the political *élites* who, although they represented less than 1 percent of

the population, controlled most of the wealth in the country. *See also* ECONOMY.

**PRESIDENT.** The presidency, as envisioned at **independence** by the **Loi Fondamentale** (Fundamental Law), was meant to be a largely ceremonial office. The power of **government** was to rest largely with the **prime minister** and **parliament**. However, Congo's first president, **Joseph Kasavubu**, repeatedly used his powers to depose his prime ministers and, on several occasions, he caused a constitutional crisis when parliament refused to accept their dismissals.

Following the **coup d'état** of 1965, **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** became president with the authority to issue decrees and ordinances with the power of law. With the **constitution** of 1967, and especially that of 1974, power increasingly became concentrated in the presidency until it became the predominant force in **politics** and government. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Bureau du Président (Office of the President) was a branch of government that had virtually no budget limitations and was staffed with the best and brightest administrators and *cadres*. The president of Zaire was the president of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) party, which was the supreme institution of state, as well as head of the **armed forces** and six organs of government. Under the 1974 constitution, the president was elected by direct vote and could serve an unlimited number of seven-year terms. Mobutu ran unopposed in 1970, 1977, and 1984, and was elected each time by more than 99 percent of the vote.

With the advent of multipartyism in 1990, the presidency lost some of its influence. **Opposition** parties proliferated, and the **National Conference** sought to decentralize political and administrative power and create a **federal**, parliamentary system. Mobutu initially sought to place himself above politics and even resigned as head of the MPR for a year. However, he returned to marshal his supporters against the opposition. During the **democratic transition**, Mobutu remained the dominant political force in the country and repeatedly blocked the opposition through political patronage, parliamentary maneuvers and, when these failed, use of force by **security** elements that he ensured remained loyal to him alone.

When the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) took power in May 1997, the AFDL leader

and the country's new president, **Laurent Kabila**, promised to draft a new constitution and hold **elections** by 1999. The AFDL indicated that it favored a system similar to that established by the constitution of 1964, in which parliament played a major role in government. However, with the constitution under revision and political demonstrations banned, the presidency continued to form the backbone of government. President Kabila thus continued to rule by decree, especially during the **civil war** that started on 2 August 1998.

Kabila was assassinated in January 2001 and his son, **Joseph Kabila**, became president in late January. In December 2002, the belligerents signed the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI) that set up a transitional government, which included the president and four vice presidents, called the 4 + 1 system. This government remained in power from 2003 to 2006. Free elections took place in late 2006 and, after the second round of presidential elections, Joseph Kabila was elected president for a five-year term, renewable once. *See also* LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM.

**PRESS.** *See* MEDIA.

**PRESSES UNIVERSITAIRES DU ZAÏRE (PUZ).** The official printing and publishing house of the Université Nationale du Zaïre (UNAZA), PUZ was established in October 1972 to disseminate monographs, textbooks, and studies of the country by Congolese authors and researchers. During its early years, PUZ published hundreds of titles a year. In subsequent years, the number of titles was reduced considerably because of budget constraints. As a result, many academics published their own works or sought publishers outside the country.

**PRICE CONTROLS.** At various times and to varying degrees the **government** has used price controls in an attempt to manage the **economy** and meet popular concerns over **inflation**. Prices paid for **agricultural** products traditionally were set low to favor urban populations and maintain political stability. Prices paid by government marketing boards to miners for **gold**, **diamonds**, and other minerals also tended to be low, while **petroleum** prices at the pump were usu-

ally subsidized. In addition, prices paid to producers of agricultural **exports**, such as **coffee**, were kept low to maintain an overvalued **currency** that allowed for **imports**. These policies tended to encourage the consumption of imported products and discourage farming and the legal marketing of minerals and agricultural produce. They also encouraged **smuggling** and undermined official exports and the government tax base.

In mid-1983, the government liberalized many of these policies. Agricultural and mineral prices were still set, but at levels that removed overall subsidies. In the case of fuel, for example, high-octane gasoline, used primarily for personal cars, was set high enough to subsidize diesel fuel, which was used primarily for commercial **transportation**. A similar pattern was adopted for agricultural products. In addition, restrictions were lifted on farming and the marketing of minerals by private individuals, leading to significant increases in productivity in these sectors. Controls were further loosened in 1987. However, any control over prices disappeared when inflation accelerated to triple-digit levels in the late 1980s and prices began to rise on a daily basis in the 1990s. Both the **Laurent Kabila** and **Joseph Kabila** governments continued some price controls, especially on the price of gasoline to keep it within the reach of drivers and avoid riots that might have destabilized the polity.

**PRIME MINISTER.** The office of prime minister historically has been the second most powerful political post in the nation, although at **independence** it was meant to be the most powerful position. Under the **Loi Fondamentale** (Fundamental Law) that served as **constitution** from 1960 to 1964, the office of prime minister was considered to be the leading position in **government**, balanced by **parliament** and the power of oversight from the largely ceremonial presidency. **Patrice Lumumba**, **Cyrille Adoula**, **Moïse Tshombe**, and **Évariste Kimba** were the most notable prime ministers during that period. However, a lack of definition in the division of powers and the absence of legal precedents led to a series of constitutional crises. These were caused by political standoffs when the **president** tried to dismiss the prime minister but parliament refused to support the dismissal. The paralysis of government that accompanied these crises led to a loss of faith in the system. As a result, the constitution

of 1964 gave the president unquestioned power to dismiss the prime minister and cabinet and, with parliamentary approval, appoint a new government.

Following the **coup d'état** that brought **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** to power in 1965, the post of prime minister was suspended, then eliminated by decree on 26 October 1966. The constitution of 1967 institutionalized the move, making the president the head of government. In July 1977, as part of a series of liberalization moves aimed at countering international criticism following the first **Shaba War**, the post of prime minister was resurrected but renamed "first state commissioner." The first state commissioner coordinated the activities of the ministries, renamed **departments**, and was the second-ranking official in government. However, the position was overshadowed by the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) party, the **MPR Political Bureau** headed by the president, and by the president's position as head of the **Executive Council** or cabinet. **Mpinga Kasenda**, **Nguza Karl-I-Bond**, **Umba di Lutete**, and **Kengo wa Dondo** were the most notable leaders to serve in the post during the 1980s. Initially, these technocrats did not remain in the position long enough to assimilate enough power to constitute a threat to the president.

On **24 April 1990**, under increasing international and domestic pressure for political reform, Mobutu announced the **democratic transition**. **Crispin Mulumba Lukoji** was named prime minister to oversee what was to be a one-year process, but he resigned a few months later after the controversial **National Conference** collapsed in chaos. With the election of **Étienne Tshisekedi** by the **Conference Nationale Souveraine** (CNS) in August 1992, the prime minister's office became a source of **opposition** to and confrontation with the president.

Tshisekedi ordered a number of fiscal reforms that included the dismissal of the governor of the **central bank** and the head of the collections department of the customs office. Both were Mobutu allies, and their offices reportedly were sources of virtually unlimited cash for the president and his friends. Mobutu refused to accept the dismissals and eventually sent troops to guard the central bank building and prevent Tshisekedi from entering the prime minister's offices. Tshisekedi was dismissed in 1993 and replaced by **Faustin Birindwa**, his former senior advisor. Following a year of political

paralysis in which each leader claimed to be the legitimate head of government, Mobutu removed Birindwa and appointed Kengo.

When troops of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) took **Kisangani** in a major victory in March 1997, Mobutu dismissed Kengo and reappointed Tshisekedi prime minister. He then dismissed him again after the fall of **Lubumbashi** on 9 April 1997 and replaced him with General Likulia Bolongo, who fled the country with Mobutu on 16 May, the day before the AFDL arrived in Kinshasa. AFDL leader **Laurent Kabila** was sworn in as president on 29 May 1997 and appointed a cabinet that did not include a prime minister. The **civil war** against Kabila further reinforced the power of the presidency. It was not until the promulgation of the 2006 constitution that a post of prime minister was again part of Congolese government.

After **Joseph Kabila** won the presidential elections in October 2006, his political party, the **Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie** (PPRD), only gained 111 out of 500 parliamentary seats and was thus unable to form a government. However, the pro-Kabila coalition reached a total of 224 seats. The final results indicated the **Parti Lumumbiste Unifié** (PALU) of **Antoine Gizenga** had won 34 seats. An alliance, the **Alliance de la Majorité Présidentielle** (AMP) between the presidential coalition and the PALU, was necessary, and Gizenga was made the prime minister of Congo. In late 2008, he resigned stating that his age did not allow him to continue. Joseph Kabila appointed another member of the PALU, **Adolphe Muzito**, as prime minister. *See also* LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM.

**PRISONS.** *See* PENAL SYSTEM.

**PRIVATIZATION.** A term given to the program in the mid-1980s of reducing state dominance in certain sectors of the Congolese **economy**, in particular **agriculture**, **transportation**, and **diamond and gold mining**. It should not be confused with **Retrocession**, which was the term used in 1974–75 to return enterprises nationalized under **Zairianization** to private and joint private/public ownership. In 1994, **Léon Kengo wa Dondo** launched a broader privatization program that envisaged joint ownership by domestic and foreign



investors of state-owned companies, including state-owned airline, river transportation, and mining companies. The program, however, was slowed by the fiscal chaos of the mid-1990s and the **civil wars** of the late 1990s. By 2007, attempts had been made to create joint ventures and to pursue a cautious privatization policy under the guidance of the **International Monetary Fund**.

**PROPHETS.** The name given to religious leaders who developed their own teachings, often based on **Christian** principles, and drew a group of followers who accepted their vision of life and the after-life. Prophets were numerous in early Congolese history and, although many played small roles, others developed followings large enough to be considered a danger by colonial authorities. One of the most famous prophets to incur the wrath of early European **missionaries** was **Kimpa Vita Nsimba Ndonga Beatriz**, who lived in the 1700s and came to be called the “Black Joan of Arc.” She was burned at the stake by **Portuguese** religious and civilian authorities after she developed a strong following and was proclaimed to have delivered a child of virgin birth. Her sect eventually died out.

Twentieth-century prophet **Simon Kimbangu** developed a following that grew into a major church. Kimbangu was imprisoned in 1921 after reports of his “miracles” began to disturb colonial authorities. Kimbangu died in prison in 1951, but Kimbanguism continued to grow and was admitted to the World Council of Churches in 1969, the first of several African churches to be recognized by Western church groups.

Although prophets were viewed with some suspicion during the 1970s when **Authenticity** was in force, they were usually tolerated by the **government** if they did not violate the law and social taboos or threaten state **security**. Since the mid-1990s, a number of prophet-led churches have mushroomed in Congo, possibly because of ongoing economic hardship. *See also* KIMBANGUIST CHURCH; MES-SIANIC AND SYNCRETIC MOVEMENTS.

**PROTESTANT CHURCH.** Protestant **missionaries** arrived in Congo after their Roman Catholic counterparts, founding the first Protestant mission among the **Kongo** in 1878. In addition to spreading

the gospel, they were responsible for standardizing and developing written forms of numerous Congolese **languages** in order to publish and disseminate the Bible and religious literature in local languages. The Roman **Catholic Church** was less active in this field since during this period it preferred to have its word interpreted orally by its priests. Protestant churches formed the Congo Continuation Committee (CCC) in 1911 to encourage contact and cooperation and to minimize competition among themselves. The CCC became the Congo Protestant Council in 1924 and formally renamed itself the **Église du Christ au Congo** (ECC) in 1934.

During the colonial era, Belgian authorities favored Catholic missions, but were nevertheless supportive of Protestants and, at **independence**, 46 Protestant missionary groups were working in the country, primarily in the areas of **health care**, **education**, and the training of African church leaders. With the advent of independence, efforts intensified to Africanize the church hierarchy, and Rev. Pierre Shaumba was elected the first Congolese secretary-general of the organization. Following his retirement, he was replaced by Rev. (later Archbishop) **Jean Bokeleale**. From 1971 until 1997, the ECC was known as the **Église du Christ au Zaïre** (ECZ). The ECZ claimed 83 member denominations and 10 million members throughout the country in 1982.

During the **Authenticity** period of the early 1970s, the church came under pressure from **government**, and many foreign missionaries left. Like other religious organizations, the Protestant Church's publications were banned and its youth organization was taken over by the **Jeunesse du Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (JMPR) in 1972. In 1974, its schools were taken over by the state, its **university** campus at **Kisangani** was absorbed into the Université Nationale du Zaïre (UNAZA), and the public display of religious artifacts was banned. These measures were gradually rescinded in subsequent years and, in 1983, **Mobutu Sese Seko** publicly encouraged church groups abroad to return to help reconstruct **social services**.

By the 1990s, many missions, hospitals, and schools were again operating. They frequently did so entirely under Congolese religious leaders, despite considerable financial hardships caused by the economic crisis. In 1997, Bokeleale died and was replaced by Vice-President **Bohdo Pierre Marini**.

**PROVINCES.** During the colonial era, Congo was divided administratively into six provinces: **Leopoldville**, **Kasai**, **Équateur**, **Orientale**, **Kivu**, and **Katanga**. Provinces were divided into districts and districts into territories. Their number was expanded to 21 in June 1963 in an attempt to dilute regional power bases, address intra-regional tensions and strengthen the central **government**. Their number was reduced to 12 in April 1966. Under the administrative reorganization of 24 December 1966, they were further consolidated into eight provinces and the capital district of **Kinshasa**. The provinces were renamed **regions** on 19 July 1972, and the country was divided into eight regions and the capital district of Kinshasa. The regions were **Bas-Zaïre**, **Bandundu**, **Équateur**, **Haut-Zaïre**, **Kasai Occidental**, **Kasai Oriental**, **Kivu**, and **Shaba**. The number was increased to 11 in May 1988, with the division of Kivu into three regions: **Nord-Kivu**, **Sud-Kivu**, and **Maniema**. The regions were divided into urban and rural subregions. Rural subregions were further divided into zones that, in principle, were to contain no more than 200,000 residents.

Under the **constitution** of 1964, the provinces were granted considerable autonomy, with their own assemblies and executive branches. With the advent of the **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** government, however, and the consolidation of power in the presidency during the 1970s, regions lost most of their powers. Under the constitution of 1974, which institutionalized the single-party system and fused it with the state, regional assemblies became consultative rather than legislative, and laws passed in Kinshasa applied equally to all regions. The **military** and the administrative, legislative, and judicial branches of government were divided along regional and subregional lines. The regions were administered by governors who wielded considerable power over the local administrations. However, local military commanders and officials of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) party also enjoyed considerable influence.

In the 1970s and 1980s, regional governors and military commanders were routinely assigned to regions other than their home areas in an effort to combat **tribalism** and prevent them from building personal power bases. However, this policy began to change in

the late 1980s and, with the advent of multipartyism in 1990, was abandoned. In the 1990s, as the influence and solvency of the central government declined, the regions took on additional responsibilities and autonomy. Governors were appointed to their home regions in what Mobutu called “geopolitics.” Many levied their own taxes (obtained from local publicly owned companies), paid local **security** forces, and issued their own “visas” to travelers from other parts of the country.

When the government of **Laurent Kabila** was installed after the fall of Mobutu in May 1997, the regions were renamed provinces once again and Bas-Zaïre, Shaba, and Haut-Zaïre became Bas-Congo, Katanga, and Orientale. The 2006 constitution, which took effect February 2009, divided the country into 25 provinces and the capital Kinshasa.

**PYGMIES.** The earliest known inhabitants of the **Congo River Basin**, the Pygmies were **forest** dwellers who are best known for their small size and hunting prowess. Adults usually grow only to about 1 meter (3–4 feet) in height. Pygmies are thought to be of **Bantu** origin, but some anthropologists believe they are more closely related to Khoisan-speakers of southern and eastern Africa. Seminomadic hunters and gatherers, they traditionally live in temporary houses of branches and leaves that allow them to move about easily. The reasons for their frequent displacements are a source of much speculation. Some say they avoided other groups that historically have enslaved them. They are known to have adopted the **languages** and customs of their neighbors. Others say their migratory patterns were related to changes in **food** sources.

The largest known group in Congo inhabits the forest and swamps above **Lake Mai-Ndombe** in the northwest. They are part of a larger Pygmy group inhabiting parts of northern **Congo-Brazzaville**, Gabon, and Cameroon. Another major group lives in the northeastern **Ituri Forest** and parts of **Kivu** northeast of the **Lualaba** and **Lo-mami Rivers**. In the 1990s, some citizens, taking note of the historical discrimination against Pygmies and their increasing assimilation into the general **population**, began to criticize the term, saying Pygmies are merely “short Bantus.”

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**RADIO.** *See* MEDIA; RADIO-TELEVISION NATIONALE CONGOLAISE (RTNC).

**RADIO-TÉLÉVISION NATIONALE CONGOLAISE (RTNC)** [NATIONAL CONGOLESE RADIO AND TELEVISION]. The RTNC represents the **government** agency in charge of overseeing the electronic **media** in Congo, following the installation of the **Laurent Kabila** government in May 1997. It replaced the **Office Zaïrois de Radio et de Télévision** that existed until 1997. Its primary purpose is to operate the government-owned television and radio stations, the latter renamed La **Voix du Peuple** by the Kabila government to replace La Voix du Zaïre. The agency, however, was also responsible for licensing private radio stations, which began to proliferate in the late 1990s. For one week in late 1997, it banned rebroadcasts by local stations of transmission from international broadcasters, but rescinded the order after protests from the international community. Since the end of the transition in 2006, the RTNC has been more liberal in granting licenses. *See also* TELECOMMUNICATIONS.

**“RADIO TROTTOIRE.”** Literally translated “sidewalk radio,” Radio Trottoire was the overactive Congolese rumor mill that even **Mobutu Sese Seko** acknowledged was so influential that it occasionally obliged a response on the part of the **government**. The influence of “*radio trottoire*” has declined since the transition government ended in 2006. A number of observers attribute it to the large number of newspapers and radios in **Kinshasa**.

**RAILWAYS.** Five separate railway systems totaling 5,169 km operate in Congo. They were owned and operated jointly by **government** agencies and private companies until 1974 when they were nationalized under **Zairianization** and taken over by the newly established Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Zaïrois (SNCZ; National Zairian Railway Company). The railways were partly **privatized** in the mid-1990s in an effort to revitalize them after the collapse of most government-operated services during the economic crisis of the early 1990s. Since the mid-1970s, deteriorating track and rolling

stock and a shortage of spare parts and fuel have crippled the operation of most lines.

Railways connecting **river ports** were the main means by which the colonial administration sought to evacuate raw materials from the territory and bring in manufactured goods. They were built at great human and material cost, primarily between the 1890s and 1930s. Thousands of laborers, local and foreign, as well as hundreds of European technicians, died from disease, **malnutrition**, and accidents during the construction and under the heavy loads of **portage**.

The oldest line was the Chemin de Fer Matadi-Kinshasa (CFMK), which linked the ocean port of **Matadi** to **Kinshasa** and the river and rail network that serviced most of the country. Construction began in Matadi in 1889 on the line to Thysville (now **Mbanza-Ngungu**) and was completed in 1898. Construction on the extension to the capital began in the 1920s and was completed in 1932. The CFMK provided the major land link on national territory between the Atlantic Ocean and 95 percent of the **Belgian Congo**, which, because of the cataracts on the **Congo River** between Kinshasa and Matadi, is basically landlocked.

The longest system, the Chemin de Fer Kinshasa-Dilolo-Lubumbashi (KDL), connects the **mining** area of southern **Katanga Province** to the port of Ilebo on the **Kasai River** and, ultimately, to Kinshasa by the Kasai and Congo Rivers. The 1,645-km-long railway did not actually reach Kinshasa, although plans existed from the 1920s for an Ilebo-Kinshasa leg. The first section of the line, from **Elisabethville** to Bukama, which lies on the upper end of the navigable part of the **Lualaba River**, was begun in 1911 and completed in 1918. In 1923, construction of a 1,123-km line connecting Bukama to Ilebo was begun and completed in 1928. The final 522-km leg of the system from **Tenke** to **Dilolo** was completed in 1931 in order to connect the KDL system to the **Benguela Railway** through **Angola**. The Dilolo-Benguela route was widely used to export minerals from Katanga to the Angolan port of **Lobito** on the Atlantic Ocean until the Angolan civil war closed the Benguela Railway in 1975.

In eastern Congo, the Chemin de Fer des Grands Lacs (CFL) was a 960-km truncated system that connected the navigable portion of the Lualaba River to the navigable portion of the upper Congo River. The Lualaba flows into the Congo River (and is considered part of

the Congo River by local cartographers) but commercial navigation is impeded by cataracts between Kongolo and **Kindu** and between Ubundu and **Kisangani**. The first, 125-km-long section of the line from Kisangani to Ubundu, opened in 1906. The second, 355-km section from Kindu to Kongolo, became operational in 1911 and extended to Kabalo in 1938. A 275-km branch was later added that extended the system eastward to **Kalemie** on **Lake Tanganyika**, where goods were transhipped across the lake by steamer to Tanganika (present-day **Tanzania**) and transported by rail to Dar es Salaam. In 1956, the CFL system was linked to the KDL system by a 201-km branch from Kabalo to Kamina. The fourth system, the Chemin de Fer de Mayombe (CFM), was a 140-km line linking the ocean port of **Boma** in **Bas-Congo Province** to the agricultural area of Tshela near Cabinda.

The fifth system, the Chemins de Fer Vicinaux du Zaïre, was a 1,025-km narrow-gauge railway in northeastern Congo that connected agricultural areas in Mugbere and Isiro in the east and Bondo in the north to the port of Aketi on the Itumbiri River, a tributary of the Congo River. The line was extended to **Bumba** on the Congo River in 1973.

A multimillion-dollar plan was announced by the Congolese government in 1984 to rehabilitate and modernize the railways as part of a \$135 million dollar project to improve **transportation** infrastructure. However, it was stalled by the government's growing financial insolvency. In 1995, the government of Prime Minister **Léon Kengo wa Dondo** opened ownership of some of the lines to foreign investors in order to revive them. A company named **Sizarail** was formed with 49 percent government ownership and 51 percent **Belgian** and **South African** participation and began operating that year. It rehabilitated the Lubumbashi–Ilebo line and the line from Kamina to Kalemie on Lake Tanganyika. In the first year of operation, the company invested \$6 million and made a \$1 million profit on \$66 million gross revenues. Sizarail's operations were disrupted first by the rebellion of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) in 1997 and by the rebellion of the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD) beginning in 1998.

In 1997, the **Laurent Kabila** government announced a \$507 million program aimed at revitalizing the railroads over the coming three

years. However, Kabila never invested in the railways, as he faced a **civil war** that lasted until 2003. As of late 2008, the rail system remains the only economically viable means of traveling or transporting goods across the vast interior for most travelers and commercial shippers, despite sporadic service, overcrowding, and disrupted schedules. *See also* NATIONAL WAY.

**RAINFOREST.** This dense, triple-canopy tropical **forest** covers most of the **Congo River Basin** and the northern third of the Congo territory. Heavy rainfall, combined with a thin layer of topsoil, makes the forest a delicate ecological **environment** that is poorly suited to intensive **agriculture**. **Timbering** and **rubber** collection have been widely carried out in the forest, but a large number of natural barriers prevented widespread deforestation of all but the **Mayombe Forest** in **Kongo Central Province**. Nevertheless, ecologists became concerned in the 1990s over agreements signed between the **government** and various business groups allowing uncontrolled timbering of about one-third of the country's rainforests.

The Congo rainforest is one of the least-explored regions on earth. Poor soil and the prevalence of disease there make farming and animal husbandry difficult. As a result, it is one of the most sparsely populated regions in the country. The forest is believed to hide interesting archaeological artifacts and possibly important mineral reserves, but the dense canopy makes aerial surveys difficult. The area has important hydroelectric potential and contains millions of species of flora and fauna that have yet to be studied by science. Environmentalists believe that intense commercial farming is not possible in the area without serious damage to the ecology, but controlled exploitation of such resources as fish, nuts, rubber, and materials for pharmaceutical products is feasible.

**RASSEMBLEMENT CONGOLAIS POUR LA DÉMOCRATIE (RCD) [CONGOLESE RALLY FOR DEMOCRACY].** The political wing of a **rebellion** launched on 2 August 1998, by former members of the **Laurent Kabila government** and former **Mobutu Sese Seko** supporters. Headed by **Ernest Wamba dia Wamba**, an academic from **Kongo Central Province** who spent many years in exile in **Tanzania**, the RCD also included among its leaders a



number of **Tutsi**, and **Arthur Z'Ahidi Ngoma**, an opposition leader who was subsequently imprisoned by the Kabila government for violating a ban on political activity. RCD **military** forces were led by **Jean-Pierre Ondekane**, a career officer from **Katanga Province** who commanded the Mobutu forces in **Lubumbashi** until he joined the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) when it took the city in May 1997.

The RCD was beset by internal rivalries in late 1998 and sought to broaden its base of support by announcing a national assembly in January 1999. Wamba was officially ousted from the RCD in June 1999. He moved to **Kisangani**, where he created the RCD-Kisangani to distinguish it from the RCD-Goma. Continuous rivalries between Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers over the control of Kisangani forced Wamba to move his headquarters to **Bunia**. The RCD-K became internally divided and in late 1999. However, after the peace agreement of December 2002, called the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI), only the RCD-Goma received a vice-presidency and several ministerial portfolios in the transitional government. Although it was able to win four seats in the Senate, it only secured four parliamentary seats in the national assembly in the legislative elections of July 2006.

**REBELLIONS.** *See* CIVIL WARS.

**REFUGEES.** Since **independence**, Congo has been home to hundreds of thousands of refugees, mostly displaced by war and repression in neighboring countries. The first major group of refugees fled the war in **Angola** beginning in 1959. In the 1960s, Angolan refugees in Congo averaged 417,000 people per year. This trend continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Although repatriation efforts by the Office of the **United Nations** High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had returned more than half of them by the 1990s, Angolan refugees numbered 250,000 by the late 1990s. From 2000 to 2007, their number declined to average 140,000 a year.

The second source of refugees in Congo has been from **Rwanda**. In 1959, 60,000 Rwandan **Tutsi** fleeing pre-independence ethnic strife moved into eastern Congo. Others arrived from Rwanda

and **Burundi** after interethnic fighting in 1975 and 1988. In 1993, 100,000 **Hutu** refugees fled interethnic violence in Burundi in which the elected president, Melchior Ndadaye, was assassinated.

In 1994, 1.2 million Rwandan Hutu fled to **Nord-Kivu** and **Sud-Kivu Provinces** after a four-year civil war and the death of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana that led to two months of violence in which at least 500,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed. Activities by pro-Habyarimana elements in the refugee camps, which included attacks on local villages and international aid agencies, caused the **government** of Congo to announce in August 1995 that it would repatriate Rwandan refugees by force if necessary. The government relented under international pressure, but after the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) led by **Laurent Kabila** seized the area in late 1996, 660,000 refugees returned home. Some 250,000 Hutu fled deeper into Congo. Less than 20,000 were eventually repatriated or crossed into **Congo-Brazzaville**, and 233,000 were massacred over the ensuing months by Rwandan troops, the Rwandan Patriotic Army, which backed the Kabila offensive.

In addition to these large groups, the UNHCR estimated in the late 1990s that there were 110,000 refugees from southern **Sudan** in Congo, 10,000 from **Uganda**, and 1,300 from other African nations. In 2001, Congo had 305,000 refugees from neighboring countries. From 2002 to 2006, the number of refugees averaged 203,000 per year, mostly from Angola and Sudan. The rest were from Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda. Less than 6,000 were from Congo-Brazzaville. In 2007, Congo-Kinshasa received 177,500 refugees. More than 110,000 were from Angola and 30,000 from Rwanda.

Most African refugees came to Congo as the result of civil wars and repression in their home countries since the early 1960s. This trend continued, with an average inflow of 550,000 refugees a year in the 1970s and the 1980s. The end of the Cold War brought political liberalization in Central Africa and a decline of refugee movements. However, another spate of refugee movement began in 1992, peaking in 1994, as a result of massive influxes of Hutu refugees from Rwanda. However, the number of refugees into Congo has declined since the late 1990s as the result of civil wars within Congo.

While the influx of refugees into Congo has declined since the late 1990s, the number of Congolese refugees in neighboring countries has increased. Congolese refugees in Central Africa remained quite small in the 1970s and 1980s, averaging less than 10,000 a year. The civil war against Mobutu increased the number of Congolese refugees from about 52,000 in 1996 to 136,000 in 1997, but declined a year later. The **civil war**, which started in early August 1998 against Laurent Kabila, increased the number of Congolese refugees to 240,000 in 1999. From 2000 to 2005, Congolese refugees in Central Africa averaged 400,000 a year, with the bulk of these refugees going to **Tanzania**, Congo-Brazzaville, and **Zambia**.

Although the war against Kabila forced hundreds of thousands of Congolese across borders, a large number of Congolese were internally displaced by the war. The number of internally displaced persons increased from a mere 200,000 in 1998 to 1.8 million in 2000. It reached its peak of 3.5 million people in 2003 when the transitional government took office. Although the number of internally displaced Congolese declined in subsequent years, it remained on average above 500,000 between 2004 and 2007 as the result of political instability in eastern Congo. Most of these internally displaced persons were cared for by nongovernmental organizations and the **Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo** (MONUC). *See also* ETHNIC CLEANSING.

**RÉGIE DE DISTRIBUTION D'EAU ET D'ÉLECTRICITÉ (REGIDESO) [WATER AND ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION AGENCY]**. A **government** agency responsible for water and electric utility administration and development, REGIDESO was responsible for 7 million meters of pipe to 202,828 registered clients in 1985. It employed 4,180 agents and pumped 1.75 million cubic meters of water during the year. It also furnished electricity provided by small **petroleum**-powered complexes to about 23,000 clients in 40 towns in the interior until 1979, when these operations were turned over to the **Société Nationale d'Électricité** (SNEL), the national **electrical power** agency. REGIDESO was one of the state-owned companies that weathered the economic crises of the early 1990s relatively well and managed to provide water to customers with relative regularity. However, in the 2000s, the company could not provide water to many

cities on a regular basis because it had no financial resources to import spare parts and chemicals.

**REGIONS.** *See* PROVINCES.

**RELIGION.** Citizens of Congo are free to practice any religion as long as it is not subversive or abusive to others. Most are deeply religious. The influence of Christian missions has been strong since the 1870s, and an estimated three-fourths of the **population** avow some ties with **Christianity**, although their faith may be mixed with traditional practices and beliefs. The remaining people are considered to have been relatively untouched by outside religious influences and adhere to traditional, sometimes called animist beliefs. An estimated 50 percent of the population practices some form of Roman Catholicism, 25 percent are **Protestant**, and 15 percent adhere to smaller Christian-related groups, such as the **Kimbanguist Church**, Rosicrucians, Celeste, and others. About 10 percent of the population is Muslim. Figures reported by the churches tend to be higher.

In the early 1970s, the Congolese **government** sought to institute a secular state during a period of intense **nationalism** called **Authenticity**. In May 1972, Congolese were told to abandon their Christian given names for “authentic Zairian” ones. Later that year, the state took over church schools and **youth** groups and banned religious publications. In 1974, the public display of religious artifacts and symbols was banned. However, these measures were gradually rescinded. Church-owned schools were returned in the 1980s and, by 1990, many Congolese had resumed using their Christian names. *See also* CATHOLIC CHURCH; ÉGLISE DU CHRIST AU CONGO; JAMAA; KITAWALA MOVEMENT; MESSIANIC AND SYNCRETIC MOVEMENTS; MISSIONARIES; PROPHETS; SPIRITUALISM, FETISHISM, SORCERY, AND WITCHCRAFT.

**RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO (RCD) [DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO].** *See* CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF.

**RÉPUBLIQUE DU ZAÏRE.** *See* ZAÏRE, REPUBLIQUE DU.

**RÉPUBLIQUE POPULAIRE DU CONGO (RPC).** *See* CONGO, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (PRC).

**RETROCESSION.** The name the **Mobutu Sese Seko** government gave to the policy announced on 30 December 1974 that reversed **Zairianization** and returned **nationalized** foreign-owned enterprises to their former owners. Under the program, medium-sized businesses, primarily farms and merchant operations, were returned outright, and ownership of up to 40 percent of large enterprises and those operating in certain "strategic" sectors were returned to the private sector. The level of private ownership allowed in these ventures was later increased to 60 percent. The policy was further extended in the 1980s with **privatization**.

**REVOLTS.** *See* CIVIL WARS.

**RHODES, CECIL (1853–1902).** British colonizer who extended British influence over parts of southern Africa and competed against the agents of **Leopold II** for control of the **copper** belt that crossed the region of **Katanga** and northern Rhodesia (now **Zambia**).

**RIVERS.** Congo has more than 12,000 km of navigable rivers. These rivers were the primary means of early exploration and development of the territory. A few rivers form part of the hydrosystem of the **Great Rift Valley** lakes in the east, but most of the country's rivers are part of the **Congo River Basin** system, drained by the **Congo River**, the world's second-largest river after the Amazon in terms of volume of water (120,000 cubic meter per second). The system straddles the equator and drains regions in both the northern and southern hemispheres. Because the Congo Basin has rainy seasons at different times of the year, most of the system is navigable during the entire year. The Congo River, however, is marked by three sets of cataracts that prevent commercial navigation between **Kinshasa** and **Matadi**, **Ubundu** and **Kisangani**, and **Kongolo** and **Kindu**. To circumvent the cataracts, a system of **railways** was constructed between 1890 and 1932 that remains today.

The headwaters of the Congo River are formed by the tributaries of the **Lualaba River**, which rises near the border with **Zambia**. Tribu-

taries of the Lualaba, or Upper Congo River, include the **Lufira**, **Luvua**, Luama, and Elila Rivers in the Katanga and **Kivu Provinces**, and the **Lomami**, Aruwimi, and Itimbiri Rivers below Kisangani. One of the major tributaries of the Congo River is the **Kasai River** system, which extends into a number of southern Congolese provinces. The **port** of **Ilebo** on the Kasai River is a major transshipment point for minerals exported from Katanga via the **National Way**. The Kasai River's major tributaries are the **Kwango**, **Kwilu**, Lukenie, and **Sankuru** Rivers. A second tributary system drains the southern part of **Équateur Province** via the **Tshuapa**, Lomela, and Songela Rivers, which join the Congo River at **Mbandaka**. A third tributary system is the **Ubangi River** system that drains Équateur Province via the Lua and Giri Rivers and is navigable only during the rainy season. *See also* RAINFALL; TRANSPORTATION.

**ROADS.** Congo had 145,000 km of roads in 1959, mostly built before **independence**. In 1985, there were approximately 2,600 km of asphalt roads in the country, and 40,000 km of treated roads were maintained. About one-half of the system consisted of dirt tracks. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the governments of the **United States** (U.S.) and **Japan** funded bridge-building and road improvement projects as part of their bilateral aid programs. The Japanese helped build a suspension bridge across the **Congo River** at **Matadi** in 1983. In the 1980s, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) began a program to build bridges in the **Bandundu** area aimed at replacing log-crossings that were considered the weakest links in the system. Another program was launched to repair and refurbish the 300 **river** ferries in operation in the country. However, the road system had deteriorated considerably by the mid-1990s because of lack of maintenance. By then, roads in some areas were being maintained by local governments and private businesses. The rural road system was built primarily to connect **agricultural** and mineral-producing areas to the river and **rail** systems. Major asphalt highways in western Congo link **Kinshasa** to the sea **ports** of **Boma** and Matadi and Kinshasa to **Kikwit**. In the southeast, they link the **mining** centers of **Kolwezi** and **Lubumbashi** to northern **Zambia**. Most other highways are either dirt or gravel. Many of the roads through lowlands are impassable during heavy rains.

The **Office des Routes** agency was created by the government in 1972 to oversee road maintenance and construction, but it was largely inoperable in the mid-1990s. Following the **military** offensive that brought **Laurent Kabila** to power in May 1997, his government announced a major program to improve roads and infrastructure in the country, but particularly in the east, which had suffered from decades of neglect. However, he was assassinated in early 2001 without any commitment being made to improve roads. By December 2008, Congo had less than 10,000 kilometers of road, mostly located in Kinshasa as well as in **Kongo Central**, **Haut-Katanga**, and **Lualaba** Provinces. *See also* TRANSPORTATION.

**ROBERTO, HOLDEN (1923–2007).** A descendant of the monarchy of the **Kongo Kingdom**, Roberto was born on 2 January 1923 in São Salvador in **Angola**. His family moved to **Leopoldville** in 1925. In 1940, he graduated from a Baptist mission school. He worked for the Belgian Finance Ministry in Léopoldville, **Bukavu**, and **Stanleyville** for eight years. In 1951, Roberto became involved in the Cold War rivalry. In the late 1950s, the **United States** (U.S.) National Security Council began paying Roberto \$6,000 annually until 1962, when it increased his salary to \$10,000, for intelligence-gathering. Roberto created the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) in March 1962. He visited Israel in the 1960s, and received aid from the Israeli government from 1963 to 1969. Jonas Savimbi left the FNLA in 1964 and founded the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) in response to Roberto's unwillingness to spread the war outside the traditional Kingdom of Kongo.

Roberto thus became the sole leader of the FNLA who would fight with other groups against the **Portuguese** during the struggle for Angolan independence, and he subsequently fought against the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) during the civil war that followed independence. Roberto, who was **Mobutu Sese Seko**'s son-in-law, received considerable support from the Congolese **government** during the early years of the civil war and also received covert assistance from the **United States** through the Mobutu government. He faded from the international scene following an agreement between the Congolese and Angolan governments in 1978 to end hostilities and cease support for each other's **oppo-**

**sition** movements. FNLA activities resumed on a smaller scale in the early 1980s. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, most internal opposition to the MPLA government came from the UNITA, which also received support from Congo and the U.S. government. In 1991, the FNLA and MPLA agreed to the Bicesse Accords, allowing Roberto to return to Angola. He ran unsuccessfully for president, receiving only 2.1 percent of the vote. The FNLA won five seats in Parliament, but refused to participate in the government. Roberto died on 2 August 2007 at his home in Luanda.

**ROBERTSON, PAT (REVEREND) (1930– ).** A prominent pastor and leader of the right-wing Christian Coalition in the **United States**, whose friendship with **Mobutu Sese Seko** led to the formation of the African Development Company, which in the 1990s operated a \$300 million **diamond mining** and **forestry** project on concessions granted by the Mobutu **government**.

**ROGET, LÉON (MAJOR) (1865–1929).** The first commander of the **Force Publique**, Roget was appointed by **Leopold II** in 1886 to form an army for the **Congo Free State**. He forged the Force in two years using a core of European officers and soldiers hired from various African territories.

**ROUND TABLE CONFERENCES.** Two meetings held in Brussels, **Belgium**, in early 1960 between Congolese leaders and Belgian officials following the riots and political unrest that erupted on **4 January 1959** and the inconclusive **elections** of December 1959. The first conference was hastily organized after the Belgian government announced on 13 January 1960 its intention to “form a **democracy**” in the **Belgian Congo**. The Belgian authorities felt the main purpose of the conference was to resolve differences over the timetable for **independence**, which until that time had varied widely among Congolese leaders. Belgium had refused to set a date for independence and as a result some of the most important Congolese parties boycotted December’s local elections and there were threats of renewed violence.

The conference opened on 20 January, but the 45 Congolese delegates, led by **Joseph Kasavubu** and **Patrice Lumumba**,



demanded that two preconditions be granted: first, that a date be set for independence; and second, that resolutions of the conference would be made binding. In a move widely interpreted as a victory for the Congolese, the Belgian government agreed. As a result, the date for independence was set for **30 June 1960**, and the conference opened on 25 January 1960.

A second Round Table Conference began on 26 April 1960 and continued into May. Its purpose was to examine the financial affairs of the soon-to-be-independent nation and to establish the framework for self-government. The **Loi Fondamentale** (Fundamental Law) was drafted to serve as a **constitution** during the initial years of independence and was passed by the Belgian parliament on 19 May 1960. It repealed the **Colonial Charter** and set up a political system modeled on Belgium's.

**RUBBER.** One of the principal commercial **crops** of Congo and, according to the **World Bank**, its third-largest **export** crop, rubber was one of the first exports of the **Congo Free State** (CFS). The harsh **labor** practices used in its extraction were the main cause of the public outcry that led to the annexation of the Congo by the Belgian parliament, the end of the CFS, and the beginning of the Belgian colonial era. Rubber was grown throughout the tropical **forest** area of northern Congo, but was a major crop primarily in the **Kisangani** area.

At **independence**, Congo produced 40,000 tons of rubber per year, of which virtually all was exported. Production declined during the political instability of the early 1960s, sinking to 20,000 tons in 1965. It began to rise again, and in 1973 reached 45,000 tons, of which 30,000 tons were exported. With **Zairianization** and the economic crisis of the mid-1970s, rubber production declined to 17,000 tons in 1982, according to the **central bank**. Production reportedly increased in the late 1980s, but a great deal of it was **smuggled** to East Africa. Exact figures are not available. *See also* ECONOMY.

**RUBERWA, AZARIAS (1964– )**. Ruberwa graduated with a law degree from the **University of Lubumbashi** and practiced law there before joining the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) in late 1996. He remained part of

the AFDL until August 1998 when **Rwanda** and a group of Congolese **dissidents** created the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD) and declared war against **President Laurent Kabila**. As president of the RCD, Ruberwa was chosen as one of four vice presidents during the transition, and he was in charge of policy and the security commission in 2003–2006. After losing the presidential elections in 2006, he became a member of the bar in **Kinshasa** and reopened his law practice.

**RUSSIA, RELATIONS WITH.** Relations between Congo and Russia, then the **Soviet Union**, were generally cool after **independence** and occasionally hostile. The Soviet government viewed the **government** of Congo as a Western puppet, and the Congolese government saw the Soviet Union as a supporter of local **dissidents** and certain hostile neighbors. Diplomatic relations were established at independence and shortly thereafter **Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba** threatened to ask for Soviet military assistance to help put down the **Katanga secession**. This threat was one of the reasons for his dismissal by **President Joseph Kasavubu** in 1960, leading to the first constitutional crisis. When **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** neutralized the Kasavubu–Lumumba government on 5 September 1960, he gave the Soviet diplomats 48 hours to leave the country. A low-level mission returned a few years later, only to be expelled by the **Moïse Tshombe** government, which accused it of complicity in the **Pierre Mulele** uprising in **Kwilu**. The Soviet Union criticized Mobutu's **coup d'état** in 1965, but later moderated its policies when Mobutu adopted nationalistic and nonaligned positions. Relations were normalized in 1967, and ambassadors were exchanged in 1968. However, Soviet diplomats were again expelled in 1970 and 1971 after being accused of encouraging **student** unrest.

Relations were further strained in the 1970s by Soviet support for the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) faction in **Angola**, which Zaire opposed, and by suspicions of Soviet responsibility in the **Shaba** invasions of 1977 and 1978 by guerrillas based in Angola. Relations remained cool in the early 1980s. No Soviet representative was invited to the extensive inauguration ceremonies of Mobutu's third presidential term in December 1984. However, a Soviet trade delegation paid a 10-day visit to **Kinshasa** in March 1985,

and Soviet officials announced their desire to increase cooperation in the areas of **mining, health care, energy,** and **fish** processing. They said during the visit that Soviet **exports** to Congo reached \$10 million in 1984, four times the level of **trade** the year before. Congolese exports to the Soviet Union historically were negligible.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 caused the suspension of most Soviet aid programs in Africa and a significant reduction of the Russian diplomatic presence in all but its closest allies on the continent. Although the relations between Congo and Russia remain cordial, both foreign aid and trade have remained negligible since the early 1990s.

**RUZIZI RIVER.** A medium-sized **river**, 120 km in length, unnavigable because of cataracts, the Ruzizi flows from **Lake Kivu** to **Lake Tanganyika**, descending rapidly from about 1,500 meters above sea level to about 770 meters above sea level over its length. At its southern end, the Ruzizi Plain has only gentle hills, and the river flows into Lake Tanganyika through a delta. It delineates the southern border of **Rwanda** with Congo and, along with Lake Tanganyika, it forms the border between Congo and **Burundi**. The Bridge of Concord links Congo and Burundi, near its mouth. Because of the difference in altitudes of the two lakes, the river generates considerable hydroelectric potential and drives a 12,600-kilowatt installation near Kamanyola that supplies electricity to **Bukavu**.

**RWANDA, RELATIONS WITH.** Rwanda and **Burundi** originally were German colonies that were placed under Belgian trusteeship following World War I. One of three former Belgian colonies, Rwanda's ties with Congo have historically been strong. A small, densely populated country of 10.2 million people as of 2006, Rwanda lies in the **Great Rift Valley** across **Lake Kivu** from eastern Congo. Relations between Rwanda and Congo were good at **independence**, but were strained in 1967 when Congolese army units mutinied over the lack of pay and, with support from foreign **mercenaries** and former members of the **Gendarmerie Katangaïse**, tried to bring down the central **government**. Loyal troops, also backed by foreign mercenaries, drove the rebels out of the country into Rwanda. The Congolese government's request for extradition was denied, leading to a break

in diplomatic relations on 11 January 1968. The **Organization of African Unity** was able to negotiate a compromise, and the mercenaries were evacuated by the Red Cross in April 1968, while the Katangan gendarmes were repatriated to Congo.

Relations were restored in February 1969 and strengthened by the establishment, in September 1976, of the **Communauté Économique des Pays des Grands Lacs** (CEPGL) with its seat in Gisenyi, Rwanda. Ties remained strong through the mid-1990s, based in large part on the personal friendship between **Presidents Mobutu Sese Seko** and Juvenal Habyarimana.

In October 1990, the historical rivalries between the **Hutu** and **Tutsi ethnic groups** in Rwanda escalated into violence. The Tutsi-dominated Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) attacked northern Rwanda from bases in **Uganda**. Congo sent military units to bolster the Rwandan government forces. Several years of mediation, in which Congo participated, were leading to multiparty elections when Habyarimana was killed in a suspicious plane accident on 6 April 1994. His death led to two months of violence in which an estimated 500,000 Rwandans, mostly Tutsi and moderate Hutu, were killed. The RPF took control of the country in mid-1994. More than 1.2 million Hutu **refugees**, fearing retaliation by the new leaders, fled to eastern Congo, and 700,000 took refuge in Burundi and **Tanzania**.

Relations soured as the new government in Kigali accused Congo of harboring leaders of the former regime, whom it accused of organizing the genocide and of plotting a counteroffensive. The Mobutu government claimed neutrality, but in late 1995 it sought to expel the refugees, accusing them of straining the local government and threatening internal stability. Escalating attacks by troops and allied Hutu militia of the Habyarimana regime led to an offensive in October 1996 by the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL). The AFDL and Rwandan soldiers attacked the refugee camps, forcing 660,000 Rwandan refugees to return home in two weeks. Backed by fighters from Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and **Angola**, the AFDL forces took the country in a seven-month **civil war** and entered **Kinshasa** on 17 May 1997, one day after the departure of Mobutu.

The Rwandan government was one of the first to recognize the **Laurent Kabila** government after it was sworn in 12 days later.

Subsequent relations were so close as to lead some citizens to call the Kabila government a Rwandan puppet. They deteriorated, however, when the Kabila government proved unable to halt attacks against Rwanda by Rwandan rebels based in eastern Congo. In July 1998, the Kabila government expelled about 100 Rwandan officers, and Rwanda switched support to rebels of the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD). On 2 August 1998, a **civil war** broke out in eastern Congo backed by Rwandan troops. The Rwandan government claimed in late 1998 that its military intervention in Congo was a humanitarian effort to prevent another genocide of Tutsi.

On 9 June 2000, the government of Congo called on the **United Nations** Security Council to order Rwanda and Uganda, whose armies were fighting each other in **Kisangani**, to leave Congo immediately. As a result, relations between Congo and Rwanda further deteriorated. However, the two countries were able to sign a peace accord on 29 July 2002 by which the Rwanda government promised to pull its army out of Congo, while the Congo government promised to disarm former Rwandan soldiers who had committed the genocide in Rwanda. Relations remained strained during the transition, 2003–2006, because of the failure of Congo to disarm these former Rwandan soldiers. Meanwhile, the Rwandan government continued to support **Laurent Nkunda** and his militias, who were creating humanitarian emergencies in **Nord-Kivu**. In early November 2008, Congo and Rwanda signed an agreement to set up a permanent task force charged with following up and monitoring the implementation of the Nairobi declaration on provision of common border security. Nkunda was arrested on 22 January in Rwanda as he tried to resist a joint Rwandan–Congolese military operation against former Hutu soldiers still operating in eastern Congo. *See also* BANYAMULENGE; BANYARWANDA.

**RWENZORI MOUNTAINS.** Often referred to as Mount Rwenzori, the mountain range is located on the border between **Uganda** and the **Democratic Republic of Congo** (DRC), with peaks reaching heights of up to 5,109 m (16,761 ft). The highest Rwenzori Mountains are permanently snow-capped. The Rwenzori Mountains are often identified with the Mountains of the Moon because of their stark,

desolate landscape. The range is about 120 km (75 miles) long and 65 km (40 miles) wide. It consists of six massifs separated by deep gorges: Mount Stanley (5,109 m), Mount Speke (4,890 m), Mount Baker (4,843 m), Mount Emin (4,798 m), Mount Gessi (4,715 m), and Mount Luigi di Savoia (4,627 m). Mount Stanley is the largest and has several subsidiary summits, with Margherita Peak reaching an elevation of 5,080 m or 16,763 feet. These mountains are in an extremely humid area, and are frequently enveloped in clouds. A subject of concern has been the impact of climatic change on Rwenzori's glaciers. In 1906, the Rwenzori had 43 named glaciers distributed over six mountains with a total area of 7.5 square km, about half the total glacier area in Africa. By 2005, less than half of these survive, on only three mountains, with an area of about 1.5 square km. Scientific studies attribute this to global climate change. *See also* ENVIRONMENT.

**RYCKMANS, PIERRE (1891–1959).** The influential **governor-general** of **Belgian Congo** from 1934 to 1946, Ryckmans was born in Antwerp, **Belgium**, on 23 November 1891. After less than two months at the Belgian Officers School, he left in early September 1915 for Africa. He took leave from the army in 1920 and served as acting Royal Commissioner in Usumbura (now Bujumbura, **Burundi**). He served as a member of the commission to study labor issues in Belgian Congo during the Great Depression, where he was in charge of **Kasai Province**. In October 1934, he was appointed governor-general. Belgian Congo was badly hit by the economic crisis, to the extent that the European **population** dropped from 23,000 in 1931 to less than 17,000 in 1934. Harsh reforms by his predecessor had disheartened the civil service.

Nonetheless, in less than two years, Ryckmans was able to balance the budget, increase **exports**, and restimulate the economy. The governor was also able to make the minister of colonies approve a number of decrees that increased the autonomy of colonial administration from large mining companies and the right of both **Catholic** and **Protestant** missionaries to receive government subsidies for their schools. He opposed the capitulation of the Belgian army in May 1940. For Ryckmans, to win the war became his first priority after capitulation. During his tenure as governor-general, Belgian Congo

increased production of gold and tin to help the Allies and, after Pearl Harbor, the Belgian colony provided the Allies with uranium that was critical to make the first atomic bomb. For many years until 1957, he was the Commissioner for Nuclear Energy in Belgium and helped renegotiate the terms of the cooperation between Belgium, **Great Britain**, and the **United States** following the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Ryckmans died in February 1959.

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**23–24 SEPTEMBER 1991.** On the night of 23 September 1991, elements of the 31st Airborne Division based at the **Centre d’Entraînement des Troupes Aéronautiques** (CETA) at **Ndjili Airport** on the outskirts of **Kinshasa** revolted over low and late wages and began looting containers at the airport. The looting or “pillages” quickly spread to Kinshasa’s commercial districts and to some wealthy residential areas. Civilians followed soldiers in taking merchandise and equipment from shops, factories, and warehouses. The incidents caused **Belgium** and **France** to send troops to evacuate an estimated 10,000 expatriate workers. Similar incidents occurred in other major cities during the following weeks. The looting caused losses estimated at \$1 billion and reduced economic productivity by an estimated 20 percent. Political analysts said the violence was also due to popular frustration over the lack of progress by the **National Conference**, which had opened in August to chart the transition to multiparty **democracy** but had collapsed in chaos. It brought a compromise between **Mobutu Sese Seko** and **opposition** parties that led to the reopening of the conference in December. Another wave of looting in January 1993 reached middle-class residential areas and further aggravated the country’s economic crisis. Since 1993, soldiers have been accused quite often of looting in the **provinces**, away from major cities. *See also* MILITARY.

**SACRED UNION.** Formally known since 1993 as the Union Sacrée de l’Opposition Radicale et Alliés et Société Civile (USORAS; Sacred Union of the Radical Opposition and Allies and Civil Society), the Sacred Union was formed in early 1991 as an alliance of **opposition**

parties. Its purpose was to present a united front against attempts by **President Mobutu Sese Seko** and the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) to manipulate the **democratic transition** and divide the opposition in order to remain in power. By mid-1991, more than 200 parties had joined the group, and their number grew to 400 by the mid-1990s. The alliance was dominated by the **Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social** (UDPS) led by **Étienne Tshisekedi**, the **Parti Démocrate et Social Chrétien** (PDSC) of **Joseph Iléo**, and the **Union des Fédéralistes et des Républicains Indépendants** (UFERI) of **Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond**. It was weakened by defections, most notably of the UFERI, when Nguza was appointed **prime minister** on 28 November 1991.

The Sacred Union formally assumed power on 15 August 1992 when Tshisekedi was elected prime minister by the **Conférence Nationale Souveraine** (CNS). However, he was dismissed by Mobutu in February 1993, and a senior UDPS advisor, **Faustin Birindwa**, was appointed prime minister. The UDPS and hardline members of the Sacred Union did not recognize any subsequent **government** appointed by Mobutu because they maintained the Tshisekedi government had been dismissed illegally. There were numerous defections and expulsions from the alliance as various parties were drawn into subsequent governments of the democratic transition. The group was also beset by internal conflicts between moderates, who wanted to compromise with Mobutu in order to permit the democratic transition to move forward, and hardline members, led by the UDPS, who believed any accommodation with Mobutu would eventually discredit them in the eyes of the people.

Nguza drew several dozen small parties away in 1992 to form the short-lived **Alliance des Forces Patriotiques** (AFP). **Léon Kengo wa Dondo**, who was not a member of the Sacred Union, succeeded in drawing some of the Sacred Union's minor parties away when he was appointed prime minister in 1994, to form the **Union pour la République et la Démocratie** (URD) alliance.

In late 1996, the Sacred Union, after initially hesitating, announced its support for the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) in an effort to overthrow Mobutu, although it did not support the use of force to bring it about. After the AFDL took power in May 1997, newly installed President **Laurent**



**Kabila** met with Tshisekedi and other Sacred Union leaders, but he did not include them in his first government, arguing he would govern only with **political parties** that had participated in the **military** struggle against Mobutu. Kabila was able, however, to draw a number of Sacred Union members into subsequent governments, most notably a rival wing of the UDPS led by **Frédéric Kibassa**, and the daughters of two founding fathers, **Justine Kasavubu** and Julienne Lumumba.

**"SALONGO."** A **Lingala** term coined in the early 1970s that denoted **labor** holidays set aside for community cleanup activities. Local **political party** leaders were entrusted with organizing this civic activity, and prominent leaders were expected to make an appearance. Enthusiasm for the practice, however, waned in the late 1970s and, by the 1980s, the primary participants were party *cadres*, **students**, and other groups organized by the **government**.

**SAMBALA.** A people of the **Tetela ethnic group** that through association with the **Afro-Arabs** and Belgians became identified as a separate group. Sambala was the name given to the people of the Tetela and **Kusu** groups that joined **Ngongo Lutete** to pacify and occupy the **Maniema** region toward the end of the 19th century. Following the end of the war to drive Afro-Arabs from Congolese territory, they were placed in charge of the area. They led other ethnic groups in the region in access to **education** and economic advancement.

**SAMPASSA KAWETA MILOMBE, GODEFROID (1942–2006).**

An economist and **government** official long associated with **youth** and **education** during the heyday of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR), Sampaşa was born on 23 January 1942 in **Likasi, Katanga Province**. He was educated in Katanga and received a degree in economic and financial sciences from the Université Officielle du Congo (subsequently renamed the **Université Nationale du Zaïre/Lubumbashi**). He served as minister of youth and sports on a number of occasions from 12 July 1970 until 1 June 1975, when he was appointed secretary-general of the **Jeunesse du Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (JMPR), the youth wing of the party. He was appointed state commissioner (minister) for culture and the

arts on 18 February 1981, and state commissioner for secondary and university education on 7 May 1982. Sampassa became a member of the **Laurent Kabila** cabinet in 1999. During the transitional period, 2003–2006, he was a senator. He died on 2 August 2006.

**SANITATION.** According to **World Bank** figures, 16 percent of the Congolese **population** in 1990 had access to improved sanitation facilities. In 2004, less than 10 percent of the population had access to these facilities. The figures were higher in **urban** areas than in rural areas. In urban areas, potable water was provided to about one-fifth of the residents through private connections or primarily through neighborhood standpipes. Others obtained water from wells or streams of varying quality. Less than one-third of urban dwellers had access to public sewage connections. The remainder used pit latrines or public facilities. Garbage collection in urban areas is nonexistent. Few rural dwellers had access to public water, sewage, or sanitation systems. With the decline of public services in the 1990s and the **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila**, public sanitation, particularly garbage collection, has since deteriorated considerably to the point that **Kinshasa**, which used to be called Kin-La Belle (Kin-The beautiful) is presently called Kin-La Poubelle (Kin-The Garbage Can).

**SANKURU PROVINCE.** In 1962, Sankuru Province was created from the former **Kasai Province**. It was incorporated into **Kasai-Oriental** in 1966. The 2006 constitution reestablished Sankuru as a province effective in February 2009. It has an estimated population of 1.4 million in 2006 and a density of more than 14.8 habitants per square kilometer. The capital of Sankuru is Lodja. Sankuru consists of six territories: Katako-Kombe, Kole, Lodja, Lomela, Lubefu, and Lusambo.

**SANKURU RIVER.** The main tributary of the Kasai River, the Sankuru River is about 1,230 km long. It begins in the western highlands of former **Katanga Province**, where it is known as the Lubilash River, and flows 460 km north and northwest, where it becomes the Sankuru proper; it then flows northward and then almost directly westward to the **Kasai River**. The Sankuru is navigable for 590 km below the town of Pamia-Mutombo, north of the city of **Mbuji-Mayi**.

**SÃO SALVADOR.** The **Portuguese** name for the capital of the **Kongo Kingdom**, located in what is now northern **Angola**. The name was changed from **Mbanza Kongo dia Ntotila** by **Afonso I** after his conversion to **Christianity**.

**SCHRAMME, JEAN (1929–1988).** A Belgian **mercenary** who participated in the **Katanga secession** of 1960–63 and in 1967 led a revolt in eastern Congo that attempted to restore **Moïse Tshombe** to power. Schramme, who had gained a reputation as one of the more ruthless of the foreign mercenaries, disappeared for a time but later resurfaced in Brazil. In April 1986, a Belgian court at Mons convicted Schramme in absentia of murdering a Belgian diamond dealer, Maurice Quintin, in Yumbi in 1967. Schramme said he ordered the murder because the businessman had been spying for the **Mobutu Sese Seko government**. Schramme was sentenced to 20 years of hard labor. However, Brazil refused to extradite him because he was married to a Brazilian citizen. The Brazilian media reported Schramme died in December 1988 of cancer at the age of 59 years.

**SCIBE AIRLIFT.** One of the major private **air transportation** companies launched in the late 1970s when the **government** monopoly was ended. The company was owned by **Bemba Saolana**, a friend of **Mobutu Sese Seko** and one of the country's wealthiest men. It operated some flights between Congo and Europe, but concentrated mostly on domestic routes. One of its planes, reportedly leased through an affiliate, crashed in northern **Angola** in 1995, killing 165 people. Scibe Airlift stopped operating a few years later as the result of financial difficulties and mismanagement.

**SECESSIONS.** *See* CIVIL WARS.

**SECOND CONGO WAR.** **Laurent Kabila** became **president** of Congo after a seven-month **civil war** that toppled **Mobutu Sese Seko**. The war against Mobutu was the outcome of a regional consensus to remove him. Mobutu's interference in his neighbors' domestic politics was resented and left them ready to settle the score. Thus, each of Congo's neighboring leaders had reasons to support Kabila. **Angola** had a chance to pay back years of Mobutu's support of Angolan rebels

and to squeeze the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) by closing off its pipeline to the outside world. **Rwanda** and **Uganda** supported Kabila to create a buffer zone against their own insurgent groups that were roaming in Congo. However, Kabila never quelled these insurgents, and rebellious activities against his eastern allies continued from Congo's borders. According to a number of observers, the intelligence chiefs of Angola, Rwanda, and Uganda held discussions regarding the desirability of finding an alternative leader for Congo as early as January 1998. By April 1998, Kabila was convinced that **Tutsi**, backed by Rwanda, were planning a coup.

Internally, Kabila's war against Mobutu was supported by most Congolese who hoped for economic renewal and political reform after 32 years of **kleptocracy** and autocratic rule. All these hopes were dashed by Kabila's autocratic leadership when he excluded prodemocratic groups from his **government**. Kabila was also perceived by Congolese as a Rwandan puppet. On 27 July 1998, Kabila ordered all foreign troops to leave Congo. This decision ended **military** cooperation with Rwanda and Uganda, and the former allies initiated an anti-Kabila civil war that began on 2 August 1998.

The government of Rwanda counted on a quick victory to capture Kinshasa, and President Paul Kagame launched a spectacular transnational attack from the eastern town of Goma to the western military base of Kitona, located 1,500 km away. A group of former Kabila supporters, including all Tutsi from his government, announced the formation of the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD) 10 days later. **Ernest Wamba dia Wamba** emerged as the chairman of the RCD.

The rebels advanced quickly, reaching the outskirts of Kinshasa on 26 August, where they were repelled by government forces reinforced by troops and aircraft from **Angola**, **Namibia**, and **Zimbabwe** as part of a military alliance within the **Southern African Development Community** (SADC). The RCD, backed by Rwanda and Uganda, gained control over a vast swath of territory in eastern Congo. As the war dragged on, fissures materialized within the fragile RCD coalition, producing several rebel groups with different agendas, such as Wamba's RCD-Kisangani, **Mbusa Nyamwisi's** RCD-Mouvement de Libération, and **Jean-Pierre Bemba's** **Mouvement de Libération du Congo** (MLC).

Described by many commentators as Africa's First World War, the anti-Kabila civil war was quite different from the anti-Mobutu war. First, the impact on the people was devastating. According to International Rescue Committee, more than 2 million people were internally displaced in 2001; of these, 65 percent in eastern Congo. Moreover, from late 1998, when the civil war started, until mid-2003, when it officially ended, 5 million people died as the result of the war and other related consequences. Second, the anti-Mobutu war emerged from regional consensus to remove him, whereas the anti-Kabila war was limited to Rwanda and Uganda. Third, Congolese rebel groups that challenged the Kabila regime did not share the same regional security agenda with their state sponsors, Rwanda and Uganda. As a consequence, a number of battles were waged on Congolese territory: Rwanda against former Rwandan soldiers and militias who committed the genocide in Rwanda; Uganda against its own rebels roaming in Congo; Angola against the UNITA; Burundi against the *Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie*; the **Mai-Mai** militias against Rwanda, Uganda, and RCD; and the Congo government and its foreign allies against its own rebel groups and against both Rwandan and Ugandan troops.

The rebels and the government met in Lusaka to conclude a ceasefire agreement on 10 July 1999, the **Lusaka Peace Accord**. The accord emphasized a ceasefire; deployment of a **United Nations** force; the withdrawal of foreign armies; the organization of the **Dialogue Inter-Congolais** (Inter-Congolese Dialogue, DIC), which aimed to provide the terms of the transition to democratic institutional arrangements; and assistance to vulnerable people. However, Kabila refused to implement the accord until what he called invading troops—Rwandan and Ugandan forces—left Congolese territory.

The assassination of Laurent Kabila on 16 January 2001 left the country in total economic chaos, half-occupied by foreign troops and rebel groups. On 26 January 2001, **Joseph Kabila** succeeded his father, promising to follow up on the Lusaka Peace Accord, settle the terms of the transition to democratic government, and restore state authority throughout the entire Congolese territory. The **Mission des Nations Unies au Congo** (MONUC) began to deploy in 2001. The DIC effectively started in Sun City, **South Africa**, in February

2002. On 17 December 2002, the government and all belligerents signed the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI) in Pretoria, South Africa. The peace agreement resulted in the formation of a national transitional government that included Joseph Kabila as president and four vice presidents (called the 1 + 4 formula), as well as 35 ministers with their deputies. The accord also called for the reintegration of former rebels into the national army. This ended the war against Laurent Kabila, which many international observers dismissed as an internal African implosion. However, in the opinions of some, the war against Kabila was a battle for **coltan, diamonds, gold**, and other resources destined for sale in the West that claimed 5 million lives.

Despite signing the AGI, a number of military commanders refused to join the peace process. The most notable example occurred on 26 May 2004, when **Laurent Nkunda** was promoted to general. He was appointed regional military commander of **Kasai Oriental** after the installation of the transitional government in 2003, but he declined the offer for personal security reasons. In May 2004, when a Munyamulenge colonel, Jules Mutebutsi—trained in Rwanda like Nkunda and integrated into the national army—mutinied against his commanding officer, General Mbuza Mabe, Nkunda intervened to save Mutebutsi. Their combined troops took the town of **Bukavu**. Nkunda claimed that the action was necessary to stop another genocide of Tutsi.

In early 2006, his rebel forces attacked and occupied Rutshuru territory, **Nord-Kivu**, after routing the Congolese army stationed in the area. For almost two years, Nkunda made Nord-Kivu province ungovernable. In January 2008, most belligerents operating in Nord-Kivu and Sud-Kivu signed a peace agreement, called *Amani* (peace) to end hostility. However, fighting resumed in late October. It uprooted 200,000 civilians in late 2008, bringing the total number of people displaced by the Kivu conflict to 2 million in less than three years, causing civil unrest, large food shortages, and what the United Nations called “a humanitarian crisis of catastrophic dimensions.” Nkunda was arrested in January 2009. *See also* DISSIDENTS.

**SECRET POLICE.** *See* INTELLIGENCE SERVICES; SECURITY.

**SECURITY.** Under the **Mobutu Sese Seko government**, internal security was considered efficient, relying on a large network of informants and foreign technical advisors at different times from **Belgium, France, the United States, Morocco, North Korea, Israel, and South Africa**. A network of several security services operated independently of all other organs and of each other. Each service was endowed with its own **communications** system and reported directly to the **president**. They were credited with unmasking several attempted **coups d'états** and, reportedly, numerous assassination plots. Security was weakest in the remote rural areas of northern, eastern, and southern Congo, primarily because of a lack of communication facilities, personnel, and material resources in those areas. As a result, some of these areas harbored the most successful antigovernment resistance movements.

The national security service of the 1990s was called the Service National d'Intelligence et de Protection (SNIP). Originally called the Sûreté Nationale at **independence**, it was renamed the Centre National de Documentation (CND) in 1969 and the Agence Nationale de Documentation (AND) in the early 1980s. A small, separate wing responsible for external intelligence primarily in neighboring countries was created in 1975. Military intelligence was furnished by the Service d'Action et de Renseignements Militaire (SARM). Border security was provided by the Agence Nationale d'Immigration (ANI). The **Civil Guard** and **Gendarmerie Nationale** also had intelligence units. A shadowy unit called "**Les Hiboux**" ("The Owls") appeared in 1990 and engaged in kidnapping and urban terrorist acts against the **opposition**. Its members possessed automatic firearms and rocket-propelled grenades, leading to speculation that it was a unit of the **military**. When the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) took power in 1997, it renamed the SNIP the Agence Nationale des Renseignements (ANR) and undertook a major purge of Mobutu's **intelligence services**.

**SENDWE, JASON (? –1964).** An early political leader who founded the **Association des Baluba du Katanga** (BALUBAKAT) to represent the **Luba** in **Katanga Province** prior to **independence**. He tried to mediate the conflict between the **Lunda** and Luba in Katanga in

1960–61. He was assassinated in Albertville, now **Kalemie**, in June 1964 during an internal dispute in the BALUBAKAT.

**SENGELE.** An **ethnic group** that lives west of **Lake Mai-Ndombe** in the **Mai-Ndombe Province**. Part of the **Mongo language** group, the Sengele differ from many Mongo groups because of their more complex and hierarchical social structure.

**SHABA.** Shaba, meaning “**copper**” in **Kiswahili**, was the name given to the mineral-rich southeastern **province** during the **Mobutu Sese Seko** era, beginning in 1971. (The provinces were renamed **regions** in 1972.) After **Kinshasa**, it was the wealthiest and most developed region in the country and was the scene in 1977 and 1978 of two incursions, known as **Shaba Wars**, which shook the Mobutu **government** and were only suppressed with the help of foreign troops. The original name, **Katanga Province**, was restored following the fall of Mobutu in May 1997. The constitution of 2006 divided the Katanga Province into four new provinces: **Haut-Katanga**, **Haut-Lomami**, **Lualaba**, and **Tanganyika**. This went into effect in February 2009.

**SHABAIR.** One of the first and more successful of the private **air transportation** companies operating in the 1990s. From its base in **Lubumbashi**, Shabair operated daily flights to **Mbuji-Mayi** and **Kinshasa** and, in the mid-1990s, sought to expand service to Europe and **South Africa**. However, it declined in the mid-1990s and by 1996 was operating only intermittently.

**SHABA WARS.** The name often used by the **government** to denote the first **Shaba** incursion, from 8 March until the end of May 1977. During the war, also called “Shaba I,” **Angola**-based guerrillas of the **Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo** (FLNC) took the border town of **Dilolo**, in western Shaba **Region**, and marched east to the outskirts of the mining center of **Kolwezi**. The attack took authorities by surprise and, because of the remoteness of the region, it was several weeks before a counteroffensive could be organized. The second Shaba incursion, frequently called “Shaba II,” was more costly. One year after Shaba I, FLNC guerrillas infiltrated the region



and on 3 May seized Kolwezi and its **mining** installations. One thousand citizens and 200 foreigners died in the ensuing violence, which only ended weeks later after a bloody counteroffensive by Congolese and French paratroopers. *See also* KATANGA.

**SHI.** A Bantu-related group that lives in the highlands of **Sud-Kivu Province** near **Bukavu**, between **Lake Tanganyika** and **Lake Kivu**. The Shi are divided into Shi of Kabare and Shi of Ngweshe. The two groups have had a number of confrontations since the 1920s. The chief of Kabare, **Chief** Albert Kabare, ferociously resisted colonial penetration for years until his internal exile in Kinshasa in the late 1920s. He returned home in 1959 to confront his rival, the chief of Ngweshe.

**SHINKAKASA MUTINY.** *See* MUTINIES.

**SILVER.** A relatively small amount of silver was produced as a by-product of **gold mining** by the **Société Minière et Industrielle du Kivu** (SOMINKI) and the **Générale des Carrières et des Mines** (GECAMINES). Congo produced 113,398 kilograms (kg) or 4 million ounces of silver per year at **independence**, but production declined to 34,019 kg or 1.2 million ounces by 1984. Production picked up again in early 1990s to 84,000 kg in 1990 and 80,000 kg in 1991. From 1992 to 1994, production of silver averaged 53,000 kg per year. In 1995, production plummeted to 900 kg, and was only 500 kg in 1997. In subsequent years, production of silver improved to 4,000 kg a year from 1998 to 2000. An increase in production occurred in the mid-2000s. According to U.S. Bureau of Mines figures, production of silver increased from 2,108 kg in 2002 to 35,501 kg in 2003. It reached 32,953 kg and 53,553 kg in 2004 and 2005, respectively.

**SIMBAS.** Simba, **Kiswahili** for “lion,” was the name taken by rebels during the eastern **rebellion** in 1964–66. The Simbas used potions and incantations that they believed rendered them invulnerable, turned bullets into water, and incapacitated their enemy. The Simbas were primarily young warriors with an average age of 15 years; they were often drugged, but fought with a ferocity that in many battles

routed **government** troops. *See also* CHILD SOLDIERS; KADOGO; SOUMIALOT, GASTON.

**SINGA, BOYEMBE MOSAMBAYI (1932–1981).** One of the supporters of the **coup d'état** that brought **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** to power, Singa remained at the senior political and **military** level in Congo through the 1970s. Born on 10 October 1932 in Ibembo, **Orientale Province**, Singa was educated in Orientale and **Kasai** Provinces and received military training at the École Royale de Gendarmerie Belge in **Belgium**, and in the **United States** and **Israel**. He was made commissioner (governor) of **Shaba Region** in 1978 following the **Shaba Wars** and became armed forces chief of staff on 1 January 1980. He was appointed to the **Central Committee** on 2 September 1980.

**SIZARAIL.** *See* SOCIÉTÉ NATIONALE DES CHEMINS DE FER CONGOLAIS.

**SLAVES AND SLAVERY.** Slavery was practiced to a certain degree in traditional Congolese societies, usually as part of the spoils of war, but it reached mass proportions in the 16th and 17th centuries because of the demand for cheap labor in the Americas. Between 1500 and 1900, when the practice was ended, as many as 30 million Africans are estimated to have been shipped against their will from ports on the central Atlantic coast to markets primarily in Brazil, Central America, and the Caribbean. An estimated 3 million persons were shipped to the Americas from what is now Congo and, during the height of trade, 50,000 were shipped annually. Meanwhile, in eastern Congo, **Afro-Arab** traders exported an estimated 50,000 to 70,000 slaves per year to markets in the east. Territorial wars and the battles fought to capture slaves destroyed a large portion of the region's population. Entire villages were wiped out in order to capture a few dozen "exportable" slaves.

In the late 18th century, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands abolished slavery. England outlawed the trade in 1807 and slavery itself in 1833. **Portugal** followed in 1835 and **France** in 1848. By the mid-19th century, all European countries had abolished the practice,

although it continued unofficially for decades afterwards. The importation of slaves was prohibited by the U.S. Congress in 1808, and the **United States** abolished slavery with the Emancipation Proclamation of 1 January 1863, although it was not until the end of the U.S. Civil War in 1865 that abolition came into force throughout the nation. Brazil was the last major nation to abolish slavery in 1888. However, many enforced labor practices were continued that resembled slavery. *See also* PORTERAGE.

**SMUGGLING.** Smuggling of certain **agricultural** and mineral products traditionally has been high in Congo. In 1961–62 alone, illegal trade between **Kivu** and **Uganda** cost the Congolese government \$100 million dollars, according to journalist Paul Mason. **Central Bank** officials estimated in the 1980s that one-half of the country's **diamonds** were being marketed outside official channels. Smuggling of diamonds is believed to have reached as high as 80 percent during the economic collapse of the 1990s. According to the **United Nations**, most minerals and timber from eastern Congo were exported illegally by **Rwanda** and Uganda from 1998 to 2002.

In general, **gold**, diamond, **coltan**, **ivory**, **coffee**, and tea are other heavily smuggled commodities. A primary reason for smuggling was the low prices paid by **government** marketing boards, heavy taxes, and restrictions on private participation in the exploitation of minerals in particular. Another reason has been the weakness of the **currency** and shortages of consumer goods in the remote regions where many of the commodities are produced. An additional factor is the deterioration of the national transportation network and the lack of policy for rural development by the central government. It was much cheaper for business people to trade with neighboring countries than with the Congolese hinterland.

Thus, smuggling across Congolese borders ties the different regions of the country to wider geographical areas, each with its own specific circuits of illegal trafficking. To the east, the Kivus are linked to **Burundi**, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, and Southeast Asia. To the west, the **Kinshasa** and **Kongo Central** area is linked to **Angola**, **Congo-Brazzaville**, West Africa, and Europe. The region of former **Katanga Province** in the southeast forms a part of the network

that extends from **Zambia** to **South Africa**. The former **Équateur Province** is tied to the **Central African Republic**, Cameroon, and through the system, to Nigeria.

**SOCIALISM.** During the height of **Mobutism**, socialism, like **communism** and capitalism, was officially condemned by party ideologists, who called it a foreign belief system and advocated instead for **Authenticity**, characterized as “Zairian **nationalism**” that was “neither to the right nor the left, but forward.” However, some aspects of socialism were contained in **government** policies that advocated, for instance, universal **health care**, an end to hunger, and a heavy degree of government involvement in the **economy**. Following the economic crisis of the mid-1970s, economic policies began to move away from centralization and toward **privatization**, with increasing private participation in the **mining**, **agriculture**, and **transportation** sectors. These policies were extended further in the 1990s and beyond as the government sought funds and technical expertise to revive insolvent state companies.

**SOCIÉTÉ BELGO-AFRICAINE DU KIVU (SOBAKI).** A **mining** consortium of mixed public and private ownership, SOBAKI was established in 1908 and was one of the largest privately owned consortia licensed by **Leopold II**. It was given a virtual monopoly over large tracts of land, with the ostensible goal of helping to develop the territory. The company was nationalized under **Zairianization** but was returned to mixed ownership under **Retrocession**.

**SOCIÉTÉ CONGO-ITALIENNE DE RAFFINAGE (SOCIR).** A company jointly owned by the **government** and private Italian interests that operated Congo’s sole **petroleum** refinery. It was completed in 1968 at **Kinlao** near Moanda on the coast. The installation has a capacity to refine 17,000 barrels per day. However, most Congolese crude is too high in sulfur to be processed by the refinery. As a result, locally produced crude is traded for lighter oil, imported primarily from Nigeria, which can be processed. In 1984, SOCIR (then called *Société Zaïro-Italienne de Raffinage*) refined 183,730 tons of crude but that amount declined in the 1990s and early 2000s.

**SOCIÉTÉ DE DÉVELOPPEMENT INDUSTRIEL ET MINIER DU ZAÏRE (SODIMIZA).** The second-largest **copper mining** company in the country, SODIMIZA was formed in 1969 and given mining rights to a 93,000-square-km tract of land in **Haut-Katanga Province**. Copper production from two underground mines at Musoshi and Kinsenda began in 1972 and reached 80,000 tons in 1984, but low prices and the closure of the **Benguela Railway** prevented a large-scale expansion of production. The ore from the mines was processed through a crusher and blender at Musoshi, and the semi-refined copper was then shipped by **railway** to **Zambia** for smelting and refining. SODIMIZA was owned by the **government** and Japanese firms until 1983 when it abandoned operations as the result transportation costs.

**SOCIÉTÉ DES CIMENTS DU CONGO (CICO).** Owner–operator of one of two major cement plants in **Kongo Central**, CICO was formerly known as Société des Ciments du Zaïre (CIZA) until 1997. It produced 630,000 tons of cement per year in the early 1980s, despite problems caused primarily by shortages of spare parts and occasionally disruptions in the supply of raw materials. During the economic crisis of the early 1990s, production fell drastically, but increased again in the early 2000s.

**SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE DE BELGIQUE (SGB).** A large, Belgian capital-investment and holding company chartered in 1891 to which **Leopold II** granted large territorial concessions in the **Congo Free State**, particularly in **Katanga**. The SGB's parent company, Société Générale, was founded in 1822 by the king of the Netherlands and private members of the aristocracy. The SGB began a massive growth program in 1919–25 and was an influential stockholder in the **Union Minière du Haut-Katanga** (UMHK) until its **nationalization** in 1966. SGB's refining subsidiaries, based primarily in **Belgium**, continued to be major purchasers of Congolese minerals, particularly the production of the **Générale des Carrières et des Mines** (GECAMINES), and there were reports in 1996 that it was contemplating entering into an agreement to help revive GECAMINES operations. As of December 2008, the deal had not materialized.

**SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE DES MINÉRAIS (SGM).** The former agent for the **Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK)**, SGM was a Belgian **mining** company that processed semirefined **copper** from the **Katanga Province**. When UMHK was nationalized in 1966, SGM began operating the company under an agreement with the Congolese **government**. Its responsibilities included mining, processing, marketing, procurement, and staffing. In 1969, a 25-year extension was signed, aimed at eventually compensating SGM for operating costs and the **Zairianization** of UMHK, which had been renamed the **Générale des Carrières et des Mines (GECAMINES)**. A revised agreement in 1974 settled the compensation issue and, in return, SGM agreed to aid with a projected expansion of copper refining in former **Shaba Region** and the establishment of a casting operation in **Kongo Central Province**. However, the agreement was abrogated by the central government later that same year, paving the way for the creation of a government-owned mineral-marketing entity called **Société Zaïroise de Commercialisation des Minerais (SOZACOM)**, which nevertheless continued to market a great deal of copper through SGM. In 1984 SOZACOM was dissolved, and GECAMINES assumed responsibility for marketing its own minerals.

**SOCIÉTÉ MINIÈRE DE BAKWANGA (MIBA).** Congo's second-largest company and its major **diamond mining** entity, the MIBA was formed in December 1961 by combining three private companies: the Société Minière du Beceka (MIBEKA), founded in 1919; the Société d'Entreprise et d'Investissements (SIBEKA), owned by the **Société Générale de Belgique (SGB)**; and the Anglo-American Corporation of **South Africa**. The MIBA was **nationalized** in 1973, although 20 percent of ownership was returned to SIBEKA in 1978. Until the early 2000s, the MIBA produced most of Congo's industrial and gemstone diamonds, primarily from alluvial deposits in a concession of 43,000 square km in the southern **Kasai provinces**. At its peak, MIBA production provided two-thirds of the noncommunist world's supply of industrial diamonds.

In 1984, following liberalization in diamond-marketing regulations, MIBA reversed a 20-year decline and in one year nearly doubled production. In 1985, it produced 13.6 million carats of

industrial diamonds and 4.8 million carats of gem-quality stones. The figures represented a return to production levels of industrial stones at **independence** and a ten-fold increase in the production of gem-quality stones over the same period. A great deal of the increase, particularly in gemstone production, was attributed to new **government** policies, announced in 1983, which allowed private firms to **trade** in diamonds. It was also attributed to the floating of the national **currency**, which enabled dealers to make a realistic profit on their transactions. MIBA's production declined in the 1990s and beyond because of deteriorating equipment, while artisanal mining in the Kasais and **smuggling** from northern **Angola** raised Congolese production overall. By 2005, artisanal mining outpaced MIBA production by a ratio of almost three to one. *See also* SOCIÉTÉ ZAÏROISE DE COMMERCIALISATION DES MINÉRAIS (SOZACOM).

**SOCIÉTÉ MINIÈRE DE KISENGE (SMK).** Congo's major producer of manganese, the SMK operates at Kisenge in the **Lualaba Province** near the **Angolan** border. The SMK was originally the Société Beceka Manganèse, a holding of the Société Générale founded in 1950. SMK was **nationalized** in 1973. Manganese production peaked in 1960 at 381,000 tons per year and remained above 300,000 tons per year until the closure of the **Benguela Railway** in 1975 and the **Shaba** invasions of 1977–78 that caused production to cease. However, considerable stockpiles remained, and 15,000 tons of ore were processed in 1984. There are no available data for production in the 1990s and 2000s.

**SOCIÉTÉ MINIÈRE DE TENKE-FUNGURUME (SMTF).** A **copper mining** company formed in 1970 with 20 percent state participation and the remainder owned by a consortium of **United States**, European, and Japanese companies. It was granted a concession of 1,425 square km in southern **Shaba Region**, but the operation depended heavily on the reopening of the **Benguela Railway**, which failed to occur because of the conflict between the **Angolan** government and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). The company was liquidated in October 1984. A consortium led by **South Africa's** Anglo-American Corporation sought to reopen the mines in the late 1980s but abandoned the project.

In November 1996, Canada-based Eurocan Consolidated Ventures announced a joint venture with the **Générale des Carrières et des Mines** (GECAMINES) to resume production by 2000. The agreement was abrogated after the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) took power in May 1997. It was renegotiated following the installation of the **Laurent Kabila** government in May 1997 and was renegotiated again in 1998, when the Kabila government, facing accusations of favoritism, reopened bidding and brought in companies from Europe, South Africa, and the United States. Negotiations continued during the transition, 2003–2006. In 2007, Tenke Mining Corporation was partly owned by GECAMINES and a subsidiary of Phelps Dodge.

#### **SOCIÉTÉ MINIÈRE ET INDUSTRIELLE DU KIVU (SOMINKI).**

A company of mixed public and private ownership formed on 25 March 1976 by the merger of eight companies, some of them in existence since 1928, engaged primarily in **tin** mining in **Kivu**. The company was owned by the Congolese **government** and a Franco-Belgian company, Empain-Schneider. It was granted a concession area of 9,800 square km lying in a 90,000 square km part of the **Kindu** area in **Maniema Province**. Known tin reserves in the area were 29,000 metric tons and estimated reserves were 43,700 tons. Output in 1983 was 2,582 tons of cassiterite but declined to 1,600 tons in 1990; the company virtually ceased operations in subsequent years. Production and the possible exploitation of known deposits in another area at Twangiza were hindered by transportation problems and low tin prices. SOMINKI also operated a 50-year-old **gold** mine at Mobale, with an output of 28 kg per month in the 1980s. Total known reserves of gold in the area were 25,506 kg and estimated reserves were 43,800 kg. During the civil war against **Laurent Kabila**, 1998–2002, and the transitional government, 2003–2006, most mining sites were controlled by the Rwanda-backed rebel group, the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD).

**SOCIÉTÉ NATIONALE D'ÉLECTRICITÉ (SNEL).** The **government**-owned agency charged with the development and administration of **electrical power** generation in Congo, SNEL operates all of the country's electricity generating complexes. The agency's largest



project in the 1970s was supervising the construction of the **Inga hydroelectric complex** in **Kongo Central** and the **Inga-Shaba power line** linking the complex to the power grid in former **Katanga Province**. Refurbishment of smaller hydroelectric complexes in the area and other parts of Congo began in the late 1970s, and plans were launched in the early 1980s for a rural electrification program. SNEL constructed a small hydroelectric complex in the 1980s at Mobayi-Mbongo, near **Mobutu Sese Seko's** home town of **Gbadolite**. The “pillages” of 1991–93 damaged some facilities. The company's old and failing equipment has been a major problem, with major cities often going weeks without electricity.

**SOCIÉTÉ NATIONALE DES CHEMINS DE FER CONGOLAIS (SNCC)**. The SNCC is the Congo's national railroad authority, formed in 1974 as the Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Zaïrois (SNCZ) by combining five **railway** lines. It became Sizarail as a result of a joint venture between the Congolese **government** and interests in **Belgium** and **South Africa** in 1995 to revive railways in Congo. Sizarail invested \$66 million to refurbish the lines between **Lubumbashi** and **Ilebo** and between **Kamina** and **Kalemie** in 1996. It reportedly turned a \$1 million profit in its first year, but its operations were disrupted in early 1997 by the offensive of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL), which took control of the operation at one point. After the installation of the AFDL-backed government of **Laurent Kabila**, Sizarail Manager Patrick Claes was arrested in September 1997 on **corruption** charges, but was released five months later. Sizarail operates the five major railway systems in the country. The company has been losing money since the 1990s, to the extent that its employees had wage arrears ranging from two to three years. A new board of directors, made up mostly of foreigners, was appointed in early 2009 to revitalize the **National Way**.

**SOCIÉTÉ ZAÏROISES DE COMMERCIALISATION DES MINÉRAIS (SOZACOM)**. The government established SOZACOM in June 1974 to market Congolese minerals, primarily those produced by government-owned **Générale des Carrières et des Mines** (GECAMINES). SOZACOM also took over the marketing of **diamonds**

produced by the **Société Minière de Bakwanga** (MIBA) in 1983, following a dispute with De Beers, which had been the marketing agent since before **independence**. However, SOZACOM was judged to be inefficient and was dissolved in 1984. GECAMINES and MIBA subsequently assumed responsibility for marketing their own minerals.

**SONGYE.** A **Bantu**-speaking group that lives near Kabinda, in southern **Kasai Oriental Province** between the Lubufu and **Lomami Rivers**.

**SOUMIALOT, GASTON.** A central figure in the eastern **rebellion** of 1964–65, Soumialot in January 1964 began recruiting young Congolese and **Tutsi** refugees from **Rwanda** and organizing them into a fighting force that later came to be called **Simbas**. He launched an offensive in early April 1964 that led to the capture of a number of towns in **Kivu** and north **Katanga** (now **Tanganyika Province**) and culminated in the taking of **Stanleyville** in August and **Lisala** a few weeks later. By September, Soumialot's forces controlled nearly one-half of Congolese territory. However, their inability to administer the captured territory and growing abuse of local populations led to a decline in popular support. The Congolese **army**, backed by foreign **mercenaries**, launched an offensive (Operating Dragon Rouge) that, with the airdrop of Belgian forces on Stanleyville in November 1964, reduced the rebellion to small pockets of resistance by the end of the year. Soumialot sought asylum in **Egypt**. Soumialot died in the late 1960s.

**SOUTH AFRICA, RELATIONS WITH.** During the years following **independence**, Congo was not in the forefront of the international movement to ostracize South Africa because of the white-led government's policy of *apartheid* or racial separateness. Congo often abstained on **United Nations** (UN) resolutions condemning the Pretoria government and did not support the move to expel South Africa from the organization in 1975. However, **Mobutu Sese Seko** condemned the apartheid regime in a speech before the world body in 1973 and, from the late 1970s until the late 1980s, Congo voted with the African bloc on most anti-South African resolutions at the

United Nations and the **Organization of African Unity** (OAU). Mobutu also hosted a meeting of southern Africa's frontline states in **Gbadolite** in November 1986. Nevertheless, Congo and South Africa found themselves in the same camp on many geopolitical issues. Both governments strongly condemned the **Cuban** and **Soviet Union** presence in Africa, particularly in **Angola** where, during the civil war, they opposed the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA) faction that took power in Luanda in 1975. They both opposed the resolution at the UN General Assembly equating Zionism with racism.

Despite Congo's official condemnation of apartheid, it was pragmatic on trade. A primary example was in the **transportation** sector. After the **Benguela Railway** was closed in 1975 by Angola's civil war, as much as one-half of Congo's mineral **exports** were shipped through Zimbabwe to the South African port of Durban along the **Southern Way**. During the 1980s, unofficial commercial ties developed, particularly the **import** of South African food and the export of Congolese minerals. By the late 1980s, food products from South Africa were found on most grocery shelves in Congolese cities. The practice continued into the 1990s because of the deterioration of the **National Way** network of **roads** and **railways** within Congo.

On 1 October 1988, President Pieter Botha visited Mobutu in Gbadolite. Beginning in 1989, with the dismantling of apartheid, official relations improved, and South Africa became an increasingly important trading partner. Congo has exported **coffee**, **timber**, and minerals to South Africa and has imported South African food, machinery, and spare parts. Airline routes developed between **Kinshasa**, **Lubumbashi**, and Johannesburg. A sizable Congolese business community established itself in South Africa.

With the advent of majority rule in South Africa and the election of Nelson Mandela as president, relations were further enhanced. South African companies entered into a number of joint ventures to rehabilitate mines and transportation networks in Congo. Military ties, which had been kept secret, were enhanced, and South African military officers trained elements of the **Division Spéciale Présidentielle** (DSP), the presidential guard, in the former **Shaba Province**. In addition, Mandela hosted mediation talks in May 1997 on a South African ship at Pointe-Noire, **Congo-Brazzaville**, as forces led by **Laurent**

**Kabila** advanced on Kinshasa in their drive to overthrow the Mobutu **government**. In June, the South African government announced it was donating \$300,000 worth of equipment to help the Kabila government rebuild the **police** force that had been abolished under Mobutu. When the Kabila government was attacked by rebels in August 1998, South Africa remained neutral—unlike several of its neighbors, which supported Kabila militarily—and tried to mediate the conflict.

The election of Thabo Mbeki as president of South Africa in 1999 influenced the war in Congo as South Africa became more involved in trying to bring all belligerents to the negotiating table. In late 2002, South Africa offered 1,500 troops as part of the forces of the **Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo** (MONUC). Then, in December 2002, all belligerents signed an all-inclusive peace agreement in Pretoria, South Africa. This was followed by another peace accord that sought to restore democracy and stability to war-torn Congo in April 2003. The peace agreement also supported a transitional government in Congo.

Since the early 2000s, South Africa has become the major trading partner of Congo after the **European Union**. Congolese imports from South Africa have averaged 17.2 percent of the total. However, exports to South Africa were less than 5 percent of total in the 2000s.

**SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)**. Originally the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the SADC was founded in July 1979 in Arusha, **Tanzania**, by **Angola**, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and **Zambia**. A draft declaration was drawn up proposing a program of action to improve regional transportation, agriculture, industry, energy, and development planning, with a view to reducing their economic dependence on **South Africa**, then under apartheid. During its first seven years, SADCC focused on the rehabilitation and expansion of the transportation system to permit the movement of goods from the interior of each country to ocean ports without the use of South African routes. In the 1980s, SADCC called for the international community to impose comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa.

A treaty was signed on 17 August 1992 in Windhoek, **Namibia**, which transformed SADCC into SADC. With the new institution,

member states were to seek development and integration in several areas that would lead to a full-fledged common market. The end of apartheid in South Africa paved the way to the democratic transition in South Africa. In late August 1994, in Gaborone, Botswana, SADC accepted South Africa as its 11th member. Mauritius became its 12th member in August 1995. At the annual meeting of heads of states in 1996, SADC launched the Organ on Politics, Defense, and Securities with an independent chair. The Seychelles and the **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)** became the 13th and 14th SADC members on 8 and 9 September 1997, respectively.

At the July 1998 summit held in Namibia, an attempt was made to refocus on economic cooperation. Member states pledged to eliminate tariffs and other restrictions on 90 percent of intra-community trade by 2005. Nonetheless, security matters, particularly the outbreak of **civil war** in the DRC, returned to center stage at the summit on 13–15 September in Mauritius. Several countries urged action in support of the **Laurent Kabila government**. Meanwhile, SADC members Angola, Namibia, and **Zimbabwe** had already sent troops to the DRC to oppose anti-Kabila rebels. The 19th summit, held in mid-August in Maputo, Mozambique, was dominated by the conflict in the DRC. From 1999 to 2003, the focus was on the DRC, and efforts began in 2001 to bring the belligerents to the negotiating table. Under President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, the **Dialogue Inter-Congolais** was held in Sun City, South Africa, and resulted in the signing of an inclusive peace agreement on 17 December 2002 called the **Acte Général et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI).

At the August 2003 summit in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, member states discussed the food crisis and, in March 2004, the Council of Ministers launched the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) that includes among its economic concerns food security, sustainable growth, trade promotion, regional integration, and development of transport and communications infrastructure. In 2007, the political and socioeconomic deterioration of Zimbabwe was the main concern of member states. SADC appointed South African President Thabo Mbeki to mediate between the government and opposition parties. Despite this move, SADC was highly criticized for its soft stand with President Robert Mugabe.

Another issue in 2007–2008 was the crisis in eastern Congo. While the Congolese and Zimbabwe crises were being debated, SADC promised to introduce a customs union in 2010 and a full common market in 2012.

**SOUTHERN WAY.** The second most economic way to **export** Congo's minerals from the former **Katanga Province**, after the **Benguela Railway**. The Southern Way is a route of 3,500 km that traverses **Zambia**, **Zimbabwe**, and **South Africa** to the ports of Durban, East London, and Port Elizabeth. Although longer than the more politically favored **National Way**, the route takes less than one-half the time, about 30 days. During the late 1980s, the Southern Way was used to transport nearly half of Katanga's minerals. Its use reportedly increased in the 1990s with the deterioration of the **river** and **railway** networks along the National Way. In early 2005, Congo also began using the Mozambique port of Beira after many years of interruption.

**SOVIET UNION, RELATIONS WITH.** *See* RUSSIA, RELATIONS.

#### **SPIRITUALISM, FETISHISM, SORCERY, AND WITCHCRAFT.**

Many Congolese, like many other Africans, are deeply mystical, and some of their traditional rites and beliefs, often called "superstitions" by Westerners, have been borne by the diaspora to Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas. These beliefs, sometimes called witchcraft but which would perhaps better be characterized as spiritualism, frequently coexist with equally deep, religious beliefs in **Christianity**, **Islam**, or African adaptations of monotheistic religions, such as **Kimbanguism**. These beliefs range from honoring and consulting one's ancestors, to the wearing of protective talismans and consulting with practitioners to obtain one's wishes or to seek protection from enemies. Ethnographers have observed that beliefs vary from tribe to tribe and even from clan to clan within specific **ethnic groups**.

In Congolese society, the spiritual world is often based on one supreme god supported by lesser and subordinate gods or spirits, and ancestors. The lesser spiritual beings might sometimes communicate with the living, thus providing a link between those in what is considered

to be the temporary existence that is corporeal life and those in the eternal existence that precedes and follows life. The spirits might be contacted at times by individuals and sometimes with the help of diviners or intermediaries.

Practitioners who invoke spirits for malevolent purposes, or in some cases to deflect evil from a client to another person, are often called witches or sorcerers. Others who seek the help of spirits for benign purposes are often called **healers** or physicians. The terms, however, are often interchangeable and, since many of the practitioners use intangible items such as fetishes or talismans in their rituals, they are sometimes called fetishists. *See also* RELIGION.

**STANLEY FALLS.** *See* BOYOMA FALLS.

**STANLEY, HENRY MORTON (1841–1904).** The journalist-explorer who, as a star reporter for the *New York Herald* newspaper, led an expedition into central Africa to find missionary/explorer **David Livingstone**. He later explored the **Congo River** for **Belgium's** King **Leopold II**. Stanley was born in Denbigh, Wales, in 1841. He went to America at an early age, was naturalized a U.S. citizen, and later went to work for James Gordon Bennet, Jr., at the *Herald*. He was sent to central Africa in October 1869, with an unlimited budget, to find Livingstone, who had not been heard from in two years. Stanley began his trip in March 1871 from Zanzibar. He arrived at the shores of **Lake Tanganyika** later in the year and finally met Livingstone at **Ujiji** on 28 October 1871, with the famous words, “Dr. Livingstone, I presume.”

During the trip, he became interested in proving that the **Lualaba River**, which many thought to be the headwater of the Nile, was in fact the headwater of the Congo River, of which little was known. Following Livingstone's death, Stanley set out again to discover the source of the Congo River, the mouth of which had been known to Europeans since the late 15th century. He began in Zanzibar in September 1874. After mapping Lake Victoria and Lake Tanganyika and marching across the Maniema Forest, he reached the headwaters of the Congo River at the confluence of the Luama and Lualaba Rivers on 17 October 1876. He sailed down the river to prove the headwaters were indeed those of the Congo River and reached **Kinshasa** on

9 March 1877. After a grueling crossing of the Crystal Mountains, he reached **Boma** on 9 August 1877, 999 days after leaving Zanzibar.

In 1878, Stanley was hired by Leopold II to chart and open the Congo for trade. He left in January 1879 and arrived on 14 August 1879, at **Vivi**, across the river from what is **Matadi** today. From his base at Vivi, he worked his way up the river, building a **road** and establishing trading stations. He reached Stanley Pool (now **Malebo Pool**) at Kinshasa in mid-1881 and negotiated a treaty with King Ngaliema on the pool's southern bank. Count Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza beat Stanley to the northern bank and signed a treaty between **France** and the local chief on that side of the river, leading the French to claim what would become **Republic of Congo** or **Congo-Brazzaville**. The road to Vivi was completed by the end of 1881, and Stanley left for Europe.

He returned in December 1882 and sailed up the Congo River to Stanleyville (now **Kisangani**), signing more than 250 treaties with local chiefs in the name of Leopold II. Stanley made a final voyage in 1887, ostensibly to rescue a British garrison under siege at Juba, southern **Sudan**, by the forces of the **Mahdi**. The trip lasted three years, but the expedition never reached Juba.

Stanley is credited with opening up the Congo River from Kinshasa to Kisangani to European **trade** and with establishing those treaties with local tribes that Leopold used to take control of most of the **Congo River Basin** when Africa was partitioned among the European powers at the **Berlin Conference** in 1885.

**STANLEY POOL.** *See* MALEBO POOL.

**STANLEYVILLE.** *See* KISANGANI.

**STRIKES.** Congo's **labor** movement historically has been weak. During single-party rule, the sole legal trade union, the Union Nationale des Travailleurs Zaïrois (UNTZA), was part of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) party. The **Mobutu Sese Seko government** frequently co-opted labor leaders by appointing them to well-paying political positions. When co-option did not succeed, threats, dismissals, and force were used. During the 1970s and 1980s, teachers and **civil servants** struck on numerous occasions over low



pay, but these strikes were largely ineffective. With the advent of the **democratic transition** in 1990, UNTZA lost its monopoly over the labor movement, and more than a dozen trade unions were formed. Civil servants, whose purchasing power had been seriously eroded by **inflation**, staged lengthy strikes during the 1990s to demand increases in **wages and salaries**. Medical workers in public hospitals staged strikes to protest working conditions. The **Sacred Union opposition** alliance on a number of occasions paralyzed **Kinshasa** with “*ville morte*” (“dead city”) general strikes to apply pressure during the frequent political stalemates between the opposition and the Mobutu government. The practice continued during the **Laurent Kabila** government and beyond.

For example, a series of strikes over salary claims occurred in August–September 2005 and coincided with the government’s purchase for members of the transitional parliament 620 new sport utility vehicles at a cost of \$13.6 million. In face of these protests, the government tried to intimidate the trade unions and ordered the arrest of the leader of the civil servants’ union, Romain Mutu Mayi Tamunde, who was jailed in the Makala prison in Kinshasa in September. Despite their efforts, trade unions’ strikes have remained ineffective in improving workers’ social conditions. *See also* UNION NATIONALE DES TRAVAILLEURS CONGOLAIS (UNTC).

**STUDENTS.** **University** students have often played a political role in Congo, whether supporting the **government** during the “revolutionary” days following the **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu coup d’état** or criticizing the government in the years that followed. Students exerted little influence during the early years following **independence**, but by the mid-1960s they had organized into associations and formed important blocs in certain **political parties**. Many supported **Patrice Lumumba** and were deeply angered by his assassination in 1961. By 1968, two major students organizations had emerged: The **Union Générale des Étudiants Congolais** (UGEC), with branches on all three campuses and in **Belgium**, and the Association Générale des Étudiants de Lovanium (AGEL), based at **Lovanium University** in **Kinshasa**.

Both were disbanded by the government in 1968, and the **Jeunesse du Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (JMPR) wing of the

party was proclaimed the only legal **youth** organization. One of the major responsibilities of the JMPR was student mobilization. Many students at first supported Mobutu and opposed **Moïse Tshombe**, whom they linked with the **Katanga secession**, **mercenaries**, and the assassination of Lumumba. They also supported Mobutu's policies of combating tribalism and regionalism and strengthening the authority of the central government. In subsequent years, however, disenchantment grew with the Mobutu government because of mismanagement, declining government support for **education**, the president's growing personal fortune, and his close ties to the **United States** (U.S.) government. Students demonstrated against the visit to Congo-Kinshasa by U.S. Vice President Hubert Humphrey in January 1968.

On 4 June 1969, students at the Lovanium demonstrated against low stipends and what they considered to be extravagant government spending. Hundreds marched from the campus into the downtown area, breaking through several **police** and **military** roadblocks. Troops opened fire. Estimates of the number of students killed varied from 40 to 100 although official figures were never published. Thirty-four students were arrested and charged with subversive activities. A number of them fled the country and were given asylum in Bulgaria. Many were tried and given sentences of up to 20 years in prison. They were amnestied on 14 October 1969.

On 4 June 1971, students demonstrating at Lovanium and **Lubumbashi** campuses in memory of the 1969 victims again clashed with security forces. The universities were closed, and all students at the Lovanium campus and the leaders of students in the Lubumbashi campus were enrolled in military service. The event was to be repeated in 1977, 1981, and 1982. Following the protests of 1971, a single, national university, the **Université Nationale du Zaïre** (UNAZA), was created from the three universities at Lovanium, Lubumbashi, and **Kisangani**.

On the night of **11–12 May 1990**, elements of the **Division Spéciale Présidentielle** (DSP) presidential guard entered UNAZA's Lubumbashi campus and attacked students in their dormitories. **Human rights** groups said that between 30 and 100 students were killed. The government claimed that only one died. The incident led to a cutoff of nonhumanitarian aid to the Mobutu government by the **European Union**, Canada, and the United States.

Students were among the protesters who demonstrated against **Laurent Kabila** in June 1997, after his forces took power in Kinshasa and he declined to name **Étienne Tshisekedi** to his new government. A few other demonstrations occurred in the early 2000s, with no major consequences.

One of the largest demonstrations in the history of independent Congo was by primary and secondary school students in September 2005. Unable to attend classes for weeks, they demonstrated in the Kinshasa streets and in mid-September they marched from different sectors of the capital to the office building of the vice president for economic affairs, **Jean-Pierre Bemba**, calling on the government to pay their teachers. A few weeks later, teachers were paid.

**SUDAN, RELATIONS WITH.** Relations between Congo and Sudan were good until 1985, in large part because of the friendship between **Mobutu Sese Seko** and President Gafaar al Nimeiry and their mutual dislike for **Libyan** leader Muammar Khadhafi. Relations cooled after the overthrow of Nimeiry in 1985 and further deteriorated with the advent of the radical Islamic regime of Omar al-Bashir in a coup d'état in 1989. The civil war in southern Sudan, waged at various levels of intensity from the early 1960s, complicated relations. The **Kinshasa government** historically provided refuge to southern Sudanese fleeing the fighting and supported guerrillas of the Sudan People's Liberation Army. When relations with the government in Khartoum were good, Mobutu tried to mediate the war. In the 1990s, however, reports of atrocities by the Sudanese army against southern civilians and increased activity by Iran in Sudan aggravated relations.

Sudan initially was cool toward the **Laurent Kabila** government when it came to power in 1997 because of Khartoum's poor relations with **Uganda**, one of Kabila's main backers. However, it began to support Kabila diplomatically in 1998, after Uganda backed rebels of the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD). Sudan even sent soldiers to support Kabila's faltering army. Relations remain cordial as of December 2008.

**SUD-KASAI.** The southern **region** of the former province of **Kasai**, Sud-Kasai was a province from 1962 to the reform of 1966 when it was merged with Nord-Kasai to form **Kasai Occidental**. At in-

**dependence**, ethnic rivalry between the **Luba** and **Lulua** in Kasai and between the Luba and **Lunda** in **Katanga** drove many Luba into South Kasai, tripling its **population** between 1958 and 1963. The presence of large mineral deposits, including two-thirds of the noncommunist world's industrial **diamonds**, contributed to the pressures for independence that led **Albert Kalonji** to proclaim the "Independent Mining Republic of South Kasai" on 8 August 1960. The secession was ended on 2 February 1961, when Kalonji joined **Cyrille Adoula's** government of reconciliation. Ethnic tensions remained in the region, however, and the **government** responded to these pressures in 1972 by creating two provinces (later renamed regions), Kasai Occidental, dominated by the Lulua, and **Kasai Oriental**, dominated by the Luba. *See also* CIVIL WARS.

**SUD-KIVU.** A **province** in eastern Congo that was a subregion of **Kivu Region** until 1988. Sud-Kivu covers an area of 64,789 square km, primarily of heavy **forest**. With an estimated **population** of more than 2.5 million in 2005, it is one of the most densely populated regions of the country. Sud-Kivu is home to a number of **ethnic groups** including the **Banyamulenge**, **Fulero**, Havu, Lenga, Rundi, **Shi**, and Vira. The area around the capital of **Bukavu** was overwhelmed in 1994 by an influx of more than 200,000 **refugees** from **Rwanda's** civil war. The region was the first to be seized by troops of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) in October 1996 and by forces of the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD) two years later in what many commentators called the **Second Congo War**.

Despite the signing of the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en Démocratie République du Congo** (AGI), a number of military commanders refused to join the process. The most notable example occurred on 26 May 2004. **Laurent Nkunda** was promoted to general and appointed regional military commander of **Kasai Oriental** after the installation of the transitional government in mid-2003. However, he declined the offer for personal security reasons. His troops occupied Bukavu in May 2004. His followers, the Banyamulenge, also destabilized the Uvira and Fizi territories. For almost two years, Sud-Kivu Province was ungovernable because the Banyamulenge insurgency also prompted the revival of **Mai-Mai**

groups. In January 2008, most armed groups operating in **Nord-Kivu** and Sud-Kivu signed a peace agreement, called *Amani* (peace), to end hostility. However, the conflict resumed again in October 2008. Nkunda was arrested in January 2009 in Rwanda.

**SUD-UBANGI.** A former district of the **Équateur Province**, Sud-Ubangi became a province in February 2009 according to the 2006 **constitution**. It lies in the northwestern corner of the country on the **Ubangi River**. Its capital is Gemena. The province includes four territories: Budjala, Gemena, Kungu, and Libenge.

**SUGAR.** Sugar cane is grown commercially in **Kongo Central Province** and the **Ruzizi River** valley in **Kivu**. Production of sugar began on a commercial scale in 1925, and the first sugar refinery, Moerbek, was built in 1929 in **Bas-Congo** (now Kongo Central) with an initial capacity of 7,000 tons in 1930, expanded to 40,000 tons in the 1980s. In 1956, a second sugar refinery called Sucrerie et Raffinerie de l'Afrique Centrale (SUCRAF) was created at Kiliba in **Sud-Kivu** and produced 15,000 tons in 1985.

Production of raw sugar cane, one of the country's major cash crops, peaked in 1975 at 614,000 metric tons, declined in subsequent years, but began to rise again in the 1980s, reaching 550,000 tons in 1985. Production of refined sugar reached 80,000 tons in 1985. However, **imports** were still required to meet an annual consumption of 150,000 tons.

With **Zairianization**, both refineries were grouped under the **Office National du Sucre** (ONS). However, they were returned to their private owners under **Retrocession**. The ONS was liquidated on 5 May 1978, and Projets Sucriers au Zaïre (PSZ) was established on 8 May to oversee the industry and promote the development of new projects. A third refinery was established under a joint Congolese–**Chinese** venture in 1984 in Yawenda, in the former **Oriental Province**, with a planned capacity of 15,000 tons per year. It produced 3,000 tons in 1985.

In 1985, the PSZ announced plans to construct four additional refineries: at Mushie-Pentane near **Bandundu**, at Lubilashi in **Haut-Katanga Province**, at Luiza in Kongo Central, and at Businga in **Équateur Province**. Each refinery was to have an annual production

capacity of 15,000 tons. However, the arrival of **Laurent Kabila** and the ensuing **civil war** against him delayed all these projects. Production of sugar plummeted drastically as the result of a decline in sugar cane production from 2,000,000 tons in 1998 to 1,669,000 tons in 2000; it dropped to only 1,650,000 tons in 2003, according to data from the Food Agriculture Organization.

**SUPREME COURT.** *See* JUDICIAL SYSTEM.

**SWAHILI.** *See* KISWAHILI.

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**TABU, LEY PASCAL (TABU LEY ROCHÉREAU) (1940– ).**

Known as Tabu Ley or Rochereau, Tabu was born in **Bandundu**. In 1954, he wrote his first song “Bessama Muchacha” that he recorded with “Grand Kallé” **Joseph Kabasele**’s band, African Jazz. After finishing high school he joined the band as a full-time musician. Tabu Ley sang the pan-African hit *Indépendance Cha Cha*, which was composed by Grand Kallé when Congo was declared an independent nation in 1960, propelling him to instant fame. He remained with African Jazz until 1963, when he and Dr. Nico Kasanda formed their own group, Africa Fiesta. Two years later, Tabu Ley and Dr. Nico split, and Tabu Ley formed African Fiesta National. The group became one of the most successful bands in African history.

In 1970, Tabu Ley formed the Orchestre Afrisa International. In the mid-1980s, Tabu Ley discovered a young talented singer and dancer, **M’bilila Bel**, who helped popularize his band further. M’bilila Bel became the first female soukous singer to gain acclaim throughout Africa. Tabu Ley and M’bilila Bel later married and had one child. In the early 1990s, he briefly settled in Southern California, where he began tailoring his music to an international audience by including more English lyrics and adding more international dance styles such as Samba. He found success with the release of albums such as *Muzina*, *Exil Ley*, *Africa Worldwide*, and *Babeti Soukous*.

When **Laurent Kabila** became president, Tabu Ley returned to **Kinshasa** and became a cabinet minister in the government.

Following Kabila's death, Tabu Ley joined the appointed transitional parliament until it was dissolved following the establishment of the inclusive transitional institutions. In November 2005, he was appointed vice governor in charge of political, administrative, and socio-cultural questions for the city of Kinshasa.

**TANANARIVE CONFERENCE.** The French government sponsored this conference, which was held from 8 to 12 March 1961 in the capital of Madagascar. The conference adopted a resolution calling for a confederal system of **government** in Congo. The delegates agreed to create 16 states. Opposition from the central government in **Leopoldville** led to the **Coquilhatville Conference** in **Équateur Province** in April and May. The Coquilhatville Conference renounced a confederal system and called for a **federal** system of government. Neither conference, however, came up with a system of government that was acceptable to the various secessionist groups. After extensive negotiations, **parliament** met in **Leopoldville** on 2 August 1961, with representatives from **Katanga** and **South Kasai** present, and elected **Cyrille Adoula** to head a government of national reconciliation.

**TANGANYIKA PROVINCE.** Home of the **Luba** of **Katanga**, Tanganyika became a province in February 2009 as the result of the 2006 **constitution**. The province was the scene of an insurrection by the Luba against the seceded state of Katanga. In 1961, it was reconquered by the seceded state, only to be taken back by the central **government** later that year. From 1962 to 1966, the area was known as North-Katanga Province, but it was merged into the restored Katanga Province by the administrative reorganization of 1966. The capital of Tanganyika Province is **Kalemie**.

**TANZANIA, RELATIONS WITH.** Relations between Congo and Tanzania have officially been good. During the **Mobutu Sese Seko** era, however, they were strained repeatedly by suspicions in the Mobutu **government** that Tanzania harbored **opposition** guerrillas. In mid-1975, guerrillas of the **Parti Révolutionnaire du Peuple** (PRP) kidnapped a group of foreign students from a game preserve in Tanzania and held them in eastern Congo for a number of weeks. In November 1984, the PRP attacked the Congolese port city of

**Moba** on **Lake Tanganyika** and held it for two days before government troops recaptured it. The guerrillas attacked Moba again in June 1985 in a less successful action. Congolese authorities said the guerrillas were based in Tanzania and threatened to carry out “hot pursuit” raids into Tanzania if they attacked again. Tanzania denied the charges, saying the guerrillas were based entirely within Congo.

The poor relations of this period were also blamed in part on personal relations between Mobutu and Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere. Nyerere, with his **socialist** policies, friendship with Eastern bloc nations, and unassuming lifestyle, differed markedly from Mobutu. When Nyerere retired in 1985, Vice President Ali Hassan Mwinyi was elected president of Tanzania. Relations improved markedly, especially after Mwinyi declared that his government would not allow its territory to be used to destabilize its neighbors. Mwinyi was re-elected to a second term in 1990. In the early 1990s, Mwinyi and Mobutu sought to mediate the civil wars in **Rwanda**, **Burundi**, and **Angola**, further reinforcing diplomatic cooperation between their two governments. Mwinyi was succeeded by Benjamin Mkapa in 1995, who continued the policies of friendship and cooperation and sought to mediate the conflict in eastern Congo.

In October 1996, the PRP joined the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL), which took Kinshasa in May 1997. Fighters involved in the AFDL offensive came from a number of neighboring countries, including Rwanda, **Uganda**, and Angola. Tanzania sought to remain neutral when rebels of the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD) attacked the **Laurent Kabila** government in August 1998. During the **civil war** against Kabila, from 1998 to 2003, and the transitional government, from 2003 to 2006, Tanzania remained the export route for many goods **smuggled** out of Congo, such as **cobalt** and **uranium**.

**TEKE.** A **Bantu**-speaking group that lives on both sides of the **Congo River** between **Kinshasa** and the confluence of the **Kasai** and Congo Rivers. Widely believed to have entered the region as early as the 1600s, the Teke were one of the groups that made early contact with Europeans, beginning with the arrival of the **missionary** Father de Montesarchio in 1652. They **traded** in tobacco and other **agricultural** goods but became heavily dependent on the **slave** trade in



the 18th century. The Teke's traditional political structure has been described as a group of chiefdoms, each with several villages. These villages tended to be small and unstable, and there was no centralized defense system. Chieftaincy was hereditary, and one of the **chief's** major duties was to collect tribute for the king, who was elected by the village elders and acted as the judicial authority.

**TELECOMMUNICATIONS.** In 1995, there were an estimated 4 million radios in Congo, 40,000 television sets, 32,000 telephones, and 200 telegraph offices. Ten years later, the Congolese owned more than 20 million radios. A satellite station at N'Sele links by microwave towers to Kinshasa, 100 km away, and the **Voix du Peuple** (formerly the Voix du Zaïre) complex provides telecommunications links with the outside world. The station allows the complex to transmit feeds to eight regional stations in **Bandundu**, **Bukavu**, **Kananga**, **Kisangani**, **Lubumbashi**, **Matadi**, **Mbandaka**, and **Mbuji-Mayi**. Six other cities reportedly have television stations. Reception is also possible in Kinshasa of television and radio broadcasts from Brazzaville.

The **government**-operated telephone system was largely dysfunctional by 1990. However, a joint private **United States** and Congolese company in June 1991 launched a cellular telephone network in **Kinshasa** and several other cities. Called Telcel, it had 4,000 subscribers. Major humanitarian relief organizations and **missionary** groups operate their own high-frequency radio networks. By the mid-1990s, many businessmen had purchased their own personal satellite telephone systems.

From 4,000 subscribers in 1991, the number of mobile phones rose to 8,900 in 1997. With an increasing number of **South African** companies investing in Congo, the number of mobile phones jumped from 15,000 in 2000 to 150,000 in 2001 and 560,000 in 2002. From 2003 to 2006, people with mobile phones increased dramatically, from 1.3 million to 4.5 million. While the number of mobile phones went up, telephone land lines declined from 26,900 in 1975 to 9,695 in 2006.

The internet has been a major innovation in Congolese telecommunications. According to **World Bank** figures, the number of internet

users increased from a mere 50 subscribers in 1996 to 3,000 in 2000. This number jumped from 6,000 in 2001 to 180,000 in 2006.

**TELEVISION.** *See* MEDIA; TELECOMMUNICATIONS.

**TENKE.** A small town in **Haut-Katanga Province**, Tenke is located east of **Likasi**, near an area where significant deposits of **copper** and **cobalt** have been found. *See also* FUNGURUME; SOCIÉTÉ MINIÈRE TENKE-FUNGURUME.

**TERRITORIAL POLICE.** This **police** force, formed during the colonial era, consisted of about 6,000 men, armed and uniformed, who guarded prisons and public buildings and provided reinforcements to the police when called upon. The force was disbanded following **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu's coup d'état** in 1965.

**TETELA.** A **Bantu**-speaking group that lives between Lusambo and the upper **Congo River** in **Sankuru** and **Maniema Provinces**. Ethnologists view the Tetela and **Kusu** as closely related to each other and as distant members of the **Mongo** cluster. The Tetela began to be viewed as a distinct group in the late 1800s with the arrival of **Afro-Arabs** from the east and Europeans from the west and south. The Tetela living in **Kasai** had less contact with Afro-Arabs than the Kusu, who in some cases adopted Muslim religion and dress. Belgian colonial authorities separated the two groups when they divided the area into Kasai and **Kivu Provinces**. **Patrice Lumumba** was a Tetela who tried unsuccessfully to unite his people with the Kusu. The Tetela reportedly were the object of a major purge within the **military** in 1975.

**THANT, U (1907–1974).** The Burmese diplomat who became secretary-general of the **United Nations (UN)** following the death of **Dag Hammarskjöld** in a plane accident in **Katanga** on 17 September 1961, while trying to mediate an end to the **Katanga Secession**. Thant announced a new plan to end the secession on 10 August 1962. However, lack of progress led to the seizure of important Katangan installations by UN troops on 28 December and the announcement

by **Moïse Tshombe** of the end of the secession on 14 January 1963. Thant oversaw the final three years of the UN administration in the Congo. He was replaced by Kurt Waldheim of Austria in 1972.

**TIMBER.** In the 1990s, Congo produced an average of 400,000 cubic meters of timber per year, of which an average of 150,000 cubic meters was exported, according to official figures. This timber comes primarily from the **Mayombe Forest** in western **Kongo Central Province**. The remainder comes from the eastern part of the country and is usually exported by road through East Africa. However, official production from eastern Congo declined in 1998–2003 as illegal exports from **Uganda** increased during the **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila**.

Relatively little of the 1.2 million square km of Congolese forests had been exploited by the early 1990s. Nevertheless, **environmental** groups place them at risk because timber concessions signed by private companies and the government cover one-third of the country's forests.

In 2008, a **World Bank** working group evaluated the technical and legal aspects of 156 logging deals, mostly signed during the civil war, 1998–2003, and subsequent corruption-plagued interim government in 2003–2006. It concluded that only 29 contracts met the minimum standards required. Among contracts recommended for cancellation were 10 to 16 belonging to Portuguese-owned Sodifer, a unit of Siforco, and a subsidiary of Germany's Danzer Group. These companies constituted more than 60 percent of all timber exported from Congo.

**TIN.** In the 1940s, the **Belgian Congo** was the second-largest producer of tin in the world, after Bolivia; it produced 14,000 metric tons of the mineral in 1942. Tin in deposits of cassiterite were found primarily along the southern side of the **Lualaba River** in southern **Katanga** and in **Kivu** east of **Bukavu**. A survey by the Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières (BRGM) under a 1969 agreement with the Congolese **government** uncovered estimated reserves of 600,000 metric tons. Beginning in the late 1970s, however, production declined steadily due to low prices and the exhaustion of easily mined deposit. Output of tin contained in ore and concentrate

was 3,000 tons in 1983, but declined to 1,600 tons by 1990. Smelter production was 150 tons.

In **Shaba Region** during the 1970s and 1980s, tin was mined by **Zairétain**, a joint venture that was 50 percent owned by the government and 50 percent by the Belgian **GEOMINES** company, which operated the mine. Other companies with operations in Shaba in the 1980s included the **Générale des Carrières et des Mines** (**GE-CAMINES**) and the **Entreprises Minières du Zaïre** (**EMZ**), of mixed ownership. In Kivu, tin deposits were mined by **EMZ**, the **Société Minière de Katando** (**SOMIDO**), **Société Minière et Industrielle du Kivu** (**SOMINKI**), and **Société Minière de Goma**, all of mixed public and private ownership. According to the **United States Bureau of Mines**, production declined in the early 1990s to represent only 100 kg in 1994. The average annual production was 150 kg from 1997 to 1999. Tin production increased from 300 kg in 2001 to 3,200 kg in 2004 but declined again to 2,800 kg in 2005.

**TIO KINGDOM.** A relatively small kingdom established along both sides of the **Malebo Pool** as early as the 16th century. Relatively friendly and anxious to **trade**, the Tio kings signed agreements with **Henry Morton Stanley** and Count Savorgnan de Brazza that led to the rapid development of **Leopoldville** and **Brazzaville** as the capitals of the Belgian and French colonial empires in central Africa.

**TIPPO TIP (TIPPU TIP) (1837–1905).** An **Afro-Arab** whose real name was **Hamed bin Muhammed el-Murjebi**. He was a merchant of **slaves** from **Zanzibar**, now part of **Tanzania**. Successor of the sultans of Zanzibar, he led many commercial endeavors in Eastern Central Africa, some of which involved slaving. He was also an owner of plantations. Tippo Tip met and helped a number of European **explorers** to penetrate Central Africa, among them **Henry Morton Stanley** and **David Livingstone**. Tippo Tip created a quasi-trade monarchy in eastern Congo from 1884 to 1887. He was perhaps the first African explorer in eastern Congo. In 1887, he was named governor of the district of the **Stanley Falls** in the **Congo Free State** (**CFS**). However, his position of governor obliged him to render services to King **Leopold II**. Tippo Tip left the CFS just as Leopold II started a **military** campaign to drive Afro-Arabs out of the Congo Basin. He

died in 1905 at Stone Town, his birthplace and the main town of the archipelago of Zanzibar.

**TOGO, RELATIONS WITH.** Relations between Congo and Togo were close from 1967, when General Gnassingbe Eyadema came to power in a coup d'état. Eyadema was one of the first African leaders to embrace **Mobutu Sese Seko's Authenticity** program and also imitated in many ways the Congolese president's personality cult. Togo under Eyadema traditionally sided with Congo (then **Zaire**), Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Senegal, and other "moderates" on regional and international issues. Togo contributed troops to the Pan-African Peacekeeping Force sent to **Shaba** in 1978 following the Shaba invasions. During an attempted coup in Lomé in September 1986, the Congolese government sent airborne troops to bolster the Eyadema regime. When Mobutu fled **Kinshasa** on 16 May 1997, one day before the arrival of **opposition** forces led by Kabila, he went to Togo for five days, until **Morocco** granted him asylum. Trade between Togo and Congo has remained quite minimal.

**TRADE.** *See* EXTERNAL TRADE.

**TRADE UNIONS.** *See* LABOR.

**TRANSITIONAL ACT.** The document adopted by the **Conférence Nationale Souveraine** (CNS) on 15 August 1992 to govern the nation during a two-year transition period, until a new **constitution** could be drafted and national **elections** held. The act called for a figurehead **president**, a **parliament** called the **Haut Conseil de la République** (HCR) to oversee elections, a **prime minister** with full executive powers elected by the HCR, and an independent **judiciary**. The act incorporated the **Compromis Politique Global** (Comprehensive Political Arrangement) of 30 July 1992, which stated that no institution of state could hinder another from exercising its functions. The reference was to the presidency and the **military**, but **Mobutu Sese Seko** never formally acknowledged this agreement. *See also* DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION.

**TRANSPORTATION.** The size and topography of Congo, combined with its status as a virtual enclave, have hindered the development of efficient transportation routes. The country's 14,000 km of navigable **waterways** form the backbone of a system that was mostly built during the colonial era. Some 5,000 km of **railways** (five separate systems) circumvent unnavigable portions of the **rivers** and link urban, **mining**, and **agricultural** centers to the river and rail systems. Most railways were built between 1900 and 1932.

Most **roads** were constructed in the decade following World War II. The system deteriorated following **independence**, and only two paved roads were constructed: between **Boma** and **Matadi** and between **Kikwit** and **Kinshasa**. In 1983, the Japanese government provided assistance in building a suspension bridge over the **Congo River** at Matadi that improved road links between the breadbasket Bas-Fleuve district and markets in Kinshasa.

Transportation was one of several sectors nationalized under **Zairianization** in 1973 and liberalized during **Retrocession** in 1975. In the 1980s, the Japanese and **United States** (U.S.) governments launched bilateral programs to develop transportation in the former **Bandundu** and **Bas-Congo Provinces**. Initial projects included building hundreds of concrete bridges to replace small ferries and log crossings. Ferries on larger rivers were to be refurbished. On 16 January 1997, the **government** announced a re-registration program aimed at raising an estimated \$300 million and recovering vehicles stolen during the "**pillages**" of 1991–93. In 2005, more than 1 million motor vehicles were registered in the country, of which more than half were registered in Kinshasa.

Liberalization of **air transportation** in the mid-1980s led to the creation of numerous private air carriers, which competed vigorously with each other and, by 1990, had virtually supplanted the money-losing national carrier, **Air Zaïre**, which was reorganized as the **Lignes Aériennes Congolaises** in 1997. *See also* BENGUELA RAILWAY; EASTERN WAY; NATIONAL WAY; PORTS; SOUTHERN WAY.

**TRIBES AND TRIBALISM.** *See* ETHNIC GROUPS.

**TROUPES EN SERVICE TERRITORIAL (TST) [TERRITORIAL SERVICE TROOPS].** The name of the colonial-era **police** force created after World War I. In 1959, the troops were renamed *gendarmes* and one year later were incorporated into the army. *See also* **MILITARY**.

**TSETSE FLY.** A fly common to the wet, low-lying **forest** areas of the **Congo River Basin** that is a major carrier of sleeping sickness disease. Because of the tsetse fly, commercial cattle herding in Congo is limited primarily to the plains of the former **Katanga**, **Bas-Congo**, **Kivu**, and **Oriental Provinces**. *See also* **LIVESTOCK**.

**TSHIKAPA.** A city of about 350,000 inhabitants as of mid-2007, Tshikapa is located on the **Kasai River** in the heart of the **diamond mining** area of southern **Kasai Province**. Many residents of Tshikapa dig and pan for diamonds in the alluvial deposits on the Kasai, Tshikapa, Lovua, Lonaishinie, and Lubembe Rivers. In the past, competition for diamonds sometimes led to clashes between local residents and soldiers who also worked the area. Liberalization of diamond trading in the 1980s and 1990s created an economic boom. According to a number of observers, outside post-war Iraq, Tshikapa has the densest source of satellite phone communications in the world due to the exploitation of the diamond mines.

**TSHISEKEDI WA MULUMBA, ÉTIENNE (1932– ).** One of the founders of the multiparty movement in 1980 who suffered various forms of detention during the 1980s and who, as president of the **Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social** (UDPS) party in the 1990s, was considered the major hardline opponent of **Mobutu Sese Seko**. Tshisekedi was born on 14 December 1932, in Lulua-bourg (renamed **Kananga** in 1966), in the former **Kasai Province**, and attended school there. He graduated from **Lovanium University** in 1961 with a degree in law, the first Congolese to do so. Following the Mobutu **coup d'état**, he was named interior minister from 1965 until 1968, during which time he helped to draft the **N'Sele Manifesto** that was the Magna Carta of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) and the single-party movement. He served as justice minister from 1968 until 1969, and subsequently as ambas-

sador to **Morocco**, deputy-speaker of the **Legislative Council**, and chairman of **Air Zaïre**.

In 1980, he was one of the **Group of Thirteen Parliamentarians** who wrote a 52-page open letter to Mobutu condemning **government corruption** and calling for the creation of a multi-party **democracy**. In 1982, he co-founded the UDPS, which in the single-party state was considered a seditious act. He was arrested, convicted of treason and, in July 1982, sentenced to 15 years in prison. Tshisekedi was freed under the general **amnesty** of 1983, but when he tried to meet with a **United States** (U.S.) congressional delegation at a major hotel in **Kinshasa** on 12 August 1983, he and other UDPS members were beaten by **security** forces, arrested, and banished to their home regions. He was detained and released on half a dozen subsequent occasions. He was in detention on **24 April 1990** when Mobutu announced the end of single-party rule, and was quickly freed.

The UDPS was one of the first **political parties** to apply for registration and was one of the founders of the **Sacred Union** alliance which, by 1991, grouped more than 200 **opposition** parties. Tshisekedi led the struggle to wrest control of the **democratic transition** from Mobutu and the government. During periods of political stalemate, the UDPS pressed its agenda through **strikes** and acts of civil disobedience, and its members were attacked on numerous occasions by security forces. Tshisekedi's residence in the Kinshasa suburb of Limete was attacked on several occasions.

On 15 August 1992, after a year of confrontation and stalemate, the **Conférence Nationale Souveraine** elected Tshisekedi **prime minister**. In December, it adopted the **Transitional Act**, drafted a **constitution**, and formed the **Haut Conseil de la République** (HCR) to oversee the democratic transition. The draft constitution eliminated many decrees of the Mobutu years, restricted the power of the presidency, and abolished such symbols as the **flag** and national anthem adopted under the MPR government. Mobutu, who had never formally accepted the Transitional Act, rejected the draft constitution and in October convened the disbanded MPR **parliament** to draft a version more to his liking. When Tshisekedi tried to replace the governor of the **central bank** in order to stem a tide of **currency** counterfeiting that had raised **inflation** to 30 percent per day, Mobutu



placed soldiers around the central bank and the offices of the prime minister. He also locked out the Tshisekedi government.

In February 1993, Mobutu dismissed Tshisekedi and named a rival government headed by a former senior UDPS advisor, **Faustin Birindwa**. The HCR refused to recognize the Birindwa government, which was also boycotted by many Western governments. After another year of political stalemate, a compromise was reached, forming the **Haut Conseil de la République/Parlement de Transition** (HCR/PT) by merging the HCR and the MPR parliament. The HCR/PT elected **Léon Kengo wa Dondo** prime minister, but his government was rejected as illegal by Tshisekedi and the Sacred Union, who said the vote was taken without a quorum. Tshisekedi's refusal to compromise caused some supporters, including Congo's major Western partners, to switch support to more moderate opposition groups. However, because of his uncompromising opposition to Mobutu, Tshisekedi was regarded by many as the only major opposition leader who could not be corrupted. He told those who criticized his stubbornness that only with the departure of Mobutu could true **democracy** be installed in the country.

Mobutu left power in May 1997 as troops of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) entered Kinshasa. AFDL leader **Laurent Kabila** met with Tshisekedi after taking the oath of office on May 29, but did not include him in his first cabinet. This exclusion led to demonstrations, which were subsequently banned by the new government. In late 1997, Tshisekedi was briefly detained for attempting to hold a political rally. In January 1998, the authorities prevented a meeting at which Tshisekedi was to "present his new year's greetings to the people." On 12 February 1998, two days after meeting U.S. civil rights leader Jesse Jackson, Tshisekedi was again arrested as he was making preparations for a speech to commemorate the 16th anniversary of the UDPS. The Kabila government, in a gesture that reminded many of the Mobutu government of the 1980s, sent Tshisekedi into internal exile in his home village for a number of months.

Tshisekedi supported the Kabila government against the **civil war** launched by the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD) in August 1998, but subsequently called for a negotiated end to the war. Tshisekedi vehemently criticized the transitional govern-

ment of 2003–2006 for its lack of progress and for its decision to delay promised **elections**. However, when the **Commission Électorale Indépendante** (CEI; Independent Electoral Commission) announced the elections, he asked his supporters to boycott them and not register to vote. In January 2006, he officially ended his two-year boycott of the transitional government and initially said that he would participate in the national elections scheduled for 29 April 2006, as well as in the preceding polls in March. The elections were postponed to 30 July 2006, and Tshisekedi requested that voter registration operations' stations be partially reopened, in order for his militants—who had boycotted the registration on his orders—to receive election identification cards and vote. The CEI denied this request because it came so late in the process. Tshisekedi then reverted to his previous position of boycotting the elections. In the week leading up to the elections, Tshisekedi's numerous militants protested against the polls by taking down and destroying all the electoral banners they could reach in Kinshasa and other cities, prompting intervention by riot police.

Many independent observers still consider Tshisekedi the most popular politician in Congo. However, his uncompromising attitude has also been criticized by others as having delayed the democratic process. *See also* DISSIDENTS.

**TSHOMBE DITENJ, JEAN.** A son of former **Prime Minister Moïse Tshombe**. He was an exiled **dissident** for a number of years until 1984, when he returned under the general **amnesty** of 1983. He was appointed state secretary (the equivalent of deputy minister) for mines and **energy** in the cabinet reshuffle of 25 January 1985. However, he stayed out of politics after his removal in the late 1980s.

**TSHOMBE KAPENDA, MOÏSE (1919–1969).** A Congolese leader who epitomized for some the fractiousness of early Congolese **politics** and the ties of some leaders to foreign interests. For others, however, Tshombe was a pragmatic leader who, as **prime minister**, attempted to unify the country. Tshombe was born on 10 November 1919, at Musamba, the traditional capital of the **Lunda** Empire. He was of a noble Lunda family, related to the Lunda king, and son of a prominent businessman. He received his primary **education** from

Methodist **missionaries** at Sandoa, obtained a teaching diploma at Kanene lez-Kinda, and later received an accounting diploma.

In the 1950s, Tshombe helped found the **Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga** (CONAKAT) party and became its president-general. He led the CONAKAT delegation to the two **Round Table Conferences** prior to independence. In 1960, he was elected to the national assembly as a delegate from **Katanga**, and CONAKAT swept the Katangan provincial assembly. However, Tshombe's southern-based supporters failed to obtain enough seats to form a majority in the **parliament** of the central government.

Angered by what he felt was a lack of Katanga representation in the **Patrice Lumumba** cabinet and encouraged by Belgian commercial interests in Katanga, Tshombe declared the **Katanga secession** on 11 July 1960. The secession brought the first **mercenaries** to independent Africa and prompted the **United Nations'** first police action on the continent.

The secession was ended on 14 January 1963 and Tshombe went into exile in Spain. The following year, **President Joseph Kasavubu** appointed him prime minister with a mandate to end the **rebellion** in **Kwilu** and the eastern provinces, as well as to organize **elections**. The Tshombe government was installed on 6 July 1964, with Tshombe holding five portfolios. He subsequently infuriated Africanist circles by hiring mercenaries, many of them veterans of the Katanga Secession, to end the eastern rebellion and by authorizing the **Belgian** airdrop on **Stanleyville** on 24 November 1964.

In early 1965, Tshombe created the **Convention Nationale Congolaise** (CONACO) that represented a loose coalition of tribal political parties to contest legislative elections. Under the constitution of 1964, the prime minister assumed greater powers, and the CONACO party scored sizable gains in the 1965 elections. Kasavubu dismissed him on 13 October 1965 and appointed **Évariste Kimba** to form a government. Kimba's attempt was blocked by Tshombe's supporters, leading to a political stalemate that was one of the major reasons for the **military coup d'état** by **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** on **24 November 1965**.

Tshombe went into exile in Spain once again. He was condemned to death in absentia for high treason on 13 March 1967 by a high court in **Kinshasa**. On 30 June 1967, as the **Gendarmerie Katan-**

**gaïse** backed by foreign mercenaries tried to restore him to power through a military invasion in eastern Congo, he was kidnapped while on a flight over the Mediterranean Sea and placed under house arrest in Algeria. The Algerian government announced that he had died of a heart attack on 30 June 1969.

**TSHOPO PROVINCE.** A district of the former **Orientale Province**, Tshopo became a province in February 2009 as the result of the 2006 **constitution**. The capital of the province is **Kisangani**.

**TSHOPO RIVER.** A small **river** in northeastern Congo that flows into the **Congo River** near **Kisangani**. A 12,000-kilowatt hydroelectric complex on the river supplies **electrical power** to the area.

**TSHUAPA PROVINCE.** A former district of **Équateur Province**, Tshuapa became a province in February 2009. Its capital is Boende.

**TSHUAPA RIVER.** An 800-km-long **river** that rises in northern **Kasai Oriental Province** near Kataka-Kombe and flows north, then west. It merges with the Lomela River at Boende to become the Busira, which subsequently flows into the **Congo River** at **Mbandaka**. It is navigable by shallow-draft boats from Mbandaka to Ikela.

**TUCKEY, JAMES (CAPTAIN) (1776–1816).** A British **explorer** who led an expedition up the **Congo River**, reaching Isangila near what is now **Matadi** in 1816. He is credited with making the first detailed mappings of **Kongo Central Province**.

**TUTSI.** The Tutsi make up a minority group that lives in **Rwanda**, **Burundi**, and parts of eastern Congo, especially **Nord-Kivu** and **Sud-Kivu Provinces**. Descendants of nomadic herders, the Tutsi migrated to Congo in several waves from Rwanda. The first wave migrated to Congo in the mid-19th century and settled in Rutshuru territory, Nord-Kivu. Tutsi penetration into Rutshuru was mostly peaceful because they intermarried with the Hutu, easily adopting the Hutu language, Kinyarwanda, and agricultural activities. Although predominantly shepherds of large **livestock**, the Tutsi were also farmers in pre-colonial Rutshuru.

The second group of Tutsi migrated to Sud-Kivu in the late 19th century into Uvira, and local **Fuleru** chiefs provided them land in the Itobwe area. This group is now known as **Banyamulenge**. Another wave occurred from 1937 to 1955 from Rwanda as the result of labor shortages in the **Belgian Congo**, as well as overpopulation and famine in Rwanda. Most of these migrants settled in Masisi territory, Nord-Kivu.

In 1959, a revolt in Rwanda brought the Hutu to power and sent thousands of Tutsi into exile as **refugees** in Congo and **Uganda**. This was the fourth wave of immigrants, with 60,000 Tutsi fleeing to Congo in 1959–61 alone. These political refugees went mostly to Nord-Kivu (Masisi and Walikale territories) and Sud-Kivu (Kalehe and Fizi territories). Several other waves have occurred since.

Congo became independent in June 1960. Two years later, Nord-Kivu became a province, but all Tutsi and **Hutu** legislators of Rutshuru and Goma territories refused to be part of the province and decided to remain in Kivu Central Province (today's Sud-Kivu). The central government decided to put the issue to referendum.

As the referendum approached, Tutsi provincial legislators developed a strategy intended to increase their numbers to win the referendum and to remain in Kivu Central by distributing Congolese identification cards to Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Goma and Rutshuru. **Hunde**, **Nande**, and **Nyanga** legislators of Nord-Kivu complained to the central government, which dispatched a parliamentary commission in March 1963 to Nord-Kivu to investigate the complaint. The commission reported that Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Goma had, in fact, received counterfeit identification cards making them de facto eligible voters in order to take part of the scheduled referendum. The **United Nations** High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) also confirmed that 50,000 to 60,000 refugees from Rwanda in 1959–64 were registered Congolese in Nord-Kivu.

The referendum occurred in May 1965, and the results were officially promulgated by the decree of 18 September 1965 attaching the two contested territories, Goma and Rutshuru, to Nord-Kivu. The political environment of Nord-Kivu remained tense, but tensions never escalated into open conflict. Most complaints were over land. In 1966, the Hunde of Masisi complained to the central government that they had become a minority in their own land, pushed aside by

the Rwandan Tutsi immigrants. However, **President Mobutu Sese Seko** ignored the complaint and a year later closed all Rwandan Tutsi refugee camps in Nord-Kivu, turning more than 50,000 Tutsi refugees into Congolese residents.

A careful examination of the personnel in the Bureau du Président (Office of the President) explains his decision. In 1967, Mobutu signed a decree that established the Office of the President with the mission to advise him. One of his advisors was a Tutsi from Rwanda, **Bisengimana Rema Barthélemy**. The presence of Bisengimana in the presidency explains Mobutu's decision to close refugee camps. Less than two years after the creation of his office, President Mobutu appointed Bisengimana as director or chief of staff of his office.

From his nomination in May 1969 until his removal in 1977, Bisengimana was the architect of most Congolese policies. For example, Bisengimana advised Mobutu to sign the decree-law No. 72-002 in 1972 that conferred Congolese **nationality** to all immigrants from Rwanda and Burundi. This decision affected more than 190,000 Tutsi in Masisi and, to a lesser degree, Rwandan Tutsi refugees living in Rutshuru, Goma, and Walikale. However, the 1972 law on nationality did not generate animosity between Tutsi and other groups in Nord-Kivu until Mobutu promulgated a law on land tenure in July 1973 and the **Zairianization** of foreign small- and medium-sized businesses in November 1973.

Mobutu handed over most nationalized businesses to his cronies. Most Tutsi in Nord-Kivu benefited enormously from the policy, acquiring vast concessions of land and plantations in Masisi and Walikale. For example, Bisengimana received all coffee plantations located on **Idjwi Island** in **Lake Kivu**. In 1977, Bisengimana was accused of pocketing more than his share of commissions from a **Kisangani**-based textile plant. After his removal from the Office of the President, Kivu politicians lobbied in parliament to annul the 1972 nationality law. In June 1981, Mobutu promulgated a new law on nationality that explicitly canceled the rights of the Tutsi in Kivu, except for the native **Banyabwisha**. Because the 1981 law was never implemented, and given the porous borders between Congo and Rwanda, illegal migrations from Rwanda into Nord-Kivu continued unabated.

In neighboring Burundi, however, Tutsi continued to dominate the military and government. Periodically, age-old rivalries erupted

into violence. Bloody clashes between Hutu and Tutsi occurred in 1963 and in Burundi in 1972–73 and 1988, sending waves of Hutu to **Tanzania** and Congo. In June 1993, multiparty elections in Burundi led to the election of the country's first Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, but he was killed in October in an attempted coup d'état by the Tutsi-dominated Burundian military. This sent more Hutu refugees to Congo.

After Mobutu announced the liberalization of his political system in April 1990, the issue of nationality gained momentum as some, fearing to lose at the ballot box, created self-help organizations to mobilize their own ethnic groups. At this juncture, a native administration was appointed in Nord-Kivu. Appointing natives to head the government of their own provinces was called in the Congolese political lexicon "géopolitique." Jean-Pierre Kalumbo Mboho, a Nande, and Miha Bamwhisho, a Nyanga, were appointed governor and vice governor of Nord-Kivu. The duo purged all Tutsi in the provincial government and replaced most administrators with Nande, Hunde, and Nyanga. The result of this exclusion was also reflected in the representation of Nord-Kivu in the **Conférence Nationale Souveraine** (CNS), in which Tutsi were totally excluded from political institutions and had to rely on civil society to have some representation at the conference.

After the CNS closed its proceedings, the situation in Nord-Kivu took a turn for the worse, completely escaping the control of central authorities. In late 1992, several Tutsi leaders were assassinated, and thousands of cattle were slaughtered in Masisi. The Tutsi responded to this threat by killing a Hunde chief and mutilating the body, symbolically undermining the chief's authority, the chieftaincy, and traditional customs. The Hunde retaliated violently. By early 1993, mutual suspicion and fear were general. On 20 March 1993, the conflict escalated between Tutsi and Nyanga in Walikale. This conflict lasted almost three weeks before it extended into Masisi territory. The violence continued until 31 August 1993; 7,000 to 30,000 people were killed and 350,000 people were internally displaced.

Also during this period (1991–93) most Tutsi youth living in Nord-Kivu and Sud-Kivu joined the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) living in Uganda, which was waging a war against the Hutu government of Rwanda. (One of these Tutsi was **Laurent**

**Nkunda.**) The RPF's war against the Rwanda Hutu-dominated government culminated in the death of President Juvenal Habyarimana in a mysterious plane crash in April 1994. Habyarimana's death was followed by two months of violence in which an estimated 500,000 Rwandan Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed. The RPF took control of Rwanda in mid-June 1994, sending 1.2 million Rwandan Hutu refugees across Congo, with more than 800,000 of them relocated in Nord-Kivu.

The massive influx of Hutu into Congo broke the coalition that existed between Hutu and Tutsi in Nord-Kivu since 1960. Prior to 1994, the Hutu and Tutsi in Nord-Kivu, commonly called **Banyarwanda**, spoke with one voice against the Nande and other ethnic groups on issues of land, nationality, and state spoils. The arrival of Hutu refugees increased the number of Hutu, thus marginalizing Tutsi in the political discourse. Meanwhile, former Rwandan Hutu soldiers living in refugee camps began attacking Rwanda.

In April 1995, the **Haut Conseil de la République/Parlement de la Transition** (HCR/PT) promulgated a resolution that required the repatriation of all peoples of Rwandan origin back to Rwanda, including Hutu and Tutsi living in Congo since the 19th century. On 8 October 1996, the deputy governor of Sud-Kivu, Lwabanji Lwasi, gave the Tutsi living there (called Banyamulenge) an ultimatum: leave Mulenge in what he called a "cleansing of the plateau." He gave them eight days to vacate Congo, but the Banyamulenge refused to leave and turned to the Rwandan government for help. This call for help suited the Rwandan government, which needed to deal with repeated incursions of former Rwandan soldiers into Rwanda from refugee camps. In late September 1996, the Rwandan army and armed elements of Banyamulenge attacked Mobutu's army in Sud-Kivu. A week later, several anti-Mobutu groups joined the Banyamulenge-led rebellion and formed the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) in order to oust Mobutu.

In mid-November, the Rwandan army attacked refugee camps around Goma from all sides, leaving a small eastern corridor toward Rwanda for refugees to escape. Some 660,000 refugees returned to Rwanda. Having gained partial control of its borders, the Rwandan government decided to give the Banyamulenge war a national character in order to topple Mobutu. The Rwandan government agreed to



let **Laurent Kabila**, a veteran **dissident**, be spokesman for the rebel movement.

Encouraged by the weak defense of the Congolese **military** and the lack of leadership by Mobutu, who was dying of cancer, the AFDL pushed west and took **Kinshasa** on 17 May 1997. Kabila was sworn in as president in late May. He pledged to solve the nationality problem of Rwandan Tutsi immigrants in Congo, but never delivered on his promise. In subsequent months, popular resentment in Kinshasa grew against the foreign troops, who came to be regarded as an occupation force. In late July 1998, Kabila asked all foreign troops to leave Congo. The Tutsi saw this as a measure against them and left Kinshasa.

Kabila's decision, as well as atrocities against Tutsi in various parts of the country, sparked a **civil war**, backed by Rwanda and Uganda, in early August 1998. The rebels formed the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD)**, which was dominated by Tutsi who claimed to fight in order to regain their rightful Congolese nationality. Less than two years after the signing of the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en Démocratique République du Congo (AGI)** in December 2002, in **South Africa**, the Congolese transitional legislature passed the 2004 law on nationality. Promulgated in November, the law granted citizenship to all ethnic groups that were in Congo at independence in June 1960. While many Hutu and Tutsi would qualify, there is intense debate about the many immigrants from Rwanda who arrived shortly after independence. *See also* ETHNIC CLEANSING; SECOND CONGO WAR.

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**UBANGI DISTRICT.** A former district of **Équateur Province**, Ubangi benefited from the largess of the considerable number of businessmen, politicians, and military leaders who attained power and wealth under the **government of Mobutu Sese Seko**, a favorite son. The Ubangi district was divided into two **provinces** in February 2009 according to the 2006 **constitution**: **Nord-Ubangi** and **Sud-Ubangi**.

**UBANGI RIVER.** A 1,000-km-long **river** that marks Congo's border with the northern **Congo-Brazzaville** and southwestern **Central African Republic** (CAR). The Ubangi forms where the Bomu and Uele Rivers join together near Yakoma. It flows past the town of **Gbadolite** and the CAR capital of Bangui before joining the **Congo River** about 100 km downriver from **Mbandaka**. The Ubangi is navigable only during the Northern Hemisphere rainy season, usually from June through October.

**UELE RIVER.** A small, commercially unnavigable **river** in northeastern Congo that rises near the border with southern **Sudan**, where it is called the Dungu River, and flows 750 km west into the **Ubangi River** near Yakoma. *See also* BAS-UELE PROVINCE; HAUT-UELE PROVINCE.

**UGANDA, RELATIONS WITH.** Relations between Congo and Uganda have periodically been strained because of **smuggling**, troop incursions, and rebel activity along their common border. Because of poor **transportation** links between **Kinshasa** and the east, smuggling and illegal **trade** historically flourished across the border. Merchants smuggled **gold**, **diamonds**, and some **agricultural** products into East Africa through Uganda in exchange for fuel, manufactured goods, spare parts, and consumer items. Relations were generally good in the 1970s, during the eight-year regime of Idi Amin Dada, in large part because of his friendship with **President Mobutu Sese Seko**. During this period, the two governments changed the names of two lakes along their border, **Lake Albert** and **Lake Edward**, to Lake Mobutu and Lake Idi Amin, respectively, although the changes were not recognized by the international community. Amin was driven into exile by opposition forces aided by **Tanzanian** troops in 1979. After the National Resistance Army led by Yoweri Museveni took power in Kampala on 29 January 1986, following a lengthy guerrilla war, relations with Congo initially were warm but later cooled.

From 1985, guerrillas of the **Parti de Libération Congolaise** (PLC) staged attacks on **government** installations in eastern Congo from bases in the **Rwenzori Mountains**. Then, in January 1989, Idi Amin surfaced in Congo with the intention of returning to Uganda

with several hundred armed supporters. The Ugandan government requested his extradition in order to try him for atrocities committed during his rule. However, the Mobutu government rejected the request, citing the lack of an extradition treaty between the two countries, but expelled him nine days later. The dispute led the two governments to withdraw their respective ambassadors, but relations were normalized in September of that year.

In 1990, the PLC registered as a **political party** and joined the **democratic transition**, thus ending its attacks on the Congolese soil. Attacks by Congolese troops in 1992 and 1993 caused 20,000 Congolese to flee into Uganda as **refugees**.

A year later, the Museveni government backed the offensive of the Rwandese Patriotic Front, led by Uganda-based **Tutsi** refugees, which took power in **Rwanda** in 1994 following the death of President Juvenal Habyarimana, a close friend of Mobutu. That same year, Mobutu's decision to allow French troops to use Congolese territory as a staging base to help the pro-Habyarimana forces created animosity.

Uganda backed the troops of the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL), which deposed Mobutu and took power in Kinshasa on 17 May 1997, thereby considerably enhancing Uganda's influence in central Africa. However, relations with the **Laurent Kabila** government, which was installed after the AFDL took over, quickly soured because of its inability to halt cross-border raids by Ugandan rebels and deteriorating relations with Rwanda, a close ally. Uganda sent troops to back the **rebellion** by the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD), which began in early August 1998. Relations between Uganda and Congo deteriorated further as both closed their respective embassies. The Kabila government accused Uganda of having violated the country's territorial integrity and plundering Congolese resources. Three **United Nations** reports made public in 2001–2003 accused Uganda of illegally exporting **gold**, **timber**, and other natural resources from eastern Congo and even having ignited the **Ituri conflict** between the **Hema** and **Lendu**. Furthermore, Ugandan forces supported the **Mouvement de Libération du Congo** (MLC) of **Jean-Pierre Bemba**, as well as the RCD-Kisangani of **Ernest Wamba dia Wamba**.

However, after the signing of the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI) in December 2002, the Ugandan government began pulling out its troops and totally withdrew in mid-2003. In late 2004, the armed forces of the two countries decided to combat rebels and arrest elements posing a security threat to their neighbors and hand them over to international authorities. On 8 September 2007, Presidents Museveni and **Joseph Kabila** met in northern **Tanzania** and agreed to rid their countries of rebels blamed for destabilizing eastern Congo. Less than two years later, in March 2009, both presidents held their summit at Kasindi, located in the border town of **Beni**, Congo, to exchange diplomats as a token of normalcy, restoring ties that broke in the 1990s. A cooperation protocol was signed under which Uganda will provide power to border towns of Congo and the two countries will share experiences in exploiting oil in the **Lake Albert** region, which spans the two countries' common border.

**UJJI.** A small **port** city on the eastern shore of **Lake Tanganyika** that was the departure point for many **explorers'** expeditions into eastern Congo in the 1800s. **Henry Morton Stanley** met **David Livingstone** there in 1871.

**ULINDI RIVER.** A tributary of the upper **Congo River** (**Lualaba River**) that rises in the **Virunga Mountains** west of **Bukavu** and joins the Congo River above **Lowa**, between **Kindu** and **Ubundu**.

**UMBA DI LUTETE (1939– ).** A lawyer, diplomat, and on several occasions foreign minister, Umba was a technocrat who rose primarily through the executive branch. Born on 30 June 1939 at Kangu in **Kong Central Province**, he received a law degree from **Lovanium University** in 1965 and other law certificates in **Belgium** and the **United States**. He served in senior staff positions in the Foreign Ministry and at the Presidency from 1965 to 1967. He was vice foreign minister from 1967 to 1969, minister of **energy** from 1970 to 1971, state commissioner (minister) of mines from 1971 to 1974, state commissioner for foreign affairs in 1974–75, ambassador to the **United Nations** in 1976–77, and state commissioner for foreign

affairs again in 1977–79 and 1984–85. He retired from politics and has been running his private business since the mid-1990s.

**UNEMPLOYMENT.** The **government** has issued no official figures for unemployment rates, but economists estimate unemployment in **Kinshasa** and **Lubumbashi** in the 1980s at 40 percent and as high as 80 percent in other regional cities. Following the “**pillages**” of 1991 and 1993, unemployment rose to 80 percent, but declined to 60 percent by 1996. Historically, less than half of working-age males in the cities participate in the formal **economy**. That figure fell to 25 percent during the early 1990s. Rural unemployment is estimated at 80 percent or more. Unemployment increased further during and after the **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila** as the private sector disappeared in many major towns and people survived through participating in an informal economy. According to a number of economists, unemployment in Congo might be as high as 90 percent in late 2008.

**UNION DES DÉMOCRATS INDÉPENDANTS (UDI) [UNION OF INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATS].** A centrist political party formed by **Léon Kengo wa Dondo** in 1990 in an effort to seize the middle ground between the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) and the **opposition Sacred Union**. The UDI was composed primarily of businessmen and politicians associated with the **Mobutu Sese Seko government**, often called the “Dinosaurs.” Kengo had been **prime minister** on two occasions in the 1980s, during which periods he instituted severe austerity measures in an attempt to stabilize **inflation** and reduce government budget deficits, but these were abandoned before they could be completed. In July 1994, when Kengo was again appointed prime minister, the UDI convinced several moderate members of the Sacred Union to defect and join a moderate alliance called the **Union pour la République et la Démocratie** (URD). However, it was dismissed in March 1997 during the final months of the Mobutu regime. *See also* DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION.

**UNION DES FÉDÉRALISTES ET DES RÉPUBLICAINS INDÉPENDANTS (UFERI) [UNION OF FEDERALISTS AND INDEPENDENT REPUBLICANS].** A **political party** formed

by **Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond** in 1990 with a strong political base in **Katanga Province**. The UFERI advocated a **federal** system of **government** with considerable autonomy for provinces. During the early 1990s, it built some support in **Kongo Central** because of Nguza's marriage to the daughter of a prominent family in the region, Wivinne N'Landu Kavidi. The UFERI was one of three major parties that formed the **Sacred Union** alliance in 1991, but it was expelled when Nguza accepted the post of **prime minister** in November. UFERI subsequently led several dozen members of the Sacred Union into a governing coalition called the **Alliance des Forces Patriotiques** (AFP). When Nguza was dismissed in 1992 and replaced by **Étienne Tshisekedi**, UFERI militants in **Shaba**, which they called Katanga, began attacking **Luba-Kasai**, who tended to be supporters of Tshisekedi. Thousands were made homeless in the violence of **ethnic cleansing**. An estimated 500 people were killed and more than 100,000 fled to **Kasai Oriental** over the next two years. Some UFERI leaders joined the **Laurent Kabila** government after it came to power in 1997.

**UNION DOUANIÈRE ET ÉCONOMIQUE DE L'AFRIQUE CENTRALE (UDEAC) [CENTRAL AFRICAN CUSTOMS AND ECONOMIC UNION]**. The UDEAC was a French-sponsored customs and tariffs union of former French Equatorial African states. **Mobutu Sese Seko** tried to form a similar organization in 1968, called the Union des États de l'Afrique Centrale (UEAC) with **Chad** and the **Central African Republic (CAR)**. Chad agreed to join, but the CAR declined. Cameroon, **Congo-Brazzaville**, and Gabon, backed by **France**, actively opposed the UEAC, and it never reached the operational stage. Congo (then **Zaire**), joined UDEAC in the early 1980s and Chad, which had dropped out after it joined the UEAC, was readmitted in 1984.

**UNION GÉNÉRALE DES ÉTUDIANTS CONGOLAIS (UGEC) [GENERAL UNION OF CONGOLESE STUDENTS]**. A radical and articulate **student** organization of the mid-1960s that criticized imperialism and many Congolese politicians. Although it sympathized with **socialism**, it condemned foreign influence in national affairs and advocated the creation of truly Congolese institutions. In

1966, many of its members joined the Corps des Volontaires de la République (CVR), which was a major precursor to the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR). Some UGEC leaders—including its president, N’Kanza Dolomingu—did not choose to join the CVR and were imprisoned. Others were successfully brought into the **Mobutu Sese Seko** system, including its secretary for international affairs, **Gérard Kamanda wa Kamanda**, who was made secretary-general of the Presidency. The UGEC was banned from the **universities** in 1968 after the MPR was created in order to facilitate the establishment of the **Jeunesse du Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (JMPR) youth wing of the MPR.

**UNION KATANGAISE [KATANGAN UNION].** A group of primarily Belgian expatriates living in **Katanga Province** that pressed for autonomy for Katanga in the 1950s. Part of the Union pour la Colonisation du Katanga founded in 1944, the Union Katangaise was accepted into the **Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga** (CONAKAT) in 1959 and was one of the strongest advocates of an autonomous Katanga within a federal Congolese state. During the **Katanga secession**, the Union became a shadow group, advising officials and occasionally recruiting abroad. *See also* SHABA.

**UNION MINIÈRE DU HAUT KATANGA (UMHK).** The UMHK was a **mining** consortium of primarily Belgian ownership formed in 1906 to exploit deposits of **copper** ores in **Katanga Province**, which was known as **Shaba Region** under **Mobutu Sese Seko**. Historically the largest company in Congo, UMHK was **nationalized** in 1966 and its name was changed to Générale Congolaise des Minerais (GECOMINES). In 1971, the name was changed to **Générale des Carrières et des Mines** (GECAMINES). *See also* SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE DES MINÉRAIS (SGM).

**UNION MONGO (UNIMO).** A group organized in the 1950s to represent the interests of the **Mongo** people, particularly prior to the **elections** for local councils in 1957. UNIMO sent a delegation, headed by its founder **Justin Bomboko**, to the **Round Table Conferences** in 1960 and was represented in early Congolese **governments**.

**UNION NATIONALE DES INTÉRÊTS SOCIAUX CONGOLAIS (UNISCO) [NATIONAL UNION OF CONGOLESE SOCIAL INTERESTS].** One of Congo's first **nationalist** organizations, UNISCO was founded in 1946 as an association because of the ban on political activity. Its avowed purpose was to "coordinate activities" of alumni groups such as those of the Scheut Fathers, Christian Brothers, Jesuits, and Marists.

**UNION NATIONALE DES TRAVAILLEURS CONGOLAIS (UNTC) [NATIONAL UNION OF CONGOLESE WORKERS].** Formed in the early years of the **Mobutu Sese Seko** government, this trade union became Congo's only such organization under the single-party state. Originally formed as the Union des Travailleurs Congolais (UTC) in June 1967, it brought together disparate rival unions that existed under the first republic. The move drew protests from some **labor** leaders, who feared it would become too closely aligned with the party and **government**. In subsequent years this fear was borne out as the union, renamed the Union Nationale des Travailleurs Zaïrois (UNTZA) in 1971, became part of the party-state through decrees and the **constitution** of 1974.

**President Mobutu** believed trade unions should serve to mobilize workers behind government policies for the purpose of economic development and the good of the nation. Nevertheless, UNTZA at times demonstrated independence at the grassroots level. Despite opposition from its senior leaders, many of whom held senior party positions, workers staged demonstrations and **strikes** on a number of occasions to protest low **wages** and government austerity measures. In 1990, UNTZA reported 1.1 million registered members, of which 600,000 were employees of the government or state-owned enterprises.

Following Mobutu's announcement of the transition to multipartyism, UNTZA lost its monopoly on the labor movement. It no longer automatically received dues from all workers employed in the formal **economy**, and nearly a dozen rival unions formed along political and professional lines. With the rise of **inflation** in the 1990s and the decline in buying power, strikes became frequent and even UNTZA



leaders began to criticize the Mobutu government. Following the fall of Mobutu in 1997, the name was changed to the UNTC.

**UNION POUR LA COLONISATION DU KATANGA [UNION FOR THE COLONIZATION OF KATANGA]**. Founded in 1944 by a group of primarily Belgian inhabitants of **Katanga Province**, the union intended to promote the European colonial presence in the **Belgian Congo**. The group advocated Katangan autonomy, and some of its leaders belonged to the militant **Union Katangaise**, which was accepted into the **Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga** (CONAKAT) in June 1959. The group strongly influenced CONAKAT's subsequent positions, advocating Katangan autonomy, a **federal** system of **government** and, following **independence**, secession.

**UNION POUR LA DÉMOCRATIE ET LE PROGRÈS SOCIAL (UDPS) [UNION FOR DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS]**. A **political party** founded on 15 February 1982 by the **Group of Thirteen Parliamentarians**, who in 1980 signed an open letter to **Mobutu Sese Seko** calling for multiparty **democracy**. The UDPS, led by **Étienne Tshisekedi**, became the core of the internally based **opposition** movement in the 1980s. When the UDPS was formed, the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) was the only legal party and, under the **constitution** of 1974, the formation of a second party was an act of treason. The 13 parliamentarians were arrested, convicted of sedition, and sentenced to lengthy prison terms in June 1982. They were released under the **amnesty** of 1983, but were arrested and placed under various forms of detention on several subsequent occasions, including following an attempt, on 12 August 1983, to meet with a delegation of U.S. congressmen visiting **Kinshasa**.

Following Mobutu's announcement of the transition to multiparty democracy on **24 April 1990**, the UDPS held a rally on 30 April that was suppressed by **security** forces in an incident in which at least two supporters were killed, the first of hundreds of casualties of the **democratic transition**. Its rallies and demonstrations pressured the government to end single-party rule in 1990, and it led the hardline opposition of the mid-1990s to reject any cooperation with Mobutu,

maintaining that only when he was removed from power could the country move toward true democracy.

The UDPS was one of the first opposition parties to be registered after single-party rule was officially ended on 25 November 1990. Its platform advocated building democratic institutions, and it was one of the few parties to develop a broad national following. The party was also noted for leading the struggle against what were perceived as Mobutu's attempts to dominate the transition and remain in power. Through **strikes** and popular demonstrations, it pressed for a **National Conference** to oversee the transition, draft a new constitution, and organize national **elections**.

UDPS was one of three major parties to form the **Sacred Union** alliance, which by mid-1991 grouped more than 200 opposition parties. After the National Conference was convened on 7 August 1991, the UDPS and Sacred Union led a number of walkouts to protest what was seen as an attempt by pro-Mobutu forces to take control of the body. The protests led to the collapse of the conference eight days later. On 29 September 1991, Tshisekedi became **prime minister**, one week after the "**pillages**" in Kinshasa that led to military intervention by **Belgium** and **France** and the evacuation of most expatriate workers. However, Tshisekedi's appointment was canceled the following week when he refused to sign an oath of allegiance to the **president**. Mobutu then attempted to divide the Sacred Union by appointing as prime minister **Jean Nguza Karl-I-Bond**, who headed another pillar of the alliance, the **Union des Fédéralistes et des Républicains Indépendants** (UFERI). A period of political confrontation ensued that ended in April 1992 when the National Conference reconvened. The conference proclaimed itself the sovereign institution of state and, on 15 August, elected Tshisekedi prime minister, bringing the UDPS and its allies to power for the first time.

Tshisekedi soon clashed with Mobutu and was dismissed on 5 February 1993, after calling for foreign help to overthrow him. UDPS's senior economic advisor, **Faustin Birindwa**, accepted the post of prime minister the following month. His appointment led to a period of political stalemate characterized by two rival governments whose leaders were both originally from the same party.

In the mid-1990s, UDPS still formed the hard, inner core of the Sacred Union, called the Union Sacrée de l'Opposition Radicale et

Alliés et Société Civile (USORAS). It viewed the Tshisekedi government of 1992 as the sole legitimate government of the country and rejected all subsequent governments appointed by Mobutu.

When the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) launched its offensive to overthrow Mobutu in October 1996, UDPS announced it supported the goals of the AFDL but not its use of force to attain them. After the AFDL took power in Kinshasa and installed **Laurent Kabila** as president on 29 May 1997, senior UDPS leaders were consulted but were not included in the first Kabila government. This exclusion led to protests by UDPS members and raised tensions between the UDPS and the Kabila government, which subsequently banned all political meetings. In subsequent months, a number of UDPS demonstrations were dispersed by **security** forces and their leaders arrested. Tshisekedi was detained on 12 February 1998, a few days before he was to deliver a speech marking the 16th anniversary of UDPS. He was sent into internal exile in his home village but was later released. In November 1997, a faction of the UDPS led by **Frédéric Kibassa Maliba**, joined the Kabila government.

The UDPS was, however, supportive of the Kabila government after the civil war launched by the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD) in August 1998. During the transition, 2003–2006, UDPS was more critical of members of government, and when the electoral process was announced, the leader of UDPS, Tshisekedi, called his supporters to boycott the process. The result of this call was unfortunate because it kept a large number of the electorate from registering and participating in the first free elections since 1965. UDPS remains a strong opposition party in Congo since the election of **Joseph Kabila** to the presidency in 2006. *See* DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION; TSHISEKEDI.

**UNION POUR LA RÉPUBLIQUE ET LA DÉMOCRATIE (URD)** [UNION FOR THE REPUBLIC AND DEMOCRACY]. An alliance of centrist parties formed by **Léon Kengo wa Dondo** after he was appointed **prime minister** in 1994. One of three major alliances in the mid-1990s, the URD positioned itself between the pro-Mobutu Sese Seko, **Forces Politiques du Conclave** (FPC), and the opposition Sacred Union.

**UNIONS.** *See* LABOR.

**UNITED KINGDOM.** *See* GREAT BRITAIN.

**UNITED NATIONS (UN).** Since **independence** in June 1960, the UN has been dealing with Congo through its various bodies in a variety of ways. In 1960, the **World Bank** was the first body to lend the new state \$58 million for a number of projects that included agriculture, roads, ports, and waterway projects. Throughout the years, the World Bank has financed numerous development projects in Congo. In addition to the World Bank, the **International Monetary Fund (IMF)** has also helped to resolve various financial crises. More specifically, the IMF became an *agency of restraint* in the 1970s and 1980s because **President Mobutu Sese Seko** had dismantled all similar indigenous agencies, such as the **central bank**, by placing them under his control. (An agency of restraint is an institution whose goal is to protect public assets from depletion, prevent inflationary money printing, prevent corruption, protect socially productive groups from exploitation, and enforce contracts.)

Three other UN agencies have been active in Congo, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Food Agriculture Organization, and the International Labour Organization. For example, the UNHCR has not only helped African refugees in Congo, but it has also accommodated Congolese refugees in Africa and elsewhere. In addition to refugees, the UNHCR and a number of nongovernmental organizations have jointly provided much-needed help to internally displaced Congolese during the **civil war** against **Laurent Kabila** that started in August 1998 and until the provincial elections in 2009. The ILO also launched a number various projects locally and even criticized government labor policies. Moreover, the ILO was involved in the demobilization of rebel combatants in the early 2000s.

In addition to these relatively positive and normal activities, the UN has been forced on two occasions to intervene militarily in Congo. The first was the UN's intervention in **Katanga**. Faced with deteriorating **security**, the collapse of **government** services, and the perceived threat of Belgian reoccupation following troop landings in **Matadi**, **Elisabethville**, and **Luluabourg**, the Congolese government

asked for UN military assistance on 12 July 1960, less than two weeks after **independence**. The UN passed a resolution on 14 July 1960 agreeing to send troops to Congo, but limited their responsibilities to “internal” Congolese affairs, namely the Katanga **secession**. Faced with the continued inability of the Congolese government to end the secession, the UN passed another resolution on 21 February 1961 giving UN forces the authority to “prevent civil war.” The resolution granted broader powers than those of the previous year, and UN officials used it to try to expel foreign **mercenaries** from Katanga in September 1961, causing an outbreak of fighting. The fighting stopped following the death of UN Secretary-General **Dag Hammarskjöld** in a plane crash while on a trip to Northern Rhodesia (now **Zambia**) to meet Katangan leader **Moïse Tshombe**. However, fighting resumed in December when UN troops moved again to expel the mercenaries. The second operation was more successful and led Tshombe to return to the negotiating table.

The UN role in Katanga was controversial, and the early part of the operation received a great deal of international attention. Certain UN actions in the Congo were severely criticized by some members, and the **Soviet Union**, for example, refused to contribute funds to the operation. UN personnel helped set up the Congolese **civil service** and staffed the **police** and **judicial system**, which had been devastated by the sudden departure of Belgian technicians and professionals. UN officials also served for a number of months in a “shadow cabinet” for the Congolese government.

It soon became evident, however, that assistance was needed in other areas, and the UN contingent in Congo grew to 20,000 people before the operation ended in mid-1964. UN troops withdrew from Congo on 30 June 1964. Their mission lasted four years. More than 93,000 men from 35 countries served in the UN forces and contributed a total of 675,000 man-months, costing \$411.2 million (1964 = 100).

The second UN intervention arose out of fighting between rebel groups and the government of **Laurent Kabila** as a result of the **civil war** that began on 2 August 1998. The war against Kabila involved seven African countries and more than 10 rebel groups. The UN Security Council established the **Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo** (Mission of the UN in Congo, MONUC) to facilitate the implementation of the **Lusaka Peace Accord** signed in

July 1999. MONUC became operative only after the death of Laurent Kabila.

In 2001–2002, the UN issued three reports on the illegal exploitation of Congo's resources and accused Congolese officials of looting Congo's natural resources and criminally diverting state funds. Leaders of Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe were also included in the report, as well as a number of multinational corporations. Despite a number of ceasefire agreements signed between 1999 and 2001, all belligerents continued to plunder Congolese resources.

The UN Security Council, in collaboration with the **African Union**, was called upon by these ceasefire agreements to constitute, facilitate, and deploy peacekeeping forces in Congo to ensure the implementation of these accords and to pursue all armed groups that threatened peace and stability. Considering the situation prevailing on the ground, the UN Security Council was given the authority to decide upon any extra deployment of peacekeepers to maintain peace in Congo.

The accession of President **Joseph Kabila** in January 2001, following the assassination of Laurent Kabila, gave new impetus to the peace process. In 2002, important steps in the process were carried out, in particular on the progressive withdrawal of foreign forces and on the political transition. On 30 July 2002, the Pretoria Agreement was signed on the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congo and the disbanding of Rwandan armed forces and Rwandan *interhamwe* militias. On 6 September 2002, in Luanda, presidents of Congo and Uganda signed an agreement on the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from Congo, as well as the cooperation and normalization of relations between the two countries.

The long process of the **Dialogue Inter-Congolais** (DIC) led to the signature on 17 December 2002 of the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI) by all parties involved. On 2 April 2003 in Sun City, South Africa, the participants in the DIC signed the final act of the political negotiations, by which they formally approved the whole of the agreements that constituted a total program for the restoration of peace and national sovereignty in Congo, and for a transitional period from mid-2003 to mid-2006.

The signature of the final act marked an important new chapter in the process of national reconciliation and peace in Congo. On 4 April

2003, the Constitution of the Transition was signed and, on 30 June 2003, a transitional government was created, as well as institutions of the republic and institutions in support of democracy.

On 13 February 2006, a UN donors' conference in Brussels called for international donors to provide \$681 million for an action plan for Congo. This amount was three times the size of the UN appeal in preceding years, and necessary to cope with the fact that more than 1,000 people were dying every day as victims of conflict, hunger, and disease. In late March 2008, the UN Security Council unanimously lifted the arms embargo imposed on Congo in 2003, but extended the embargo to rebel groups still operating in the country.

Although the UN had done a good job in Congo, given the constraints of its terms of reference, it was accused of not adequately protecting civilians. Also, some of its troops were involved in scandals regarding sexual abuses of girls and trading guns for **gold** with the very militia groups that they were meant to disarm. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon authorized, in July 2007, the investigation of Indian peacekeepers who were accused of trading not only food, but also military intelligence with Rwandan Hutu rebels in return for gold. He also repeatedly called for the Congolese government to control its troops from abusing civilians, and for foreign troops still directly or indirectly operating in Congo to withdraw. *See also* THANT, U.

**UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH.** The United States has been interested in Congo since the *New York Herald* newspaper sent **Henry Morton Stanley** to find **David Livingstone** in 1871. The U.S. government initially supported **Leopold II's** pledge to "civilize" the peoples of Congo and was the first nation to recognize his **Congo Free State (CFS)** after the **Berlin Conference** in 1885. However, public outcry in the United States and Europe over harsh **labor** practices and atrocities committed against Congolese by agents of the CFS led to the annexation of the territory by the Belgian government in 1908.

During the colonial era, U.S. economic interests in the **Belgian Congo** remained considerably smaller than those of **Belgium**, but U.S. churches sent large numbers of **missionaries** during the 1930s to establish and staff schools, churches, and hospitals. Strategic inter-

ests, however, were strong. **Uranium** from Congo was used to make the first atomic bomb in the 1940s and, following World War II, appreciation grew for the fact that the territory was one of the largest sources in the noncommunist world of industrial **diamonds**, **cobalt**, and other strategic minerals, such as **coltan**.

Following **independence**, the U.S. government was one of the first to establish diplomatic relations with Congo. The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) and the Peace Corps launched many programs, and the U.S. government sent \$1 billion in **foreign aid** during the next 30 years. During the early 1960s, the U.S. government supported the central **government** in **Leopoldville** and opposed the **Katanga secession**, the **Stanleyville** government in 1961, and the various **rebellions**. U.S. planes transported Belgian paratroopers who landed in Stanleyville on 24 November 1964 to rescue several hundred European and American hostages being held by **Simba** rebels.

The U.S. government quickly recognized the **Joseph-Désiré Mobutu** government after the **coup d'état** of **24 November 1965**, and U.S. investment increased further. Relations cooled somewhat when Mobutu began moving the country toward a single-party state in the late 1960s, and they deteriorated further following **Zairianization** and Mobutu's diplomatic break with **Israel** in 1973. In June 1975, Mobutu accused the U.S. government of supporting an attempted coup d'état. Washington denied the charge and recalled its ambassador from **Kinshasa**. Despite the strain in relations, both governments continued to support the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) against the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) in Angola's civil war. In the 1980s, Congolese territory was used to transship covert U.S. aid to UNITA.

The U.S. government provided transport planes, arms, and food to Congolese troops during the **Shaba Wars** of 1977 and 1978, and accused **Cuba** and the **Soviet Union** of complicity in the attack on **Kolwezi**, in which one U.S. citizen was killed. Following the Shaba Wars, Mobutu sought a rapprochement with the United States and other Western nations, where his government was coming under increasing criticism for **corruption** and **human rights** violations. Relations were cool during the late 1970s because of the Jimmy Carter



administration's (1976–79) emphasis on human rights, but improved considerably under the Ronald Reagan administration (1980–89), which valued Congo's strategic location, mineral wealth, and support for U.S. policies in the region. In the 1980s, **military assistance**, which had been reduced to less than \$8 million per year, increased to more than \$30 million per year. The U.S. Congress continued to criticize authoritarianism and economic mismanagement in Congo, but the U.S. government expressed support for and pleasure over the economic reforms enacted by the Mobutu government and the reestablishment of diplomatic ties with Israel in the mid-1980s. George Bush visited Congo as vice president in November 1982, George Schultz visited in February 1987 as secretary of state, and Mobutu visited the United States regularly in private and official capacities.

With Mobutu's announcement of the **democratic transition** in April 1990, however, relations entered a difficult phase. The U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa, headed by Ambassador Melissa Wells, criticized Mobutu's efforts to disrupt the **National Conference** and pressed Mobutu to allow true political reforms. In 1992, when Mobutu dismissed **Étienne Tshisekedi** and appointed **Faustin Birindwa** as **prime minister**, relations entered a period of confrontation. The U.S. government adopted a policy of isolating Mobutu and officials of the rival Birindwa government. As a result, nonhumanitarian aid programs were curtailed and members of the Mobutu government were refused visas to the United States, even for medical reasons.

In 1993, frustration over what was perceived as Tshisekedi's hardline **opposition** to Mobutu and concern over declining living standards caused by Congo's economic crisis led to a moderation of this policy. Official contacts were allowed and, in 1994, **Léon Kengo wa Dondo**, viewed as a political moderate and economic reformer, visited Washington. Official U.S. policy continued to press for an orderly democratic transition and free, multiparty elections, but the view expressed privately by many Congo watchers in the mid-1990s was that true reform could only occur after the departure of Mobutu.

The U.S. government was among the first to recognize the government of **Laurent Kabila** after the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) took power in Kinshasa in May 1997, one day after Mobutu's flight into exile. News

agencies subsequently reported that U.S. troops had helped train AFDL forces. The U.S. government denied the reports, but acknowledged that U.S. military officers had trained troops in **Rwanda**, which militarily supported the AFDL offensive.

Some major U.S. investors in Congo have included General Motors, Goodyear, Firestone, and Morrison-Knudsen. Others participated in the **mining** and cement industries and in **petroleum** exploration. By the 1990s, many of these projects had been sold or were inactive, but a number of companies approached the Kabila government in 1997 with proposals for ventures in the mining and **transportation** sectors.

After a few months in power, relations between the U.S. and Congo deteriorated as the result of Kabila's nationalist and Cold War rhetoric. On 12 February 1998, two days after meeting U.S. civil rights leader Jesse Jackson, Etienne Tshisekedi was arrested as he was making preparations for a speech to mark the 16th anniversary of the **Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social** (UDPS). The arrest prompted a negative reaction from the U.S. government. In August 2000, the Kabila government expelled American cultural attaché, Denis Burgess, and political adviser, Roger Moran. The pro-government newspaper, *L'Avenir*, accused the two diplomats of having taken part in a plot to overthrow President Kabila. Relations between the two countries improved after the assassination of Laurent Kabila and his replacement by **Joseph Kabila**.

The West, especially the U.S., encouraged the peace process, and provided \$2.6 billion or 23.4 percent of total foreign aid to support the transitional government in 2003–2006. Moreover, President George W. Bush, in late October 2006, placed sanctions on high-profile politicians whose actions were contributing to conflict in eastern Congo. The three politicians affected were **Laurent Nkunda**, Ignance Murwanashyaka, and Khawa Panga Mandro. The decree also blocked access to the property of any political or military leader of an armed group, indigenous or foreign, who was operating in Congo and preventing disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, or reintegration of forces or who recruited children to fight. The U.S. government remained active in the peace process in the **Nord-Kivu** conflict and, in late 2008, it was able to secure a summit between Presidents Joseph Kabila of Congo and Paul Kagame of Rwanda.

to work together to disarm former Rwandan soldiers still roaming eastern Congo.

Finally, the United States has become a major trade partner of Congo. Congolese exports to the U.S., which averaged less than 2 percent of the total in the 1970s, increased to 13 percent in the 1980s, and in the early 2000s represented 19 percent of exports. Congolese imports from the U.S. remained on average 10 percent of total imports from the 1970s to the 1990s. They declined in the 2000s, perhaps as the result of the **civil war** against Kabila, to less than 6 percent by 2006.

**UNIVERSITIES.** **Lovanium University**, the oldest and perhaps most prestigious campus, was founded in 1954 by the Roman **Catholic Church**. The Lubumbashi campus was first established in 1956 by **Protestant** groups as the Université Officielle du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi. It became the Université de l'État du Congo in 1960, the Université d'Élisabethville in 1963, and the public Université Officielle du Congo in 1964. The Kisangani campus was founded in 1963 by Protestant missions, but classes were disrupted for a number of years because of the eastern **rebellions**. In August 1971, **President Mobutu Sese Seko** nationalized all universities under the Université Nationale du Zaïre (UNAZA) by decree, following several years of **student** protests against the **government**. UNAZA was created from three universities, two of which were run by churches: the **Lovanium University** in **Kinshasa**, the Université Officielle du Congo in **Lubumbashi**, and the Université Libre du Congo in **Kisangani**.

From 1971 until the 1990s, when higher **education** was liberalized, Congo had a single, national university. The Université Nationale du Zaïre was renamed the Université Nationale du Congo (UNC) in 1997 with campuses in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Kisangani, and **Kananga**. Prior to 1971, the campuses were private universities, run primarily by church groups with financial support from some lay organizations and philanthropic foundations. Total enrollment ranged from 15,000 to 20,000 students.

Following the creation of UNAZA, the three campuses were maintained in the regional capitals but administration was centralized in Kinshasa. Although some types of degrees were offered by more than one campus, each campus had a certain degree of specialization:

medicine at Kinshasa, for example; philosophy and letters at Kisan-gani; and natural and social sciences at Lubumbashi. The creation of the fourth campus at Kananga was announced in 1984.

Most educators said the quality of education of the universities was seriously eroded during the 1980s and 1990s by a lack of funds, low **wages** for professors, and frequent closings due to student protests, usually over poor living and study conditions. All campuses suffered severe declines in the 1980s and 1990s because of low government financial support. Witnesses reported empty libraries and classrooms where students took notes standing because of a lack of desks and chairs. However, the universities continued to increase the country's population of university graduates, from 12 at independence, to 167 in 1968, an estimated 2,000 in 1985, and tens of thousands by the mid-2000s. Graduates of professional and technical schools numbered roughly twice those of the universities.

The **Makanda Kabobi Institute** of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR) party provided postsecondary school training to party cadres. Two institutions trained teachers, the Institut Pédagogique National-Kinshasa and the Institut Pédagogique National-Bukavu. These institutions offered a five-year program leading to a *license*, the approximate equivalent of a bachelor of arts degree. A number of other institutions offered three-year programs awarding a *graduat* diploma, the approximate equivalent of an associate of arts degree.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number of private universities opened—most notably the Université du **Bas-Zaïre**, Université Catholique de Graben (**Butembo**), and Université de **Mbuji-Mayi**—in several regional urban centers. In 1992, the **National Conference** adopted a measure offering to return nationalized universities to churches, but the churches initially declined, citing the high cost of refurbishing the physical plants. In 1995, the Protestant Church created the Université Protestante du Zaïre, with faculties in theology and business and economics, on a small campus in Kinshasa. The number of universities began to grow in the mid-1990s and, by 2006, exceeded 100. These institutions frequently lacked teaching facilities and consequently advertised that they taught “theory” only. Few earned international accreditation.

The universities were frequently a source of government **opposition**. A number of demonstrations were harshly repressed by **security**

forces in 1969, 1971, 1977, 1981, and 1982. In the 1990s, students were strong supporters of the prodemocracy movement. An attack against students in their dormitories at the Lubumbashi campus of UNAZA in May 1990 caused the suspension of nonhumanitarian aid by the **United States**, Canada, and the **European Union**.

**URANIUM.** Uranium deposits are known to exist in a number of **copper**-mining areas of the former **Katanga Province**. However, actual **mining** of the mineral occurred only at one location, the Shinkolobwe **gold** mine in southern Katanga, 40 km south of **Likasi**, between 1944 and 1960 by the **Union Minière du Haut-Katanga** (UMHK). Radium was discovered in gold ore there as early as 1922. The first concentrates were produced from tailings in 1944 and sold to the Combined Development Agency (CDA) of the **United States** and **Great Britain**. Uranium bought from the **Belgian Congo** by the U.S. government was used in the Manhattan Project that produced the atomic bomb dropped on Japan. From 1944 to 1960, the CDA purchased a total of 32,500 metric tons of uranium ( $U^{308}$ ) concentrate. The Shinkolobwe mine was closed in April 1960, three months before **independence**.

In 1982, Congo signed an agreement with the French government to undertake surveys and possible production of uranium. The survey of the Shinkolobwe mine showed that remaining reserves were too deep to justify reopening the mine. However, surveys of other concessions owned by UMHK's successor, **Générale des Carrières et des Mines** (GECAMINES), revealed commercially exploitable deposits of **copper** ore.

In 1999, Congolese authorities tried to reopen the uranium mines with the help of North Korea, but the deal faltered under pressures from the United States. Then, in 2006, a report by a **United Nations** (UN) investigation team submitted to the chairman of the UN Sanctions Committee, Oswaldo de Rivero, stated that a huge shipment of smuggled uranium-238 from **Lubumbashi** mining area was uncovered by customs officials in **Tanzania** on 22 October 2005. The shipment was destined for the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. According to the British journal *Sunday Times*, the container was put in a secure part of the port and was later taken away by American officials. In March 2007, Congolese Commissioner General for Atomic Energy

Fortunat Lumu was accused of belonging to an international ring of illegal uranium exporters. The arrest prompted the government to announce in early April that it had dismantled an international network set up to use Congolese uranium mined illegally.

**URBANIZATION.** During the colonial era, authorities restricted urban **migration** through a system of registration and forced deportations from the cities. After **independence** in 1960, these controls were abandoned and Congo began to experience the same rapid urban growth experienced in most African nations. The proportion of people living in urban areas was estimated to have quadrupled from 1960 to 1980. The **World Bank** estimated that 27 percent of the **population** in 1980 was living in urban centers, and this rose to 39.8 percent by 1992. However, the urbanization rate declined to 33 percent in subsequent years. Although there are indications that the severe economic recession of the early 1990s has reduced the rate of migration to the cities, the prospect of jobs and access to **health care** and social services continues to attract rural inhabitants to urban centers. The migration has strained the social services and tended to aggravate **unemployment** and **crime**. The **government** has at times forcefully returned homeless and unemployed people to their home regions. It also has inducted jobless **youth** into the **military**. These efforts have been successful. In fact, urban population has remained below 33 percent since the early 1990s. In 2006, 32.7 percent of the Congolese population lived in urban centers.

– V –

**VIRUNGA MOUNTAINS.** A chain of mountains lying in eastern Congo north of **Lake Kivu**, the Virunga Mountains have peaks as high as 5,000 m above sea level. They consist mostly of volcanoes between **Lake Edward** and Lake Kivu. Most of them are dormant, except Mount Nyirangongo (3,463 m) and Mount Nyamuragira (3,063 m) in Congo. These volcanoes erupted most recently in 2006. Mount Karisimbi (4,507 m) is the highest volcano, and the oldest mountain is Mount Sabyinyo (3,634 m). The Virunga Mountains are home to mountain gorillas placed by the International Union for

Conservation of Nature on the red list of endangered species. Remote and dense, the Virunga Mountains frequently harbored antigovernment guerrillas following **independence** until 1990 and were a haven for bandits at various times throughout history.

**VIVI.** First “capital” of **Leopold II’s** Congo, founded by **Henry Morton Stanley** in 1880. Vivi was a small fishing village lying across the **Congo River** from what is now **Matadi**. It was used by Stanley as a base for the arduous overland trek to **Kinshasa**, which Stanley renamed **Leopoldville**. Kinshasa soon became the political and economic center of the territory because of its strategic position as the main **river port** for the interior.

**VOIX DU PEUPLE [VOICE OF THE PEOPLE].** The **government-owned radio** station that was part of an electronic broadcasting complex built with French assistance in 1976 as Voix du **Zaire** at a reported cost of \$1 billion. It became Voix du Peuple after the takeover by the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) in May 1997. The Voix du Peuple is a subsidiary of the government broadcasting agency, the **Radio-Télévision Nationale Congolaise** (RTNC), formerly the Office Zaïrois de Radio et de Télévision (OZRT), which is supervised by the Ministry of Information. *See also* MEDIA; TELECOMMUNICATIONS.

**VOIX DU ZAÏRE/VOICE OF ZAIRE.** *See* VOIX DU PEUPLE.

**VONGARA (VUNGARA).** One of two major groups of the **Zande** people living in northernmost Congo and speaking a **language** related to the Adamawa-Eastern cluster. The Vongara live primarily in the eastern part of Zande land near Ango and Faradje, between the **Uele** and **Ubangi Rivers**. They began to arrive in the 18th and 19th centuries, when groups of hunters, divided into the Vongara aristocracy and the **Mbomu** commoners, entered northern Congo and conquered the local peoples, some of whom spoke Sudanic languages, others of whom spoke languages of the **Bantu** cluster.

**Chieftaincy** among the Vongara was handed down from father to son. However, the son was obliged to vanquish any of his brothers who chose to contest the succession. The vanquished brothers were

then expected to leave, to conquer their own people and found their own lineages. This pattern of succession is said to be one of the major reasons for the mosaic mixture of Sudanic and Bantu cultures in northern Congo. The Vongara fiercely resisted Belgian colonial authorities until the late 1890s, when they were defeated during a military offensive against followers of the **Mahdi** in southern **Sudan**.

**VUNDUAWE TE PEMAKO, FÉLIX.** A powerful advisor to **Mobutu Sese Seko** in the 1990s, who during the **democratic transition** period frequently served as chief negotiator between the pro-Mobutu political alliances and the **opposition**. Vunduawe first came to prominence in the late 1970s when, as state commissioner for territorial **administration**, he carried out a major administrative reform. The reform, enacted in 1982, ostensibly decentralized the **government** by setting up a system of regional councils. However, real power never devolved to these councils and control remained with the party and the **president**. With the overthrow of Mobutu in 1997, Vunduawe reportedly fled to **South Africa**. He returned during the transition, 2003–2006. In 2006, he was elected as a member of the National Assembly for the Budjala territory, **Sud-Ubangi Province**.

– W –

**WAGES AND SALARIES.** Wage and salary earners in Congo have always been near the bottom of the organized **economy**, while successful businessmen and entrepreneurs have usually occupied the upper levels and senior political officials constitute the *élite*, state bourgeoisie. The minimum wage has historically varied between \$30 and \$60 per month. Professionals earn two to six times that amount, while ministerial-level, **government**, and party officials earn 80 to 100 times the minimum wage, not including benefits such as subsidized housing, cars, educational expenses, and entertainment allowances.

Real wages began declining in the early 1970s. Indexation of wages to inflation ended in 1976, and the **currency** was floated on the open market beginning in September 1983. These measures pleased donor governments and multilateral lending institutions pressing for



free-market reforms. However, they seriously disrupted the purchasing power of wage earnings and weakened public confidence in the local currency. By the late 1980s, the real wage of the average worker had dropped to almost zero. From the late 1970s, salaries of professionals in the public sector were usually less than \$80 per month, obliging many of them to subsidize their earnings by trading and charging fees for their services.

With the rise of **inflation**, which reached 6,000 percent in 1994, the value of wages plummeted and the minimum wage at some points fell as low as \$1 per month in real terms. Salaries of workers in the private sector were adjusted for inflation more frequently than those of public employees, but during the 1990s and 2000s, the minimum wage rarely rose above the equivalent of less than \$10 a month.

The country's per capita income has always been low in comparison to equally endowed African countries. It stood at \$984 in 1959, the last year of colonial rule. It plummeted to a mere \$141 by 2006. According to the **World Bank**, the decline was even more drastic in constant prices (2000). **Central Bank** figures show that, traditionally, income levels are highest in **Kinshasa** and **Lubumbashi**, reaching \$280 per year in the mid-1970s. Former **Katanga**, **Bas-Congo**, and **Kasai Oriental Provinces** follow, in that order, with per capita income levels averaging one-half to one-fourth of those in the two major cities.

Inflation was reduced to less than 400 percent in 1996 but began to rise again in 1997. At that time, the salaries of most public servants were less than \$10 per month. Inflation declined between 2001 and 2005, and increased by only 21.3 percent in 2006. Despite some control of inflation, salaries remained quite low and the majority of those who have a job supplement their income by working on the side, known in Congo as **Article 15**. *See also* EMPLOYMENT.

**"WALL STREET."** The popular name given to a stretch of road in downtown **Kinshasa** along which traders, sitting on open-air stools and benches, have created a vibrant **currency** exchange market. In the early 1990s, "Wall Street," which ironically was located near the **United States** Embassy, accounted for \$200–300 million in exchanges per month, roughly 20 percent of the country's total cur-

rency transactions. During the period of **hyperinflation**, banks and businesses frequently were obliged to go to “Wall Street” to obtain foreign currency that was unavailable at the **Central Bank**.

**WAMBA DIA WAMBA, ERNEST (1942–)**. Wamba dia Wamba was born in Sundi-Lutete, in **Kongo Central Province**. He was reared in Swedish mission schools. Upon graduation from secondary school, he was one of three students awarded scholarships by the African–American Institute to study in the **United States**. He went to Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo. In 1980, he accepted a position as Professor of History at the University of Dar es Salaam in **Tanzania**. While visiting his parents’ village in 1981, he was arrested by the **government of Mobutu Sese Seko** for possessing a paper he had authored that was deemed “subversive,” and was detained for one year. He participated in the **Conférence Nationale Souveraine** (Sovereign National Conference), held from 1991 to 1992.

In mid-1998, Wamba dia Wamba emerged as chairman of the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD), which was backed by **Rwanda** and **Uganda** and based in **Goma**. On 16 May 1999, Emile Ilunga was appointed new head of the RCD, and Wamba fled to the Ugandan-controlled town of **Kisangani**. The faction of the RCD he maintained control of was variously known as the **RCD-Mouvement de Libération** (RCD-ML), RCD-Kisangani, or RCD-Wamba. Rwanda and Uganda engaged in fierce battles in Kisangani, following which Wamba retreated to **Bunia**, in **Ituri Province**. Wamba was faced with an internal revolt by **Antipas Mbusa Nyamwisi**, leading to another split. His organization remained known as the RCD-Kisangani (RCD-K), but the Nyamwisi-led group was known as the RCD-ML.

In 2001, Wamba denounced a Ugandan proposal to unite the RCD-K, RCD-ML, and **Mouvement de Libération du Congo** (MLC) of **Jean-Pierre Bemba** as an unwelcome foreign imposition. The further disintegration of the RCD-K to the point at which it was without any significant military force may have been the result of Ugandan withdrawal of support. This action, which took place as the **Ituri conflict** escalated, was seen by some **Lendu** as evidence of a pro-**Hema** bias in Uganda. Following the **Dialogue Inter-Congolais** that ended the war against **Laurent Kabila**, Wamba became a senator and vice

president of the Senate Permanent Commission on Legal and Administrative Matters in the transitional government, 2003–2006. Wamba returned to academia as a professor of history in 2007.

**WATERWAYS.** Congo's 14,000 km of navigable waterways provide the country with a unique natural **transportation** system. However, parts of the country's major **rivers** are not navigable, and the **road** and **railway** systems designed to circumvent them are plagued by swamps, mountain ranges, and dense **rainforest**. The **Congo River** forms the backbone of the waterway system, with 5,000 km of navigable waters that, however, are interrupted by unnavigable cataracts in three places: between **Kinshasa** and **Matadi** on the lower Congo River, between Kongolo and **Kindu**, and between **Ubundu** and **Kisangani** on the upper portion of the river. The **Kasai**, **Tshuapa**, and **Ubangi Rivers** are the major navigable tributaries. Five railway systems circumvent unnavigable portions of the rivers and connect the rivers to areas of commercial mineral and **agricultural** production. In the **Great Rift Valley**, **Lakes Tanganyika**, **Kivu**, **Albert**, and **Edward** provide major transportation links with East Africa and points along the eastern Congolese border. *See also* NATIONAL WAY; PORTS.

**“WAX.”** The name derived from the method of making patterned **cloth** using dyes and “lost wax” that came to denote the brightly colored cloth used for everything from tablecloths and curtains to clothes and head coverings. Wax originated in the Dutch-influenced areas of Malaysia and Indonesia and was brought to Africa by Dutch traders returning from Asia. The cloth is widely used throughout Africa and has become popular in Europe and America. Most African nations have textile **industries** that manufacture the cloth, although the use of the traditional lost wax method has largely been abandoned. *See also* DRESS.

**WEMBADIO, JULES SHUNGU PENE THABANI KIKUMBA (1949– )**. Born in Lubefu, **Kasai**, Wembadio is known as Papa Wemba since 1975. He is a rumba (later known as soukous) musician and one of Africa's most popular musicians. Papa Wemba was one of the very first musicians to join the influential soukous band, Zaiko

Langa Langa, when it was created in December 1969 in **Kinshasa** along with such musicians as Nyoka Longo Jossart, Evoloko Lay Lay, and others.

The young Papa Wemba (then known as Jules Presley Shungu Wembadio), was one of the driving forces that by 1973 made Zaiko Langa Langa one of the most dominant Congolese performing groups. In December 1974, Papa Wemba along with Evoloko Lay Lay, Mavuela Somo, and Bozi Biana, left Zaiko Langa Langa to establish their own musical ensemble Isifi Lokole, ISIFI being an acronym for “Institut du Savoir Idéologique pour la Formation des Idoles” (Institute for Ideological Knowledge for the Formation of Stars). However, Isifi Lokole lasted only a year.

In November 1975, Papa Wemba and a few musicians created a group called Yoka Lokole that enjoyed some success. Less than two years later, Papa Wemba established his own band, known as Viva la Musica. During the height of his success in 1977, Papa Wemba’s family home was known as Village Molakai, and Wemba assumed the exalted title of traditional chief. Since 1977, Viva la Musica has seen both the defections of musicians every two or three years and the emergence of other new talents such as **Koffi Olomide** (1978–79). After the wave of African emigration to Europe in the 1990s, Wemba maintained one group in Kinshasa and another group in Paris.

On 18 February 2003, suspected of being involved in a network that had allegedly smuggled hundreds of illegal immigrants from the **Democratic Republic of Congo** (DRC) into Europe, Papa Wemba was arrested at his home in Paris. He was found guilty in June 2003 and spent four months in prison, an experience which, on his release after a \$30,000 bail was posted, he declared had a profound psychological effect on him.

**WENDO, KOLOSOY ANTOINE (1925–2008).** Born on 25 April 1925 in Mushi territory, **Mai-Ndombe Province**, Antoine Kolosoyi was known as Papa Wendo. Both of his parents died when he was young, and he was taken to live in an orphanage run by the Société des Missionnaires d’Afrique (Society of the Missionaries of Africa), where he stayed for six years until he was 12. He started his music career by entertaining passengers on **Congo River** ferries. He thus began playing guitar in the mid-1940s around **Leopoldville** with a

**Cuban** style band called Victoria Bakolo Miziki. Wendo recorded his first hit, “Marie-Louise,” in 1948, and the song became a success throughout West Africa. He is credited with being the father of Congolese soukous, that is, a combination of African lyrics and Afro–Cuban rumba rhythms.

Wendo’s music propelled Congolese Rumba to fame and even helped to develop a national culture. In 1960, Wendo developed a friendship with political leaders such as **Patrice Lumumba**. He stopped playing in 1965. Wendo reemerged after **Laurent Kabila** became **president** in May 1997. President Kabila helped Wendo restart his career of recording and touring with some members of the old Victoria Bakolo Miziki band. He recorded his last album, titled *Bana ya Papa Wendo* (Children of Papa Wendo), in 2004. On 28 July 2008, Papa Wendo died in Kinshasa.

**WOMEN.** In most traditional Congolese societies, many of which are matrilineal, women played an important role in lineage and family. An elderly woman could rise to the position of village elder and in some societies, **chief**. However, male pastimes and vocations such as hunting, **fishing**, and warring tended to be regarded as more noble and valorous than the traditional female occupations of cultivating, collecting firewood, cooking, and caring for children. Following **independence**, a number of women rose to prominence over the years as barristers, professors, physicians, and civil servants. Like most African states, Congo has enacted laws guaranteeing women equal rights, such as the rights to vote, to own property, and to custodial rights in divorce. The law also outlaws, in principle, the practice of polygamy. The **civil service** and **military** are open to women. The latter has had its own all-female battalion since 1976. In 2007–2008, as many as seven ministerial portfolios at one time were occupied by women since independence.

However, full equality has yet to be achieved. Significantly fewer women attend and graduate from high schools and **universities** than males. Literacy rates in 1985 were 47 percent for women and 78 percent for males. In 2006, the percentage of women above the age of 15 years considered literate was 61 percent, as compared to 84 percent for males, according to **World Bank** statistics.

Fewer women still rise in the professional ranks, and their salaries often are lower than those of males fulfilling similar or less responsible roles. A number of observers note, however, that with the high incidence of **unemployment**, jobs tend to go to heads of families, who usually are considered to be male despite the increasing number of **urban** families headed by women. The economic decline beginning in the 1980s and the crisis of the 1990s and the 2000s placed additional economic burdens upon women. Traditionally, they were most active in the informal **economy**, which became a major source of survival and, as a result, many became the major providers for their families when earnings in the formal economy were undercut by rising unemployment and **inflation**.

Given the tendency in family disputes toward recourse to **customary law**, few women are able to draw satisfactory compensation from a divorce if the husband decides to take the children and belongings. In the early 2000s, although the African and Congolese feminist movements were considered young and not as militant as their European and American counterparts, observers noted they had grown since the 1960s and had achieved some progress in the quest for equality. Despite hardship, a few women, such as **Kasavubu Justine M'poyo**, have risen to prominence. *See also* M'BILIA BEL.

**WORLD BANK.** This is the name commonly used to refer to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). It was formed following World War II to help rebuild European countries devastated by the war, but beginning in the 1960s, it increasingly turned to financing economic development in newly independent nations of Africa and other parts of the world. The bank's first loan occurred in 1947, when Congo was still a colony (**Belgian Congo**), in the amount of \$80 million to rehabilitate **agriculture** and recovery support. Two more loans of \$40 million each were approved, in September 1951, to help a development plan project, and in November 1957, for road projects. In early 1960, Belgian Congo received \$58 million for a variety of projects that included agriculture, roads, ports, and waterway projects.

The first loan given to independent Congo targeted the Société Congolaise de Financement et Développement, in the amount of \$10

million. The bank approved the first major loan of \$100 million in January 1975 to expand mining. Another loan of \$110 million was extended to the **Générale des Carrières et des Mines** (GECAMINES) in April 1986. In addition to these two loans, World Bank loans to Congo have remained quite small, averaging less than \$20 million per year from 1960 to 2001 to finance infrastructure projects, such as the construction and improvement of **roads**, **railway** and maritime networks, **telecommunications** facilities, and the development of **electrical power** complexes.

Agriculture and rural development projects have also received considerable attention. The World Bank has provided the Congolese **government** with numerous loans to help refinance **debt** payment arrears as part of various stabilization agreements with its sister institution, the **International Monetary Fund** (IMF). However, Congo's inability to service its debt in the 1990s led to a shutoff of new funding, and the World Bank closed its office in **Kinshasa** in 1993. However, it resumed its operations again in the late 1990s.

Two massive loans of \$450 million and \$454 million were approved in July and August 2002 for economic recovery and emergency multisector rehabilitation and reconstruction projects. In the next five years for which data are available, most loans concentrated on civil war-related issues such as health, education, and infrastructure. World Bank's loans declined to \$352 million in 2003, but increased again to \$476 million in 2004 to deal specifically with post-reunification economic recovery (\$200 million), multisector **acquired immune deficiency syndrome/human immunodeficiency virus** (AIDS/HIV) (\$102 million), and emergency demobilization and reintegration of combatants (\$100 million). In 2005, Congo received a loan of \$453 million to rehabilitate the health sector and a number of social projects. Although World Bank's loans declined to \$22 million in 2006, it picked up again in 2007 to \$344 million to rehabilitate social programs in urban areas, improve education, and support reintegration of combatants in eastern Congo. *See also* LONDON CLUB; PARIS CLUB.

**WORLD WARS.** **Belgian Congo** provided important human and material resources to **Belgium** and the Allies during the two world wars. Troops of the **Force Publique** fought against German forces

in Cameroon and Tanganyika during World War I and against Nazi and Fascist forces in Ethiopia and Nigeria during World War II. In both wars, the heroism of Congolese contingents was praised by Allied commanders. In addition, mines in **Katanga** supplied **copper**, **tin**, **cobalt**, and other minerals to the war industry. They also furnished the crude **uranium** used to make the atomic bombs that were dropped on Japan and ended World War II. Revenues from Congolese **exports** were partly responsible for keeping afloat the treasury of the Belgian government-in-exile during the wars and helped finance Belgium's post-World War II reconstruction effort.

– Y –

**YAKA.** A group of **Bantu**-speaking people that lives between the **Kwango** and Wamba Rivers in southwestern Congo. Some ethnologists contend that the **Jaga** invasion, which severely undermined the **Kongo Kingdom** in the 1600s, was actually mounted by the Yaka. A fierce, independent people, the Yaka tended to avoid contact with Belgian authorities during the colonial era for geographical and political reasons. Yaka residents of **Leopoldville** clashed with **Kongo** groups following **independence** and, during the 1960s, occasionally resisted violently **government** attempts to take control of their lands.

**YEKE.** A people of the **Bantu** cluster, exhibiting some Arab influence, that live in southern **Katanga Province** between **Kolwezi** and Kazanga near the **Zambian** border. The Yeke are descendents of **Nyamwezi** traders from Tabora, **Tanzania** and auxiliaries of **Afro-Arabs**, who migrated in the area in the 1850s. Some Yeke joined the **Lunda** in forming the **Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga** (CONAKAT) party in the late 1950s. *See also* YEKE KINGDOM.

**YEKE KINGDOM.** Commonly known as the *Garenganze* kingdom, the Yeke Kingdom lasted from 1865 to 1891 under King Msiri or **Ngelengwa Mwenda**. Around 1856, Msiri settled near Chief **Katanga** with the **Yeke**. He married Katanga's daughter and established



himself in Chief Katanga's land by offering mercenary services to opposing political factions. Helped by the Ovimbundu traders from **Angola**, he intervened in disputes among different **chiefs** in the region. The most successful of these ventures was his interference in the dispute among pretenders to the throne of **Kazembe** Kingdom at the death of Kazembe X in 1862. Between 1865 and 1871, Msiri had incorporated all possessions of Kazembe west of the Luapula valley into his estate. He took the title of king after his father's death in late 1870 and founded the state of Garenganze, with its capital at Bunkeya. He expanded his prestige in the region and gained popular support as the result of his victory, ending Kazembe's predatory rule. From its capital at Bunkeya, the Yeke Kingdom expanded, stopping the southward expansion of the **Luba** Empire and subjugating tribes in the southwest on the trading route to Angola.

The Garenganze Kingdom became for a while the most powerful state in south-central Africa, controlling a territory of about half a million square kilometers. The Yeke Kingdom also controlled the only trade route across the continent from east to west, since the Kalahari Desert and Lozi Kingdom in the south and the Congo rainforest in the north blocked alternative routes. It achieved this control through natural resources and force of arms. Msiri traded Katanga's **copper** principally, but also **slaves** and **ivory**, for gunpowder and firearms. The most important links were with Portuguese Angolans in the **Ben-guela** area, with **Tippo Tip** in the north, with his brothers Nyamwezi from Tabora, and **Swahili** traders in the east, and indirectly with the Sultan of Zanzibar who controlled the east coast traders.

When King **Leopold II** was told that the Yeke Kingdom controlled east-west trade and was rich in copper and possibly **gold**, he sent expeditions to try to obtain a treaty for the kingdom to be joined with his **Congo Free State** (CFS). **Cecil Rhodes** also sent expeditions to recruit the kingdom to his British South Africa Company's chartered territories. Leopold's expedition won Katanga and ended the kingdom by killing Msiri; the expedition took over the territory for the CFS, but with its own administration until it was more closely incorporated into **Belgian Congo**. Captain Stairs, the expedition's leader, installed one of Msiri's adopted sons, Mukanda-Bantu, as chief but of a vastly reduced area with a radius of only 20 km of Bunkeya. The chieftainship continues to this day under the title *Mwata Msiri*.

**YEMO, MARIE-MADELEINE (? –1971).** President **Mobutu Sese Seko**'s mother, affectionately known as "Mama Mobutu," was the model for the "Black Madonna" theme of African motherhood that was prominent in the early stages of the **Authenticity** movement. Following her death on 18 May 1971, **Kinshasa**'s main hospital was named after her, and a large monument was erected in her memory at Gemena, in northern Congo, where she died. After **Laurent Kabila** took power in May 1997, he renamed the hospital merely Hôpital Général.

**YIRA.** *See* NANDE.

**YOUTH.** More than half of Congo's **population** is below the age of 15 years and two-thirds are younger than 25 years. The growth of the youth population is the result of high birth rates and reduced infant mortality beginning in the 1950s. In the mid-1960s, Congolese cities experienced a dramatic increase in their population of young people, due not only to demographic factors, but also to urban **migration** by youth seeking jobs and the modern life. In the cities, **unemployment** and the decline in influence of the extended family, which traditionally provided support, led to problems of homelessness and juvenile **crime**. The **government**, aware of the potential threat to stability, created in 1967 the **Jeunesse du Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (JMPR), the youth wing of the **Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution** (MPR). However, the zeal of early JMPR organizers in taking over church and lay youth movements and their property created considerable resentment among the adult population. The resentment waned as the movement matured and became institutionalized.

The lack of **educational** facilities and job prospects later made some youth, particularly university **students**, the most persistent critics of the government. Protests organized by university students and supported by secondary students in 1969 led to clashes with the army in which dozens were killed. Further protests by students commemorating the first clashes led to the **nationalization** of the **universities** in 1971 and the centralization of curricula in 1972 and 1973. Protests in subsequent years led to frequent closings of universities and secondary schools. Many of the protests focused on poor living and study conditions but some were also against **corruption** and

wasteful government spending. The protests also occasionally led to vandalism and looting or “**pillages**.” They usually prompted a stern response from authorities, including arrest, suspension of classes, and induction of protest leaders into the **military**.

Many student leaders later rose to senior positions in the party and government. Others went into exile and became **dissidents**. In 1990, criticism by students at the **Lubumbashi** campus of the **Université Nationale du Zaïre** (UNAZA) led to an attack by **security** forces on 11 May, less than one month after President **Mobutu Sese Seko** announced the **democratic transition**. According to **human rights** organizations, more than 200 students were killed when soldiers invaded their dormitories, although the government reported that only one was killed. The attack caused the **United States**, Canada, and the **European Union** to curtail all nonhumanitarian aid to Congo and marked the beginning of the final withdrawal of support for Mobutu by Western governments.

In late 1996, when the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) started its campaign against Mobutu, a large number of youth joined the movement, in part because they were against Mobutu and hoped that **Laurent Kabila** would offer them opportunities to gain a decent living. They were called the **kadogo**. Once in power, Kabila never kept his promises. The assassin of Kabila, Rashid Kasereka, was a kadogo. In addition to joining the AFDL, many others joined militia groups such as the **Mai-Mai** in order to survive by carrying a gun. The war against Kabila, from 1998 to 2003, saw a large number of youth enrolled in militia groups. Most human rights organizations contend that as many as 50,000 children belonged to militia groups during the **civil war** against Laurent Kabila. *See also* CHILD SOLDIERS; SECOND CONGO WAR.

– Z –

**Z’AHIDI NGOMA, ARTHUR (1947– )**. The leader of a small **political party** called the Forces de l’Avenir (Forces of the Future), Z’Ahidi, who once worked for the **United Nations** Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), became the first

major prisoner of conscience of the **Laurent Kabila government**, which came to power after the fall of **Mobutu Sese Seko** in May 1997. Z'Ahidi was arrested on 25 November 1997 after he publicly criticized Kabila. Humanitarian organizations pleaded for his release or transfer to house arrest because of his deteriorating health. In early 1998, Z'Ahidi and several other dissidents escaped from detention in **Katanga Province**. He was recaptured but later freed.

Z'Ahidi emerged in August 1998 as one of the leaders of the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD) that rebelled against the Kabila government, accusing it of favoritism and undemocratic practices. When the RCD established a national assembly in an attempt to broaden its political base in January 1999, Z'Ahidi was appointed its president but he announced in February that he was leaving the alliance. Z'Ahidi became one of the four vice presidents in the transitional government of the **Democratic Republic of Congo** (DRC). He ran for President in the 2006 elections as the candidate of the Force du Future and received .34 percent of the vote. As of December 2008, Z'Ahidi was without any political office.

**ZAÏRE.** *See* CONGO; DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO; ZAÏRE, RÉPUBLIQUE DU.

**ZAÏRE COMMITTEE.** A group of intellectuals that consisted mostly of Belgian former teachers in Congo (then Zaire) and exiled Congolese **dissidents**, based primarily in **Belgium**. The committee opposed the **Mobutu Sese Seko government** and published occasional newsletters denouncing **corruption**, authoritarianism, and **human rights** violations. During the 1980s, some exiled politicians allied with the committee and contributed to its work by providing documents and verbal accounts of the regime's excesses, but most preferred to lead their own dissident groups.

**ZAÏRE (CURRENCY).** *See* CURRENCY.

**ZAÏRE, RÉPUBLIQUE DU.** The formal name of the nation from 27 October 1971, when it was changed by decree from the République Démocratique du Congo, until 29 May 1997, when it was changed back. Zaire was the name first given to the **Congo River** by Portuguese

**explorers.** According to legend, local inhabitants, asked by the explorers what the name of the great **river** was, responded saying “Nzadi,” which meant “river” in their dialect. However, the Portuguese understood them saying “Zaire.” The river and the territory were subsequently renamed “Congo,” after the **Kongo** people living near the coast who were the first to enter into contact with Europeans.

During the **Authenticity** movement, the name of the republic was changed to an authentic African name that did not evoke a single **ethnic group**, in an effort to remove a painful reminder of the brutality of colonialism and the chaos following **independence**. The name change was also aimed at eliminating confusion with neighboring **Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville)**, the former French colony. The change was institutionalized by the **constitution** of 1974, which established the party-state.

Under the constitution drafted in August 1996 by the **Haut Conseil de la République/Parlement de la Transition** (HCR/PT), the name was changed to République Fédérale du Congo. However, after the **Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo** (AFDL) came to power on 29 May 1997, the name was changed back to République Démocratique du Congo. To avoid confusion, this dictionary uses Congo or DRC because it was not only accepted by Congolese and geographers but it was also approved by the 2006 **constitution**. *See also* BELGIAN CONGO; CONGO FREE STATE; CONGO, REPUBLIC OF (KINSHASA); NAME CHANGES.

**ZAIRIANIZATION.** The term used to describe the policy of **nationalization** of foreign-owned companies in strategic sectors of the **economy** between 1973 and 1975. On 30 November 1973, amid rising mineral prices and at the peak of the **Authenticity** movement, **Mobutu Sese Seko** announced a program aimed at transferring a great deal of the country’s wealth still in foreign hands to national ownership. The large **mining** companies had already been nationalized in the late 1960s. Zairianization transferred most large and medium-sized companies in the **agricultural** and **transportation** sectors and all companies with gross annual revenues of more than 1 million **zaïres** (at the time roughly equal to \$1 million) to public ownership.

The program affected most medium-size and small business owners. A large number of them were foreigners of Asian, Arab, and southern European nationalities who were perceived as profiteering middlemen. Their companies were turned over to Congolese citizens chosen by the **government**. In many of the more than 100 large enterprises that were Zairianized, the government appointed representatives, called “*délégués*,” but retained the original owners as operators or partners. In smaller businesses, however, there were few controls, and the new owners in many cases merely sold off existing assets and abandoned the business. Zairianization also seriously hurt the agricultural sector because the new owners failed to maintain transportation, distribution, and marketing infrastructures. In addition, the lack of guidelines for compensation and the favoring of political loyalists brought criticism at domestic and international levels.

On 30 December 1974, in the face of falling production figures and rising criticism from the international financial community, the Mobutu government announced **Retrocession**, a policy that allowed up to 40 percent of the Zairianized properties to be returned to their foreign owners. The proportion was increased to 60 percent nine months later. However, the government retained ownership of what were considered vital industries, namely in **energy**, **timber**, and large-scale transportation.

**ZAMBIA, RELATIONS WITH.** Relations between Congo and Zambia during the years following Zambian independence in 1964 were cordial for the most part, in large part because of the friendship between **Mobutu Sese Seko** and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda. However, relations were strained periodically by **smuggling**, border disputes, and competition for markets for their principal **exports** of **copper** and **cobalt**. Congolese mistrust was aroused during the **Shaba** invasion of 1978 when the **Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo** (FLNC) guerrillas used Zambian territory to cross from bases in **Angola** to **Shaba Region**, although it was later established that they did so without the consent of the Zambian government.

Relations were strained again in 1983 and 1984 by a series of border clashes in southern Shaba. In one incident, Congolese soldiers raised the national **flag** over several small villages claimed by both countries. In another, Congolese passengers were abducted from a

train in Zambian territory. These incidents and subsequent acts of retaliation were often characterized as acts of banditry by hungry soldiers or as disputes between smugglers. Zambia's expulsion of illegal Congolese immigrants in July 1984 led the Mobutu government to retaliate by ordering the deportation of illegal Zambian immigrants. The order was revoked on 25 August. Heavy smuggling, allegedly involving senior military and civilian officials, obliged the two governments to impose strict visa controls in 1988. Negotiations led to an agreement on 18 September 1989, ending a longstanding border dispute and leading to an improvement in relations.

Kaunda was defeated in multiparty elections on 31 October 1991 by Frederick Chiluba, who was reelected in 1996. Chiluba tried to mediate the **rebellion** launched in 1998 against **Laurent Kabila** by the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD)**, in which half a dozen African nations became militarily involved. Despite this effort, border issues remained salient between the two countries. On 27 April 1999, the Zambian government closed its borders after the arrest of 16 Zambian topographers by Congolese soldiers who accused them of spying. However, the border was reopened six days later, after talks in **Lubumbashi** between five governors from Zambia and the governor of **Katanga**. The major issue of the two countries has remained the extent of smuggling activities and speculation in the Zambian currency, the Kwacha, which has remained strong compared to the Congolese currency over the years. Despite a number of military incursions on both sides, Zambia and Congo continued to enjoy warm and cordial relations throughout the 2000s.

**ZANDE.** A large cluster of **ethnic groups** of Sudanic origin, speaking **languages** of Adamawa-Eastern origin. The Zande live in northern Congo along the **Ubangi** and **Uele Rivers** bordering the **Central African Republic** and **Sudan**. Hunters and warriors, they are believed to have arrived in the **forests** of the **Congo River Basin** in the 1700s and 1800s, although ethnologists are not certain why. They subjugated the people already living in the area and resisted the colonial administration until the early 1920s.

A hierarchical society, the Zande are sometimes divided by ethnologists into an aristocracy called the **Vongara** and commoners

called the **Mbomu**. Chieftaincy, generally within the Vongara group, was passed from father to a designated son, who was obliged to vanquish any of his brothers who opposed the succession. Vanquished brothers were obliged to leave the society and find new people to conquer. The practice was believed to have been a major cause of the intermingling of Zande and **Bantu**-related groups in the area. The group was subdivided into the Vongara, living primarily in the east, and the Bandiya, living primarily in the west. The Bandiya live in the western part of Zande land, near the confluence of the Uele and Ubangi Rivers, between the towns of Ango and Bondo. Another group, the Banda, represents a large cluster of ethnic groups speaking a language of Adamawa-Eastern origin living in northernmost Congo near the Ubangi River. The group is characterized by a relatively structured hierarchy with a strong lineage system.

**ZIMBABWE, RELATIONS WITH.** Relations with Zimbabwe were friendly from its independence on 17 April 1980. After the fall of **Mobutu Sese Seko** in 1997, Zimbabwe grew alarmed at the influence and aggressiveness of **Uganda** and **Rwanda** in central Africa. It sent troops, as did **Namibia**, **Angola**, and **Chad**, to support the **Laurent Kabila government** when it was attacked by the **Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie** (RCD) in August 1998. Between 1998 and 2002, Laurent Kabila and later, his son **Joseph Kabila**, gave Zimbabwe diamond rights and huge logging concessions as repayment for the country's military support. These businesses included Cosleg, a joint venture operation with the DRC mining diamonds and Socebo, in partnership with SAB Congo, exploiting forests.

After signing the **Acte Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo** (AGI) in December 2002 in Pretoria, South Africa, President Robert Mugabe's party and the military began regularizing their business operations in Congo by transferring control of the ventures from the military to civilians. The Mugabe government pulled all its troops out in late 2002. In early 2003, the Congolese and Zimbabwean governments met to discuss compensation of \$1.8 billion that Zimbabwe had sunk into the four-year **civil war** against Kabila.



**ZINC.** Zinc was produced solely by the **Générale des Carrières et des Mines** (GECAMINES) as a by-product of **copper mining** at a single mine at Kipushi, west of **Lubumbashi**. Ore with zinc graded as high as 19 percent was extracted from depths of up to 1,280 m. A plant at Kipushi produced concentrates that were shipped to **Likasi** for roasting and then to the Usine de Zinc de Kolwezi, at **Kolwezi**, where 25-kg ingots of 99.99 percent pure zinc were produced through the electrolytic process. The country's zinc reserves were estimated at 2.2 million metric tons in the late 1980s.

Production of zinc ingots, primarily for **export**, began in the late 1950s and reached 109,182 tons in 1960. However, it declined to 67,000 tons in 1980. Despite an increase to 80,000 tons in 1984, production of zinc never reached its independence level.

With the financial deterioration of GECAMINES, production declined steadily in the late 1980s and totaled 20,000 tons in 1992. Production of metal content of zinc was 6,830 tons in 1993 and reached its lowest level of 100 tons in 1994, but increased in the subsequent two years to 4,516 tons in 1995 and 3,159 tons in 1996. From 1997 to 2001, production of zinc averaged 1,000 tons per year. Production picked up again in 2004 to 5,067 tons and was 15,000 tons in 2006.

**ZONGO RIVER.** A **river** located in **Kongo Central Province** east of **Matadi** that flows into the **Congo River**. The Zongo is the site of a dramatic waterfall, where a 60,000-kW hydroelectric complex, built in 1928, supplies power to Kongo Central. The station became less important following the completion of the **Inga hydroelectric complex** in the early 1970s, but remained in operation, the oldest such complex in the country.

## **Appendix A**

### **Evolution of Provinces in Congo**

<i>Fundamental Law (1960)</i>	<i>Law of 27 April 1962</i>	<i>Decree of 6 April 1966</i>	<i>Administrative Reform of 1967</i>	<i>Decree of 1987</i>	<i>Constitution of 2006</i>	<i>Capital</i>
Léopoldville	Léopoldville Kongo Central Kwango Kwilu	Kinshasa Kongo Central Bandundu	Kinshasa Bas Congo Bandundu	Kinshasa Bas Congo Bandundu	Kinshasa Kongo Central Kwango Kwilu	Kinshasa Matadi Kenge Kikwit
Équateur	Lac Leopold II Cuvette Centrale Moyen Congo Ubangi	Équateur	Équateur	Équateur	Mai-Ndombe Équateur Mongal Nord-Ubangi Sud-Ubangi Tshuapa	Inongo Mbandaka Lisala Gbadolite Gemena Boende
Kasai	Sud Kasai Nord-Kasai Lomami	Kasai Occidental Kasai Oriental	Kasai Occidental Kasai Oriental	Kasai Occidental Kasai Oriental	Kasai Occidental Lulua Kasai Oriental Lomami	Luebo Kananga Mbuji Mayi Kabinda
Kivu	Maniema Nord-Kivu Kivu Central	Sud-Kivu Nord-Kivu	Kivu Maniema	Maniema Nord-Kivu Sud-Kivu	Sankuru Maniema Nord-Kivu Sud-Kivu	Lodja Kindu Goma
Katanga	Katanga Oriental Lualaba Nord-Katanga	Katanga	Katanga	Katanga	Haut-Katanga Haut Lomami Lualaba	Bukavu Lubumbashi Kamina Kolwezi
Province Orientale	Haut Congo Ituri Uele	Haut Congo Kibali Ituri	Province Orientale Uele	Province Orientale	Tanganyika Tshopo Ituri Bas-Uele Haut Uele	Kalemie Kisangani Bunia Buta Isiro

## Appendix B

### Rulers of Congo, 1885–1960

<i>Date</i>	<i>Sovereign</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Governor General</i> <sup>1</sup>
1885–1909	Leopold II	1885–1886	Sir Francis de Winton
		1887–1890	C. Janssen
		1891–1908	Baron Th. Wahis
		1908–1909	Baron Th. Wahis
1909–1934	Albert 1st	1909–1912	Baron Th. Wahis
		1912–1916	F. Fuchs
		1916–1921	E. Henry
		1921–1923	M. Lippens
		1923–1927	M. Rutten
		1928–1934	A. Tilkens
		1934–1946	P. Ryckmans
1934–1951	Leopold III	1946–1951	E. Jungers
		1952–1958	L. Pétillon
1952–1960	Baudouin 1st	1958–1960	H. Cornelis

<sup>1</sup>Governors were called General Administrator during the Congo Free State period.



## **Appendix C**

### **Rulers of Congo, 1960–2009**

<i>Date</i>	<i>President</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Prime Minister<sup>1</sup></i>
01/07/1960–23/11/1965	Joseph Kasavubu	24/06/1960–05/09/1960 20/09/1960–03/10/1960 04/11/1960–09/02/1961 09/02/1961–27/07/1961 02/08/1961–30/06/1964 10/07/1964–13/10/1964 18/10/1964–14/11/1965 28/11/1965–16/12/1966 08/07/1977–05/01/1979 06/03/1979–26/08/1980 27/08/1980–23/04/1981 23/04/1981–05/11/1982 05/11/1982–22/01/1987 22/01/1987–07/03/1988 07/03/1988–26/11/1988 26/11/1988–04/05/1990 04/05/1990–01/03/1991 01/03/1991–29/09/1991 29/09/1991–07/10/1991 15/10/1991–25/11/1991 25/11/1991–15/08/1992 15/08/1992–18/12/1992 19/12/1992–17/03/1993 18/03/1993–05/07/1994 06/07/1994–30/03/1997 02/04/1997–09/04/1997 09/04/1997–16/05/1997	Patrice Lumumba Albert Ndele <sup>2</sup> J. Marie Bomboko <sup>2</sup> Joseph Ileo Cyrille Adoula Moïse Tshombe Evariste Kimba Leonard Mulamba Mpinga Kasenda Boboliko Lokonga J. Nguza Karl-I-bond N'singa Udjuu L. Kengo Wa Dondo Mabi Mulumba Sambwa Pinda Mbagui L. Kengo Wa Dondo V. Lunda Bululu Mulumba Lukoji Etienne Tshisekedi B. Mungul Diaka J. Ngunza Karl-I-bond Etienne Tshisekedi N. Zuchi Mupiemina <sup>3</sup> Faustin Birindwa L. Kengo Wa Dondo Etienne Tshisekedi Likulia Bolongo
24/11/1965–16/05/1997	Mobutu Sese Seko		
17/05/1997–16/01/2001 17/01/2001–	Laurent D. Kabila Joseph Kabila	30/12/2006–25/09/2008 10/10/2008–	Antoine Gizenga Adolphe Muzito

<sup>1</sup>Prime ministers were called First State Commissioners under President Mobutu from 1977 to 1990.

<sup>2</sup>In September 1960, President Kasavubu nominated Joseph Ileo as prime minister. However, he was never approved by the parliament that endorsed Prime Minister Lumumba. Mobutu staged a coup on 14 September 1960 to neutralize Lumumba and nominated a Board of General Commissioners. Thus, Albert Ndele and Justin Marie Bomboko were called chairman.

<sup>3</sup>The government was made of senior civil servants and called Collège des Secrétaires Généraux.

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## INTRODUCTION

The literature on the Democratic Republic of Congo is abundant and the bulk of this material is written in French. Researchers can also use Internet resources to access information on the DRC. We provide Internet links of a number of organizations, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group, and the United Nations, instead of listing a large number of their publications since the early 1990s. This abundance creates an advantage for researchers; it creates problems for the bibliographer and thus imposes some criteria of selection. We have been quite selective for materials written in French and published before 1960 because our intent is to provide the readers with a substantial number of works in English. The rationale behind our selection is that readers can always find this abundance of literature in the previous editions of the dictionary. Although a student seeking an advanced or specialized knowledge of the country prior to the 1980s will find the absence of at least a working knowledge of French to be a serious handicap, a large number of papers have been written in English since the early 1990s and even more since the late 1990s when the war against Laurent Kabila started. This bibliography is devoted to works in English and French. Therefore, works in Flemish, German, Italian, and Portuguese were eliminated and interested readers can access this information in the previous editions of the dictionary.

Researchers interested in yearly reviews of politics and economics of the DRC can find these materials in *Africa Contemporary Record* and *Africa South of the Sahara*. A number of magazines provide monthly and weekly

coverage. They include *Afrique Contemporaine*, *Africa Confidential*, *Africa Research Bulletin* (political and economic issues), *Jeune Afrique*, and *Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens*.

Several works exist for the student seeking a general overview of the DRC in English. One that is relatively complete, succinct, and unopinionated is the fourth edition of *Zaire: A Country Study. Area Handbook*, edited by Irving Kaplan et al. Of course, it omits the post-Mobutu period, but provides the reader basic knowledge of Congolese history and society. Another general work published in 2002 that complements the first one is Georges Nzongola Ntalaja's *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila. A People's History* published by Zed Books.

Work on ethnic groups in the DRC has been extensive. Olga Boone provided two outstanding French works in mapping ethnic groups in the DRC: *Carte ethnique du Congo: Quart sudest* published in 1961 and *Carte ethnique de la République du Congo: Quart sud-ouest* published in 1973. Moreover, the series, *Ethnographic Survey of Africa* by the International Africa Institute in the early 1950s provides a broad, though dated, overview. Finally, the monographs published by the Centre d'Études Ethnographiques de Bandundu (CEEBA) provides a good example of efforts by Congolese scholars to collect, preserve, and analyze their traditional societies amidst financial difficulties in collecting data and infrequent and disrupted publications.

Despite an abundance of materials on the DRC, the bulk of the literature has focused on politics at the expense of other areas of inquiry since the civil wars of the 1990s. For example, there is scarcity of works on education since the late 1980s. In 2005, however, the World Bank published *Education in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Priorities and Options for Regeneration*. The book provides an excellent overview of education in the DRC since 1960 and future challenges. Other areas that have not been much explored since the late 1970s are archaeology, arts, livestock, and science. Thus, our selection kept most important works published during the colonial period. In sum, we wanted to ensure that our selection reflected important works on the DRC.

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS IN BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARSOM	Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer
CEDAF	Centre d'Étude et de Documentation Africaines

CEEBA	Centre d'Études Ethnographiques de Bandundu
CEMUBAC	Centre Scientifique et Médicale de l'Université Libre de Belgique en Afrique Centrale
CEPSI	Centre d'Études de Problèmes Sociaux Indigènes
CRISP	Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques
IAI	International Africa Institute
INEAC	Institut pour l'Étude Agronomique du Congo
IMNZ	Institut des Musées Nationaux du Zaïre
IRCB	Institut Royal Colonial Belge
IRES	Institut de Recherches Économiques et Sociaux
JPRS	Joint Publications Research Service
MRAC	Musée Royal de l'Afrique Centrale, Tervuren, Belgium
PUZ	Presses Universitaires du Zaïre
SRBG	Société Royale Belge de Géographie
UNAZA	Université Nationale du Zaïre

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*La Semaine.* Weekly newspaper published in Kinshasa beginning in 1990.

*Le Cobalt.* Newspaper published in Lubumbashi in the early 1990s.

*Le Forum des As.* Biweekly newspaper published in Kinshasa in the 1990s.

*Le Kiosk.* Weekly newspaper published in Kisangani in the early 1990s.

*Le Lushois.* Triweekly newspaper published in Lubumbashi.

*Le Phare.* Daily opposition newspaper published in Kinshasa beginning in 1990.

*Le Potentiel.* Daily newspaper published in Kinshasa.

*Le Soft.* Daily financial newspaper published in Kinshasa.

*Le Souverain* (published in Goma)

*Les Coulisses* (published in Beni)

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*Mjumbe.* Weekly newspaper published in Lubumbashi in the early 1990s.

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