



## HISTORICAL DICTIONARIES OF AFRICA

Edited by Jon Woronoff

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# Historical Dictionary of Madagascar

*Second Edition*

Philip M. Allen and  
Maureen Covell

*Historical Dictionaries of Africa, No. 98*



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To Poppins





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## Editor's Foreword

Madagascar is unique among African countries. Near the continent but not of it, the island has a population and culture formed from an intricate blend of African and Asian elements. The country's unusual flora and fauna are well known to the West, but there is very little information available in English on its often tumultuous political history. This historical dictionary will help fill that gap. In 2002, 42 years after independence, the Great Island acquired its most open, progressive administration. The current regime seems dedicated to the successful conversion of Madagascar's undeniable assets in land, natural resources, human talent, and energy into the fortunate prosperity that the Malagasy people deserve.

This second edition of the *Historical Dictionary of Madagascar* sheds much needed light on the precolonial, colonial, and postindependence history of the country, with an inevitable emphasis on politics. It also includes a substantial amount of information on the economy, society, and culture of Madagascar. Much of this is contained in the dictionary section, with numerous additions to the first edition, which was published a decade ago. The chronology has also been brought up to date, and the introduction provides an excellent overview. The bibliography lists further sources, both in English and French.

This second edition, by Philip Allen, builds on a strong first edition by Maureen Covell. Dr. Covell, professor of political science at Simon Fraser University, first visited the island from 1967 to 1969, when she did research on France and Madagascar for her dissertation on local politics. During her stay she encountered many future Malagasy leaders. She later wrote *Madagascar: Politics, Economics, and Society*. Dr. Allen, a distinguished university professor at Frostburg State University, also traveled to Madagascar in the 1960s, when he served as a political officer at the United States Embassy, with a second extended stay

as Fulbright lecturer at the University of Madagascar, from 1999 until 2000. He is the author of *Madagascar: Conflicts of Authority in the Great Island* and *Security and Nationalism in the Indian Ocean*. It would be hard to find better qualified specialists, who not only have a mastery of the facts and figures but more importantly have developed an obvious affinity for this unique and fascinating country.

Jon Woronoff  
Series Editor

## Acknowledgments

This second edition of the *Historical Dictionary of Madagascar* was prepared with substantial help from a number of expert sources. I am particularly indebted to Andrianaivo Rajaona of the Francophone Agency in Paris for his patient, sage advice, both substantive and procedural, on matters of Malagasy jurisprudence and political culture. At the Université d'Aix-Marseille's Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur les Sociétés de l'Océan Indien (CERSOI), I was able to consult not only the archives of the Centre's authoritative *Annuaire des pays de l'Océan Indien (APOI)* but also its distinguished research fellows, including Rajaona and center director Hubert Gerbeau. Isabelle Verdier, who prepared the series *Les Hommes au Pouvoir* for Indigo Press in Paris, has also been particularly helpful, as were a host of correspondents in Madagascar and France, notably Solange Razafimbelo-Harisoa, Ginette Randriambeloma, Jackie Lamour, Lalao Ramandimbilahatra, Ros and Peter Metcalf, and Brice Lejambale.

On my home campus, I'm grateful to Frostburg State's provost, Steve Simpson, who appreciates that writing a book is equivalent to work, to a resourceful library staff under David Gillespie, and to Larry Orndorff for preparing the maps from my 1995 book. Thanks also to Alicia Northcraft, for the maps on pp. xxiii–xv.

If, despite such expertise, the doom of the *tsiny* should happen upon faults, failures, and follies in this text, it will inevitably land on the head of this most humble *vahaza* admirer of the Great Island.

Philip M. Allen



## Reader's Notes

Although earlier European visitors to Madagascar compiled vocabularies and even dictionaries, the first systematic transcription of Malagasy into the Latin alphabet was undertaken by missionaries from the London Missionary Society after their arrival in Antananarivo in 1820. Consonants in Malagasy have the same pronunciation as consonants in English, with some exceptions. *G* is always hard; *J* is pronounced *dz*, *S* is softened to a sound between *s* and *sh*, and *Z* is a soft *zh*. When *G* and *K* are preceded by *I* or *Y*, the vowel is sounded after as well as before the consonant, giving a sound like that of *Y* in “yellow.”

The pronunciation of vowels is more consistent than in English, since Radama I rejected the English practice of having one letter stand for more than one sound.

*A* is pronounced like the *a* in “father.”

*E* stands for a sound between the *e* in “get” and the *e* in “very.”

*I* is pronounced like the long *e* in “green.”

*O* is pronounced like the double *o* in “soon.”

*AI* is pronounced like the *i* in “like.”

*AO* stands for a sound between the *o* of “cow” and that of “row.”

*N* is an exception, sometimes representing a sound between the *ng* of “sing” and the *ny* of “canyon.”

Elision of syllables is common, particularly final vowels as well as *an* and *in* in the middle of a word. Thus, for example, “Merina” is pronounced to rhyme with “cairne,” with a breath but not a voiced sound on the final vowel.

Malagasy surnames are particularly difficult for Westerners, for they signify proverbial or aspirational qualities. Although the advent of Christianity resulted in the attribution of first names, historically and often today Malagasy tend to have only one name in its complex form.



They also have options to reverse the order of first and surnames, to hyphenate them, or to use what seems to be a first name as their surname. For instance, the important contemporary politician Manandafy Rakotonirina is known as often as “Manandafy” as he is by his surname.

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADM	Alliance Démocratique Malgache (Malagasy Democratic Alliance)
AEOM	Association des Etudiants d'Origine Malgache (Association of Students of Malagasy Origin)
AFFA	Asa, Fahamarinana, Fampandrosoana, Arindra (Action, Truth, Progress, Harmony)
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act (USA)
AKFM	Antokon'ny Kongresin'ny Fahaleovantenan'I Madagasikara (Independence Congress Party of Madagascar)
ANP	Assemblée Nationale Populaire (National People's Assembly)
AREMA	Avant-garde de la Révolution Malgache (Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution); <i>subsequently</i> Aro sy Riana Enti-Manavotra an'i Madagasikara / Association pour la Rénovation de Madagascar (Association for the Renewal of Madagascar)
AU	African Union
AVI	Asa Vita Ifampitsarana (A Person Is Judged by Work)
CAR	Collectivités Autochtones Rurales (Indigenous Rural Communities)
CFV	Comité des Forces Vives (Committee of Vital Forces)
CGT	Confédération Générale du Travail (General Confederation of Labor)
CIS	Central Intelligence Service (Malagasy agency with English title)
CMD	Conseil Militaire pour le Développement (Military Council for Development)
CNOE	Comité National pour l'Observation des Elections (National Election Observation Committee)


CNP	Congrès National Populaire (National Popular Congress)
CNPD	Conseil National Populaire du Développement (National People's Development Council)
CNRES	Comité National de Redressement Economique et Social (National Committee for Economic and Social Recovery)
COSOMA	Comité de Solidarité de Madagascar (Committee for Solidarity with Madagascar)
CRAM	Communes Rurales Automes Modernisés (Modernized Indigenous Rural Community)
CRN	Comité de Réconciliation Nationale (Committee for National Reconciliation)
CSI	Conseil Supérieur des Institutions (Higher Council of Institutions)
CSR	Conseil Suprême de la Révolution (Supreme Council of the Revolution)
DGIDIE	Directoire Général d'Investigation et de Documentation intérieure et extérieure (General Directorate for Internal and External Investigation and Documentation)
DM	Directoire Militaire (Military Directorate)
DRM	Democratic Republic of Madagascar
EDF	European Development Fund
EEM	Electricité et Eau de Madagascar (Electricity and Water [Company] of Madagascar)
EPZ	Export Processing Zones
ESAF	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (IMF)
EU	European Union
FAEM	Fédération des Associations des Etudiants Malgaches (Federation of Associations of Malagasy Students)
FDM	Front Démocratique Malgache (Malagasy Democratic Front)
FFKM	Fikombonan'ny Fiangonana Kristiana eto Madagasikara (Council of Christian Churches of Madagascar)
FIDES	Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social (Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development)

FISEMA	Firaisan'ny Sendika eran'i Madagasikara (Federation of [Labor] Unions of Madagascar)
FJKM	Fiangonan'i Jesosy Kristy eto Madagasikara (Church of Jesus Christ in Madagascar)
FMG	Franc Malgache (Malagasy franc)
FNDR	Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution (National Front for the Defense of the Revolution)
FNM	Front National Malgache (Malagasy National Front)
FRS	Forces Républicaines de Sécurité (Republican Security Forces)
GEC	Groupe d'Etudes Communistes (Group for Communist Studies)
GMP	Groupe Mobile de Police (Mobile Police Group)
GRAD Iloafo	Groupe de Réflexion et d'Action pour le Développement de Madagascar (Study and Action Group for the Development of Madagascar)
HAE	Haute Autorité d'Etat (High State Authority)
HBM	Herim-Bahoaka Mitambatra (Union of the People's Vital Forces)
HCC	Haute Cour Constitutionnelle (High Constitutional Court)
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (World Bank)
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
IDA	International Development Agency (World Bank)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ILO	International Labor Organization
JINA	Jeunesse Nationale (National Youth)
JIRAMA	Jiro sy Rano ny Madagasikara (Electricity and Water [company] of Madagascar)
KIM	Komity Iraisan'ny Mpitolona (United Action Committee)
KMMR	<i>originally</i> Komity Mpanohana an'i Marc Ravalomanana (Committee to Support Marc Ravalomanana); <i>subsequently</i> Komity Miaro ny Marina sy ny Rariny (Committee for the Defense of Truth and Justice)
LMS	London Missionary Society

MDRM	Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache (Democratic Movement for Malagasy Renewal)
MFM	Mpitolona ho amin'ny Fanjakan'ny Madinika (Movement for Power to the [Little] People); <i>subsequently</i> Mpitolona Fanavaozan'i Madagasikara (Militants for the Progress of Madagascar)
MMSM	Mouvement Militant pour le Socialisme Malgache (Militant Movement for Malagasy Socialism)
MONIMA	<i>Originally</i> Mouvement National pour l'Indépendance de Madagascar (National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar); <i>since 1967</i> Madagasikara Otronin'ny Malagasy (Madagascar Guided by Malagasy)
MORENA	Mouvement de la Rénovation Malgache (Movement for Malagasy Renewal)
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCAM	Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (African-Malagasy Common Organization)
OMNIS	<i>originally</i> Office Militaire National pour les Industries Stratégiques (National Military Bureau for Strategic Industries); <i>subsequently</i> Office des Mines Nationales et des Industries Stratégiques (Bureau of National Mines and Strategic Industries)
OMPIRA	Office Militaire pour la Production Agricole (Military Bureau for Agricultural Production)
ORSTOM	Office pour la Recherche Scientifique et Technique d'Outre-Mer (Bureau for Overseas Scientific and Technical Research)
PADESM	Parti des Dshérités de Madagascar (Party of the Disinherited of Madagascar)
PDM	Parti Démocratique Malgache (Malagasy Democratic Party)
PLC	Parti Libéral Chrétien (Christian Liberal Party)
PRGF	Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (IMF)
PROCOOP	Promotion Coopérative (Advancement of Cooperatives)
PSD	Parti Social Démocrate (Social Democratic Party)

PSM	Parti Socialiste Malgache (Malagasy Socialist Party)
RCM	Rassemblement Chrétien de Madagascar (Christian Assembly of Madagascar)
RNM	Rassemblement National Malgache (Malagasy National Assembly)
RPM	Rassemblement du Peuple Malgache (Assembly of the Malagasy People)
RPSD	Rassemblement pour la Social-Démocratie (Assembly for Social Democracy)
RP3R	Ralliement pour la Troisième République (Rally for the Third Republic)
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SDR	Special Drawing Rights (IMF)
SECESS	Syndicat d'Enseignants et Chercheurs de l'Enseignement Supérieur (Union of Teachers and Researchers in Higher Education)
SECREN	Société d'Etudes de Construction et de Réparations Navales (Society for the Study of Naval Construction and Repair)
SEKRIMA	Sendika Kristiana Malagasy (Malagasy Christian [Labor] Union)
SEREMA	Sendika Revolisionara Malagasy (Malagasy Revolutionary [Labor] Union)
SINPA	Société d'Intérêt National de Commercialisation des Produits Agricoles (National Society for the Marketing of Agricultural Products)
SIRAMA	Siramamy Malagasy (Malagasy Sugar Company)
SMOTIG	Service de la Main-d'Oeuvre des Travaux d'Intérêt Général (Labor Service for Public Works)
SOMALAC	Société Malgache du Lac Alaotra (Malagasy Lake Alaotra Company)
SOMASAK	Société Malgache de la Sakay (Malagasy Sakay Company)
SONACO	Société Nationale de Commerce Extérieur (National Foreign Trade Company)
SOSUMAV	Société Sucrière de Madagascar (Sugar Company of Madagascar)

SPDUN	Solidarité Parlementaire pour la Défense de l'Unité Nationale (Parliamentary Solidarity for the Preservation of National Unity)
TIM	Tiako-i-Madagasikara (I Love Madagascar)
TTS	Tanora Tonga Saina (Youth Aware of Responsibilities)
UAM	Union Africaine et Malgache (African and Malagasy Union)
UDECMA	Union des Chrétiens de Madagascar (Christian Union of Madagascar)
UDSM	Union Démocratique et Sociale de Madagascar (Malagasy Democratic and Social Union)
UEM	Union des Etudiants Malgaches (Union of Malagasy Students)
UESM	Union des Etudiants Socialistes Malgaches (Union of Malagasy Socialist Students)
UIT	Union des Indépendants de Tananarive (Union of Independents of Tananarive)
UN	United Nations
UNAM	<i>originally</i> Union des Autochtones Malgaches (Union of Malagasy Natives); <i>subsequently</i> Union Nationale Malgache (Malagasy National Union)
UNDD	Union Nationale pour le Développement et la Démocratie (National Union for Development and Democracy)
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNIUM	Union des Intellectuels et Universitaires Malgaches (Union of Malagasy Intellectuals and Academics)
UPM	Union des Peuples Malgaches (Union of the Malagasy Peoples)
USDM	Union des Sociaux Démocrates de Madagascar (Social Democratic Union of Madagascar)
USM	Union Socialiste Malgache (Malagasy Socialist Union)
Vonjy	Vonjy Iray Tsy Mivaky (Salvation in Unity)
VVS	Vy Vato Sakelika (Iron Stone Network)
ZOAM	Zatovo Orin'asa Anivon'ny Madagasikara (Young Unemployed of Madagascar)
ZWAM	Zatovo Western Andevo Malagasy (Young Slave Cowboys of Madagascar)




Map 1. Madagascar and Surrounding Region.





**Map 2. Ethnic Groups of Madagascar.**



Map 3. Provinces and Cities of Madagascar.



## Chronology

**c.400 A.D.** Human settlement of Madagascar begins, probably by Afro-Indonesians following trade routes along South Asia, Northeast Africa, and Comoro Islands. Succeeding this original population (known in Malagasy lore as *Vazimba*), a second wave of neo-Indonesians arrives between the 8th and 12th centuries, migrating inland to the central highlands (Imerina).

**Before 1000** Islamic settlements along the north coast enter into the trading networks of the western Indian Ocean. On Arab maps, a large island appears off the east coast of Africa under the names Waqwaq and Komr.

**15th century** The Sakalava begin to form kingdoms in the west under the Maroserana dynasty. Merina kingdoms begin to form in the interior.

**1500** Diogo Diaz sights Madagascar.

**1506** Tristan da Cunha explores the large bay in the far north, later named Diégo Suarez Bay (now Antsiranana), for Portuguese Admirals Diogo Diaz and Fernando Suarez.

**late 16th century** The Sakalava kingdom of Menabe is established.

**mid-17th century** The Sakalava kingdom of Boina is established.

**1642** The French found a settlement at Fort-Dauphin (Taolagnaro) in the southeast.

**1645–1646** A British attempt to settle Saint Augustine Bay in the southwest fails.

**1674** The French abandon Fort-Dauphin.

**1685–1730** Pirates occupy the seas around Madagascar and settle on Ile Sainte-Marie, as well as Antongil Bay, Diégo-Suarez Bay, and Saint Augustine Bay.

**late 17th century** The Betsileo kingdom of Lalaingina is established on the southern highlands.

**early 18th century** The Betsileo kingdom of Isandra is established in the southeastern highlands.

**1712** Ratsimilaho begins construction of the Betsimisaraka Confederation on the east coast.

**1745** Mahajanga becomes the capital of the Boina Sakalava dynasty.

**1750** Queen Beti (daughter of Ratsimilaho) signs Ile Sainte-Marie over to the French.

**1774** Hungarian Count Maurice Benyowski attempts to found a settlement at Antongil Bay.

**c.1783** Andrianampoinimerina overthrows his uncle Andrianjafy and becomes ruler of Ambohimanga in the central highlands.

**1786** Benyowski is killed by a French expedition at Antongil Bay.

**c.1793** Andrianampoinimerina captures Antananarivo, future capital of the Merina Empire.

**late 18th century** The Betsileo kingdom of Isandra becomes part of the Merina Empire.

**1810** Andrianampoinimerina dies. He is succeeded by his son, Radama I.

**1815** The Betsileo kingdom of Lalaingina becomes part of the Merina Empire.

**1817** The Merina occupy Toamasina. **October:** Radama and Sir Robert Farquhar, governor of Mauritius, sign a treaty of friendship.

**1820** **December:** The first missionaries from the London Missionary Society arrive at Antananarivo.

**1824** The Merina occupy Mahajanga. King Andriantsoly of the Boina Sakalava flees.

**1826** The Zanamalata leaders of the Betsimisaraka Confederation rebel against the Merina Empire and are defeated.

**1828** Radama I dies. After internal struggles his first wife becomes Queen Ranavalona I.

**1831** Jean Laborde is shipwrecked on the east coast; he makes his way to Antananarivo and becomes indispensable as architect, engineer, and general contractor to the monarchy.

**1835** Ranavalona I bans the practice of Christianity in Madagascar and expels the missionaries.

**1836** The Tanala kingdom of Ikongo rebels against Merina rule.

**1837** Queen Ranavalona sends a diplomatic mission to London and Paris.

**1840** Sakalava Queen Tsiomeko negotiates a French protectorate over Nosy Be with the governor of Réunion, Admiral de Hell, in 1841.

**1845 June:** British and French ships bombard Toamasina.

**1855** Prince Rakoto, son of Queen Ranavalona, later to rule as Radama II, signs a charter granting territory in Madagascar to Joseph Lambert.

**1861 August:** Queen Ranavalona dies and is succeeded by her son, Radama II. The ban on Christianity and the exclusion of Europeans are lifted and the court comes under strong influence by French and British tradesmen, counselors, and missionaries.

**1863 12 May:** Radama II is assassinated in reaction against his European proclivities. He is succeeded by his wife, who rules as Queen Rasoherina. Her government denounces the Lambert Charter; France demands the payment of an indemnity to Lambert.

**1863–1864** The Merina monarchy sends a mission to Europe. It agrees to payment of the indemnity to Lambert.

**1864** Rainilaiarivony, a member of the influential Andafiavaratra clan, becomes prime minister of Madagascar. He will retain the post for 31 years and the term for his family's Hova (commoner) status is employed incorrectly by Europeans and Americans to characterize the monarchy itself.

**1866 January:** The Lambert Charter is publicly burned.

**1867** The United States and the Merina Empire sign a trade agreement.

**1868** Queen Rasoherina dies. She is succeeded by Queen Ranavalona II. Rainilaiarivony continues as prime minister and as the queen's consort.

**1869 February:** Ranavalona II announces her conversion to Protestant Christianity; the entire Merina court becomes Christian.

**1878 27 December:** Jean Laborde dies. His will leaves his property in Madagascar to two French nephews.

**1879** The Malagasy government refuses to recognize the Laborde legacy.

**1881** The United States and the Merina Empire sign a second treaty of trade and friendship. **29 March:** The Code of 305 Articles forbids the sale of Malagasy land to foreigners. **November:** Flags of the Merina are planted on the northwest coast of Madagascar. The French demand their removal.

**1882 June:** The French remove the Merina flags from the northwest coast. **October:** The Merina government sends a mission to Paris. **November:** Negotiations with the French government break down. **December:** The French decide to send a naval expedition to Madagascar.

**1883** The treaty between the United States and Madagascar is promulgated. **16 May:** Admiral Pierre captures Mahajanga. **10 June:** Pierre takes Toamasina. **13 July:** Ranavalona II dies. She is succeeded by Ranavalona III, with Rainilaiarivony continuing as prime minister and the queen's consort. **November:** Negotiations begin between France and the Merina government.

**1884 March:** The negotiations between France and the Merina monarchy break down.

**1885 August:** Negotiations resume between Paris and Antananarivo. **17 December:** A Franco-Malagasy treaty establishes a French protectorate over the Merina territory (more than two-thirds of the island). Disputes over interpretation of the treaty begin immediately.

**1890** In a Franco-British Convention, London recognizes the French understanding of its protectorate over Madagascar in exchange for French recognition of the British protectorate over Zanzibar.

**1894 January:** The French Chamber of Deputies authorizes the conquest of Madagascar. **October:** Le Myre de Vilers is sent to Antananarivo to present an ultimatum to Rainilaiarivony. **27 October:** Le Myre de Vilers rejects the Merina counterproposals and returns to Toamasina. **16 November:** The French Chamber of Deputies votes funds for the invasion of Madagascar. **12 December:** The second Franco-Malagasy war begins with the occupation of Toamasina.

**1895 January:** French forces arrive at Mahajanga. **30 September:** Antananarivo is captured. **October:** Queen Ranaivalona III signs a treaty establishing a French Protectorate over Madagascar. Rainilaiarivony is arrested and exiled to Algiers. **22 November:** The revolt of the Menalamba begins with the killing of a missionary family.

**1896 6 August:** The Annexation Law declares Madagascar a French possession. **26 September:** Slavery is abolished. **27 September:** General Joseph Gallieni arrives to restore order. Ranaivalona III is removed from the throne. **15 October:** Gallieni accuses the uncle of the queen, Prince Ratsimamanga, and her minister of the interior, Rainandriamampandry, of directing the Menalamba rising. They are executed.

**1897** French forces occupy Ihosy, in Bara territory. The Bara revolt. **February:** Ranaivalona III is exiled to Réunion and then to Algiers. **May:** Insurrection in the south spreads. **June:** Menalamba leader Rabezavana surrenders. **August:** King Toera of the Menabe Sakalava is killed.

**1898 February:** Menalamba leader Rabozaka surrenders.

**1899–1902** The Tanala in the east and the Mahafaly in the south rebel against French rule.

**1900** The French begin fortifications at Diégo-Suarez Bay.

**1904** The insurrection in the south is considered overcome. Forced labor is introduced.

**1912** Pastor Ravelojaona publishes a series of articles on Japan and the Japanese, discussing the possibility of modernization without abandoning national culture.



**1913** The nationalist organization Vy Vato Sakelika (VVS) is formed at the Befelatanana Medical School in Antananarivo.

**1914** Over 40,000 Malagasy are mobilized by Governor-General Hubert Garbit to fight in World War I.

**1915 24 December:** The leaders of VVS are arrested.

**1920** In Paris Jean Ralaimongo founds the Ligue Française pour l'Accession des Indigènes de Madagascar aux Droits des Citoyens Français.

**1921** The VVS prisoners are amnestied.

**1924** Délégations Economiques et Financières are established, with some elected Malagasy members.

**1926** The Service de la Main-d'Oeuvre pour les Travaux d'Intérêt Général (SMOTIG) is created.

**1929 19 May:** A demonstration outside the Excelsior Theater in Antananarivo demands an end to colonialism and leads to the arrest of several nationalist figures, including Jean Ralaimongo.

**1930** Ralaimongo and Joseph Ravoahangy are placed under house arrest. **December:** The Cayla Decree gives the administration the right to suppress opposition to the colonial regime.

**1936** The Popular Front government amnesties Ralaimongo and Ravoahangy and abolishes the SMOTIG.

**1937** Malagasy who can speak and read French are entitled to join trade unions.

**1939** Some 15,000 Malagasy are mobilized to fight for France in World War II.

**1940 June:** At the fall of France, Governor-General Marcel De Coppet declares first for the Free French and then for the Vichy regime. Under Vichy administrators, many of the restrictions eliminated in 1936–1937 are reintroduced.

**1941** The secret nationalist society PANAMA (Parti Nationaliste Malgache) is formed.

**1942 May:** British forces invade Madagascar. **November:** The French forces surrender.

**1943–1944 January 1943:** Madagascar is returned to the Free French, who call up 28,000 Malagasy; the new regime establishes the Office du Riz. The secret nationalist society JINA (Jeunesse Nationale) is formed.

**1945 21 October:** Ravoahangy and Joseph Raseta are elected delegates to the first Constituent Assembly of the Fourth French Republic.

**1946 February:** Raseta, Ravoahangy, and Jacques Rabemananjara form the Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache (MDRM) in Paris. **April:** Forced labor, the Indigénat, and the Office du Riz are abolished. **2 June:** Ravoahangy and Raseta are reelected to the second Constituent Assembly of the Fourth French Republic. The Parti des Dshérités de Madagascar (PADESM) is formed, with French encouragement, to oppose the MDRM. **October:** The constitution of the Fourth French Republic makes no provision for eventual independence for France’s overseas territories. **October–November:** Madagascar is divided into five provinces. **10 November:** Raseta, Ravoahangy, and Rabemananjara are elected Madagascar’s deputies to the French National Assembly.

**1947 Night of 29–30 March:** The anticolonial Rebellion of 1947 breaks out. **April–July:** The three MDRM deputies lose their parliamentary immunity and are arrested for allegedly instigating the rebellion.

**1948 19 July:** Samuel Rakotondrabe, accused by the French of being the “generalissimo” of the Rebellion of 1947, is executed. **22 July:** Accused conspirators in the rebellion go on trial at Antananarivo. **4 October:** Raseta and Ravoahangy are sentenced to death, Rabemananjara to life with hard labor.

**1949 July:** The death sentences delivered in the Tananarive Trial are commuted to life imprisonment.

**1950 September:** The MDRM deputies are transferred to prison in Corsica.

**1955 September:** The MDRM deputies are transferred to assigned residence in France. **15 November:** The French National Assembly authorizes elections with universal suffrage under a single college system.

**1956 2 January:** Philibert Tsiranana, former PADESM member and future president of the First Republic, is elected to the French National Assembly. **23 June:** The Loi-Cadre provides a degree of internal autonomy for France's African colonies and for the abolition of the college system at the territorial level. Diégo-Suarez becomes Madagascar's sixth province. **18 November:** Municipal elections are held. **December:** Tsiranana and other coastal leaders create the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD).

**1957** The Union Démocratique et Sociale de Madagascar (UDSM) is created by Norbert Zafimahova. **30 March:** Elections to the provincial assemblies are held. **13–19 May:** Provincial assemblies elect delegates to the territorial assembly in Antananarivo. **27 May:** Tsiranana is elected vice president of the Loi-Cadre Governing Council.

**1958 2–4 May:** The Tamatave Congress of nationalist parties demands immediate independence; some of those parties merge to form the AKFM (Congress Party). **July:** Monja Jaona creates the Mouvement National pour l'Indépendance de Madagascar (MONIMA). **28 September:** In the empire-wide referendum, Madagascar ratifies the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic by 78 percent of the vote. The PSD and UDSM, which favored ratification, join in the Cartel des Républicains. **15 October:** A constituent assembly composed of members of the provincial assemblies meets in Antananarivo to discuss the future status of the island. It votes in favor of autonomy within the French Community. **15 October:** High Commissioner André Soucadaux announces abrogation of the Annexation Law of 1896.

**1959 April:** The constituent assembly adopts a presidential constitution. **1 May:** Tsiranana is elected president by the assembly, replacing Zafimahova. **11 October:** In municipal elections, the AKFM's Richard Andriamanjato, a Protestant pastor, becomes mayor of Antananarivo. **December:** Madagascar asks for full independence.

**1960 26 June:** Full independence is proclaimed. The MDRM deputies return from Paris; Ravoahangy and Rabemananjara take portfolios in Tsiranana's government; Raseta joins the opposition. **27 June:** The Cooperation Agreements with France are signed. **4 September:** In elections to the new National Assembly, the PSD wins 75 of 107 seats; its allied parties obtain 29 additional seats, leaving the opposition AKFM with

three, all of them from Antananarivo. Following strictly pro-Western policy options, and with help from France, the Tsiranana government implements its development agenda by decree (ordonnance).

**1965 30 March:** Tsiranana is reelected president, against Raseta, by direct popular vote, with over 90 percent of the vote. **8 August:** In elections to the National Assembly, the PSD wins 104 of 107 seats; the AKFM retains its three Antananarivo seats.

**1967** The regime begins to cultivate economic ties with South Africa.

**1970 January:** Tsiranana suffers a stroke at a meeting of the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM) in Yaoundé and is hospitalized in Paris. **May:** Tsiranana returns to Madagascar. **6 September:** In elections to the National Assembly the PSD retains its 104 seats and the AKFM its three Antananarivo seats.

**1971 17 February:** Tsiranana forms a new government and demotes his powerful first vice president and long-time minister of the interior, André Resampa, to the Ministry of Agriculture. **March:** A strike at Befelatanana Medical School spreads to other parts of the university. The university is closed on 25 March. **April:** The government-hosted National Development days bring together the PSD, the AKFM, and representatives of other groups in Antananarivo. **1–2 April:** A peasant uprising breaks out in the south and is suppressed with many deaths. Monja Jaona goes into hiding but is arrested on **23 April** and claims sole responsibility for the uprising. By **27 April**, 454 have been arrested and sent to prison on Nosy Lava. **May:** Resampa is ousted as secretary-general of the PSD. **30 May:** A foreign embassy, understood to be that of the United States, is accused of attempted subversion. **1 June:** Resampa is arrested. **October:** The government announces discovery of a plot by ORSTOM (Office pour la Recherche Scientifique et Technique d’Outre-Mer) scientists.

**1972 January:** Students at Befelatanana Medical School again go on strike. **30 January:** Tsiranana is reelected president, as sole candidate, with 99.9 percent of the vote. **12–13 May:** The Forces Républicaines de Sécurité (FRS) stage an overnight raid on the campus of the University of Madagascar and on ZOAM (unemployed youth) posts in the Isotry neighborhood of Antananarivo. Over 300 are arrested and sent to Nosy Lava. In the morning a crowd gathers in front of the Hôtel de Ville. In

the afternoon the FRS fires on the demonstrators, who counterattack. **14 May:** A procession marches to the presidential palace to demand the return of the deportees and the dissolution of the FRS. It is turned back and returns to the Hôtel de Ville, which it attacks and burns to the ground. **15 May:** Crowds return to the Place de l'Hôtel de Ville and are joined by representatives of the Christian churches, AKFM, and labor unions. Colonel Richard Ratsimandrava, head of the gendarmerie, advises Tsiranana that the armed forces will not fire on the crowd. **16 May:** The deportees are returned. Tsiranana threatens to send the FRS back into the crowd. **17 May:** The crowds return to the Place de l'Hôtel de Ville, demanding Tsiranana's resignation. The French embassy announces that the French troops at Ivato airport will intervene only to save French lives and property. **18 May:** Tsiranana gives full powers to General Gabriel Ramanantsoa. **23 June:** The new government breaks ties with South Africa and cancels the agreements with Pretoria. **26 June:** The abolition of the head tax is announced. **September:** The Congrès National Populaire at Antananarivo breaks down into quarrels between radical and conservative factions of the movement's Action Committee (KIM). **October and November:** Diplomatic relations are established with the Soviet Union, People's Republic of China, and North Korea. **December:** The MFM (Militants for Proletarian Power) emerges out of the KIM. **December 1972 to April 1973:** Coastal city populations stage riots and strikes in favor of Tsiranana, the PSD, and their pro-French policies.

**1973 January:** Negotiations begin with France for a revision of the Cooperation Agreements. The Vonjy Iray Tsy Mivaky (Vonjy) party is founded. **May:** Madagascar withdraws from the Franc Zone and from OCAM. **4 June:** New Cooperation Agreements reduce the French role in Madagascar. **21 October:** The Conseil National Populaire du Développement is elected; the MFM boycotts the elections. French troops leave Diégo-Suarez and Ivato.

**1974 March:** Tsiranana and Resampa, now reconciled, create the Parti Socialiste Malgache (PSM), a rebirth of their PSD. **31 December:** A coup attempt, organized by Colonel Brécharid Rajaonarison, is discovered. Rajaonarison and his supporters flee to the Antanimoro military camp outside Antananarivo.

**1975 25 January:** Ramanantsoa dissolves his government and is unable to form another. **5 February:** Ramanantsoa names Richard Ratsi-

mandrava chief of state. **11 February:** Ratsimandrava is assassinated, and three members of the Groupe Mobile de Police (GMP) are arrested at the scene. The Directoire Militaire is formed and martial law is declared. **13–14 February:** The Antanimoro camp is occupied and pillaged by an Antananarivo mob, as is the headquarters of the PSM. **21 March:** The “Trial of the Century,” of suspects in the Ratsimandrava assassination, begins. **16 April:** Once powerful Col. Roland Rabetafika is added to the defendants in the trial. **17 May:** Amnesty is granted to 260 defendants. **12 June:** The three members of the GMP found at the scene are given prison sentences. Charges against the remaining defendants are dismissed. **15 June:** The Directoire Militaire announces its selection of Navy Captain Didier Ratsiraka as president. He proposes the formation of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar (DRM) and the nationalization of banks, insurance companies, and the film distribution network. **30 June:** The state takes 51 percent participation in the Société des Transports Maritimes, the Société Malgache de Raffinage, and the Compagnie Marseillaise de Madagascar. **July:** The United States NASA tracking station at Imerintsiasosika is closed. **21 December:** A referendum ratifies the creation of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar and the selection of Ratsiraka as president by 94.6 percent of the vote. The official beginning of the Second Republic (DRM) is declared on 30 December.

**1976** The Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution (FNDR) is created to include all parties endorsing the revolutionary republic. **13 January:** The Conseil Suprême de la Révolution (CSR) is established. **March:** The regime party, Avant-Garde de la Révolution Malgache (AREMA), is established within the FNDR. **26 July:** Five years of education at the primary level are made free and compulsory. **30 July:** Prime Minister Joel Rakotomalala is killed in a helicopter accident. He is succeeded by Justin Rakotonjainina on **12 August**. **21 August:** Technical schools in Antananarivo go on strike. **10–11 September:** The Palace of Andafiavaratra (known as the Prime Minister’s palace) is burned during night riots. Two American diplomats are expelled, and the MFM is proscribed. **9 October:** The FNDR accepts membership by the AKFM and Vonjy. **20 December:** Attacks on Comorians in Mahajanga lead to a mass evacuation. **27 December:** An ordinance creates the Decentralized Communities system of local government. The FNDR accepts the application of the Union des Chrétiens de Madagascar for membership;

MONIMA joins without applying for membership. **29 December:** The FNDR officially comes into existence. MFM leaders arrested in September are amnestied.

**1977 January:** A plane from South Africa lands without permission at the Mananjary airport, stirring rumors of conspiracy. **20 March to 29 May:** Elections are held in the decentralized communities with sweeping victories for AREMA. Monja Jaona denounces the regime for electoral fraud and calls for annulment of the results; his MONIMA leaves the FNDR in June but in August MONIMA splits into Monima Ka Miviombio (Monja Jaona's faction) and Vondrona Sozialista Monima; the latter rejoins the FNDR. **24 May:** An ordinance establishes the Assemblée Nationale Populaire (ANP), the DRM's parliament. **May to July:** Secondary schools are on strike, precipitating riots in Antananarivo, clashes between students and ZOAM youth, and the looting of Indo-Pakistani businesses. **30 June:** Elections are held to the ANP; MONIMA refuses to participate, as does the MFM, but on **30 July** Manandafy Rakotonirina brings the MFM into the FNDR and joins the CSR. **31 July:** Justin Rakotoniaina is replaced as prime minister by Colonel Désiré Rakotoarijaona. **16 September:** The army is placed on alert after mysterious plane flights over the island, attributed to South Africa. **October:** Three army officers are arrested for conspiring with South Africa against the regime. Befelatanana Medical School is closed. Ratsiraka announces the beginning of the All-Out Investment policy, to be financed by "omnidirectional" borrowing.

**1978 January:** In a secret trial, the pilot and passengers of a plane from South Africa are given sentences of three years in prison for landing in Madagascar without clearance. **April:** The First Conference of Progressive Forces of the Indian Ocean is held at Antananarivo.

**1979 August:** A civil servants' strike over administrative reforms is put down by the police.

**1980** Madagascar approaches the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a loan to cover a balance-of-payments deficit. Relations with the United States are restored at the ambassadorial level. **March:** Ratsiraka announces the discovery of a plot to destabilize the regime and assassinate him. **October:** Riots break out in Antananarivo's impoverished

Isotry district. **November:** Monja Jaona is arrested in Antananarivo. **December:** Riots and looting of shops continue in Antananarivo.

**1980–1981** The University of Madagascar is on strike.

**1981 January:** Madagascar again approaches the IMF for relief from its growing international debt. **3–4 February:** Riots in Antananarivo lead to six deaths and to the arrests of students and professors. **March:** Monja Jaona is released from house arrest and returns to the FNDR. The first standby agreement with the IMF is signed. **May:** Madagascar's creditors agree to reschedule the debt due between January 1981 and January 1982. **End of June, July:** The strike at the university ends with discharges for staff arrested in February. **September:** Ratsiraka undertakes a state visit to France. **November:** Riots at Antananarivo lead to the intervention of the army. **December:** Oil exploration contracts are signed with Mobil Oil and Occidental Petroleum. **9–10 December:** Riots and looting resume in Antananarivo.

**1982 10 January:** Ratsiraka schedules presidential elections for November and announces his own candidacy for a second term. **15 January:** A government change ejects members of the "right-wing AREMA." **25 January:** Another assassination plot against Ratsiraka and members of the government is announced; five colonels and other members of the armed forces, as well as civil servants and priests, are arrested. **3 February:** A cyclone leaves 60,000 without shelter in Antananarivo. **February to March:** Disorders occur in the northwest, especially on Nosy Be. Crowds attack government and AREMA officials for corruption, forcing many of them, including the president of the province of Antsiranana, to flee; more rioting erupts on their return. **May:** A clash between the gendarmerie and peasants at Bezizika in Toliara province leaves 200 to 300 dead. **17 May:** The Malagasy franc is devalued. **June:** Members of a suspected illegal vanilla trafficking ring are arrested in Antsiranana province. A new financial stabilization agreement is signed with the IMF. The Malagasy franc is devalued by 15 percent. **25 July:** Monja Jaona declares that he will run against Ratsiraka for president. **7 November:** In the presidential elections, Ratsiraka receives 80.17 percent of the vote, Monja Jaona 19.83 percent. **27 November:** Monja Jaona claims fraud and demands that the High Institutional Court annul the elections. **November:** Three members of the



MFM are convicted for instigating the riots on Nosy Be and are sentenced to four years on Nosy Lava. **December:** France and Madagascar begin discussions for the resumption of military cooperation. **14 December:** Monja Jaona seizes the Antananarivo radio station, denounces the regime for electoral fraud, and calls for a general strike; he is arrested and dismissed from the CSR. Riots break out in Antananarivo, Fianarantsoa, and several coastal cities.

**1983 January:** The World Bank names its first resident representative to Madagascar. **10–11 January:** Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Chester Crocker visits Madagascar for the 100th anniversary of the US-Malagasy friendship treaty. **27 February to 29 May:** Elections are held in the Decentralized Communities. **March:** Rakotovaorazakaboana, leader of the “right-wing AREMA,” is expelled from the party’s political bureau. At a meeting of the Nonaligned Movement, Ratsiraka declares that the socialist states are the natural allies of the Third World, but criticizes them for their failure to aid developing countries in the debt crisis. **April:** At the meeting of the World Bank’s consultative group for Madagascar in Paris, Minister of Finance Pascal Rakotomavo announces new measures for liberalizing the economy, including the end of a fixed price for rice. Vernon Walters, President Ronald Reagan’s roving ambassador, visits Madagascar. **28 August:** In parliamentary elections, AREMA obtains 115 of 137 ANP seats with less than 65 percent of the vote. Monja Jaona is released from house arrest and wins a seat in Antananarivo. **5 December:** Ratsiraka is promoted to admiral by the ANP.

**1984 March:** Following another stabilization agreement with the IMF, the Malagasy franc is devalued by 15 percent. **9–12 April:** A cyclone destroys 60 percent of the harbor installations at Mahajanga. **31 May:** The corpse of the leader of the president’s bodyguard, Colonel Kamisy, is found near gendarmerie headquarters at Antsirabe. **July:** Monja Jaona’s MONIMA Miviombio demands the dissolution of the government and the CSR. **August:** The government forbids the practice of martial arts. **5–8 September:** Kung Fu societies riot and burn the Ministry of Youth building. **November:** The London Club of private creditors agrees to refinance the Malagasy debt to 1990. **4–6 December:** Kung Fu militias attack the strongholds of the government’s Tanora Tonga Saina (TTS) youth association. **December:** Madagascar

is elected to the Security Council of the United Nations. The World Bank consultative group approves Madagascar's investment plan.

**1985 March:** On the 150th anniversary of the translation of the Bible into Malagasy, Ratsiraka declares his commitment to the evangelical lessons. **April:** The IMF approves a fourth standby credit and the World Bank authorizes a credit for industrial development. **22–23 May:** Madagascar's public creditors agree to reschedule debts due in 1985 and the first quarter of 1986. **31 July to 1 August:** The army attacks Kung Fu headquarters in Antananarivo, killing leader Pierre Mizael Andrianarijaona.

**1986 March:** A cyclone destroys 80 percent of the port of Toamasina. **May:** The IMF provides emergency relief and another standby credit; the Fund and the World Bank increase their assistance throughout the year. French is reintroduced as a language of instruction in the secondary schools. **June:** A new Investment Code is passed by the ANP. **August:** The Malagasy franc is devalued by 20 percent. **October:** Madagascar's public creditors agree to reschedule debts due in 1986 and 1987. **November:** There are riots in Antananarivo over the proposed reform of the education system and in Toamasina over food shortages and layoffs at the port. Students at the University of Madagascar begin a boycott of classes. The government postpones implementation of the reforms.

**1987 26 February:** Attacks on Indo-Pakistani traders begin in Antsirabe and spread to other provincial towns. Clashes with students at the University of Madagascar lead to the arrest and detention of six students. Over 40 students are arrested during the strike. **March:** Vonjy, MONIMA-Miviombio, and the MFM announce the formation of an opposition Alliance Démocratique Malagasy, but do not leave the FNDR. **March–April:** Several members of the CSR threaten to resign because of the handling of student unrest. **12 April:** The aftermath of a football game leads to rioting in Antananarivo. The government announces that classes will resume at the University of Madagascar on **27 April**. Students attempt to block the return to classes, and clashes between striking and non-striking students cause three deaths. **7 May:** Student leader Aimée Francis, adopted son of Monja Jaona, is arrested. **June:** The Malagasy franc is devalued by 41 percent. **August:** The IMF agrees to

an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) of SDR (Special Drawing Rights) 46.5 million. Madagascar's private creditors agree to reschedule debts coming due from 1992 to 1996. **November:** A Roman Catholic bishops' letter attacks the regime for its economic failures and for the growing gap between rich and poor. Ratsiraka announces the postponement of parliamentary and local elections. **December:** The ANP votes the budget for 1988. AREMA and the AKFM vote for the budget; Vonjy, MONIMA, and the MFM vote against it.

**1988 January:** The World Bank consultative group on Madagascar commends the government's economic policy and pledges further aid conditional on a rescheduling of debts by Madagascar's public creditors. **21 January:** Finance Minister Rakotomavo announces the closure of poorly functioning state corporations, including the foreign trade and agricultural export companies. **February:** Désirée Rakotoarijaona resigns as prime minister and is succeeded by Victor Ramahatra. A system of import liberalization is introduced, to take effect in July. **March:** 245 members of Kung Fu groups arrested in August 1985 are tried. Eighteen members are sentenced to two years in prison; the rest are released. **August:** At the MONIMA party congress in Toliara, speakers demand the resignation of the government, and Monja Jaona announces that he will run again for president. **October:** Madagascar becomes the second country after Mali to benefit from debt relief under the Toronto Plan.

**1989 January:** The Franco-Malagasy Joint Commission announces cancellation of one-third of Madagascar's debt to France. The World Bank begins to help people harmed by the structural adjustment programs. **3 March:** The World Bank and the IMF announce their support for a three-year economic development plan. **12 March:** Ratsiraka is re-elected with 62.6 percent of the vote. Manandafy Rakotonirina receives 19.57 percent, Jerome Razanabahiny-Marojama 14.83 percent, and Monja Jaona 2.97 percent. Richard Andriamanjato resigns from the AKFM and forms AKFM-Renouveau. **20 April:** The Alliance Démocratique holds a rally at the University to protest the election results. Riots in Antananarivo lead to five deaths and to calls for a general strike. **20 April:** Manandafy Rakotonirina is expelled from the CSR. **28 April:** The visit of Pope John Paul II allows a truce in the political turmoil. **28 May:** In elections for the Assemblée Nationale Populaire, AREMA

wins 66.8 percent of the vote but 119 of 137 seats. The MFM wins seven seats; Vonjy, three; the AKFM, three; Andriamanjato's AKFM-Renouveau, three; and MONIMA, one (Monja Jaona's seat). **25 July:** The government announces that it is in control of the situation after a group of soldiers attempts to seize the Antananarivo radio station. **17 August:** The government and the CSR are reshuffled; Monja Jaona and Gilbert Samson are reappointed. The FNDR meets to discuss changes in the constitution in response to demands by the Council of Malagasy Churches (FFKM) for the abolition of the FNDR and the removal of references to socialism in the constitution. **September:** In local government elections, AREMA maintains its dominant position. **October:** The MFM calls for a constitution without reference to socialism. Andriamanjato's AKFM-Renouveau announces that it will not support the regime in the government or in the CSR. **21 December:** The ANP abolishes the constitutional requirement that political parties belong to the FNDR, effectively ending the existence of the Front.

**1990 February:** Reforms to the education system are announced and meet resistance. **March:** The constitution is formally amended to allow the formation of parties outside the FNDR. **23 March:** The revival of the PSD is announced by André Resampa. Albert Zafy, Manandafy Rakotonirina, and Richard Andriamanjato form the Comité des Forces Vives, uniting the opposition to Didier Ratsiraka and his regime. Parties supporting President Ratsiraka form the Mouvement Militant pour le Socialisme Malgache (MMSM). **13 May:** Armed rebels seize the radio station in Antananarivo. Police put down the coup attempt, with three deaths. **August:** South Africa opens a trade office in Antananarivo and resumes air links with the island. To consecrate its conversion to liberal market ideology, the MFM changes its name to the Militants for the Progress of Madagascar, retaining the monogram.

**1991 31 January:** Ratsiraka proposes the creation of a bicameral legislature, with the CSR to be replaced by a senate. **February:** Ratsiraka reshuffles his government and removes his brother-in-law, Christophe Raveloson-Mahasampo, as minister of defense. **19 April:** South Africa and Madagascar sign a diplomatic agreement. **1 June:** Manandafy Rakotonirina and Richard Andriamanjato call for a national conference to draft a new constitution. **10, 11, 14 June:** Demonstrations in Antananarivo demand an end to the Democratic Republic and a new constitution. **20**

**June:** The Comité des Forces Vives proposes a provisional government with Francisque Ravony as prime minister. **July:** The opposition calls for a general strike, which takes place during the first two weeks of July. **16 July:** Opposition forces announce the formation of a new transitional “shadow” government, with General Jean Rakotoharison as president and Albert Zafy as prime minister. **22 July:** Supporters of the transitional government occupy six government ministries. Members of the transitional government, including Zafy, are arrested. Ratsiraka declares a state of emergency, but promises constitutional change and the formation of a new government of conciliation. **10 August:** Members of the presidential guard fire on a crowd of 400,000 demonstrators in front of the presidential palace in the Iavoloha suburb of Antananarivo. Estimates range from 12 to 130 killed. Zafy is wounded. Although there are no investigations and no trials, Ratsiraka is widely believed to have given the order to fire. The French government calls for a compromise between Ratsiraka and his opposition. Ratsiraka charges Guy Razanamasy, mayor of Antananarivo, with forming a new government. **26 August:** The Forces Vives refuse to participate in Razanamasy’s government and renew the general strike and demonstrations, demanding the removal of Ratsiraka from office. **September:** Strikes and demonstrations continue; negotiations begin between Ratsiraka and opposition leaders. **31 October:** The “Panorama Agreement,” named after the hotel where it was negotiated, calls for power sharing between opposition and regime representatives, preparing for a transition to a Third Republic, with Ratsiraka continuing as head of state and head of the army. The agreement establishes an Haute Autorité d’Etat (HAE), headed by Zafy, and a Comité de Redressement Economique et Social cochaired by Manandafy Rakotonirina and Andriamanjato. The Razanamasy government remains in place, but faces a “parallel power” in the streets. **7 November:** Zafy returns from a trip abroad to denounce the agreement for leaving Ratsiraka with too much power. **13 November:** Razanamasy announces the formation of a new government, including opposition members, with Ravony as deputy prime minister. **16 December:** Eleven members of the Razanamasy government resign. **19 December:** Razanamasy forms a new government, including representatives of the opposition.

**1992 9 January:** The 31 October Panorama Agreement is ratified, and the institutions for the transitional period set in place. These include the maintenance of Ratsiraka as president but not head of state (that be-

comes collectivized in the HAE) or of the armed forces. **22 March:** The National Forum, charged with drafting a new constitution begins its work. Supporters of Ratsiraka urge the creation of a federal state, which the Forum refuses to consider. Violent demonstrations force the forum to move to a military camp outside Antananarivo. **31 March:** The Forum ends its deliberations. **29 July:** An unsuccessful coup attempt occurs in Antananarivo. **19 August:** A referendum ratifies the constitution of the Third Republic. Supporters of a federal state disrupt the voting in Antsiranana and Toamasina. **9 October:** The army fires on pro-federalist demonstrators in Antsiranana, killing eight. Ratsiraka-appointed chiefs of Toliara, Toamasina, and Fianarantsoa provinces declare federal states. Federalist forces cut the railroad line between Toamasina and Antananarivo. A compromise allows Ratsiraka to run for president and, in exchange, obtains suspension of the federalist secessions and disturbances. **25 November:** In the first round of elections to the presidency of the Third Republic, the two front-runners are Albert Zafy, with 48 percent of the vote, and Didier Ratsiraka, with 28 percent.

**1993 10 February:** Runoff elections for the presidency of the Third Republic go to Zafy, with 67 percent of the votes; Ratsiraka has 33 percent; participation is over 80 percent; 7,000 observers (mostly Malagasy) confirm electoral regularity. **Early April:** Ratsiraka supporters engage in outbreaks of violence in Antsiranana. **16 June:** In elections to the National Assembly, apportioned among 57 unequal constituencies through a complicated procedure, a coalition of parties supporting President Zafy win 74 of the 138 seats. Participation is low, at 55.8 percent. Of 121 “party” lists (fielding over 4,000 candidates), 26 succeed in seating deputies. Zafy’s own Forces Vives Rasalama “cartel” directly commands only 46 seats, requiring continuing partnerships with other parties. The declared opposition seats 37 deputies, only five of whom belong to ousted President Ratsiraka’s Avant-Garde pour le rassemblement économique (FAMIMA) party; other ex-AREMA politicians survive through adherence to newly formed opposition groups. **August:** Pastor Richard Andriamanjato (AKFM) is elected National Assembly president (speaker), after being rejected by Zafy as the Third Republic’s first prime minister. That post goes to Francisque Ravony. Operating from a minority base, Ravony is obliged to negotiate continuously to form working coalitions. Rains return in late 1993 after drought and locusts once again threaten famine in the impoverished South.

**1994** The United Nations Development Program's "Human Development Index" places Madagascar 135th out of 174 rated countries, a better showing than the island's relative poverty, malnutrition, and mortality rates would indicate. Cattle rustlers and bandits (*dahalo*) as well as deliberately set brushfires continue to plague the countryside, which is losing population to the relatively more secure towns. Gold and sapphires are being smuggled out of the country. Major assistance projects, inoperative since the uprisings of 1991, remain frozen throughout the year, as Zafy pursues popular autarchic policies, refusing accommodation to global demands. Annual inflation exceeds 40 percent. **28 May:** Bus and taxi drivers call a four-day strike over the rising cost of fuel. **Early June:** Zafy negotiates a \$33 million loan from a private syndicate headed by the Prince of Liechtenstein to finance imports of rice, sugar, and cooking oil at commercial interest rates, causing outrage among international agencies. **19 August:** Ravony survives a no-confidence vote brought by the Ratsirakist opposition, but has to reorganize his cabinet nonetheless. He also must contend with Zafy's disapproval of his macroeconomic policies, including several devaluations of the Malagasy franc (FMG) to encourage hitherto lagging exports. Revenues from shellfish and tuna, as well as textiles from the Export Processing Zones (EPZ), begin replacing traditional export mainstays, coffee and vanilla. Although Zafy is not empowered to dismiss the prime minister, the president insists on a role (along with 28 parliamentary delegates) in deciding reallocation of the ministerial portfolios. Ravony continues to juggle constantly shifting coalitions, with little help from Assembly Speaker Andriamanjato. **5 November:** Exasperated by stalemate among the president, prime minister, and speaker, former Prime Minister Razanamasy and MFM leader Manandafy Rakotonirina demand the resignation of all three. Against Zafy's will, Ravony recommences negotiations with the World Bank and IMF, leading to changes in leadership of the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank.

**1995** The French press begins reporting popular disenchantment with the foundering Third Republic. **July:** Despite an 18 percent pay raise in May, civil servants join transportation workers in new protest strikes over rising cost of living, especially fuel prices. **26 July:** In a radio address, Zafy blames Ravony for continually mounting levels of crime, including murder; he also claims that arms are being smuggled into Madagascar to overthrow his regime. For his part, Ravony refuses pay-

ment to an Israeli company with which Zafy had contracted to provide coastal patrol boats and to organize a presidential guard. **17 September:** Zafy, who had never accepted his constitutionally subordinate role to the Third Republic legislature, obtains greater authority in a complex referendum voted by 66 percent (on a turnout of 65 percent), allowing him to appoint and dismiss his prime minister and to dissolve parliament; while most people seem to have voted for or against the president, rather than for/against the referendum's content, their endorsement represents the first strong blow against the parliamentary democracy intended by the conventions of 1991–1992. Ravony is promptly fired and the Forces Vives coalition that had carried Zafy to power in 1992–1993 is permanently split. **30 October:** Zafy names his party comrade Emmanuel Rakotovahiny to replace Ravony, with a cabinet dominated by their UNDD, to the dismay of former Forces Vives collaborators, particularly his erstwhile Merina allies. Rakotovahiny's orders are to slow the process of "structural adjustment," resumed under Ravony's agreements with the Bretton Woods agencies. **5 November:** Municipal elections restore most incumbent mayors and town councilors, but a high abstention rate suggests elector fatigue; nevertheless, Razanamasy returns to the mayoralty in Antananarivo, beating Forces Vives rivals. **6 November:** The historic landmark Queen's Palace (Rova) is destroyed by fire; royal tombs and the historical collection are severely damaged. Ten are arrested for arson but none are convicted and there has been no official report on the calamity.

**1996 January:** Cyclones, followed by locust swarms, again devastate crops and villages in the southeast. **February:** New signs of unrest appear; an opposition coalition (the "G-7") marches on Zafy's palace demanding his resignation; Ratsiraka supporters cancel an **18 February** meeting with the president after Zafy demands that they be strip-searched before entering his office. **April:** Former Zafy supporters form the Rally for the Third Republic (RP3R), taking their cue from well-publicized IMF dissatisfaction with presidential policies carried out by the Rakotovahiny government. **15 May:** The Assembly votes censure of the prime minister by 109 to 15. **20 May:** Rakotovahiny resigns. **26 July:** By a 99 to 32 vote, the National Assembly impeaches Zafy under Article 50 of the Constitution for delaying legislative implementation, violating the separation of powers, interfering with government services, obstructing external relations, and overall bad faith.



**3 August:** High Court Chief Justice Norbert Ratsirahonana, a Merina, had become prime minister, with the allocation of portfolios largely dictated by Zafy; on this date he wins a parliamentary vote of confidence. **5 September:** The High Constitutional Court upholds the first two counts of the impeachment indictment, vacating Zafy's office forthwith, appointing Ratsirahonana acting president (in the absence of a Senate president), and instructing him to organize new presidential elections. **October–November:** Ratsirahonana manages to redesign economic policy, entailing rapid privatization of state-owned industries, restoring Madagascar to favor with the IMF and World Bank. **27 November:** After a five-year hiatus, the Fund approves a three-year ESAF worth \$188 million and the Bank adds major new adjustment credits; the European Union (EU), African Development Bank (ADB), and other major donors gradually follow suit. **3 November:** Returning after a three-year self-imposed exile former President Didier Ratsiraka leads the field of 15 candidates in the first round of presidential elections, with 36.6 percent of the vote; Zafy (able to run since his impeachment did not entail conviction for a felony) comes in second with 23.4 percent; the relatively unknown Ratsirahonana manages a 17 percent third-place finish. **29 December:** In the second-round run-off between the two disgraced ex-presidents, with only 49.66 percent of the voters participating, Ratsiraka edges out Zafy by 50.72 percent to 49.28 percent. Pledging a "Christian, humanitarian and ecological republic," Ratsiraka promptly assures domestic and international opinion of Madagascar's good faith and stability. Reconciliation with external donors is enhanced by improved economic performance: for the first time since 1990, GDP growth for the year (3.7 percent) exceeds population increase, and inflation is held to 6.2 percent; rice production is adequate for domestic needs, and the number of export processing industries rises to 66, nine-tenths of them in textiles and garment manufacture.

**1997 January:** Cyclone Gretelle damages areas of the southeast, leaving 200 dead and 80,000 homeless. **28 February:** Ratsiraka designates veteran economic advisor Pascal Rakotomavo as his first prime minister, with a cabinet designed to sustain favor in the external donor community. **February–March:** Civil service unions resume their strikes to obtain wage hikes and to restore laid-off members; EPZ workers follow suit. Both strikes are ended by police action. **April:** Students

at all six national universities stage strikes for increases in scholarship grants. **June:** A World Bank report documents the island's devastating economic decline from the early 1970s; per capita income had fallen to \$230 (from \$473 in 1970); 70 percent of the population was subsisting beneath the poverty level of \$50 monthly income; 59 percent earned less than \$40, while the population continued to grow at an annual rate of 2.8 percent; 55 percent of the 1993 population of 15,850,000 was under 20 years of age; tax collection amounted to only 7.9 percent of GDP; the external debt was estimated at \$4.41 billion. **3 June:** Ratsiraka persuades the High Court to allow a 10-month postponement of elections to renew the National Assembly (in order to permit issuance of required new voter identification cards); the delay allows reconstitution of his AREMA party under the new name (same initials) of Association pour le Renouveau de Madagascar. Former prime ministers Ravony, Rakotovahiny, and Ratsirahonana form the "Panorama Group" in opposition to Ratsiraka, but they refuse to ally with their more militant former leader, Zafy, in a massive national coalition. **10 August:** Bombs explode outside the homes of several AREMA leaders on the anniversary of the 1991 massacre of protesters at Ratsiraka's palace, but Zafy's appeals for a repeat mass march go unheeded. **November:** Zafy seeks to declare his home province of Antsiranana "liberated territory," but the gesture fails. **20 December:** A no-confidence vote against Rakotomavo, filed by 46 deputies, falls short of the necessary two-thirds majority. Drought conditions return to the South and locust swarms spread from there to the center of the island.

**1998 4 February:** A Zafy-inspired motion to impeach Ratsiraka for perjury, nepotism, postponing parliamentary elections, and other charges obtains only 60 of the necessary 91 votes in the National Assembly (49 abstain). **15 March:** Ratsiraka obtains a bare majority of 50.56 percent in support of his constitutional referendum to increase presidential powers over parliament and the judiciary, and to begin decentralizing legislative and administrative authority to six "autonomous provinces." His slender margin is obtained with an electoral participation of 70 percent, thanks to an ill-advised boycott called by opposition leaders and an administrative "irregularity" that cost two million people their right to vote. **17 May:** Postponed from the previous August, legislative elections draw only 60 percent to the 15,700 polls, with the president's AREMA obtaining 63 of the 150 National Assembly seats; its partner, Leader-Fanilo

adds 16, the Andriamanjato AKFM three (not including the pasteur himself, who lost reelection for the first time since 1958), with 31 declared pro-government independents; the opposition's 37 places are fragmented over four often-irreconcilable parties, plus nine independents. **June:** At the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit, Ratsiraka speaks of sending troops to end the secession of Anjouan island from the neighboring Comorian Republic; he seems to have been dissuaded by French objections. **23 July:** Rakotomavo is replaced as prime minister by his former deputy Tantely Andrianarivo, a technocrat who retains his Finance Ministry portfolio. Without a solid majority, the market liberal Andrianarivo has to fight off intermittent challenges from both opposition and Ratsiraka loyalists. **9 September:** To enhance relations with Beijing, Ratsiraka expels a resident trade delegation from Taiwan. **19 November:** As though demonstrating the fluidity of Malagasy politics, the Leader Fanilo party joins an "opposition" grouping with Ratsirahonana's AVI party, RPSD, MFM, and Zafy's AFFA movement, although three Leader Fanilo ministers remain in Andrianarivo's cabinet.

**1999** A World Bank report shows Madagascar's external debt service declining steeply as a percentage of export revenues; real GDP rose by 4.7 percent for the year; educational expenditures returned to 3 percent of GDP (the 1990 rate), remaining well below the African average rate of 4.2 percent; unemployment is estimated at 8 percent (10.4 percent in Antananarivo), although underemployment is far higher. **May:** The African Development Bank reopens its Antananarivo office and announces the availability of loans to the private sector. Seven centrist parties form an ephemeral anticorruption coalition called Tranobe (Big House). **28 May:** Air Madagascar is placed on the auction block, but bidders prove scarce. **July:** The IMF approves a final phase for its ESAF assistance and the World Bank releases additional structural adjustment credits; the floating FMG drops sharply in value, facilitating export expansion. **September:** Approximately 200 Europeans, Asians, and Africans are deported for irregularities in documentation, stirring already robust rumors of illegal immigration networks feeding Chinese into the island's cities. **14 November:** Aided by a record-high abstention rate of 60 percent, the disciplined AREMA party machinery dominates elections to 1,386 mayoralties and commune councils, including all major towns except Fianarantsoa and Antananarivo. In the latter, newcomer Marc Ravalomanana, a successful businessman supported by

Ratsirahonana's AVI, wins the mayor's post with 45 percent of the vote over 17 opponents, including Postal Service Minister Ny Hasina Andriamanjato; son of the illustrious pasteur, the younger Andriamanjato had been supported by both the weak capital city AREMA and the new but ineffective Tranobe.

**2000 February–April:** Three cyclones passing over the island from east to north and west kill another 200 people, put 400,000 in need of emergency assistance and cause an estimated \$137 million of damage to schools, homes, and croplands; lower rice, vanilla, and coffee production is among the consequences. A cholera epidemic accounts for about 1,000 more deaths. In midyear, official investigations of government corruption begin, addressing a concern on virtually everybody's mind.

**29 June:** Major parcels of the huge SOLIMA oil complex, including the country's only refinery, at Toamasina, are sold to a French consortium.

**July:** Unconfirmed rumors surface of three alleged coups d'état by ex-president Zafy.

**August:** An unusual complaint by senior army officers is published, alleging political favoritism in promotions, fear of reprisals for criticism of policy, as well as poor working conditions and low morale among the troops.

**December:** The new locust control program comes to a close, after intensive insecticide spraying from the air (over environmentalist protests) and the establishment of a monitoring agency; the project is expected to avoid repetition of the costly depredations of 1998 and 1999.

**3 December:** The six provincial assemblies are composed through indirect elections by party lists, an arrangement that favors AREMA's patronage networks over the highly fragmented opposition; the president's party wins majorities in five assemblies and a plurality of 36 out of 76 in Antananarivo; turnout stays low, at 45 percent, thanks in part to a desultory boycott by the opposition and some church groups which argued that the electorate had not been sufficiently informed of the import of the elections.

**20 December:** The government files its new Poverty Reduction Strategy paper, opening the way for qualification under the World Bank's Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) debt relief program; the Bank also approves a \$100 million credit package to increase food production and support rural poverty reduction measures. GDP increases by 4.8 percent with annual per capita income climbing slightly, to \$258; tax revenues reach 12 percent of GDP and must remain at or above that level for HIPC to take effect; inflation falls from 11.3 percent in February to single figures. Coffee exports

decline from a normal 55–68,000 tons to 25,000 whereas vanilla revenues rise. The FMG stabilizes after its 1999 depreciation, and privatization of the banking and energy sectors is completed. Good macroeconomic news remains unimpressive to the mass of Malagasy who continue to await material signs of progress in their lives.

**2001** Having attained macroeconomic stability, Madagascar seems to be weathering the global recession fairly well, although new capital investment is lagging. GDP grew by 6.7 percent and the EPZ's garment and textile products are taking advantage of American import concessions under the AGOA regime. **7 February:** HIPC begins operating under agreement from the IMF, World Bank, Paris Club, and ADB; Madagascar must show significant advances in expenditures on health, education, sanitation, water resources, and other poverty factors within the year for renewal of HIPC debt relief. **1 March:** The IMF approves a new Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) at \$103 million, requiring in its turn good governance, administrative transparency and efficiency, improved tax administration, continued privatization of state enterprises, and rational prioritization of fiscal expenditures. **18 March:** The Third Republic finally acquires its "upper" legislative house, with the long-awaited election of 60 senators. Once again, through its majorities among 1,391 mayors and 336 provincial councilors—the senatorial electoral college—AREMA triumphs; it captures 49 of the 60 seats and counts on eight more from relatively friendly parties; hence, the opposition consists of only three senators. **1 May:** Honoré Rakotomanana, a distinguished jurist, is elected president of the Senate. **12 June:** Postponed from April, electoral colleges meet to choose governors for the six "autonomous provinces"; all six are from AREMA. The provinces are to inherit local control over most domestic matters, albeit under supervision and grant funding from the center, and their development programs aim at counter-balancing the economic preponderance exerted for nearly two centuries by Antananarivo. **November:** As the presidential election campaign heats up, despite general expectations that AREMA would deliver Ratsiraka another term, the president begins to worry over energetic nationwide competition from Antananarivo Mayor Ravalomanana. On **18 November**, he replaces three judges on the High Constitutional Court (HCC), the authority that certifies election results. Coincidentally, the tax authorities shut down part of Ravalomanana's Tiko dairy products industries, contending that they owe \$47

million in tax arrears, a charge denied by the management (which cries foul politics). **16 December:** Benefiting from effective advertising, his private radio/TV network, his overt religious fervor, and the best island-wide mobility that his money could buy, Ravalomanana astonishes observers by beating the incumbent and four other contenders; the Ministry of the Interior awards him 46.44 percent of the vote, ahead of Ratsiraka's 40.61 percent, but not enough to preclude a run-off. Nevertheless, the Ravalomanana campaign claims a clear 52.15 percent majority, based on polling-station protocols seen by the national election observation teams.

**2002 Early January:** Fearing that a run-off presidential election would be "stolen" by Ratsiraka's AREMA machine, large numbers of demonstrators fill the streets of Antananarivo, encouraged by Christian church leaders, labor unions, and popular entertainers; these nonviolent demonstrations closely resemble the movement of 1991 that brought down Ratsiraka's Second Republic. **25 January:** The recently reconfigured HCC, meeting 70 kilometers out of town, endorses the government's December tally, awarding Ravalomanana 46.21 percent of the vote and Ratsiraka 40.89 percent; the presidency rejects Ravalomanana's demand for a recount. This controversy precipitates massive general strikes, overtly encouraged by Ravalomanana; the majority of civil servants stay away from their jobs for five weeks. **22 February:** As an OAU delegation seeks to reconcile the two contending positions, Ravalomanana stages his own "inauguration," with blessings from Catholic and Protestant clergy. **26 February:** The self-proclaimed president names Jacques Sylla, a lawyer and bitter Toamasina rival of Ratsiraka, as his prime minister. **28 February:** Ratsiraka seeks to regain control by declaring a state of emergency and martial law in the capital, but Madagascar's traditionally nonpartisan military declines to enforce the decree. Ratsiraka retreats to his power base at Toamasina, along with his immediate family (itself the object of much street denunciation) and all but four (Merina) cabinet ministers. Five of the six provincial governors declare their continued loyalty to him (the exception, Rakotomavo, did not dare do so in Antananarivo). **4-6 March:** Ravalomanana supporters occupy and begin operating government offices; Ratsiraka's prime minister, Andrianarivo, is placed under house arrest; a contingent storms the provincial headquarters at Fianarantsoa, leaving six people dead. As Ravalomanana consolidates de facto authority, Ratsiraka loyalists begin

erecting barricades, destroying bridges, and generally disrupting connections between Antananarivo and the coasts, hoping thereby to reduce the insurgent capital by siege. **18 March:** The OAU calls for reconciliation and for lifting the blockades (neither of which happens); it warns Ratsiraka and his AREMA governors against contemplating secession, but there is little international outcry against their blockade strategy. **10 April:** The Administrative Tribunal rules Ratsiraka's 18 November reconstitution of the HCC illegal, restoring that court to its previous membership. **17 April:** The HCC annuls the 25 January vote tabulation; it calls for a complete recount after which, should no candidate obtain a majority, the nation must vote by referendum. Ratsiraka, hoping for better terms in negotiations at Dakar, again refuses to accept a recount—which proceeds nonetheless, the court declaring on **29 April** that Ravalomanana had indeed obtained an outright majority of 51.46 percent; Ratsiraka's tally dropped to 35.9 percent. **6 May:** Ravalomanana stages his second inauguration, reappoints Sylla prime minister, and proclaims a new political ethos of truth and sanctity (*fahamarinana* and *fahamasi-nana*). The United States promptly joins a few countries (including Mauritius and Senegal) that endorse Ravalomanana's electoral majority and recognize his government; France does not do so until early July and the African Union (successor to the OAU) excludes Madagascar's new leader for an entire year. Ratsiraka's Toamasina base is badly damaged by cyclone Kesiny. **26 May:** Persuaded by the judiciary and by popular enthusiasm, the army begins dismantling the Ratsirakist barricades on the roadways linking Antananarivo to the coasts, subduing the militias recruited to defend them. The military comes under mounting criticism for allegedly indiscriminate arrests during these campaigns and for abuses of discipline, especially by reservists called up to support the operations. **27 May:** Ex-Prime Minister Andrianarivo is removed from house arrest and jailed for abuse of office. **4–9 July:** A conciliatory visit to Antananarivo by new French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin serves to restore critical Franco-Malagasy relations and to precipitate Ratsiraka into exile along with his family and closest advisors (most of them going to France). **November:** Investigations by Amnesty International and the International Committee of the Red Cross publicize human rights violations and abuses of due process in the consolidation of the new regime's authority; the government disputes virtually all charges. **15 December:** Needing to govern with congenial majorities and to demonstrate his na-

tional standing, Ravalomanana advances National Assembly elections by five months. Although he had no formal political party when he campaigned successfully for the mayoralty in 1999 and the presidency two years later, the new president gives his blessing to the I Love Madagascar (TIM) party which captures 110 of 156 National Assembly seats, with professed support from 22 additional pro-Ravalomanana deputies; the outright opposition is reduced to less than 20 deputies, several of them AREMA members who had declined to follow their leadership's boycott of the elections. During the long and painful crisis, which cost Madagascar a minimum of \$600 million in infrastructure and industrial plant losses and in tourist revenues, official Antananarivo maintains adherence to Bretton Woods expectations; it develops poverty reduction and privatization strategies, keeps up its external debt service payments, reduces inflation to 13.5 percent at year's end, and vows to fight official corruption at all levels. Ravalomanana is thus able to count on sustained support from Madagascar's donor base for its struggle to recover from the deep wounds of contested regime change.

**2003 16 January:** Prime Minister Sylla reduces his cabinet from 29 to 22 members, including several former supporters of Ratsiraka. **24–26 February:** Ravalomanana attends the non-aligned states summit at Kuala Lumpur, after visiting France and meeting with President Jacques Chirac; these ventures enhance his international standing. **4 March:** The gendarmerie announces interception of an illegal shipment of arms off Mahajanga; the cargo presumably originated in (French) Mayotte; rumors have been circulating about a commando of 60 mercenaries landed somewhere on the island, but the commando never materializes. **5 March:** Ravalomanana meets with leaders of the former Committee for the Support of Marc Ravalomanana (KMMR), which had changed its name three days before to Committee for the Defense of Truth and Justice (keeping the same initials). **6 March:** The Justice Ministry issues a detailed refutation of Amnesty International's December report on the arrests and imprisonment of anti-Ravalomanana militants, accusing Amnesty of adopting inaccurate charges lodged by the Ratsirakists in exile. **9 March:** The president's TIM party captures only two of four by-elections for the National Assembly; one goes to an independent and the fourth, in Maintirano, is won by RPSD champion, Jean-Eugène Voninahitsy, a former opponent of Ratsiraka and KMMR supporter of Ravalomanana, now sworn to opposition. **March:** Famine



rages in the south, where 270,000 people are reported to be without food (60,000 of them eating cactus) and where marauding bandits (*dahalo*) have prevented farmers from planting food crops. **First quarter:** The FMG depreciates steeply, from ca. 6,000 to the US dollar in December 2003 to 7,500 (from FMG 7,000 to the euro to 9,000); the fall is attributed to import surges requiring foreign currency and general inflationary pressures as the economy heats up. **3–4 June:** Ravalomanana visits the United States, contracting for assistance to infrastructural development, debt relief, and exports under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). **7 June:** Police in Toamasina break up a joint KMMR / National Reconciliation Committee (CRN) rally; one dead, 15 injured. **July:** Ravalomanana attends the AU summit at Maputo, declares Madagascar prepared to participate in an African military reserve force. **4 July:** The first appointment is made to the National Council to Fight Corruption: Bakolalao Ramandraibe Rainivoarimanana will be chair of the council; its mandate is to develop anticorruption strategies and conduct educational and prevention campaigns, not to conduct investigations. A Central Intelligence Service (CIS; the title is in English) is created, originally to supplement, then to supplant, the controversial General Directorate for Investigation and Documentation (DGID). **August:** Import taxes are lifted for two years on 400 products; the intention is to ease supplies of investment capital goods, but profiteers exploit the loophole to bring in luxury and other consumer goods, costing the treasury 9 to 10 percent of its revenues, exerting drains on foreign exchange, and aggravating inflationary pressures. The IMF subsequently criticizes the move as unwise. **6 August:** Former President Didier Ratsiraka is sentenced in absentia to 10 years at hard labor and a fine for embezzlement of public funds. **22 August:** The government opens the real estate market to foreign proprietors who invest a minimum of \$500 million in the Malagasy economy; although the move draws severe criticism from national proprietors and defenders of tradition, the opportunity attracts only three applications during its first six months, none of them concluded. **17 October:** The government's Poverty Reduction Strategy paper is received by the IMF; it pledges public-private cooperation to achieve a 50 percent reduction in the ranks of the poor over 10 years. **9 November:** 1,513 rural communes elect their town councils and mayors; TIM captures about half the mayoralties and, with its partner, AVI, 56 percent of the council seats. **23**

**November:** 45 urban communes elect their councils; TIM and AVI again sweep the councils, except for Toamasina, where Roland Ratsiraka (nephew of the ex-president) is reelected mayor and Fianarantsoa, which elects the MFM/KMMR's Péty Rakotoniaina. **16 December:** The National Assembly's bill of amnesty, restricted to minor, non-political criminals, is rejected by the Ratsirakist Senate which insists on amnesty for all participants in the political conflicts of 2002. **23 December:** Ratsiraka's prime minister, Tantely Andrianarivo, is convicted on two of five counts of misappropriation of funds; he is sentenced to 12 years hard labor and a \$6 million fine; the sentence is denounced as excessive by various national groups and by Amnesty International. By year's end, 11 trials remain to be terminated. The year-end economic report is encouraging except for exports and foreign investment; 40 new manufacturing plants opened in the EPZ; air and sea transport recovered from the shocks of 2002; budget controls were working, prices remained stable, imports rose steeply. Officials complained that Madagascar's reputation as a (poor) risk had been exaggerated in the foreign press. Despite a 9 percent rise in GDP, 70 percent of the population lives below the UN-established poverty level, per capita annual income remains at \$260, and Madagascar occupies the 149th place out of 173 on the UN's development index.

**2004 1 January:** Having failed to obtain an amnesty law, Ravalomanana issues presidential pardons affecting 73 prisoners from the 2002 political crisis; 40 of them are military personnel. He also allows Tantely Andrianarivo to go to France for medical treatment, postponing the former prime minister's sentence. **4 January:** Prime Minister Sylla cuts his cabinet from 22 to 19 ministers, with two ex-AREMA members, and a broader geographical coverage; only one woman remains in the government (vice three in the previous cabinet). **9 January:** Sylla declares his priorities to be decentralized and cost-efficient governance; equitable and sustainable economic growth; improved health, education, water, and nutrition services; control over HIV/AIDS; progress in anticorruption and civil society campaigns. **21 January:** The once-despised DGID is abolished in favor of the new CIS; with 300 employees out of work, fears arise over leaks of sensitive files. **29 January:** 2,500 army reservists are technically discharged, but, while 620 can reenlist, the remainder demonstrate vigorously for higher separation pay; encouraged by opposition politicians, their protests continue into

March accompanied by anxiety that some ex-reservists will carry their weapons into armed banditry which already plagues the country. **January–February:** High school students go on strike in Fianarantsoa to protest a change of principals; police investigation turns up clandestine arms, blamed on disgruntled Mayor Rakotoniaina. **16 February:** A normal budget is issued for 2004; seeking credibility among foreign investors the government projects a 6.5 percent rise in GDP and 5 percent inflation; it emphasizes infrastructure, health, education, raises for civil servants, and administrative decentralization. **18 February:** Manandafy Rakotonirina on TV confirms that he was told in Dakar that without an amnesty law for the prisoners of 2002, Madagascar would obtain little or no substantial foreign aid; the Senegalese government denies having conveyed this message. **5 March:** 1,552 mayors attend a presidential conference at Antananarivo; their communes are to become the basis for national development, particularly in education, public health, sanitation, roadways, markets, sports, culture, security, environmental conservation, and tax collection; Ravalomanana calls this his version of “national reconciliation,” an auspicious start to decentralized development administration. **6 March:** 1,200 civil society organizations combine to form the Association of Civil Societies of Madagascar. **7 March:** Cyclone *Gafilo*, second murderous storm of the year, kills 241, with 181 missing, 305,000 homeless, and damage to the vanilla crop around Antalaha; total cost exceeds \$250 million. **15 March:** The National Council Against Corruption announces it has received 400 complaints against officials; not even operational until September, the council will require gendarmerie and police units to investigate the charges. **17 March:** The IMF completes its fourth review of Madagascar’s Poverty Reduction Growth Fund program and approves a new level of assistance; delay in the review had caused considerable anxiety in Antananarivo over Bretton Woods and other donor assessment of the country’s approach to development. **19 March:** Pro-government youth squads attack a CRN rally in the capital. Ravalomanana is in Paris, meeting with Chirac; they agree on major foreign policy issues (Iraq, Haiti, Islamic radicalism, HIV/AIDS, and Madagascar’s participation in NEPAD). **28 March:** TIM meets with 27 other parties at the Hotel Panorama to plan eventual constitutional amendments and a new electoral code. **4–7 April:** Mauritian Prime Minister Paul Bérenger visits Madagascar; cooperation is pledged on trade, protection of investments,

information technology expansion, transportation, radio frequencies, public health programs, and Mauritian sponsorship of Madagascar's application to join the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in August. **May:** Ravalomanana sends parliament a plan to replace the six provinces (*faritany*) with 22 regions. Madagascar is admitted to the United States Millennium Challenge Account, envisioning a 50 percent rise in American aid over three years.



## Introduction

At once isolated and strategically located, Madagascar has long fascinated both its own population and outside observers. The island's situation off the coast of Africa at the southwestern edge of the monsoon system has involved it in the trading networks and population movements of the Indian Ocean and the east African littoral. The result is a culture that blends African and Asian (largely Indonesian) elements and a language—Malagasy—that combines African, European, and Arabic components on an Indonesian base. Besides its extraordinary human culture, the island holds unique forms of plant and animal life, some of them, unfortunately, already extinct and others endangered.

Madagascar's location near important sea-lanes has attracted the attention of outside powers. A millennium ago Arab traders established outposts on the island; they were disrupted by the arrival of Portuguese and Dutch shipping. Later European powers, particularly the French and British, were rivals for influence over various Malagasy polities. Slave trading flourished into and out of the island's coasts until well into the 19th century. In our time, the growth of Europe-Africa-Asia networks in global economics and communications, the importance of the Mozambique Channel for oil shipments from the Persian Gulf to Europe, and great power rivalry in the Indian Ocean have increased Madagascar's strategic standing. Attention from and to the outside world has not, however, diminished the importance of the internal determinants of Malagasy history and politics or the value that the Malagasy themselves give to their own history. They—and others who know Madagascar—call it “the Great Island” (*la grande Ile*).

## LAND AND PEOPLE

Madagascar lies almost entirely in the southern tropical zone between 11°57' and 25°32' latitude south. It is 995 miles (1,600 km) long and 360 miles (580 km) wide at the widest point. At 230,000 square miles (590,000 square kilometers), it is the fourth largest island in the world, after Greenland, New Guinea, and Borneo. Larger than its conqueror, France, it is almost as vast as Texas. The Mozambique Channel, 220 miles (350 km) wide at the narrowest point, separates it from the continent of Africa. According to geologists, the island was part of the ancient continent of Gondwanaland and separated from the African continent several million years ago. One result of this early separation was the development and preservation of unique species of both flora and fauna, while another was the lateness of human settlement. Archaeological remains dating from before 1000 A.D. are rare, although more are being found, and few scholars put extensive settlement before 400 A.D.

The Great Island has a variety of topography and climates. On the east is a narrow lowland coastal strip that quickly turns into a steep escarpment running the length of the island. Behind the escarpment are the “plateaux,” more correctly called the highlands since they are mountainous rather than flat. These mountains reach elevations of over 2,500 meters in the north (2,879 at the highest point, Tsaratanana), diminishing in the central region around the capital, Antananarivo. The western slope of the highlands ends in wide coastal plains.

Differences in topography combine with wind patterns to create a variety of climates. The eastern region has heavy rainfall and frequent cyclones. The interior has a dry season from April to October, and a rainy season from November to March. In addition, central highland nights can be quite chilly in July and August, with frost recorded from time to time. The west coast, from Morombe to just north of Mahajanga, receives less rain than the east coast or the highlands, but profits from the presence of a series of rivers that provide water and alluvial deposits for agriculture. The south of the island has a desert climate with few rivers, which often disappear completely in the driest part of the year.

Considerable controversy still prevails over the exact time of arrival of humans in Madagascar, the sources of the population, and the routes by which they reached the island. A single language—Malagasy—is

spoken throughout the country, although with dialectic differences that vary in importance. The language is largely Malayo-Polynesian in vocabulary and grammar, and most sources agree that its origin lies in the Indonesian archipelago. There are important African elements in the Malagasy language, however, including most of the vocabulary having to do with cattle raising. There are also Arab components: the names of the months are of Arab derivation; the first written form of Malagasy, collected in manuscripts known as *sorabe*, used Arabic characters. In physical appearance the population ranges widely along an Indonesian-African continuum, with considerable variation often occurring within a single family. The culture of the separate island ethnic groups also reflects varying mixtures of African and Indonesian influences, as well as Arabic and even Indian contributions. A number of theories seek to account for this diversity within the overall cohesion of Malagasy culture, which includes devotion to ancestral precedent as a potent religious principle. These theories are not without political overtones, since emphasizing African or Asian elements, unity or diversity, has had implications for power rivalries and party formation.

Theories of the origin of Madagascar's population fall into two general categories. One school argues that the population blended over time as proto-Malagasy migrated from the Indonesian archipelago along the northern rim of the Indian Ocean, across the southern coast of the Arabian peninsula, and down the east coast of Africa, arriving in Madagascar, possibly via the Comoro Islands. Others contend that separate migrations of Indonesian, Arab, and African stock peopled the island, although there is some debate about whether the Asian or African groups arrived first. The cultural unity of the Malagasy, less emphasized by the latter theories, is the result of interactions on the island itself. It is quite possible, of course, that both sets of theories are true, and that the assimilation of groups arriving separately was facilitated by a pre-existing cultural blend brought by migrants who had taken the coastal route.

It is usual to divide Madagascar's population of about 16 million into 18 "official" ethnic groups, each of which is examined in the Dictionary. Limiting ourselves to this framework, however, underestimates both the degree of unity and the degree of fragmentation of Malagasy society. Shared language, shared customs, and long-standing migratory tendencies (both individual and collective) have facilitated interaction



among the various peoples who are radically unlike the structures identified as “tribes” on the African and American continents. Nevertheless, the groups themselves often subdivide into regional and clan units. Many never had a common political structure (e.g., the Tsimihety) or had one only briefly (e.g., the Betsimisaraka), while others seem to have been assembled from migratory fragments of other groups (e.g., the Tanala). Some were grouped together as administrative subdivisions of the indigenous 19th-century Merina Empire, or of the French occupation (e.g., the Betsileo and Bara). The 18 “ethnic groups” should therefore be regarded as an intermediate category between the overarching Malagasy identity and smaller family and territorial entities, rather than as the basic division of the insular population.

Many groups are also divided into endogamous castes. There is a basic division between the descendants of slaves and those of free individuals, and the free castes are usually divided into commoners and nobles. Within each of these categories there is often also a hierarchy of clans based on such historical factors as services once rendered to ruling elites. These differences are becoming less pronounced, particularly in the cities, through the expansion of a modern economy, democratization of educational access, and the pauperization of the 1980s; the result is a leveling at the lower ranks of society and a new, wealth-based elite at the top. Family solidarity has retained preeminent political and social importance, however, even when the relative ranking of individual families undergoes change.

The modern population has also seen a division between indigenous and non-Malagasy inhabitants. The latter include Europeans (mainly French), Indo-Pakistanis (usually called *Karana* or *Karany*), and Chinese. The economic importance of these communities is greater than their numbers would suggest. There is also a fluctuating but regionally significant community of Comorians in the north and northwest of the island.

## HISTORY

According to most theories, Madagascar was settled by participants in the trading networks of the Indian Ocean, and the earliest archaeological remains are those of commercially oriented cities established possibly a

few hundred years before 1000 A.D. The cities appear to have traded produce for manufactured goods, testifying to the existence of a settled agriculture that may have been preceded by a hunting-and-gathering economy. Although some information about the society of these coastal cities can be gathered from the archaeological remains, little is known about the interior of the island during this early period.

Madagascar's cities participated first in the Arab-dominated trade of the western Indian Ocean and were later connected with the "Swahili" trading network of the East African coast. Whether conducted directly or through a series of intermediaries, this trade was far-ranging; Chinese artifacts have been discovered in Madagascar as well as on the African coast. The trading posts were still active when the Portuguese arrived in the Indian Ocean and landed in Madagascar in 1506. By this date, the interior of the island had evidently been inhabited for some time. Seventeenth-century missionaries and settlers speak of settlements in the center of the island, and the oral traditions of interior peoples can be followed with some confidence even farther back.

The arrival of Europeans appears to have altered conditions both on the coast and in the interior. The Portuguese and Dutch destroyed the connection with the Arab-Swahili trading networks without being able to establish the transoceanic dominance that would have allowed a coherent alternative. By the mid-17th century it was the English and French, already rivals for the rest of the Indian Ocean, who reestablished the trading pattern. Once more, manufactured goods were traded for produce and, increasingly, weapons for slaves. Both the British and the French attempted to establish settlements in Madagascar—the British at Saint Augustine Bay in 1645–1646 and the French at Fort Dauphin from 1642 to 1674; both early colonies had some historical importance, but both failed to prosper.

At the same time, larger political units were beginning to form in Madagascar. The French settlers at Fort Dauphin dealt with several kingdoms and heard reports of others. To their west, along the Mozambique Channel coast, the Sakalava dynasties of Menabe and Boina were also established. Although the Sakalava monarchs' dominance over their hinterland might have been rather loose, they did control the coast well enough to monopolize the Malagasy side of the trade with the Europeans, using the port of Mahajanga in the mid-18th century as a staple in the slave trade.

Also in the mid-18th century, the Betsimisaraka confederation developed on the east coast. It was founded by the Zanamalata, children of the pirates who had moved from the Caribbean to the seas around Madagascar at the end of the 17th century. Within a few decades, the Sakalava and Betsimisaraka were mounting joint raiding expeditions on the Comoro Islands. At the same time, smaller kingdoms were being formed in the southern highlands and their marches, but it does not appear that any of these principalities ever succeeded in uniting the whole of what was later considered Betsileo and Bara territory.

The most important kingdom to form was that of the Merina in the central highlands of Madagascar, united under King Andrianampoinimerina (1787?–1810). His successor, Radama I (1810–1828), completed the subjugation of Imerina and began the conquest of the rest of the island, a process that would eventually bring two-thirds of Madagascar under at least nominal control by the Merina Empire. The Betsimisaraka and Betsileo were among the first groups to be conquered, and the Sakalava were decisively undermined, although never entirely subjugated.

In 1817 Radama entered into diplomatic relations with the British, who had by then replaced the French in Mauritius and the Dutch in South Africa. With diplomatic relations came assistance to train the army and the arrival of British missionaries, notably from the London Missionary Society. The missionaries transliterated Malagasy into the Latin alphabet and set up an educational system. The French, who had maintained their base at Réunion, also continued to be active on both the east and west coasts. They established a trading post in the Ile Sainte-Marie off the east coast, and in 1840 occupied the island of Nosy Be in the northwest.

Much of the 19th-century history of the Merina Empire consisted of a complicated balancing act. The requirements of consolidating authoritarian rule clashed with the maintenance of popular support. It was necessary, and for some attractive, to introduce Western techniques and culture to gain the international “respectability” seen as crucial to the protection of Malagasy independence, but attachment to Malagasy heritage remained strong in all parts of the population. Merina rulers also attempted to balance French and British influence to avoid being subordinated to either power. Radama’s successor, Queen Ranavalona I (1828–1861), expelled the Europeans in 1835 and attempted to reform

society on more traditional bases, but her son, Radama II (1861–1863), reopened the country to European influence, an opening that remained after his assassination. In 1869 Queen Ranavalona II (1868–1883) and her prime minister, Rainilaiarivony, converted to Protestant Christianity, a triumph for the British missionaries.

In the long run, the balancing acts proved untenable against European imperial ambitions. From 1883 to 1885 a war with France resulted in the imposition of a heavy indemnity on the Merina state. In 1890 Great Britain and France signed a treaty exchanging French recognition of British control of Zanzibar for British acceptance of the French claim to Madagascar. In 1895 the French invaded again, and conquered the center of the Merina monarchy at Antananarivo. Although the French occupation aroused some resistance, especially in the revolt of the *Menalamba* (“Red Shawls”) in Imerina and the southern uprising of 1904–1905, the conquest marked the beginning of a colonial occupation that lasted until 1958.

## THE PERIOD OF FRENCH OCCUPATION

The colonial period began with the introduction of the usual administrative apparatus and the arrival of French settlers. The French presence was strongest in administrative centers, like the capital (renamed Tananarive), and in areas converted to plantation agriculture, like the east and north coasts, but the colonial administration extended throughout the island. Taxation of persons and cattle, as well as the *indigénat*, a separate legal system for non-French citizens, and the *corvée*, which imposed obligations to furnish the government a certain number of days of labor, identified the proud Malagasy as a subject people and kept them under control.

Nationalist movements began in fragments. The first, the Vy Vato Sakelika (VVS), was centered in Tananarive, and was dismantled by the French in 1915. More widespread movements began after World War I, with the return of thousands of demobilized combatants to a population resentful of the aggravated burdens of the wartime system. Such leaders as Jean Ralaimongo and Joseph Ravoahangy agitated for the granting of the rights of French citizenship to Malagasy subjects while thinking increasingly of independence as a possible alternative. The

interwar nationalist movements had the advantage of a shared language and widespread literacy, but the disadvantage of being limited largely to the cities. They were also closely watched by the French administration. A brief relaxation of political control in 1936–1937, at the time of the French Popular Front, was followed by a reimposition of controls at the outbreak of World War II.

After the fall of France in 1940, the governor of the island, Marcel De Coppet, declared first for the Free French and then for the Vichy regime. In response, and to obstruct putative Japanese ambitions in the region, British forces invaded the island in 1942. To the disappointment of nationalist groups, the British handed control of Madagascar back to the Free French, who treated the island as a reservoir of men and raw materials for their war effort, greatly increasing the burden of the colonial system on the population.

At the end of the war, the hopes of nationalists were once again raised. The Brazzaville Declaration, and even more the Charter of the United Nations, held out the possibility of an end to colonial rule. A nationalist party, the Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache (MDRM), elected delegates to the constitutional congress and subsequent legislatures in Paris in spite of opposition from the administration-supported Parti des Dëshérités de Madagascar (PADESM). There the MDRM delegates pressed for a status similar to that of Indochina, which had just been granted a large measure of autonomy. In the end, Madagascar was treated like France's African colonies, subject to the reestablishment of colonial rule without prospect for independence.

The response was the rebellion of 1947, an uprising that combined the interests of urban nationalists, returning veterans, and peasants, particularly on the east coast and eastern highlands. The rebellion was put down, with casualties (almost all Malagasy) that have been estimated at over 50,000 and were probably closer to 100,000 out of a population of four million. Participants in and suspected sympathizers with the rebellion were imprisoned, executed, or barred from political life. The three MDRM deputies and other Malagasy politicians denied involvement in the revolt, but were tried and sentenced either to death or to life imprisonment, although the deputies' death sentences were later commuted to imprisonment. A state of emergency was declared that in some areas lasted until the 1956 *Loi-Cadre*. The result was the stunting of Malagasy political life in the post-1947 period. Political parties did not

develop as they did in other French African colonies, and political discussion and activities took place via the intermediaries of the press and the labor unions.

Political life and parties resumed when the *Loi-Cadre* gave France's African colonies, including Madagascar, internal autonomy. Three major tendencies coalesced during this period. The movement that became the eventual governing party, the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD), was led by Philibert Tsiranana, a former schoolteacher elected to the French National Assembly at the beginning of 1956. The PSD was composed largely of people with established records of loyalty to France, including some, like Tsiranana, who had been members of PADESM; it gradually absorbed virtually all nonnationalist movements. Two major parties took a more nationalistic position, attracting some former MDRM supporters; the Independence Congress Party of Madagascar (AKFM), led by Richard Andriamanjato, combined the ambitions of the Antananarivo elite with a vigorous Marxist faction, also centered in the capital city. A southern-based populist party, the National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar (MONIMA), was led by a survivor of the 1947 repression, Monja Jaona. The two parties provided a nationalist opposition to the Tsiranana regime of 1958–1972, but the narrowness of their respective bases, and the resistance of the colonial and later of the PSD governments, prevented them from seriously challenging PSD control of Malagasy politics.

## THE FIRST REPUBLIC

Its close relationship with the former colonial power proved to be an insurmountable handicap for the First Republic. Independence had been accompanied by the signing of a series of cooperation agreements that maintained French influence over defense, education, the economy, and the machinery of government itself. Tsiranana's administration had difficulty stimulating economic growth, in part because it controlled very few of the economic power centers and in part because of a lack of popular enthusiasm for the government and its system of self-serving local functionaries. In foreign policy, Tsiranana followed a conservative line, and by the end of his mandate was pursuing contacts with the Republic of South Africa. Persistent subservience to France and the frustration of

Malagasy economic aspirations contributed to popular exasperation with an aging, unproductive political elite. Hostility was particularly volatile among the students of Antananarivo, who were opposed both to the ideological posture of the regime and to its failure to provide them with adequate post-graduation opportunities.

In the end, two very different revolts led to the collapse of the First Republic. On 1 April 1971 southern peasants under the leadership of MONIMA attacked government posts. This insurgency was severely suppressed; its leaders, including Monja Jaona, were sent to prison. Public reaction to the suppression strained the relationship between the politicians and the armed forces, particularly the gendarmerie, which felt it had been unfairly blamed for its role in putting down the rebellion. The second revolt began with student rallies in the capital in May 1972. These demonstrations turned into an uprising, now known as the May Revolution, led by a new group of radical and clandestine opposition figures later to form a political party called the Movement for Power to the (Little) People (MFM). The student revolt spread to other sectors of the Antananarivo population, and on 15 May the commander of the gendarmerie, Colonel Richard Ratsimandrava, informed Tsiranana that the armed forces would no longer defend his regime. Nor would the French military leave its island bases to come to his rescue. Having no alternative, Tsiranana handed power over to the commanding officer of the army, General Gabriel Ramanantsoa.

## THE INTERREGNUM

Ramanantsoa's time in office lasted only from May 1972 until January 1975. The period was marked by important changes in political orientation and by increasing instability. The cooperation agreements with France were renegotiated as part of a more radical stance in foreign affairs, and state marketing concerns were established in an attempt to gain control over the island's economy. The regime suffered from increasing corruption, however, and from personal rivalries and doctrinal quarrels among three important figures in Ramanantsoa's government: his chief assistant, army colonel Roland Rabetafika; the minister of the interior, gendarmerie colonel Richard Ratsimandrava; and the minister of foreign affairs, naval captain Didier Ratsiraka. In December 1974 a

disaffected army officer, Brécharad Rajaonarison, attempted to overthrow the government. Although the coup was unsuccessful, Ramanantsoa was forced to step down and was succeeded by Ratsimandrava, whose assassination one week later led to the formation of a military directorate and another period of uncertainty. In June 1975 Didier Ratsiraka emerged as the military directorate's choice for president, and proclaimed Madagascar a Democratic Republic.

## THE SECOND REPUBLIC

Ratsiraka and his supporters created a regime party, the *Avant-garde de la Révolution Malgache* (AREMA) / Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution, which coexisted with several smaller parties in the *Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution* (FNDR) / National Front for the Defense of the Revolution. He appointed troublesome dignitaries to a *Conseil Suprême de la Révolution* (CSR) / Supreme Revolutionary Council to debate matters of principle while his AREMA-dominated governments managed the country. Extensive nationalizations were carried out, a Charter of Socialist Industry was promulgated, and attempts were made to establish cooperatives in the countryside. Ratsiraka continued the foreign policy he had developed under the Ramanantsoa regime, stressing ties with other socialist countries, especially North Korea, supporting efforts to declare the Indian Ocean a neutral zone, and attempting to play a leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement. In 1978 the government launched an "all-out" investment policy to create an industrial base for the island's economy, entailing audacious and ill-timed international borrowing campaigns that ultimately brought economic catastrophe.

The 1980s were marked by economic and political crises that required gradual abandonment of the socialist direction proclaimed in the Charter of the Malagasy Revolution. Massive indebtedness, declining terms of trade, and surges in the price of petroleum propelled the economy into tailspin. Not only did the projected industries fail to function, production of such export staples as coffee and vanilla declined, and shortages of the chief food, rice, precipitated costly import bills and a large-scale black market. The sole recourse would be to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and to globally authenticated liberal reforms.



Economic liberalization policies required by the IMF and World Bank agreements entailed serious modifications of economic structure and foreign trade. Moreover, the need to maintain good relations with creditor countries and organizations induced ineluctable changes in foreign policy. These included a rapprochement with France, which remained, in spite of the vicissitudes in Franco-Malagasy relations, Madagascar's largest creditor and most important trading partner. Concurrently, however, Ratsiraka stressed cordiality with the USSR, China, and other socialist partners, especially North Korea, without ability to demonstrate substantial benefit from these allegiances.

Challenges to control the political system, particularly from the youth of the capital, were also an important feature of the 1980s. In the 1982 presidential election, Ratsiraka, now an admiral, faced a split in his own party and the opposing candidacy of Monja Jaona, and he was able to gather only a bare majority of the votes in Antananarivo; elsewhere, his AREMA machine was suspected of rigging the vote in his favor. In 1985 the army was sent to destroy the headquarters of a movement of Antananarivo youth organized into Kung Fu martial arts societies. The Kung Fu leader and several hundred of his followers were killed in the fighting. Urban unrest and insecurity in the countryside led to problems with the armed forces, and there were several attempted coups. In 1986 Guy Sibon, minister of defense and a longtime supporter of Ratsiraka, died and was replaced by the admiral's brother-in-law, Christophe Raveloson-Mahasampo. Suspicions of nepotism focused on the extended Ratsiraka family and its prominence in economic life.

In March 1987 three member parties of the FNDR—MONIMA, the MFM, and Vonjy Iray Tsy Mivaky—formed an Alliance Démocratique Malgache (ADM) / Malagasy Democratic Alliance, and their members of parliament voted against the budget for 1988. The 1989 presidential elections were rescheduled for 12 March, ahead of term in order to short-circuit the opposition. When the ADM was unable to agree on a joint candidate, the parties' three leaders all ran against Ratsiraka. He was elected with 62 percent of the vote. The ballot tally provoked charges of fraud by the other candidates and there were demonstrations of protest in the capital. Pressure from the opposition was joined by criticism from a recently unmuzzled press and by political action from the churches, whose organization, the Council of Christian Churches of Madagascar (FFKM), formed a human rights committee. The FFKM

began agitating for a categorical renunciation of the commitment to socialism and the dissolution of institutions of the Second Republic, such as the FNDR.

Ratsiraka continued his efforts to hold on to power by a mixture of concessions and consolidation. Leaders of the developing opposition, such as Manandafy Rakotonirina (MFM) and Richard Andriamanjato (New-AKFM), were removed from the Supreme Revolutionary Council while potential supporters, such as Monja Jaona and Gilbert Sambson, were rehabilitated. In August 1989 the FNDR was convened for the first time since 1982, and its members were asked to submit proposals for changes in the constitution. The MFM proposed a new constitution without reference to socialism. Andriamanjato announced that his party would no longer support the government. In December, parliament adopted revisions to the constitution abolishing the requirement that parties belong to the FNDR in order to have a legal existence.

This opening of the system to multiparty politics did not satisfy the opposition, which began demanding an end to the republic. Admiral Ratsiraka riposted by grouping the parties loyal to him, including AREMA, the old AKFM, and the Union des Chrétiens de Madagascar (UDECM), under the label Mouvement Militant pour le Socialisme Malgache (MMSM) / Militant Movement for Malagasy Socialism. The opposition began increasingly to consolidate in a Forces Vives (Vital Forces) Committee, including a veteran antagonist of Ratsiraka's from the 1970s, Albert Zafy. Ratsiraka continued to give some concessions, including the departure of his brother-in-law, Raveloson-Mahasampo, from the post of minister of defense in February 1991, but made it clear that he intended to remain in power.

In June 1991 Rakotonirina and Andriamanjato presented an ultimatum in the name of the Forces Vives demanding a national conference on democratization and threatening a general strike if their demands were not met. Demonstrations in the middle of June in Antananarivo, involving students and civil servants, backed up the demands. At the end of June, the Forces Vives announced the formation of a "provisional government" and called for a general strike. This strike continued for two weeks in the capital and other major centers, and was revived sporadically thereafter. On 22 July 1991 members of the provisional government and their supporters occupied six ministries. Ratsiraka's administration responded by arresting several of the members of the

transitional government and declaring a state of emergency. At the same time, the admiral made a conciliatory speech promising movement on the constitution and the appointment of a new government. The opposition demanded the release of its arrested members before it would enter into negotiations.

Significantly, the event that marked the beginning of the end of the Second Republic was the same as for the First Republic: troops loyal to the regime fired on a demonstrating crowd. On 10 August about 400,000 marched to the presidential palace at Iavoloha. There the Presidential Guard opened fire, killing several demonstrators (accounts range from 12 to 130) and wounding Zafy. As in 1972, this action induced both the armed forces and the French to withdraw their support from the regime. Paris called for a compromise and ordered the French instructors attached to the Presidential Guard to avoid further military action, while a group of retired army officers issued a public call for Ratsiraka's resignation.

At the end of August, Ratsiraka installed a new government, led by Antananarivo mayor Guy Razanamasy, with a mandate to find a formula for cooperation with the opposition. At the end of October an agreement for a transition to the Third Republic was reached between Ratsiraka and his MMSM, the opposition groups, the churches, and the armed forces. The agreement allowed Ratsiraka to remain president and head of the army during the transitional period, with his other powers transferred to the prime minister, Razanamasy. Zafy would become the president of a High State Authority composed of representatives of the MMSM and Forces Vives, to replace both the parliament (*Assemblée Nationale Populaire*) and the CSR, and to assure sovereignty once the DRM had ended. A consultative National Committee for Economic and Social Revival, headed by Manandafy Rakotonirina and Richard Adria-manjato, was also created.

Albert Zafy had been out of the country while the agreement was being negotiated and on his return on 7 November 1991, he denounced it as leaving Ratsiraka with crucial power as head of the armed forces. There followed a confused period of attempts to relaunch the agreement and to create a government that would satisfy the opposition without engendering undue resistance from the supporters of the admiral. Finally, in January 1992, acceptance of a revised agreement was announced, and a National Forum to write a new constitution began work on 22 March.

The period during and after this forum was marked by preparations for a transition to the Third Republic and by attempts on the part of Ratsiraka and his supporters to retain control. They argued for the creation of a federal system, in which the provinces rather than a central government based in Antananarivo would hold the bulk of the power. This would have protected the basis of Ratsiraka's leverage in the peripheral provinces. There was also an attempt on Zafy's life on 30 March, albeit under questionable circumstances. In the end, the constitution provided for a unitary state.

A referendum on 19 August 1992 ratified the constitution of the Third Republic, but was disrupted by Ratsiraka supporters demanding federalism. These demonstrations were accompanied by violence, particularly in Toamasina and Antsiranana where provincial leaders issued unilateral declarations of federal status. Faced with the possibility of civil war, or at least continuing unrest, the transitional authority and the admiral made a deal; Ratsiraka would cooperate with the new system in exchange for authorization to run for president of the Third Republic.

## THE THIRD REPUBLIC

On 25 November 1992, and then 10 February 1993, the first and second rounds of the presidential election were held. Ratsiraka was defeated, and Albert Zafy became the new republic's first president. Legislative elections held on 16 June 1993 returned a majority of Zafy supporters to the National Assembly, but the coalition proved unstable, particularly under presidential pressure against parliamentary prerogatives. Zafy got his way in a referendum of September 1995, but, a year later, after constant conflict with his prime ministers and with the IMF and World Bank, Zafy was removed from office by impeachment. Like Ratsiraka four years earlier, he was permitted to run to fill the presidential vacancy, but his effort foundered, not before some new champion of the parliamentary democracy that had impeached him, but to Ratsiraka himself, returned from exile in time to take a plurality of votes on 3 November and a razor-thin majority in a run-off against Zafy on 29 December 1996.

The admiral proceeded to organize an administration where he had left off in 1989. Unlike his predecessor, he conceded the need for a ministry with credibility in global economic forums, and he saw to the

consolidation of presidential authority through reconstruction of his AREMA party machinery, as well as through constitutional amendment. AREMA and allies gave him a working parliamentary majority and a new Senate was formed, dominated, like provincial and local elections, by the presidential party. Federalism was to be enacted gradually through empowerment of the six provinces under a strategy of decentralization that obtained mixed reviews among Madagascar's international benefactors. Those external patrons were generally pleased, however, with considerable macroeconomic progress registered by Madagascar's technocratic ministries, including privatization of most (but not all) of the 140 state enterprises that had weighed down the economy from the days of rampant nationalization. This progress had not yet been felt by a wretchedly impoverished population, but that effect was to come in time, when budget surpluses could be put to social purposes and the privatized corporations would operate efficiently.

Preparing for another reelection in December 2001, Ratsiraka found himself confronted by a new kind of opponent. Marc Ravalomanana, self-made business tycoon, had been elected mayor of Antananarivo in November 1999, and proved capable of generating enthusiasm, not only among his Merina compatriots, but throughout the island. His campaigns were well financed and technically up-to-date, and he managed, unlike the admiral's rivals of 1982, 1989, and 1996, to unite most of the opposition behind his candidacy. Apprehending defeat with one month to go, Ratsiraka replaced three judges on the High Constitutional Court (HCC) that would certify electoral results, and sure enough, on 25 January, the HCC confirmed Interior Ministry tallies showing Ravalomanana with a plurality but not a majority of votes in the 21 December election, thus auguring a second round against second-place Ratsiraka. Supported by the churches and the national election observation teams, Ravalomanana claimed outright (majority) victory, and, when the government refused a recount of ballots, he called a strike of civil servants that paralyzed Antananarivo for weeks. He thereupon had himself inaugurated in a partisan ceremony on 22 February, named Jacques Sylla as his prime minister, and ordered civil servants back to their jobs under new management. The admiral sought to break the strike and nullify the inauguration by declaring martial law in the capital on 28 February, but when the army refused to enforce the decree, he moved his office to his home base at Toamasina, leaving Antananarivo to the enemy.

The sequel was a prolonged crisis during which the Organization of African Unity (OAU), encouraged by France and the European Union, sought to mediate between the rival claimants to the presidency while Ratsiraka's partisans set up roadblocks and dynamited bridges in an effort to lay siege to Ravalomanana's capital. France and friendly African states discouraged pro-Ratsirakan initiatives in the coastal provinces to secede from the "Merina" republic, but they did nothing to lift the blockades. However, when Ratsiraka refused to agree to a vote recount recommended by OAU mediators as a preliminary step to new elections, he lost some credibility. In Antananarivo, the HCC was declared reconstituted to its pre-November membership and it proceeded with a tally of ballots that, on 29 April 2002, vindicated Ravalomanana's claim to an outright majority in the previous December's vote. This determination brought the army out of its barracks; stage by stage, it wiped out the barricades and evicted old regime incumbents; the crisis of 2002 was finally ended. On 6 May, Ravalomanana staged a more orthodox inauguration, and his administration began to gain gradual international recognition. France lagged somewhat behind the United States, Mauritius, Senegal, and other states, but by the end of June, the new government in Paris had signaled its consent to Ravalomanana. The new president undertook to reassure France against defection by the Great Island from the privileged bilateral relationship—a relationship that had been reformed by Ratsiraka after having torn it asunder in the 1970s. African Union acceptance did not come until 2003, after Ravalomanana had consolidated his hold through advanced parliamentary elections, won resoundingly by his own regime party, the *Tiako-i-Madagasikara* (TIM) / *I Love Madagascar*.

Declaring his administration inspired by principles of truth and sacredness, the pious (Protestant) Ravalomanana has adopted anti-corruption and grassroots development principles to mobilize enthusiasm among a highly skeptical, long-suffering population. The political crisis of 2002 exacted a serious economic toll, and recovery was not complete until well into 2003. Since then, investment has remained sluggish, demand for Malagasy exports is only gradually increasing, periodic tropical cyclones have hurt, and the Great Island's reputation has suffered from opposition exploitation of the arrests and convictions committed in the 2002 crisis. Ratsiraka and Zafy have been rhetorically joined in an extra-parliamentary opposition that rejects Ravalomanana's

right to govern while the president's TIM party has run roughshod over erstwhile sympathizers in the middle. Disturbed by outright dissent, responsive to occasional signs of insecurity, and impatient to experience the benefits of the new mandate, Madagascar's population shows new signs of restlessness as the year 2004 turns toward its close.

## ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

From a congeries of polities linked by a common language and by religious commitment to ancestral precedent, the Great Island has advanced toward the current unitary state governed by a Western-educated elite responsive to global market forces. The Malagasy present remains cogently linked to traditional values—in religion, a reverence for family and its landhold, a conciliatory temper elaborated in flourishing rhetoric, a virtual addiction to daily portions of rice, and an investment in cattle as a form of wealth. Against these and other traditions run the imperatives of participation in the world, first enunciated in the ambivalent policies of the 19th-century Merina monarchy, subsequently in unwilling subservience to French colonial demands, and, after 1960, in rarely successful strategies of modernization and general prosperity.

From murky origins as hunter-gatherers (often identified with the legendary original inhabitants, known as *Vazimba*), the Malagasy developed intricate methods of rice cultivation and extensive pasturing of cattle on savannas created by burning their indigenous forest. Centuries of tropical storms and winds have reduced much of that grassland landscape to laterite (hence the nickname “red island”) and driven the Malagasy into pockets of fertility along coasts, riverbeds, and semi-urban installations. The forest, down to less than 20 percent of its original extent, continues to be nibbled away—for pasture, for food crops, and for firewood and charcoal to serve a too-fast-growing population devoid thus far of alternative fuel sources. Under acute demographic pressure, the vast majority of Malagasy subsist beneath the poverty level of one dollar a day.

Madagascar can hardly be regarded as condemned to poverty, for its resources are evident. They have not yet been exploited through an optimal concatenation of economic, social, and political factors for the benefit of the Malagasy majority. Western education, productive agriculture, and commerce (including the slave trade) took hold during 19th-century

Malagasy contact with imperial powers without uprooting the pillars of Malagasy culture. The French installed a system of cash crops and mineral exploitation that served their own interest and kept the majority of Malagasy subservient. An entire infrastructure implanted itself on the vast island to convey produce for French markets and disseminate French manufactures into the Malagasy hinterland. Obligations and burdens were tolerated by an accommodating population until those moments when the dominating power showed vulnerability—in 1947, especially, when the spirit of nationhood possessed a substantial minority of Malagasy and propelled them into the first burst of violent decolonization in the postwar world.

Eventually, two elites evolved: one from the 19th-century Merina empire that placed highland people in all positions of privilege; the second, that reaped a political and economic harvest for the “disinherited” out of the colonial epoch and into the vicissitudes of independence. The latter elite governed under the First Republic, keeping nationalist highlanders at arm’s length. Its strategies for development were both cautious and grandiose; they courted capital, technology, and markets in France (and, secondarily, in other Western countries and South Africa) and they imposed “grand operations” for domestic development on a recalcitrant rural population. When those strategies collapsed in the Revolution of 1972, Madagascar adopted a more radically nationalist path, breaking most of the formal links to French foreign and security policy, the Franc Zone monetary system, and educational equivalency. Banks, trading companies, and productive enterprises were nationalized into public corporations, beginning in General Gabriel Ramanantsoa’s interregnum (from 1972 to 1975), and accelerating after promulgation of the Democratic Republic in December 1975. The power struggle that produced the DRM was won by Navy Captain Didier Ratsiraka over the partisans of his assassinated rival, Richard Ratsimandrava whose development vision began with empowerment of traditional grassroots councils (*fokonolona*) and followed radically indigenous tracks toward the goal of prosperity.

Development models were found in the Soviet Union, China, and even (or especially) North Korea, but these precedents were distracted by a frenetic campaign of international borrowing during the late 1970s to finance rapid industrial investment. Ideology had emerged in President Didier Ratsiraka’s Revolutionary Charter, only to fade gradually into a hazy



distance while the republic found itself unable to pay its mounting debt in the early 1980s. By 1984, Ratsiraka's brave new Madagascar was sinking into an all-too familiar third world morass: production declined radically across the agricultural and industrial spectrum as the state corporations failed to function; terms of trade plummeted as traditional exports suffered price declines and the cost of imported oil and other products soared; International Monetary Fund and World Bank help was required to begin a return to solvency in national accounts; a population that had protested sluggish growth in the 1960s found itself suffering annual losses in income, leading to food shortages, infrastructural decay, and the paralysis of basic services.

This catastrophe plagued Madagascar through the 1980s, as Ratsiraka's ministers sought to placate creditors through half-hearted accommodation to global economic orthodoxy, without firm commitment to the dictates of "structural adjustment." Ratsiraka clung to power through 17 years largely through the exertions of his AREMA party and its effective networks of patronage on the ground; even so, election campaigns were tense and results had to be "adjusted" to be sure of majorities for the admiral and cooperation among the parties admitted to his National Front for Defense of the Revolution (FNDR). Party participation and status within the bureaucratized economy guaranteed prosperity for a minority of Malagasy—many of them heirs of the older First Republic elites—while the majority sank more deeply into poverty, unalluviated illness, and illiteracy. An exasperated opposition evolved in the late 1980s, as it had, albeit with less provocation in the early 1970s, most notably in Antananarivo, but with widespread sympathy among the rural majority and the provincial towns as well. Mass demonstrations, strikes, and denunciations again occupied the streets of the capital from 1989 until the collapse of the regime in 1992.

After a decade of negative growth under the Democratic Republic, the incipient Third Republic had to adopt a different mode to revitalize national development. Its first three years were unfruitful, however, as leaders who had heretofore agreed mainly on the eviction of Ratsiraka proved unable to sustain cohesion in matters of national policy. Populist president Albert Zafy sought to defy international desiderata through unilateral tactics in public finance, domestic production, and external trade; at the same time, his more global-minded ministers and several key parliamentary leaders stressed the need to accommodate IMF,

World Bank, European, and other expectations for institutional change. The struggle between Zafy and his legislature was settled in July 1996 through a hitherto unprecedented impeachment process, confirmed by the High Constitutional Court in September. A reopened presidency provided an opportunity for advocates of parliamentary democracy to concert on a new champion to replace Zafy and consign Ratsiraka to history, but they failed to sustain their solidarity. The admiral emerged from his exile in time to confront another fragmented challenge as Zafy and 13 others competed for the anti-Ratsiraka vote in November 1996. Although second-place Zafy almost made up the distance by run-off election time in December, the Democratic Republic's ex-president won by a hair's breadth and in effect resumed his presidency in 1997. The economy had scarcely budged during the three-year standstill, as external benefactors awaited a coherence of economic policy reforms.

Ratsiraka's second mandate differed significantly from his Democratic Republic strategies for national development. No longer inclined toward Marxist, Maoist, or Juche principles, he was free to collaborate more closely with French and European interests, and to appoint ministers congenial to international creditors and aid donors. As currency and market liberalization, industrial privatization, and fiscal austerity took hold, investors appeared in the Export Processing Zones (primarily in textile manufactures for the American and European markets), in shellfish harvesting and processing, and in tourist infrastructure. Macroeconomic statistics responded with alacrity, although the benefits of progress were scarcely felt outside Antananarivo—and even there, proved less than satisfactory to working class families. Encouraged by the World Bank, the Ratsirakan Third Republic was to implement hitherto desultory plans for the decentralization of decisions and resources into the six provinces (*faritany*). A broader generation of young Malagasy began to claim educational, technological, and cultural advantages not enjoyed by their elders from the 1980s; private technical schools and management training programs sprang up to enhance prospects for this new elite. English became the language of high demand in Malagasy cities, and American popular culture emerged as the touchstone of advancement.

Once again, however, progress at the top failed to persuade a highly skeptical population that their establishment (*fanjakana*) was working in any way to their advantage. If there were more Malagasy in the modern

economy (including tens of thousands of low-paid women in the export processing mills), the life of the peasantry refused to improve. Hence, as Ratsiraka prepared for his reelection in December 2001, a new form of opponent had emerged to channel popular discontent. Marc Ravalomanana was among the rare crop of young Malagasy who had benefited from “globalization” in the 1980s; he obtained a World Bank loan to start an agro-dairy business that had become an astonishing success by the late 1990s, and he was elected mayor of Antananarivo in November 1999 by communicating an optimistic entrepreneurial message to capital city voters. Although a Merina in a country that putatively would never accept a chief of state from the highlands, and although confronted by Ratsiraka’s rebuilt AREMA machine in the hinterlands, Ravalomanana campaigned vigorously for the presidency in Fall 2001. He converted his “I Love Madagascar” message into votes in all six provinces, gaining what he clearly believed to be an outright majority on 16 December. When Ratsiraka’s interior ministry and a manipulated court awarded him only a plurality of the vote, Ravalomanana and his influential partisans refused to accept the inevitable sequel—a runoff against second-place Ratsiraka with the risk of electoral manipulation by the incumbent.

In the six-month crisis of 2002, economic production, commerce, and finance came to a virtual halt—some of it deliberately, as Ratsiraka’s militias sought to strangle Ravalomanana’s capital city through blockade and sabotage. When the crisis ended with judicial confirmation of Ravalomanana’s electoral majority, followed by military enforcement, then international recognition, Madagascar had suffered a loss of infrastructure, productive investment, jobs, and international credibility. Rebuilding this structure occupied the new government for the rest of 2002 and much of 2003, after which macroeconomic progress once again turned positive—except for key indicators of foreign investment and exports. A crusade against corrupt officialdom, proclaimed by a highly pious president, started slowly but remained in public view during 2003 and 2004. At the same time, Prime Minister Jacques Sylla and other leaders were constructing a presidential party—named I Love Madagascar (*Tiako-i-Madagasikara*, TIM) in the slipstream of presidential victory—with a vision of monopoly power not unlike Tsiranana’s First Republic PSD and Ratsiraka’s AREMA.

Although the new president has transferred business cohorts and other managerially skilled cadres into prominence, much of the political and economic leverage remains in the hands of the traditional political classes inherited from previous regimes. Two sources of challenge have emerged out of those classes: a parliamentary minority antagonized by TIM's appetite for the lion's share, and an extra-parliamentary "National Reconciliation" committee headed by former President Zafy in league with his erstwhile mortal enemies from AREMA. Declaring Ravalomanana illegitimate and tyrannical, coloring its rhetoric with anachronistic denunciations of the highland elite, the vociferous Zafy-AREMA "reconciliation" movement has obtained an international audience by advocating for prisoners arrested during the Ratsiraka-Ravalomanana crisis of 2002.

Development strategy in the Ravalomanana republic has followed successful macroeconomic precedent; the final privatizations (of the power/water monopoly, Air Madagascar, and other complex corporations), resuscitation of the export processing industries vacated (with considerable job loss) during the 2002 crisis; investment in fisheries, tourism, and infrastructure (especially, roads); enforcement of tax collection and other government revenues; encouragement of public-private initiatives; and an altered approach to decentralization, stressing the role of the island's 1,558 rural and urban communes and 28 intermediate regions, rather than the six provinces. Requiring judicial reform, cooperation from government officials in the hinterlands, and willingness of the Antananarivo elites to allow authority to percolate, this strategy is certainly not guaranteed success. Nevertheless, it comes closer to World Bank recommendations than preceding programs and may strike the sympathetic cultural chord in the Malagasy population that has never responded thus far to exhortations from the top. Whether these processes will be allowed time to work remains a key question in a nation that knows how to express its justifiable impatience.



## THE DICTIONARY

– A –

**AFFA** (ASA, FAHAMARINANA, FAMPANDRESOANA, ARINDRA, “ACTION, TRUTH, PROGRESS, HARMONY”). A political party founded by former president **Albert Zafy** in 1996, after his impeachment by the parliament of the **Third Republic** and the collapse of the **Forces Vives** coalition that had carried him to power in 1992. With a voter base restricted largely to Zafy’s home province of **Antsiranana**, AFFA placed six deputies, including Zafy, in the **Assemblée Nationale** in May 1998. It obtained eight seats in the Antsiranana provincial council in December 2000 but has fared poorly in subsequent **elections**, winning one senatorial place in March 2001 and no seats in the Assembly of December 2002, an election boycotted by Zafy. Continuing its links with Zafy’s former national party, the **Union Nationale pour le Développement et la Démocratie (UNDD)**, AFFA serves its leader’s effort to return to power through a campaign for national reconciliation.

**AFRICAN UNION (AU)**. The AU emerged out of the 39-year-old Organization of African Unity (OAU) in mid-2002, just as the controversial regime of **Marc Ravalomanana** was consolidating its authority and obtaining international legitimacy. Although a founder of the OAU, Madagascar’s **First Republic** maintained its distance, preferring the exclusively Francophone **Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache**. President **Philibert Tsiranana** criticized the OAU for verbosity and ineffectualness, its tendency to provide a platform for radical regimes, and the disquieting domination of Anglophone states. With the radicalization of Malagasy foreign policy under the **Ramanantsoa interregnum** and the **Democratic Republic**, Madagascar

attempted to play a more active role. It was one of the first to recognize the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic and it received OAU endorsement for its claim to the **Iles éparses** off the northern coasts of the Great Island. In later years, however, President **Didier Ratsiraka**, like Tsiranana, deplored the OAU's excess of verbiage and lack of solidarity. Nevertheless, after his ouster by **Marc Ravalomanana** in early 2002, Ratsiraka appealed to the OAU where several of his colleagues objected to Ravalomanana's self-proclamation as president. Several OAU efforts to mediate between the two presidential rivals prolonged the **Crisis of 2002** and displayed the divisions within the organization. Even after resolution of the crisis in Ravalomanana's favor on the ground and in Western capitals (including Paris), the AU delayed recognition of Ravalomanana until July of the following year.

**AGRICULTURE.** Although more than 75 percent of the active population is employed in farming, agriculture accounts for only one-third of Madagascar's Gross Domestic Product. Thanks to its diversity of climates the island produces a large variety of crops, but the area under cultivation has scarcely increased since 1980. The main food crop is **rice**, followed by manioc (cassava) and corn. Agricultural **exports** are dominated by **coffee, vanilla, sugar**, and cloves, but all face severe world competition. **Cotton, Cape peas** (limas), peppers, bananas, and groundnuts are also produced in marketable quantities. (See table 1.) **Cattle**-raising is important for both economic and cultural purposes. Historically the agricultural sector has been plagued by poor productivity and mediocre quality; rice yields per hectare are low by international standards and virtually perennial imports of this staple food have drained foreign exchange. Food imports, including rice, cost the island **economy** about \$59 million a year from 1990 through 2001. Food production per capita declined over this period by an average of more than one percent per year. Food aid receipts have varied annually from 59,000 metric tons in 1992 to 13,000 metric tons in 1997. Producers in the agricultural sector have also suffered from devastating seasonal cyclones, drought conditions often accompanied by ravenous swarms of locusts, as well as from declining prices and government price control policies that favor the towns. *See also* AGRICULTURE POLICY; AMERICAN CROPS; FISHERIES; SPICES.

**1. Agricultural Production. Source: Food and Agriculture Organization estimates reported in *Regional Surveys of the World, Africa South of the Sahara, 2004*.**

	1998	1999	2000
<i>Principal Crops (metric tons)</i>			
Rice (paddy)	2,447	2,637	2,300
Cassava (manioc)	2,412	2,435	2,228
Sugar cane	2,180	2,180	2,200
Sweet potatoes	510	520	476
Potatoes	280	285	293
Corn (maize)	152	181	150
Bananas	260	265	290
Coffee	60	65	64
Sisal	18	17	15
<i>Livestock (head)</i>			
Cattle	10,353	10,364	10,300
Goats	1,360	1,370	1,350
Pigs	1,500	1,450	850

**AGRICULTURE POLICY.** At the beginning of the colonial period, the French experimented with a variety of **agricultural** structures, including large-scale plantations (**concessions**) run by the island's **commercial companies**, smaller plantations run by individual **settlers**, and small-scale production and **cattle**-herding by the Malagasy themselves. At first the Malagasy were largely used as labor on French-run plantations, but they later moved into cash-crop production and in some cases were even required to grow crops. After World War II, such settlement schemes as the **Sakay** operation were resumed, but colonial agricultural policy increasingly concentrated its efforts on Malagasy producers, with a continuing emphasis on cash crops.

French agricultural policy was criticized for its fixation on the “miracle crop”—whether luxury **rice**, robusta **coffee**, or **cotton**—that would by itself lift Madagascar out of underdevelopment. In general, however, these crops proved to be disappointments, as did attempts to increase peasant productivity by manipulating the framework of agricultural administration. One reason for this failure was that agricultural assistance was used as a political tool to reward favorites of the colonial administration.



The **First Republic** continued to look for the miracle crop, although more attention was given to food crops for domestic consumption. It sought to stimulate production through adaptation of Senegal's program of Animation Rurale and through integrated projects called Grandes Opérations. The contradiction between using agricultural policy to increase productivity and using it as a tool of political patronage continued. Large-scale importation of rice began in 1965; exportation of long-grain luxury rice dwindled to insignificance shortly thereafter.

After 1975, the **Democratic Republic** tried both to increase productivity and to give the **economy** a more socialistic direction. Policies included the establishment of rural credit facilities, expansion of **cooperative** farming, **land reform**, and the creation of some state farms. Attempts to gain control of agricultural activities included the creation of state companies for the collection and distribution of rice, **vanilla**, and most other commodities. They included the **Société d'Intérêt National de Commercialisation des Produits Agricoles** (SINPA) and the Office Militaire pour la Production Agricole (OMPIRA) which managed the army's farms, some of them expropriated from foreign proprietors. The performance of these agencies was inefficient at best and they have been liquidated under **World Bank** and **International Monetary Fund** guidelines for liberalizing the economy. The regime's *fokonolona* reform was intended to increase productivity by changing the authoritarian relationship between the administration and the rural population, but the change did not take place. The idea of the miracle crop remained, however, (soybeans, this time), as did the use of agricultural policy for political ends. International assistance was obtained in the mid-1980s on condition that state monopolies over key commodities revert to private control of collection and marketing. That process continues—affecting vanilla, cotton, and **sugar**, for instance—and virtually all markets have been liberalized, but basic problems of fluctuating production and population pressures on the food supply continue. *See also* INVESTMENT POLICY; DEBT.

**AKFM (ANTOKON'NY KONGRESIN'NY FAHALEOVANTE-NAN'I MADAGASIKARA, INDEPENDENCE CONGRESS PARTY OF MADAGASCAR).** The roots of the party lie in the 1958

**Tamatave Congress**, which assembled the Malagasy parties advocating immediate independence from **France**. The AKFM was formed in November 1958 from the non-Catholic participants in the congress, the **Union du Peuple Malgache**, the **Front National Malgache**, and the Association des Amis des Paysans. Protestant pastor and educator **Richard Andriamanjato** was elected president of the party, and **Gisèle Rabesahala** its secretary-general. During the **First Republic**, the party's bases of support lay in the capital and the province of **Antananarivo**, the northern part of **Fianarantsoa province**, and the town of **Antsiranana** (Diégo-Suarez). Its leadership, drawn largely from the intelligentsia and bourgeoisie of the capital, combined **Merina** nationalism with Marxist ideologies, and the party maintained links with the French and other communist parties. The AKFM has a newspaper, *Imongo Vaovao*, and a once-influential **labor union** movement, the Firaisan'ny Sendika eran'i Madagasikara (FISEMA), which lost strength to **Didier Ratsiraka's AREMA** affiliates during the **Democratic Republic**.

Under the First Republic, the AKFM was the only opposition party with representation in the legislature. Its deputies were elected from the capital city, as administrative pressures assured pro-government majorities elsewhere, even in the Antananarivo countryside. Willingness to compromise ideology in the hope of an eventual coalition with the regime party, the **Parti Social Démocrate**, cost the AKFM support both to the radical nationalist **MONIMA** and to the unorganized opposition that developed at the end of the 1960s. The AKFM condemned both MONIMA's **Peasant Rebellion of 1971** and, at the outset, the **May 1972 Revolution**. Its bourgeois-radical image alienated the student and working-class factions that precipitated the revolution (later creating the rival **MFM**), and its Merina leadership proved unable to appeal to electors outside Antananarivo. The party eventually became an enthusiastic supporter of the radicalization of Madagascar's **foreign policy** undertaken by Didier Ratsiraka during his tenure as foreign minister of the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**, and it endorsed his candidacy for the presidency in 1975.

As a member of the **Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution**, the AKFM was one of the strongest participants in the Democratic Republic. Annexing the initials KDRSM (Democratic Congress for the Defense of the Malagasy Revolution), it did better

electorally than under the First Republic, gaining 11 seats in the 1977 elections to the **Assemblée Nationale Populaire** and nine seats in the 1983 elections. In 1989, however, the AKFM-KDRSM split over Andriamanjato's intention of running for president against Admiral Ratsiraka. When the party refused to back him, Andriamanjato resigned from the AKFM and created the **AKFM-Fanavaozana** (AKFM Renewal). This party took three seats in the May elections to the ANP, while the remaining AKFM-KDRSM won only two. In the political crisis that led to the end of the Democratic Republic, the AKFM-KDRSM remained faithful to the regime and, in March 1990, joined other pro-Ratsiraka parties in the **Mouvement Militant pour le Socialisme Malgache**. The party paid for this option, however, and for its earlier failures to attract younger generations of political activists. It was shut out of the parliamentary elections of June 1993 and has played a negligible role in politics since that time.

**AKFM-FANAVAOZANA (AKFM RENEWAL).** The AKFM-Renouveau was created in March 1989 by the leader of the original AKFM, **Richard Andriamanjato**, when the party refused to allow him to run against **Didier Ratsiraka** in the presidential elections of that year. In the subsequent legislative elections it won three seats as part of the evolving opposition to Ratsiraka and his **AREMA** regime. In 1990, AKFM-Fanavaozana joined with other opposition groups to form the Comité des **Forces Vives**. It contributed members to the December 1991 coalition government formed by **Guy Razanamasy** to begin the transition to the **Third Republic**, and, in June 1993, as part of the victorious Forces Vives "cartel," it placed five deputies in the new **Assemblée Nationale**—not enough to make Andriamanjato prime minister, but sufficient to carry him to the presidency (speaker) of the Assembly. In the immediate sequel, however, as the Forces Vives disintegrated, the New AKFM abandoned its erstwhile standard-bearer, President **Albert Zafy**, lining up once again behind Ratsiraka in the election of November/December 1996. Marginalized even in **Antananarivo**, the party retained only three parliamentary places in May 1998, when even Andriamanjato lost his seat. He was replaced as party leader by his son, Ny Hasina Andriamanjato, who entered Ratsiraka's cabinet as postal and telecommunications minister. Important defections from

the party ensued nonetheless, and, in November 1999, the younger Andriamanjato lost his bid for mayor of Antananarivo to businessman newcomer **Marc Ravalomanana**. While both Andriamanjato remain in public view, their party has followed its predecessor into oblivion.

**ALAOTRA, LAKE (17°30'S, 46°30'E).** Original home of the **Si-hanaka**, Lake Alaotra is Madagascar's most important **rice**-growing region. Already productive in precolonial times, the lake has been a continual object of development efforts ever since. Swampy areas west of the lake had to be drained and irrigation extended in other places. For a time under the control of French **settlers** from **Réunion**, the land was gradually reclaimed for Malagasy farmers, some of them in the Société Malgache du Lac Alaotra (SOMALAC) **co-operative**.

**AMBALAVAO (21°50'S, 46°56'E).** Lying halfway between the southern highland capital of **Fianarantsoa** and the outpost of **Ihosy**, Ambalavao was garrisoned by the troops of the **Merina Empire**. During the French conquest, it also served as a center of operations for the conquest of southern Madagascar. A center of **Betsileo** culture, Ambalavao is currently the site of an important **cattle** market as well as notable communities of weavers and makers of decorative paper (papier d'Antaimoro).

**AMBANIANDRO.** Literally, "Those Who Live Under the Heavens," Ambaniandro is a synonym for **Merina**.

**AMBOHIMANGA (18°45'S, 47°33'E).** It was from this hilltop village to the northeast of **Antananarivo** that **Andrianampoinimerina** embarked on his conquest of **Imerina** at the end of the 18th century. As the homestead of the 19th-century **Merina** monarchy and the site of the tombs of the royal **ancestors**, the **Rova** of Ambohimanga is considered a holy place and is listed as a world heritage site by UNESCO. Although the remains of the early Merina kings were transferred to Antananarivo in 1896, Ambohimanga retains original royal structures which compose a historical museum and a place of pilgrimage.

**AMBOHITSIROHITRA.** One of the royal palaces of the **Merina Empire**, Ambohitsirohitra, near the center of **Antananarivo**, was taken over as the headquarters of the colonial **governor-general**. After independence in 1960 it served as the French embassy. The palace was handed over to the government of Madagascar in 1975, and since then has served as presidential chancery.

**AMERICAN CROPS.** A variety of crops from North and South America are grown in Madagascar. Some were introduced directly, and others came via the **Mascarene Islands** or Africa. One of the most important is manioc (cassava), which was introduced in the early 18th century. It is widely grown, and in the southern regions of the island was used as a primary foodstuff before the spread of **rice** production. It is used as a supplement to rice in times of drought and in the period of shortage before the rice harvest; manioc leaves are also consumed as a vegetable. Since the colonial period manioc has been exported, mainly for the manufacture of tapioca. Corn has also been established in Madagascar for a long time and is widely cultivated, especially in the south central **highlands** and in the southwest. Like manioc, it is used as a supplement to rice. Peanuts are grown along the west coast, primarily for export to be turned onto oil.

**AMICALE DES ETUDIANTS MALGACHES COTIERS.** *See* UNION DES ETUDIANTS MALGACHES.

**AMNESTY.** After the **Tananarive Trials** of 1948 a campaign was spearheaded by the French Communist **Comité de Solidarité de Madagascar** to secure amnesty for the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** (MDRM) leaders convicted of plotting the **Rebellion of 1947**. This campaign polarized opinion in Madagascar, and the amnesty initiatives were frequently opposed by Malagasy deputies and senators in the French legislature. A bill of amnesty was finally adopted in 1958, but did not lift the sentence of exile on the MDRM deputies. They returned to Madagascar only after the granting of independence in 1960.

A new prospect of amnesty has been raised in the aftermath of the **Crisis of 2002**, after the arrest of over 400 partisans of ousted president **Didier Ratsiraka**. Despite exhortations by Ratsiraka's successor,

**Marc Ravalomanana**, the Malagasy **Senate**, with a Ratsirakist majority, and the **Assemblée Nationale**, controlled by Ravalomanana's **Tiako-i-Madagasikara** (TIM), could not agree on the scope of an amnesty measure in 2003. After 1 January 2004, Ravalomanana issued presidential pardons for 73 persons (including 40 military personnel) serving relatively light sentences for “crisis”-related offenses, but, unlike amnesty, pardons do not restore all civic rights (e.g., former civil servants are barred from returning to administrative jobs, and military personnel remain under strict surveillance). The amnesty issue has been kept alive by both Ravalomanana's avowed opposition, the **Réconciliation Nationale** committee headed by former president **Albert Zafy** and a coalition of independent and centrist deputies, the **Solidarité Parlementaire pour la Défense l'unité nationale** (SPDUN) which met with the presidential TIM to resolve differences during early 2004.

**ANCESTORS.** Malagasy tradition honors ancestral precedent with religious fervor. Even the most “modern” elites pay deep respect to family and clan lineage. The vitality of the living depends on the blessing of the forebears who must be propitiated. Ceremonial litanies and rhetorical remembrances emerge in everyday life as well as on more spectacular occasions, such as the *famadihana*, or returning of the dead. Although the *famadihana* is practiced primarily in the **highlands** and a few other regions, its basic principle—the honoring of ancestral remains grouped in the family tomb—gives the tomb site a sacred character throughout the island. Ancestral predecessors take credit for instituting norms of conduct, ethical warnings and prohibitions (*fady*), rewards (*hasina*) and punishments (*tody*), as well as a proverbial language (*ohabolona*) expressive of all conceivable circumstances. Although certain ancestral individuals are retained in collective memory, they gradually merge into the generalized dead and the tomb takes its sanctity from their collective presence. In some localities, particularly along the coasts, ancestors assume totemic forms (crocodiles, forest animals), but they are more often amorphous, efficacious “in spirit,” particularly in the vicinity of the family tomb.

At its extreme, Malagasy tradition (*fomba*) identifies the realm of the dead as a privileged “reality” for which this world, sometimes

referred to as “European life,” is a mere prelude. As in their mundane existence, royal personages carry special ancestral weight in their respective principalities. They communicate with their descendants in dreams, in organized séances of trance (*tromba*), and at least once as a politically formidable movement. This *ramenanjana* occurred during the short reign of the ill-fated King **Radama II** when desperate crowds rioted in waves of mass hysteria against his Europeanized way of life and his Western favorites. The mobs evoked the return of Radama’s late mother, **Ranavalona I**, great champion of the traditional **Merina** nation, and their pressure helped justify the assassination of the young king in 1863.

**ANDAFIAVARATRA.** Under the **Merina** monarchy, Andafiavaratra, or “People from the North,” was the name given to the clans—largely *hova*, or commoner—who had supported the royal claim of the founder of the modern monarchy, **Andrianampoinimerina**. They dominated the politics of the monarchy after the death of Andrianampoinimerina’s successor, **Radama I** in 1828, and even more after the death in 1863 of **Radama II**, the result of a coup d’état for which they were largely responsible. They engaged in mercantile as well as political activities, and occupied the top posts of the administration and army. One of the Andafiavaratra clans, the Tsimahafotsy, provided the successive prime ministers of the kingdom. Presidential chancery of the **First Republic’s Philibert Tsiranana**, the Andafiavaratra Palace in **Antananarivo** now serves as a conference hall and museum. *See also* RAHARO; RAINILAIARIVONY.

**ANDEKALEKA.** The largest hydroelectric project in Madagascar, the Andekaleka dam was inaugurated in June 1982 on the Vohitra River near the border between **Antananarivo** and **Toamasina** provinces. Construction began in 1978 under the all-out **investment policy** of the **Democratic Republic**. Financial contributors included the **World Bank**, the **United States Agency for International Development**, and the Canadian International Development Agency, as well as Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti development assistance agencies. The installation at Andekaleka now provides hydroelectric power for the capital and for **Antsirabe**, the two major industrial centers of the island.

**ANDEVO.** A **slave** caste descended from captives imported into the **highlands** under the **Merina Empire**.

**ANDRIAMAHAZO, GILLES (1919–1989).** Born to a **Merina** family living in Taolagnaro, Andriamahazo served in the French army in World War II. In 1949, he was promoted from the ranks to the grade of second lieutenant and sent to training courses in France. He joined the new Malagasy army at independence, and at the time of the **May 1972 Revolution**, he was in charge of the **Antananarivo** garrison. In this capacity he successfully opposed using the army to suppress popular demonstrations against the administrations of President **Philibert Tsiranana** and his successor, General **Gabriel Ramanantsoa**. Under Ramanantsoa, he was promoted to general and given the post of minister of territorial development. In the government of **Richard Ratsimandrava**, subsequent to Ramanantsoa's resignation on 5 February 1975, he was minister without portfolio. After Ratsimandrava's assassination on 11 February, as the ranking active general in the armed forces, Andriamahazo became the formal head of the **Directoire Militaire** that took power. Although Andriamahazo showed some signs of presidential aspirations, he was outmaneuvered by naval captain **Didier Ratsiraka** whom the directorate chose in June 1975 to succeed Ratsimandrava. Andriamahazo was named to the largely honorific post of president of the **Comité Militaire pour le Développement**; he retired in November 1976.

**ANDRIAMAHOLISON, HYGIN RICHARD (1937– ).** A major in the gendarmerie in 1975, Andriamaholison served as minister of information in the weeklong government of **Richard Ratsimandrava**. After Ratsimandrava's assassination, he was a representative of **Antananarivo province** in the **Directoire Militaire** that took power and that, against his advice, chose **Didier Ratsiraka** as the new president. Andriamaholison returned to the gendarmerie, and in 1977 was one of three officers of the armed forces arrested and charged with conspiracy against the state. He was not tried until 1983, when he was sentenced to deportation—in effect, house arrest—in spite of his lawyers' pleas that his poor health justified clemency. An appeal of the sentence was denied by the Supreme Court in 1987. He was finally pardoned by Ratsiraka in 1990 under pressure from French



President François Mitterrand. After three years in **France**, Andriamaholison returned in 1993 to be elected **Assemblée Nationale** deputy from Antananarivo as a member of the Comité de Soutien au Développement et à la Démocratie (CSDDM), headed by prime minister **Francisque Ravony**. *See also* OFFICERS' TRIAL.

**ANDRIAMANELY**. A ruler of the **Bara** at the end of the 18th century, Andriamanely belonged to a clan from the southeast part of Bara territory. His descendants, or Zafimanely, gradually imposed themselves as rulers over the major Bara groups.

**ANDRIAMANJATO, RICHARD (1930– )**. Founding president of the **AKFM** and longtime mayor of **Antananarivo**, Andriamanjato has been a conspicuous figure in Malagasy national politics and culture for a half century. He was born to a noble **Merina** family, studied theology in Strasbourg, and became president of the nationalist **Association des Etudiants d'Origine Malgache**. Active in the **Comité de Solidarité de Madagascar** (COSOMA), he returned to the island in 1957 and was a COSOMA delegate to the **Tamatave Congress** of pro-independence parties that coalesced into the AKFM. Andriamanjato was elected mayor of Antananarivo in 1959, and became one of three AKFM deputies in the legislature of the **First Republic**. He was also a member of the Ecumenical Council of Protestant Churches in Geneva, principal of an important private school in the capital, and author of a highly influential study of Malagasy philosophy. In spite of frequent trips to Eastern Europe, he was usually considered to be a member of the AKFM's "Merina nationalist," rather than its Marxist wing.

Although at first critical of the **May 1972 Revolution**, Andriamanjato joined the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** that followed it as a member of the **Conseil National Populaire de Développement**. He supported the presidential candidacy of **Didier Ratsiraka** and the creation of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** in 1975, taking his party (now AKFM-KDRSM) into the **Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution**. He sat as the party's representative in the **Conseil Suprême de la Révolution**, resigning as mayor so that he could hold the national post. Disapproval of the regime's disastrous economic policies of the 1980s, however, led Andriamanjato to de-

clare his intention of running against Ratsiraka in the presidential elections of March 1989. This action was disavowed by the AKFM-KDRSM central committee, and at the end of March, Andriamanjato resigned from the party and created the **AKFM-Fanavaozana**.

In 1991, Andriamanjato joined with **Manandafy Rakotonirina** and **Albert Zafy** to form the **Comité des Forces Vives**, which militated for an end to the Democratic Republic. In the transitional institutions established under the power-sharing **Panorama Agreement** of October 1991, he and Rakotonirina headed the 130-member **Comité National de Redressement Economique et Social**. Elected to the **Assemblée Nationale** of the **Third Republic** together with four other AKFM-Fanavaozana deputies, Andriamanjato had aspirations for the post of prime minister under Zafy, but the latter's suspicions of this "quintessential Merina" forced him to settle for parliamentary president (speaker). From that position, although he backed some of Zafy's irregular financial ventures, Andriamanjato blocked much of the president's legislative agenda, asserting parliamentary prerogatives against the executive, and participating in the disintegration of the Forces Vives coalition. In mid-1996, Andriamanjato led the Assembly in a successful no-confidence vote against Zafy's second prime minister, **Emmanuel Rakotovahiny**, and an unsuccessful attack against Rakotovahiny's successor, **Norbert Lala Ratsirahonana**. On 26 July of that year, the Assembly voted a bill of impeachment against Zafy himself; the president was deposed by court order on 4 September.

Ironically, the fall of his erstwhile ally started Andriamanjato's own career on its own downward spiral. He ran for the presidency in November, obtaining an embarrassing 5 percent of the vote, then switched allegiance back to Ratsiraka in the latter's narrow run-off victory against Zafy a month later. While his son, Ny Hasina Andriamanjato, became one of two AKFM-Fanavaozana ministers in Ratsiraka's 1997 cabinet, Richard Andriamanjato remained Assembly president until his own unexpected defeat in the parliamentary **elections** of May 1998. His party retained three seats at that time (including Ny Hasina's), but was wiped off the books in all subsequent elections. Endorsement of Ratsiraka's second coming had caused shrinkage in the AKFM's traditional Antananarivo power-base.

Anything but a quiet retirement awaited this mercurial statesman, poet, and preacher. From his parlor pulpit, "le Pasteur" (Rapasy, a not

invariably affectionate nickname) continues to draw attention by free-wheeling political commentary, including in 2004, unsubstantiated insinuations of “satanic” affinities on the part of the new president, **Marc Ravalomanana**.

**ANDRIAMASINAVALONA.** A **Merina** king who ruled from about 1675 to 1710, Andriamasinavalona extended the kingdom to unprecedented size. On his death, however, he divided the realm among his sons, provoking a succession of wars among the rival kingdoms that ended with the conquests of **Andrianampoinimerina** at the end of the 18th century.

**ANDRIANA.** **Merina** noble or royal caste.

**ANDRIANAMPOINIMERINA (?–1810).** Born approximately in the middle of the 18th century, and given the birth name of Ramboasalama, Andrianampoinimerina was the nephew of the ruler of the **Merina** principality centered on **Ambohimanga**. According to legend his grandfather, Andriambelomasina, had named him to succeed his uncle, **Andrianjafy**, on the latter’s death. The chronicles record that the uncle was a cruel and oppressive ruler who exiled his nephew and plotted his death. Andrianampoinimerina returned, however, to take over the throne in alliance with the important *hova* clans of the kingdom. Andrianjafy was expelled and later killed.

After consolidating his hold on Ambohimanga in approximately 1783, Andrianampoinimerina proceeded to conquer and reunite the other kingdoms of **Imerina**, beginning with the most important, Analamanga, which he renamed **Antananarivo**. The city was permanently subdued about 1793, and turned into a second capital. The other Merina kingdoms were annexed through wars of conquest and political marriages, thus establishing the **Merina Empire**. He is often quoted as claiming “The sea is the limit of my rice field.”

Andrianampoinimerina (sometimes called “Nampoina,” for short) proved skillful in organizing the defense, economy, and administration of the kingdom. The western border was secured against the **Sakalava** who had been raiding the kingdom for **slaves** and tribute. The management of **rice** fields and their irrigation were regularized and extended, as was the network of markets, including **slave** mar-

kets. The territory of the kingdom was divided into districts, and the villages were brought under royal control via the creation of the post of village headman, or *mpiadidy*, and roving supervisors called *vad-intany*, as well as a system of obligatory labor. The custom of ritual payments to overlords was also regularized into a taxation structure.

At the level of ritual, Andrianampoinimerina took proprietorship of the *sampy*, or royal talismans, and solidified the king's role as mediator between the population and the spiritual world of the **ancestors** through ceremonies such as the *fandroana*, or New Year's bath. After the conquest of Imerina, Nampoina began extending the kingdom to the east into lands occupied by the **Sihanaka** and **Bezanozano** and to the south into **Betsileo**. With the conquests came the growth of trade in slaves and firearms and the first visits of Europeans to the capital. After his death in approximately 1810, Andrianampoinimerina was succeeded by his son, Rakoto who, as **Radama I**, continued his policy of imperial expansion. *See also* ANDAFIAVARATRA; MAYEUR, NICHOLAS; SLAVE TRADE; TANTARAN'NY ANDRIANA ETO MADAGASIKARA.

**ANDRIANARAHINJAKA, LUCIEN XAVIER MICHEL (1929– ).**

One of the central figures of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar**, Andrianarahinjaka was born in **Fianarantsoa** province. A professor specializing in Malagasy **literature**, he served as cultural counselor in the government of **Gabriel Ramanantsoa**. When **Didier Ratsiraka** took power in 1975, Andrianarahinjaka was named secretary-general of the **Conseil Suprême de la Révolution**. He later became counselor to the president in charge of information and ideological animation, a post from which he played a major role in the formation of the regime party, **AREMA**. Andrianarahinjaka was a founding member of the party's political bureau and one of its representatives in the **Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution**. In 1977, he was elected to the presidency of the **Assemblée Nationale Populaire**, a post he held until the institution was dissolved at the collapse of the Ratsiraka regime in 1992.

**ANDRIANARIVO, TANTELY (1954– ).** Prime minister in the last government of **Didier Ratsiraka**, Andrianarivo is a **Betsileo** from Ambositra in the southern highlands. He was educated in Paris and at

Stanford University where he earned an MBA degree. Returning to Madagascar in 1982, he became an advisor in the Ministry of Agriculture, subsequently transferring to the Ministry of Energy and Mines. In 1984, he was appointed president of the board of the Government-owned water and electricity utility (Jirama) and a year later became director-general of the parastatal Banque Nationale de l'Industrie, assuming presidency of the bank in 1991 when it was purchased by the French Crédit Lyonnais. In 1992–1993, Andrianarivo was vice president of the transitional Conseil de Redressement Economique et Social, headed jointly by **Richard Andriamanjato** and **Manandafy Rakotonirina**.

In private business during the **Zafy** regime, he resumed government service on Ratsiraka's return to power and was appointed deputy prime minister for Finance and Economics in February 1997. He replaced Pascal **Rakotomavo** as prime minister on 23 July 1998. Lacking political leverage within the regime's **AREMA** party, his advent was understood as a technocratic concession to the demands of external donors for a government of austerity, fiscal discipline, and structural change. Retaining his Finance/Economics portfolio, Andrianarivo engineered considerable macroeconomic growth and large-scale foreign aid and investment achievements over three and one-half years without apparent improvement in living conditions for the majority.

He resisted **Marc Ravalomanana's** unilateral assumption of power in February 2002, and was forcibly deposed and placed under house arrest. He was transferred to prison on 21 October, charged with abuse of office, misappropriation of public funds, undermining state security, and harboring criminals. On 5 July 2003, the High Court found that he could be tried for these offenses, since his official immunity had been "tacitly abrogated" by the assertion of Ravalomanana's authority and the appointment of **Albert Sylla** to replace him on 6 May 2002. Andrianarivo was convicted on 23 December 2003 for endangering security and embezzling state funds. He was sentenced to 12 years at hard labor and a \$6 million fine. Amid widespread protest over the severity of this penalty (for what were essentially nonviolent acts of loyalty to Ratsiraka), Ravalomanana promptly declared his sentence suspended, allowing him to go to **France** (where he holds dual citizenship) for medical treatment. Al-

though Justice Minister Alice Rajaonah denied that Andrianarivo had been mistreated in prison and cast doubt on his claims of ill health, much of the public remained persuaded that he had become a scapegoat for anti-Ratsirakan sentiment. Minister Rajaonah was replaced on 5 January 2004.

**ANDRIANDAHIFOTSY (c.1610–c.1685).** Andriandahifotsy is credited with expanding the **Sakalava** kingdom of **Menabe** to the north of its original site. His rule covered the period in which extensive trade with Europeans began, and the exchange of **slaves** for weapons became an important basis for the Menabe economy.

**ANDRIANJAFY.** Ruler of **Ambohimanga** in the late 18th century and uncle of **Andrianampoinimerina**, Andrianjafy resented the fact that his father, Andriambelomasina, had named Andrianampoinimerina rather than his own son to succeed him. (**Merina** sovereigns could name successors for more than one generation, and this type of oblique succession was not uncommon.) To secure the succession for his son, Andrianjafy exiled his nephew and plotted his death. Andrianampoinimerina rallied the clans of Ambohimanga against his uncle, however, and overthrew him about 1783. Andrianjafy continued to fight to recapture his kingdom, and was killed about 1787.

**ANDRIANJAKA.** A **Merina** king of the early 17th century, Andrianjaka is credited with founding the current capital of Madagascar, **Antananarivo**, and establishing the first royal settlement there.

**ANDRIANTSOLY.** Andriantsoly became king of the **Boina Sakalava** in 1822, when the kingdom was collapsing under pressure from the expanding **Merina Empire**. His capital, **Mahajanga**, was captured by the Merina in 1824. A convert to **Islam**, Andriantsoly increased the role of the **Antalaotra** in his kingdom, and with their help mounted resistance to the Merina. After an initial flight to Mayotte in the **Comoro Islands**, he returned and attacked Mahajanga, but without success. In 1831 he fled once more to Mayotte, where he became a local ruler, or sultan, while the women of the Boina royal family established the Bemihisatra kingdom north of enemy-held Mahajanga. *See also* TSIOMEKO.

**ANDRY, NY (THE PILLAR).** *Ny Andry* was the semiclandestine journal of the radical opposition to the **First Republic** in the late 1960s. Edited by, among others, **Manandafy Rakotonirina**, *Ny Andry* was instrumental in politicizing the student movement of the time. See also MAY 1972 REVOLUTION.

**ANNET, ARMAND (1888–1973).** Annet succeeded **Léon Cayla** as the **Vichy** regime’s **governor-general** in Madagascar in 1941, with instructions to control both the Malagasy **nationalist movement** and the **Free French** groups on the island. He resisted the **British Invasion** of 1942, but surrendered in October of that year. After the war he was tried in France and condemned to “national degradation.” Annet wrote *Aux heures troublées de l’Afrique française* to justify his position.

**ANNEXATION LAW.** Voted by the French National Assembly on 6 August 1896, this law ended the French **Protectorate** in Madagascar and made the island a French colony. Its passage was precipitated by the revolt of the **Menalamba**, but its main proponents, **François de Mahy** and **Le Myre de Vilers**, had long been exponents of French expansion in Madagascar. Annulment of the law was a major goal of the Malagasy **nationalist movement**. It was never formally repealed, but its nullification was announced in 1958, when Madagascar received internal autonomy.

**ANTAIMORO.** The Antaimoro live along the southeastern coast of Madagascar in the region of Farafangana. Their ruling groups claim to be of **Arab** descent, and the Antaimoro are the main possessors of the **sorabe**, Malagasy documents written in Arabic characters. Many of Madagascar’s **ombiasy** are Antaimoro, skilled in the practices of astrology and the *sikidy*, a system of divination based on the interpretation of patterns of grains or stones. Antaimoro clans are organized into a hierarchy that includes nobles (*anteony*) and commoners (*ampanabaka*). At the end of the 19th century, after conquest by the **Merina Empire**, the commoner clans revolted against the nobles, ending many of their privileges. The Antaimoro economy is based on **rice** and **coffee** cultivation. Their population is estimated to be about 400,000.

**ANTAISAKA.** The Antaisaka are a group of diverse origins living in southeastern Madagascar, inland from the **Antaimoro**. Their ruling groups claim descent from a prince of the **Maroserana** dynasty of the **Sakalava**, while the commoners are said to be a mixture of **Bara**, **Sakalava**, and **Tanala**. The Antaisaka have a mixed economy that includes some herding as well as the cultivation of **rice** and **coffee**. Like other southern groups they are a source of immigrants for more favored parts of the island, providing both migrant labor and permanent immigrants who take up residence in the farming lands of the Malagasy middle west. Their population was estimated at about 600,000 in 1994 (406,468 in 1972).

**ANTALAOTRA.** An **Islamicized** group of **Arab** antecedents living on the west coast of Madagascar, the Antalaotra provided ritual specialists to several monarchies, but were mainly active in trade and flourished in the Swahili trading network with East Africa, Zanzibar, and the **Comoro Islands** in the 18th and 19th centuries. In the early 18th century their trading posts on the west coast were conquered by the **Sakalava**, with whose ruling dynasties they later intermarried. Their position was strengthened by the conversion of several of these dynasties to **Islam** in the 19th century. The **Merina** conquest of **Mahajanga** disturbed their political position and economic activities, and the end of the **slave trade** that came with the French conquest in 1895 led to their disappearance as an economically distinct group.

**ANTAMBAHOAKA.** The Antambahoaka live on the east coast of Madagascar, in the lower valley of the Mananjara River. Founders of the port city of Mananjary in **coffee**-growing country, they claim to be descended from the **Zafiraminia** and are among the groups in Madagascar to show **Islamic** influences.

**ANTANANARIVO (18°55'S, 47°31'E).** Founded in the mid-17th century under the name Analamanga, Antananarivo (city of thousands) was one of the first strongholds of the **Merina**. The early city was situated on a hill, or **rova**, overlooking the Ikopa and Betsiboka Rivers, at a point where the rivers formed marshes suitable for **rice** cultivation. At the time of **Andrianampoinimerina**'s conquests, Antananarivo was the strongest of the Merina kingdoms; tradition records



that it took three attempts before the city was finally conquered, in about 1793. Andrianampoinimerina made it a second capital, and under subsequent rulers it became the metropolis of the country. At the time of the French conquest the city had a population of about 75,000, over half of them **slaves**.

The French made Antananarivo, renamed Tananarive, the capital of the entire annexed territory. Although wary of Merina revanchist nationalism, they concentrated their administrative, economic, transportation, and educational systems in the city and regularly favored its population with jobs and educational opportunities. By the end of the colonial period Tananarive had a population of nearly 300,000, including a large permanent population of Europeans. Although subsequent regimes until 2002 drew their leading political figures from regions outside the capital (so-called *Côtiers*), the metropolitan primacy of Antananarivo (the name was restored after the **May 1972 Revolution**) has not been challenged. It now has a fluctuating population of well over one million (1,103,304 in the 1993 urban census), larger than that of the other five provincial capitals combined. Nearly 90 percent of the Malagasy inhabitants are Merina, about 5 percent **Betsileo**, and the remainder *Côtier*. Site of the main **export processing** industrial zone, the capital remains the economic as well as the political center of the island. It occupies 44 percent of Madagascar's 110,000 civil servants and accounts for 75 percent of the island's GDP and 80 percent of its tax revenues. In 2002, 68 percent of the city's households had access to electricity; half of them had television.

A succession of distinguished mayors served Antananarivo since before independence. **Stanislas Rakotonirina** was a nationalist opponent of **Philibert Tsiranana** before the latter's victory as president of the **First Republic**. His successor, **Louis Rakotomalala**, became Tsiranana's ambassador to the **United States** and **United Nations**. Pastor **Richard Andriamanjato**, a prominent intellectual, became the leading opposition figure in the Tsiranana republic, subsequently collaborating in the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** before participating in the DRM's collapse in 1991–1992 and taking an important part in the early stages of the **Third Republic**. Andriamanjato's successor, **Guy Willy Razanamasy**, served as prime minister from 1991 to 1993 during the transition from the DRM to the Third Republic. In Novem-

ber 1999, business tycoon **Marc Ravalomanana** was elected mayor, and, on his assumption of the presidency of the republic in 2002, the city became administered by Ravalomanana's business associate Patrick Ramiaramananana, with another business partner, Andrianatoandro Raharinaivo, as president of the municipal council as well as chairman of Ravalomanana's **Tiako-i-Madagasikara (TIM)** party.

During three months of the **Crisis of 2002** following Ravalomanana's election, militias loyal to ousted President **Didier Ratsiraka** sought to strangle Antananarivo through a cordon of road and rail blockades and infrastructural sabotage. The capital survived rigorous fuel, food, and communication hardships, however; if anything, outlying areas of the island suffered more from denial of central administrative services. In the municipal elections of November 2003, TIM captured 139 of 160 city council seats.

**ANTANANARIVO PROVINCE.** Located at the center of Madagascar, in the **highlands**, Antananarivo is the fastest growing of the Malagasy provinces, due in part to natural population growth and in part to immigration from less favored sections of the island. The capital, **Antananarivo**, is located here, and most of the island's **industry** is centered either in that city or in **Antsirabe** to the south. As the seat of the former **Merina Empire** and center of **Protestant** and **Catholic mission** activities in the 19th century, the province also has the densest **educational** network of the island. Its **economy** rests on services, an expanding industrial plant, and **agriculture**, in particular the cultivation of **rice**. In spite of immigration, its population is still largely **Merina**.

**ANTANDROY.** The "People of the Thornbush" inhabit the arid southernmost tip of Madagascar. Like many Malagasy ethnic groups, they have over time absorbed people from elsewhere, particularly **Sakalava**, **Bara**, and **Antanosy**. Organized in small villages based on kinship, the Antandroy are largely **cattle** herders, often on a semi-nomadic basis. They have a proud artisanal tradition, primarily in weaving. The poverty of their region—spiny forest and savanna subject to droughts and locust onslaughts—drives the Antandroy into the migrant labor force for the rest of the island. Their estimated population in 1994 was 600,000 (1974 census estimate: 412,500).

**ANTANKARANA (ALSO ANTAKARANA).** The “People of the Rock” live in northern Madagascar, south of **Antsiranana**. Apart from their once prominent city of Vohémar and their plantations of cloves and **vanilla**, the Antankarana habitat is a wild area of limestone rock, sculpted by wind and erosion. A small group, estimated as less than 100,000, the Antankarana have a history of external contact and exchange. Their Zafimpotsy kings were converted to **Islam** by **Arab** merchants, and they pursued commercial relations with the **Comoro Islands**, the East African littoral, and the **Sakalava** to the west.

**ANTANOSY.** Inhabiting a region stretching inland from **Taolagnaro** in the southeast, the Antanosy (“people of the island”) number about 200,000 in a sparsely populated landscape. Like many other southern groups, their ruling clans claim descent from the Arabicized **Zafiraminia** and they, too, possess writings in Arabic characters known among the **Antaimoro** as **sorabe**. Their economy is based on **cattle** herding and on work in the **sisal** plantations of their region.

**ANTOKON’NY KONGRESIN’NY FAHALEOVANTENAN’I MADAGASIKARA.** *See* AKFM.

**ANTONGIL BAY (15°30'S, 49°50'E).** Stretching inland for 100 kilometers, Antongil Bay provides the best harbor on the east coast between **Toamasina** and **Antsiranana**. At the end of the 17th century it provided a haven for **pirates** and later was the first harbor used for trade in **slaves**, **cattle**, and **rice** with the **Mascarenes**, although it lost its position to **Foulpointe** in 1756. In 1774 Count **Maurice Benyowski** was sent by the **Compagnie des Indes Orientales** to establish a permanent settlement there, but the establishment did not match his reports of it. After the company sent a mission of inspection that revealed Benyowski’s fabrications, Antongil Bay was definitively abandoned in favor of **Toamasina**.

**ANTSIRABE (19°55'S, 47°2'E).** Located 163 km south of the capital, **Antananarivo**, Antsirabe was founded in 1869 by Norwegian missionaries attracted by the area’s cool climate and mineral springs. During both the **Merina Empire** and the colonial period it

was a favored spa, and a rail line from Antananarivo was extended there in 1923. With a population estimated in 1993 at 126,062, Antsirabe sits in the heart of an intensive **rice**-growing region and since independence has become one of the major industrial and cultural centers of Madagascar. The main military academy is located in Antsirabe.

**ANTSIRANANA (12°25'S, 49°20'E).** Previously **Diégo-Suarez**, Antsiranana is the site of Madagascar's best harbor, but access to inland centers is exceedingly arduous; hence, its relative unimportance as a seaport, compared to **Toamasina**. With a population estimated in 1993 as 59,040, Antsiranana is Madagascar's third most important port, serving the export of cash crops from the interior of **Antsiranana Province** and as a point of transshipment to the Seychelles and the **Comoro Islands**. The former **French** naval base was handed over to the Malagasy government in 1973 after renegotiation of the **cooperation agreements** between the two countries. The arsenal and dry dock attached to the base were nationalized as the Société d'Etudes de Construction et de Réparations Navales (SECREN), and the arsenal was transformed into a factory for the construction of agricultural machinery. The factory was not successful, and the dry dock fell into disuse, but SECREN has been sold to private entrepreneurs who have projected their restoration. **Tourism** has grown significantly in the lively port town.

**ANTSIRANANA PROVINCE.** Northernmost of the Malagasy provinces, Antsiranana is isolated from the rest of the island by the Tsaratanana mountain range. The political province was created in 1956 out of the northern parts of **Toamasina** and **Mahajanga** provinces, and to this day has difficult linkages with its neighbors. It is the richest province after **Antananarivo**, growing a variety of cash crops, including **coffee**, **perfume plants**, **vanilla**, pepper, and cloves. Its isolation has periodically caused provincial leaders, including former President **Albert Zafy**, to threaten separation from the rest of the island. The main Malagasy ethnic group in the province is the **Antankarana**, followed by the **Sakalava**, **Tsimihety**, and **Betsimisaraka**. The plantations attract migrant labor from the south, and the area has also been subject to immigration from non-Malagasy

groups, particularly in the offshore **tourist** paradise of **Nosy Be** and the port of **Antsiranana**.

**ARABS.** **Islamic** influence has been strong in Madagascar since at least the 11th century, as the island became incorporated into the western Indian Ocean trading network dominated by the Arabs. Early Arab maps show the approximate location of Madagascar, called alternately “Waqwaq” and “Komr.” Arab trading centers were established on the coast of the Great Island at such locations as **Vohémar**, and the ruling clans of several Malagasy groups, most notably the **Antaimoro** and the **Sakalava**, claim to be of Arab descent. Malagasy was first written in Arabic script, in sacred writings called *sorabe*. Although the main Arab settlements were eliminated after the arrival of Europeans in the western Indian Ocean, groups of Arab-Swahili traders known as **Antalaoatra** remained on the west coast until the end of the 19th century. High-caste **Comorians** from the islands to the north are commonly known to Malagasy as “Arabs.”

**AREMA (ORIGINALLY ANTOKIN'NY REVOLOSIONA MALAGASY, AVANT-GARDE DE LA RÉVOLUTION MALGACHE, “VANGUARD OF THE MALAGASY REVOLUTION”).** AREMA was founded by **Didier Ratsiraka** in March 1976 to be the central, or regime, party of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM), after negotiations to form a single party had broken down. It was the first party to apply and be admitted to the **Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution**, an umbrella covering all recognized parties of this Second Republic. Like the regime party of the **First Republic**, the **Parti Social Démocrate**, AREMA was a loose coalition of divergent interests. In the late 1970s and 1980s, these divisions became especially acute, and the party developed a split between a “left” or “presidential” AREMA and a “right,” market-liberal AREMA headed by the then minister of finance, **Rakotovo-Razakaboana**. The schism ended when Ratsiraka reasserted his control over the party after winning the 1982 presidential **elections**, although many of the policies advocated by the dissident group were adopted during the decade-long series of negotiations with the **International Monetary Fund** for relief from Madagascar's debts.

Party organization paralleled the regime's **decentralization** strategy, with the basic unit being the *fokontany* cell. The intermediate and national levels were not clearly organized, and the national congress never met. As secretary general of the party, Ratsiraka named the members of the political bureau. His authority emerged out of the party and its patrimonial networks of office-holders and clients, rather than through direct appeal to the electorate.

In spite of its divisions, AREMA was able to dominate elections to the **Assemblée Nationale Populaire** and to the provincial and local councils of the DRM. In the legislative elections of May 1989, it won 120 of 137 seats in the assembly with only 66 percent of the vote. A year later, during the crisis that led to the fall of the regime, AREMA joined other parties supporting President Ratsiraka in the **Mouvement Militant pour le Socialisme Malagasy**. After the admiral's loss to **Albert Zafy** in February 1993, the party declined into a variety of provincial and local factions under the title of FAMIMA (Faritra mirara mandroso, together for progress). Its new message was federalism, a strategy to weaken what it apprehended as a resurgence of **highland Merina** behind the triumphant **Forces Vives** movement. Devoid of patrimonial authority under the early **Third Republic**, FAMIMA captured only 8 percent of the vote in the June 1993 legislative elections, taking 11 **Assemblée Nationale** seats out of 138. In the provinces, however, many ex-AREMA office-holders clung to their privileges while the Forces Vives challenge fragmented.

In 1996, on the return of its leader, AREMA reconstituted itself as the Association pour le Renouveau de Madagascar (Association for the Renewal of Madagascar), keeping the familiar initials. Seizing advantage after Ratsiraka's narrow victory over Zafy in the December 1996 run-off, AREMA restored its networks of clients and patrons. It registered steady progress toward recovery of its position of dominance although it never reproduced the monolithic hegemony of the 1980s. With 42.7 percent of the legislative electorate in May 1998 and 47.4 percent of the municipality vote a year later, AREMA reached 58.6 percent in the provincial council elections of December, capturing 197 of 336 council seats. It was thus able to dominate the newly formed **Senate**, elected by local and provincial notables in March 2001.

In his final years as president, Ratsiraka came to depend on AREMA as his main channel of authority, but despite its nationwide

organization of more than 20,000 stake-holders, the party was unable to assure his reelection in December 2001 against a new type of challenger with an effective nationwide campaign, **Marc Ravalomanana**. After confirmation of Ravalomanana's majority in the first round of that election, many AREMA leaders, including General Secretary **Pierrot Rajaonarivelo**, followed their champion into exile, while others, including Prime Minister **Tantely Andrianarivo**, were arrested on charges ranging from corruption to violations of national security. Ordered to boycott Ravalomanana's parliamentary elections in December 2002, 132 AREMA members disobeyed and, led by **Antananarivo** party chair Pierre Raharijaona, stood for reelection. All but three lost, most of them to Ravalomanana's **Tiako-i-Madagasikara** party.

AREMA has retained a slender majority of votes in the Senate, which cannot be dissolved until 2006, and has cooperated in most essential legislation, including the governmental budget and new laws eliminating **import** taxes on certain products and opening property ownership to foreign corporations. The party has remained divided between participatory opposition and a rejectionist wing. Guided by its leaders in exile, the rejectionists have joined with AREMA's erstwhile nemesis, Zafy, in demonstrations, rallies, and denunciations against the new regime as well as in appeals for the liberation of party members imprisoned after the **Crisis of 2002**.

In its two periods of prominence (1976–1991 and 1997–2001), AREMA had several auxiliary organizations, of which the most important was AREMA Women, headed by first-lady **Céline Ratsiraka** and her sister, **Hortense Raveloson-Mahasampo**. There was also an AREMA-run union federation, SEREMA, and an AREMA **cooperative** organization, **PROCOOP**. *See also* LABOR UNIONS.

**ARMED FORCES.** *See* MILITARY.

**ART.** A fervently poetic and **musical** culture, Madagascar has developed distinct traditions of sculpture, textile arts, and architecture, many of them associated with **ancestral** and kinship cults. Unique tomb design and funerary sculptures (*aloala*) manifest the spiritual core of traditional culture, particularly in the south and west, while more mundane domestic architecture, wood carving, musical instrument fabrication, silk and cotton weaving (*lamba*), and impressed pa-

per design (*papier d'Antaimoro*) have also been noteworthy in various regional styles. Frescoes adorn the walls of high-peaked houses in **Antananarivo** as well as elaborate, life-celebrating tombs in the south; much highly prized tomb sculpture has been lost to thieves and vandals, however. Bas-relief carving has evolved with great skill among the Zafimaniry of Ambositra in the southern **highlands** while farther east, the **Betsileo** carvers of Iakora and the southern **Mahafaly** specialize in deliberately naïve statuettes on themes of common life. Ebony, mahogany, rosewood, and other fine woods still serve the Malagasy artist while sisal, raffia, mohair, clay, zebu horn and leather, bamboo, reeds, palm fronds, metals, shells, and stone—both common and precious—are used in lighter art work.

Typical **highland** architecture betrays a presumed **Indonesian** influence in its sharply angled sloping roofs, verandas, and an interior disposition of people and furnishings dictated by astrological factors. European architects arrived to convey advanced 19th-century building technology to Antananarivo and other towns, but the elegance of Malagasy craft and the presence of indigenous materials have synthesized with imported techniques into an array of handsome building styles.

Malagasy art is distinguished more for its decorative than its structural quality, its alluring detail more than its existential power. **Arab** influence is evident in geometric motifs, primarily in the northern and eastern coastal areas, and some iconographers detect suggestions of abstract Indonesian motifs. Still, figurative art abounds, particularly in the presence of European influences and markets. Although painting and graphic arts first emerged under missionary influence, Malagasy artists have developed their own styles, beginning in naïve realism to reflect religious and daily life, while aiming more recently at deeper interpretation of Malagasy values. As in most traditional cultures, volumes of uninspired, machine-like work shows up at airports and in town markets for the trinket trade, but authentic Malagasy artists are at work in Antananarivo and other centers of the island, as well as in Europe. Among the most admired of contemporary and 20th-century artists are representational painters Coco Rabesahala, Henri Ratovo, and Gilberte Ralaimihoatra, the semi-abstractionists Jean Andrianavo-Ravelona and Clark Andriambelo, the portraitist William Rajesitera, and the water-colorist Ramanakamonjy.



**ASIA.** Despite its historical sources in the Indo-Polynesian seas and its participation in the ancient trade circuits of **Arabs** and Asians, the Malagasy population has displayed relatively little affinity for modern Asia. Drawn powerfully toward Europe even before the French conquest, Madagascar has consistently proclaimed its uniqueness. Economically important colonies of **Indo-Pakistanis** and **Chinese** settled on the island without engendering noteworthy economic or political relations with their homelands. **First Republic** president **Philibert Tsiranana** repeatedly declared the island a cultural “bridge” between Africa and Asia and he received President Macapagal of the Philippines on a state visit in 1963, but few economic or political consequences emerged. In the **Democratic Republic**, relations evolved closely with China and **North Korea**, albeit with primarily ideological significance that rarely impressed the mass of Malagasy. **Kung-Fu** became exceedingly popular among city youth during the 1980s, thanks largely to imported Asian cinema. Malagasy diplomacy has been active in asserting **Indian Ocean** interests, and economic exchange opened notably in the late 1990s as Asian entrepreneurs (particularly from Hong Kong, Thailand, and Singapore) took interest in Madagascar’s cheap industrial labor force and in its deposits of precious minerals, especially sapphires. Beginning in 1996, the **Didier Ratsiraka** government authorized a new wave of Chinese immigration, arousing alarm among urban Malagasy over putative smuggling rings and alleged predatory business practices.

**ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE.** The legislature of the **First Republic** had as its lower house a National Assembly of 125 members. Deputies to the assembly were elected by the list system through which a list gaining 55 percent of the vote in its district won all the seats. The exception was the city of **Antananarivo**, where a strict system of proportional representation was followed.

While the first Assembly was dominated by the regime **Parti Social Démocrate** of President **Philibert Tsiranana**, its revival under highly complex rules of distribution in the **Third Republic** inspired an unprecedented multiplicity of genuine parties, interest groups, and fly-by-night political associations. Most of these groups were trying their wings for the first time, having had no stake in the tightly controlled **Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution** of the **Democratic**

**Republic.** In June 1993, 122 “parties” campaigned for 138 seats (37 for **Antananarivo**’s eight seats alone); 26 of these put deputies into the Assembly in an inconsistent pattern of affinities that precluded the construction of stable legislative majorities. This unruly welter of political factions proved all the more problematic in view of the unprecedented authority granted parliament by the new constitution. Both presidents of the 1990s, **Albert Zafy** in 1995 and **Didier Ratsiraka** in 1998, resorted to **referenda** to weaken that authority to their executive advantage, albeit with different consequences for themselves; Zafy was impeached by a vengeful Assembly in July 1996 whereas Ratsiraka survived an impeachment vote and went on to consolidate his hold through his rejuvenated **AREMA** party.

With 68 of 150 deputies secured in the May 1998 **election**, AREMA had a far stronger legislative base than its predecessors. Nevertheless, it depended on coalition partners—**Leader Fanilo** with 16, **Rassemblement pour la Social Démocratie** (RPSD) with 11, **MFM** with three, and the balancer **AVI** with 14, and a dozen more or less cooperative independents—for voting majorities in the second Assembly. By this time, however, these votes had become less crucial for Malagasy statecraft, thanks to the enhancement of executive power conveyed in the referenda of 1995 and 1998.

Nevertheless, in consolidating his own mandate after the disputed presidential election of December 2001, the republic’s third president, **Marc Ravalomanana**, had to supplant that hostile parliamentary majority of AREMA and its collaborators. A “cleanly elected” legislature would also represent a final test of Ravalomanana’s legitimacy in the eyes of European and African skeptics. Hastily constructing a political party, the **Tiako-i-Madagasikara** (TIM) out of his central core of partisans from 2001, Ravalomanana met the test so impressively that his TIM emerged from the December 2002 campaigns with a solid majority of 110 out of 160. TIM’s Jean Lahiniriko took the Assembly presidency (speaker), and TIM placed its personnel in all six vice presidencies and attendant offices of the Assembly, thus alienating a number of smaller parties seeking rewards for their electoral alliances with TIM and its president.

**ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE POPULAIRE (NATIONAL PEOPLE’S ASSEMBLY).** The legislature of the **Democratic Republic**

of **Madagascar**, composed of 137 deputies, held its inaugural session on 28–30 July 1977. It normally met for four months of the year, from October to December, but could be called into session at other times. Its agenda was established by the president of the republic in consultation with the president (speaker) of the ANP, **Lucien Xavier Michel Andrianarajinaka**, a major figure of the Second Republic, and the Assembly's political bureau. The Assembly was dominated by the regime party, **AREMA**, and the turnover of deputies was relatively high. Although the ANP lacked real power, it did serve as a forum for the expression of discontent. It delayed the passage of the 1987 **investment code** for several months, and in 1988 three opposition parties—**MFM**, **MONIMA**, and **Vonjy**—refused to vote for the budget. The last election to the ANP was held on 28 May 1989, with **AREMA** winning 120 of the 137 seats. The operations of the Assembly were suspended in 1992 during the period of transition to the **Third Republic**, and in the new constitution it was replaced by a bicameral legislature composed of an **Assemblée Nationale** and, albeit belatedly, a **Senate**.

**ASSOCIATION DES ETUDIANTS D'ORIGINE MALGACHE (AEOM)**. The AEOM was founded in **France** in 1934 by science student **Albert Rakoto Ratsimamanga**. At first a cultural and social club, it became one of the major voices of nationalist sentiment after the **Rebellion of 1947**. AEOM played an important role in the campaign for **amnesty** for the MDRM leaders convicted of plotting the uprising and for the repeal of the **Annexation Law of 1896**. Under **Richard Andriamanjato**, who became its president in 1956, AEOM developed links with the International Student Union based in Prague and subsequently evolved into the **Fédération des Associations des Etudiants malgaches**, a source of youthful opposition to the **First Republic** regime of **Philibert Tsiranana**. *See also* UNION DES ETUDIANTS SOCIALISTES MALGACHES.

**AUGAGNEUR, VICTOR (1855–1931)**. A deputy from the Rhône district of **France**, Augagneur was the first civilian **governor-general** of Madagascar, occupying the post from 1905 to 1910. Under his administration, extensive work was done on the island's **transporta-**

**tion** system, including the continuation of the Tananarive-East Coast railroad. Augagneur continued the work of his predecessor, General **Joseph Gallieni**, in constructing the framework of the colonial system. He revised the *indigénat* and established the conditions by which Malagasy could acquire French citizenship. A strongly anti-clerical republican, Augagneur cut the subsidies traditionally granted to the **mission** schools and forbade holding classes in buildings used for religious services. The result was a drastic decline in school attendance. As an economy measure, he also had to close the regional schools established by Gallieni as part of the latter's **politique des races**, a strategy to reduce the dominance of **Antananarivo** and its elite in **education** and employment. After leaving Madagascar, Augagneur returned to the French National Assembly, and later served as governor-general of French Equatorial Africa.

**AVI (ASA VITA NO IFAMPITSARANA, PEOPLE JUDGED BY THEIR WORK).** A centrist party limited mainly to electorates on the **highlands**, AVI was an independent, critical, but often cooperative participant in the second **Didier Ratsiraka** regime, from 1997 to 2001. The party was founded in 1996 by former prime minister **Norbert Lala Ratsirahonana** after his brief tenure as interim chief of state. An advocate of market reform and global economic cooperation, AVI won 14 **Assemblée Nationale** seats in the May 1998 **election** and two **Senate** positions on 18 March 2001, as well as 24 provincial council seats (21 in **Antananarivo**) in December 2000. Disappointed by these election results, AVI threw its support to **Marc Ravalomanana** in the 2001 presidential elections and Ratsirahonana became a close advisor to Ravalomanana as the latter's authority was being established in 2002. Collaborating once more with Ravalomanana in the December 2002 parliamentary elections, AVI improved its Assembly role, gaining 21 seats while most other parties were swamped by the president's own new **Tiako-i-Madagasikara**. It has protested exclusion of its members from cabinet posts and parliamentary offices, but remains loyal to Ravalomanana. In 2003, AVI began expanding its coverage to rural areas and the coasts.

**AVOTSE.** *See* COOPERATIVES.

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**BAIBOHO.** These are river banks, largely located on west coast rivers, that receive alluvial deposits at the time of annual floods. They provide an area for cultivation, particularly of **rice** and **cotton**.

**BANKING SYSTEM.** As part of its attempt to gain control of the Malagasy economy, the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**, established after the **May 1972 Revolution**, began to nationalize the French-dominated banks. The reorganization was completed by the successor **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM). In 1973 Madagascar left the **Franc Zone**, and the Institut d'Emission Malgache, which had been run jointly with the French, was taken under Malagasy control and renamed the Banque Centrale de la République Malagasy. In 1975, three specialized banks were created: the Bankin'ny Indostria, or Bank for Industry; the Bankin'ny tantsaha mpamokatra, or Bank for Peasant Producers; and the Banky Fampandrosoana ny Varotra, or Bank for the Encouragement of Commerce. The banking system had uneven success, and the Bank for Peasant Producers in particular never attracted the savings or committed the investments that were expected of it.

The banking system was one of the targets of the liberalization policies begun in the late 1980s, particularly since the banks' ill-regulated lending activities had helped fuel inflation. The Bank for Industry was promptly opened to private capital, but both the DRM and the governments of the **Third Republic** resisted pressures to open the other two banks until confronted with ultimatums from the **International Monetary Fund** (IMF) and the **World Bank** in 1999. Liquidation of the Peasants' and Commerce banks required the state to pursue delinquent debtors and to compensate new owners for uncollectible loans. By early 2004, the country's seven commercial banks (all but one of them foreign owned) were pronounced healthy by the IMF despite the large number of nonperforming loans held by virtually all banks.

**BARA.** With a population estimated at 450,000, the Bara are a semi-nomadic group living in south central Madagascar, with **Ihosy** as their main town. They claim to have come to this territory from the east, pushed out by pressure from the **Tanala**. The basis of their econ-

omy is **cattle**-herding, with **rice** cultivation as a subsistence crop. Although the Bara contain many groups that came together and split up, by the end of the 19th century there were three major “kingdoms” (actually extended clans engaged in cooperative cattle-rustling and **slave** raiding whose kings were essentially heads of the raiding parties): the Bara Iantsantsa in the eastern part of the territory, the Bara Be in the center, and the Bara Imamo in the west. Although the Merina established an outpost at Ihosy in mid-century, the Bara were generally able to avoid rule by the **Merina Empire**. The French arrived in 1897, but it took 10 years and the execution of a leader of the Bara Be, **Lahitafika**, before the territory was conquered. *See* ANDRIAMANELY.

**BARGUES, ROBERT.** Barges served as **governor-general** of Madagascar from February 1950 to October 1954. During his period in office, the political controls imposed after the **Rebellion of 1947** began to be eased, and the Malagasy electorate was expanded from 256,930 to 885,000. Political activity at the level of the municipalities was also increased. Barges refused to allow French political parties to establish themselves in Madagascar, and attempted to limit political discourse to economic development issues. He was succeeded by **André Soucadaux**.

**BAS-MANGOKY.** The delta of the Mangoky River, which drains western central Madagascar, receives extensive alluvial deposits during the flood season and has the potential for high-yield **agricultural** production. The Bas-Mangoky was the site of a major, and not entirely successful, attempt to develop the production of **cotton**, first during the colonial period and then during the **First Republic**.

**BEFELATANANA.** A medical school was established by Governor-General **Joseph Gallieni** in 1897 at the Befelatanana Hospital in **Antananarivo** to train Malagasy medical auxiliaries for the colonial health system. The school and its students have played an important role in Malagasy politics. The 1915 secret society **Vy Vato Sakelika** was centered on the school, and such graduates as **Joseph Ravaohangy** were important figures in the **nationalist movement**. The school served as a detonator for the **May 1972 Revolution** when its

students went on strike to protest the subordination of their degrees below the French-equivalent diplomas delivered by the Faculty of Medicine of the **University of Madagascar**. In 1977, the school was closed and its functions divided between the Faculty of Medicine and training programs for midwives and paramedical personnel.

**BEMANANJARA, JEAN.** A native of **Toamasina province**, Bemananjara was a longtime minister of foreign affairs of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar**. He served as director of cabinet for **Jacques Rabemananjara**, then foreign minister in the last government of the **First Republic**, but he skillfully survived the transition to the more nationalist successor regimes. He was a member of the **Conseil National Populaire du Développement** during the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** and was minister of transportation in the short-lived government of **Richard Ratsimandrava**. After the installation of **Didier Ratsiraka** in June 1975, Bemananjara continued as minister of transportation and food supplies, leaving the post to become director of the president's personal cabinet in 1982. He was named minister of foreign affairs in 1983, a post he held until August 1991. His diplomacy was determined by the chief of state's eccentric trajectories, from commitments to socialist and radical third-world principles to reaccommodation with **France** and market-oriented international agencies. *See also* FOREIGN POLICY.

**BENYOWSKI, MAURICE AUGUSTE DE ALADAR, COUNT (d. 1786).** A member of the Hungarian nobility, Benyowski participated in a Polish revolt against the Russians in 1768. He was captured, sent to Siberia, but managed to escape and make his way to Canton in 1770. There he proposed his services to the **Compagnie des Indes Orientales**, which sent him to **Antongil Bay** to found a settlement in 1774. He sent back glowing reports of the founding of cities and the establishment of an alliance network of Malagasy rulers. A commission of inquiry demonstrated that the reports were fabrications, and Benyowski was recalled to **France**. Instead he went to **Great Britain** and the **United States**, where he was able to raise enough money to equip a ship, the *Intrepid*, and engage some more "volunteers," as he called his associates. Benyowski returned to Antongil Bay in 1785 and expelled the French garrison, proclaiming himself emperor of

Madagascar. The French sent a retaliatory mission, and Benyowski was killed in the battle that followed their arrival.

**BETSILEO.** Inhabitants of central **Fianarantsoa province** in the southern **highlands**, the Betsileo claim to be descended from east coast immigrants around the 15th century. With a population estimated at 1.5 million (920,600 in the 1974 census estimate), they are the third largest ethnic group on the island. Like the **Merina**, their society was divided into endogamous castes of nobles (*hova*), commoners, and **slaves**. In the late 17th and 18th centuries several kingdoms developed in what is now Betsileo territory, including **Isandra** in the west and **Lalaingina** in the east. Betsileo territory was invaded by the **Merina Empire** around 1815, and, although their name means “so many they are unbeatable,” they were rapidly conquered, the Merina establishing a southern capital at **Fianarantsoa** in 1830. The eastern part of Betsileo territory was intensively involved in the **Rebellion of 1947**, but the rebels were not able to capture Fianarantsoa itself.

The modern Betsileo **economy** is dominated by irrigated **rice** cultivation, in which the Betsileo have a reputation for excellence. They boast a distinguished **musical** heritage and have also produced some of the finest craftspeople in the island. Because of population densities, many Betsileo emigrate to other parts of the island, particularly to the middle west of **Mahajanga province**. Since Fianarantsoa province is second only to **Antananarivo province** in the density of its **educational** network, Betsileo are frequently to be found in the administration. The Betsileo have also contributed many notables to national political elites, including **L. X. M. Andrianarahinjaka**, president of the **Assemblée Nationale Populaire** of the **Democratic Republic**, and **Tantely Andrianarivo**, prime minister from 1997 to 1992 in the **Third Republic**.

**BETSIMISARAKA.** Madagascar’s second largest ethnic group, the Betsimisaraka are estimated to number two million (1,134,000 in the 1974 census estimate). They inhabit the east coast of the island from **coffee-growing** Mananjary in the south to **Antongil Bay** in the north. Despite their name which means “the many who never separate,” the Betsimisaraka are a loosely knit coalescence of several subgroups.



During the 18th century, the northern Betsimisaraka were united in the **Betsimisaraka Confederation** under the leadership of the **Zanamalata**. The island's principal seaport, **Toamasina**, is located on their territory, rendering the Betsimisaraka an early target for the expansion of the **Merina Empire**, which occupied the port in 1817. During the colonial period the Betsimisaraka, like the **Tanala**, were subject to seizures of land and **forced labor** for plantations and for the Antananarivo-Toamasina railroad. Their territory was one of the major centers of the **Rebellion of 1947**. The Betsimisaraka **economy** mixes a variety of **agricultural** activity with extensive cultivation of **rice** and of cash crops (particularly **coffee**) and, in the north, **vanilla** and cloves. Several leading Malagasy politicians have been Betsimisaraka, including the poet-statesman **Jacques Rabemananjara** and two-time president **Didier Ratsiraka**.

**BETSIMISARAKA CONFEDERATION.** The confederation was started after 1712 by **Ratsimilaho**, son of a pirate and of a Malagasy chief's daughter. Leading several other **Zanamalata** chiefs of the **Fenoarivo** region, Ratsimilaho conquered territory along the coast down to the port of **Toamasina** and moved inland, putting pressure on such groups as the **Sihanaka**. From this position they were able to control the trade with the European **Mascarenes** that was crucial to the regional **economy**. After Ratsimilaho's death in 1750, however, the confederation began to disintegrate. His successors, Zana-hary (d. 1767), Iavy (d. 1791), and Zakavola (d. 1803), were never able to exercise comparable authority. By the end of the 18th century, the confederation had lost its control over Toamasina to Creole traders under the leadership of **Jean René**. The confederation was unable to resist the attacks of the **Merina Empire**, which occupied Toamasina in 1817. The Zanamalata staged a rebellion against Merina rule in 1826, but it was put down. *See also* BETSIMISARAKA-SAKALAVA RAIDS.

**BETSIMISARAKA-SAKALAVA RAIDS.** Although **pirates** were eliminated from the western Indian Ocean by the first quarter of the 18th century, the area was not always well patrolled by the navies of the great powers of the time. From about 1785 to 1820 the **Betsimisaraka** descendants of the pirates joined with the **Sakalava**, with

whom they had been linked by a dynastic marriage earlier in the century. The alliance assembled fleets of pirogues and attacked the **Comoro Islands**, the shipping around the islands, and the east coast of Africa. The islanders sent requests for help to the sultan of Zanzibar and to the British at the Cape and **Mauritius**, but without success. The attacks stopped only with the **Merina** conquest of the Betsimisaraka and much of Sakalava territory. *See also* ZANAMALATA.

**BEZAKA, ALEXIS (?–1999)** Mayor of **Toamasina** (Tamatave) from 1957 to 1964, Bezaka was a member of the first **Loi-Cadre** government council, having been elected at the head of a list entitled Defense of Provincial Interests that he later turned into the **Union National Malgache**. As mayor, he convened the 1958 **Tamatave Congress** of parties favoring immediate independence for Madagascar, an action that led to his expulsion from the government council. In 1958, he founded the **Rassemblement National Malgache**, which merged with the regime party of the **First Republic**, the **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD). He was expelled from the PSD and defeated as mayor of Toamasina for persistent public criticism of the government. In 1968, he founded the **Parti Démocrate Chrétien de Madagascar**, but without electoral success. After the **May 1972 Revolution**, he supported a “yes” vote in the referendum that led to the establishment of the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** but denounced that regime’s policy of *fokonolona* reform. Bezaka went into exile in **France** at the time of the founding of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar**, and maintained his critical stance. In 1987 he announced the formation of the Union des Opposants Malgaches de l’Extérieur, or Union of External Malagasy Opponents. Reelected mayor in the **Third Republic**, Bezaka died before expiration of his mandate in 1999.

**BEZANOZANO.** One of several groups practicing *tavy*, or slash-and-burn **agriculture**, the Bezanozano live along the boundary of the forest zone, between the more numerous **Merina** and the **Betsimisaraka**. They were one of the first groups conquered by the **Merina Empire** at the beginning of the 19th century, and were used as porters between the **highlands** and the coast. They increasingly adopted Merina customs, including irrigated **rice** culture. Their population is estimated as under 100,000.

**BEZARA, JUSTIN.** Elected to the French Senate in 1947 as a member of the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** (MDRM), Bezara had his parliamentary immunity lifted and was tried for complicity in the **Rebellion of 1947**. He was sentenced to forced labor on the prison island of **Nosy Lava** and was released in 1954. He returned to political activity in his home city of Diégo-Suarez (**Antsiranana**) and joined the **Union des Peuples Malgaches**. In 1956, he became mayor and member from Diégo-Suarez in the **Loi-Cadre** representative assembly. He was a minister in the Loi-Cadre government council, but his political orientation was more radically nationalist than that of the **Parti Social Démocrate**, which was establishing itself as the dominant party, and he did not have a post in the government after independence in 1960.

**BINAO (1867–1923).** A granddaughter of **Andriantsoly**, Binao became ruler of the Bemihisatra group of the **Sakalava** in 1881, nominally controlling a territory that included the island of **Nosy Be** and the mainland opposite. Her kingdom had already been under pressure from the advance of the **Merina Empire**, and she assisted the French during the **Franco-Malagasy War of 1883–1885**. The **protectorate** established at the end of the war disappointed her since it recognized Merina control over the island. She supported the French again during the **Franco-Malagasy War of 1895**, however, and refused to join the **Sambirano Rebellion** of 1897. Under the French **politique des races**, she was confirmed as ruler of an internal protectorate established in her territory.

**BLANQUET DE LA HAYE, JACOB (?–1677).** When the **Compagnie des Indes Orientales** obtained royal permission to abandon the settlement at **Fort-Dauphin** in 1669, it sent Blanquet de la Haye to remove the **settlers** and to explore the possibility of establishing trading posts in India. He arrived at Fort-Dauphin in 1670, where he alienated both settlers and local rulers. He proceeded to the Ile de Bourbon (**Réunion**), but returned to Fort-Dauphin in June 1671, when he removed most of the settlers, leaving behind the Comte de Champmargou and a garrison of 40 soldiers. After unsuccessful attempts to set up French settlements in India, Blanquet de la Haye returned to Fort-Dauphin in December 1674, to find that most of the

garrison, including Champmargou, had been massacred, and that the others had either fled to the interior or been picked up by passing boats.

**BOINA.** Boina was a northern **Sakalava** kingdom established at the beginning of the 18th century by groups from the Menabe kingdom to the south under the leadership of Andriamadisoarivo, who had lost a dispute over the succession to a brother. The kingdom absorbed the groups already living on its territory, including the **Antalaotra** traders along the seacoast. The port of **Mahajanga** was established and in 1745 became the capital of the kingdom. Boina dominated the trade between the coast and the interior for the rest of the century. At the beginning of the 19th century, the **Merina Empire** began to seize lands in Boina, and occupied Mahajanga in 1824. The ruler of Boina, **Andriantsoly**, fled to the **Comoro Islands**, and his sisters fled to **Nosy Be** and later to the mainland, where they founded the kingdom of Bemihisatra.

**BOTOKEY, LAURENT.** A teacher from Belo-Tsiribihina in the southwest, Botokey was minister of education and then of culture and education from the beginning of the **First Republic** until 1972. He helped found the republic's dominant party, the **Parti Social Démocrate**, serving as its treasurer. Prior to the creation of the First Republic, he had been a member of the French Senate; he also served as mayor of Belo. As minister of education he was faithful to the system's reflection of French standards and critical of the demands for **Malgachization**, thus making himself a major target of the **May 1972 Revolution**. He resigned during the early stages of the revolution and his subsequent attempts to win elective office were unsuccessful.

**BOUDRY, ROBERT.** Boudry was secretary-general of the French colonial administration in Madagascar in 1946 and was generally sympathetic to Malagasy aspirations for increased political autonomy. In the 1930s, he had befriended the great Malagasy poet Jean-Joseph Rabearivelo and sought to help Rabearivelo obtain a coveted but invariably rejected trip to **France**. His transfer in 1946 was part of the hardening of the administration that preceded the **Rebellion of**

**1947.** Boudry continued to take an interest in Malagasy affairs and was one of the critics of the **Tananarive Trial** and an early advocate of **amnesty** for the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** leaders convicted at the trial.

**BOURBON, ILE DE.** *See* REUNION.

**BRADY (?–1835).** A mulatto from Jamaica, and a sergeant in the British army, Brady was one of the military assistants sent by **Mauritius** governor **Sir Robert Farquhar** to train the armies of **Radama I** after the treaty of 1816. He assisted in the transformation of the army of the **Merina Empire** into a standing force capable of undertaking the wars of conquest planned by Radama. He married a Malagasy, rose to the rank of general, and died a wealthy man in 1835.

**BRAZZAVILLE CONFERENCE.** This conference on the future of **France's** colonial possessions, held from 30 January to 8 February 1944, came to an ambiguous set of conclusions. Although it recommended increased representation of the colonial populations in French political institutions, the decentralization of imperial administration, and the development of the “political personality” of each colony, it rejected the possibility of self-government for the colonies. Malagasy nationalists tended to give the conference recommendations an optimistic interpretation, seeing it as a stage in the loosening of the French colonial system.

**BRITISH INVASION.** After the Japanese victories in the Far East, including the capture of Singapore on 15 February 1942, the British feared that Japan might try to establish a base in the western **Indian Ocean**, thereby threatening **South Africa** and the supply lines to India. Madagascar, under a **Vichy**-appointed governor, was considered a possible target. Consequently, British and **South African** forces invaded Madagascar on 5 May 1942, beginning with an attack on the naval base at **Diégo-Suarez (Antsiranana)**. The British captured the main coastal cities, and on 5 October **Antananarivo** was declared an open city. Control over Madagascar was handed to the **Free French** on 7 January 1943. The episode increased French suspicion of British intentions toward Madagascar, especially since the Free French had

not been included in the invasion itself. **Nationalist** groups had been in contact with the occupying forces, and after the war they were often accused of being agents of the “Anglo-Saxons.”

**BRUNET, AUGUSTE.** Brunet was secretary-general of the colonial administration in Madagascar and served as acting **governor-general** from March 1923 to February 1924. He resigned from the colonial service to enter politics and served as deputy from **Réunion**.

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**CAMERON, JAMES (1800–1875).** Born in Scotland, Cameron trained as a carpenter and joined the **London Missionary Society** as an artisan missionary. He served in Madagascar from 1826 to 1835 and from 1862 until his death in 1875. In addition to missionary activities, Cameron undertook a large number of economic and construction projects for the **Merina** monarchy. He set up the first printing shop and developed factories for the making of soap, bricks, and sulfur. When **Queen Ranavalona I** expelled the missionaries in 1835, Cameron was invited to remain, on condition that he give up his missionary work. He refused, and moved to Cape Town. After the death of the queen and the succession of **Radama II**, Cameron returned to **Antananarivo**, where he continued his building activities, including several of the capital’s churches and a stone shell for the royal palace (*manjakamiadana*). When he died in 1875, he was given a state funeral.

**CAPE PEAS.** Pois de Cap were introduced to Madagascar from **South Africa** as early as the 17th century. These small lima beans were once a major **export** crop in the southwest of the island, where they are grown in alluvial deposits along riverbanks known as *baiboho*. Production and marketing were wrested from the hands of **Indo-Pakistani** middlemen during the 1960s by the Syndicat des Communes, a **cooperative** of southwest villages sponsored by then interior minister and Morondava mayor, **André Resampa**, but the syndicate evaporated with Resampa’s disgrace in 1971. Production and exports have virtually disappeared since 1980, when about 20,000 metric tons were sold (as “Madagascar butter beans”) to markets in **Great Britain**.

**CARTEL DES REPUBLICAINS.** Formed in October 1958 by **Philibert Tsiranana**, leader of the **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD), the cartel linked his party with the **Union Démocratique et Sociale de Madagascar** (UDSM) of **Norbert Zafimahova** to overwhelm the parties that had advocated a “no” vote in the French republic’s **referendum** of 28 September. The PSD and the UDSM were the two largest parties in the legislature and were able to form a majority. The cartel disintegrated as the PSD incorporated members of the UDSM and other parties, becoming able to form a majority by itself.

**CATHOLIC CHURCH.** Nearly four million Malagasy profess Roman Catholicism, although practitioners on baptismal rolls number fewer than three million. With or without church acknowledgment, most Malagasy **Christians** freely combine formal doctrine with traditional animist **religion**. A first church mission was established in the 17th century at Fort Dauphin (**Taolagnao**), but it did not survive. The contemporary church dates to 1837, originally on **Sainte-Marie** island. Resistance from both the entrenched **London Missionary Society** and the indigenous religious preferences of Queen **Ravalona I** kept Catholicism out of the **highlands** until 1861 when it enjoyed tolerance under the short-lived Europhile reign of **Radama II**. Subsequently, the mission suffered from the establishment of **Protestantism** by Queen **Ranavalona II** in 1869. Hence, the Jesuits, Christian Brothers, and other missions found firmer footing in the **Imerina** countryside around **Antananarivo**, to the south in **Fianarantsoa**, and on the coasts.

The church had an ambiguous relationship with the colonial administration. It was preferred over the Protestant denominations thanks to its largely French clergy, and because Protestantism was identified with revanchist Merina aspirations, but most colonial governors were anti-clericals suspicious of church interference. In 1953, when the bishops published a letter recognizing the legitimacy of Malagasy aspirations to independence, they were resented by both the French **settlers** and Governor-General **Robert Barges**. In 1956, Madagascar officially ceased to be mission territory, although missionary activity continues. Recent conversions to Catholicism are rare, however, as the population has responded more favorably to competition from indigenous cults, Pentecostal sects, and **Islam**.

After independence in 1960, the Catholic church continued to be a political presence in the island. Its **educational** network—two presidents, **Philibert Tsiranana** of the **First Republic** and **Didier Ratsiraka** of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) and the **Third Republic**, attended the College Saint Michel in Antananarivo—its press and its international ties have combined to allow it to be critical of government. Under the DRM the church expressed consistent antagonism to the regime's professed socialism, its economic failures, and its governance tactics. In 1984, another Bishops' Letter portrayed the characteristics of dictatorship in terms that clearly reflected on Ratsiraka. In 1987, a message from Pope John Paul II deplored the deterioration of the moral climate of the regime, and in the same year a second Bishops' Letter attacked the growth of a wealthy elite immune to the misery of the poor. The Catholic churches, like the Protestants, had links with the **Kung Fu** movements that threatened the power structure in 1984.

After 1987, the church press continued to criticize the government of the Democratic Republic. In the crisis of 1991, the Catholic and Protestant ecumenical **FFKM** (Council of Christian Churches) at first attempted to mediate between Ratsiraka and his opponents. After the massacre of **Iavoloha** the FFKM undertook leadership of the opposition and contributed to the demise of the DRM. Through the 1990s and into the 21st century, the church participated in the FFKM's ecumenical campaigns, often in overt dissent from both the **Albert Zafy** and (second) Ratsiraka administrations. In 2001, it gave full support to the presidential candidacy of **Marc Ravalomanana**, a devout Protestant, endorsing Ravalomanana's self-inauguration on 22 February 2002. The influence of Antananarivo's Cardinal Armand Razafindratandra, has been perceived in several of the new president's key government appointments.

The contemporary church consists of 20 dioceses served by 360 priests, 23 monastic congregations with 601 monks (364 of them non-Malagasy), and 75 convents with some 3,000 nuns. The first Malagasy bishop was consecrated in 1948. Cardinal Archbishop Razafindratandra presides over the hierarchy and represents the church in the FFKM. Its weekly newspaper, ***LaKroan'i Madagasikara***, carries considerable political and moral weight well beyond the church's parishioners.



**CATTLE.** More than a mere commodity, Malagasy humpbacked cattle (zebu) represent a source and an index of family wealth. They are property to be cherished, rather than consumed, as a guarantee of prosperity for the lineage. Only by necessity and on special occasions, usually connected with a rite of passage, will a family butcher its herd but, when it needs to display generosity, hospitality, or sheer affluence, the feast—and the financial sacrifice—can be excessive. In some parts of the south, the horns of this sacrifice adorn family tombs, again as a sign of wealth. Madagascar's zebu herds, estimated as over 10 million, are ubiquitous—in villages and towns as well as the vast, sparsely populated interior. They are often subject to systematic raids by rustlers who use far-flung family networks for refuge in a wild-western culture of clan rivalries. Fresh beef is available in all island markets. It is consumed regularly (always with **rice**) by those can afford it. Canned beef was once an **export** item of importance in the economy, but the industry encountered difficulty satisfying sanitary regulations in Europe and has been unable to compete with Argentina and other more efficient exporters. From 7,200 metric tons in 1980, beef exports declined to 800 tons in 1997, then became negligible.

**CAYLA, LEON (1881–1965).** A career colonial administrator, Cayla had already been stationed in Madagascar before serving as **governor-general** there from 1930 to 1939. He arrived with orders to control the developing **nationalist movement**, which had just staged the **Demonstration of 19 May 1929**, and his name is associated with the **Décret Cayla**, which gave the colonial administration increased powers to arrest and detain agitators. His administration was marked by arrests of Malagasy nationalists and their French sympathizers, suspensions of newspapers, and a tight control on the labor market that eased only with the coming to power of the **Popular Front in France** in 1936. Economic hardships of the 1930s obliged Cayla to reduce the size of his administration, but he pursued a program of public works that included completion of the **Fianarantsoa-Manakara** railroad, improvements to the port of **Toamasina**, and the development of an air travel network. Much of this work was implemented through a compulsory labor corps known as the **Service de la Main-d'Oeuvre des Travaux d'Intérêt Général** (SMOTIG). Cayla returned to Madagascar from

July 1940 to April 1941 as the **Vichy** regime's replacement for **Marcel De Coppel**, who had contemplated siding with the **Free French** in 1940.

**CENSORSHIP.** Madagascar has one of the oldest presses in Africa and one of the oldest censorship laws, passed under the **Merina Empire**. Censorship was strengthened under the colonial administration, which first forbade newspapers in the Malagasy **language** and later, when this ban was relaxed, required all newspapers to be managed by French citizens. In 1959 the **Philibert Tsiranana** government, to become the **First Republic** in 1960, prohibited publication of articles offensive to national and (French) Community institutions. Censorship was briefly lifted after the **May 1972 Revolution**, but returned with the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** and the establishment of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar (DRM)**. In 1973, an Order of Journalists under the control of the Ministry of Information was created, and journalists were required to be licensed. In August 1975 an ordinance allowed **Didier Ratsiraka's** new administration to suspend any journal harmful to public order, national unity, or morality. Newspapers were audited by the Ministry of Information and Ideological Guidance, by a unit in the president's office, and by the DRM regime party, **AREMA**. Film distribution was nationalized in 1975, and both radio and television were government managed.

Abolition of censorship was one of the demands of the opposition groups that mobilized to end the Second Republic (DRM). In March 1989 President Didier Ratsiraka announced the end of press censorship. Control over broadcasting was also relaxed. Like the other reforms produced in Ratsiraka's attempt to retain power, these were not enough to satisfy the opposition. **Media** freedoms continued through the **Third Republic**, however, despite periodic complaints of harassment by journalists. In 2003, a new draft communications code sought to standardize requirements for the profession and to control the intense proliferation of (often fugitive) broadcast outlets.

**CHARTER OF THE MALAGASY REVOLUTION.** Also known as the *Boky Mena*, or Red Book, the charter is based on a series of broadcasts by **Didier Ratsiraka** in August 1975 as part of the campaign for the **Referendum of 21 December 1975** on the establishment of the

**Democratic Republic of Madagascar (DRM).** The charter provided the ideological basis of the Malagasy political system, and adherence to its principles was the precondition for legal political participation. It begins by exalting the Malagasy nation and identifying the Democratic Republic with the **nationalist** tradition of the **Menalamba**, **Vy Vato Sakelika**, and the martyrs of the **Rebellion of 1947**. Although the republic espouses Marxism, the charter minimizes the importance of internal class conflict and argues that the main conflict is between the Malagasy nation and neocolonialism. The revolution is declared to be compatible with **religion**, small-scale private property, and rule by social elites if they share the goals enunciated in the charter. Five “pillars of the revolution” were identified: oppressed workers and peasants, progressives, young intellectuals, **women** “as such,” and the **military**. The charter promises the **decentralization** of economic benefits and political power, increased access to **education**, and a nationalist and “progressive” **foreign policy**. Although political discourse in the DRM was more pluralistic than its restrictions suggest, the charter was never disavowed as the basis of the 1975–1991 regime.

**CHEVIGNE, PIERRE DE (1909–?).** De Cheigné served as **governor-general** of Madagascar from February 1948 to February 1950. Although without previous colonial experience, he had served with the **Free French** forces during World War II, and was given the task of restoring the colonial system after the **Rebellion of 1947**. He ordered the execution of the presumed “general” of the uprising, **Samuel Rakotondrabe**, and strictly enforced the state of siege, preventing any reconstitution of the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** (MDRM) and keeping identifiable nationalists under strict administrative surveillance.

**CHINESE.** Madagascar has a Chinese community largely concentrated on the east coast and central **highlands**. Their population, listed in the 1966 census as about 9,000, is by now certainly double that number, although many earlier Sino-Malagasy have married into indigenous families. The Chinese first came to Madagascar to work on the **Antananarivo-Toamasina** railroad, but most came in waves of immigration between the two world wars, largely from the area around

Canton. World War II and the Communist takeover of mainland China put an effective end to immigration until the 1990s. The Sino-Malagasy established themselves as small merchants at first and, like the **Indo-Pakistanis** on the west coast, gradually came to dominate retail and wholesale markets, the collection of cash crops and **rice**. Like the Indo-Pakistanis (**Karana**), their businesses were the targets of **nationalizations** under the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** of 1972–1975 and the subsequent **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM), but they never disappeared from their networks of rural credit and marketing. Liberalization of economic policy after 1983 reopened legitimate access to those networks.

In the pro-Western **First Republic**, Taiwan maintained a fairly active embassy in Madagascar, but the policy was reversed under the DRM, with the People's Republic assuming a conspicuous role in diplomacy and technical assistance. From 1991 to 1998, the **Third Republic** practiced a virtual “two Chinas” policy, sustaining a relatively dormant formal relationship with Beijing while indulging a Taiwanese “special delegation” that itself produced very little for either side. The Taiwanese were expelled in September 1998. Beginning in 1996, a new wave of merchant immigrant families settled in Antananarivo and other cities. They seemed to Malagasy less committed to their new homeland, less willing to assimilate than earlier generations of Chinese, more interested in short-term trading advantages, particularly in consumer **imports** and in **exporting** Madagascar's gemstones. Relations between the communities were expected to improve after the creation of a new Malagasy-Chinese Business Council in July 2004.

**CHRISTIANITY.** One-half the population of Madagascar is affiliated with a Christian church; an estimated 25 percent of the population professes **Catholicism** (although actual practitioners are probably three-fourths that number) and 21 percent **Protestantism**. The establishment of Christian **missions** in Madagascar began with the arrival of the **London Missionary Society** (LMS) in 1817, at the invitation of **Radama I**, king of the **Merina Empire**, and the churches were at first closely connected with royal power. The LMS missionaries were expelled in 1835 by **Ranavalona I** but returned after her death in 1861. They were followed by other missions, Protestant and Catholic.

Christianity became formally established in 1869 by the conversion of **Ranavalona II** and her prime minister, **Rainilaiarivony**, to LMS Protestantism. Because of the official position of Protestant Christianity in the Merina Empire, its churches tended to recruit among the upper classes of **Antananarivo province**, while the **Catholic church**, including the Jesuits, recruited more to the south, on the coasts, and among the lower classes of **Imerina**. At the village level, rivalry between the denominations was often acute. Although starting in competition, Christian church relations have developed considerable solidarity over time, and with important historical consequences. In 1970, the *Fiangonan'i Jesosy Kristy eto Madagasikara*, (FJKM, Church of Jesus Christ in Madagascar) was founded to link the Protestant churches of the **highlands**, the French Evangelical churches, and the Quaker meetings. In 1980, the **FFKM**, or Federation of Malagasy Christian Churches, linked the Catholic and FJKM denominations, the Lutherans, and the Anglicans.

At virtually all degrees of faith, Malagasy Christians tend to combine tenets of indigenous **religion** with church doctrine, as exemplified in circumcision rituals, the acceptance of a supreme deity (*Andriamanitra*, the perfumed lord), the ubiquity of an ancestral world together with realms of heaven and hell, and recourse to astrology and divination as influences on existential decisions. While this syncretistic impulse is stronger among rural and lower class Malagasy, all denominations have had to tolerate unorthodox beliefs and practices among their most faithful adherents, rich and poor. A rise in the popularity of Pentecostal cults during the last decades of the 20th century has eroded the strength of the established churches without weakening this devotion to traditional animism.

Far from otherworldly renunciation of the mundane, Malagasy Christianity has developed in dialectical tension with political reality. After the French conquest, the church networks, particularly those of the Protestants, provided rare opportunities for **education** and employment not controlled by the colonial regime, and were often a source of **nationalist** activities. After independence, the control of the churches over educational networks, publications, and funding permitted them to maintain a stance independent of successive governments. Although Christian political parties fared poorly on the national level, they exerted influence on both regime parties in the **First**

**Republic** and the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM). During the former, spokespeople and newspapers expressed the frustration of Merina nationalists against the “neo-colonialist” indulgence of the **Philibert Tsiranana** government. Under the DRM, the most articulate criticism of **Didier Ratsiraka**, until the formation of a Democratic Alliance in 1988, came from the churches and particularly from the Catholic bishops.

The FFKM played a major role in the transition to the **Third Republic**. It created an important **election** observation committee (CNOE) and at first attempted to mediate between President Ratsiraka and the opposition factions in the **Forces Vives**. After the massacre at **Iavoloha** in 1991, however, the FFKM declared its solidarity with the opposition that overthrew Ratsiraka and crafted a new constitution. The FFKM has received both credit and blame for precipitating the faithful but ineffective Forces Vives leader, **Albert Zafy**, into the Third Republic’s presidency in 1992–1993. After cohabiting in tension with both Zafy and the second Ratsiraka administration through the 1990s, the churches reemerged into prominence during the presidential campaign of 2001, overtly favoring the devoutly Protestant **Marc Ravalomanana**, businessman-mayor of **Antananarivo** and vice president of the FJKM. During the ensuing **Crisis of 2002**, Christian clergy exhorted the faithful to resist Ratsiraka and to support Ravalomanana in strikes, demonstrations, and even in his self-inauguration as president in February 2002. For his part, once in power, Ravalomanana unequivocally endorsed a positive role for religion in public life. He advanced the concept of *fahamasinana* (sacredness) as one of the twin pillars of statecraft (the other is truthfulness), and called on the churches to contribute to Madagascar’s social and economic development. In mid-2003, FFKM leaders seemed to retreat from their uncritical partisan commitments; they decried the subordination of religion to policy and induced the president to grant the churches a more subdued role of prayer and moral example. This compromise failed to suppress speculation over whether Ravalomanana had seriously entertained theocratic proclivities (some even termed them “satanic”), or rather, was craftily using traditional Malagasy spirituality as leverage against entrenched but corrupt bureaucratic power (the *fanjakana*).

**CLOVES.** *See* SPICES.

**CLUB DES 48.** An informal association of the **Merina** economic elite based in **Antananarivo**, the club was frequently referred to during the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** of 1972–1975 as a conservative force pushing the regime in the direction of state capitalism rather than popular or scientific socialism. Although the term “club” exaggerates their degree of organization, the elaborately interconnected elite families of the capital have maintained noteworthy influence on the political, economic, and cultural leadership of all three republics.

**CODE OF 305 ARTICLES.** An effort to rationalize the legal system of the **Merina Empire** in 1881, codification of laws was part of the strategy of Prime Minister **Rainilaiarivony** to protect the monarchy and his own administration against European condemnation as “barbarian.” The code was intended for **Imerina** alone, while the **Betsileo** had their own code, and other areas of the empire were ruled indirectly. The code included provisions barring foreign ownership of Malagasy territory, a provision that was to lead to disputes with the French.

**COFFEE.** Although there are some indigenous species of coffee in Madagascar, commercial cultivation first started in the mid-19th century with arabica beans introduced from **Réunion**. Under local growing conditions, the species proved vulnerable to *Hemileia vastrix*, which arrived about 1880, also from Réunion. Arabica was replaced by hardier varieties, of which the most common today is robusta. Coffee was one of the main crops grown by French **settlers**, particularly on the east coast, but in the period between the two world wars, the colonists were gradually displaced by Malagasy cultivators. The **Rebellion of 1947** led to further abandonment of European plantations, and by independence 90 percent of commercialized coffee was grown by Malagasy.

Coffee is now cultivated by 500,000 small planters on the east coast and in some areas of the north; 90 percent of it is robusta, which has encountered market resistance overseas. The **European Union** is helping expand cultivation of high quality arabica in the western **highlands**. Coffee was once Madagascar’s most important **export**, but it has been surpassed by **vanilla** and subsequently by **fisheries** products and by textile manufactures. Vicissitudes of weather, anti-

quated technology, and weak commercial links to urban and foreign markets have depressed production and discouraged investment. Since 1998, production has varied between 58,000 and 65,000 metric tons while **exports** of coffee, once as high as 63,500 metric tons in 1989, fell to 30,000 tons in 1998, and to less than 5,000 tons annually in 2000–2002. When the world price declines, beans may be stockpiled to await better market conditions but they are often left unpicked, and farmers are inclined to uproot trees to convert acreage to **rice**.

**COMITE DE RECONCILIATION NATIONALE.** *See* RECONCILIATION NATIONALE.

**COMITE DE SOLIDARITE DE MADAGASCAR.** Also known as COSOMA, this committee was founded in 1948 under the aegis of the French Communist party to aid Malagasy **nationalists** prosecuted for their part in the **Rebellion of 1947**. Active in both **France** and Madagascar, COSOMA first concentrated on supplying the political prisoners of 1947 and their families with food, clothing, and legal assistance. Later it campaigned to ameliorate the conditions of imprisonment and for **amnesty**. Its efforts were in part responsible for the transfer of the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** (MDRM) deputies from prison in Corsica to restricted residence in France. The COSOMA also served as an organizational base for nationalists who were prevented from overt political activity. Among the Malagasy active in the committee were **Richard Andriamanjato** and **Gisèle Rabesahala**.

**COMITE DES FORCES VIVES.** *See* FORCES VIVES.

**COMITE DU SALUT PUBLIC.** This Committee of Public Safety was founded during World War II by the nationalist pastor **Ravelojaona** to defend the farmers of the **highlands** against the exactions of the **Office du Riz**. In 1945 its activities took a more directly political turn when it sent a letter to the French government demanding independence for Madagascar. Although Ravelojaona did not join the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** after the war, other members of the committee did, and the networks established by



the Comité du Salut Public were used as a basis for the MDRM party's expansion.

**COMITE NATIONAL DE REDRESSEMENT ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIAL (CNRES) / NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RECOVERY.** The CNRES was established by the **Panorama** agreement of 31 October 1991 as one of the institutions of the transition to the **Third Republic**. It was a consultative body of 130 members, chaired by two prominent defectors from the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar (DRM)**, **Manandafy Rakotonirina**, and **Richard Andriamanjato**. Although its functions were never clearly defined, it did manage to produce a sketch for the economic recovery of the island in April 1993.

**COMITE NATIONAL POUR L'OBSERVATION DES ELECTIONS (NATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION COMMITTEE).** On the urging of church leaders in the **FFKM**, the CNOE was formed in 1989 to monitor the series of **elections** announced for that year by President **Didier Ratsiraka** of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar (DRM)**. Ratsiraka had refused to invite international **election** observers. CNOE challenged the published results of the presidential elections of March 1989, contending that Ratsiraka had received only 47 percent of the vote rather than the 62 percent he claimed. After the elections the CNOE joined with other groups, including the Comité des **Forces Vives**, to work for the removal of Ratsiraka and the end of the DRM. CNOE jurists also denounced irregularities in legal process, including the organic linkage between the Second Republic's constitution and Ratsiraka's **Charter of the Malagasy Revolution**. Its participation in the Forces Vives provided a pragmatic counterweight to a predominantly charismatic movement. Under the leadership of **Madeleine Ramaholimihaso**, CNOE exerted considerable influence on the composition of the **Third Republic's** constitution. It maintained a critical attitude toward both the **Albert Zafy** and the second Ratsiraka administrations. While endorsing the outcomes of some elections staged during the 1990s, CNOE protested the massive exclusion of voters from the constitutional **Referendum of March 1998** and the subsequent legislative elections, which it termed a "reversal of democracy."

Seeking a more operative role, CNOE has expanded its activity from sheer electoral observation, becoming a major participant in civil society; these functions lengthened its name to Comité National d'Observation des Elections et d'Education des Citoyens (National Committee for Election Observation and Citizen Education). Its specific functions aim at the elimination of official **corruption**, protection of civil liberties, and the realization of public-private partnerships in state affairs. In the controversy over the December 2001 presidential elections, CNOE suffered a split; Ramaholimihaso deemed the first-round results too ambiguous to declare a winner, whereas her deputy, André Rasolo, interpreted CNOE observer reports as verification of **Marc Ravalomanana's** claim to have won a majority. Rasolo's position was eventually confirmed by the courts, the churches, and by political reality.

**COMMERCIAL COMPANIES.** Along with the imposition of **French** colonial rule, French trading and commercial companies took over the Malagasy **economy**. The three most important companies were the Marseillaise, the Lyonnaise, and the Société de l'Emyrne, a subsidiary of the Rochefortaise. These companies handled the wholesale end of Madagascar's **import-export** business. Through their access to credit and their ability to finance smaller businesses down the chain of distribution, they dominated trade on the island. Another company, the Havraise, had a monopoly of shipping to and from Madagascar and controlled the island's two major **banks**. The activities of the first three companies earned them the title "the three crocodiles of the island." The **First Republic** did little to diminish the power of the commercial companies, and they were among the targets of the **nationalization** measures of the **Gabriel Ramanantsoa** and **Didier Ratsiraka** regimes. The Marseillaise was the last to be nationalized, in 1976.

**COMMISSION MIXTE FRANCO-MALGACHE.** 1. This was an advisory body created in December 1943 at the instigation of the **Free French** commissioner for colonies, René Pleven, in response to demands of both French **settlers** and Malagasy citizens for a restoration of some degree of representation. The commission was to be composed of an equal number of Europeans and Malagasy named by

the governor-general. Before it could begin operation, however, it was superseded by the **Conseil Représentatif**. 2. This commission was established at the time of the renegotiation of the **Cooperation Agreements** between **France** and Madagascar in 1973. Relations between the two countries were so difficult at the time, however, that the commission did not meet until 1977. It now meets on an annual basis to discuss the amount and distribution of French aid to Madagascar, particularly in the area of technical assistance. Other issues, including French assistance in the relief of Madagascar's **debts**, are handled through alternative channels. *See also* PARIS CLUB; WORLD BANK.

**COMMUNE DE MOYEN EXERCICE.** Under the colonial system a commune de moyen exercice was an urban area with an elected municipal council and an administrator-mayor appointed by the **governor-general**. By the 1950s, there were 20 communes de moyen exercice in Madagascar, including the capital, Tananarive (**Antananarivo**). In 1955, a French law on municipal organization in Africa and Madagascar created the **communes de plein exercice** with mayors chosen by the councils.

**COMMUNE DE PLEIN EXERCICE.** Created by French law in 1955, the commune de plein exercice had an elected council and a mayor elected by the council. The first communes de plein exercice in Madagascar were the provincial capitals: Tananarive (**Antananarivo**), **Fianarantsoa**, Tamatave (**Toamasina**), Majunga (**Mahajanga**), and Tuléar (**Toliara**). Diégo-Suarez (**Antsiranana**) became a commune de plein exercice when the province of Diégo-Suarez was created in November 1956. The law also merged the French and Malagasy colleges within the councils. The municipal councils elected in 1956 served as political bases for many of the early figures of the **First Republic**. After internal autonomy in 1958, the remaining municipalities became communes de plein exercice. In 1960, Tananarive, which had consistently elected mayors from opposition parties, was given a special status with the elected mayor subordinate to an appointed prefect.

**COMMUNES RURALES.** Rural communes, grouping several villages with an elected council and mayor, were established by the

**First Republic** in 1959 in an attempt to coordinate rural development efforts. In general this system of rural organization was not considered a success. Villagers complained of a lack of resources for development and of the authoritarian attitude of the administration, while administrators complained of corrupt and inefficient rural councils and mayors. The institution was revived in 1995 under the **Third Republic**, which has 1513 rural communes; they elect their respective mayors and councils on a four-year cycle.

**COMMUNES RURALES AUTONOMES MODERNISEES (CRAM).** After a succession of failures, the CRAM were created by the French colonial authority in an attempt to increase rural **agricultural** productivity. Under this scheme a small number of the more promising Malagasy communes were to be provided with extra development funds and encouraged to experiment with new crops and techniques. By 1953, 17 CRAM were in operation. Their effectiveness was limited, however, by administrative insistence on crops that provided a quick monetary return and on mechanization in circumstances where it was not always suitable. The fact that the CRAM were run by the territorial administration and largely boycotted by the agricultural services also made their operation difficult.

**COMMUNES URBAINES.** The **Third Republic** distinguishes between rural and urban communes, both designated as points of origin for social and economic development. In 2004, there are 45 urban communes, nine of them large enough to be coextensive with an electoral district (*fivondrona*); communes have elected mayors and councils, while districts are administered by appointed sub-prefects.

**COMORIANS.** Many Comorians came to Madagascar after World War II in response to overcrowding on their home islands. By 1970, there were approximately 60,000 Comorians in Madagascar; they formed close to a majority of the population in the port city of **Mahajanga**. In that city, and in **Antsiranana** where they were also numerous, they constituted a large proportion of the urban proletariat and most of the **Islamic** community. Comorians often had difficult relations with the Malagasy because of competition for jobs and because the Comorians had been extensively employed in the colonial

police force. At the time of Malagasy independence in 1960, most Comorians retained French citizenship. When the **Cooperation Agreements** between Madagascar and **France** were nullified in 1973, French citizens no longer enjoyed special status in Madagascar, and an exodus of Comorians began. In 1976, anti-Comorian riots broke out in Mahajanga, leaving over 1,000 dead. Most of the remaining Comorians were repatriated by the two governments. About 15,000 to 20,000 remained, most living in the capital, **Antananarivo**. Recent decades have witnessed a steady revival of Comorian immigration, particularly from the three islands granted independence in 1975 where domestic instability and insuperable poverty stimulate emigration. Comorian students attend all Malagasy universities and, albeit undocumented, tend to remain in the Great Island after the end of their studies. The Comorian community in Mahajanga has again neared majority proportions. *See also* COMORO ISLANDS.

**COMORO ISLANDS.** The Republic of the Comoros, consisting of Njazidja (Grande-Comore), Nzwani (Anjouan), and Mwali (Mohéli), is located in the **Indian Ocean** just northwest of Madagascar. The archipelago's closest island, Mayotte, 320 kilometers away, has been retained as French territory against the objections of the republic and sympathetic African states. It is possible that the earliest settlers of Madagascar came via the Comoro Islands, and the Comoros and Madagascar were part of the Indian Ocean trading network that predated the arrival of Europeans in the region. At the turn of the 18th century, the **Sakalava** and **Betsimisaraka** sent raiding expeditions against the islands, and in 1831, the king of the **Boina Sakalava**, **Andriantsoly**, fled to Mahore (Mayotte) after the capture of his kingdom by the **Merina Empire**. Both Madagascar and the Comoros were incorporated into the French Empire in the 19th century, and from 1912 to 1946, the islands were administered from Madagascar. The **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** supported the creation of the new state of the Comoro Islands in 1976, and protested the separation of Mayotte. Relations with the government of Ali Soilih were prejudiced, however, by the attacks on **Comorians** in **Mahajanga** and other cities in December 1976. When Soilih was overthrown by a group of mercenaries in 1978, Madagascar condemned the new

regime and protested the ties it developed with **South Africa**. Relations did not return to normal until 1985, under encouragement by the French. They have remained cordial, although some Malagasy worry about **Islamic** extremism among young Comorians in the Great Island, and they often object to smuggling of **vanilla** and **cloves** out to the Comoros, to be sold for French francs (now euros).

**COMPAGNIE DES INDES ORIENTALES.** The company was created by Cardinal Richelieu in 1642 under royal patent to develop a French presence in the **Indian Ocean** and in India itself. The establishment of a settlement in Madagascar was among its charges, and an attempt was made at **Fort-Dauphin**. The company's charter was reconfirmed in 1654, but its history was troubled by the political vicissitudes of its founders in **France** and by maritime competition with the British and Dutch. The attempt to settle in Madagascar was abandoned after the massacre of the garrison in 1674, and the company's other enterprises were not significantly more successful. It was taken over by the Crown, renamed the Compagnie Française des Indes Orientales, and in 1717, given a formal monopoly over the **slave trade** from Madagascar. The monopoly was never effective, and was ended in 1767.

**CONCESSIONS.** Under the **Merina Empire**, French and creole merchant-planters on the east coast received usufructory grants of land from the Crown to grow food and cash crops for the benefit of the colonies at Bourbon (**Réunion**) and Ile de France (**Mauritius**). The French colonial regime gave large land grants to companies and **settlers** as part of its agricultural development policy. In all about 900,000 hectares were granted as concessions, 500,000 to five companies: Suberbie, la Compagnie de la Grand Ile, la Compagnie Franco-Malgache de la Culture, Sambrana, and Delhorbe. The remaining land went to smaller companies and to about 2,000 individuals. The concessions were expected to play a major role in the production of cash crops for **export**, but much of the land remained unworked, though unavailable for cultivation by the Malagasy. The concessions, particularly along the east coast, were among the main targets of the **Rebellion of 1947**. After the creation of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** in 1975, the concessions were **nationalized**

as part of the **land reform** policy. Although the land was claimed both by the descendants of the original owners and by the Malagasy who had been employed there, most of the land turned into state farms that have been re-**privatized** since the 1980s. *See also* AGRICULTURAL POLICY.

**CONGRES NATIONAL POPULAIRE.** After the **May 1972 Revolution** the leader of the new government, General **Gabriel Ramanantsoa**, agreed to demonstrator demands for a national congress to discuss the political future of Madagascar. Revolutionary leaders in the **Komity Iraisan'ny Mpitolona** (KIM, United Action Committee) wanted a fundamental restructuring of Malagasy politics and society and saw the gathering as a constituent congress that would design a political system based on their ideas. By the time the congress convened on 4 September 1972, however, Ramanantsoa had consolidated his position so that he was no longer dependent on the radical KIM and had established a more conservative government. On the eve of the congress he declared a state of siege, effectively preventing further demonstrations, and announced that he was preparing a new constitution to be submitted to a nationwide **Referendum on 8 October**. These two actions undercut the purpose of the congress, as did quarrels among the delegates from various factions and various parts of the island, and it ended without having been able to draft a plan for the type of radical direct democracy hoped for by some participants. *See also* RAMANANTSOA INTERREGNUM.

**CONGRESS OF PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES.** After the success of the “yes” vote in the **Referendum on the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic**, **Philibert Tsiranana** convoked the assemblies of Madagascar’s provinces to **Antananarivo** to vote on the future status of the island. The congress voted for the status of autonomy within the French Community, and on 15 October 1958, Governor-General **André Soucadaux** proclaimed the achievement of autonomy and the expiration of the **Annexation Law of 1896**. The **Loi-Cadre Government Council** became a provisional government, and the existing legislature was dissolved, to be replaced by a new national assembly.

**CONSEIL DE LA REPUBLIQUE.** This was the second house of parliament under the Fourth French Republic, replacing the senate of the Third Republic. Madagascar was to have five senators, two elected by French citizens and three elected by Malagasy holding French citizenship. Following the successes of the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** (MDRM) in elections to the French parliament, however, the administration decided to have the senators jointly elected by the two colleges of the provincial assemblies. Under these circumstances, one MDRM senator, **Justin Bezara**, was elected on 30 March, just after the outbreak of the **Rebellion of 1947**. His parliamentary immunity was lifted in August so that he could be tried for complicity in the uprising. *See also INDIGENAT.*

**CONSEIL MILITAIRE POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT.** The Military Council for Development, established by the 1975 constitution of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar**, was the consultative body of the Malagasy armed forces. Composed of 50 members chosen by the president of the republic from lists submitted by different branches of the military, it met twice a year in closed sessions. Reports of its deliberations suggest that it did not provide a major arena for **military** politics in Madagascar or a major channel for communication between the armed forces and the administration. Rather, discussion tended to concentrate on technical aspects of development projects and law-and-order issues, such as the repression of banditry. The presidency of the council was often used as a semiretirement position to remove senior officers from direct political activity.

**CONSEIL NATIONAL POPULAIRE DE DEVELOPPEMENT (CNPD) / NATIONAL PEOPLE'S DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL.** This 162-member assembly was established as a consultative body during the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** after the **May 1972 Revolution**. Elected in 1973, it included some former members from the dominant party of the **First Republic**, the **Parti Social Démocrate**, but most members listed themselves as "nonpartisan, favorable to the regime." The CNPD itself rarely met, but its permanent commission, chaired by the Protestant minister **Michel Fety**, played an important role in the politics of the Interregnum. The council itself met once after Ramanantsoa's fall, on 5 November



1975. It was formally dissolved on 31 March 1976, to be replaced under the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** by the **Assemblée Nationale Populaire**.

**CONSEIL REPRESENTATIF.** This council was established by the French colonial authority on 23 March 1945. It was to be composed of 60 members, half of them Malagasy. One-third of the Malagasy members were to be named by the **governor-general** and the others were to be elected by local notables. It was replaced by the more directly elected *Assemblée Représentative* after the creation of the Fourth French Republic.

**CONSEIL SUPERIEUR DES COLONIES (CSC).** The Superior Council of the Colonies was a largely phantom body designed to represent **France's** colonies under the Third French Republic. In its early period of existence members were usually French citizens and were customarily named by the colonial administration. In 1939 Madagascar's first election to the council was held, and the **nationalist** leader **Ravelojoana** was elected.

**CONSEIL SUPERIEUR DES INSTITUTIONS.** The Superior Council of Institutions was formally the highest judicial authority of the **First Republic**. It consisted of five members, two named by the president of the republic, two by the president of the **Assemblée Nationale**, and one by the president of the **Senate**. The council played a role in legitimizing the transfer of power from **Philibert Tsiranana** to General **Gabriel Ramanantsoa** in 1972, from Ramanantsoa to Colonel **Richard Ratsimandrava** in 1975, to the **Directoire Militaire** after Ratsimandrava's assassination, and to **Didier Ratsiraka** and the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar (DRM)** in June 1975. Under the DRM, it was replaced by the **Haute Cour Constitutionnelle**.

**CONSEIL SUPREME DE LA REVOLUTION.** The Supreme Council of the Revolution was the formal executive body of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar**. Established by the 1975 constitution, the CSR was charged with the task of assisting the president of the republic in the "conception, orientation, and oversight of national policy and the preservation of internal and external national sover-

eignty.” Immediately following **Didier Ratsiraka**’s accession to power in June 1975, the council consisted of the officers of the **Directoire Militaire** that had been formed after the February assassination of President **Richard Ratsimandrava**. In 1976, it was enlarged to include civilians, and eventually became a largely civilian body of approximately 22 members named by the president, two-thirds directly and one-third from a list supplied by the **Assemblée Nationale Populaire**. The CSR was chaired by the president of the republic, and its doyen (oldest member) replaced the president as acting head of state in his absence. Although the council included representatives of all parties who were members of the **Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution**, it was dominated by the regime party, **AREMA**.

The CSR had seven commissions: the plenary commission, which dealt with foreign affairs and the national plan; the defense commission, composed only of **military** councilors; and commissions for finance and **agriculture**; food supplies, agriculture, and **tourism**; **industry** and commerce; culture and society; and justice and administration. The commissions dealt with questions as assigned by the president. Although appointment to the CSR was often tantamount to semiretirement, the council also served as a power base for certain commissioners and was the scene of some political struggles. In December 1982, **Monja Joana** used his status as CSR doyen to commandeer radio time for a protest against his defeat by Ratsiraka in the recent presidential election, an action which led to his removal from the council (though he later returned). In April 1989, another rival candidate in the presidential elections of the previous month, **Manandafy Rakotonirina**, was ejected from the council for his persistent opposition to Admiral Ratsiraka. In the last days of the Second Republic, Ratsiraka used the CSR as part of his efforts to stay in power. Members of doubtful loyalty were ejected, but Monja Jaona, and the leader of **Vonjy**, Gilbert Sambson, returned to the council. The CSR was abolished in February 1992 by the **Panorama Agreement** that opened the transition to the **Third Republic**.

**CONSEILS DE DISTRICT.** These councils, to be elected by the notables of rural areas, were established in 1944. Their role was purely consultative, and in many districts they rarely met.

**CONSEILS DES NOTABLES.** Councils of Dignitaries, elected by village chiefs, were established by Governor-General **Joseph Gallieni** in 1903, in an attempt to create a reliable political organization in the countryside. They became operational in the 1920s, but dissatisfaction with their usefulness led to reorganization in 1926 and 1930.

**CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLIES.** Two constituent assemblies were held before the establishment of the Fourth French Republic. The first was elected in October 1945, and the second in June 1946, after the French electorate had rejected the constitution drafted by the first assembly. Election to the assemblies constituted the first legal nationwide political activity, and the two delegates chosen by a restricted electorate (the Malagasy college) were **nationalist** leaders **Joseph Raseta** and **Joseph Ravoahangy**. It was during their stay in Paris that the two veteran nationalists, joined by other expatriates, founded the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** (MDRM). In February 1946, the Malagasy delegates sent a memorandum to the minister for colonies calling for the abrogation of the **Annexation Law of 1896** and in March, they submitted a motion to the Assembly calling for autonomy for Madagascar. Reaction to this motion was so hostile that they withdrew it and submitted another calling for negotiations over Madagascar's status. This also met with a hostile response, and a third motion calling for a referendum in Madagascar was pending when the Constituent Assembly ended its work. In the second Assembly the Malagasy delegates continued to urge a referendum on Madagascar's status, but without success. They were also disappointed with the new constitution's provisions for the colonies, which allowed very little autonomy and treated the overseas territories as integral parts of **France** with no prospect for future independence. *See also* REBELLION OF 1947.

**CONSTITUTION, THIRD REPUBLIC.** The constitution was passed by the **National Forum** on 31 March 1992, in spite of objections from partisans of the expiring **Democratic Republic of Madagascar**. The constitution establishes a modified parliamentary system, the first in Malagasy history, with a dual executive. Reacting against the imperial presidencies of **Philibert Tsiranana** and **Didier Ratsiraka**, presidential powers were sharply reduced. The president

serves a five-year term and may be reelected once. The prime minister was elected by and responsible to the lower house of the legislature. The legislature is composed of two houses, an **Assemblée Nationale** that is directly elected by proportional representation and a **Senate** (not actually formed until 2001) that is indirectly elected—two-thirds by a college of representatives of local government bodies and one-third appointed by the president from lists submitted by registered economic and social organizations. The constitution was submitted to a **Referendum on 19 August 1992**, and passed with 66 percent of the vote.

Both Presidents **Albert Zafy** and Ratsiraka successfully challenged the constitution's limitations on their powers. Among other things, Zafy obtained control over the appointment of prime ministers by **Referendum on 17 September 1995**. His term ended a year later, however, in impeachment by a rebellious National Assembly. Although initially committed to replace the 1992 constitution entirely, Ratsiraka had to bide his time and compromise with parliament. His omnibus amendment was approved by still another **Referendum on 15 March 1998** with a slender 51 percent majority of a problematically reduced electorate. This amendment enlarges presidential domination over the prime minister and government, protects the president against peremptory impeachment, gives him special emergency powers, and authorizes devolution of responsibilities from the center to six "autonomous provinces." Paradoxically perhaps, the **decentralization** strategy also operated in favor of presidential authority through budget controls and the **AREMA** party hierarchy, thus marginalizing parliament. In contrast to his predecessors, President **Marc Ravalomanana** has chosen not to experiment with the constitution, preferring to rely on his personal charisma and to decentralize authority through rural and urban communes and newly empowered regions without seeking plebiscitary authorization.

**COOPERATION AGREEMENTS.** The accords de coopération were negotiated in 1960 between **France** and the **First Republic**, as Madagascar moved toward independence. They provided for Franco-Malagasy cooperation in several areas. In **military** affairs they provided for training in France for Malagasy officers and for the secondment of

French officers to the Malagasy military until **Malgachization** of the officer corps was completed. The agreements also authorized French bases at Ivato airport outside the capital, **Antananarivo**, and at **Diégo-Suarez (Antsiranana)**. In **education** the agreements maintained the equivalence of Malagasy degrees with French degrees and put the **University of Madagascar** under a rector nominated by the French Ministry of Education. In financial affairs the agreements kept Madagascar in the **Franc Zone**. Other agreements provided for a supply of French **technical assistants** in the educational system and the administration. This complex nexus with France provoked resentment among the **nationalist** opposition; a demand for their abrogation was one of the slogans of the **May 1972 Revolution**. They were renegotiated in 1973, and most of the arrangements were ended. *See also* RAMANANTSOA INTERREGNUM.

**COOPERATIVES.** Both the postwar **nationalist movement** and the **First Republic** experimented with the establishment of peasant cooperatives. A successful, government-backed cooperative marketed bananas for **export** on the east coast during the 1960s, and in the southwest, a village cooperative, the Syndicat des Communes, organized **Cape pea** production for export to **Great Britain**. The post-1975 **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** attempted to use cooperatives as part of a major reorganization of rural production. The first plan for the formation of cooperatives, published in 1977, was closely modeled on the system operating in **North Korea**. It envisaged a situation in which land was owned by the cooperative, or at least was worked jointly. This plan met with little success and was subjected to two revisions. The final version simply established cooperation in **agricultural** work and in the acquisition of tools and material. In addition to the state cooperative system, there was a rival system operated by the regime party, **AREMA**, that used an investment network called **PRO-COOP** to channel resources directly to regime supporters. Other parties, most notably the **MFM** and **MONIMA**, attempted both to take control of state cooperatives and to establish their own. The **MONIMA** cooperative network, **AVOTSE**, was at one time quite extensive in the south, but eventually ran into financial difficulties from which the regime refused to rescue it. In the past two decades, the cooperative movement has run out of steam.

**COPPET, MARCEL DE (1881–1968).** De Coppet served as **governor-general** of Madagascar twice, from 1939 to 1940 and from 1946 to 1948. A member of the French Socialist party, he had served in Madagascar from 1905 to 1910 and as governor-general of French West Africa. In 1939, De Coppet mobilized the island for the **French** war effort, and at the time of the fall of France in June 1940, declared first for the **Free French** and then, after the British attack on the French fleet at Mers el-Kebir, for the **Vichy** regime. He was recalled to France and replaced by **Armand Annet**, whom the Vichy government considered to be more reliable. His return to Madagascar after the war aroused some hopes in nationalist circles, since one of his acts in 1939 had been the enlargement of Malagasy representation on the **Délégations Economiques et Financières**; however, he had received instructions to block the rise of the nationalist party, the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache**. His vacillating policies, which alternately raised and disappointed nationalist hopes, may have contributed to the **Rebellion of 1947**, and he left under recriminations from both the **settlers** and the nationalists.

**CORN.** *See* AMERICAN CROPS.

**COROLLER, ARISTIDE.** Born in **Mauritius** in or shortly after 1797, Coroller was the secretary (and possibly the nephew, as he claimed) of **Jean René**, whom he succeeded as governor of **Toamasina** under the **Merina Empire** in 1826. As governor of the port, he played a crucial role in dealing with the traders established there and with the representatives of the British and French governments.

**CORRUPTION.** In its preface to a new law specifying strict penalties for official misconduct, the government of President **Marc Ravalomanana** characterized corruption as a “national plague” (*un fléau national*). The law, effective on 9 September 2004, established an Independent Anti-Corruption Agency to investigate and prosecute charges of extortion, conflict of interest, favoritism, bribery, abuse of authority, illegal enrichment, false accusation, and failure to report private holdings. It guarantees leniency for voluntary confessions of such abuses and it pledges protection for authentic sources and witnesses. The new agency has inherited over 700 accusations collected since

2002 by its advisory body, the Conseil Supérieur de Lutte contre la Corruption (CSLCC) / High Council for the Fight against Corruption. The current combat punctuates a decades-long process of veiled complaint, innuendo, and shoulder-shrugging on the part of the **media**, civil society, and a general public that had taken such malfeasance for granted, almost as an entitlement of the bureaucratic class.

Fraudulent personal enrichment by Malagasy officials and tradespeople may be traced to acts of petty insubordination (“*résistance*”) against French colonial domination in the early 20th century. The tendency expanded into a complete methodology for acquisition and retention of political power under the three republics since independence in 1960. Patronage in public employment, favoritism in license and contract issuance, and electoral skullduggery became inherent in the way politicians maintained their positions. Neutral observers consider this “plague” to have reached peaks of intensity during the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) from 1975 to 1991, as opportunities for flagrant self-enrichment multiplied through bureaucratized management of hundreds of state corporations. Nevertheless, while many bureaucracies indulged in routine fraud virtually with impunity, the political arena began to experience some sanitation toward the end of the DRM. Indignation against election-rigging, especially in the remote provinces outside **Antananarivo**, induced the Council of Christian Churches (**FFKM**) to form a prominent **Comité National pour l’Observation des Elections** (CNOE) in 1989, with highly significant improvements in the conduct of virtually all subsequent political contests. Framers of the **constitution** that created the DRM’s successor **Third Republic** in 1992 sought to restrain the range of benefits that could be tapped by dignitaries, using as an example DRM President **Didier Ratsiraka**’s conversion of gifts from his **Libyan** and Iraqi counterparts into personal campaign funds. Nevertheless, very few cases of malfeasance ended in convictions, although informal “evidence” circulated constantly in the capital and other cities.

The new republic’s first president, **Albert Zafy**, deplored Madagascar’s “culture of corruption” early in his three-year tenure (1993–1996). He denounced an innate cultural reluctance to bring “friends and relatives” to justice, even occasionally turning his condemnation on his own ministers. (Although Zafy was ousted by impeachment in 1996,

his offenses were not connected to corruption and he has remained relatively unmarked by the “plague” of corruptibility.) Most suspicions either ended in silence or circulated around the streets until the public tired of them—for instance, the suspicious November 1995 coincidence of the tragic fire that destroyed the *Manjakamiadana* (Queen’s Palace) simultaneously with another deliberately set fire at the archives depository that probably contained incriminating documentation against somebody. In 1999 and 2000, under pressure from **United Nations** agencies, church groups, Transparency International, and the **United States**, Ratsiraka’s second regime enacted legislation for an agency to fight corruption; it began financial audits of several ministries and training centers (even including the parliament), but again with little consequence. In August 2003, after falling from power, Ratsiraka himself was sentenced in absentia to 10 years at hard labor for illegal appropriation of public funds.

The administration that took action against Ratsiraka and other politicians scarcely had a choice. President Ravalomanana owed his legitimacy to confirmation by the **Haute Cour Constitutionnelle** (HCC) in April 2002 that Ratsiraka’s agents had deliberately manipulated the ballot count in the December 2001 election, precisely to deny Ravalomanana the outright majority that he had claimed. Supplanting the Ratsirakan hierarchies under the slogans of “honesty and sanctity” (*fahamarinana* and *fahamasinana*), Ravalomanana’s regime encouraged unusually cogent public expectations of probity, even retribution against malefactors—hence, the prompt establishment of the CSLCC, headed by Bakolao Ramanandraibe Rainivoarianana, director of the magistrates training academy. The new government also pursued several cases of extortion by customs agents and enforced the declaration of financial holdings requirement, even against magistrates who had heretofore claimed exemption from such inquiry.

But an advisory council without investigative powers could only issue policy exhortations, educational guidance, and invitations to file complaints. Until the new agency arrived in 2004, armed with a clear legislative mandate and an array of penalties, public opinion remained skeptical over the government’s good faith—including doubts about Ravalomanana’s well-publicized early initiative to multiply the salaries of ministers and other high officials, precisely, he



said, to *preclude* temptations toward illicit enrichment. Transparency International continued to rank Madagascar among the lowest ten nations in its annual Corruption Perceptions Index (in 2002, it tied for third from the bottom, higher only than Bangladesh and Nigeria, and even with Paraguay). While this deplorable assessment emerged from consultations among the various business communities dealing with Malagasy authorities, the general public seemed more sanguine. A Francophone Agency survey of over 3,000 capital city households in 2003 compared Madagascar relatively well among eight French-speaking African countries for incidents of officious corruption affecting the personal lives of citizens.

Civil society and external agencies have been joined by the Paris-based Francophone Organization in developing approaches to the “national plague.” Greater transparency is already notable in the information available from key ministries and the presidency, and there is a new bill aiming at regulating the acquisition and expenditure of resources by hitherto untouchable political parties.

**COTIER.** This term is used to refer to the non-Merina populations of Madagascar, not all of whom live on or near the coast. It is a political term, designed by French colonial administrators to dramatize the contrasts between the comparatively favored status of the Merina and the marginalization of the other **ethnic groups**. In fact, there is little coherence of interest among the various peoples of the vast lowland regions, and little that separates them from the Merina. Nevertheless, the Merina-Côtier division has served as a pretext for much political organization, as in the formation of the **Parti des Désherités de Madagascar** and the **Parti Social Démocrate**, the dominant party of the **First Republic**. Putative *Côtier* resentment against the Merina was revived intermittently by **Didier Ratsiraka** in his combat against **Antananarivo**-centered dissent and in his unsuccessful calls for “federal” secession in 1992 and 2002. *Côtier* sentiment has become a paradoxical part of the Ratsiraka-Albert Zafy campaign via their Comité de **Réconciliation Nationale** to unseat President **Marc Ravalomanana**, a Merina who was elected in 2001 by majorities in three provinces and substantial showings in the other three. The arrest and prosecution of hundreds of Ratsiraka loyalists, most of them *Côtiers*, during the **Crisis of 2002** has fueled these tribalist campaigns.

**COTTON.** Colonial Madagascar had several rudimentary schemes for cotton growing, mainly in the hot, sparsely populated midwest. Although production never soared to anticipated proportions, acquisition and processing of local yarns became a profitable concern of established **Indo-Pakistani (Karana)** families who managed to compete for decades, albeit at low output levels, with cheap imported fabrics. The industry came under control of the state-owned HASYMA Corporation in the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** but the Karana maintained their share of investment and, in the 1980s were able to take advantage of the advent of new clothing plants set up in the **Export Processing Zones**. HASYMA is scheduled for privatization in 2004.

**COURRIER DE MADAGASCAR.** Madagascar's largest newspaper during the **First Republic**, the *Courrier* was French owned, and took a pro-French and pro-regime stand. Its offices and plant were burned at the time of the **May 1972 Revolution**. The *Courrier* was replaced by *Madagascar Matin*, which was in turn succeeded by the *Madagascar Tribune*. See also MEDIA.

**CRISIS OF 2002.** From early January until late June 2002, Madagascar suffered a damaging political conflict resolved only when the country was nearing the verge of civil war. The first-round presidential **election** of December 2001 was declared indecisive by the **Haute Cour Constitutionnelle** (HCC, High Constitutional Court) after the National Electoral Commission declined to verify the contested vote count reported by the Interior Ministry. That report gave challenger **Marc Ravalomanana**, mayor of **Antananarivo**, a plurality of 46.2 percent over the incumbent, **Didier Ratsiraka**, with 40.9 percent. Four also-rans shared the remainder. Thus, theoretically, a second round was to decide between the two. Although the Ratsiraka administration had refused to allow international election observers in December, a sampling of 80 percent of the voter precincts by the **Comité National pour l'Observation des Elections** (CNOE) confirmed Ravalomanana's claim to have scored better than 50 percent; if correct, the Antananarivo mayor had won the presidency in the first round. The HCC was itself a doubtful authority after having had all but two of its nine members replaced by new Ratsiraka appointees in

November, only one month before the election. In an unusual flight away from public attention, the court issued its controversial verdict on 25 January at a resort hotel 70 kilometers outside the capital.

Outraged by what they considered an effort to steal the election, the Fikombonan'ny Fiangonana Kristiana eto Madagasikara (**FFKM**, Council of Christian Churches of Madagascar), which had favored Ravalomanana, joined with the Ravalomanana factions and some of the CNOE leadership in an appeal for a series of general strikes. So successful were these demonstrations, particularly among the civil service, the **labor unions**, and **students**, that on 28 February, Ratsiraka ventured to declare martial law in the capital and ordered the civil servants back to their posts. Madagascar's traditionally apolitical **military** declined to enforce these decrees, however, leaving Ratsiraka and most of his ministers no choice but to abandon Antananarivo. They set up a rival "capital" at **Toamasina**, Madagascar's principal port and Ratsiraka's home province. From there, the Ratsirakists sought first to effect a secession of the "autonomous provinces" from Antananarivo and, when that effort failed, to strangle the **highland** capital through roadblocks and bridge demolition. These blockades, defended by irregular militias recruited among political partisans, proved partially effective, but the external provinces, never well linked together, suffered as much as the highlands.

Capitalizing on his successes in the streets, Ravalomanana had himself inaugurated, with benedictions from the FFKM, on 22 February 2002. In early March, his appointees took control of government agencies in the capital. These moves went unrecognized internationally and a stalemate ensued in which the Organization of African Unity (predecessor of the **African Union**) sought ineffectually to negotiate a resolution. Taking sides proved difficult for many, including the military, for if Ratsiraka appeared to represent "legality" as declared by the court, Ravalomanana embodied a "legitimacy" borne on the evident desire of the Malagasy population for a decisive change of regime. On 10 April, an administrative tribunal of the Supreme Court declared Ratsiraka's last-minute HCC appointments illegal, restoring the High Court to its status quo ante. That court proceeded to recount the ballot tallies from all 16,493 districts and, on 29 April, it confirmed Ravalomanana's claim of a majority (51.46 percent, to Ratsiraka's 35.9 percent). Once legality had been

redefined, the hitherto quiescent army emerged to eliminate Ratsiraka's militias and their barricades. International approval followed, first by **Mauritius** and the **United States**, subsequently by a hitherto indecisive **France** and its **European Union** partners. Notified by the (recently installed) French government of its intention to deal henceforth with the Ravalomanana reality, Ratsiraka, his family, and several lieutenants left the island on 25 June for voluntary, if unreconciled, exile in France.

The results of the crisis proved deep and lingering in both **economic** and political terms. At least 70 deaths are attributed to skirmishes in the conflict, and the round-up of alleged criminal opponents produced an extended imprisonment for some 400 Ratsirakists—as well as dozens of indictments of exiles in absentia, including the ex-president, members of his family, and chief political lieutenants. Delayed prosecution and dubious prison conditions gave credibility to the opposition Comité de **Réconciliation Nationale**, spearheaded by the intransigent ex-President **Albert Zafy** together with his erstwhile mortal enemies, the captains of Ratsiraka's **AREMA** party. According to **World Bank** estimates, the direct economic cost to the nation exceeded \$600 million, not counting reconstruction of eight bridges destroyed by the militias; 150,000 jobs were lost in the formal sector of the fragile **economy** (80,000 of them in the **Export Processing Zones**); foreign trade was cut in half; the Gross Domestic Product fell 12 percent from its 2001 level; inflation rose to 15 percent, subsiding after supply chains were restored.

**CUNHA, TRISTAN DA.** A Portuguese explorer, Da Cunha was sent to investigate Madagascar after its existence had been reported by **Diego Diaz**. He explored the coast of the island, attacking some **Islamic** settlements, but, finding no evidence of gold or **spices** he abandoned any plans for further activity there.

**CURRENCY.** Having used the Malagasy franc (FMG) during the entire period since independence, Madagascar introduced a new currency, the *ariary*, on 31 July 2003. The changeover proceeds gradually through 2009. Named for the precolonial money of the **Merina Empire** (when it shared currency with locally mined gold and silver, semi-precious stones, cowrie shells and beads), one ariary replaces

five FMG. The conversion thus alleviates the appearance of a steady depreciation that had reduced the FMG's value from its original **Franc Zone** peg, equating 50 FMG to one French franc, to a bottom of over 1,400 FMG to the franc (before the latter's transition to the euro). Since Malagasy **exports** are denominated in dollars, the currency has suffered seriously against the climbing euro. In mid-2004, one United States dollar was worth about FMG 6,525, or 1,305 ariary. This rate reflected some recovery from a precipitous 25 percent decline of the FMG against both the dollar and the euro in the first quarter of 2004.

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**DANCE.** Traditional Malagasy dance tends toward sedate group movement, lacking some of the freedom and vigor associated with dance forms on the African continent. Significant exceptions are found in modernized forms of the **Sakalava** *salegy* which incorporate sexually suggestive movements with versions of “rap” poetry. In the **highlands**, body gestures are restrictive, formalized, emphasizing social solidarity. The **Merina** *afindrafindrao*, a line dance of alternating women and men, is typical in its fixity of form and controlled message. On the coasts and in the south, solo dance is more frequent, more expressive, incorporating narrative and mimesis; yet even there, dance is controlled by **music** of the *valiha* (cylindrical zither), the drum, or other master instrument.

Although western ballet has found little acceptance in Madagascar, modern dance has taken hold among young troupes which perform frequently to small, devoted audiences in the capital. Their work displays original fusions of traditional, mythical themes expressed through sophisticated international vocabulary. Among these troupes is the *Rary* company of the noted choreographer Ariry Andriamoratsiresy, invited to the 2004 Venice Biennale, and the *Vahinala* company of Gaby Saranouffi. *See also* MUSIC.

**DEBT, EXTERNAL.** Madagascar's debt crisis of the early 1980s was precipitated by a combination of internal and external factors. The All-Out **Investment Policy**, initiated in 1978 by the **Democratic Republic**

of **Madagascar** (DRM), involved large-scale borrowing at prevailing commercial rates from both public and private sources. At the same time, attempts to gain control of the collection and distribution of **rice** were leading to shortages that required increasing importation of food, while the redirection of direct foreign investment away from the socialist **economy** perpetuated a decline in industrial production that had begun under the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**. Most of the state corporations erected to replace private enterprises proved inefficient. Externally, a decline in the prices of Madagascar's most important **exports**, particularly **coffee**, and rising prices of **petroleum** and other essential **imports** contributed to the crisis. Madagascar's 1973 departure from the **Franc Zone** also meant that an increasing share of imports was payable in American dollars. By early 1980, the government had to approach the **International Monetary Fund (IMF)** for assistance, concluding in June of the year an initial "standby" credit worth 64.5 million in special drawing rights (SDRs).

Since then, Madagascar's **economic** policy has largely been dominated by the debt crisis and its consequences. Amelioration of the crisis has involved a large number of international actors. The country's major public bilateral creditor is **France** and its largest multilateral creditor is the **World Bank**. Money is also owed to private banks, particularly in France and the **United States**, and to the states of the former **Soviet Union**, which was a major supplier of oil. Conditions for the continuance of IMF aid have included several devaluations of the Malagasy franc, the abandonment of state trading monopolies, and the drafting of a new and more liberal **investment code**.

The crisis has followed several stages. The 1980 agreement was suspended when the IMF decided that the Malagasy government had not fulfilled the conditions for the credits, but was resumed and followed by a new agreement for SDR 109 million in April 1981. In 1984, and again in 1986 and 1987, Madagascar benefited from a rescheduling of debts involving the IMF, the **London Club** of private banks, and the **Paris Club** of public creditors. (The Soviet Union rescheduled the Malagasy debt in 1984.) Rescheduling was accompanied by more loans from, in particular, France, the United States, and the IMF. This rescheduling was not enough to resolve the crisis, which had its basis not only in the debt itself, but also in declining

productivity and financial mismanagement. The government also sought to protect its functionaries and party elite who stood to lose their prerogatives through market liberalization and conversion of state monopolies to private business. By the end of 1987, Madagascar's external debt was estimated as over \$3.2 billion; debt-servicing was taking over 50 percent of export earnings. In October 1988, Madagascar became the second country after Mali to receive exceptional reduction of principal and rescheduling of payments provided in the Toronto Plan for poor-country debtors. In spite of these measures, total debt was estimated at about \$3.9 billion in 1990.

Debt reduction activity was suspended in the political crisis of 1991. Production declined, civil servant strikes prevented the collection of government revenues, payment on all debts except those owing to international institutions stopped, and the IMF suspended interaction with the Malagasy government. Negotiations resumed with the installation of the **Third Republic**, but international donors were wary of the "go it alone" nationalism of the **Albert Zafy** administration and the confusion attending **Didier Ratsiraka's** return to power in 1997, given his record of preference for controlled parastatal economics. Debt relief resumed in earnest with the advent of a technocratic ministry under **Tantely Andrianarivo** in 1998. Paris Club concessions lowered debt-service burdens and Madagascar qualified in 2000 for cancellation of principal, suspension of interest payments, and rescheduling of reimbursements under the World Bank's Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative. In 2001, the external debt had been reduced to \$4.16 billion; \$1.4 billion was owed to the World Bank (mainly through its International Development Agency window), \$127 million to the IMF, and \$442 million to five other multilateral agencies; \$1.87 billion was held bilaterally by foreign governments (14 members of the Paris Club and 8 states outside the "club"), and \$73 million by four groups of private banks, with \$239 million outstanding in short-term loans. On 27 July 2004, during a brief visit to **Antananarivo**, French President Jacques Chirac signed a protocol eliminating 60 percent of Madagascar's bilateral debt to its erstwhile colonizing power.

**DECENTRALIZATION.** Five successive strategies have aimed since 1976 to satisfy a variety of often conflicting objectives for a devolu-

tion of power away from the central state. None to date has produced a tangible erosion of central control, a legacy from the 19th-century **Merina Empire** as well as two centuries of French “Jacobinism” inherited by Madagascar’s postcolonial authorities. The first effort was identified with **Richard Ratsimandrava**, interior minister under the transitional regime of **Gabriel Ramanantsoa** from 1972 to 1975, subsequently assassinated after only one week in office as Ramanantsoa’s successor. Ratsimandrava sought an outright redistribution of political, economic, and social authority to directly elected village/district units traditionally known as *fokonolona*. This strategy was designed to dissolve the invidious, counter-productive hold of a potent, “foreign” *fanjakana rayamandreny* (parental establishment) over an already alienated peasantry and urban mass. The policy was to endow these face-to-face units with the resources needed for authentic grassroots development. Its populist message exerted strong appeal on large numbers of Malagasy but its champion, Ratsimandrava, paid for that advantage with his life. His partisans proved unequal to the weight of authoritarianism in the **Directoire Militaire** that succeeded him, and the untested *fokonolona* strategy went with Ratsimandrava to an early grave.

After the **Referendum of 21 December 1975**, the new leader, **Didier Ratsiraka**, promptly introduced the first of two strategies in his Charter of Decentralized Communities. In theory, the communities (*collectivités* in French) represented a paradoxical effort to combine the popular *fokonolona* principle with a continuity of centralization required by the socialist option of his **Democratic Republic**. To resolve these contradictory aims, Ratsiraka proposed an elaborate hierarchy of *collectivités*. At its base were 11,373 *fokontany*, a term preferred by the designers of the system, corresponding to the village or the urban neighborhood. These were grouped into 1,250 districts, *firaisampokontany*, which in turn belonged to 110 regions, *fivondronampokontany*. At the summit of the system were the six *faritany*, corresponding exactly to the six provinces of earlier regimes. At the *fokontany* level the population elected a council which then chose an executive whose president was also directly elected. Elections to the other levels were indirect, with the people’s council at each level sending delegates to the next higher level. Each echelon was supervised by the level above, and provinces and urban areas came directly



under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior. This ponderous system barely functioned—for want of genuine authority and real budgetary allocations down the cascade of councils. It was in fact unworkable from the outset, given the regime's centralist ideology as well as the reluctance of the political party and administrative decision makers to relinquish their profitable control. By the mid-1980s, however, a new set of priorities, imposed by international donors and lenders, urged a territorial administration that would be less top-heavy and more responsive than its predecessors to the needs of an impoverished population.

In the transition to the **Third Republic**, the elected officials of the decentralized communities were dismissed and replaced by appointed delegations. The regime party, **AREMA**, reacted by mounting a futile secessionist initiative in the coastal provinces under the banner of "federalism." This was more an assault on perceived **Merina** dominance of the **Forces Vives**, Ratsiraka's antagonists, than a genuine confederal strategy.

The **National Forum** that produced the **constitution of the Third Republic** in 1992 allowed the preexisting decentralized community formulas to remain in place. A simplified version of decentralization strategy nevertheless emerged in April 1995 as the parliamentary authority of the Third Republic struggled to accommodate demands from the **World Bank** as well as to mobilize popular enthusiasm for development. This formula, adapted from **France's** territorial nomenclature, created three levels of administration: 1,392 **rural and urban communes**, 158 *départements*, and 28 regions. In its three years of validity the system produced very little; the communes were organized, but they found themselves paralyzed by the internal party dissension that characterized the early Third Republic. Administrative authority remained concentrated at **Antananarivo**, and whatever happened outside the capital was undertaken by appointed agents of the central authority.

After the impeachment of his rival, **Albert Zafy**, and his own reelection in 1997, President Ratsiraka reactivated his 1976 decentralization ideal, albeit without his earlier deference to the *fokonolona* tradition. He was able by a bare (and questionable) majority of 50.96 percent in the **Referendum of 15 March 1998** to revive the concept but with decentralized powers devolved largely on

the six *faritany* (provinces). Under this compromise, autonomous *faritany* councils were directly elected. The 336 councilors, augmented by the province's **Assemblée Nationale** deputies and its senators, subsequently elected a governor for each *faritany*. The provinces were to have jurisdiction over local administration, police, fairs and markets, and social services. The central state retained authority over national interests, internal security, international relations, justice, strategic resources, currency and finance, and fundamental civil liberties. National law took precedence over provincial laws, and the two levels of authority were to share responsibility for civil defense, economic development, environmental conservation, and general welfare. Provincial services were to be financed by a combination of direct taxation, bloc grants from the state, and borrowing (on approval by the state). The *fokontany* continued to exist, albeit as a forum for debates dominated by elders without specified powers and with virtually no budget. Local services continued to be supplied by the communes. As for the *faritany* themselves, budgetary resources were to begin flowing once the population had become accustomed to the changes. Implemented by an organic law on 29 August 2000, this project was left unfulfilled, although the provincial governors and councils, dominated by the presidential AREMA party, were put in place by **elections**, with low turnout, in December 2000. Although still on the books, Ratsiraka's second strategy went down with its patron after the presidential election of December 2001.

The victor in that election and in the ensuing **Crisis of 2002** has adapted the Ratsiraka strategy to satisfy external demand for genuine devolution of responsibility and the ineluctable necessity of motivating the grassroots for development. Avoiding empowerment of a half-dozen province-level mandarins, **Marc Ravalomanana** sent the **Assemblée Nationale** a draft law in May 2004 inserting 28 regions between the *faritany* and the communes. Moreover, referring to his own experience as mayor of Antananarivo in 1999–2001, he has situated crucial initiatives in the mayors and councils of the 1,558 communes. Through assiduous training and coaching, and an as yet ill-defined relationship with the constituent *fokonolona*, the island's localities are to develop business-like action plans and to obtain resources through state grants. Local jurisdiction affects the full range

of social services as well as public-private partnerships for developmental projects, agricultural and commercial credit schemes, and external investment initiatives. Central state emissaries (prefects, sub-prefects, and technical agents) are to take direction from local authorities. While communal, regional, and provincial councils have been formed through elections in 2003 and 2004, they will be put to the test against the multiple forces that have thus far frustrated all previous decentralization programs: an intellectual commitment to the unity of the Malagasy state; resistance from an entrenched central bureaucracy; reluctance on the part of Antananarivo's business class to accede to productive investment outside the capital; and the admittedly advanced levels of corruptibility evinced by self-serving local officials. Many of these local notables are now protected in a new client-patron network erected by Ravalomanana's regime party, the **Tiako-i-Madagasikara** (TIM), implanted virtually in the footprint of Ratsiraka's AREMA.

**DECRET CAYLA.** Decreed by Governor-General **Léon Cayla** in December 1929, this law attempted to restrain the growing Malagasy **nationalist movement** and particularly the activities of the **Ralai-mongo** faction. Among other provisions, it required each newspaper to have a French citizen as managing editor, and empowered the administration to seize publications carrying articles likely to incite animosity toward the colonial administration.

**DE GAULLE, CHARLES (1890–1970).** De Gaulle was the leader of the **Free French** during World War II, and president of the French Fifth Republic from 1958 to 1969. He visited Madagascar in August 1958 as part of his campaign in favor of the **Referendum on the Constitution of the Fifth Republic**. His failure to promise **amnesty** for the prisoners of the **Rebellion of 1947** or an abrogation of the **Annexation Law of 1896** disappointed the strongly nationalist groups, who campaigned for a “no” vote in the referendum. The groups campaigning for a “yes” vote cited his promise that under the Fifth Republic Madagascar would have its own government, as in the days of the **Merina Empire**. During his presidency in Paris, De Gaulle maintained highly cordial relations with **Philibert Tsiranana**, president of Madagascar's **First Republic**.

**DELEGATIONS ECONOMIQUES ET FINANCIERES.** The Economic and Financial Delegations were established in 1924 by Governor-General **Marcel Olivier** in response to demands for a greater voice in decisions on the colony's taxes and budgets. The Delegations had separate European and Malagasy sections, with the Malagasy delegates being elected by the **Conseils des Notables**. The Malagasy section met rarely, in closed session, and had only a consultative role.

**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR (DRM).** The République Démocratique de Madagascar was proclaimed on 15 June 1975, when the **Directoire Militaire** that had taken power after the assassination of President **Richard Ratsimandrava** chose naval captain **Didier Ratsiraka** as the new president. The new republic was ratified in the **Referendum of 21 December 1975** and Ratsiraka opted for Marxist socialism as its ideological orientation. In addition to the president, there was a government headed by a prime minister. Among the institutions of the DRM were the **Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution**, which grouped the political parties of the regime, and the **Conseil Suprême de la Révolution**, composed of representatives of those parties. The unicameral legislature was called the **Assemblée Nationale Populaire**, and there was a military council called the Comité Militaire pour le Développement.

Didier Ratsiraka was the first and only president of the Democratic Republic. Weakened by internal political and economic failures, including the **debt** crisis, and by the international collapse of Marxist regimes, the DRM was finally successfully challenged by an opposition movement called the Comité des **Forces Vives**. After a period of instability that began in 1989, it was replaced by the **Third Republic** in 1992.

**DEMONSTRATION OF 19 MAY 1929.** This was a major protest against colonial rule, which began outside the Excelsior Theater, to which Malagasy were denied admission, and moved to government installations. The demonstration differed from previous rallies in stressing the goal of independence over demands for equality of treatment of Malagasy under the colonial system. It was put down, and several nationalist figures, including **Jean Ralaimongo**, and French sympathizers

like **Paul Dussac**, were arrested. The demonstration precipitated a campaign of repression under the new governor-general, **Léon Cayla**, and led to the **Décret Cayla**, which was used throughout the 1930s and after World War II to prevent the expression of nationalist sentiment.

**DIASPORA.** About 100,000 Malagasy reside outside the Great Island, most of them propelled into emigration by the paucity of **educational** and career opportunities at home, and attracted by opportunities for individual fulfillment abroad. Nearly 80,000 live in **France**. They arrived in the former colonial metropole in several culturally distinct waves. Early immigrants during the colonial administration and **First Republic** consisted of privileged Malagasy, mainly from the **highlands**, often in search of a comfortable, stimulating European context for part-time residence. Finding Europe less than hospitable for their aspirations of social integration, later arrivals also divided residency between the island where they enjoyed social status and France (or elsewhere in the West) where they tended to cluster into ethnic and religious associations. Under the **Democratic Republic** from 1975 to 1992, the elite desperately sought to place children in overseas schools while young Malagasy from all classes fled an increasingly impoverished and stagnating **economy**. Since a weakened educational system had prepared them less well than their elders, particularly in the all-important French language, emigrants in this wave sought training and jobs anywhere they could be found. Scholarships from the **Soviet Union** and other socialist countries came to equal what was available in France and West Germany, but the beneficiaries had to return to an island dominated (some claim suffocated) by a rigid system of party clientelism and a hierarchy of wealth and of age. Luckier, well-trained émigrés found posts in **United Nations** and other international agencies.

While intensely absorbed in national matters, proud of their heritage, both waves of the western diaspora tended to be hostile toward whatever regime was in power at **Antananarivo**. This animosity rarely emerged overtly to trouble the peace, however. In virtually all cases the Malagasy diaspora has been regarded as “good immigrants,” prepared to live harmoniously, if ambivalently, within an admired culture. Nevertheless, as immigrant life became harder in France during the late 1990s, expatriates sought placement in the

**United States, Great Britain, Canada, and the Francophone Antilles.**

During the presidential **Crisis of 2002**, the France-based diaspora agitated predominantly for **Marc Ravalomanana**, putting pressure on the French government and press to renounce their putative bias toward the incumbent **Didier Ratsiraka**. Demonstrations at the Malagasy embassy in Paris in mid-2002 were well reported in the French media although the regime countered by branding the participants as **Merina** tribalists agitating for their compatriot, Ravalomanana. This appeal to the proverbial antagonism between Merina and **Côtiers** appears to contradict the general tendency toward national solidarity found among diaspora Malagasy of all origins. Since confirmation of Ravalomanana's victory, emigration has slowed and some expatriates have returned to take positions in a new administration that promised openness and honesty. Others remain unconvinced, however, that the status they enjoy abroad will be emulated once they plunge into the uncertainties of professional and social life on the island.

**DIAZ, DIEGO (ALSO DIOGO).** Diaz was captain of one of 12 ships of a Portuguese fleet commanded by Pedralvares Cabral, sailing for India. His ship was blown off course and touched the coast of Madagascar in 1500. It was after this that Madagascar was reliably situated on European maps of the western **Indian Ocean**.

**DIEGO-SUAREZ.** Now **Antsiranana**, Diégo-Suarez was named after two Portuguese admirals, **Diego Diaz** who first sighted Madagascar in 1500, and Fernando Suarez, who entered the bay itself in 1506. The bay at Diégo-Suarez is one of the best natural harbors in the western **Indian Ocean**. It served as a base for **pirates** in the early 18th century, being the site of the International Republic of **Liber-talia**. In the 19th century, the French were attracted to the bay, and the **protectorate** of 1885 gave them the right to construct installations there. The fortifications of the modern base were begun in 1900 by Colonel Joseph Joffre, later known for his role in the Battle of the Marne in World War I. An arsenal and dry dock were added later. During World War II, British anxiety that the scantily defended port would be used by the Japanese for attacks on **South Africa** led to the

**British invasion** of Madagascar in 1942. After the war, Diégo-Suarez served as headquarters for the French Indian Ocean fleet which frequented it until 1973, when renegotiation of the **Cooperation Agreements** evicted the French military from the island.

**DIRECTOIRE MILITAIRE.** The Military Directorate was established by the Malagasy armed forces on 12 February 1975, immediately after the assassination of Colonel **Richard Ratsimandrava**. The directorate had 18 members, drawn from both the army and the gendarmerie, and from all regions of the country. It was led by the ranking general of the army, **Gilles Andriamahazo**. Among its members were the future president, **Didier Ratsiraka**, and two of his brothers-in-law. One of the contenders for power, **Roland Rabetafika**, attempted to find a place on the directorate, but was rejected and later accused of complicity in the assassination. It was the task of the directorate to maintain order in the country and in the armed forces while it settled the question of succession to the presidency. Over a period of four months Ratsiraka was able to put together a coalition that included, after some hesitation on their part, a number of Ratsimandrava's supporters. On 15 June 1975, the directorate declared Ratsiraka the new president of the republic and dissolved itself. *See also* MILITARY; TRIAL OF THE CENTURY.

**DRURY, ROBERT (1687–1733).** Drury was born in London and went to sea at the age of 12. He was shipwrecked off the coast of Madagascar about 1701 and became a slave of the local ruler. He traveled extensively through western Madagascar until he escaped and returned to London in 1717. The authorship of his book of reminiscences is disputed, since many attribute it to the author of *Robinson Crusoe*, Daniel Defoe, claiming that it is a pastiche of Drury's memories and other sailors' tales. The descriptions of groups and territories in the book are corroborated by other sources, however, as is his vocabulary of the Malagasy **language** of that time and place.

**DUPRE, JULES-MARIE (1813–1881).** A career naval officer, Dupré became commander of the French **Indian Ocean** fleet in 1861. After the death of Queen **Ranavalona I**, he was sent to negotiate a treaty with her son, **Radama II**. Dupré achieved the opening of Madagas-

car to French activities that Ranavalona had refused. There were two conventions: a public treaty that provided for trade expansion and recognized the validity of the **Lambert Charter**, and a secret treaty that recognized French sovereignty over territory ceded to **France** by other Malagasy, notably **Sakalava** rulers. The secret treaty was not acknowledged by the French government, but the public treaty was ratified. Dupré also joined with **Joseph Lambert** in creating the *Compagnie de Madagascar* to take advantage of the new opportunities. In 1863, however, Radama II was killed in a coup d'état, and the treaties were denounced by the new queen, **Rasoherina**, and her government. Dupré urged the French to invade Madagascar to punish the **Merina** government, but without success during his lifetime. He later became governor of **Réunion**.

**DUSSAC, PAUL (1896–1938)**. A French citizen born in Russia where his father had fled after the fall of the Paris Commune, Dussac settled at **Diégo-Suarez** in 1922. He was a supporter of the Malagasy **nationalist movement**, and in particular of the **Ralaimongo** faction. At the time, Malagasy newspapers were required to have French managing editors, and he collaborated on several journals, helping to found new versions as the colonial administration closed down the previous ones. The journals included *L'Aurore Malgache*, *La Nation Malgache*, and *Le Proletariat Malgache*. Dussac was imprisoned for his involvement in the **Demonstration of 19 May 1929** and freed only after the liberalization of political life under the **Popular Front**. He attempted to found a Malagasy communist party, but was disavowed by the French communists. In 1937 he returned to France, where he died.

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**ECOLE LE MYRE DE VILERS**. This school, named after the first administrator of the French **Protectorate of 1885**, was established by General **Joseph Gallieni** in 1897. It was the highest level of state **education** available in Madagascar and served as a training school for Malagasy civil servants and teachers. The president of the **First Republic**, **Philibert Tsiranana**, was a graduate of the school, as were many members of his cabinet.



**ECOLOGY.** *See* ENVIRONMENT.

**ECONOMY.** The Malagasy economy has historically been dominated by **agriculture**, which still occupies about 75 percent of the active population and once accounted for almost all **exports**. That sector now provides less than 30 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). (See table 2.) The production of **rice** for local consumption and the raising of **cattle** are the most important agricultural activities, while export crops consist largely of **coffee** and tropical **spices**, especially **vanilla** and cloves. During the 1990s, in part under encouragement by international agencies and **European Union** patrons, exports of prawns and tuna took first place in the gamut of Malagasy exports, while textile manufactures from the expanding **Export Processing Zones** (EPZ) exceeded the inconstant foreign exchange earnings from agriculture. By the turn of the century, the traditional production of the lowlands—vanilla, cloves, coffee, pepper, beef, tobacco, **Cape peas**—had stagnated, reinforcing the dominance of **Antananarivo** in the national economy. **Tourism** also became a significant source of revenue during this period. Apart from these export-oriented developments, the nonagricultural sector of the economy is dominated by services, and by “informal” (untaxed) family trading.

**Table 2. Economic Overview, Two Decades. Sources: World Bank, *World Development Indicators, 2003*; African Development Indicators, 2003.**

	1981	1991	2000	2001
Population	8,870	11,673	15,523	16,400
% urban	18.5	25	29	30.1
GDP, \$ million	3,600	2,700	3,900	4,600
GDP per capita, \$	290	230	251	260
GDP by sector, %				
Agriculture	33.1	29.7	29.1	29.8
Industry	14.1	13.1	14.6	14.6
Services	52.8	57.2	56.4	55.7
Economically active population by sector, %				
Agriculture	82	78	77	76
Industry	6	7	8	9
Services	13	15	15	15

The economy has historically suffered from a lack of connection between sectors and regions, in part resulting from problems of **transportation** and communication, as well as from natural disasters, especially cyclones. During the French colonial period the economy was dominated by French **commercial companies** and Asian intermediaries, a situation that continued after independence under the **First Republic**. The **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**, which controlled the island from 1972 until early 1975, attempted to gain national control of the economy by leaving the **Franc Zone**, **nationalizing** some major **industries**, setting up state trading companies, and enacting an **investment code** that required firms to establish local headquarters and encourage Malagasy participation in management and ownership. Further nationalizations and an attempt to increase state control of the economy (via devices such as state farms) followed from the Marxist orientation of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar (DRM)**, established under President **Didier Ratsiraka** in 1975. In October 1979, Ratsiraka announced the adoption of an All-Out **Investment Policy** to be financed by “Omni-Directional Borrowing.” The failure of this policy, the increase in **debt** that it entailed, and such external factors as the second oil crisis and the fall of prices for Madagascar’s exports led to the collapse of the Malagasy economy, a collapse from which the country has yet to recover. Both agricultural and mineral production declined or remained stable over the 1980s, with a slight increase at the end of the decade reversed by the 1991 political upheaval that led to the fall of the DRM and the creation of the **Third Republic**.

In 1980, the Malagasy government appealed to the **International Monetary Fund (IMF)** for assistance in its debt crisis and signed a first agreement that year. Subsequent agreements have followed, as has the rescheduling and annulment of much of the Malagasy debt by other creditors. The conditions for this assistance have led to the reversal of earlier economic policies. Regulation of the price of agricultural goods has been replaced by floor and ceiling prices, and the monopolies of the state trading companies and **banks** have been ended, with gradual, hesitant **privatization** of dozens of other state-owned enterprises, a process that continued into the 21st century. Suffering brought about by the economic decline, the debt crisis, and the structural adjustment programs enabled the opposition to mobilize crowds

to overthrow the DRM in 1991–1992. The successor **Third Republic** has attempted to restore government accounts by improving the collection of revenue, particularly customs duties, and by restraining increases in the size of the civil service.

The conflict between parliament and President **Albert Zafy**, culminating in the latter's impeachment, included ideological disagreement over the republic's commitment to internationally imposed economic conditions. An avowed "go it alone" nationalist, Zafy resented foreign determination of policy, embarking on a variety of economic schemes denounced by the Bretton Woods agencies as "parallel financing." Although national populism was approved by some key parliamentarians, others, including Zafy's prime ministers **Francoisque Ravony** and **Norbert Lala Ratsirahonana**, understood the island's economic future as dependent on compliance with international expectations. After Zafy's fall and the return of Ratsiraka, the Third Republic gradually quickened its response to international norms of adjustment. Privatization continued, albeit sporadically; the Malagasy franc was successively devalued to encourage exports; inflation came under adroit management; internal markets were liberalized. The resulting increases in foreign assistance and debt relief, and a corresponding strengthening of GDP and financial accounts qualified the national economy for the **World Bank's** Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt initiative and the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth program. Moreover, diversification of Madagascar's export base helped the economy ride out the world economic slump of 2000–2001.

These achievements nonetheless failed to convince the Malagasy nation that conditions were in fact improving on the ground, particularly as the government delayed delivery of basic government services and the vast majority of the population remained below the international poverty level of \$1 per day per person. Terminal disenchantment with Ratsiraka and his ministry of technocrats under Prime Minister **Tantely Andrianarivo** drove a majority of voters to place their trust in the successful businessman, **Marc Ravalomanana**, in the presidential election of December 2001. In the **Crisis of 2002**, while Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana disputed the presidency, the economy suffered substantially. Investors abandoned the EPZ, creating unemployment and a radical decline in exports; foreign

assets were frozen; internal communications and infrastructure suffered damage; profiteering destabilized domestic markets; most external aid was suspended until well into the ensuing year. Despite statistical recovery by May 2003 and a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper approved by the IMF in July, vigorous efforts toward “rapid and sustained development,” with special attention to **transportation**, public **health**, and **education**, failed to persuade the population of a significant improvement in their lot. The number of urban households under the poverty level, which had decreased between 1997 and 2001, increased thereafter. Per capita income remained at its 2001 level of \$260.

After its fourth review of Madagascar’s poverty reduction program in mid-March 2004, the IMF approved continuing balance of payments assistance, including special relief for the consequences of a particularly devastating cyclone (*Gafilo*) that struck the island earlier that month. Antananarivo was nonetheless admonished to accelerate the pace of privatization of remaining state industries (telephone, electricity-water, sugar, and cotton), to reduce **corruption**, diversify exports, enhance private access to credit, and improve tax collection rates. In May 2004, Standard and Poor’s gave Madagascar a “B” rating, warning against fiscal imbalances and the slow pace of structural reforms. As very little seemed to have changed for the mass of Malagasy, hopes for a miraculous recovery under Ravalomanana’s “dream machine” subsided after his first two years into even gloomier realism. *See also* CURRENCY; FISHERIES; MINING.

**EDUCATION.** Western schooling began in Madagascar in 1821 through the **London Missionary Society** (LMS) at the request of **Radama I**, ruler of the **Merina Empire**. The school system at first recruited its pupils from the upper classes of the capital, **Antananarivo**, but was later extended to the villages of **Imerina**. Malagasy was the **language** of instruction at the primary level, and Malagasy and English were used at the secondary level. The schools served as the main training and recruiting ground for the **Merina** administration. When the **Catholic** missions came to Madagascar in 1861, they extended the educational network south to **Fianarantsoa** in **Betsileo** territory. In 1876 primary education became compulsory for boys and girls in Imerina, and by the time of the colonial conquest there were

an estimated 137,000 students in the **Protestant**-run schools and 27,000 in the Catholic system.

Early anticlerical French governors were suspicious both of the perpetuation of British influence through the Protestant system and of church-run education in general. In 1906 Governor-General **Victor Augagneur** forbade the use of **languages** other than French and the holding of classes in religious buildings; school attendance fell accordingly. After the failure of an attempt by **Joseph Gallieni** to set up regional colleges, a state system of education was centered on the Antananarivo elite, with the most important postsecondary institutions—the medical school at **Befelatanana** and the **Ecole Le Myre de Vilers**—located there. An Institute of University Studies was created in 1955, but did not develop into a university until after independence. French was the language of instruction at the secondary level, while the language used at the primary level varied between French and Malagasy.

At the time of independence in 1960, Madagascar had the highest school-participation rate of France's African colonies. About one-third of the eligible population was in school, one-half of them in the **mission** network. Education had become a valued commodity, and the **First Republic** was under considerable pressure to expand the system. Expansion did take place, but largely at the primary level. Above that, the system was sharply pyramidal, with a series of cutoff points, primarily the examination for entry into secondary school, the examination between the first and second levels of secondary education, and the baccalaureate, which entitled the holder to pass on to the new **University of Madagascar**. Unemployment among school dropouts and among graduates in arts and letters became an increasingly serious problem. The system was also criticized for its French emphasis, particularly at the university, where the equivalence of Malagasy and French diplomas under the **Cooperation Agreements** meant that Madagascar's curriculum had to follow French university models. Demands for **Malgachization** of the curriculum and staff of the secondary schools and the university mobilized a growing **student** opposition in the late 1960s. The fall of the First Republic in the **May 1972 Revolution** was precipitated by strikes and demonstrations staged by students and school dropouts.

Under the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** and the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM), the educational system was expanded until it absorbed 25 percent of the national budget. Standards, especially for the baccalaureate, were relaxed, and the number and value of university scholarships increased. Malagasy became the language of instruction and the curriculum gave a larger role to the study of Malagasy culture and history. At the university, most of the French professors left, to be replaced by Malagasy, and, under the Democratic Republic, instructors from the **Soviet Union**. University centers were also added to the provincial capitals in an attempt to create a regime counterweight to the university at Antananarivo. Although the government promised to end private education, both the church and, to a lesser degree, the nonreligious private system survived.

In spite of these increases in expenditure, the relationship between the state and students remained difficult. The expansion of public sector activity in the DRM did not stem the tide of unemployment for school dropouts and graduates, and the system itself suffered during the austerity of the 1980s. School attendance dropped from 65 percent in 1973 to 30 to 35 percent 15 years later. Public schools closed en masse for want of teachers, materials, and adequate buildings. Both the university and the secondary schools were the scenes of frequent strikes and demonstrations. Students provided an audience for critics of the regime, like **MONIMA** and **MFM**, as well as for the **Kung Fu** associations. In November 1986, President Ratsiraka sponsored an attempt to reform higher education by limiting the right to repeat academic years and by centralizing instruction in the third and fourth years. The proposed reform precipitated riots that resulted in some deaths, and the proposal was eventually withdrawn.

As in 1972, students and teachers were prominent participants in the demonstrations that brought down the DRM. The first president of the **Third Republic**, **Albert Zafy**, was a professor of surgery at the University of Madagascar. Higher education underwent a campaign of depoliticization; managerial authority was concentrated on university rectors; "lifetime" students were dismissed; private academies sprang up to complement and often compete with the state universities. Persistent budgetary shortfalls resulted in elimination of schools and expansion of class sizes as well as a constant drift of

students toward fee-based private schools at all levels. In 1996–1997, only 15 percent of the school-age rural population completed the five-year primary cycle. Thanks in part to intervention by UNICEF, school attendance began rising in the late 1990s (to 68 percent of primary, 19.4 percent of secondary age groups), but by 2001, still only 40 percent actually completed the primary cycle. By then almost half the adult Malagasy population had had no schooling (30.2 percent in the cities). The rate of baccalaureate passage remained at only 33 percent and one-third of Malagasy over age 15 were classified illiterate in 2001. Madagascar's notable educational advantage from the 19th century into the 1970s had been reversed, as virtually all other African societies maintained higher rates of school attendance, expenditure, advancement, and democratization. By the late 1990s, young people were entering the labor force with less education than their parents. The gap also widened between island elites and the poor, its urban and rural populations, as prosperous urban families patronized higher quality private schools and even continued to send children abroad for schooling. Education has become a class entitlement, not an investment in the island's future.

Under its internationally supervised poverty reduction program, Madagascar is to increase public investment in education, returning the nation's commitment to a level closer to general African norms. Priorities include reconstruction of rural schools, teacher training, financial incentives for poor families, and greater efficiencies in student placement and graduation at the higher levels. *See also* FEDERATION DES ASSOCIATIONS D'ETUDIANTS DE MADAGASCAR; SYNDICAT DES ENSEIGNANTS ET CHERCHEURS DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT SUPERIEUR.

**ELECTIONS, FIRST REPUBLIC.** Starting as a multiparty system, the 1960–1972 period became gradually dominated by the patron-client machinery of President **Philibert Tsiranana** and his cohorts in the **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD). Designated president in 1959 after indirect election as head of the **Loi-Cadre Government Council**, Tsiranana had to face universal suffrage only twice—on 30 March 1965 and on 30 January 1972. Both occasions gave him enormous majorities even though the second reelection, when he made sure of being reopposed, came two years after suffering a serious stroke and

only five months before being overthrown by popular movements in the southern countryside and city streets. Rejection so soon after recording a 97 percent majority elicited doubts, lingering to this day, over the accuracy of elections as a test of the Malagasy popular will. For its part, Tsiranana's PSD dominated all three parliamentary contests during the First Republic's 12 years. On 4 September 1960, it captured 75 of 107 seats in the **Assemblée Nationale**. On 8 August 1965, after absorbing much of the 1960 alternatives, the PSD enlarged its caucus to 104, all three opposition deputies coming from the **Antananarivo** bastion of the **AKFM**. The 104-seat majority held through the elections of 6 September 1970 despite well-publicized dissension within the PSD's national leadership. Although more open to multiparty contests, the mayoralties and communal councils of the First Republic were also controlled by the PSD, in part thanks to the systematic nomination of loyal provincial, prefectural, and sub-prefectural administrators by the unitary state. These subordinates were supervised by the skillful PSD general secretary and minister of the interior, **André Resampa**, who also served as mayor of Morondava. The Malagasy vote during these 12 years proved readily available to incumbents bearing enticements. It reflected as well the cultural mystique of power that once obtained must have been deserved—unless fate should prove otherwise. This credibility has been sorely tested in the political sequel. *See also* MAY 1972 REVOLUTION.

## ELECTIONS, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR.

The adult population of the DRM directly elected the president of the republic, the members of the **Assemblée Nationale Populaire** (ANP), and the council and president of the executive of the lowest level of the decentralized collectivities. Although the electoral results were dominated by the regime party, **AREMA**, other parties did contest elections and win votes. All parties wishing to run candidates in elections were, however, required to belong to the **Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution**, meaning that they pledged endorsement of the president's revolutionary **charter**.

There were three series of elections during the DRM. On 21 December 1975 a **referendum** approved the **constitution** of the republic and the nomination of **Didier Ratsiraka** as president by 94.5



percent of the votes. In March 1977 elections to the newly created *fokontany* (local village and urban district) councils gave AREMA 88.2 percent of the seats, with its strongest results in the provinces of **Toamasina** and **Mahajanga**. The **AKFM** placed second, with 8.3 percent, gaining its best results in **Antananarivo province**. **MONIMA** gained 1.8 percent of the seats, mainly in **Toliara province**, while **Vonjy** obtained a scattering of 1.4 percent in Antananarivo and southeast **Fianarantsoa province**. In June, elections to the ANP were held, although the distribution of seats had been agreed to in advance. AREMA had 112 of the 137; AKFM, 16; Vonjy, 7; and the **Union des Chrétien de Madagascar** (UDECEMA), which had received almost no votes in the earlier election, had 2 seats. The **MFM** boycotted both elections, and **MONIMA** boycotted the election for the ANP.

Elections were held again in 1982 and 1983. Ratsiraka postponed the legislative and local elections until after the presidential election, in which his only opponent was **MONIMA's Monja Jaona**. The incumbent admiral won with 80 percent of the vote, although he had only 50 percent in the capital. In elections to the decentralized communities and the ANP, AREMA won 65 and 64 percent of the vote, respectively. At the local level, the AKFM, with 12 percent, was the closest party, while in races for the ANP it was the MFM, with 11 percent, that came in second.

Presidential elections were advanced from November to 12 March 1989 in an effort to get ahead of growing unrest. There were four candidates: Ratsiraka, Monja Jaona, **Manandafy Rakotonirina** of the MFM, and Vonjy's **Jerome Razanabahiny-Marojama**. Ratsiraka won with 62 percent of the vote, down from his 1982 total, but more than neutral observers were inclined to acknowledge for him; Rakotonirina gained 20 percent, Razanabahiny 15 percent, and Monja Jaona only 3 percent.

The last elections held under the DRM were to the ANP and the councils of the decentralized communities, held in May and September 1989, respectively. In the legislative elections, AREMA won 120 seats; the MFM 7; Vonjy 3; **AKFM-Renouveau** 3; AKFM 2; and **MONIMA** 1 seat. In races for the local councils, AREMA again reaffirmed its dominance, but the high abstention rates, particularly in urban centers, were a truer indication of the popular temper. Betray-

ing its fragility into 1990 and 1991, the DRM was to disappear, replaced by the **Third Republic** in 1992.

**ELECTIONS, THIRD REPUBLIC.** The first election of the 1990s was a **Referendum on 19 August 1992** to approve the new **constitution**. In spite of disruptions caused by “federalist” supporters of the former **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM), the constitution was approved by 66 percent of the voters. Subsequent contests for president and for deputies to the **Assemblée Nationale** were delayed by political instability. Eight candidates entered the first stage of the presidential race, held on 25 November 1992. They included **Didier Ratsiraka**, president of the DRM, and **Albert Zafy**, candidate of the **Forces Vives**, which had been responsible for the overthrow of Ratsiraka. Others included **Manandafy Rakotonirina**, leader of the **MF**M, which had separated from the regular **Forces Vives**; **Jacques Rabemananjara**, famous poet, nationalist deputy from the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache**, and minister in the **First Republic**; the acting chief of state, Prime Minister **Norbert Lala Ratsirahonana**; and Ruffine Tsiranana, daughter of the president of the First Republic. Zafy and Ratsiraka emerged as the two leading candidates, with 48 and 28.3 percent respectively. In the runoff election held on 10 February 1993, Zafy received 66.6 percent of the vote.

Elections to the National Assembly were held on 16 June 1993. The new constitution granted increased prerogatives to parliament (over an executive regarded as excessively potent in the first two republics) and it allowed political parties to enter the Assembly by proportional representation in their respective districts. The result was a proliferation of parties, with 122 vying for 138 seats. Many of them presented candidates in order to obtain a share in the republic, without cogent consideration of platform content, voting commitments, coalitions, or leadership on the national level. Hence, although by far the strongest caucus, the **Forces Vives** “cartel” weakened into what Assembly president (speaker) **Richard Andriamanjato** termed a “geometrically variable majority.” Fluctuations in that majority handicapped governance seriously. Systematic confusion was compounded by President Zafy’s efforts to reassert presidential authority over parliament, a campaign initially vindicated in the **Referendum**

of **17 September 1995**, but set back a year later in the president's impeachment.

Voter disenchantment with such machinations by the political elites played a role in the subsequent presidential election, held in November and December 1996, with record abstention rates of 41.6 percent and 50.3 percent, respectively. The electorate exhibited slightly greater disapproval of the recently disgraced Zafy than of his repatriated rival. Sharing a huge field of candidates, Zafy captured only 23.4 percent of the vote to Ratsiraka's 36.6, but 14 others did even less well, so the two repudiated ex-presidents met in the runoff. Profiting from the shift of votes from most of the 14 also-rans, Zafy nearly made up the ground, but ultimately lost to Ratsiraka by the slender margin of 50.7 to 49.3 percent.

Ratsiraka's next moves aimed at consolidating presidential powers and assuring his own geometrically consistent majority through a rebuilt **AREMA** party. Retaining its local and provincial sinews from DRM days, AREMA rose from a negligible caucus of three deputies in the 1993 Assembly to a plurality of 63 seats (of 138) in the legislative elections of 17 May 1998. Bolstered by an array of coalition partners on the national level, AREMA proceeded to sweep **communal** council elections on 14 November 1999. In the contests of 3 December 2000, where only 45 percent of the electorate turned out, AREMA captured 197 of 336 provincial council seats. When time came for the long overdue organization of a **Senate**, the outcome was hardly in doubt; on 18 March 2001, the "colleges" of provincial officials and civil appointees gave AREMA 49 of 60 senatorial seats, with reliable partners occupying all but three of the remaining 11. The president proceeded to expand his majority with the appointment of the remaining 30 senators. Similarly, the six province (*faritany*) governors, elected on 10 June 2001 by "colleges" of provincial and parliamentary officials, were all from AREMA.

By this time, Ratsiraka had also strengthened his presidential hand through another one percent majority in the constitutional **Referendum of 15 March 1998**; at this point, Madagascar's reputation for relatively clean, internationally monitored voting processes, earned in 1992, 1993, and 1996, had disappeared in a flurry of charges of electoral fraud, intimidation, disenfranchisement, ballot manipulation, and other irregularities. The exception, as always, concerned

**Antananarivo** where a vigorous, skeptical press and a variety of national and international witnesses generally produced more openly competitive races than in the more obscure hinterlands. It was in the capital that the 1999 mayoralty was captured by a political outsider, businessman **Marc Ravalomanana**, whose star would continue to rise over the ensuing two years.

Nevertheless, the stage seemed clearly set for Admiral Ratsiraka's reelection on 21 December 2001. Once again in the absence of international monitors, the AREMA machine appeared likely to deliver all but recalcitrant Antananarivo to its champion. Ratsiraka's chances were enhanced by the usual proliferation of opposition candidates—five in all—and by last-minute appointments to the High Constitutional Court (HCC) that would certify his interior minister's ballot count. The outcome was unexpected, however, as the wealthy Ravalomanana mounted a skillful, modern nationwide campaign to transcend AREMA's reliance on traditional methods of patron-client incentives. Never a rousing orator, but this time evidently unwell, Ratsiraka himself proved ineffective in his campaign rallies. With voter turnout restored to a respectable 67 percent, and with 80 percent of the voting districts under observation by the experienced **Comité National pour l'Observation des Elections** (CNOE), the ministry reported an unprecedented 46.49 percent plurality for the challenger, against 40.64 percent for the incumbent; it began preparations for the usual second-round run off between the two contestants. Even this extraordinary reversal of precedent caused outrage among observer groups, bolstered by **FFKM** clergy; while not quite confirming Ravalomanana's claim to 53.3 percent of the vote they agreed (on admittedly incomplete polling data) that the Antananarivo mayor had achieved a clear majority. When, after refusing to order a recount, the HCC endorsed the official tallies (amended to 46.21 percent for Ravalomanana, 40.89 percent for Ratsiraka), it did so almost furtively, at a resort restaurant 70 kilometers outside Antananarivo.

Even neutral observers were apprehensive over Ratsiraka's propensity to "steal" a run-off election through whatever means might be necessary. To avoid this, the opposition refused to participate in a second round. It resorted to public demonstrations and strikes that paralyzed the civil service, evicting Ratsiraka from the

capital, and allowing Ravalomanana to assume de facto control of the state. The political **Crisis of 2002** was resolved when, on 29 April, after a recount of ballots, a reconstituted HCC confirmed a majority of 51.5 percent for the challenger. Although the precise voter tally remains in doubt, several conclusions seem clear: a substantial consensus had built against Ratsiraka and his machine; Ravalomanana's campaign effectively exploited this disaffection; the Malagasy electorate took the contest seriously as shown by the voter turnout and by the small proportion (13 percent) of the votes awarded the four also-ran candidates; a groundswell of legitimacy buoyed Ravalomanana's claims against a notoriously manipulative incumbency. Moreover, the electoral strength shown by Ravalomanana in all provinces and a comparably strong showing by Ratsiraka in Antananarivo province (with 40 percent of the vote) contradict stereotypes of ethnic voting patterns popular among those who see Madagascar as a battleground between **Merina** and **Côtiers**. Nevertheless, Ratsiraka's refusal to accept defeat represented the first instance in which a Malagasy president declined to cede to an elected rival; he had done so in 1992, as had Tsiranana in 1972 and Zafy in 1997.

Having reached the presidency without a formal political party, Ravalomanana needed to organize a legislative majority to support his presidential consensus. His 2001 campaign slogan, "I love Madagascar," was a derivation from his 1999 mayoral campaign's "I love Antananarivo," both echoing the brand name of his most popular dairy products, *Tiko*. Staying with what wins, he gave his new party the name **Tiako-i-Madagasikara** (TIM, I Love Madagascar). Benefiting from *Tiko*'s national marketing network as Ratsiraka had from AREMA's patronage system, TIM captured 103 seats (of 160) in the new National Assembly on 15 December 2002; it added seven more as the Assembly was being organized. TIM's declared opposition was reduced to at most 28 deputies. The party thereupon proceeded to assert regime control over legislative offices and local appointments, often to the dismay of erstwhile coalition partners and some of Ravalomanana's 2001-era supporters outside the TIM, who regarded themselves as entitled to a share of the rewards.

On 9 and 23 November 2003, TIM dominated elections in the rural and urban communes, respectively. It set about preparing for eventual provincial and senatorial contests in a manner not unlike the

methodologies of AREMA in the DRM and Tsiranana's **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD) in the island's **First Republic**.

**ELLIS, WILLIAM (1794–1872).** An official of the **London Missionary Society** (LMS), Ellis's first posting was in the Society Islands and Tahiti, but on his return to London in 1824 he began work for the foreign-contact section of the society. In 1835, he was sent to Madagascar to negotiate the return of the **Protestant** missionaries expelled by Queen **Ranavalona I**. He landed at **Toamasina** but was not allowed to proceed to the capital. He tried again in 1854, and was finally invited to **Antananarivo** in 1858, although he did not succeed in effecting a return of the missionaries. After the queen's death, Ellis and the LMS regained Madagascar at the invitation of her son, **Radama II**, with whom Ellis had had contacts during his previous visit. Ellis reestablished the **mission** and acted as advisor to the king, returning to London in 1865 after a remarkably successful tour of duty. He has bequeathed historically important memoirs and photographs of 19th-century Madagascar.

**ENVIRONMENT.** In recent decades, Madagascar's unique biodiversity has attracted a higher degree of international scholarly, **tourist**, and general attention than any other aspect of the island. When it broke off from the area now occupied by Kenya and Tanzania during the Upper Cretaceous period, the Great Island carried a contemporaneous population of plants and animals that have by now evolved into unique species of flora and fauna. Luckily for some of these creatures, the island was settled by humans only millennia after the evolution of *homo sapiens* on the African continent. Some 8,000 higher and lower plant species are found nowhere else in the world. They include 97 species of ebony and six species of baobab. The animal and insect endowment is equally extraordinary, including the world's only indigenous lemurs (28 of 42 inventoried species survive).

Now supporting 16 million humans, most of them in search of food and household fuel, the Great Island finds its precious natural endowment in mortal danger. Only 20 percent of an original 144 million acres of **forest** still stands. This great protective cover has been diminished by fire, some of it to clear land for **rice** fields and pasture, some even to express social protest. Reduction of timber to charcoal

for domestic fuel alone takes 10 million tons of wood annually, but natural gas and other substitutes are either unavailable or too expensive for Malagasy households. Hence, many animal species have been extinguished directly or by contraction of their habitat. These include such extraordinary specimens as the pygmy hippo, the dinosaur bird aepyornis, and giant lemurs. Moreover, the erosion consequent to perpetual conflagration has turned 70 percent of the soil to laterite. In addition, over-fishing, maritime pollution, and unregulated shoreline construction have endangered the barrier reefs that have hitherto sheltered one of the world's richest repositories of ocean life.

To defend Madagascar's natural patrimony, successive governments have cooperated, more or less enthusiastically, with a host of official and nongovernmental agencies. The island represents the largest single work site for the World Wildlife Fund, for instance. Since 1990, the **World Bank** has financed a complex program of direct conservation, erosion control, reforestation, public education, and (with UNESCO) "discovery tourism." Slightly less than 2 percent of the total land area now lies in 40 environmentally protected zones. Whether humans can protect what humans seem bent on destroying remains to be seen. (See table 3.)

**ESOAVELOMANDROSO, MONIQUE ANDREAS (1945– ).**

Named general secretary of the **Indian Ocean Commission** in 2004, Esoavelomandroso comes from **Taolagnaro** (Fort-Dauphin) in the southeast corner of the island. She studied in Paris, qualifying as a financial auditor, and at the University of Pittsburgh. She is the author of several studies in Malagasy demographics. A member of the **Leader Fanilo** party now led by her husband, Manassé Esoavelo-

**Table 3. Flora and Fauna, Selected Species, 1999. Source: World Bank, *African Development Indicators*, 2001.**

	<i>Total No.</i>	<i>No. endemic</i>	<i>No. classified threatened</i>
Mammals	141	93	46
Birds	202	105	28
Reptiles	363	259	17
Amphibians	179	155	2
Higher plants	9,000	6,500	255

mandroso, she held important subcabinet posts in all successive Malagasy administrations since 1971, including the ministries of rural animation, finance-economics, population—where she was in charge of **women's** and children's affairs from 1977 to 1993—and budget and decentralization. In May 2002, she entered President **Marc Ravalomanana's** administration as secretary of state for **decentralization** and development of the autonomous provinces.

**ETHNIC GROUPS.** Madagascar is generally considered to have 18 “ethnic groups,” although some authors argue for the existence of 21. This disagreement is indicative of the fluid nature of ethnicity in Malagasy society. Most groups have subdivisions that are as important as the nominal groups themselves, and the dispute over their number arises from disagreements over when differences become important enough to distinguish one ethnicity from another. Although “tribe” and “tribalism” are occasionally employed (as in the colonial administration's “**politique des races**”), Malagasy ethnicity does not break clearly into such categories. Few of the 18, even those that developed centralized political institutions, ever had a single political system covering the whole ethnicity. The **Merina** monarchy is the major exception to this rule. The several **Sakalava** monarchies date from the 17th, and possibly even the 16th century, while the **Bet-simisaraka Confederation** and the **Betsileo** kingdoms date from the 18th century. A group name like the **Tanala**, or “People of the Forest,” is essentially a geographical description, and most of the 18 units cohere largely by virtue of territorial cohabitation. Principal customs and beliefs are common to all or nearly all groups; they include reverence for **ancestors** and the Malagasy **language**, which is spoken universally, albeit in a variety of dialects. Competitive interaction in the 19th century and extensive colonial exploitation of the concept have bestowed such importance on ethnic identity that virtually all Malagasy pay some attention to the ethnic balance, or imbalance, of political and administrative institutions—including the **military**. See also *COTIERS* and refer to the map on page xxiv.

**EUROPEAN UNION (EU).** France's continental partners have maintained a steady share of the international assistance granted Madagascar from the time of independence to the present. The EU was



formed on 1 November 1993 by transformation from the preceding European Community (EC). Its 25 members absorbed 69 percent of the Great Island's **exports** in 2001—mainly in prawns and other **fisheries** products, garments from the **Export Processing Zones**, **coffee**, and **vanilla**; 44 percent of Madagascar's imports, primarily in manufactured and capital goods, came from EU members. In addition, the EU has supplied **election** observation teams, notably for the December 2002 parliamentary race, and has contributed to “good governance” projects, including reform of the Malagasy **judiciary**. In 1999, the EU became Madagascar's largest assistance donor, ahead of the **World Bank**. The European Development Fund has concentrated intensively on a limited number of sectors, particularly **transportation** (roadways) infrastructure, social services (especially **education** and **health**), and rural development (including food production and consumption). Madagascar also benefits from multilateral pacts like those applying to the **Indian Ocean Commission's environmental** and university projects, the Stabex price stabilization program (for coffee, vanilla, and cloves); it is a member of the EU's beef and **sugar** protocols, but has not been authorized to export such products into Europe since 1997, primarily for want of adequate sanitation safeguards. In addition, the EU provides occasional budget stabilization assistance and relief from natural disasters and locust depredation. A major fisheries agreement, signed in March 2001, allows 80 European trawlers to take tuna out of Malagasy waters in return for a royalty of 2.5 million euros as well as research, training, and other technical assistance to Malagasy fishing. Total annual EU aid now runs at a level of nearly 350 million euros.

**EVOLUES.** Under the colonial system, *évolués* were Malagasy who qualified for French citizenship. Access to this status required a certain level of **education** and an attestation of good character from the local colonial administrator. French citizenship freed its holder from the requirements of the *indigénat*, including **forced labor**. It was not easy to acquire this status, and in 1939 there were barely 8,000 Malagasy holding French citizenship.

**EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES (EPZ).** In 1988, the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar (DRM)** began to encourage domestic and

foreign investors to mount light manufacturing industries at **Antananarivo**, **Antsirabe**, **Toamasina**, **Fianarantsoa**, and **Antsiranana** for purposes of exportation to relatively protected markets in Western Europe. Modeled on the highly successful precedent set a decade earlier in **Mauritius**, the initiative offered EPZ investors duty-free import privileges, tax exemptions, and immunity from foreign exchange controls. Gratifying response came from **France**, **South Africa**, East Asia, and even Mauritius itself. By 2001, 130 EPZ firms had become a major source of employment and foreign exchange earnings. They recruited some 150,000 Malagasy into minimally paid but nonetheless crucial jobs, primarily in the fabrication of apparel. The preponderance of these enterprises in Antananarivo exacerbated an already flagrant imbalance in economic power between the capital and the impoverished provinces. In 2000, Madagascar obtained access to the American market through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the EPZ accounted for 40 percent of the island's **exports** for that year. Manufacturing suffered during the political stalemate of 1991–1992 and especially under blockade conditions in the bitter political **Crisis of 2002**. The investment displaced from the island in that crisis cost an estimated 70,000 jobs in the capital. Recovery has been slow while the world economy struggled through recession and capital went looking for other repositories of inexpensive labor. In 2003, the **Ravalomanana** administration sought to induce new investment by making Malagasy real estate available to foreign ownership (a controversial subject for centuries), but with little immediate result.

**EXPORTS.** *See* EXTERNAL TRADE.

**EXTERNAL TRADE.** During the late 1990s, light manufactures from the **Export Processing Zones** and ocean products, mainly prawns and tuna, overtook Madagascar's traditional **agricultural** products and certain minerals as the island's principal exports. The rise of these new resources (and **tourism**, in years of stability) has allowed the nation's export accounts to outpace overall GDP growth in the 1991–2001 decade, by 4.5 percent to 2.9 percent. Manufactured goods exports rose at an average annual rate of 16.8 percent between 1990 and 2001. Export revenues reached \$928 million in that year,

**Table 4. Total External Trade. Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Madagascar*, 1 June 2004.**

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Exports	584	824	928	486	791
Imports	742	997	955	603	1,003
Current acct. balance	-252	-283	-170	-298	-281

although the current account remained in deficit as imports rose proportionately, to \$955 million. Malagasy exports of **vanilla**, cloves, and gemstones represent a significant proportion of world production, while **coffee**, **sugar**, most **spices**, and minerals amount to only fractions of world supply. Terms of trade are constantly problematic, for production has always been uncertain and Madagascar has little control over prices. (See table 4.)

Before the colonial period Madagascar's exports went mainly to the **Mascarene Islands** and to a variety of countries, including the **United States** and **Great Britain**. During the colonial period trade was monopolized by **France**, and after independence, the **First Republic** enjoyed privileged access to the French market. With the change of regime in 1972 and the creation of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) in 1975, an attempt was made to diversify trading partners. The share of France as a market decreased, but the domination of Western countries did not. Currently, France remains in first place; textile manufactures and seafood are sold in Western Europe and Japan, while the United States continues as a principal client for vanilla and for apparel. (See tables 5 and 6.)

As table 4 shows, Madagascar's imports consistently outpace exports so that the island's trade balance remains perennially negative. Reliable historical data are difficult to establish, and the statistical re-

**Table 5. Composition of Imports and Exports in 2001. Source: Economic Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Madagascar*, 1 June 2004.**

<i>Exports</i>		<i>Imports</i>	
Export processing zone manufactures	344	Fuel products	170
Vanilla	166	Capital goods	166
Cloves	97	Consumer goods	134
Shellfish	94	Raw materials	133
Petroleum products	26	Food	85

**Table 6. Direction of External Trade, 2002, Percent of Total.**  
**Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Madagascar*, 1 June 2004.**

<i>Exports to</i>		<i>Imports from</i>	
France	33.6	France	16.7
United States	24.3	Hong Kong	6.7
Germany	6.2	China	5.8
Japan	3.9	Singapore	2.8
United Kingdom	2.8	Germany	1.8

ports of the Malagasy government differ significantly from those of the **World Bank** and other sources. Inadequate collection of import duties and evident **corruption** in the customs services have also kept the market turbulent. Madagascar's traditional suppliers are France, Iran, and a variety of Far Eastern sources (many of them supplying **cotton** yarn for the garment mills). Under the Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union supplied significant amounts of **petroleum** and military equipment that did not appear in the trade statistics. As a result of the **debt** crisis that began in 1981 and subsequent periods of instability and mismanagement, the DRM encountered severe shortages of imported goods, as the total import bill declined from \$545 million in 1981 to \$446 million in 1991. Since then, in the **Third Republic**, the volume has risen steadily, reaching \$997 million in 2000 and over a billion dollars in 2003. Not only are imported goods necessary for the new Export Processing Zone plants; they are also required for capital investment in infrastructure and transportation, and for the stability of urban classes. A three-year import tax holiday declared by President **Marc Ravalomanana** for many imported products in 2003 aroused charges of favoritism in Malagasy business circles as well as international agency criticism for untimely curtailment of government revenues.

While Western European and Asian partners maintained their share of Malagasy external trade, Africa declined in overall importance. Imports from **Mauritius**, **South Africa**, and other neighbors had supplied about 12 percent of Madagascar's needs in 2001, while exports to African partners fell from 20.6 percent of Madagascar's sales in 1996 to under 4 percent in 2001. *See also* EUROPEAN UNION; SPICES.

## – F –

**FAHAVALO.** The *fahavalo* were politicized groups of bandits who gathered in areas outside the effective control of the **Merina Empire** as it began to collapse after the **Franco-Malagasy War of 1883**. Beginning in the northwest, they drew their numbers from deserters from the armed forces. These were augmented by refugees from the **forced labor** programs enacted after 1885 as the Merina government sought to repay the indemnity to **France** under the peace treaty. By 1888, the *fahavalo* had developed into an insurrectionary army that threatened the monarchy, attacking the holy city of **Ambohimanga**, and in 1890, raiding **Antananarivo** itself. After the French conquest of 1895, they turned their attention to official French targets as well as officials of the Merina monarchy, Malagasy Christians, and missionaries. Some of their activities merged into the revolt of the **Menalamba**.

**FAMADIHANA.** Referred to in English as “the turning (or re-turning) of the dead,” the *famadihana* is a festive ceremony that consists of removing the remains of **ancestors** from the family tomb and wrapping them in new shrouds (*lambamena*). **Cattle** are sacrificed and considerable food is consumed amid **music**, **dancing**, and long, flowery oratory called *kabary*. The ceremony “where the ancestors dance” is found throughout Madagascar, although it is especially common in the **highlands**. Some writers argue that the *famadihana* is not ancient but took its present form in the 19th century in response to changes introduced by the extension of the **Merina** monarchy.

**FANJAKANA.** *Fanjakana* is the Malagasy word for “government” or “administration” and is often used quite generally to indicate an authority that is alien to local society. Malagasy history abounds with examples of tension between local or clan loyalties and the *fanjakana rayamandreny* (parental government).

**FARQUHAR, SIR ROBERT.** In 1814, Farquhar became governor of **Mauritius**, the erstwhile Ile de France, captured by **Great Britain** three years earlier. Eager to consolidate British influence in the **Indian Ocean**, he entered into contact with **Radama I**, ruler of the ex-

panding **Merina** monarchy, in 1815. In 1817 he sent sergeants **James Hastie** and **Brady** to the Merina capital, **Antananarivo**, to demonstrate the advantages of British-style **military** training. On 23 October 1817, a treaty was signed in which Britain provided military technical assistance and Radama agreed to abolish the **slave trade** in return for an indemnity and for British recognition of his sovereignty over all Madagascar. When Farquhar went on leave to England, his replacement refused to pay the indemnity. Farquhar returned to Mauritius in 1820 and renegotiated the treaty.

**FEDERATION DES ASSOCIATIONS DES ETUDIANTS MALGACHES (FAEM) / FEDERATION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF MALAGASY STUDENTS.** The FAEM was the main student organization at the **University of Madagascar** during the **First Republic**. It alternated between negotiations for the improvement of student amenities and more politicized demands, until the slogan of **Malgachization** brought the two sets of interests together. Although the FAEM participated in the **May 1972 Revolution**, it was by no means the most radical of the groups involved in that event.

**FENERIVE.** *See* FENOARIVO AT SINANA.

**FENOARIVO AT SINANA (WEST FENERIVE, 18°26'S, 46°34'E).**

A port lying south of **Sainte-Marie** island on the east coast, Fenoarivo was an early staple for the **slave trade** with the **Mascarenes**. It was also the center from which the **Zanamalata** launched the formation of the **Betsimisaraka Confederation**. The Fenoarivo area was a bastion of solidarity for President **Didier Ratsiraka** in the 1980s and 1990s. After the inauguration of his rival **Marc Ravalomanana** in 2002, it drew considerable speculation over alleged militia maneuvers, arms smuggling, and antigovernment conspiracies. Nevertheless, the area has continued to produce normal harvests of cloves and litchi fruit.

**FETY, MICHEL (1921– ).** A Protestant minister from **Toamasina province**, Fety was active in the **First Republic** and the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**. An early critic of the government's suppression of the **peasant rebellion** of April 1971, he became president

of the permanent commission of the **Conseil National Populaire de Développement** under **Gabriel Ramanantsoa**. In this capacity he supported the *fokonolona* project of Colonel **Richard Ratsiman-drava**. At the last meeting of the CNPD after creation of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) in 1975, Fety attempted to defend the assassinated colonel's view of grassroots development, but was criticized for romanticism by the champions of the new socialist regime. After the installation of the DRM, Fety more or less disappeared from official political life. On 29 July 1992, however, a small group of armed civilians seized the **Antananarivo** radio station, claiming to act in Fety's name. The attempted coup quickly collapsed.

**FFKM (FIKOMBONAN'NY FIANGONANA KRISTIANA ETO MADAGASIKARA, COUNCIL OF CHRISTIAN CHURCHES OF MADAGASCAR).** The FFKM was founded in 1980 to bring together the **Catholic church** and the major **Protestant churches** of Madagascar. It consists of four separate components, the Eglise Catholique Apostolique et Romaine (Roman Catholic), the Eglise Réformée et Protestante (Protestant Evangelical Church, FJKM), the Lutheran church, and the Anglican church. Speaking with consensus, the FFKM has played an intermittently powerful role in Malagasy politics and in the development of social awareness. After a decade of pulpit and journalistic criticism against regime failures, it became preeminent in the transition from the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** to the **Third Republic**. The FFKM created an important **election** observation committee (the CNOE) in 1989, after which it convened assemblies of politicians to discuss reform of the political system. When DRM partisans refused to attend, the assemblies turned into gatherings of opposition forces.

In the political crisis of the summer of 1991, the FFKM at first attempted to mediate between President **Didier Ratsiraka** and the opposition Comité des **Forces Vives**, but after the massacre of demonstrators at the presidential palace of **Iavoloha** in October 1991, it sided definitively with the opposition and participated in the **Panorama** negotiations that led to a power-sharing agreement on 31 October 1991. The FFKM took a direct part in the **National Forum** of 1991–1992 that produced the **Constitution of the Third Republic** and it supported (Catholic) **Albert Zafy** of the Forces Vives for

the presidency of the republic in 1992. Critical of both Zafy and the rehabilitated Ratsiraka who succeeded him in 1997, the churches endorsed (Protestant) **Marc Ravalomanana**, vice president of the FJKM, in the presidential election of 2001. FFKM's Roman Catholic leader, Cardinal Armand Gaétan Razafindratandra, is believed to have influenced Ravalomanana's top cabinet appointments, but the council has since sought to avoid excessive public identification with the administration. General secretary of the FFKM is Father **René Ralibera**, a veteran commentator in the Catholic press and radio. *See also* CHRISTIANITY; RELIGION.

**FIANARANTSOA (21°26'S, 47°0'E).** The city whose name means "where the best is learned" was established as the southern capital of the **Merina Empire** in 1830 on the site of a **Betsileo** village. It was a major center of **mission** activity, particularly after the arrival of the **Catholic** missions in 1861. After the French conquest in 1895, Fianarantsoa served as a base for the extension of colonial rule to the south, and a French military camp was established there. The city population was estimated as 109,248 in 1993. Fianarantsoa's university includes the nation's only school of law. Normally acquiescent to central state options under all three republics, the provincial capital's population turned belligerent toward the **AREMA** party establishment during the **Crisis of 2002**. In early April, **Pety Rakotoniaina**, a parliamentary deputy of the **MF**M who had been appointed administrator of the province by **Marc Ravalomanana**, stormed provincial headquarters at the head of an army detachment and declared the province for Ravalomanana. Subsequently, the Malagasy army under General Randrianafidisoa wiped out the remnants of resistance by partisans of **Didier Ratsiraka**. Rakotoniaina's sudden removal as province chief in early 2003 turned him toward the opposition Comité de **Réconciliation Nationale**, and in November of that year, he was elected mayor of Fianarantsoa. One of his first challenges was a boisterous, occasionally violent, strike by high school students which he was suspected of covertly supporting.

**FIANARANTSOA PROVINCE.** Located in the southern part of the **highlands**, the province extends eastward to the coast. Its capital,



**Fianarantsoa**, was an administrative center for the **Merina Empire** and the site of intensive **mission** activity. Since it was also used by the French colonial administration, Fianarantsoa province has an infrastructure second only to that of **Antananarivo province**. The dominant ethnic group is the **Betsileo**, with **Bara** to the south and **Tanala** and Antaifasy to the east. The province's climatic zones allow a diversified **economy** of specialization: **rice** in the north, **cattle** in the south, and cash crops, especially **coffee**, on the coast. Its **musicians**, **artists**, and craftspeople, particularly among the Betsileo, are nationally celebrated. Thanks to the **Catholic** missions, Fianarantsoa also produces generally acceptable white and rosé wines.

**FINAZ, MARC (1815–1880)**. A French Jesuit, Finaz began missionary work in **Réunion** in 1846. In 1855 he went to the capital of the **Merina Empire**, **Antananarivo**, disguising his identity as a priest because of the ban on **mission** activity decreed by **Queen Ranaivalona I**. Finaz became a friend and counselor of Prince Rakoto, the future **Radama II**, and was implicated in the 1857 plot to unseat Ranaivalona and replace her with her son. He left the capital after the plot was discovered, but returned in 1862, following the queen's death, to direct the establishment and expansion of **Catholic** missions in Madagascar. He died at Antananarivo in 1880.

**FIRST REPUBLIC**. The First Malagasy Republic began its existence as an autonomous state in the French Community, established by the constitution of the Fifth French Republic in October 1958. The **constitution** of the First Malagasy Republic was passed on 20 April 1959. It provided for a presidential system along the lines of the French, with the exception that there was no prime minister, the president being both head of state and head of government. The constitution provided for a bicameral legislature with an **Assemblée Nationale** and a **Senate**. There was also a constitutional court, or **Conseil Supérieur des Institutions**. In December 1959, the government petitioned for full independence, and on 26 June 1960, independence was proclaimed in **Antananarivo**. The nullified **Annexation Law** of 1896 was replaced by a series of **cooperation agreements** that maintained a French **economic**, **military**, and cultural presence on the island. Opponents of the First Republic referred to these agree-

ments as the “original sin” that damned the neocolonial republic from birth.

Although the First Republic was dominated by the **Parti Sociale Démocrate** (PSD) under the presidency of **Philibert Tsiranana**, it was technically a multiparty system, with two significant parties of opposition, the **AKFM** and **MONIMA**, and many other ephemeral parties. The PSD clearly controlled the administration and political system, however, and after 1965 held all but three seats in the National Assembly and all of the Senate.

Tsiranana’s republic had a conservative **foreign policy**, firmly aligning itself with **France** on the Western side of the Cold War. It kept a distance from the **Organization of African Unity**, which it considered too radical, and maintained relations with states not generally in vogue at Third World gatherings, such as Taiwan, Israel, South Korea, Portugal, and at the end of the 1960s, **South Africa**. In spite of the “social democratic” label of the PSD, internal policy was also conservative. The colonial administrative framework was maintained, as were colonial policies like the head and **cattle** taxes, while **Malgachization** of the upper reaches of the administration and the **military** proceeded slowly. **Education** remained tied to the French system through the presence of hundreds of French educators and the equivalency of Malagasy diplomas with the corresponding French diplomas.

The end of the First Republic began with Tsiranana’s illness in 1970 and the eruption of power struggles among the barons of the PSD. A **Peasant Rebellion** in 1971 added further instability, and finally the **May 1972 Revolution** brought about the fall of the republic and its replacement by the civil-military **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**.

**FISHERIES.** Madagascar’s territorial waters abound in tuna, shellfish, and various other aquatic species but national exploitation of these resources remained undeveloped until the 1990s. French, Japanese, Russian, Norwegian, and smaller fleets have taken negotiated quantities (and sometimes more) from these waters for decades, rarely off-loading for Madagascar’s benefit. The **Sakalava**, especially the southern subgroup called **Vezo**, have fished for coastal markets, and there is some inland fishing for local consumption.

Tilapia are introduced for insect control in the inundated paddy **rice** fields. In 1989, under financial and technical assistance agreements with the European community, Madagascar began harvesting and packaging prawns, tuna, and a few other species for **export** to Europe and Japan. By 1995–1997, Malagasy fisheries were producing at an annual rate of 71,000 metric tons, twice the volume of a decade earlier. The annual oceanic take is now supplemented by nearly 10,000 tons of prawns raised aqua-culturally in the north of the island, mainly by **Indo-Pakistani** entrepreneurs. In 2000, shellfish and tuna sales reached second place in the island's export list, earning \$129 million. The industry managed relatively well during the **Crisis of 2002** and has been thriving since then, albeit under risks of overproduction. Fresh water fishing declined appreciably during the 1990s.

**FLACOURT, ETIENNE DE (?–1660).** De Flacourt was the agent sent by the **Compagnie des Indes Orientales** to restore its settlement at **Fort-Dauphin** after the first attempt of 1642 had disintegrated in quarrels among the **settlers**. He arrived in 1648 and proceeded to re-fortify the settlement and send out exploring parties over much of southern Madagascar to forge trading networks. In 1653, he returned to **France** to raise interest in the colony and wrote a history and a dictionary of Malagasy. In 1660, he set out on a return journey to Madagascar, but his ship was sunk by the Dutch.

**FOKONOLONA.** These are grassroots village councils formalized in **Imerina** by King **Andrianampoinimerina** and subsequently spread ubiquitously throughout the island. The *fokonolona* have played a sporadic role in local administration for over two centuries, sometimes enjoying modest taxation and judicial authority, often merely “consulted” for the record. Reform of the territorial administration and a change in the nature of government-populace relations had been among the more radical goals of the **May 1972 Revolution** that overthrew the **First Republic** and installed the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**. After 1972, the idea of using *fokonolona* instead of central administrative agencies was popularized by Ramanantsoa's minister of the interior, gendarmerie colonel **Richard Ratsimandrava**. Using the slogan “popular control of development,” Ratsimandrava pro-

posed to end the peasantry's inveterate suspicion of government by returning as much decision-making power as possible to the level of the village community, or *fokonolona*. Popularly elected councils were to take over many of the functions of local control that had been the role of the territorial administration, and economic councils were to establish local development plans. Regional and national plans were to follow from the local plans, rather than the other way around. The territorial administration was to enter the villages only at their invitation.

Implementation of the reform ran into several problems, including the reluctance of territorial administrators to subvert the state structures on which their power rested. At the time of his assassination in 1975, Ratsimandrava was pursuing the reform and encouraging peasant expression of grievances against the administration. Although this radically populist vision of *fokonolona* reform died with him, it had aroused enough enthusiasm that the subsequent **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) was obliged to adopt much of its terminology while at the same time ensuring increased centralization. Lip-service to *fokonolona* tradition continued through the end of the DRM in 1992 but the entity itself was used more as a town meeting than a participant in policy. It had little place in the **decentralization** plans of the early **Third Republic** but has been revived, rhetorically at least, in the local development strategies of the **Marc Ravalomanana** presidency.

**FONDS D'INVESTISSEMENT POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIAL (FIDES).** More commonly known by its initials, FIDES, this fund was established in 1946 to provide long-term loans for infrastructure and other economic development projects in **France's** overseas territories. In Madagascar it helped to finance the **Communes Rurales Autonomes Modernisées** and projects for the development of **coffee** and **sugar** cultivation.

**FORCED LABOR.** Most precolonial political units in Madagascar had a system of obligatory labor owed to the collectivity or to the ruler. Under the **Merina Empire** the *fanampoana*, as this system was usually called, was extended to public works, to portage, to the maintenance of a standing army, and to various administrative necessities.

Migration to escape the labor recruiters was not uncommon. In 1896, French Governor-General **Joseph Gallieni** decreed that all healthy males between the ages of 16 and 60 furnish a maximum of 50 days labor for public works and supply convoys. Later, Malagasy permanently employed by Europeans were exempted, but this system was often abused through the sale of work certificates. In 1926, the system was tightened and made more onerous by the introduction of the **Service de la Main-d'Oeuvre des Travaux d'Intérêt Général** (SMOTIG). Forced labor was used by the **Free French** administration in 1943–1944 to contribute to **France's** continuing World War II effort against Germany. It was abolished throughout the French African empire in 1946, but subsequent regimes have often required labor for various “development” projects, particularly the building and repair of roads and bridges.

**FORCES REPUBLICAINES DE SECURITE (FRS).** The Republican Security Forces were a paramilitary unit, about 2,000 men strong, created in 1966 by the minister of the interior, **André Resampa**. As long as Resampa held his portfolio, he took a personal interest in recruitment to the force, usually drawing its men from his home base of Morondava, and the FRS was considered to be his personal militia. Alienated from him at the end, it did not react to Resampa's fall from grace in 1971, and by the time of the **May 1972 Revolution** it was the only force willing to defend the **First Republic** and its president, **Philibert Tsiranana**. It was the FRS raid on **students** assembled at the **University of Madagascar** on the night of 12 May that turned the demonstrations into revolution; when it fired on the crowd assembled at the **Antananarivo** city hall the next day, capital city opinion turned decisively against the Tsiranana regime.

After the First Republic was replaced by the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**, the FRS was renamed the Groupe Mobile de Police (GMP), but not otherwise reformed, and in fact was generally ignored by the regime. Colonel **Brécharid Rajaonarison**, whose attempted coup at the end of December 1974 led to the fall of **Gabriel Ramanantsoa**, took refuge at the GMP camp at **Antanimoro** and held out there until the assassination of **Richard Ratsimandrava** in February 1975. Ratsimandrava's assassins were members of the GMP from the Antanimoro camp. After the reorganization of the **military** under the

**Democratic Republic of Madagascar** the GMP/FRS was disbanded.

**FORCES VIVES (VITAL FORCES, IN MALAGASY HERY VELONA).** The Comité des Forces Vives (CFV) was formed in March 1990 to unite groups working for the overthrow of President **Didier Ratsiraka** and his **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM). Original members included the **AKFM-Renouveau**, led by **Richard Andriamanjato**; the **MFM** under **Manandafy Rakotonirina**; and the **Union Nationale pour le Développement et la Démocratie**, led by **Albert Zafy**, as well as representatives from **labor unions** and the clergy. In the summer of 1991 the Forces Vives began a series of demonstrations and general strikes, and in August it named a “transitional government,” with retired general **Jean Rakotoharison** as president and Zafy as prime minister. The MFM withdrew from the comité over this “insurrectional” act, but continued to cooperate with it. During the months of August and September, the FV “government” occupied ministries and continued to stage general strikes. Efforts by Prime Minister **Guy Razanamasy** to expand his government to include members of the Forces Vives were at first rejected, but after pressure from the armed forces, government and opposition signed the power-sharing **Panorama Agreement** of 31 October 1991, stripping Ratsiraka of most of his powers and setting up institutions to manage a transition to the **Third Republic**.

Although the original *comité* had already divided into several factions, each meeting at a different site in the capital, the Forces Vives dominated the transition period, and its compromise candidate, Zafy, won the run-off **election** for president of the **Third Republic** against Ratsiraka with 66 percent of the vote in February 1993. Collaborating in an exceedingly fragile “cartel,” FV component parties gained a working plurality in the parliamentary elections of June 1993, but once in power, they returned to the factional disputes that had prevented united opposition during the 17-year DRM. One by one, the factions deserted Zafy, never a compelling candidate for leadership. They resented his efforts to strengthen the presidency against the parliament and ultimately returned a bill of impeachment against him in 1996. In the aftermath, the remnants of the Forces Vives could not agree on an alternative candidate and they lost the presidency, ironically to the

same Ratsiraka whom they had successfully overturned four years earlier. The movement thereupon dissolved. *See also* ELECTIONS; FFKM; IAVOLOHA.

**FOREIGN POLICY.** Nineteenth-century external affairs under the **Merina Empire** were complex, as the monarchy sought to sustain its independence and enhance prosperity against the ambitions of **Great Britain, France**, and occasional intruders from elsewhere. Foreigners, most of them French, obtained **concessions** for plantations and for import-export commerce under surveillance from the court at **Antananarivo**. Commercial relations were formalized with the **United States** as well as Britain and France. **Protestant** and **Catholic** missionaries brought significant changes to Malagasy culture, education, economics, and politics, but this “modernization,” a source of anxiety for the traditionalist-nationalist parties at court, was frequently insufficient to satisfy Westerners as to the “civilized” credentials of the regime. Wherever Merina controls could not reach, **Sakalava, Bet-simisaraka**, and other organized polities conducted their own foreign relations with European, Comorian, and African powers. Relying on Great Britain in vain for sympathy, Merina diplomacy failed to deter French ambitions, ending in the conquest of 1895 and the long humiliation of colonialism.

Independent again in 1960, Madagascar’s **First Republic** openly espoused alignment with the West, particularly with France and, notwithstanding serious disagreements, the United States. France enjoyed an array of privileges embodied in the **cooperation agreements** signed before independence. Under President **Philibert Tsiranana**, Madagascar exchanged ambassadors with Taiwan, Israel, the Federal Republic of Germany, Portugal, and South Korea, not with the USSR or other Cold War antagonists. In the late 1960s, Tsiranana allowed **South Africa** to open an “information office” in Antananarivo. Resentment against perceived neocolonial policies contributed to the sudden upheaval of 1972 in the streets of the capital and the fall of Tsiranana.

His immediate successor, General **Gabriel Ramanantsoa**, began a conversion from Western affiliation toward neutrality. The foreign minister, Navy Captain **Didier Ratsiraka**, renegotiated the cooperation accords to give Madagascar a free hand in international security,

economic and financial commitments, and **education**. In power from 1975, Ratsiraka turned the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) toward a combination of ideological affinities with Marxist states, including **North Korea**, but was compelled by financial exigencies to indulge in global pragmatism, particularly after the prodigious foreign **debt** crisis engendered by the DRM's unfettered **investment policies**. Accommodating these exigencies gradually restored much of the role played by French agencies and businesses, cautiously accompanied by other international and Western patrons.

By the mid-1980s, Madagascar's **economy** was becoming a ward of creditors grouped in the so-called **Paris** and **London Clubs**. Its strategies were henceforth to be constrained by "conditions" imposed from the **World Bank** and **International Monetary Fund**. If the DRM's compliance with the terms of "structural adjustment" was habitually hesitant and half-hearted, such external controls became anathema to its successor **Third Republic** whose first president, **Albert Zafy**, antagonized the global community through unorthodox economic policies. The rewards of compliance—financial and technical assistance, debt relief, trade concessions—resumed with more coherence in 1998 during Ratsiraka's second mandate, staffed by competent, internationally trained economists.

While Ratsiraka's administration moved toward collaboration with global market authority, it maintained good, if largely unfruitful, relations with African states, particularly with the other former French territories grouped in the Francophone community (derivatively termed "*la Franceafrique*"). The admiral's credibility in those forums helped him resist the claims of his presidential challenger, **Marc Ravalomanana**, to have ousted Ratsiraka in the **election** of December 2001. During the semester-long **Crisis of 2002** both sides sought approval for their claims in Paris and other European capitals, in the United States, and throughout Africa. While key statespeople hesitated to pronounce in his favor, Ravalomanana benefited from a belated vote recount (verified by the U.S. embassy) and a subsequent sweep of the landscape by the Malagasy **armed forces**. Recognition pledges came in June–July 2002 from **Mauritius**, Switzerland, and Senegal in addition to Washington's, and the French ultimately brought in the **European Union**. A consensus of African leaders proved more difficult for Ravalomanana who attended a succession



of African and third-world meetings but was not invited into the **African Union** as head of state until January 2003.

Washington's early endorsement and Ravalomanana's own predilection for American management techniques, his enjoyment of English language pronouncements and weakness in French (contrasted with the eloquent Francophone Ratsiraka) posed a diplomatic challenge for the new president. He went to elaborate lengths to reassure Paris—and his own people—that Antananarivo was not seeking dependence on a (reluctant) Washington. Ravalomanana managed that reassurance in 2003, while extending his policy initiatives toward Germany, East and Southern Africa, and neighboring Mauritius. His prime minister, **Jacques Sylla**, is an experienced Francophone ex-foreign minister with admirable credentials in Europe.

**FORESTS.** Much of Madagascar was originally covered by forest, but now all that remains are some reforested areas in the **highlands** and the remnants of the rain forest of the east coast—about 20 percent of the 144 million acres that once held forest cover. Deforestation began at an early period, particularly in the highlands, and 19th-century visitors to the **Merina** capital, **Antananarivo**, remarked on the bare appearance of the surrounding countryside. Deforestation persists as timber is harvested for fuel and as land is cleared for crops and pasture through the practice of *tavy*, or slash-and-burn **agriculture**. Attempts to ban the *tavy* under successive regimes, and to make reforestation a national duty, have not been conspicuously successful. The deforestation has resulted in serious erosion and in the silting up of river mouths, particularly along the west coast. *See also* ENVIRONMENT.

**FORT-DAUPHIN.** Now **Taolagnaro**, Fort-Dauphin received its name at the time of an attempted French settlement under the **Compagnie des Indes Orientales** in 1642 (“dauphin” refers to the future King Louis XIV). The settlers at first attempted to establish themselves at Saint Lucy's Bay to the north, but moved to the more secure ground of the peninsula that forms one side of the Taolagnaro harbor. **Etienne de Flacourt** was sent there in 1646 and managed to keep the settlement in operation, but after his death it stagnated and was closed in 1674 upon the massacre of most of its garrison. Fort-

Dauphin continued to be used as a port to provide supplies, largely **cattle**, for the **Mascarenes** after the colony was abandoned, and in 1768, the company made another attempt to establish a settlement there, under the Comte de Maudave. He abandoned the effort in 1771, leaving only a small post that was conquered by the troops of the **Merina Empire** in 1825.

**FORUM NATIONAL.** This forum was held in **Antananarivo** from 22 to 31 March 1992, to discuss the **constitution** of the imminent **Third Republic**. The draft constitution had already been debated in the transitional institutions established by the power-sharing **Panorama Agreement** of 31 October 1991 and in regional forums which sent delegates to the National Forum. The greatest conflict took place not in the forum itself, but between the forum and the advocates of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** who wanted the forum to consider a federal form of state. Violent demonstrations and an attempt on the life of the leader of the transition, **Albert Zafy**, forced the forum to move from its meeting place in Antananarivo to a military camp outside the city, where it completed its deliberations. An ad hoc transitional committee was established in 1992 to manage the transition from the forum to the Third Republic. It was composed of the three leaders of the Comité des **Forces Vives**— **Manandafy Rakotonirina**, **Richard Andriamanjato**, and Albert Zafy—as well as the president of the **FFKM** (Council of Malagasy Churches). Its most controversial act was an attempt to prevent the president of the defunct Democratic Republic, **Didier Ratsiraka**, from running for the presidency of the new republic on the grounds that the constitution limited the president to two terms of office. This decision aroused violent opposition from Ratsiraka's supporters, and the committee retracted its decision, allowing an exception for the admiral, who proceeded to come in second in the subsequent presidential race.

**FOULPOINTE (ALSO MAHAVELONA; 17°41'S, 49°31'E).** A harbor lying between **Toamasina** and **Antongil Bay** on the east coast, Foulpointe was one of the early stations for the **slave trade** between Madagascar and the **Mascarene Islands**. In 1756, the **Compagnie des Indes Orientales** established a post there, and in 1758, Foulpointe replaced Antongil Bay as the official center of company

activities on the east coast, a position it lost to Toamasina in 1800. It was subsequently occupied by the forces of the **Merina Empire**. In 1826, the **Betsimisaraka** attacked the Merina post, but were defeated, and their **Zanamalata** leaders were taken to **Antananarivo** where they were executed.

**FRANC ZONE.** A monetary association of **France** and its former colonies, the Franc Zone agreements provided for free convertibility of the former colonies' currencies into French francs in return for retention of their reserves in French francs and use of the Paris Exchange for their transactions in other currencies. The **First Republic** joined the Franc Zone by the Financial **Cooperation Agreement** of June 1960. As part of the renegotiation of the Cooperation Agreements undertaken by the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** in 1973, Madagascar left the Franc Zone. After the arrival of the **debt** crisis of the 1980s there have been periodic rumors that Madagascar would apply for readmission, but it has not done so. *See also* CURRENCY.

**FRANCE.** Playing a subordinate role to **Great Britain** in the **Indian Ocean** after the loss of its Ile de France (**Mauritius**) in 1811, the French maintained trading interests along the east and west coasts of Madagascar, often in conflict with the expanding **Merina Empire**. The French faction at the Merina court in **Antananarivo** was headed by the protean-talented **Jean Laborde**, a useful favorite of **Queen Ranavalona I**. It was ironically a dispute over Laborde's property, left to his nephews after his death in 1878, that precipitated the **Franco-Malagasy War of 1883–1885**, after which Paris enjoyed a form of **protectorate** over Merina Madagascar. Following the invasion of 1895, France established a second protectorate but annexed the island outright after the revolt of the **Menalamba**. It ruled Madagascar as a colony until 1958, when the constitution of the Fifth French Republic established the French Community, and Madagascar gained internal autonomy within the community.

Under the Third French Republic, from 1875 until World War II, French citizens in the "overseas territories" (*territoires d'outre-mer*) elected deputies to the Assemblée Nationale and the Conseil de la République; these deputies were usually both firm republicans and strong supporters of empire. Under the Fourth French Republic, from

1946 to 1958, the overseas territories were grouped in the French Union and elected members to parliament according to the college system whereby French citizens voted separately from a restricted electorate subject to the *indigénat*. By 1939 only 8,000 Malagasy had acquired French citizenship and Paris remained under constant pressure from **Réunion**'s representatives in parliament to keep Madagascar a dependent reservoir of natural resources and cheap labor. The constitution of the Fourth Republic considered the overseas territories to be an integral part of France, a conception that led to the **Rebellion of 1947** and subsequently to wars of independence in Indochina and Algeria.

It was not until the passage of the **Loi-Cadre** in 1956 that a greater measure of autonomy was granted to the African colonies, including Madagascar. The Fifth French Republic was established in 1958 after the passage of its constitution in the **Referendum of 28 September** of that year. The constitution provided for a French Community in which the overseas territories, including Madagascar, would enjoy internal autonomy, while France handled questions of defense, foreign relations, and monetary affairs. Internal and international pressures toward decolonization were too great, however, and in January 1959 the Federation of Mali, grouping Senegal and the current state of Mali, asked for full independence; in December 1959 Madagascar followed suit.

In 1960, Madagascar became fully independent, but the **First Republic** maintained close ties with France, governed by a series of **Cooperation Agreements**. Other international partners, including the **United States**, behaved with overt deference to this "privileged relationship," which was bitterly resented by Malagasy **nationalists**. After the **May 1972 Revolution**, the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** renegotiated the agreements, ending the close links. Relations between Madagascar and France became more distant with the creation of the avowedly Marxist **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) in 1975. **Nationalizations** of French firms, Malagasy criticism of French policy in the **Comoro Islands**, and territorial disputes over the "scattered islands" (*îles éparses*) of the Indian Ocean all added friction to the relationship. There was some improvement in 1977, when the Franco-Malagasy Commission established in 1973 met for the first time and agreed to a resumption of French assistance in the

**educational** system. The rapprochement was furthered by Madagascar's **debt** crisis in the early 1980s. In 1984, Madagascar agreed to pay an indemnity to the French firm Electricité et Eau de Madagascar in return for French help in its dealings with the **International Monetary Fund** (IMF). In 1989, France agreed to a substantial reduction of Madagascar's **debt**.

Throughout, France remained Madagascar's first customer and most important supplier of **imports**. By the time of the collapse of the Democratic Republic in 1991–1992, France had regained much of its former position of influence and its chief "rival," the Soviet Union, was no longer in the arena. French teachers returned to the island, and French soldiers moved in as trainers to the presidential guard. During the crisis of 1991, French authorities tried at first to bring about a compromise between President **Didier Ratsiraka** and his opponents in the **Forces Vives**, but after the massacre of demonstrators at the presidential palace of **Iavoloha** on 10 August 1991, the French began putting pressure on Ratsiraka to resign, offering him asylum in France.

In Madagascar's **Third Republic**, successive French governments remained the Great Island's bilateral mainstay. Paris's diplomacy encouraged greater participation by **European Union** (EU) members and international agencies as Madagascar struggled to improve economic and social conditions. French investment and business people returned in considerable strength. By 2003, the French community had grown to 80,000 residents, the largest in sub-Saharan Africa, with 600 French-owned businesses, 26 schools and three cultural centers throughout the island. The French **language**, a crucial asset in France's global identity, returned to its historical importance in Malagasy education, civil service, and technology despite a mounting interest in English among the island's young people. Although the old trading systems were gone, the erstwhile colonial power remained Madagascar's principal political and cultural point of reference.

During the long political **Crisis of 2002**, the Paris establishment remained incapacitated by divided sympathies for Didier Ratsiraka and **Marc Ravalomanana**. France and its EU partners refused to take sides until well after the United States and others had accepted the vote recount of 29 April legitimizing Ravalomanana's de facto incumbency. On the other hand, the resident French community at An-

tanananarivo expressed strong support for Ravalomanana. It joined the Malagasy **diaspora** in protesting French official passivity, Paris' deference to the pro-Ratsirakan "*Franceafrique*" leaders, its apparent allergy to Ratsiraka's English-speaking rival, and its calls for "national reconciliation"—meaning from the diasporan viewpoint, giving Ratsiraka an undeserved new chance. In early July, once it had become aware of the solidity of Ravalomanana's domestic control, a new French government promptly closed the diplomatic gap. Ratsiraka and his entourage were once again invited to seek refuge in France, ministerial delegations signed new conventions of assistance, and the new president became assured of sustained cordiality with the former colonial power. French assistance resumed at its normal pace, equal to about \$150 million a year, and virtually all Malagasy applicants have received visas for travel to France.

For his part, Madagascar's new president has cautiously maintained that cordiality. Against some expectations, Ravalomanana has shown no inclination to substitute the United States or any other presence for the privileged role of the French, and he has refrained from embarrassing Paris by requesting—as advocated by many Malagasy—the extradition of Ratsiraka and his lieutenants to serve their sentences for malfeasance on the island. In his first two years as president, Ravalomanana visited Paris three times, including meetings with French President Jacques Chirac; the courtesy was returned on 27 July 2004, when Chirac and his family stopped briefly at Antananarivo on their way to vacation in Réunion to have lunch with President and Madame Ravalomanana.

**FRANCO-BRITISH CONVENTION.** In August 1890, the French and British governments signed the so-called Treaty of Helgoland that settled their rivalry in the western **Indian Ocean**. In that convention, **France** recognized the newly established British protectorate in Zanzibar in return for recognition of the French version of its **protectorate** over the **Merina Empire**. This effectively signaled that **Great Britain** would not intervene in future French efforts to secure their position in the island.

**FRANCO-MALAGASY WAR, 1883–1885.** In February 1883, Admiral Pierre, commander of the French **Indian Ocean** fleet, was ordered

by Minister of the Navy **François De Mahy** to attack the port of **Mahajanga** and to present the **Merina Empire** with an ultimatum. Paris demanded recognition of its claim to territory obtained from **Sakalava** rulers in the northwest of the island, permission for foreigners to own land in Madagascar, and the opening of trade. Pierre bombarded Mahajanga and proceeded around the island to receive **Antananarivo**'s answer at the port of **Toamasina**. When there was no reply, he bombarded and occupied the port. A change of government intervened in **France**, however, and the new government was less enthusiastic about the pursuit of the war. Pierre died while on his way to France to justify his actions, and his successor, Admiral Galiber, received instructions to try a more cautious approach. The Merina government was also not prepared to fight decisively, and the war ended without a clear victory on either side, although the subsequent treaty helped legitimize French claims to the island by giving France a limited **protectorate** over the Merina Empire and a base at **Diégo-Suarez**.

**FRANCO-MALAGASY WAR, 1895.** On 16 November 1894, after a series of disagreements over the implementation of the **Protectorate of 1885**, the French National Assembly voted to finance a war against the **Merina Empire** with the objective of imposing French rule on Madagascar. Although **Toamasina** was captured in December 1894, the actual conquest began from **Mahajanga** on the west coast. The French landed there with a force of 14,733 commanded by General Duchesne who planned to follow the Betsiboka and Ikopa Rivers to the Merina capital, **Antananarivo**. The expedition proved to be more difficult than expected, largely because of natural obstacles. The campaign started at the beginning of January, in the rainy season, and it was necessary to build a road before the army could advance. After six months of progress at a rate of three kilometers a day, with high mortality rates largely from fever, Duchesne formed a flying column that reached Antananarivo on 23 September 1895. The capital was bombarded, and the government of **Queen Ranaivalona III** surrendered on 1 October. A treaty establishing a new French protectorate was signed the same day. The French conquest of Madagascar was not complete with the collapse of the Merina state, however. Various pockets of resistance arose throughout the island and, in **Ime-**

**rina** itself, the revolt of the *Menalamba* obstructed French rule until 1898.

**FREE FRENCH.** After the German invasion and the fall of **France** in June 1940, General **Charles De Gaulle** and other French soldiers and politicians fled to London to continue the fight. Other members of the French government had moved to unoccupied territory in France where they established the **Vichy** regime and made peace with the Germans. Madagascar was originally under Vichy control, but the **British Invasion** of 1942 deposed the Vichy administration. In January 1943, control over the island was handed to the Free French. Many Malagasy nationalists had hoped that they, rather than the French, would take power, and relationships between the Free French administration and the Malagasy were further embittered by the imposition of **forced labor** and the extraction of food and materiel from the island in support of the French war effort. *See also* OFFICE DU RIZ.

**FRENCH EVANGELICAL CHURCH.** The church was invited to Madagascar in 1896 by Governor-General **Joseph Gallieni** to counteract the influence of the **London Missionary Society** (LMS) and other non-French **Protestants**. It was instrumental in expanding Protestant activity to the coastal regions of Madagascar. The churches derived from the French Evangelical became the second largest of the Protestant denominations in Madagascar, and have been active in working for Protestant unity.

**FRONT DEMOCRATIQUE MALGACHE.** *See* PARTI DEMOCRATIQUE MALGACHE.

**FRONT NATIONAL MALGACHE (FNM).** The Front National Malgache was an electoral committee formed to support the candidacies of **Philibert Tsiranana** and French planter Roger Duveau to the French National Assembly in 1956. After the election it tried to organize as a political party, but its adoption of a **nationalist** platform advocating immediate independence caused Tsiranana to distance himself from the party. He founded the **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD) later in 1956. At the 1958 **Tamatave Congress**, the FNM was one of the parties that founded the opposition **AKFM**.



**FRONT NATIONAL POUR LA DEFENSE DE LA REVOLUTION**

(FNDR). The constitution of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) provided for the creation of a National Front for the Defense of the Revolution to “motivate and guide the spirit of the Revolution” and to “embody the unity of the nation’s masses.” In order to have a legal existence, political parties had to join the FNDR and to consent, formally at least, to its principles. The FNDR was composed of the president of the DRM, the prime minister, the president of the **Assemblée Nationale Populaire**, and three representatives from each of the member parties. In practice, the FNDR was not able to fulfill its task of containing opposition to the regime, and when it was convened in August 1989, to discuss changes to the **constitution** of the DRM, it had not met since 1982. In March 1990 the constitution of the DRM was amended to allow the formation of parties outside the FNDR, and the institution ceased to exist.

## – G –

**GALLIENI, JOSEPH SIMON (1849–1916).** Gallieni became the first **governor-general** of Madagascar, from 1896 to 1905, after previous military and administrative experience in West Africa and Indochina. He was appointed, with civil and military powers, after the outbreak of the **Menalamba revolt**. On his arrival, he presided over the end of the **Merina** monarchy and the establishment of the colonial system. He executed an uncle and an advisor of Queen **Ranavalona III**, exiled the queen, and moved into the palace of Ambohitsara. The Menalamba and the Sambirano rebellions were put down, although it was not until 1904 that the south was subdued by Gallieni’s second-in-command, **Hubert Lyautey**.

Gallieni presided over the arrival of **settlers**, the granting of **concessions** to French **commercial companies**, and the creation of tariff barriers that reserved the Malagasy market to **imports** from **France**. He instituted the *indigénat* to subordinate the Malagasy and experimented with various systems of administration. At first, he tried the *politique des races*, a system of internal “tribal” protectorates, which attempted to replace agents of the **Merina Empire** by indigenous local structures. The variety of such structures, however, and their lack

of responsiveness to the directives of the colonial administration led to the gradual abandonment of the strategy and its replacement by more direct rule. Gallieni even made an attempt, later abandoned by his successors, to establish training schools for Malagasy administrators outside the Merina-dominated **highlands**. Gallieni also created a system of public instruction to counter-balance the **mission** schools, which, like those of the **London Missionary Society** (LMS), often used English as a basis of instruction. In **Antananarivo**, he founded the **Befelatanana** medical school and the **Ecole Le Myre de Vilers**. Gallieni also gave some attention to the infrastructure, starting a road system and the Antananarivo-**Toamasina** railroad, using **forced labor** for the purpose.

Although he initially saw Madagascar as a colony of settlement, and encouraged settlers both from his own troops and from **Réunion**, Gallieni later concluded that large-scale settlement was not appropriate for the island. When he left Madagascar he continued his military career and at the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, he was military governor of Paris. There he organized the defenses of the first Battle of the Marne. He became minister of war in 1915, and died in 1916.

**GARBIT, HUBERT (1869–1933).** Garbit was acting **governor-general** of Madagascar from 1914 to 1917 and governor-general from 1920 to 1923. He had already served as chief military officer of the island from 1905 to 1910. Charged with mobilizing Madagascar's contribution to the French defenses in the World War I, he recruited over 45,000 Malagasy to serve in **France**, raised five million francs, and sent large quantities of raw materials to the metropole. In 1917, he went to France to command the Malagasy troops there. Garbit was popular with the **settlers** for his dismantling of the nationalist **Vy Vato Sakelika** (VVS) organization, but was criticized by Malagasy for the methods used in his mobilization effort. In his second term as governor-general, Garbit made further attempts to control the **nationalist movement**, including strengthened press **censorship**, restrictions on meetings, and laws on "vagabondage." He also attempted to grant some representation to the Malagasy by creating a Malagasy section of the **Délégations Economiques et Financières**. He gave considerable attention to the development of the infrastructure, particularly the railroads.

**GENDARMERIE.** *See* MILITARY.

**GOATS.** Goats are raised in the southwest of Madagascar, where they are indigenous, possibly after an early introduction by the **Arabs**. Since 1914, native breeds have been crossbred with Angora goats. They are raised mainly by the **Mahafaly** for their mohair wool, but also are butchered for meat in times of need.

**GOVERNOR-GENERAL.** Under the French colonial system, Madagascar was ruled by a governor-general appointed by the president of the republic, theoretically for a five-year term. He was responsible to the Ministry of Colonies, and all correspondence with the ministry went through his office. He headed both the civil and military administration, named or nominated other administrative officers, and had the authority to promulgate laws and decrees. His second-in-command was called the secretary-general. After the 1956 **Loi-Cadre**, the title of governor changed to high commissioner, and his powers were modified. *See* APPENDIX B *for a list of governors*.

**GRAD/ILOAFO.** More of an elite **Antananarivo** think-tank than a political party, this Groupe de réflexion et d'action pour le développement de Madagascar (Study and Action Group for the Development of Madagascar) fielded candidates with modest success in the three parliamentary elections of the **Third Republic**. The group was founded in 1991 during the agony of the **Democratic Republic** of **Didier Ratsiraka**. Its leader, **Tovonanahary Rabetsitonta**, is an influential **Merina** intellectual. Although not represented in the 2002 **Assemblée Nationale**, Grad/Iloafo is well connected in elite business circles.

**GRANDIDIER, ALFRED (1836–1921) AND GRANDIDIER, GUILLAUME (1873–1957).** Father and son, the Grandidiers were the foremost French scholars of Madagascar of their period. Father Alfred undertook extensive geographical, botanical, and zoological exploration of the island, producing a monumental 34-volume *Physical, Political and Natural History* in collaboration with Guillaume. Both wrote prodigiously on all aspects of Madagascar. They also compiled the *Collection des ouvrages anciens concernant Madagascar*, a compilation of earlier writings on the island.

**GREAT BRITAIN.** The dominant external influence on the **Merina Empire** through most of the 19th century, British military, commercial, and **mission** personnel undertook a variety of services for the monarchy at **Antananarivo**. These included translation of the Bible into Malagasy, training of the imperial army by Sergeants James **Hastie** and James **Brady**, and an extensive network of **Protestant mission** schools, as well as scholarships for Malagasy to study in England. Much of this collaboration was designed by the British governor of **Mauritius**, **Sir Robert Farquhar**, following conquest of that island from the French in 1811. By treaty with King **Radama I**, Britain paid the **Merina** to eliminate the official **slave trade**, in turn recognizing Radama and his heirs as sovereign over the entirety of Madagascar. Farquhar also obtained protection for Protestant missionaries in **Imerina** and English commerce on the east coast. British influence aroused hostility among both the competing French and the traditional nationalist Malagasy at court. Mission activity was interrupted by Radama's wife and successor, Queen **Ranavalona I**, returning in force, however, under subsequent monarchs. In 1869, the entire court of Queen **Ranavalona II** converted to Protestantism and the King James Bible became a household necessity for the elite families of Antananarivo. By 1880, there were about 300,000 baptized Protestants in the island (some of them Lutherans, responding to Norwegian missions) and only 60,000 Roman **Catholics**. Britain took more than 50 percent of the island's formal **external trade**, most of it to supply the colony at Mauritius. British **artists** and architects worked freely in 19th-century **highland** Madagascar, and the court conducted a memorable correspondence with Victorian England.

Nevertheless, when **France** pursued its defense of property claims to **Jean Laborde's** estate in 1881, Her Majesty's Government declined the appeals for intervention from Prime Minister **Rainilaiarivony**, despite endorsements from British missionaries, military officers, traders, and even Members of Parliament. In reality, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 rendered the Great Island less valuable than heretofore to British global interests. London accommodated France's need to relieve population pressures and general insecurity on French **Réunion**, entailing use of Madagascar for colonization. The British maintained neutrality while Paris negotiated

anti-Merina alliances in the **Sakalava** northwest and French fleets attacked **Toamasina** on the east coast. The desultory **Franco-Malagasy War of 1883–1885** gave Paris control over Malagasy **foreign relations**. By 1890, in the **Franco-British Convention** of Helgoland, Prime Minister Lord Salisbury guaranteed British benevolent neutrality toward French ambitions in Madagascar, in exchange for a free hand in Zanzibar.

In the century that followed, apart from modest mission activity and a bit of English-language teaching by Mauritians, the United Kingdom scarcely paid attention to Madagascar, except when World War II strategy induced the preemptive **British Invasion of 1942**. The occupation was brief, however, and postwar diplomatic and commercial activity revived only slightly, as London continued to follow the French lead in matters Malagasy. Current relations include participation in **European Union** assistance programs as well as sponsorship of the **University of Madagascar's** English-Speaking Union.

**GROUPE D'ETUDES COMMUNISTES.** A Communist study group was started at **Antananarivo** in 1946 by Pierre Boiteau, but attracted few members, although the future president of the **First Republic**, **Philibert Tsiranana**, was briefly a member. The group had faded away by 1955.

**GROUPE MOBILE DE POLICE.** *See* FORCES REPUBLICAINES DE SECURITE.

## – H –

**HASTIE, JAMES.** A former sergeant in the Indian army, James Hastie was sent by **Mauritius** governor **Sir Robert Farquhar** to **Antananarivo** in 1817 to help train the armies of the **Merina** monarchy. In 1820, he was appointed British resident agent at Antananarivo.

**HAUTE AUTORITE D'ETAT (HAE).** The High State Authority was instituted by the power-sharing **Panorama Agreement** of 31 October 1991 to replace the **Assemblée Nationale Populaire** (ANP) and the **Conseil Suprême de la Révolution** (CSR), acting as a collegial

head of state during the transition from the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) to the **Third Republic**. It was to be presided over by **Albert Zafy**, a leader of the **Forces Vives** opposition to the DRM. Implementation of the HAE was delayed when Zafy objected to what he considered to be excessive representation by supporters of DRM President **Didier Ratsiraka**. The composition of the HAE was revised to include six supporters of Ratsiraka, seven from the opposition **MFM**, and eighteen from the **Forces Vives**. It began operation in January 1992 and ended a year later, when Zafy became president of the republic.

**HAUTE COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE (HCC) / HIGH CONSTITUTIONAL COURT.** Created by the constitution of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** in 1975, the HCC replaced the **Conseil Supérieure des Institutions** as the final authority over the constitutionality of public law. It was seldom consulted in practice, however, since the 1975 Republic tended to be governed most often through executive ordinance by its President, **Didier Ratsiraka**. The seven justices, all accountable to the president who appointed them, declined a **Vital Forces** attempt to bring articles of impeachment against Ratsiraka in 1991.

The **Constitution of the Third Republic** continued emulation of French precedents in forming a **judiciary**, although with greater concern for checks and balances. The HCC was retained as a nine-member tribunal; three were to be named by the president, two each by the **Assemblée Nationale**, the **Senate**, and the Council of Magistrates. All nine serve a term of seven years. Although not a “supreme court” in the appellate chain, the HCC was endowed by the new republic with greater independence from executive authority than its predecessor court (whose members had to commit solemnly to the ideals of Ratsiraka’s socialist revolution). Among other explicit powers, it acquired sole authority to confirm the results of national **elections**, a prerogative that was to become crucial in the constitutional **Crisis of 2002**. Nevertheless, since the Senate was not organized until 2001, all justices up to November of that year continued to be presidential appointees.

In September 1996, however, notwithstanding the dependence of their appointments on him, the HCC upheld the legitimacy of the bill

of impeachment brought by the National Assembly against the Third Republic's president, **Albert Zafy**. Subsequent efforts to deliver a similar fate to Ratsiraka during his second mandate never reached the court. On 22 November 2001, less than one month prior to the presidential balloting in which Ratsiraka sought reelection, the president announced a reconstitution of the court, replacing all but two justices inherited from 1996, and assuring a majority favorable to his chances. When the principal challenger, **Antananarivo** mayor **Marc Ravalomanana**, claimed an outright majority of the December ballots, contradicting Ratsiraka's Interior Ministry's attribution of only a plurality of 46 percent (Ratsiraka was awarded second place, with just over 40 percent), the court confronted a constitutional dilemma. On 5 January 2002, Ravalomanana's advocates (including many election observers) demanded a recount of the official minutes (*procès-verbaux*) issued in multiple copies by each polling station, to confront the Interior Ministry's summary numbers. Failing to induce the National Electoral Council to undertake the recount, the HCC proceeded on 25 January (almost furtively, at a restaurant 70 kilometers from the capital) to endorse the ministry's percentages with only slight modifications, and to call for a run-off election on 4 February between the two principal candidates.

Ravalomanana refused to accept this verdict (denounced as "formalist" by Malagasy judicial experts). From his power position in Antananarivo, he called for strikes and demonstrations that eventually evicted Ratsiraka's administration from the capital. A judicial solution to the crisis began only on 10 April when the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court declared Ratsiraka's reshuffle of the previous November as procedurally faulty, nullifying all actions of the November 2001 court, and restoring the HCC to its previous composition. This court included only three Ratsiraka supporters—who declined to participate in the restoration. The remaining six, a sufficient quorum, proceeded with the count of *procès-verbaux* of 16,493 polling stations from the previous December. It discovered fraudulent manipulation in official tallies reported by several districts in **Fianarantsoa Province** and elsewhere. These distortions proved sufficient to vindicate Ravalomanana's claim to a majority (51.46 percent) of the vote. A run-off election was thus obviated and the Antananarivo challenger was formally inaugurated as president on 6

May 2002. Despite lingering doubts by fastidious judicial observers, the April determinations have been widely approved as jurisprudentially pragmatic (“teleological”), successfully reconciling legal process with justice (“legality with legitimacy”) as expressed in the evident will of the electorate. To guarantee due process in future, a new law on 6 December 2002 requires the HCC to publish the *procès-verbaux* of all polling stations after every election.

In August 2002, a new HCC was constituted, retaining only three presidential appointees from the April court, and with entirely new justices named by the National Assembly, Senate, and Council of Magistrates.

**HEALTH.** Chronic poverty, inadequacy of government services, and periodic tropical storms create repeated crises in the physical condition of the Malagasy population. Life expectancy fell during the 1980s to 56.4 years for men, 61.2 years for women and has fallen below those levels since then. Tuberculosis and other respiratory diseases are responsible for one-third of the deaths on the island, while dysentery and diarrhea threaten the lives of children, nearly 50 percent of whom suffer from malnutrition. Other major diseases take a fluctuating toll on the Malagasy, even in the relatively healthy **highlands**; they include malaria, cholera, diphtheria, influenza, and plague. Tropical cyclones, striking the island nearly every year, entail epidemics of water-borne diseases and malnutrition, aggravating the isolation of a largely rural population from existing health centers.

The network of hospitals and clinics established by French colonial administrators and Christian **missions** was maintained under the **First Republic** and into the early 1980s by the **Democratic Republic**, but the system suffered subsequently from severe funding lapses. Since 1985, under assistance from the World Health Organization, campaigns of vaccination, maternal and child health services, and sanitation have been sporadically effective, but inhabitants of 11,000 rural villages must still resort to traditional healing methodologies prior to, or instead of, modern health facilities. A study in 1998 concluded that 35 percent of the population had no access to modern health care, only 31 percent of rural inhabitants (85 percent of urbanites) had access to safe water, and only 57 percent of births were assisted by professionals.



A medical school was founded in 1897 by the first French **governor-general**, General **Joseph Gallieni**, in the **Befelatanana** district of **Antananarivo**, but many of its 5,500 graduates, as well as doctors educated at the more recent **University of Madagascar** medical college, have gone to **France** or other lucrative markets for their practice (or into political, administrative, and commercial occupations). As a result, Madagascar has less than 3,000 physicians, a ratio of more than 5,000 inhabitants to one doctor.

By official estimate, HIV/AIDS infected 0.29 percent of the population in 2001, but the current rate of increase could threaten a significantly larger number within a decade. Hence, public information and educational campaigns have begun to alert a highly dispersed people unaccustomed to sanitary contraceptive practice.

**HELLVILLE (13°25'S, 48°16'E)**. Also known as Andoany, Hellville is the most important city on the island of **Nosy Be**. It was named after Admiral de Hell, governor of **Réunion**, signer of a treaty of protection in 1841 with rulers of the **Boina Sakalava**, who had taken refuge on Nosy Be after the capture of their kingdom by the **Merina Empire**. Hellville is the island's fourth most important port, handling both local and long-distance traffic.

**HERIM-BAHOAKA MITAMBATRA (HBM) / UNION OF THE PEOPLE'S VITAL FORCES**. *See* KMMR.

**HIGHLANDS**. Sometimes inaccurately called plateaux, the highlands form the central part of Madagascar, including the territory of the **Merina** and the **Betsileo**. The term can also have political significance, since the highlands have a more developed infrastructure than the other parts of the island and are considered by some coastal people (*Côtiers*) as unduly privileged.

**HOVA**. A noble caste for the **Betsileo**, and a commoner caste for the **Merina**. The evolution of the Merina monarchy in the 19th century saw power pass to an oligarchy dominated by *hova* clans led by the **Andafiavaratra**. The Merina state of the time was often erroneously called the *hova* state, and "*hova*" has become a loose generic term for Merina throughout the island.

– I –

**IAYOLOHA.** Built by **North Koreans** for President **Didier Ratsiraka**, Iavoloha, 13 kilometers south of **Antananarivo**, served as palace of the president of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar**. The main structure was built as a replica of the 19th-century royal palace (*manjakamiadana*), but the compound also included extensive fortifications as well as a military camp. Waggish residents of the capital dubbed it “Ratsiraka’s bunker.” On 10 August 1991, a crowd of over 400,000 anti-regime demonstrators marched on the palace. The presidential guard fired on the crowd, killing over a hundred people, including two bodyguards of opposition leader **Albert Zafy**, and wounding Zafy himself. Ratsiraka’s efforts to blame the regular **armed forces** were unconvincing, and the massacre alienated external donors. Civil society groups like the **FFKM** church council henceforth abandoned attempts to achieve a compromise between Admiral Ratsiraka and his opponents, aligning themselves definitively with the opposition. After his rehabilitation and reelection in 1996, the admiral resumed residence at Iavoloha but his successor, **Marc Ravalomanana**, has chosen to live in the capital and to use Iavoloha for ceremonial and hospitality functions only.

**IHARANA.** *See* VOHEMAR.

**IHOSY (22°24'S, 46°8'E).** Located where the road south from **Fianarantsoa** and **Antananarivo** divides, with one branch going to **To-liara** and the other to **Taolagnaro**, Ihosy was the southernmost outpost of the **Merina Empire**. It is a principal **cattle** market in the rangeland territory of the **Bara**. In January 1897, Ihosy was occupied by the French and used as a base for the conquest of the south.

**ILES EPARSESES.** Without permanent population, the scattered islets of the Mozambique Channel—Juan de Nova, Bassas da India, and Europa—and the three Glorieuses off Madagascar’s northern tip have been infrequently visited by **pirates**, fishing vessels, and the occasional aquatic tourist, but they are primarily navigational obstacles (site of numerous wrecks). **France** has claimed sovereignty since

1896, and its prefecture at **Réunion** maintains meteorological and minuscule gendarmerie installations there, otherwise keeping the islets off-limits as a nature preserve. In 1975, Madagascar lodged a competing claim, subsequently extending its oceanic resources zone to include these islets, but the disputed sovereignty has never been definitively decided. Malagasy proprietorship serves little purpose aside from a modest expansion of **fisheries** and other resource rights under the international law of the sea.

**IMERINA.** The **highland** home territory of the **Merina**. It is roughly coextensive with **Antananarivo Province**.

**IMPORTS.** *See* EXTERNAL TRADE.

**INDIAN OCEAN.** Situated on the southern edge of prevailing monsoon wind trajectories, Madagascar participated in the vast system of Asian and East African trade until its disruption by Portuguese invaders in the early 16th century. Although still uncertain, the probable points of origin of the island's permanent population were in the **Indonesian** archipelago, and the original Malagasy must have traveled over well-known south Asian and East African routes before landing on the island between 400 and 900 A.D. Madagascar's northern coasts prospered from settlements of "Antalaotse" (**Antalaotra** in the **Merina** dialect) and commercial activity (including **slave trading**) by **Arabs** and Swahili Africans. These traders carried **Islam** with them in addition to the commercial values of a millennial oceanic civilization. The legacy of that activity inheres in a collection of sacred writings known as the *sorabe*, as well as an itinerant caste of diviners, healers, and wise men called *ombiasy*, an uninterrupted interchange with the **Comoro Islands**, and an insular tradition tracing descent from one or another Asian Muslim source as a way of claiming political legitimacy.

After European domination of the hemisphere, the Great Island became known to Portuguese, Dutch, French, British, and American navigators, some of them arriving with honorable intentions, others to raid for **slaves** or to use the coast as a clandestine refuge for piracy. While the Afro-Arab populations of the east coast became absorbed into Malagasy civilization, the Arab and Swahili Antalaotse of the

northwest were eradicated by Portuguese attacks during the 16th and 17th centuries. The French **Compagnie des Indes Orientales**, subsequently **France** itself, reigned over this corner of the world until successfully contested by **Great Britain** in the early 19th century. Beginning in 1869, the **Suez Canal** marginalized this part of the Indian Ocean geo-strategically, so that, by 1890, France once again had a free hand in Madagascar, the Comoros, and **Réunion**. All three became incorporated into the French empire, albeit with varying destinies.

Following independence in 1960, the Malagasy **First Republic** cooperated with Western cold-war strategy in the Indian Ocean, offering hospitality and base facilities to French armed forces and to the occasional **United States** naval visit. An American NASA tracking station operated for a decade on the island, from 1963. Toward the end of the 1960s, **Philibert Tsiranana's** administration even courted economic, albeit not military, relations with **South Africa**. This partisanship ended with the collapse of Tsiranana's republic in 1972. The **Democratic Republic of Madagascar (DRM)** was an active proponent of demilitarization in the Indian Ocean, declared by a United Nations resolution as a "zone of peace." French bases at Ivato airport near **Antananarivo** and at **Diégo-Suarez** had already been eliminated under the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** of 1972–1975, negotiated by Foreign Minister **Didier Ratsiraka**, who subsequently became DRM president. Although the Ratsiraka administration initiated ties with the Soviet Union in 1975, and for a time permitted the presence of Soviet aircraft-spotting stations on its territory, it did not allow its harbors to be used as bases.

Indian Ocean partnerships played a modest role in the development strategy of Ratsiraka's second mandate, from 1997 to 2001, largely in investment, trade, and **tourism** ties with nearby Réunion and **Mauritius**, as well as desultory air links with Kenya and Tanzania, and a problematic neighborliness with the turbulent Comoros. Repeatedly encouraged by international patrons to develop closer, more fruitful relations with their East and Southern African neighbors, the Malagasy displayed conventional Francophone inhibitions over intimacy with "English-speaking" Africa. Integration began only after consolidation of **Marc Ravalomanana's** presidency in 2002. By contrast, Mauritius already belonged to several East and

Southern African associations together with its Francophone memberships. As Ravalomanana's diplomacy matured, adherence to the Southern African Development Council (SADC) and other regional networks became likely.

**INDIAN OCEAN COMMISSION (IOC).** Formed in 1984 by Madagascar, **Mauritius**, the Seychelles, the **Comoro Islands**, and **France** (representing its overseas department, **Réunion**), the Commission de l'Océan Indien has been dedicated to inter-island cooperation in finance and trade, **environmental** protection, technology transfer, public **health**, **transportation**, **fisheries**, and **tourism**. All five members have French-language heritage and maintain strong cultural and economic links with France. They depart from uneven levels of development, however, and have chosen different paths toward national identity, political culture, and economic development. Hence, regional cooperation has been interrupted at times by substantive dissension. Moreover, the headquarters on Mauritius is constantly running short of funds for project implementation. Only three percent of total member trade is conducted within the insular network. The IOC's most notable achievements have occurred in cultural exchange. The University of the Indian Ocean was created in 1991 for common research and noncampus study with financing from the **European Union**, the **World Bank**, UNESCO, and France. The Indian Ocean Games, a mini-olympics, engender considerable enthusiasm on all the islands and there is some cooperation among journalistic **media** and in the arts.

Of the five IOC partners, Madagascar has the most to gain from bilateral and multilateral collaboration in the region. With by far the largest potential market, the Great Island offers commercial and investment opportunities to more prosperous Réunion and Mauritius, while anticipating benefits in regional employment, technology, and circuits of tourism. Hundreds of Malagasy are working in Mauritius, Réunion, and Seychelles, and there are promising collaborations on the drawing board in integrated coastal management, tuna fishing, meteorology, medicinal plant research, and renewable energy. But, particularly when the projects depend on official cooperation, rather than on nongovernmental organizations and private businesses, the results fall far short of their potential. Although assessed only 29 per-

cent of the IOC operating budget, **Antananarivo** has often failed, pleading poverty, to meet its obligations. This disappointing record may change, for President **Marc Ravalomanana** has paid closer attention to insular cooperation prospects than any of his predecessors. In 2004, veteran Malagasy administrator **Monique Andréas Esoavelomandroso** was appointed IOC general secretary. In March 2005, Antananarivo is to host the IOC summit conference, to be attended by French President Jacques Chirac. *See also* INDIAN OCEAN.

**INDIGENAT.** The large majority of Malagasy not qualifying for French citizenship were governed under this legal system. It added a separate series of offenses to the infractions contained in the standard criminal code—including delays in tax payments, failure to grow certain crops, and failure to provide compulsory labor; these did not apply to French citizens. Offenses under the *indigénat* were usually tried not through the regular justice system but by the district officers assisted by two local notables or Malagasy administrators. Decisions were validated by the **governor-general**. The actual content of the rules and punishment under the *indigénat* varied over time and place, but in Madagascar the system gave more attention to **forced labor** control and to **censorship** than was usual in the other African colonies.

**INDONESIA.** Presumed original departure point for the permanent **population** of Madagascar, Indonesia shares many cultural qualities with the Great Island, extending from basic **language** structure to **agricultural** technology and **religious** ritual. Under different global and colonial regimes, the two nations retained little contact or reciprocal awareness, except as distant components of the great **Indian Ocean** trading system that dissolved in the 16th century. Modern Indonesia is historically the major customer for Madagascar's exports of cloves, which it uses largely in the manufacture of cigarettes. It stopped buying Malagasy cloves in 1983, however, in part because of increases in its own production and irregular negotiating tactics by the Malagasy, but also because of **Democratic Republic** criticism of its position in East Timor. The clove trade has resumed sporadically since that time, and Indonesian entrepreneurs have shown

interest recently in Madagascar's **Export Processing Zones** and even more in **mining** and marketing sapphires in Madagascar's south. *See also* SPICES.

**INDO-PAKISTANIS.** Indian merchants, mainly from the part of the subcontinent that is now Pakistan, began arriving in Madagascar during the 19th century, often via East Africa. They usually settled on the west coast of Madagascar, and, because of their adherence to **Islam**, are commonly known as Karany, or **Karana**. With time they also established themselves in the **highlands**. Today there are an estimated 25,000 people of Indo-Pakistani descent in Madagascar; in addition to the Sunni Muslim majority, there are some Hindus and Ismaelis, and many hold French citizenship. Like the **Chinese**, they are engaged primarily in wholesale and retail trade, collection and marketing of crops, informal rural credit, and more recently, in **export-import** trade, industrial operations (**cotton**, **perfume**, seafood packaging), **tourism**, and plantation management. Their activities were the target of the **nationalizations** of commercial networks carried out in the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**. Partly because of their somewhat reclusive, endogamous way of life, they are often under popular suspicion as exploiters of indigenous Malagasy; during the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) they and their shops were the targets of occasional mob violence.

**INDUSTRY.** Manufacturing accounts for about 12.5 percent of Madagascar's GDP and occupies about 8 percent of the active population; nonmanufacturing industry adds another 2.5 percent. The main centers of industrial production are **Antananarivo**, **Antsirabe**, and **Toamasina**, with a sprinkling of seafood canneries on the north and northwest coasts and **sisal** processing in the southeast. The main industries process **agricultural** products and textiles, as well as cement, soap, cigarettes, and beer. Under its all-out **investment policy**, the **Democratic Republic** nationalized most of the industries and initiated new activities, including oil refining and textiles. The industrial sector has suffered from a lack of spare parts and raw materials since the external **debt** crisis of the 1980s; it produced at less than capacity until the program of re-**privatization** eliminated some and returned others to market-oriented management. More liberal **invest-**

**ment codes** were passed in 1987 and in 1990, when the **Export Processing Zones** began to fill. The average growth rate in industrial production, which had been falling at 2.9 percent a year between 1975 and 1984, rose by 2.8 percent from 1985 to 1989 and by 2.4 percent thereafter. *See also* ECONOMY; WORLD BANK.

**INSURRECTION OF 1904–1905.** One of the last rebellions against early **French** colonial rule on the island, this insurrection began in the southeast, especially among the **Tanala**, and quickly spread throughout the south, involving the **Bara**. The insurrectionists attacked both French military posts and Malagasy administrators. The semi-desert nature of the southern terrain made suppression of the rebellion difficult.

**INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF).** The IMF was established in 1945 to stabilize fluctuations in rates of exchange and balance of payments anomalies. Member countries maintain deposits with the IMF against which they can borrow in times of shortage of foreign exchange. There are also special drawing rights (SDRs) that allow countries to borrow amounts in excess of their reserves with the fund. Since the emergence of the **debt** crisis in developing countries, the IMF has played a major role in providing funds to Third World countries and in guiding responses of prospective assistance donors. IMF aid is contingent upon restructuring programs that usually include reductions of government expenditure, the liberalization of foreign trade, and the reduction of state intervention in the **economy**. Madagascar first approached the IMF for aid in 1980, and has made several agreements with the Fund since then.

In March 2001, the IMF approved a three-year Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) of \$103 million to replace the original Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). Objectives of the PRGF are to complete **privatization** of **industries**, liberalize markets, improve tax and customs collection (entailing campaigns against official **corruption**), and expand services to the poor. The facility was renewed for a fourth stage in March 2004. The Fund also cooperates with the **World Bank** in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, authorized in February 2001. The HIPC has relieved Madagascar's debt burden substantially, requiring proceeds



to be dedicated to improvements in public **health, education**, sanitation, and other social conditions. In general, the IMF acts as a credentialing authority for other donors of external aid.

**INVESTMENT CODES.** Since independence, Madagascar has enacted four codes covering foreign investment. The first, passed in 1961 under the **First Republic**, empowered the government to grant a range of advantages and concessions to new investors, including exemption from **import** and **export** taxes and protection in the local market. The second, passed in 1973 under the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**, was more restrictive, and required new investors to include local capital and to move Malagasy personnel into management positions. The third, passed in 1987 by the **Democratic Republic** under pressure from the **International Monetary Fund**, removed the restrictions of the second, and attempted to attract investment by relaxing government regulation. The 1987 code aroused some controversy, and was criticized as too liberal in the **Assemblée Nationale Populaire**. In spite of this criticism, the continuing **debt** crisis and pressure from Western donors led to a further liberalization of controls and incentives in the code of 1990. *See also* INVESTMENT POLICY.

**INVESTMENT POLICY.** At the end of 1978, President **Didier Ratsiraka** announced his government's commitment to a policy of "*investissement à l'outrance*," or all-out investment. He believed that development via modernized tropical **agriculture** would not be sufficient to create the socialist **economy** he desired or to absorb the number of young Malagasy coming into the labor market, a number that the **World Bank** estimated as likely to double the labor force by the year 2000. A policy of borrowing to finance long-term projects in the creation of an **industrial** economy was therefore necessary. As developed over the next several years, the all-out investment policy involved such projects as a major hydroelectric installation at **Andekaleka**, the construction of textile plants, a fertilizer factory and an oil refinery at **Toamasina**, extension of the telecommunications networks, and a major expansion of the university system into the provincial capitals. These projects were financed by extensive borrowing both from official sources, led by the World Bank, and from private banks.

There were, however, several flaws in the policy. Projects were often decided in the absence of feasibility studies or even reliable statistics. As terms of trade deteriorated for traditional Malagasy **exports** against needed **imports** (including **petroleum**) in the early 1980s, the Malagasy economy spiraled into crisis. Funds became unavailable for new projects—or even to complete existing ones like the Andekaleka dam. Hence, the dam lacked industrial clients for its power, and the fertilizer factory could not function for want of imported raw materials. Most of the other major projects proved either fundamentally unsound or inefficiently managed, or both. The final result of the policy, combined with other economic factors, was the development of a serious **debt** crisis and subordination of overall development strategy henceforth to determination by international agencies and markets.

**ISANDRA.** Established in the southeastern section of **Betsileo** territory at the beginning of the 18th century, with a capital at Mahazoarivo, Isandra was the most prestigious of the southern **highland** kingdoms. King Andriamanalimbetany, who ruled from about 1750 to 1790, dominated contemporaneous Betsileo monarchs. The authority of the ruler within the kingdom was weak, however, and Andriamanalimbetany's successor declared himself a vassal of the approaching **Merina Empire** in return for Merina support for his local hegemony.

**ISLAM.** Historically of great importance during the island's participation in the ancient **Indian Ocean** economic system, Islam has maintained a limited, but energetic and now growing place in modern Madagascar. In addition to established Muslim communities of **Indo-Pakistani** (*karana*) business people and immigrants from the **Comoro Islands**, Islam has registered an increasing number of converts among the Malagasy. The total Muslim population is now estimated as 1.5 million, still modest compared to a relatively stable number of **Protestants** and Roman **Catholics**, each with over three million adherents. Muslim practice, like **Christian**, has been integrated with indigenous Malagasy **religion** in a complex synthesis of symbols, images, and ritual. Ancient mosques adorn the cities of the northern coasts and new buildings have been erected for Islam, some of them

with subsidies from **Libya** and other external sources. Frequent allegations of interference in contemporary Malagasy affairs by Libya, Algeria, and even militant Islamic extremists are seldom confirmed. Nevertheless, large Comorian student communities in the major Malagasy cities are believed to be particularly vulnerable to politicization.

**ISOTRY.** One of the poor neighborhoods of the Malagasy capital, **Antananarivo**, Isotry has a major food market which serves at night as an outdoor dormitory for the homeless. Youth of the neighborhood, once organized as **ZOAM**, have played a vigorous role in political events in the capital, particularly the **May 1972 Revolution**.

– J –

**JINA (ALSO JINY).** The Jeunesse Nationale was a secret society founded on the east coast of Madagascar in 1943 by a group of **nationalists** including **Monja Jaona**. Like the other secret society founded at the time, **PANAMA**, JINA advocated the end of the colonial system, if necessary by an armed uprising. It is probable that it was these two secret societies that provided much of the planning and leadership for the **Rebellion of 1947**.

**JOHASY, BARTHELEMY (1927–).** Born in the Vangaindrano region of Southern Madagascar, Johasy started as an employee of the colonial administration and, under the **First Republic**, alternated between the territorial administration and economic posts. In 1968, he became minister in charge of the budget, and upon the fall of the regime's strongman, **André Resampa**, Johasy, known for his rivalry with Resampa, replaced him as minister attached to the presidency in charge of internal affairs. He was in this post at the time of the outbreak of the **May 1972 Revolution**, and was thus in command of the **Forces Républicaines de Sécurité**. In the absence of President **Philibert Tsiranana**, it was Johasy who gave the order for the arrests of **student** leaders that precipitated the revolution. When the First Republic was overthrown, Johasy retired from politics.

**JUDICIARY.** Madagascar's legal system has been adapted from the French, with an admixture of customary law from precolonial times. The island has a three-level judicial structure, from the Courts of First Instance to the Court of Appeals, to the Supreme Court; in addition, the **Haute Cour Constitutionnelle** (HCC) / High Constitutional Court has played important roles in the Great Island's recent political history. Applicability of law is often confusing, however, and the courts suffer low esteem among most Malagasy. Judicial reform is being urged and financed by international donors, particularly to accommodate **decentralization** of administrative powers and the evolution of a modern **economy**. Modernization and reform are impeded by a tradition that in practice has subordinated the judiciary to executive, particularly presidential, demands for social regulation.

Like other Malagasy institutions, the courts have been subjected to political pressures, a weakening in traditional mechanisms of social cohesion, and farreaching charges of **corruption**. Malagasy justice has allowed a number of high-profile cases to evaporate without reaching politically sensitive decisions. These include the so-called **Trial of the Century** that failed to identify the assassins of President **Richard Ratsimandrava** in 1975, a manipulated treason verdict against **Richard Andriamaholison** and others in 1983, and the catastrophic fire that destroyed the Queen's Palace (*manjakamiadana*), symbol of the Malagasy nation, in 1995.

The appearance of political influence proved particularly flagrant at the outset of the **Crisis of 2002**, when the High Constitutional Court was peremptorily "stacked" by then President **Didier Ratsiraka** in order to fulfill his wish for a second round of balloting in the presidential **election** which he was determined not to lose to his popular challenger, **Marc Ravalomanana**. The HCC delivered that accommodating verdict almost furtively on 25 January 2002, choosing a resort hotel 70 kilometers from **Antananarivo** to make the announcement. After 10 April, when the HCC was restored as previously constituted, it, too, seemed to comply with executive expectations, this time in favor of Ravalomanana, by then the de facto chief of state; the court reversed the 25 January judgment and declared Ravalomanana winner by a majority in the first electoral round (held on 16 December 2001). In effect, the restored court was making what

some experts have termed a moral (or “teleological”) decision to resolve a political crisis, instead of sustaining a formalist-legalist approach to the controversy. Dissatisfied with such apparent manipulation of judicial procedure, the council of magistrates has undertaken reforms aimed at purifying—or at least restoring credibility to—the judiciary. It has cooperated with the Ravalomanana administration in pursuing numerous allegations of corruption on the bench and in the Ministry of Justice.

Criminal proceedings against Ratsiraka partisans arrested in the conclusion of the 2002 crisis have also been charged with politicization. Partially supported by human rights organizations, Ravalomanana’s unreconciled opposition, led by ex-President **Albert Zafy**, has taken up the cause of what it regards as 500 “political prisoners” convicted of or awaiting trial for security offenses. Embarrassed by revelations of the irregularity of some arrests, the vindictiveness of the prosecutions, the torpor of the process, the oppression of prison conditions, and the gravity of certain sentences (particularly the one imposed on Ratsiraka’s prime minister, **Tantely Andrianarivo**), Ravalomanana resorted to presidential pardons in December 2003 and dismissed his minister of justice, Alice Rajaonah, for overly assiduous prosecution.

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**KABARY.** A long, elaborate speech laced with copious proverbs and references to the wisdom of the **ancestors**, the *kabary* is a standard component of any Malagasy ceremony today. Originally, *kabary* were given by rulers as a feature of public life in pre-colonial Madagascar. The oratory of the founder of the 19th-century **Merina** monarchy, **Andrianampoinimerina**, is preserved in the *Tantaran’ny Andriana eto Madagasikara*. As the Merina monarchy centralized, the royal *kabary* changed in nature from a dialogue between ruler and people to a speech punctuated at intervals by the rhetorical question, “Is it not so, my people?”

**KARANA.** *Karany*, Muslim Indian, traders were active on the western coasts of Madagascar from the beginning of the 19th century. They

dominated the **slave trade** that continued on the coast until the **French** conquest and had by then amassed enough capital to move into other branches of trade and **industry**. Certain *Karana* families maintain controlling interests in **cotton** fabric, soaps and perfumes, crustacean farming, plastics, hotel management, and **import-export** trade. At present, the term *Karana* is used to designate anyone of **Indo-Pakistani** descent, but it connotes a relatively closed, endogamous merchant class that is distinctly active in rural towns and cities of the west and south. This class and its putative monopoly over local commerce and credit, as well as its members' propensity to hold unproductive property, have occasionally aroused destructive outrage in the Malagasy population. During periods of public distress, *Karana* property has been looted and burned in **Toliara**, **Mahajanga**, and other towns.

An Association des Karana de Madagascar (AKAMA) was established in 2002 to defend the common interests of Sunni, Ismaili, and Bohra Muslims as well as Hindus. The association is particularly active in asserting its members' rights as Malagasy citizens to own property (although some also carry French passports).

**KMMR (ORIGINALLY KOMITY MPANOHANANA AN'I MARC RAVALOMANANA, COMMITTEE TO SUPPORT MARC RAVALOMANANA; SUBSEQUENTLY KOMITY MIARO NY MARINA SY NY RARINY, COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF TRUTH AND JUSTICE).** Formed in September 2001 to promote the presidential candidacy of **Marc Ravalomanana**, the KMMR included the **AVI**, **MFM**, **RPSD**, and numerous independents in addition to Ravalomanana's **Tiako-i-Madagasikara** (TIM). On 2 March 2003, after TIM's sweeping parliamentary victories of the previous December, its refusal to share legislative leadership prerogatives, and its open hostility toward KMMR leaders **Pety Rakotoniana**, Thierry Raveloson, Pierre Tsiranana, and Jean-Eugène Voninahitsy, the committee changed its name and purpose to entail opposition to what they regarded as an incipient dictatorship. The revamped KMMR included dissident members of the RPSD and MFM, as well as **Grad-Iloafo** and several smaller factions. KMMR avoided formal alliance with the opposition Comité de **Réconciliation Nationale** (CRN), led by former president **Albert Zafy**, judging the

CRN to be tribalist (read: anti-**Merina**), but it has joined in CRN demonstrations and consultations while also maintaining dialogue with Ravalomanana. The KMMR had aimed at presenting its own candidates for the municipal elections of 23 November 2003, but failed to preclude its major components from fielding their own slates. Six remaining minor parties then regrouped under the rubric *Herim-Bahoaka Mitambatra* (HBM) / Union of the People's Vital Forces, to provide unqualified support for Ravalomanana, and the KMMR ceased to exist.

**KOMITY IRAISAN'NY MPITOLONA (COMITÉ COMMUN DE LUTTE, UNITED ACTION COMMITTEE; MOST COMMONLY KNOWN BY THE INITIALS KIM).** During and after the **May 1972 Revolution**, the most active factions formed this coordinating committee. With about 60 members, the KIM included delegates from **student** groups, teachers' organizations, workers, and the *lumpenproletariat* of **Antananarivo** (the **ZOAM**). **Manandafy Rakotonirina** emerged as principal spokesperson for the KIM, and has maintained a personal role in politics ever since. The committee claimed that its leadership of the May Revolution gave it a mandate to direct the future development of Malagasy politics and contested the claim of the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** to a legitimacy other than that conferred by the revolution. After Ramanantsoa's consolidation of power, the KIM held weekly study sessions and staged several demonstrations against aspects of his policy, but was unable to control events. Expanding their range in preparation for the **Congrès National Populaire** in September 1972, the committee founded KIM chapters in provincial cities. The significance of the congress was diminished by Ramanantsoa's announcement of a constitutional **referendum** to be held that October, and the congress itself disintegrated into quarrels between members of the Antananarivo KIM and the more conservative provincial delegates. The committees disintegrated after the congress, but many of their members were later active with Rakotonirina in the **MFM**.

**KOTO, ROBERT.** An economist from **Toliara**, Koto was an early supporter of **Didier Ratsiraka** and served as a presidential advisor at the beginning of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar**. In 1977,

Ratsiraka named him to the political bureau of the newly established regime party, **AREMA**, and to the **Conseil Suprême de la Révolution**. In 1982, Koto attempted to run against Ratsiraka for president, attracting the support of conservative elements who blamed the socialist orientation of the regime for the country's **economic** crisis. Koto was disqualified on the grounds that he was not presented by any of the parties belonging to the **Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution**, and he was removed from his official posts.

**KUNG FU.** Like the **ZOAM**, the Kung Fu is an organization of youths in **Antananarivo**. Inspired by the martial arts films of Bruce Lee and a revived Asian self-identification by **highland** Malagasy, these "self-defense" societies began to appear in the capital in the late 1970s and gained adherents during the **economic** crisis of the early 1980s. They were created in part as rivals to the **ZOAM** and the regime-sponsored **ZOAM** contingents known as the **Tanora Tonga Saina** (TTS), but differed in their wider social and geographic base of recruitment and in having some adult leaders. Kung Fu forged links with the churches, which at the time were critical of the **Democratic Republic**, and with political parties outside the regime's **AREMA**. In the 1982 presidential **election** campaign they provided the bodyguard for the opposition candidate, **Monja Jaona**. They were also hired to protect urban businesses against the TTS "protection" rackets.

By 1984, the Kung Fu clubs claimed over 10,000 members, and were said to have secret sections in the armed forces. The regime responded by banning the practice of the martial arts in September 1984, setting off a riot that culminated in the burning of the offices of the Ministry of Youth. In December 1984, groups of Kung Fu attacked the neighborhood bases of the TTS, aided by residents who resented the thug-like behavior of the *Tanora*. It is estimated that between 100 and 250 TTS were killed. The failure of the army and gendarmerie to intervene brought **military** relations with the regime to a crisis, and it was not until President **Didier Ratsiraka** consolidated his hold by moving loyal officers into key posts and had mended his fences with the churches, that he was able to move against the Kung Fu. On 31 July 1985, the army and gendarmerie attacked Kung Fu strongholds in Antananarivo and provincial cities,



killing several hundred, including their leader, Pierre Mizael Rakotoarijaona. Two hundred forty-five members were arrested as terrorists and were brought to trial in March 1989; 28 were given sentences of two years in prison. The others were acquitted. Although the groups themselves remain illegal, there are still active Kung Fu sections, particularly in the capital where they are sought as bodyguards.

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**LABORDE, JEAN-BAPTISTE (1805–1878).** Laborde was a Gascon sailor, shipwrecked on the east coast of Madagascar in 1831. He was sent by **Napoléon de Lastelle** to the court of the **Merina** monarchy at **Antananarivo**, where he was presented to Queen **Ranavalona I** as a “universal engineer.” He soon displayed his extraordinary range of technical skills in behalf of the monarchy and managed to transcend Ranavalona’s suspicion of Western influence, exemplified by the missionaries. Using conscript labor, he established a factory complex at Mantasoa, where textiles, paper, **sugar**, weapons, and other commodities were produced. He also experimented with new plants and with livestock breeding. Laborde built a royal palace, the ***man-jakamiadana***, and was given responsibility for the education of the heir to the throne, Prince Rakoto, later **Radama II**. A favorite of the queen who called him “her *vazaha*” (foreigner), Laborde became wealthy and important in Madagascar. He married Emilie Roux, the daughter of **Sylvain Roux**, agent of the **Compagnie des Indes Orientales**. Devoutly **Catholic** and constantly embroiled in rivalries with the **Protestant** British, he was implicated in 1857 in a plot to dethrone the queen and hasten the prince’s succession, and was expelled. After his departure the laborers at Mantasoa rose up and destroyed the industrial complex; the ruins have become a notable tourist site. Laborde spent the years from 1857 to 1861 in exile in **Réunion**, but returned after Ranavalona’s death. He continued in business and served as French consul from 1862 to 1878. After his death, the disposition of his property in Madagascar, which he left to two nephews, was an important source of discord between the **French** and Merina governments. *See also* LABORDE LEGACY.

**LABORDE LEGACY.** When **Jean Laborde** died in 1878, he left his estates in Madagascar to two nephews, who laid claim to the property according to the terms of the Franco-Merina Treaty of 1868, which the **French** interpreted as allowing them to acquire property in Madagascar. The government of the **Merina Empire** under Prime Minister **Rainilaiarivony** maintained that foreigners could not own land in Madagascar, but could only have a lifetime usufructory interest in it. The French government took up the cause of the Laborde heirs in order to vindicate the right of acquiring property in Madagascar. The issue was further treated in the **Code of 305 Articles** promulgated by the Merina government in 1881, which explicitly banned the sale of land to foreigners. The French protested, and the issues raised by the Laborde legacy were one of the causes of the **Franco-Malagasy War of 1883–1885**.

**LABOR UNIONS.** Under the colonial regime, unions were illegal for Malagasy until March 1937, when the right to organize was extended to workers who could read and write French, a restriction that was removed in August 1938. In spite of this, some Malagasy had belonged to organizations of French civil servants, and in 1909, had formed a mutual aid association that later evolved into a union. In October 1937, Malagasy union organizers were arrested and tried under the *indigénat* for violating the restrictions on unionization. It was not until **Joseph Ravoahangy** organized the Syndicat d'Agriculteurs et Eleveurs-CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail) just before World War II that union activity really began. The existing unions were dissolved by the **Vichy** administration during the war, but in 1943, under the **Free French**, a Union des Syndicats-CGT was created, with both European and Malagasy membership, and with Ravoahangy and Pierre Boiteau as secretaries-general. The union claimed 14,000 members when the **Rebellion of 1947** erupted, but after Ravoahangy was condemned to death (later deported) for plotting the rebellion and Boiteau forced to leave Madagascar, the union collapsed.

Labor activity was slow to resume after 1947, and it was not until 1956 that the roots of modern Malagasy unions were laid. In 1956, the Firaisan'ny Sendika eran'i Madagasikara (FISEMA) / Federation of Labor Unions of Madagascar, an offspring of the earlier SAE-CGT, was created, with links to the French Communist Party and

subsequently with the opposition nationalist **AKFM** party. In December of that year, **Philibert Tsiranana** turned the Union des Syndicats-Force Ouvrière, affiliated with the French Socialist Party Force Ouvrière, into the independent Confédération des Travailleurs Malgaches (Federation of Malagasy Workers). These joined the one union that had maintained a high level of activity through the period: the **Catholic**-sponsored union that became independent from the French parent union as the Confédération Chrétienne des Syndicats Malgaches (Christian Confederation of Malagasy Unions).

The political attachments of the unions continued after independence. FISEMA affiliated with the opposition **AKFM** while the regime **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD) created the Fivondronan'ny Mpiasa Malagasy (Union of Malagasy Workers). The Catholic unions regrouped as the Sendika Kristiana Malagasy (SEKRIMA) / Malagasy Christian Unions. With the coming of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM), the union landscape changed again. FISEMA split with the AKFM in 1976, seeking independent participation in the **Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution** (FNDR). The AKFM founded a new union, the FISEMARE (Federation of Revolutionary Malagasy Workers). The PSD-sponsored FMM, lacking solidarity and identified with the discredited administration, had already declined dramatically in the 1960s. Finally, the new regime party, **AREMA**, created the Sendika Revolusionara Malagasy (SENREMA) / Revolutionary Malagasy Unions.

Membership figures for the unions are extremely unreliable. Generally it is agreed that SENREMA remains the largest, with perhaps 60,000 members, followed by the Catholic-sponsored SEKRIMA with about 40,000. Once boasting over 60,000 adherents, FISEMA lost ground since its split with the AKFM; probably half its members were picked up by FISEMARE. Many FISEMA leaders joined SENREMA. The chronic weakness of the Malagasy labor movement has resulted from its political divisions, as well as from difficulties of organizing a mobile work force, the seasonal, part-time, or temporary nature of much work, the influence of employer organizations at **Antananarivo**, and the existence of a large number of unemployed who can be used as replacements for what are essentially unskilled positions. Organized labor has been favored nonetheless by the steady conversion of rural and agricultural occupations (84 percent in 1970)

into industrial and services employment (8 and 16 percent, respectively, in 2000). Among the stronger unions have been those grouping civil servants and teachers, as well as dockworkers at **Toamasina**. A new class of inspectors was formed in 2004 to investigate numerous union complaints of unfair employment practices against management of companies in the **Export Processing Zones**.

The labor market has experienced considerable turbulence since the onset of **privatization** of some 130 state corporations, entailing inevitable layoffs and retraining needs among their respective employees. Unions participated formally in the strikes called by **Marc Ravalomanana** in January and February 2002 to protest what he regarded as theft of his presidential **election** majority from the previous December. These strikes paralyzed the civil service and urban transportation in Antananarivo, allowing Ravalomanana's delegates to take over government offices and forcing the ex-president, **Didier Ratsiraka**, to displace the remnants of his administration to Toamasina.

**LAHITAFIKA.** The son of Ramieba, king of the **Bara-Be**, Lahitafika became a legendary antagonist of **French** colonial authority. When **Ihoso**, the most important town in Bara territory, was occupied by the French in January 1897, relations between the newcomers and the two Bara leaders were at first uneventful. In March, however, the French captured Ramieba and began building roads, establishing other settlements, and trying to collect taxes. A series of uprisings followed. Lahitafika was charged with organizing them and was executed, but Ramieba was able to escape from detention.

**LAKATONIANJA.** A rock shelter in northern Madagascar near **Antsiranana**, Lakatonianja contains several archaeological sites, the earliest of which has been radiocarbon dated to about 707 A.D. Later sites, dating from about the 12th century, contain ceramics from the Middle East, suggesting that Lakatonianja was part of the **Islamic** trading network that operated along the coast of Madagascar. *See also* ARABS; VOHEMAR.

**LAKROAN'I MADAGASIKARA (THE CROSS OF MADAGASCAR).**

The **Catholic church** weekly newspaper, *LaKroa* was founded in

1927 by Jean-Baptiste Ramanamisata in the image of the Paris church paper, *La Croix de Paris*. It is now owned by the Diocesan Council of Madagascar which has to subsidize the paper to keep it solvent. Editorial policy of *LaKroa* has been consistently critical of all political regimes from the **French** colonial administration and the **First Republic** (despite its predominantly Catholic leadership) to the professed Marxist-Leninism of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) under **Didier Ratsiraka**. The paper was subject to frequent **ensorship** by the DRM and has welcomed the accession of Ratsiraka's rivals **Albert Zafy** and **Marc Ravalomanana** in 1973 and 2002, respectively, as implicitly more promising for the values of Christian conscience and probity.

**LALAINGINA.** An important **Betsileo** kingdom at the end of the 17th century, with a capital at Mitonga, Lalaingina traded **slaves** for firearms with the **Sakalava** to the west. In 1805, the ruler of the kingdom, Raindritsara, was killed in battle, and the kingdom was divided among his sons. This division weakened Lalaingina, and it was incorporated into the **Merina Empire** in 1815.

**LAMBERT CHARTER.** Joseph Lambert was a French trader operating at **Antananarivo** in the last years of the reign of **Ranavalona I**. With his countryman **Jean Laborde** he formed part of the circle of Prince Rakoto, heir to the throne, later **Radama II**. In 1855, Rakoto secretly granted Lambert a charter for the development of the island, to come into effect when the prince succeeded to the throne. The charter gave Lambert and his associates **concessions** of land and mineral rights in Madagascar, the right to undertake public works, and the franchise to mint the **currency** of the **Merina Empire**, in return for 10 percent of the profits from the undertakings. In 1857, Lambert participated in a plot to overthrow Ranavalona and replace her with Rakoto-Radama, and was exiled to **Réunion**. Lambert returned to the island on Ranavalona's death in 1861, and served as Radama's ambassador to Paris and London. Alienation of land to foreigners was against the practice of the Merina state, and this and other provisions of the charter offended both the patriotism and the economic interests of the ruling oligarchy, the **Andafiavaratra**. These were among the grievances against Radama II that led to his assassination in 1863.

When the **Lambert Charter** was revoked by the subsequent government of Queen **Rasoherina**, Lambert demanded compensation and was backed by the French. He received an indemnity of one million francs for himself and his company in 1865. On payment of reparations to the French government, the queen received the original copies of the charter, which were burned in a public ceremony in 1865.

**LAND REFORM.** Inequality of land holdings and sharecropping are common problems throughout Madagascar. The land reform policy undertaken by the **Democratic Republic** after 1975 concentrated on the expropriation of large holdings (often unexploited) owned by foreign and *karana* planters and companies, turning them into state property rather than redistributing them among Malagasy. The first expropriations occurred in 1974 under the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** and concerned about 28,000 hectares of holdings over 100 hectares in size in the Mananjary district of **Fianarantsoa province**. These same plantations had been targets of the **Rebellion of 1947**. Subsequent expropriations, particularly in the region around Lake **Alaotra** and the **Sakay**, totaled nearly 100,000 hectares. In general the land was handed over to **cooperatives** or exploited as state farms. Since the mid-1980s, the state farms have been sold to large and small farmers.

**LANGUAGE.** All Malagasy speak some dialectical version of a fundamentally Malayo-Polynesian language related to the Maayan (or Manjaan) of Borneo in **Indonesia**. The long itinerary of the island's original immigrants doubtless modified the original grammar and vocabulary with derivations from Arabic and Bantu African languages. Further contact with **Arabs** and Swahili-speakers, as well as neologisms from French and English, have produced a highly imagistic, melodic hybrid. The 19th-century **Merina Empire** imposed its "*hova*" dialect on elites and functionaries in two-thirds of the island, but the particular idioms and accents of the **Côtiers** have remained. An estimated 67 percent of vocabulary is shared, for instance, between the **Merina** and the distant southern **Antandroy**. Madagascar thus has a common culture refracted in diversity.

Malagasy was written in Arabic characters by *ombiasy* and **Antalaotra** (Muslim residents of the north coasts) until the early 19th

century when European missionaries undertook alphabetization of the language under King **Radama I**. Since then, whatever the regional variations of oral discourse, written Malagasy has been invariably controlled by the Merina dialect. In revolutionary 1972, Malagasy was declared the sole official language of the state and the sole language of instruction. Before restoration of French in the **educational** system of the **Third Republic**, a generation of Malagasy emerged from the school system with weak or no internationally recognized medium of expression. Rather than vindicate the egalitarian purposes of the revolution, this **nationalist** strategy reinforced the distinctions and privileges of the bilingual elites.

Against the sustained prevalence of French in business and international life has come a recent resurgence of English. Second language of the Merina Empire elite, English now attracts intense interest among Malagasy for its global ubiquity, technological supremacy, and dominance of international popular culture. While reaffirming Madagascar's commitment to French as the nation's second language, the new president, **Marc Ravalomanana**, urged Malagasy to learn English as an asset in professional advancement.

**LAROCHE, HIPPOLYTE (1848–1914).** The first French resident-general assigned to Madagascar after the 1895 French conquest of the island, Laroche was a career administrator with experience in Algeria. He arrived in January 1896 with the task of administering the **protectorate** in a manner that would leave the internal administration of the **Merina Empire** intact. The revolt of the **Menalamba** in March, however, precipitated a crisis in **French** control that was exacerbated by quarrels between Laroche and the general in charge of French forces in Madagascar, Voyron. In July the French minister of colonies, Andre Lebon, drafted a law ending the protectorate; the **Annexation Law** was adopted in August, making Madagascar a colony. Lebon also removed Laroche and replaced him with General **Joseph Gallieni**, to whom he gave both civil and military authority. Laroche's last act as resident was the abolition of **slavery**. He returned to France and entered politics.

**LASTELLE, NAPOLEON DE (1802–1856).** De Lastelle was a French trader established in the **Mascarenes**. Beginning in 1829, he

handled most of Madagascar's trade with the outside world and undertook some activities on the island itself, including the development of **coffee** and cocoa plantations. He collaborated with **Jean Laborde**, whom he had introduced to Queen **Ranavalona I**. His activities ceased when Malagasy ports were closed to trade after the 1845 Anglo-French bombardment of **Toamasina**, but he continued to live in Toamasina where he was connected with the Fiche family who controlled the city. *See also* RENE, JEAN.

**LEADER FANILO (LEADING TORCH).** Founded in May 1992, Leader Fanilo obtained 14 seats in the **Assemblée Nationale** elected in June of the following year. Strong in the island's south, the party played a hesitant but constructive role in the **Third Republic** presidency of **Albert Zafy** and in **Didier Ratsiraka's** second mandate. It also provided numerous qualified staff for high-level civil service positions and an occasional minister in Ratsiraka cabinets. It raised its parliamentary caucus to 16 deputies in May 1998 and placed five senators in that chamber's first **election** in March 2001. The party also won 34 seats across the six provincial councils elected on 3 December 2000, a showing exceeded only by Ratsiraka's regime party, **AREMA**, with 197. Its founder, **Herizo Razafimahaleo**, was vice prime minister in Ratsiraka's 1997 cabinet. He left the coalition to run unsuccessfully for the presidency in 2001. In 2002, Razafimahaleo backed Ratsiraka's effort toward "national reconciliation" (then meaning a second round in the **election** against the winner, **Marc Ravalomanana**) and was forced out of the party leadership.

Since August 2002, Leader Fanilo has been directed by Manassé Esoavelomandroso, an Assembly deputy from Amboasary and a professor of history at the **University**. Esoavelomandroso lost his seat when the party's parliamentary presence fell to two in the 15 December 2002 election, and Leader Fanilo fared poorly in subsequent provincial and local contests. Deploping the absence of a coherent opposition platform, it has subsequently taken positions for and against government policies and has attended some rallies organized by the radical opposition Comité de **Réconciliation Nationale**. The party publishes *L'Express de Madagascar*, one of four French-language daily newspapers in the capital.



**LECHAT, EUGENE.** A **French** citizen and administrator, Lechat was one of the founders of the **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD) of the **First Republic**. A teacher like many other early PSD members, he was school principal from 1951 to 1957 when he was elected to the Territorial Assembly from **Fianarantsoa province**. He adopted Malagasy citizenship at independence and was successively minister of public works, posts and telecommunications, and equipment and communications under **Philibert Tsiranana**. Disappearing from public life after 1972, Lechat re-emerged in 1995 as a prominent member of the **Rassemblement pour la Social Démocratie** (RPSD) party.

**LEGENTILHOMME, PAUL.** A general with the **Free French** forces, Legentilhomme became **governor-general** of Madagascar after the British handed control of the island back to the French in January 1943. He left the island in May. *See also* **BRITISH INVASION**.

**LE MYRE DE VILERS, CHARLES-MARIE (1833–1918).** The first French resident in Antananarivo under the terms of the 1885 treaty establishing the French **protectorate** over the **Merina Empire**, Le Myre de Vilers had served in the French navy, as a prefect in **France**, and in the administration in Algeria and Cochin China. As resident, he quarreled with the Merina prime minister, **Rainilaiarivony**, over the terms of the protectorate, and in particular over whether French control over the empire's "external relations" meant that foreign consuls were accredited to the resident or to the Merina court. He left Madagascar in 1886 to become a deputy from Cochin China in the French National Assembly, where he joined the Third Republic's colonial lobby. In 1894, he returned to **Antananarivo** to present the French demands for an extension of their powers under the protectorate. Rainilaiarivony rejected the ultimatum on 25 October. Le Myre de Vilers left Antananarivo two days later and sent word of the refusal to Paris where, on 16 November, the National Assembly voted the funds necessary for the invasion of the island. In 1896, Le Myre de Vilers was *rapporteur* of the commission of the National Assembly that recommended passage of the **Annexation Law**. Ironically, Antananarivo's school named in his honor by **Joseph Gallieni** trained many of the island's most ardent anti-colonial **nationalists**.

**LE VACHER DE LA CASE (?–1671).** De la Case joined the **French** settlement at **Fort-Dauphin** in 1656. After quarrels with the commander of the Fort-Dauphin garrison, the Comte de Champmargou, he fled inland, and married the daughter of a Malagasy ruler, who inherited her father's position on his death. De la Case traveled widely in the southern part of the island and made alliances with many local groups. In spite of his quarrels with the settlement at Fort-Dauphin, he continued to supply it with food and to defend it when necessary. His death in 1671 was a contributing factor to the ultimate destruction of the settlement.

**LIBERTALIA.** A brief experiment in republican governance by English, French, and American **pirates** allied with noble **Betsimisaraka** families on the northeast coast. Libertalia was exterminated by a **British** naval expedition in 1721.

**LIBYA.** Close relations with Libya were part of the post-1972 radicalization of Malagasy **foreign policy**, but not much of substance emerged from the rapport. Libya furnished some aid to Madagascar, including funds for **Islamic** studies at the **University** and a personal gift of more than one million dollars to President **Didier Ratsiraka**. Madagascar supported the Libyan bid for the 1982 summit of the Organization of African Unity. Libyan aid has not been a major player in Madagascar's attempts to resolve its **debt** crisis.

**LIGUE DE DEFENSE DES INTERETS FRANCO-MALGACHES.** The League for the Defense of Franco-Malagasy Interests was formed by Madagascar's **settler** community in 1946 to combat the rise of **nationalist** organizations like the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** (MDRM). The league was one of several pressure groups reacting against what the settlers saw as weakness displayed by the colonial administration in dealing with the movements. *See also* PRESENCE FRANCAISE.

**LIGUE FRANCAISE POUR L'ACCESSION DES INDIGENES DE MADAGASCAR AUX DROITS DES CITOYENS FRANCAIS.** The French League for Attainment of French Citizenship Rights by Indigenous People of Madagascar was founded in Paris in

1920 by the nationalist leader **Jean Ralaimongo** with the patronage of Anatole France and André Gide. It attempted to ease the restrictions imposed by the regime of the *indigénat*.

**LITERATURE.** Much Malagasy writing has been both inspired and constrained by a highly oral culture, a culture of oration (*kabary*), story-telling, and proverbial wisdom, often accompanied by **music** and **dance**. Imagistic popular poems (*hain'teny*), moralistic folk tales, jousts of oratory all inspired a powerful movement of tradition-affirming literature in the 1930s. These writings celebrated the homeland of the **ancestors** (*tanin-drazana*), the communal values of “malgachitude,” and the virtues of fecundity within a prospering lineage. Since then, much traditional oratory and literature has broken free of traditional conventions, using double-meanings and word play to criticize prevailing politics and morality. These themes have been admirably exemplified by poets Avana Ramanantoanina (1891–1940), Dox (Jean Verdi Salomon Razakandriana, b. 1913), and Rado Andriamanantena, as well as the surrealist Randza Zanamihotra (1925–1997).

Literature in French lies in the gigantic shadow of the poet Jean-Joseph Rabearivelo (1901–1937), a master of symbolism, evocative imagery, and personal identification with his **highland** people; Rabearivelo's suicide was itself an iconic event in the tortured history of a culture under colonial pressure. Other major poets in French include the 1947 nationalist and **First Republic** statesman **Jacques Rabemananjara** (1913–1995) and the brilliant lyricist **Flavien Ranaivo** (1914–1999). Madagascar's most important novelist is Emilson D. Andriamalala.

**LOI-CADRE (FRAMEWORK LAW).** Passed by the Socialist-led French legislature in June 1956, the *Loi-Cadre* was designed to liberalize the political structures of **France's** African colonies, including Madagascar. It introduced universal adult suffrage, abolished the two-college system, and created a cabinet-like government council with seven elected members and four to five appointed members. After the *Loi-Cadre*, a French *chef de province* worked with a provincial council and an assembly. The central government consisted of the French high commissioner (formerly **governor-general**) as pres-

ident, the government council, with a vice president who had some of the powers of a prime minister, and an assembly, whose members were chosen by the provincial assemblies. Special provisions applied to Madagascar included the strengthening of provincial government and the creation of a sixth province, **Diégo-Suarez** (now **Antsiranana**), to counteract anticipated **Merina** dominance of a more centralized system. The *Loi-Cadre* disappointed **nationalist** groups because it did not abrogate the **annexation law** and because there was no provision for **amnesty** for the prisoners of the 1947 **rebellion**. The first (and only) *Loi-Cadre* **elections** were held in March 1957, and in them **Philibert Tsiranana**, future president of the **First Republic**, became vice president of the government council; his colleagues included **Alexis Bezaka**, **Justin Bezara**, Paul Longuet, **Alfred Ramangasoavina**, Gervais Randrianasolo, and Philippe Raondry. The work of the council was overtaken by events, as Madagascar gained autonomy in the French Community in 1958, and then independence in 1960.

**LOMBARDO, RAYMOND (1914–?).** A **French** citizen born in Madagascar, Lombardo was active in the **nationalist movement** before and after World War II. He edited a bilingual newspaper, *Fraternité-Fihavanana*, that was critical of the administration and, with Pierre Boiteau, attempted to found a **Groupe d'Etudes Communistes** in **Antananarivo** in 1946. He served as a Communist party member of the Consultative Assembly of the French Union in 1947, was accused of complicity in the **Rebellion of 1947**, and lost his parliamentary immunity on the condition that he be tried in France.

**LONDON CLUB.** The “London Club” is comprised of private banks making loans to Third World countries. In the case of Madagascar, the club included as many as 78 creditor banks, dominated by French and American lenders, with a managing committee cochaired by the Chase Manhattan Bank and the Banque Nationale de Paris. In August 1987 the London Club agreed to reduce the amount of Malagasy loans due between 1987 and 1992 from \$136.6 million to \$77.2 million, with the remainder due between 1992 and 1996. These balances were again rescheduled and reduced, following the example set by the **World Bank** and the **Paris Club** of governmental creditors. It

has also converted some of the **debt** into local investments and **environmental** conservation.

**LONDON MISSIONARY SOCIETY (LMS).** The LMS was founded in London in 1795 as the Missionary Society, adding “London” to its name in 1818. It was composed mainly of Congregationalists, with some members from the evangelical wing of the Church of England. The first LMS missionaries went to Tahiti, Guyana, Cape Province, and India. In 1815, it was encouraged by the governor of **Mauritius**, **Sir Robert Farquhar**, to send missionaries to the **Merina** monarchy with whose king, **Radama I**, Farquhar was negotiating a treaty of friendship. The first missionaries, David Jones and Thomas Bevan, arrived with their families at **Toamasina** in 1818. All fell ill with malaria, and only Jones survived. After convalescing in Mauritius, he returned in 1820 with **James Hastie**, whom Farquhar had engaged to train the Merina army, and proceeded to the Merina capital, **Antananarivo**. Other missionaries, notably **James Cameron** and **William Ellis**, followed. In the ensuing years LMS missionaries were instrumental in transcribing the Malagasy **language** into Latin characters, beginning an **education** system, and in economic activities which included a construction program in Antananarivo. The **missions** were forbidden to proselytize, but managed to attract converts.

In 1835, Queen **Ranavalona I** expelled the missionaries as a way to revitalize **ancestral** traditions, but Malagasy **Christians** maintained a clandestine church organization. Missionaries began coming back with the relaxation of Ranavalona’s rule in the late 1850s and returned in force after her death in 1861. Other denominations followed, including the **Catholic church**, but the LMS kept the advantage of precedence and close connections with the Merina monarchy. Different times of arrival and different operational strategies of the Christian missions meant that LMS strength was concentrated in the **highlands** and often in the upper ranks of society. It even converted Queen **Ranavalona II**, her prime minister-consort, **Rainilaiarivony**, and her entire court in 1869. At times these connections were a source of tension, since it was the strategy of the monarchy to use the church as a state religion and its schools as a means of compulsory recruitment into the administration. After the French conquest of 1895, the LMS and its adherents were suspected of pro-British and **nationalist**

sentiment, and their churches and educational network suffered discrimination. The **French Evangelical church** arrived to take up some of the work that had been done by the LMS; however, denominations derived from the London Missionary Society churches remain the largest of the Malagasy **Protestant** denominations.

**LUMIERE.** Published weekly in **Fianarantsoa** by the **Catholic church** from 1935 to 1975, the French-language *Lumière* was for many years Madagascar's most important journal of political comment. During the **First Republic** it wrote with increasing criticism of the administration, particularly after the repression of the **Peasant Rebellion of 1971**. Such independence would no longer be tolerable in the sequel, however, and imposition of a more rigorous system of **censorship** under the **Democratic Republic** forced the paper to close. Its tradition of critical comment has been carried on by the church's Malagasy-language *Lakroan'i Madagasikara* under **Rémi Ralibera**.

**LYAUTEY, LOUIS-HUBERT (1854–1934).** A career army officer, Lyautey served as second-in-command to General **Joseph Gallieni** in consolidating French control over Madagascar, especially in the south. From his base in **Fianarantsoa**, General Lyautey used what he called the *tache d'huile*, or "oil-spot," policy, developed earlier in his service in Indochina. It consisted of establishing a series of central posts from which French control would then spread to the surrounding countryside. Among the outposts used for this purpose were **Am-balavao** and **Ihosy**.

– M –

**MADAGASCAR.** The origin of the name of Madagascar, like the origin of the Malagasy, is mysterious. In his *Travels*, Marco Polo refers to "Madeigascar" or "Mogelasio." Early geographers located the "island of Madagascar" north of Zanzibar, and it is now considered probable that Marco Polo was in fact referring to Mogadiscio (Magadishu) on the Somali coast. After the Portuguese discovery of the island in 1500, however, it was called Madagascar as well as by

the Portuguese-given name of **Saint Lawrence's Island**. The 19th-century **Merina Empire** identified itself as sovereign over Madagascar. In modern Malagasy, it is written and pronounced "Madagasikara."

**MADAGASIKARA OTRONIN'NY MALAGASY.** *See* MONIMA.

**MAHAFALY.** A highly creative, mobile people of the southwest, Mahafaly are noted for mohair rug-weaving and strong wood-carving. Mahafaly kings used **French** protection in the 19th century to keep their port capital **Toliara** and its hinterland out of the hands of the advancing **Merina Empire**.

**MAHAJANGA (17°0'S, 47°0'E).** The most important seaport on the west coast of Madagascar, Mahajanga (Majunga in French) was officially founded in 1745, when the capital of the **Boina** kingdom was moved there. It had, in fact, served as a harbor for years before then. Throughout the 18th century, Mahajanga was the major port for the **slave trade** with the **Arab** world. It was captured by the troops of the expanding **Merina Empire** in 1824, and by invading **French** forces in 1895. It is still Madagascar's second most important seaport after **Toamasina**, and has the most diverse population of Madagascar's provincial capitals, with large numbers of **Indo-Pakistanis** and a large community of **Comorians**. The population was estimated as 106,780 in 1993, but the influx of Comorians since then has doubtless brought the total number of inhabitants to over 200,000. The development of the harbor has been hampered by silting and the lack of deepwater facilities. Illicit boat traffic and poaching of **fisheries** are reportedly rampant off this coast; they are being countered by new coast guard and other security technology.

**MAHAJANGA PROVINCE.** Covering the northwest of Madagascar, Mahajanga province's main ethnic groups are the **Sakalava** and the **Tsimihety**, but there is also considerable immigration from other parts of Madagascar. The **economy** rests on **agriculture** and **cattle** raising, with large-scale **cotton** production on the lower Mangoky River. *See also* BAS-MANGOKY.

**MAHY, FRANCOIS DE.** Elected from **Réunion** to the National Assembly of the **French** Third Republic, De Mahy was one of a group of **overseas deputies** who were an important part of the colonial lobby in Paris. De Mahy himself had credentials as a staunch republican and held office both in the National Assembly and in successive governments of the Third Republic. In 1883, he was minister of the navy and colonies in the month-long Fallières cabinet, and used the position to propose a French protectorate over the northwest of Madagascar. The **Franco-Malagasy War** of 1883 under a successor government led to the **Protectorate of 1885**, which De Mahy criticized as not giving **France** sufficient powers in Madagascar. De Mahy supported the 1895 invasion of the island, and was president of the commission of the National Assembly that recommended passage of the **Annexation Law** of 1896, which made Madagascar a French colony.

**MAINTY.** The Malagasy word for “black,” given to a **slave** caste.

**MAJUNGA.** *See* MAHAJANGA.

**MALGACHIZATION.** After independence in 1960, the meaning of Malgachization was limited to the (slow) movement of Malagasy into posts in the **military** and administration still held by French personnel. By the time of the **May 1972 Revolution** the term had acquired a broader meaning, including the establishment of national control over the **economy**, and the reform of the **educational** system, particularly at the secondary and postsecondary level, to provide an education in Malagasy that reflected the national culture. Under the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** policies pursued in the name of Malgachization included the establishment of state trading companies, the drafting of an **investment code** requiring foreign-owned companies to admit Malagasy into management and shareholding roles, and the renegotiation of the **Cooperation Agreements** with **France**. In education, Malgachization was more controversial. Although Malagasy is spoken throughout the island, there are many dialects, and written Malagasy uses the **Merina** dialect. When the government proposed to substitute Malagasy for French as the **language** of secondary education in 1973, anti-Merina riots broke out in



several coastal cities, leading to some deaths and to an exodus of Merina from the provinces. Although the government denounced the riots as the work of the recently ousted **Parti Social Démocrate**, it also established a commission to prescribe a common Malagasy language based on all the dialects.

Instruction in Malagasy also created problems of transition at the **university** level, where much education continued to be conducted in French. As part of the mid-1980s rapprochement with France, teaching in French at the secondary level was reintroduced, with an increase in the number of professors from France. Malgachization also implied a redirection of curriculum and research. Since 1972, there has been an expansion in the amount of writing about Madagascar done by Malagasy in French and Malagasy, and an attempt to do justice to the history of regions outside the **highlands**.

**MANGOKY.** *See* BAS-MANGOKY.

**MANIOC.** *See* AMERICAN CROPS.

**MANJAKAMIADANA.** Constructed on a 1,500-meter high hill (the *Rova*) adjacent to King **Andrianampoinimerina**'s modest **Antanarivo** residence, and with a commanding view of the Ikopa valley, *Manjakamiadana* (Serene Reign) was the royal palace of the **Merina** monarchy and a symbol of precolonial independence. The original palace was designed for Queen **Ranavalona I** in 1839 by **Jean Laborde**. It consisted of an elegantly proportioned wood veranda mansion disposed about an enormous central tree. Subsequently, missionary **James Cameron** surrounded the original palace with a heavy stone shell marked by four corner towers. The idiomatically Malagasy architecture of Laborde's structure was thus inserted into a monument of Victorian Europe. A year after the deposition of Queen **Ranavalona III** in 1896, the palace was converted into a museum and its *rova* became a mausoleum for the tombs of her royal predecessors. In October 1938, 21 years after her death in exile, the remains of the last queen were repatriated to the *rova* where she shared the tomb of the first two Ranavalona.

On the night of 6 November 1995, the *manjakamiadana* was destroyed by fire probably set deliberately by as yet unidentified ar-

sonists for reasons that remain open to conjecture. Together with the Laborde palace, Madagascar lost its most valuable collection of historical artifacts and works of **art** as well as the Andrianampoinimerina palace and some of the royal tombs. Although Cameron's stone shell still glowers down at the busy capital, its remaining roof was severely damaged by a cyclone in March 2004. A group of prominent *Andriana* families has been raising funds to rebuild what they regard as a sacred monument, a project estimated to cost \$20 million. Although criticized for caste-centered sentimentality when the country's majority remains in desperate need of basic sustenance, their Association Rova points to affiliation by a number of non-Merina royal families and to a March 2004 newspaper poll showing that 72 percent of Antananarivo residents were willing to contribute (however modestly) to restoration of their national symbol.

**MANJAKAVAHOKA.** *See* UNION DES SOCIAUX DEMOCRATES DE MADAGASCAR.

**MANTASOA.** Seventy kilometers east of **Antananarivo**, Mantasoa was the site of a major industrial complex constructed by **Jean Laborde** during the **Merina Empire**, taking advantage of the presence of iron deposits and the availability of water and timber. After Laborde was exiled to **Réunion** following an attempted coup against Queen **Ranavalona I**, the conscript laborers who had built and run the installation destroyed it. Much of the complex is now covered by an artificial lake but the ruins of some of Laborde's factories are still visited by **tourists**.

**MARIANO, LUIS.** A Portuguese Jesuit based in Mozambique, Mariano was charged with exploring the possibility of missionary activity on the west coast of Madagascar. He made trips to the coast, and especially to Boina Bay in 1614, 1616, and 1619, and visited the northwest in 1630. Although he made no converts, his accounts of his visits provide extensive information about Malagasy societies and political units of the area. Exploring what is now **Sakalava** territory, he described a society of villages based on **agriculture** and the raising of **goats** and **cattle**.

**MAROSERANA (ALSO MAROSERANANA).** Founding dynasty of the **Sakalava**, the Maroserana established the first important kingdom, Menabe, in the 16th century. They spread northward, usually as losers in dynastic quarrels emigrated to found new kingdoms. The status of ruler still exists in many contemporary Sakalava societies, and ceremonies honoring the *dady* (the remains of former kings) are still celebrated. *See also* ANCESTORS.

**MARSON, EVARISTE (1938– ).** A lawyer and administrator from a politically important family at Vohipeno in southeast Madagascar, Marson performed auditing services for the **Democratic Republic** from 1975 until 1990. He then joined the resuscitated **Parti Social Démocrate** in opposition to **Didier Ratsiraka**'s regime. A year later, Marson became general secretary of the party under the revised label of **Rassemblement pour la Social-Démocratie** (RPSD). In December 1991, Marson managed to leap-frog over the party's titular leader, Pierre Tsiranana, son of **Philibert Tsiranana**, PSD founder and president in the **First Republic**, to become finance minister in the transitional administration of **Guy Willy Razanamasy**. He was also appointed vice president of the **Haute Autorité d'Etat** (HAE) which acted as a collective chief of state in that transition. Marson broke with HAE president **Albert Zafy** to run for the presidency of the **Third Republic** in November 1992, but obtained only 4.6 percent of the vote. After winning the second-round run-off in that contest, Zafy helped engineer Marson's narrow defeat in the June 1993 election to the **Assemblée Nationale**, but Marson returned as minister of agriculture in the June 1996 ministry of **Norbert Lala Ratsirahonana** while Zafy was under indictment for impeachable offenses.

Replacing Tsiranana as RPSD leader, Marson became foreign minister during Ratsirahonana's transitional presidency in September 1996, but was replaced when Ratsiraka returned to power in early 1997. His RPSD became reconciled for a time with the admiral's second administration and he was elected to the assembly in 1998. Breaking with Ratsiraka as he had with Zafy, Marson threw his support to **Antananarivo** mayor **Marc Ravalomanana** in the 2001 presidential campaign. After Ravalomanana's victory, Marson became a special advisor to the president, but was not offered a ministry. Re-

maintaining loyal while a rebellious faction of the RPSD deserted Ravalomanana after the parliamentary election campaign of December 2002, Marson was personally rewarded with appointment as Madagascar's ambassador to Italy and the Vatican.

**MASCARENE ISLANDS.** Named for a Portuguese sea captain, the **Indian Ocean's** Mascarenes archipelago includes **Réunion** and **Mauritius** as well as the latter's dependency, Rodriguez. By the mid-18th century, as their developing plantation economy required provisions of **slaves** and food, these **French** possessions became important trading partners of Malagasy coastal polities. After the Napoleonic Wars, the **British** took over Mauritius (as well as the Seychelles), leaving the French with Réunion. Throughout the 19th century, contacts continued to be important. It was the British governor of Mauritius, **Sir Robert Farquhar**, who opened official contacts with the **Merina** monarchy in 1815, while Réunionnais traders had been active on the east coast around **Toamasina** even earlier. At the end of the century, deputies from Réunion played an important role in the pro-colonial lobby in France. One of them, **François de Mahy**, as minister of the navy sought to subordinate Madagascar to Réunion's needs for land and raw materials. After the French conquest of 1895, contacts between Madagascar and the British Mascarenes dwindled, although relations with Réunion continued to be important.

**MAURITIUS.** **Indian Ocean** headquarters for 18th-century **France**, situated 750 kilometers east of Madagascar, the Ile de France passed from French to British control and recovered its original Dutch name toward the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Its first British governor, **Sir Robert Farquhar**, began contacts with the **Merina Empire** which welcomed strong cordiality with London. In later decades, relations became routine, but after the French conquest in 1895, contacts between Madagascar and Mauritius virtually evaporated. They resumed with the coming of Mauritian independence in 1968, but Malagasy support for the radical Mouvement Militant Mauricien in the late 1970s and the increasingly conservative character of the Mauritian government prevented closer affinities until the mid-1980s.

Then, creation of the **Indian Ocean Commission** and the search by Mauritian capital for low-cost labor markets brought the two islands

much closer. Mauritians now own and operate several textile plants in Madagascar's **Export Processing Zones**; they also have extensive holdings in the Great Island's **banking**, hotel, and **transportation** sectors. Nearly 1,000 Malagasy work in Mauritius, many of them under exploitative conditions. In 1998, Mauritius became Madagascar's second largest importer, behind France. Relations became even more cordial with the advent of businessman **Marc Ravalomanana** to the Malagasy presidency in 2002; Mauritius was the first of Ravalomanana's advocates in the **African Union**, and the exchange of trade and technical delegations has intensified markedly since then. *See also* EXTERNAL TRADE.

**MAY 1972 REVOLUTION.** This uprising in **Antananarivo** forced the collapse of the **First Republic** and the installation of an interregnum headed by General **Gabriel Ramanantsoa**. At the time, the First Republic was already in a state of crisis brought on by the illness of the president, **Philibert Tsiranana**, in 1970 and the **Peasant Rebellion of April 1971**. The Antananarivo movement was centered on a series of issues captured by the slogan of "**Malgachization**." **Students** had gone on strike in 1971 over access to the higher levels of the **educational** system and the domination of the high school and university curriculum by French educational requirements for certificates and diplomas.

The revolution itself began in January 1972 when students at the medical school of **Befelatanana** Hospital went on strike over the subordination of their degrees to those given by the Faculty of Medicine at the **University of Madagascar**. In February, the regime reneged on its promise to hold a nationwide examination for entry into upper secondary education, and by March, secondary school students in the capital and provincial cities were again on strike. Student agitation was coordinated at Antananarivo by the **Komity Iraisan'ny Mpitolona** (KIM), headed by **Manandafy Rakotonirina** and a group of intellectuals responsible for a semi-clandestine journal called **Ny Andry** (The Pillar); KIM brought the students together with groups of unemployed youth, known as **ZOAM**, and with workers dissatisfied with **labor union** progress in Malgachizing choice jobs. At the outset, these strikes were supported neither by the opposition political parties nor by the organized union movement.

The students and their allies had called a general strike for 13 May, but on the night before, the **Forces Républicaines de Sécurité** (FRS) raided the university campus and other sites in the capital, arresting leaders of the strike movement, the ZOAM, and several adult opposition figures. In all, 357 people were sent to the prison island of **Nosy Lava**. On the morning of 13 May, a crowd assembled in front of the city hall to demand the release of the prisoners. The FRS, which had moved in to guard government installations, fired on them, causing several deaths. On 14 May, approximately 100,000 people marched on the presidential palace, but were turned back by the army and gendarmerie. The crowd returned to the town hall, and burned it down. On 15 May, the demonstrators were joined at the ruins of the town hall by representatives of the Antananarivo establishment, including churches, unions, and opposition parties.

On 16 May, the administration agreed to release the prisoners, but by then the demonstrators, whose number grew each day, were demanding the ouster of President Tsiranana and the establishment of a **military** regime. Tsiranana appealed for help to the **French**, who had 4,000 paratroopers stationed at Ivato airport, but on 17 May, the French embassy announced that its troops would be used only to defend French lives and property. On the same day the commander of the gendarmerie, **Richard Ratsimandrava**, informed Tsiranana that the Malagasy armed forces were no longer willing to defend his regime. On 18 May, the commanding general of the armed forces, **Gabriel Ramanantsoa**, announced that Tsiranana had handed emergency powers over to him.

The May Revolution was hailed as a triumph for Malagasy **nationalism**, a “second independence” that, more than the formal independence of 1960, constituted a fulfillment of the hopes of the **Rebellion of 1947**. *See also* RAMANANTSOA INTERREGNUM; DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR.

**MAYEUR, NICHOLAS (1747–1809)**. Born in **France**, Mayeur moved with his family to the Ile de France (**Mauritius**) in 1750, and by 1763, was living on the east coast of Madagascar working as an interpreter for the **Compagnie des Indes Orientales**. Mayeur traveled extensively throughout Madagascar, visiting **Fort-Dauphin** and the region around **Diégo-Suarez**. He was also involved in Count

**Maurice Benyowski's** attempt to establish an “empire” on the east coast. In 1776, Mayeur was the first European to see the **Merina** capital, **Antananarivo**. In 1788, he returned to the Ile de France, where he remained except for one last visit to Madagascar, in 1796–1797.

**MEDIA.** Endowed with a tradition of literacy in the **highlands**, Madagascar has enjoyed an active press since the appearance of the **London Missionary Society's** *Teny Soa* (the Good Word) in 1866. Although rigorously censored, Malagasy-language newspapers continued alongside French journals during the colonial administration (1896 to 1960). Rather than espouse overt **nationalism**, this press tended to convey aspirations for citizenship and respected status within the French system. By independence in 1960, however, the majority of Malagasy-language newspapers had become decidedly nationalist, and, with circulation largely limited to **Antananarivo**, were systematically critical of the **First Republic's** affinities with **France**. The regime's **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD) had its own press, relatively unappreciated in the capital where most of its opposition—and most of the island's readers—were located. The main journals with nationwide readership were the **Catholic church's** French-language weekly *Lumière* and its Malagasy counterpart *LaKroan'i Madagasikara*, both published in **Fianarantsoa**. **Philibert Tsiranana's** Francophile policy also enjoyed support from the Francophone *Courrier de Madagascar* which disappeared in the **Revolution of May 1972**.

During both the First Republic and its successor **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM), broadcast media were under government management; transistor radio represented the most effective means of communication and control among the peasantry and small-town population. The DRM also tightened **censorship** of the written press, suppressing criticism of the regime's professed Marxist options and especially its hesitant accommodations to **World Bank**, **International Monetary Fund**, and other Western demands for economic liberalization. These controls eased with a new press code in 1989, inaugurating an impressive explosion of printed and (privately owned) broadcast media. The **Antananarivo** press played a vital role in focusing popular sentiment during the decline of the DRM and its replacement by the **Third Republic** in 1991–1992.

Largely freed from intimidation and with increasing professionalism from young, well-trained journalists, the print media now find themselves restricted by competition from a multitude of radio and television stations and by declines in adult literacy during the previous two decades. Total newspaper readership is estimated as no higher than 100,000, scarcely greater than at independence. There are nonetheless 150 periodicals in Madagascar, four of them small, tabloid French-language dailies, as well as a national news agency (*Taratra*), and a monthly magazine. All are independent of government but, without a codified set of protections for opinion, they remain wary nonetheless of arousing official antipathies. Hence, putative malfeasance and criticisms of policy tend to be treated with the nuance, euphemism, and visual caricature that are characteristic of the island's culture. On 26 May 2003, however, 100 journalists marched in Antananarivo streets, handkerchiefs symbolically stuffed in their mouths, to protest vague recriminations against the press by then Minister of Defense Jules Mamizara and by church leaders.

Madagascar's broadcast media continue to flourish in a climate of relative freedom. In addition to the official media, the island has 17 private television channels (one of them owned and operated by the family of President **Marc Ravalomanana**), as well as 140 private radio stations, two-thirds of them outside the capital. Virtually all are dedicated to freewheeling coverage of public life and even more conspicuously to a national desire for inexpensive audiovisual distraction. A burgeoning industry of first-run film piracy induced the government in 2004 to suspend issuing licenses to private television operators. Also in 2004, the new minister for communications, Clermont Mahazava, undertook to eliminate "tribalist" vilifications (mainly against highland personalities) on private television channels, but without conceding implications of censorship. Internet access remains rudimentary, with only 35,000 subscribers in December 2003.

**MENALAMBA.** The revolt of the *Menalamba* (Red Shawls) is considered to have begun with the killings of the Johnson family of Quaker **missionaries** on 2 November 1895. The revolt itself was a complicated affair involving many different groups. It was directed simultaneously against three targets: the **French** invaders who had captured



**Antananarivo** at the beginning of October; the **Merina Empire's corruption** and abandonment of traditional customs, held by the rebels to have occasioned the loss of Antananarivo; and all decadent "foreigners" (*vahaza*), including **Merina** government officials, Malagasy Christians, and European missionaries. The rebellion mobilized deserters from the Merina army as well as *fahavalo* outlaws, and even local dignitaries and Merina administrators.

Various groups called *Menalamba* existed in many areas of **Ime-rina**, usually on its borders, and were not always well coordinated either in terms of action or of goals. They revived many traditional practices, including use of the royal talismans, or *sampy*, and claimed to be acting in the name of and on orders from Queen **Ranavalona III**. On the other hand, they also attacked the personnel and practices of the queen's administration, and some of the factions proposed rival monarchs. The uprising lasted until 1898, and it is estimated that it may have involved as many as 300,000 people out of a population of one million. Between 50,000 and 100,000 died, either directly in the uprising or from famine and disease resulting from the disruption it caused.

The most immediate result of the *Menalamba* revolt was the end of the Merina monarchy. An **Annexation Law** transforming Madagascar from a protectorate to a colony was passed in Paris on 6 August 1896, and General **Joseph Gallieni** was sent to Antananarivo to put down the uprising. On his arrival he arrested two counselors of the queen—Rainiandriamampandry, a commoner and minister of the interior from the powerful Tsimiamboholahy clan, and an uncle of the queen, Prince Ratsimamanga—and had them put to death for complicity in the uprising, an improbable conspiracy that was never proven. In February 1897, the monarchy itself was abolished, and the queen and several members of her family and entourage were sent into exile. By the end of 1898, the *Menalamba* rebellion was finally suppressed, but it was not the last of the uprisings against colonial rule. Later, its example was cited by the organizers of the **Rebellion of 1947**. See also RABEZAVANA; RABOZAKA.

**MERINA.** Madagascar's largest ethnic group, with an estimated population of four million (1,993,000 in the 1974 census estimate), the Merina inhabit the central **highlands**, in and around the capital, **An-**

**tanananarivo**. Their arrival in Madagascar and passage to the island's center have never been precisely clarified, although Merina traditions claim that upon reaching the highlands they conquered and absorbed a tribe of inhabitants called the **Vazimba**. By the 16th and 17th centuries, kingdoms had begun to appear, to coalesce and fragment, until their final unification under **Andrianampoinimerina** in the late 18th century. Under Andrianampoinimerina's successors the monarchy extended its control over most of Madagascar, establishing the **Merina Empire** within the island. The **London Missionary Society** and later **missions** set up **educational** systems, and by the time of the **French** conquest in 1895, the Merina were clearly the dominant group in Malagasy culture as well as in politics and economics. They still are to be found throughout the island as administrators, traders and shopkeepers, teachers, and pastors.

The French made some attempts to reduce this preeminence, but, relying extensively on Merina personnel in the colonial administration, and continuing to concentrate educational facilities in Antananarivo, they allowed Merina social supremacy to survive. After World War II, the French created an elite drawn from non-Merina groups, commonly referred to as **Côtiers**, as a counterweight to the more nationalistic Merina. It was this new elite, under **Philibert Tsiranana**, that formed the nucleus of the ruling group of the **First Republic**, sending a majority of the Merina into political opposition (mainly through the **AKFM** party). Merina technical and managerial skills, capital, and social prestige have nevertheless kept them indispensable to all regimes. Although developments since independence have reduced such disparities between the Merina and the other groups, the province of Antananarivo still has the advantage in educational, economic, and communications infrastructure. Resentment against these privileges remains an element of Malagasy politics.

The election of President **Marc Ravalomanana**, a Merina, in December 2001 shattered the mythical taboo against a Merina presidency, especially since Ravalomanana carried pluralities in five of the island's six provinces. Nevertheless, an opposition alliance of former presidents **Albert Zafy** from **Antsiranana province** and **Didier Ratsiraka** from **Toamasina** has played the *Côtier* resentment card vigorously. To the dismay of Malagasy unity advocates, the Zafy-Ratsiraka "**Réconciliation Nationale**" movement denounces

the appointment of Merina throughout the Ravalomanana administration and the preponderance of fellow *Côtiers* arrested for implementing Ratsiraka's blockade of the capital during the **Crisis of 2002**. Popular resonance for these "tribalist" campaigns is due as much to the Malagasy majority's abstract hostility to all established power (*fanjakana*), where Merina are always conspicuous, as to the Merina themselves as an ethnic population.

**MERINA EMPIRE.** The area controlled by the **Merina** monarchy began to expand beyond the boundaries of **Imerina** after 1810 with the expeditions of **Andrianampoinimerina's** son and successor, **Radama I**. Radama advanced east to the port of **Toamasina**, south into **Betsileo**, and west into the territory of the **Sakalava**. His conquests were continued under his successors, and by the late 19th century, the Merina Empire occupied about two-thirds of Madagascar, including the south as far as **Ihosa**, most of the central and southeast coast, the port of **Mahajanga** in the northwest, and a corridor of land through **Sakalava** territory to the port. The Merina also had deep-south outposts at **Toliara** and **Fort-Dauphin (Taolagnaro)** that had to be reached by water. The succession of monarchs from 1828 to 1895—all of them queens except for a two-year reign of **Radama II**—conducted robust **foreign policy** with major European powers, the **United States**, and **Indian Ocean** neighbors. From 1864, one year after the death of Radama II, external trade and security were under the tight control of the prime minister, **Rainilaiarivony**, who defended Madagascar's interests vigorously, if not always successfully, in a hemisphere increasingly subjected to European imperial ambitions.

The empire was governed by a variety of systems. Imerina was directly under the monarch and prime minister, and Betsileo territory was also directly controlled by the administration, although with a different set of laws. Other parts of the empire were governed through local rulers, under the supervision of Merina civil-military governors. Several of the incorporated peoples that had resisted Merina conquest broke into active revolt after the **Franco-Malagasy War** of 1883–1885 when the imperial grip had been loosened by internal difficulties and external pressures. The empire was also plagued in its later years by the existence of *efitra*, marginal territo-

ries occupied by escaped **slaves** and convicts and fugitives from conscription and **forced labor**. Antananarivo was not able to reassert control over these fringe areas, another sign of imperial fragility prior to the **French** conquest of 1895.

The existence of the Merina Empire has influenced modern politics in Madagascar. The specter of a return of Merina subordination has for decades been used by French and non-Merina politicians to alarm the island majority, called the *Côtiers*. These anxieties split the **nationalist movement**, colored the composition of both the **First Republic** and the **Democratic Republic**, and has reappeared in the “**Réconciliation Nationale**” campaign waged by antagonists to the current president, Merina **Marc Ravalomanana**.

**MERLIN, MARTIAL (1860–1935).** A career colonial official who served as governor-general of French Equatorial Africa in 1908, Merlin succeeded **Hubert Garbit** as **governor-general** of Madagascar in September 1917. During his brief stay he continued mobilization for the war effort, but restricted the “voluntary” recruitment of the previous administration and made some effort to improve local **rice** supplies. In response to **settler** pressure for more representation in colonial administration decisions, Merlin held regular meetings with the island’s chambers of commerce. In January 1918, Merlin left Madagascar to become governor-general of French West Africa.

**MFM (MPITOLONA HO AMIN’NY FANJAKAN’NY MADINIKA, MOVEMENT FOR POWER TO THE LITTLE PEOPLE).** The MFM was founded in 1972 by **Manandafy Rakotonirina** and other participants in the **May 1972 Revolution**. Inspired equally by its hostility to the **First Republic** and by insurrectionary European movements of 1968, MFM doctrine at first contended that violent revolution was a necessary prelude to the establishment of an egalitarian socialist state, a position that it formally abandoned in 1980. The party led a precarious existence under the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**, accusing it of having obstructed the May revolution. Very much an urban movement, the MFM also had reservations about the practicality and sincerity of the rural *fokonolona* strategy of Colonel **Richard Ratsimandrava**. Although it formed part of the Leftist front that supported **Didier Ratsiraka** after the assassination

of Ratsimandrava, the party's leadership was not fully convinced of the revolutionary potential of the regime, and it spent some time in opposition, even being banned for a period in 1976, before joining the **Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution** in 1977.

The party's relationship with the Ratsiraka regime continued to be ambivalent. The MFM supported Ratsiraka against more conservative groups but it never took a ministry and was involved in several acts of opposition, including hostility to officials in **Nosy Be** and other parts of the north in 1981. It was rumored to have contacts with the **Kung Fu** societies that threatened the government at the end of 1984. Although the party supported Ratsiraka's candidacy in the presidential election of 1982, in the spring of 1987 it formed an opposition alliance with two other parties and in the presidential **election** of March 1989 its leader, Rakotonirina, ran against Ratsiraka.

In the late 1980s, the MFM converted abruptly to liberal market policies as the solution to Madagascar's economic problems. In October 1990, it changed its name to *Mpitolona Fanavaozan'i Madagasikara* (Militants for the Progress of Madagascar), keeping the initials. As a founder of the **Forces Vives** movement the MFM played an active role in the downfall of the Ratsiraka republic. True to its origins, it mounted effective demonstrations in the streets of the capital in May 1991. The MFM separated itself from this opposition alliance in July, when the Forces Vives created a "transitional government" and began occupying ministries, but it continued in opposition to Ratsiraka and joined the **Panorama** power-sharing arrangement that brought in the **Third Republic** in 1992. The party was disappointed, however, when Rakotonirina's showing in the presidential election of that year was much weaker than expected.

Remaining in opposition to President **Albert Zafy's** nationalist platform and Ratsiraka's second administration—both considered insufficiently oriented to the free market—the MFM was weakened by the defection of its well-connected treasurer, **Francisque Ravony** who became Zafy's first prime minister in 1993. Holding 15 seats in the new republic's **Assemblée Nationale**, MFM went its own way in parliament, contributing to the impasse that destroyed the Forces Vives coalition and brought Zafy's impeachment in 1996. The party was trounced in the legislative elections of 1998, its caucus reduced to just three deputies, although it retained some influence in the is-

land's labor movement and among business people. After failing to organize a united "crisis cell" to oppose Ratsiraka's reelection in 2001, the MFM backed Antananarivo businessman **Marc Ravalomanana** in that election and its **Fianarantsoa** leader, **Pety Rakotoniaina** conducted a successful assault for Ravalomanana on provincial headquarters during the post-electoral **Crisis of 2002**. A year later, after consolidation of Ravalomanana's authority, Rakotoniaina was fired from the provincial administration. Elected mayor of Fianarantsoa in 2003, he has helped move the MFM away from the new administration despite Manandafy Rakotonirina's position as special advisor to the president.

In 2004, Rakotoniaina's dissatisfaction with Manandafy's leadership became apparent, as he developed his own quasi-party, called *Tambatr'i Fianarantsoa* (Solidarity Fianarantsoa). In this dispute, the party lost several strong members to Ravalomanana's **Tiako-i-Madagasikara** (TIM) party. Its parliamentary contingent dropped to two in the elections of December 2002, as TIM captured 110 of the 160 seats. MFM dignitaries remain in high places, however: Manandafy Rakotonirina remains at the Presidency, albeit under a cloud; Jean-Michel Rajaonarivony presides over the **Haute Cour Constitutionnelle**; Olivier Rakotovazaha was minister of transportation in Ravalomanana's first cabinet; ex-minister Germain Rakotonirainy, party general secretary, retains influence among other parties and in the business world.

**MIADANA, VICTOR (1920– )**. A northern school teacher, Miadana entered politics in the provincial council of **Antsiranana** (then **Diégo-Suarez**) in 1957 and was elected to the **Assemblée Nationale** of the **First Republic** in 1958. After serving as head of the budget office, Miadana became minister of finance and budget under President **Philibert Tsiranana** in 1963, and one of four vice presidents, still with budget and fiscal responsibilities, in 1966. He also served as mayor of Mandritsara from 1964 to 1976. He entered the pharmaceutical business after the collapse of the **First Republic**, returning in 1992 as a member of the electoral commission and as ombudsman (*médiateur de la République*). His efforts to defend civil liberties were continually challenged by the **Third Republic's** president, **Albert Zafy**, and by Prime Minister **Francisque Ravony**. He

retired after President **Didier Ratsiraka**'s return to power in 1997, and settled in Paris.

**MIARA-MIRINDRA.** This list of candidates to the **First Republic** legislative elections of 1960 in **Toamasina province** was put together by **Jacques Rabemananjara** and **Alexis Bezaka**. It ran against an official list of candidates from the **Parti Social Démocrate** but itself contained many PSD figures. It won 192,000 votes against 85,000 for the PSD, and 25,000 for the **AKFM**. After the election, the poet and **nationalist** hero Rabemananjara was granted a ministry in the government of President **Philibert Tsiranana**, and Miara-Mirindra merged with the PSD.

**MIGRATIONS.** Malagasy oral traditions record extensive individual and collective migrations in premodern times, usually in a westerly and northerly direction from the east coast inland. At present, two types of migration exist. The first involves permanent resettlement from areas of high population concentration and is composed largely of **Merina**, **Betsileo**, and **Tsimihety** moving into western Madagascar. The second involves temporary migration (annual or for a limited number of years) by people, usually from the south of the island, in search of work in **industry** and on plantations. Displacement as far north as **Antsiranana** is not uncommon.

**MILITARY.** In World War I, 41,000 Malagasy fought in French uniform; over 2,000 were killed in battle. In World War II, some 15,000 served and were stranded in **France** by the surrender of 1940. The armed forces of the **First Republic** had their origin in the transfer of Malagasy personnel serving in the French army. They developed in time into an army of about 4,000 and a navy and air force of 500 each, and a gendarmerie of about 4,500. These forces were covered by military **cooperation agreements** with the French government, and at the time of the **May 1972 Revolution** still had nearly as many French as Malagasy officers. There were two other forces not covered by the cooperation agreements: the Service Civique, to which most conscripts were assigned, mainly to participate in rural public works; and the **Forces Républicaines de Sécurité** (FRS), attached to the Ministry of the Interior and used as a political police. The army

was commanded by General **Gabriel Ramanantsoa**, who had served with distinction in World War II and in Indochina; it had two Malagasy colonels, **Roland Rabetafika** and **Brécharde Rajaonarison**. The gendarmerie, directly attached to the president's office, had been commanded since 1969 by a Malagasy, Colonel **Richard Ratsimandrava**.

The composition and role of the armed forces was a source of some tension during the First Republic. The slow rate of **Malgachization** of the officer corps was a cause of resentment, and the government of President **Philibert Tsiranana** asked for, and received, an increase in the number of French paratroopers stationed at Ivato airport—from 2,000 to 4,000—after a wave of coups hit African countries in the early and mid-1960s. The regular army was considered by the Tsiranana to be “too **Merina**,” especially under the command of the **highlander** Ramanantsoa. Hence, the gendarmerie, recruited from other regions of the island and the lower strata of Merina society, was well enough armed to serve as a counterweight. The Service Civique was resented by the population as a new form of **forced labor**, and the FRS was hated for its role in breaking up demonstrations. The military played a crucial role in the downfall of the First Republic. The action of the FRS in firing on a **student** rally and subsequently on a street crowd in **Antananarivo** turned those demonstrations into the **May 1972 Revolution**, while the refusal of the army and the gendarmerie to defend the regime forced Tsiranana to hand emergency powers to Ramanantsoa, the ranking officer. After Tsiranana's involuntary resignation, Ramanantsoa became the new head of state.

Divisions among the military were also a major cause of instability during the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**, and it was an attempted coup by Brécharde Rajaonarison that led to Ramanantsoa's resignation in January 1975. The direct blame for the assassination of his successor, Ratsimandrava, a month later was attributed to men from the FRS. Thereafter, a **Directoire Militaire** ruled until June 1975, and picked his successor, naval captain **Didier Ratsiraka**. After he took power, Ratsiraka reorganized the armed forces in an attempt to reduce the divisions and maintain his own control over them.

Considered one of the “five pillars of the revolution,” the national People's Army of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM)



grew to over 30,000 and consumed about one-third of the national budget. The largest section was the Development Army, composed of the old Service Civique, the infantry, and the engineering corps. The army, with a special antiriot unit, shared policing duties with the gendarmerie, but also had an extensive **economic** role. It conducted several **agricultural** projects, maintained roads, and helped with **transportation** during the **rice** harvest. The air force and navy were merged and the gendarmerie left largely untouched. The most politically significant change was the creation of elite military units with a level of armament above that of the other forces. They included the Intervention Force of former paratroopers and naval marines directly under the authority of the president, and the president's security guard and security regiment, recruited from among loyalists and trained by **North Korean** officers. Despite the diminutive size of Madagascar's navy, Ratsiraka had himself promoted to admiral.

Relations between the Ratsiraka administration and the armed forces were often strained. The **Conseil Militaire pour le Développement** did not act as a real channel of communication between the civilian authority and the military, and it had very little to do with development. The longtime minister of defense, **Guy Sibon**, died in 1986 and was replaced by the president's brother-in-law **Christophe Raveloson-Mahasampo**. A controversial figure from his previous post as head of intelligence, Raveloson-Mahasampo was removed in February 1991 to placate the opposition. Colonel Kamisy, head of Ratsiraka's bodyguard, had testified for the prosecution in the 1983 **Officer's Trial** of three army and gendarmerie officers accused of plotting to overthrow the president. He was found dead near the gendarmerie headquarters at **Antsirabe** in May 1984. Gendarmerie involvement in the killing was suspected but never proven, and the incident was symptomatic of the difficult relations between Ratsiraka and the armed forces at the time.

During the crisis of 1991, the military remained largely behind the scenes. It distanced itself from the massacre at **Iavoloha**, perpetrated by the Presidential Guard, and made clear that it would not engage in such actions to defend the regime. It put pressure on the Ratsirakists and their opposition to agree on sharing power in a period of transition away from the DRM. During the **Third Republic**, Madagascar's armed forces reverted to the passive, acquiescent posture that had

earned them the nickname “*la grande muette*” (the big mute). Their numbers have remained level for a decade at 22,000: 12,500 regular army, 8,100 gendarmerie and maritime police; 500 each in the navy and air force. Most military training is now handled by France, and joint maneuvers take place regularly with French and neighboring African forces. Internal promotions have resulted in a corps of 128 general officers, most of them occupying desk jobs in military and civilian agencies for this country that has had no external enemy since 1895.

As the political **Crisis of 2002** transpired, however, the sleeping giant was prodded slowly into action. The army had refused to enforce Ratsiraka’s declaration of martial law in the capital in February, forcing the beleaguered president to retreat to his bailiwick of **Toamasina**. A few of its personnel had defected to man Ratsiraka’s blockades against what they regarded as insurrectionary Antananarivo under Ratsiraka’s rival, **Marc Ravalomanana**. Others protected ministerial buildings emptied by the general strikes called in Ravalomanana’s behalf, although blood was shed only when Ravalomanana loyalists assaulted the prime minister’s headquarters at Mahazoarivo and arrested the incumbent, **Tantely Andrianarivo**. Finally, during May 2002, after registering outrage over the Ratsiraka blockades, and encouraged by the **Haute Cour Constitutionnelle**’s 29 April confirmation of Ravalomanana’s electoral majority the previous December, the army went into action against the ex-president’s militias and their barricades. The operation proceeded smoothly, and the army obtained considerable credit for restoring law and order. However, to ensure adequate numbers in subsequent mopping-up, the generals had mobilized 2,500 reservists who participated with less than perfect discipline in enforcing security against the militias. Widely criticized for irregular arrests of antagonists and abuses against the civilian population, the reserve corps was technically demobilized in December 2003. Dissatisfied with their levels of separation pay and with the army’s insistence on discharging all but 620 of them, the reservists demonstrated for months thereafter, seeking more generous treatment.

After 2002, the regular army reverted to its nonpolitical role, assigned primarily to infrastructural development projects and to support the gendarmerie’s campaigns against an increasingly widespread

threat of banditry (*dahalo*) in the island's vast countryside. On 31 December 2003, Ravalomanana issued presidential pardons for 40 military personnel of some 70 arrested in the previous year's operations against Ratsiraka's militias.

**MINING.** Madagascar boasts a variety of mineral resources, but few large deposits. Iron was the first ore to be exploited, and there is evidence of iron mining in the central **highlands** as early as the 16th century. Gold was also discovered at an early period and was a source of income for the **Merina Empire**. During the colonial administration, **concessions** (many of which were never taken up) were granted for the mining of gold, graphite, rock crystal, and mica. The largest deposit of gold was discovered in the Andavokoera region south of what was then **Diégo-Suarez** in 1907, and production reached 3.7 tons in 1909, only to fall off sharply afterward. Graphite and mica were excavated during World War I for military use, and continued to be important until after the Korean War, when their place was taken by synthetics. There are also deposits of coal, the most important located in the southwest near the Sakoa River, a tributary of the Onilahy. The quality of the coal is not high, however, and the problems of transporting it have so far proven prohibitive. The Malagasy government, in conjunction with foreign oil companies, searched for offshore **petroleum** for most of the 1980s and 1990s, but without discovering significant deposits. There are deposits of oil-bearing shale at Bemolanga, but a cheap extraction technology does not exist. New drilling technology may eventually result in profitable production of petroleum from deep deposits offshore at Moramanga in the Mozambique Channel.

Of Madagascar's minerals, graphite and chromite once were among the country's most important sources of **export** income, but production has declined radically over the past decade, except for occasional peak years. These minerals are now surpassed in value by production of sapphires and other gemstones at **Taolagnaro** in the southeast island corner, Ambilobe in **Antsiranana province**, and since 1997, around the mining "boom town" of Ilakaka in the desert south. The Ilakaka site has been estimated as the largest sapphire reserve in the world. Foreign miners and marketers are also prospecting deposits of rubies and diamonds in the Great Island. This mostly

alluvial production of precious and semi-precious stones, as well as small quantities of gold, is done purely by hand. It has proved difficult to regulate and is subject to ad hoc sales at lower than official prices, as well as persistent smuggling to Singapore and Bangkok, engendering little benefit for the Malagasy. A mining code enacted in 1998 with advice from the **World Bank** has never been consistently enforced, but the state moved in mid-2004 to curb the black market that represents an estimated 80 percent of the country's exports of precious stones at a cost to the economy of some \$4 billion per year.

A major ilmenite mining concession has been approved for the area near Taolagnaro. The Rio Tinto mines are to produce 750,000 tons annually, providing 78 percent of the world supply of ilmenite and 8 to 10 percent of the world's titanium dioxide over a 30 to 40 year period, beginning in 2005. The operation will contribute new port facilities at Taolagnaro, as well as roads and other infrastructure, employment, and **tourist** activity in the impoverished south, albeit with dubious implications for the area's fragile **environment**.

**MISSIONS.** Although there were some exploratory attempts to establish missions in Madagascar—such as the 17th-century efforts of **Luis Mariano**—the first missionary establishment of any size in Madagascar came in 1817 when the **London Missionary Society** (LMS) sent pastors to **Antananarivo** at the invitation of the king of the **Merina Empire**, **Radama I**. The missionaries were expelled in 1835 by Radama's successor, **Ranavalona I**, in her attempt to minimize Western influences. They returned at her death in 1861, however, accompanied by other denominations. The **Catholic church**, already maintaining Jesuit missions on the French-held islands of **Sainte-Marie** and **Nosy Be**, came to Antananarivo in 1861, extending their influence south to **Fianarantsoa** and to the coasts. The British Society for the Propagation of the Gospel came in 1864, Norwegian and American Lutherans in 1866, and the Society of Friends (Quakers) in 1867. The French Evangelical Society arrived in 1897.

By the time of the **French** conquest in 1895, the churches, hospitals, and school networks established by the missionaries covered much of the **highlands** and to a lesser degree the coasts. Under the French, **Protestant** missions, particularly the LMS-affiliated churches and the Lutherans, were under intermittent suspicion for

planting subversive ideas among **nationalist**-minded Malagasy. Some mission hospitals and the LMS medical school at **Befelatanana** were taken over by the state, but the **educational** networks remained in church hands. These schools provided a direct route to advanced jobs and social influence. The missions handed control of the churches over to the Malagasy at varying rates, with the Lutherans being the slowest.

**MONIMA (MOUVEMENT NATIONAL POUR L'INDÉPENDANCE DE MADAGASCAR; IN 1967 RENAMED MADAGASIKARA OTRONIN'NY MALAGASY, OR MADAGASCAR GUIDED BY MALAGASY).** MONIMA was founded in 1958 by **Monja Jaona**, who had been active in the postwar **nationalist** movement as a leader of the secret society **JINA**. At the time of its founding MONIMA advocated immediate independence and a “no” vote in the **Referendum on the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic**. The party briefly supported the **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD) in the late 1950s when the PSD moved Madagascar to independence, but it spent most of the **First Republic** in opposition. Under influence from city intellectuals, MONIMA expressed a kind of Maoist philosophy of national liberation, but the peasant base of the party remained nonideological. Administrative harassment during this period reduced the party to its local bastions around **To-liara** where Monja Jaona once served as mayor, and the party was ordered dissolved for its involvement in the **Peasant Rebellion of April 1971**. Its intransigency won it the support of educated youth no longer satisfied with the official opposition provided by the **AKFM** in the late 1960s, but by the time of the **May 1972 Revolution** MONIMA had lost much of this support to the groups that were later to form the **MFM**.

MONIMA criticized the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** that followed the May Revolution for what it saw as conservatism and pro-**Merina** bias; it regarded the *fokonolona* strategy of President **Richard Ratsimandrava** as an attack on its rural bases. Relations with the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) of **Didier Ratsiraka** were tempestuous. MONIMA participated in the institutions of the republic, but in 1977, Monja Jaona took the party out of the **Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution** (FNDR). This split the party into

two groups, Vondrona Socialista MONIMA, which attacked Monja Jaona's "dictatorial tendencies" and returned to the FNDR, and MONIMA Ka Miviombio, which remained true to him. Monja Jaona brought his branch of the party back into the Front in 1981, but nevertheless ran against Ratsiraka in the 1982 presidential election. In 1987, MONIMA joined other parties in a short-lived Alliance Démocratique, in opposition to the regime party, AREMA.

During the Democratic Republic, MONIMA lost much of its support in **Toliara province** to AREMA, and reemerged as a party of urban opposition with sections at the **University of Madagascar** and links with the **Kung Fu** societies by 1984. The party remained very much dominated by its leader, however, and had difficulty creating any organizational structure. In 1983, Monja Jaona had been elected to the **Assemblée Nationale Populaire** as a deputy from the capital. He ran against Ratsiraka in the 1989 presidential election, but gained only 3 percent of the vote. Chastened, he returned to the **Conseil Suprême de la Révolution** in August 1989. In March 1990, when multiparty politics resumed, MONIMA joined AREMA to form the **Mouvement Militant pour le Socialisme Malgache**. It continued to support Ratsiraka during the transition to the **Third Republic**, backing his demand for a federal constitution. This fidelity continued into the Third Republic. Since Monja Jaona's death in 1994, MONIMA has been managed by his son, Roindefo Zafitsimivalo Monja, who devotes most of his attention to business affairs in Toliara. The party lacks parliamentary presence but retains some devoted militants both in the south and in the capital, albeit with negligible influence in the Third Republic.

**MONIMA KA MIVIOMBIO.** *See* MONIMA.

**MONJA JAONA (1910–1994).** Born in southern Madagascar of **Antandroy** stock, Monja Jaona has been Madagascar's most persistent, mercurial **nationalist**. He participated with considerable tension for and against five successive regimes without ever holding major office. An evangelist in **Toliara province** before World War II, he began his political career denouncing the abuses of the colonial system, and was frequently the target of administrative retaliation. During the war, he was placed under house arrest at Manakara on the east coast,

where he founded the secret society **JINA**. After the war he became a member of the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** (MDRM), but his nationalist agitation resulted in imprisonment in September 1946. He was still incarcerated at the outbreak of the **Rebellion of 1947**, in which many other MDRM leaders were killed or jailed.

Monja continued to be active in politics and was elected to the provincial council of Toliara province. In 1958, he founded **MONIMA** in opposition to what was to become the regime party of the **First Republic**, the **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD), and was elected mayor of Toliara in 1959. He refused to join the PSD after independence, and was forced out of his mayoralty in 1961. Monja Jaona continued to denounce the pro-**French** policies of the First Republic, and when the **Peasant Rebellion** broke out in 1971, he accepted responsibility for it. He was arrested and sent to the prison island of **Nosy Lava**. He was released in time to participate in the **May 1972 Revolution**, but did not completely support the subsequent **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**, being suspicious of its interest in *fokonolona* reform.

Under the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar**, Monja Jaona alternated between collaboration with and antagonism to President **Didier Ratsiraka**'s system. He first brought his party into the **Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution** (FNDR) and accepted a seat on the **Conseil Suprême de la Révolution** (CSR). He took MONIMA out of the FNDR in 1977, however, leading to a split in the party. He returned to the fold in 1981, but ran against Ratsiraka in the presidential **elections** of 1982, gaining 19.8 percent of the vote. Declaring the results a fraud, he called for a general strike and the overthrow of the dictator, and was once more placed under house arrest. He was released to run in the legislative elections of 1983, where he won a seat in **Antananarivo**.

Monja Jaona ran once more against Ratsiraka in the 1989 presidential election, but by this time he had lost his rural base and was competing for opposition votes with two other candidates, **Manandafy Rakotonirina** and **Jerome Razanabahiny-Marojama**, emerging with only 3 percent of the tally. In August 1989, Monja Jaona resumed his seat on the CSR, and in the ensuing crisis he supported Ratsiraka against a burgeoning opposition. In 1990, he led

MONIMA into the **Mouvement Militant pour le Socialisme Malgache** against the opposition **Comité des Forces Vives**. In the transition to the **Third Republic** he joined the Ratsirakan call for a federal constitution. On 31 March 1992, Monja Jaona led a crowd of Ratsiraka partisans in a march on the National Forum, which was drafting the constitution for the Third Republic, and was wounded when security troops fired on the crowd. He continued to back Ratsiraka, albeit without recompense, until his death in 1994.

**MOUVEMENT DEMOCRATIQUE DE LA RENOVATION MALGACHE (MDRM) / DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT FOR MALAGASY RENEWAL.** The MDRM, Madagascar's most important **nationalist** party, was created in Paris in February 1946, by the two Malagasy delegates to the **Constituent Assemblies** of the **French Fourth Republic**, **Joseph Raseta** and **Joseph Ravoahangy**. Both of them **Merina**, they recruited **Jacques Rabemananjara**, a Malagasy intellectual from the east coast living in Paris, to run as a third candidate in the upcoming legislative elections. The party grew rapidly, particularly in the **highlands**, recruiting from traditional nationalist sympathizers and among returning veterans of World War II. It also attracted the participation of the secret nationalist societies **JINA** and **PANAMA** that had formed during the war. In spite of administrative resistance, and the creation of an opposing party, the **Parti des Dëshérités de Madagascar**, the MDRM triumphed in the November 1946 elections; it won 71 percent of the vote in the Malagasy "college" and returned its three candidates as deputies to the French National Assembly. In the January 1947 **elections** to Madagascar's five provincial assemblies, the MDRM won all the seats in Tananarive (**Antananarivo**) and Tamatave (**Toamasina**) provinces, and majorities in **Fianarantsoa** and Tuléar (**Toliara**), losing only in Majunga (**Mahajanga**) province.

The MDRM was accused by the colonial authorities as the chief organizer of the **Rebellion of 1947**. The deputies were arrested, the party itself was banned, and many members were sent to prison or executed. It seems clear now that the party as an organization was not directly responsible for the uprising. During its existence, however, it was divided between advocates of a parliamentary route to autonomy and a more extreme faction, including leaders of the secret societies,



who advocated rebellion. It was this section, in conjunction with other militants not directly affiliated with the party, that organized the rebellion. *See also* TANANARIVE TRIAL.

**MOUVEMENT MILITANT POUR LE SOCIALISME MALGACHE (MMSM) / MILITANT MOVEMENT FOR MALAGASY SOCIALISM.** The MMSM was formed in March 1990 by supporters of the president of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar (DRM)**, **Didier Ratsiraka**. It included his party, **AREMA**, as well as **MONIMA**, residual members of the **AKFM (AKFM/KDRSM)**, and **Vonjy**. The MMSM organized resistance to the opposition Comité des **Forces Vives** which sought termination of the DRM and its replacement by a **Third Republic**. When that replacement was becoming a certainty in 1991, the MMSM advocated adoption of a "federalist" constitution empowering the provinces against the power center at **Antananarivo** which it considered responsible for the collapse of the DRM. These pleas were ignored by the National Forum constitutional drafting committee.

**MOUVEMENT NATIONAL POUR L'INDEPENDANCE DE MADAGASCAR.** *See* MONIMA.

**MOUVEMENT SOCIAL MALGACHE.** This movement was launched by the **Catholic mission** in Madagascar in 1946 to provide a counterweight to the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache (MDRM)**, considered by the mission to be too **nationalistic** and **Protestant**-dominated. Never successful electorally, it dissolved after the **Rebellion of 1947** and the disappearance of the MDRM.

**MPITOLONA HO AMIN'NY FANJAKANA'NY MADINIKA.** *See* MFM.

**MUSIC.** A country of deep and diverse oral tradition, Madagascar literally lives to musical accompaniment. All rituals, ceremonies, and formal discourse are qualified, even transformed, by song and instrumental power. The well-developed art of the word (*kabary*) gets put to music regularly for laughter and tears. The voice accompanies

trance (*tromba*), ridicules social pomposity, and calls the blessed dead to join the living. Music seems always to have been indispensable for communication between the mundane world and the realm of spirit. Madagascar's principal indigenous instruments include the *valiha*, a 16-string bamboo zither (with variations in size, shape, and materials), the *sodina* flute familiar to **Indonesia**, the **Arab** *kabosa* lute, the drum called *amponga*, the zebu-horn trumpet, seashells, and the *kayamba* scraper derived from African percussion. European piano, fiddle (*lokanga*), and accordion often join the traditional ensembles. **Protestant church** hymns have strongly influenced Malagasy harmonies. Styles and techniques are conveyed through family heritage and apprenticeships, not, as in much of Africa, through secret societies, or, as in Europe, through formal conservatories.

Songs cover all manner of subjects, from enactments of legend (including Biblical narratives), to sacrifices for love, to political satire (*rija*). Throughout the island, hired musicians and dancers (*mpilalao*) set the tone for social occasions. What is taboo (*fady*) in speech can usually be sung. On the **highlands**, itinerant troupes of *mpihira gasy* perform popular musical theater on market days, often conveying authorized moral lessons. Women improvise freely in the **Sakalava** *antsa* rituals, and the suggestive *salegy* remains the most popular **dance** music in the west and north of the island. "In **Betsileo**," said a European scholar, "to sing is to conquer death." **Antananarivo** in the 1960s and 1970s developed an idiomatic style of jazz, emphasizing the voice and the piano. This music is best exemplified by pianist Jeannot Rabeson, now in Paris, but it is practiced in small clubs before an enthusiastic clientele in **Antananarivo** today. Accompanying the **May 1972 Revolution**, popular music overtly adopted African forms from Congo-Zaire and Senegal, and introduced electronic guitars to the instrumental mix. Serious Malagasy musicians turned from versions of European pop to voice the protest of disenfranchised youth—in the songs of Mahaleo from **Antsirabe** and the poet-composer Fanja Andriamanantena, as well as the social critic-poet Dama. More mellow fusions of traditional music, rock, and jazz are practiced by Jaojoby Eusèbe, Jacky "le Rouge," and Lalie. Nicholas Rakotovao (Nikosodina) blends Miles Davis with Debussy and traditional Malagasy themes in a dialogue of cultures.

In search of lucrative outlets, Malagasy musicians have enjoyed decades of popularity in **France**, where Les Surfs made films in the 1960s and the rock group Njila and Les Njava and singers Mbolatiana, Eric Manana, and Mahery Andrianaivo-Ravelona have joined the Rabeson family in performing. At home, the integration of religious myth and daily life keep generating a music that transcends both.

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**NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.** *See* ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE.

**NATIONALIST MOVEMENT.** Malagasy nationalism started under **French** colonial rule with both advantages and disadvantages. The existence of a previously independent state, the **Merina Empire**, served as an early rallying point, but an ambiguous one, since restoration of the empire was not appealing to the non-Merina peoples of the island. A single **language** and a high degree of **education** were advantages, but were counteracted by intense control from the colonial authorities that made any kind of open political activity impossible. The first organization that had a substantial membership was the **Vy Vato Sakelika** (VVS) based at **Befelatanana** medical school; the VVS was suppressed by the colonial authorities in 1915. After the war, **Jean Ralaimongo** and French sympathizers animated a loosely knit **Ralaimongo group** that extended its geographic coverage beyond the **highlands** and its social coverage beyond the elite.

The nationalist movement first aimed at the limited goals of securing the rights of French citizenship for the Malagasy and freeing them from the restrictions of the *indigénat*, but after the **Demonstration of 19 May 1929** in **Antananarivo**, it began to agitate for independence. Political activity was suppressed during World War II, but after the war a restricted Malagasy electorate was given the right to send delegates to the two **Constituent Assemblies** that decided on the constitution of the Fourth French Republic, and to the National Assembly. A coalition of nationalist leaders, the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** (MDRM), was able to elect its candidates to the two assemblies and to win the three deputies' seats. The party was divided, however, into a wing that ad-

vocated independence through peaceful means, and the secret societies **PANAMA** and **JINA** that advocated rebellion. When the **Rebellion of 1947** broke out, the MDRM was accused of organizing it. The party was dissolved, and its leaders were either executed or imprisoned. The trauma of the rebellion and the severity of control that followed it dampened nationalist activity for most of the next decade. People with nationalist leanings gravitated to **labor unions**, to ostensibly nonpolitical organizations like the **Comité de Solidarité de Madagascar**, and to the **Groupes d'Etudes Communistes**.

Nationalist forces reappeared after the liberalization of political life under the **Loi-Cadre** in 1956, and some new parties advocated immediate independence. In 1958, they assembled in the **Tamatave Congress** to demand independence and to urge rejection of the French Community proposed in the **Referendum on the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic**. Their audience was sufficiently large that Madagascar had the second highest number of negative votes of France's African colonies.

Independence came to Madagascar in 1960 not as a prize for nationalists but in recognition throughout French Africa of the unsustainable character of "autonomy" within the Community. **France** was still not the enemy for most Malagasy. Outright nationalists thus formed a margin of opposition to the pro-French **First Republic** of President **Philibert Tsiranana**. They were in part identified with Merina resentment against political domination by hand-picked Francophile **Côtiers**, in part with Marxist and Maoist opponents of Tsiranana's accommodation with Western capitalism. Both tendencies converged in the **AKFM**, the only stable party created out of the 1958 Tamatave Congress. Drawing strength almost exclusively in Antananarivo (hence the easy confusion of its platform with monarchical Merina revanchisme), AKFM nationalists eventually represented the sole parliamentary opposition to Tsiranana's **Parti Social Démocrate**. Its president, **Richard Andriamanjato**, was a **Protestant** pastor and school principal, a socialist parliamentary deputy, and mayor of Antananarivo. Its inability to reconcile contradictions between middle-class progressives like Andriamanjato and proletarian populists like general secretary **Gisèle Rabesahala**, between Merina traditionalists and "scientific socialists," reduced the party to a

subordinate role in the genuinely nationalist movement that began to manifest itself first in **Toliara province** in 1971 under the intransigent **MONIMA** of **Monja Jaona**.

This movement reached climax on the streets of Antananarivo a year later in the **May 1972 Revolution**. Categorically repudiating economic, military, and cultural linkages with France, the movement found partial expression in the policies of the 1972–1975 **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** and subsequently in the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) under President **Didier Ratsiraka** from 1975 to 1992. While consistently more nationalist than its predecessor republic, the DRM found itself forced to compromise perpetually with international dictates on which recovery from the **economic** disaster of the early 1980s depended. A brief revival of economic nationalism transpired under the **Third Republic's** President **Albert Zafy** from 1993 to 1996, but the international donor community sat on its purses while Zafy and his parliament battled to a stalemate and to impeachment of the president. The donors returned to assist Madagascar only when changes of regime demonstrated official Malagasy willingness to abandon ruinous, anachronistic nationalism.

**NATIONALIZATIONS.** The first nationalizations undertaken after the **May 1972 Revolution** occurred during the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** when the arsenal at **Diégo-Suarez** (now **Antsiranana**) and the electric/water power company (Jirama) were taken over. When **Didier Ratsiraka** took power in June 1975, he announced a series of nationalizations as part of the transition to an **economy** based on Marxist socialism. Enterprises nationalized included the French-owned banks and **commercial companies**, insurance companies, and the film distribution network. Later the Malagasy government acquired majority participation in the Société Malgache des Transports Maritimes and the oil refinery at **Toamasina**. It created parastatal syndicates to dominate **agricultural** marketing and credit. By 1978 it was estimated that the state controlled about 61 percent of firms operating in Madagascar. After the economic collapse of the early 1980s, however, the state gradually had to withdraw from many sectors of economic activity, and, pressed by the **World Bank** and **International Monetary Fund**, it has programmed **privatization** of 136 state-owned enterprises.

**NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT.** A grouping of states not affiliated with either of the Cold War superpowers was first suggested at the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states in 1955. The movement was founded at the Belgrade Conference in 1961. The **First Republic** had adopted a policy of alignment and anticommunism, and it neither asked nor was invited to join the movement. After the **May 1972 Revolution** Foreign Minister **Didier Ratsiraka** took Madagascar into the movement as part of his radicalization of the country's **foreign policy**. As president of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar**, he attempted to find a place in the radical wing of the movement, supporting attempts to demilitarize the **Indian Ocean** and accepting the thesis that the states of the socialist bloc were the natural allies of the Third World. After experiencing the **debt** crisis, however, Ratsiraka was critical of the failure of socialist states to provide assistance, accusing them of behaving like the imperialist powers, and he criticized the movement itself for its inability to achieve a united front on the crisis. His antagonist and successor, **Marc Ravalomanana**, was able to use the Non-Aligned forum at Kuala Lumpur in 2002 to demonstrate international acceptance of the authority that he had recently wrested from Ratsiraka.

**NORTH KOREA.** After the Soviet Union, North Korea was the socialist country with which the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) had the closest relations. President **Didier Ratsiraka** expressed admiration for North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, for North Korea's passage from an **agricultural** to an **industrial** economy, and for Kim's philosophy of Juche, or self-reliance. North Korea provided training, officers, and weapons for the president's security guards; it supplied weapons for the **armed forces** and assistance in their economic projects; and offered a model for the Malagasy system of **co-operatives**. North Koreans also built the presidential palace and military camp at **Iavoloha**. By the time of the fall of the DRM, however, Korean influence had been much reduced by the rapprochement with the West occasioned by Madagascar's **debt** crisis.

**NOSY BE (BIG ISLAND).** A volcanic island off the coast of **Antsir-anana** province, Nosy Be was settled by **Arabs** and by the **Antankarana**. In the 1830s, groups of Boina **Sakalava** came to the island

as refugees from the **Merina Empire**. In 1841, Admiral de Hell, governor of **Réunion**, signed a treaty of protection with the Sakalava rulers. Settlers from **France** and Réunion followed, establishing plantations for **perfume plants** and **spices**. Nosy Be now grows these crops and processes them in local factories. In 1981 and 1982, it was the site of antigovernment demonstrations protesting **corruption** in the marketing of **vanilla**. It also has a major processing plant for prawns, exported frozen to Japan and Europe. A favorite beach resort and water-sport haven for European vacationers since well before independence, Nosy Be acquired substantial **tourism** investment from **South Africa** during the 1960s and subsequently from **France**, **Mauritius**, and domestic sources (particularly **Karana**). Its beaches and limpid waters rank with **Antananarivo** as Madagascar's major tourist destination and its annual *Donia* **music** festival draws thousands of visitors from the main island, Réunion, and the **Comoro Islands**.

**NOSY LAVA (LONG ISLAND)**. Located off the west coast of Madagascar, opposite Analalava, Nosy Lava was originally a burial ground for **Sakalava** royalty. It was used during the colonial period as a prison camp for long-term convicts. Political prisoners, such as suspected members of **Vy Vato Sakelika**, were also sent there. Subsequent regimes have continued to use the island for this purpose.

**NY ANDRY**. *See* ANDRY, NY.

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**OFFICE DES MINES NATIONALES ET DES INDUSTRIES STRATEGIQUES (OMNIS) / BUREAU OF NATIONAL MINES AND STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES**. Created in 1976 as the National Military Bureau for Strategic Industries, OMNIS issues licenses for mineral exploration and monitors **mining** operations. It has played a role in **petroleum** exploration, in the island's chromite-mining activities, and is responsible for running the arsenal at **Antsiranana**. Its first director was Ferdinand Patureau, an army major related by marriage to President **Didier Ratsiraka**. Originally reporting directly to the president, OMNIS was transferred to the prime minister's office early in the

**Third Republic**, and in late 2003, moved to the Ministry of Industry and Trade, reducing much of the autonomy once enjoyed by its military-industrial staff. OMNIS continues to be managed by **military** officers headed by General Randrianafidisoa who, with **Pety Rakotoniaina**, led operations in **Fianarantsoa province** on behalf of President **Marc Ravalomanana** during the latter stages of the **Crisis of 2002**. General Randrianafidisoa has retained a personal tie with the president who has entrusted him with sensitive investigations of **corruption** in the upper bureaucracy, particularly in the customs service.

**OFFICE DU RIZ (RICE BUREAU).** The Office du Riz was established in 1944 by the **Free French** administration to help mobilize Madagascar's resources for the French war effort. It was greatly resented for forcing farmers to sell their entire crop at low prices and then selling restricted quantities back to them at considerably higher prices. These anomalies gave rise to **corruption** and a black market in rice. Protest against the Office du Riz was a rallying point for **nationalist** activities, and resentment against the office was one of the factors contributing to the **Rebellion of 1947**. *See also* COMITE DU SALUT PUBLIC.

**OFFICERS' TRIAL.** In 1977, three officers of the Malagasy armed forces—Major **Richard Andriamaholison** and Captain **Abel Rakoto** of the gendarmerie and army Captain **Marson Rakotonirina**—were arrested and charged with conspiracy against the state. They were not tried until October 1983, a time of crisis for President **Didier Ratsiraka**, and commentators speculated that the three officers, with a variety of **military** and political ties, were being prosecuted to set an example to others. The trial had been preceded by the conviction of army colonel Auguste Rasolofo and others for plotting to assassinate Ratsiraka in 1982; the relatively light sentences handed down in that trial had led to government protests. The sentences in the officers' trial were more severe: house arrest for life for Andriamaholison and Rakotonirina, and 10 years at forced labor for Rakoto. All appealed their sentences, although Rakoto later withdrew his appeal. The appeals of the others were dismissed.

**OLIVIER, MARCEL (1879–1945).** A career colonial administrator, Olivier was **governor-general** of Madagascar from 1924 to 1930. He



organized the **Délégations Economiques et Financières**, advisory councils designed to meet **settler** demands for more representation; set up a bank to issue currency (the Banque de Madagascar et des Comores); conducted a survey of land and revised landholding laws; and completed the **Fianarantsoa**-East Coast railroad. Olivier also organized the **Service de la Main-d'Oeuvre des Travaux d'Intérêt Général** (SMOTIG) to channel **forced labor** to government projects. Olivier's period in Madagascar coincided with increasing nationalist activity, in part inspired by policies like the land surveys and the SMOTIG; these protests culminated in the **Demonstrations of 19 May 1929**.

**OMBIASY.** Priests of the **Antaimoro** and **Antanosy**, the *ombiasy* (or *ombiassy*) were renowned in precolonial times for their skills in the interpretation of the *sorabe* writings, their practice of divination (called *sikidy*) that consists of reading patterns of grains, and their ability to create efficacious royal talismans known as *sampy* and individual talismans known as *ody*. They served as royal advisors in many kingdoms, including those of the **Betsileo** and the **Merina**.

**ORGANISATION COMMUNE AFRICAINE ET MALGACHE (OCAM) / AFRICAN-MALAGASY COMMON ORGANIZATION.** Continuation of the **Union Africaine et Malgache** (UAM) / African-Malagasy Union, OCAM grouped **France** and its former African colonies. **Philibert Tsiranana**, president of the **First Republic**, felt more at home in OCAM, where France had a leadership role, than in the **Organization of African Unity** (OAU). The **Democratic Republic of Madagascar's** President **Didier Ratsiraka** considered OCAM to be a form of neocolonialism and did not participate in the meetings.

**ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY.** *See* AFRICAN UNION.

**ORSTOM PLOT.** Originally called the Office de Recherche Scientifique pour les Territoires d'Outre-Mer (Bureau of Scientific Research for the Overseas Territories), ORSTOM is now the Office de Recherche pour le Développement (Development Research Bureau). During the **First Republic**, sociologists working for this French or-

ganization had contacts with Malagasy intellectuals critical of the **Philibert Tsiranana** administration. In October 1971, a group of Malagasy and French sociologists from ORSTOM were arrested and accused of preparing a Maoist plot against the government. No plot was ever proved, and the members of the group still in detention were released after the **May 1972 Revolution**.

**OVERSEAS DEPUTIES.** Under the Third French Republic, **French** citizens of the overseas territories—which included Algeria, the Antilles, Cochin China, French India, and **Réunion**—elected deputies to the French National Assembly. The overseas deputies were an important part of the colonial lobby of the Third Republic, and since they were usually long-term incumbents they often rose to influential positions. Among the deputies who were interested in the French position in Madagascar were **François De Mahy** of Réunion and **Charles-Marie Le Myre de Vilers** of Cochin China.

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**PANAMA.** The Parti Nationaliste Malgache, or PANAMA, as it was known, was a secret society founded during World War II and connected at first with the **Comité du Salut Public**. Using networks of **Protestant** pastors and teachers, it spread first in the area around the capital and then to **Antsiranana**, **Mahajanga**, **Toamasina**, and **To-liara**. It advocated immediate independence for Madagascar, if necessary by violent revolution. After the war PANAMA cooperated with the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** (MDRM). Along with another secret society, **JINA**, PANAMA probably supplied much of the planning and leadership for the **Rebellion of 1947**. The society was dissolved by the colonial administration in May 1947.

**PANGALANES CANAL.** This channel of lagoons (*pangalanes*) interrupted by land outcroppings stretches for 652 kilometers along the east coast south of **Toamasina**. Beginning with the **Merina Empire**, various administrations have projected connecting the lagoons into a continuous sheltered waterway. The full route has never been completed,

in part because of the expense of the project, but also because of opposition by the secondary ports of the east coast to the channeling of traffic to Toamasina. About 432 kilometers are now navigable, from Toamasina southward to the **coffee** port of Mananjary.

**PANORAMA AGREEMENT.** Concluded at **Anatanarivo's** Panorama Hotel on 31 October 1991, this was a power-sharing deal between President **Didier Ratsiraka** of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** and his opposition, the Comité des **Forces Vives**, on the modalities of transition to a **Third Republic**. The original agreement removed most of Ratsiraka's powers, but left him in command of the **armed forces**. It set up four transitional institutions: Ratsiraka's presidency, the government of Prime Minister **Guy Razanamasy**, an **Haute Autorité d'Etat** to be presided over by opposition leader **Albert Zafy**, and a **Comité de Redressement Economique et Social** to be chaired by two other opposition leaders, **Manandafy Rakotonirina** and **Richard Andriamanjato**. The accord was repudiated on 7 November by Zafy, who had been out of the country when it was reached, on the grounds that it left Ratsiraka with too much authority. After considerable negotiation, the agreement was amended to meet Zafy's objections, and was instituted on 9 January 1992. Since the 1991 accord, well-publicized meetings at the Malagasy-owned Panorama Hotel have produced a number of ephemeral coalitions among rival political factions. In 2004, at the instigation of President **Marc Ravalomanana**, the presidential **Tiako-i-Madagasikara** (TIM) party began a series of encounters at the Panorama with a dozen pro-Ravalomanana and neutral parties resentful of TIM's exclusive hold on parliamentary appointments and prerogatives. *See also* ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE.

**PARIS CLUB.** Chaired by the **World Bank**, the "club" is composed of representatives of seven multilateral creditors and 14 national governments which hold substantial portions of Madagascar's \$4.1 billion external **debt**. Since 1989, under leadership by the bank and the **International Monetary Fund** (IMF), the club has periodically studied Madagascar's progress in economic restructuring, the performance of its **economy**, its immediate needs for foreign currency, and prospects for forgiving debt (converting it into constructive de-

velopmental projects, including **environmental** conservation), and rescheduling the burdens of debt service. The club has cooperated in Madagascar's recent access to the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) and has encouraged bilateral agreements to cancel and reschedule the island's debt. By mid-2004, debt rescheduling agreements had been reached with Austria, **France**, Germany, **Great Britain**, Israel, Italy, the Russian Federation, Spain, Switzerland, and the **United States**. Agreements with Belgium, Japan, and Sweden were still under negotiation. Official creditors not members of the club often follow suit, so that Madagascar's total external debt burden has been reduced from 21 percent of island exports in 1998 to 5 percent (1 percent of GDP) in the 2002 to 2005 period. In addition to these bilateral arrangements, almost half of Madagascar's debt is held by seven multilateral banks and agencies associated with the Paris Club through the IMF and the World Bank's International Development Agency.

**PARTI DEMOCRATIQUE MALGACHE (PDM) / MALAGASY DEMOCRATIC PARTY.** The PDM was founded in 1945 by the veteran nationalist leader, **Ravelojaona**. It advocated independence based on the principles of the **United Nations** Charter but rejected the more radical line of the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** (MDRM). Its main support came from the **Protestant** elite of the capital, and after the **Rebellion of 1947**, it led a shadowy existence without real influence, under the name Front Démocratique Malgache. In 1955, it renamed itself the **Parti Libéral Chrétien**, but dissolved shortly thereafter.

**PARTI DES DESHERITES DE MADAGASCAR (PADESM) / PARTY OF THE DISINHERITED OF MADAGASCAR.** PADESM was founded in **Toliara** in 1946 in response to the earlier creation of the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache**. Among its early leaders were **Raveloson-Mahasampo**, **Felix Totolehibe**, **Philibert Tsiranana**, and **Pascal Velonjara**. The party rejected immediate independence and expressed its gratitude to the colonial power for freeing the "disinherited" of Madagascar from the domination of the **Merina** elite. It recruited outside Merina areas and among the nonelite of the **highlands**. In spite of administrative favor,

it was never able to win **elections** at the national level. PADESM did better in the provinces than in Merina **Antananarivo**, winning 13 of 18 Malagasy “college” seats in **Mahajanga**’s 1947 provincial assembly, 8 of 18 in **Fianarantsoa**, and 7 of 18 in **Toliara**. PADESM denounced the MDRM as the instigator of the **Rebellion of 1947**, but it too lost much of its cohesion with the disappearance of its rival. In 1956, it suffered a final split between leaders like Tsiranana, who supported the **Loi-Cadre**, and conservatives like Raveloson-Mahasampo, who opposed even this grant of autonomy as premature. The Tsiranana faction went on to found the **Parti Social Démocrate (PSD)**, while the others tended to withdraw from politics.

**PARTI LIBERAL CHRETIEN (PLC) / CHRISTIAN LIBERAL PARTY.** The PLC was founded in 1955 by **Protestant** intellectuals, including journalist Gabriel Razafintsalama and **Prosper Rajao-belina**, who had previously been connected with the **Parti Démocratique Malgache**. It advocated autonomy within the French Union but was unable to attract an audience and disappeared shortly after its inception.

**PARTI NOUVEAU DEMOCRATE DE L’OCEAN INDIEN (PN-DOI) / NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE INDIAN OCEAN.** One of Madagascar’s few openly Marxist parties, the PN-DOI was founded at Tamatave (**Toamasina**) in 1956 by journalist Jacques Titus. It received no encouragement from the French communists, who were hostile to any attempt to create an overtly communist party in Madagascar, and was unable to spread outside Tamatave. Titus abandoned this effort, but later made other attempts to found a communist organization in Madagascar.

**PARTI SOCIAL DEMOCRATE (PSD) / SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY.** Originally the Parti Social Démocrate de Madagascar et des Comores (Social Democratic Party of Madagascar and the Comoros), the PSD was founded at **Mahajanga** in 1956 by **Philibert Tsiranana** and a group that included **Calvin Tsiebo**, **Laurent Botokeky**, and **André Resampa**. The party’s founders, many former members of the **Parti des Dëshérités de Madagascar**, were mainly teachers and civil servants from modest coastal (**Côtier**) families. In 1956, the

PSD supported the **Loi-Cadre** and advocated abrogation of the **Annexation Law** of 1896. It was opposed to immediate independence, however, and favored the maintenance of a close relationship with **France**. The party received the active support of the French high commissioner, **André Soucadaux**, who, like Tsiranana, was a member of the French Socialist Party. In the Loi-Cadre representative assembly, the PSD, with a bare plurality of 37 out of 90, was able to forge a coalition that elected Tsiranana vice president of the assembly (Soucadaux was ex officio president) and leader of the government council.

Between 1957 and the coming of internal autonomy in 1958, the PSD absorbed several of the smaller parties that had appeared at the time of the Loi-Cadre. After 1958, the party used control of the administration through its general secretary Resampa, who was also minister of the interior, to destroy the power bases of other opposition leaders. On 21 October 1961, Tsiranana and the PSD convened a colloquium at **Antsirabe** in an attempt to court some of the 35 other Malagasy parties. Most of them attended, including the **AKFM** and the **Union Démocratique et Sociale de Madagascar** (UDSM) which had held 36 seats in the old Loi-Cadre assembly. Meetings at **Antananarivo** continued through November, and a second colloquium was held at Antsirabe on 27 December, but it broke up with no agreement on a common program. In the meantime, however, the PSD had attracted the **Rassemblement National Malgache** and had been joined on an individual basis by other prominent politicians, such as the nationalist leaders **Jacques Rabemananjara** and **Joseph Ravoahangy**. It also drew off membership from the weakened UDSM and the **Rassemblement Chrétien de Madagascar**. On 4 September 1960, in the first of three parliamentary elections held under the **First Republic**, the PSD captured 75 of 107 seats in the **Assemblée Nationale**. In the elections of 1965, only the AKFM managed to place any deputies against the PSD, gaining three out of 107, all from Antananarivo; the configuration remained unchanged after the elections of 6 September 1970.

Although the PSD remained in power until the **May 1972 Revolution**, it was increasingly plagued by factional disputes, aggravated by Tsiranana's deteriorating health. By 1970, the party was divided among Tsiranana loyalists, a faction behind his pro-French foreign

minister Rabemananjara, and Resampa's more **nationalist** partisans. In 1971, Tsiranana regained control of the party by ousting Resampa as first vice president, secretary-general, and minister of the interior. Hitherto the heir-apparent, Resampa was spuriously charged with conspiring against Tsiranana with both the **United States** and Communist China.

After the First Republic's collapse in May 1972, the PSD continued a legal existence until 1973 when several coastal cities erupted in anti-**Merina** riots, which the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** attributed to agitation by local PSD leaders. The party was then declared illegal and disbanded. In 1974, Tsiranana and Resampa reconciled and formed the **Parti Socialiste Malgache**, which was banned in 1975 after the assassination of then president, **Richard Ratsimandrava**. Under the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM), former PSD notables found their way into **Vonjy** and the regime party, **AREMA**. When the DRM permitted the formation of new parties in March 1990, André Resampa and Pierre Tsiranana, son of the late president, revived the PSD under the new title of **Rassemblement pour la Sociale Démocratie** (RPSD).

**PARTI SOCIALISTE MALGACHE (PSM) / MALAGASY SOCIALIST PARTY.** The Parti Socialiste Malgache was born of the reconciliation between **André Resampa** and **Philibert Tsiranana** after the **May 1972 Revolution**. Immediately after the revolution, Tsiranana had maintained the **Parti Social Démocrate** in existence, while Resampa had created the **Union Socialiste Malgache**. Neither formula met with success, and in March 1974, the two men created the PSM to regroup the forces opposed to the regime of General **Gabriel Ramanantsoa**. The new party took over the headquarters of the PSD. After the assassination of Colonel **Richard Ratsimandrava** in February 1975, the party headquarters, in which Resampa had taken refuge, was destroyed by an **Antananarivo** mob and the PSM itself was banned.

**PEASANT REBELLION OF APRIL 1971.** The uprising that began in the south of Madagascar on 1 April 1971 was in immediate response to government efforts to collect taxes in the region after an epidemic of anthrax had destroyed the **cattle** herds that the popula-

tion depended on for income. In a larger sense, the uprising expressed the long repressed frustrations of a neglected rural population whose loyalty (or passivity) had been taken for granted. Simultaneously, overnight, farmers armed with primitive weapons attacked a dozen gendarmerie posts across **Toliara province**. No match for the gendarmes, the jacquerie was quelled within 48 hours, leaving some rebels dead. The revolt had been organized by the region's party of opposition to the **First Republic, MONIMA**. Its leader, **Monja Jaona**, went into hiding, and when captured took responsibility for the uprising. He was deported to **Nosy Lava**, as were over 500 others. The severity of the government suppression of the rebellion gradually became known in the rest of Madagascar and reaction to it was part of the alienation of opinion—both in the general public and in the regular **military**—that contributed to the collapse of the regime in the **May 1972 Revolution**.

**PERFUME PLANTS.** Madagascar grows a wide variety of plants used in the manufacture of perfume, mainly in the northwest around **Nosy Be**. Among the most important are ylang-ylang, vetiver, and lemongrass. Ylang-ylang is the only one of these plants to constitute an important **export** in recent times.

**PETROLEUM.** Since Madagascar produces no petroleum, importing and paying for adequate oil supplies has been a continuing problem for successive governments. Under the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar (DRM)**, the Soviet Union was a major supplier of oil until 1988, when it suspended deliveries because the island could no longer meet the payments. It has since been replaced by Iran and **Libya**. Madagascar has tried to develop its own sources by encouraging exploration of oil-bearing shale covering over 400 square kilometers at Bemolanga in the Morafenobe region of **Mahajanga Province** and by looking for offshore deposits. Exploration agreements signed successively with several major oil companies have located petroleum sites none of which has as yet proved economically exploitable. New deep-water technology might be applicable to deposits in the Mozambique Channel off Morondava.

Nationalized under the DRM, the island's **SOLIMA** refinery at **Toamasina** and all marketing activity in oil products were divided



and sold to various private interests in 2000 under conditions imposed by the **World Bank** and **International Monetary Fund**. The government maintains some control over gasoline prices at the pump, but the industry is now largely in foreign commercial hands. *See also* PRIVATIZATION.

**PIERRE, SIMON.** An advisor to President **Didier Ratsiraka** in the early **Democratic Republic of Madagascar**, Simon Pierre was a founding member of the political bureau of the regime party, **AREMA**. An agricultural engineer from **Fianarantsoa province**, he was named minister of rural development and agrarian reform in 1976. In 1982, at the time of the controversy instigated by “rightists” within AREMA, he was removed from his post and “promoted” to the **Conseil Suprême de la Révolution** amid veiled presidential accusations of disloyalty. He returned to favor in 1985, however, and was named minister of information and ideological guidance. He lost the post when the ministry was abolished in September 1989.

**PIQUIE, ALBERT (1853–1917).** **Governor-general** of Madagascar from 1910 to 1914, Piquié was a career colonial servant with experience in Indochina and West Africa. His administration saw to the conquest of the last resistance groups in the west and the consolidation of direct **French** control with the abandonment of General **Joseph Gallieni**’s system of internal protectorates. Piquié made several attempts to develop the colonial **economy** and started the construction of the **Antananarivo-Antsirabe** railroad. *See also* POLITIQUE DES RACES.

**PIRATES.** Because of the tempting trade that crosses the western **Indian Ocean**, there has always been some pirate activity around Madagascar. Large-scale European piracy began after 1684, after advancing colonization and increased naval patrols drove the pirates from their bases in the Caribbean. Madagascar was attractive because of the lack of any powerful naval presence in the area and because it was near three important routes: to and from the Indies, up and down the East African coast, and pilgrim traffic to Mecca. Several pirates, including William Kidd, moved their bases to Madagascar, settling along the northeast and northwest coasts, especially in

**Antongil Bay**, the **Ile Sainte-Marie**, and **Diégo-Suarez Bay**, where the pirate Misson founded the “International Republic of **Liber-talia**.” By the 1730s, a growing **French** and **British** naval presence and the use of convoys to protect shipping drove the pirates out of their Malagasy bases. On the east coast, however, their descendants, the **Zanamalata**, founded and provided a ruling dynasty for the **Bet-simisaraka Confederation**. Together with the west coast **Sakalava**, the Zanamalata conducted raids on the **Comoro Islands** at the end of the 18th century. *See also* BETSIMISARAKA-SAKALAVA RAIDS.

**POLITICAL CULTURE.** Malagasy public life is built on a constant search for consensus, avoidance of overt disagreement, and consistency with **ancestral** precedent. These principles do not always work in practical political life, where the main objective of participants is to acquire and apply power. Whenever possible, however, compromise and harmony develop out of controversy; innuendo and nuance replace categorical declaration; satisfaction is achieved through an extension of the fundamental principle of “familiness” (*fihavanana*). Electoral majorities and popular acquiescence can thus be constructed on the assumption that whatever power happens to exist also happens to have legitimacy. However hateful or inefficient, government is *fanjakana ray’amandreny*, the parental establishment. Nevertheless, this quiescence does not translate into obedience to *fan-jakana* policy or dictates; the political sphere is severely limited—to **elections**, tax-paying, partisan lip-service—short of authority over the way families live, celebrate their lineage, understand their habitat, or conduct their occupations. Moreover, when public trust appears to have been violated, or when authority appears to have weakened, popular retaliation, supported by cosmic vengeance (the *tody*), can be violent. This reaction has occurred repeatedly in Madagascar’s modern history—particularly in the **Rebellion of 1947**, the **Revolution of May 1972**, the collapse of **Didier Ratsiraka’s Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) in 1991–1992, and, more mildly, the second ouster of Ratsiraka in the **Crisis of 2002**.

To maintain stability and assure personal and family security, traditional culture avoids offending the prevailing order of things. Hence, to progress in modern terms, the Malagasy must contend

against a dominance of elders over **youth**, men over **women**, proprietors over the landless, dignitaries over common folk, the old ways over innovation. For decades the progressive challenge was expressed in terms of French “civilization,” a remaking of Malagasy elites in the likeness of the colonial masters. Science, **religion, education, economic** activity, law, and jurisprudence were either French or not modern. Complete decolonization did not occur at independence in 1960 or upon the rupture of institutional links with **France** by the 1972 revolution and the DRM. Despite experimentation with cultural change following Marxist and even **North Korean** models, both Ratsiraka administrations (1975–1991 and 1997–2001) vindicated their essentially French formation. They were “at home” in the Francophone universe and their policies reflected that convenience increasingly through the 1980s and 1990s.

Madagascar’s political culture underwent periods of experimentation under the populist president **Albert Zafy** (1993–1996) and in the charismatic presidential campaign of **Marc Ravalomanana** in 2001, but these leaders, albeit less responsive to specifically French norms, have also been committed to socioeconomic development in Western terms. All regimes since independence have blamed their vicissitudes either on the recalcitrance of traditional conformist culture in the peasantry or on venal self-aggrandizement by the elite, or both. Only under the tragically brief leadership of **Richard Ratsimandrava** in 1975 did the *fanjakana* reveal a glimpse of an alternative. This was to happen through empowerment of local councils (*fokonolona*) and grassroots development initiative. How effective Ratsimandrava’s approach might have been can never be known for, although sufficiently appealing to command lip-service under Ratsiraka’s DRM, the uncontrolled politics of the folk base was never trusted sufficiently to be implemented. All regimes have reverted to top-down governance that never fails to arouse skepticism on the part of the population at large. Ravalomanana appears to understand this lesson but whether he can modify strategies sufficiently to bring administration into harmony with political culture is an open question.

**POLITICAL PARTIES.** Parties exist in Madagascar to secure offices for candidates, privileges for constituents, and power for leaders,

rarely to promote an ideology or a vision of the national future. They rise and fall opportunistically with the personal destinies of their protagonists. Although three presidents have yielded claims to power after electoral defeats (**Philibert Tsiranana** in 1972, **Didier Ratsiraka** in 1992–1993, and **Albert Zafy** in 1996) no regime party has ever been overturned at the polls. Since offices and power operate as much on local and intermediate levels as in a national context, modern Madagascar has known a bewildering plethora of parties, most of them transitory and inconsequential. The ones considered here are those with a tangible impact on the Great Island's history.

After World War II, two parties developed in the formation of France's Fourth Republic—the nationalist **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** (MDRM), convicted, then proscribed, for plotting the **Rebellion of 1947**, and its Francophile rival, the **Parti des Dëshérités de Madagascar** (PADESM). After nearly a decade of minimal political activity, the PADESM reemerged under the 1956 **Loi-Cadre** as the **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD) led by **Philibert Tsiranana**. Its leader served as president of the **First Republic** from 1958 to 1972. By 1965, Tsiranana's PSD had gradually absorbed a host of formal parties, regional political associations, and local movements, leaving a single parliamentary opposition—the **AKFM**, which itself had emerged from a coalescence of **nationalist movements** at the May 1958 **Tamatave Congress**. Among a variety of local groupings on the subnational level, only the **MONIMA** of **Monja Jaona** challenged the PSD in the southwest as vigorously as the AKFM in **Antananarivo**.

Parties were inoperative during the interregnum of General **Gabriel Ramanantsoa**, but the revolutionary **Komity Iraisan'ny Mpitolona** (KIM) evolved into the **MFM** party during the **Democratic Republic** of 1975. The MFM thereupon converted from radical nationalism into a pro-capitalist influence during the 1980s when it collaborated with **Didier Ratsiraka**'s regime party, **AREMA**. In 1976, after the failure of his effort to establish a single party out of Madagascar's welter of interest groups, Ratsiraka settled for a hegemony of AREMA within the **Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution** (FNDR). Legitimacy, entailing membership in the FNDR, was attributed exclusively to parties that overtly subscribed to Ratsiraka's **Charter of the Malagasy Revolution**. In addition to

AREMA, MFM, and AKFM, the FNDR included the more conservative **Vonjy** and the **Union des Chrétiens de Madagascar** (UDECEMA) of Norbert Solo Andriamorasata. Both AKFM and MONIMA suffered defection in conflicts of leadership, but the party splinters all maintained FNDR membership. AREMA alone captured 117 seats in the parliamentary elections of 1983.

Some 170 “parties” swarmed throughout the island after the demise of the FNDR in 1990. The critical interim of 1991–1992 produced a multidimensional, fragile coalition of disparates called the Comité des **Forces Vives** to deliver the final blow to Ratsiraka’s system. Out of the Forces Vives emerged an unstable plurality for **Albert Zafy**, elected president of the **Third Republic**, but the **Assemblée Nationale**’s collection of 26 parties proved too inchoate for effective legislation. True to its origin when its constituents could agree only on the ouster of Ratsiraka, the Forces Vives once in power held together primarily in opposition to Zafy’s campaigns for stronger presidential control. The episode ended ironically with Zafy’s impeachment in 1996 and the return of Ratsiraka, the very enemy that the Forces Vives had formed to fight in the first instance.

Ratsiraka’s return from self-exile in 1996 revived his AREMA after six years in the shadows. In May 1998, as in June 1993, parliamentary elections engendered candidates from over 100 self-defined parties. AREMA emerged with a plurality of 68 out of 150 deputies and thereupon depended for its majorities on sympathetic participation from Andriamanjato’s **AKFM-Fanavaozana**, **Evariste Marson**’s **RPSD**, and **Herizo Razafimahaleo**’s **Leader Fanilo**, as well as a variety of fellow-traveling independents. The opposition, rarely very robust in this by-now executive-dominated system, consisted of **Asa vita ifampitsarana** of **Norbert Lala Ratsirahonana**, Zafy’s **Union Nationale pour la Démocratie et le Développement / AFFA**, the **Grad/Iloafo** of **Rabetsitonta Tovonanahary**, and a dozen independents. As usual, participation in presidential strategies brought rewards, especially in the rural communities and provincial councils. There the revived AREMA, like its DRM avatar and the PSD before it, developed virtual monopolies on subnational offices and other emoluments, operating its patronage system out of sight of the Antananarivo-based **media** and the capital’s sophisticated politics-watchers. Nevertheless, the parties that had survived into the late

1990s (except for AKFM) were able to score significant voter tallies in both the **highlands** and the coasts.

The hegemonic pattern seems to be holding true for the new **Tiako-i-Madagasikara** (TIM) of President **Marc Ravalomanana**. Winning the December 2001 presidential **election** without benefit of a formal political organization, Ravalomanana enjoyed prompt or belated backing from AVI, MFM, and RPSD among the established Third Republican parties. To wage the succeeding year's legislative election campaign, he commissioned his close business advisor Rarahinaivo Andrianantoandro, president of the Antananarivo city council, to organize the TIM. Riding the crests of enthusiasm for Ravalomanana, TIM scored resounding victories in both the parliamentary contest of 15 December 2002 and the subsequent communal and provincial elections. While committed theoretically to market liberalism, TIM like its predecessors and competitors follows any prevailing ideological trajectories. What it seeks are the offices and privileges of election. This party opportunism has obliged TIM to cope with complaints from the older political organizations that had thrown in their lot with the president in 2001 but without reaping the conventional rewards due to electoral allies.

Outside this mix are the parties identified with the two defeated ex-presidents, Zafy's AFFA/UNDD and Ratsiraka's AREMA. Both leaderships called for a boycott of the 2002 elections, but their appeal went unheeded by 132 AREMA candidates only three of whom managed to win seats in the 160-member Assembly. The need to reinvigorate AREMA and to give Zafy a platform have combined in an extra-parliamentary opposition that vindicates the rejectionism of their respective leaders.

In early 2004, journalists estimated 23 parties as active out of 180 registered formations. Almost without exception, these organizations exist to buoy the power aspirations of their key members and secondarily, if at all, to promise a program, policy, or vision for a democratic Madagascar. *See APPENDIX D for list of parties in independent Madagascar.*

**POLITIQUE DES RACES (TRIBAL POLICY).** When he became **governor-general** at the beginning of French colonial rule, General **Joseph Gallieni** wanted to administer the island without excessive

reliance on the structure of the **Merina Empire** that the French had supplanted. Drawing on his experience in Indochina, Gallieni sought to empower the island's **ethnic groups** through their traditional institutions and rulers. Also known as the system of internal protectorates, the *politique des races* proved unworkable. Local political institutions had their own purposes and were hard to adapt to the requirements of colonial rule, while local rulers often either worked against the French or lost legitimacy for working with them. The policy was abandoned by Governor-General **Albert Piquié** in favor of direct administration with Malagasy "auxiliaries" at the lower levels. In view of their virtual monopoly on administrative skills, it was the **Merina** elites who satisfied personnel needs, both in their **highlands** and in the provinces.

**POPULAR FRONT.** A coalition of **French** parties of the left, of which the most important were the Socialist and the Communist parties, the Popular Front governed from June 1936 to June 1937. Although most of its attention was taken up by French domestic affairs, it did undertake some liberalization of the colonial system. In Madagascar this included the release of people imprisoned for **nationalist** activities, the legalization of Malagasy **labor unions**, and the relaxation of press **censorship**.

**POPULATION.** In the absence of formal census data, Madagascar's demographics can only be conjectured. The most credible base point is the 1975 census that established the number of inhabitants as 7,600,000. In 2001, official estimates put the number at 16,433,000, yielding a density of 26.7 per square kilometer (**International Monetary Fund** estimates are about 900,000 fewer for 2001). Extraordinary fertility has produced growth rates estimated at 2.8 percent in the 1980s, rising to over 3 percent at the end of that decade, and continuing at that higher rate through the 1990s. Urbanization and family planning take place without significant effect on these numbers; Madagascar's birth rate has remained at 42 per 1,000. The urban population grew from 18.3 percent of the total in 1980 to 28.4 percent in 1998 and 30.1 percent in 2001. Mortality rates have remained at about 1.6 percent, with life expectancy (in 2001) at 54 years for men,

57 for women (World Health Organization estimates for 2001 are lower: 53.3 for males, 56.4 for women).

Immigration is not insignificant. There has been a restoration of the **Comorian** communities once decimated by programs in **Mahajanga** and **Antsiranana**, a modest return of French technical and commercial residents after the exodus caused by the **nationalizations** and economic distress of the 1970s and 1980s, and a sprinkling of repatriated Malagasy elites seeking professional functions in the auspicious climate pledged by President **Marc Ravalomanana**. Although not yet significantly depleting the large Malagasy **diaspora**, these repatriates tend to balance the number of young Malagasy going abroad for **education** and employment. The **Indo-Pakistani (Karana)** and older Sino-Malagasy communities are counted as Malagasy, while several thousand new **Chinese** immigrants have taken up residence in the cities. If growth rates remain consistently high, the current population should double by the year 2040. (See table 7.)

**PORTOS, AUGUSTIN AMPY.** Born in **Antsiranana** province, Portos began his career in the **First Republic**, serving as chief of the personal cabinet of minister of the interior, **André Resampa**. During the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**, he was a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under **Didier Ratsiraka**. When Ratsiraka took power in 1975, Portos became minister of justice, and in 1976, minister of the interior. Also a member of the political bureau of the regime party, **AREMA**, Portos was considered to be one of the “strongmen” of the **Democratic Republic**. He lost his post as interior minister in August 1991, when **Guy Razanamasy** was called on

**Table 7. Population Projections, in Millions. Source: World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, 2003.**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Projected Population</i>
1975	7.6	2010	20.095
1980	8.87	2015	22.521
1992	12.19	2020	24.836
1996	13.72	2040	32.477
2000	15.523		
2005	17.739		



to form a government of reconciliation including opposition figures. Returning to prominence with Ratsiraka in 1997, Portos was elected senator in 2001 and stood by his leader in the **Crisis of 2002**. He escaped to Mayotte in the collapse of Ratsiraka's campaign, and was sentenced in absentia to five years imprisonment for threatening state security and engendering ethnic hatred during the crisis. He subsequently left Mayotte for asylum in Mozambique.

**PORTS.** Madagascar has 18 official ports, 14 of which can handle international traffic. The dominant seaport is **Toamasina** on the east coast, followed by **Mahajanga** on the west coast, **Antsiranana** in the north, **Hellville** on **Nosy Be**, and **Toliara** in the southwest. The ports on the east coast are subject to destructive cyclones, while those on the west coast must deal with silting. Antsiranana and Hellville acquired new importance in the 1990s with the upsurge in seafood farming and **export** processing and a modest rise in **tourism**.

**PRESENCE FRANCAISE.** An organization of conservative **settlers**, *Présence Française* was supported by the **commercial companies** and the large coastal planters. In the period after World War II, it dominated the French-citizen college of Madagascar's territorial and provincial assemblies and elected its leaders, including Roger Clément, to the French legislature. It also supported conservative candidates in the Malagasy college. The movement declined, however, as the island moved toward autonomy, and its candidates began losing to the more liberal settler organization, the Entente Franco-Malgache. In 1957, Roger Clément announced his support for the **Loi-Cadre** and the liberalization that it entailed.

**PRIVATIZATION.** From 1973 through 1983, the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) and its predecessor, the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**, undertook **nationalization** of nearly two-thirds of Madagascar's **economy**. **Concessions**, **banks**, and **industries** owned by foreigners were among the first to be turned into state-owned or parastatal corporations; unoccupied and underused land was grouped into public, often **military**, farms; ambitious industrial development contributed a large number of new enterprises, all of them requiring importation of capital and technology. Although they provided employment for thou-

sands of Malagasy managers and workers, very few of these corporations served their economic purpose; they were among the first targets of “structural adjustment” prescribed by the **International Monetary Fund** and the **World Bank**, called by the DRM government to help the Great Island out of its catastrophic crisis of external **debt**. Beginning in 1984, the economy has been exhorted toward elimination of dysfunctional enterprises and privatization of the remaining public corporations. The program has continued since the mid-1980s in fits and starts, handicapped by intermittent second thoughts on the part of the Malagasy authorities and on occasion by reluctance on the part of domestic and foreign capital to invest in the available properties.

The privatization process has been enhanced by revisions in the **investment codes** of 1987 and 1990, and by a 2003 ordinance permitting major foreign investors to own land. Large state farms and government **cooperatives** have reverted to local landhold, and the pre-1973 networks of rural marketing and credit have been restored to their Sino-Malagasy and **Indo-Pakistani** entrepreneurs. By 1999, some 86 of the 136 targeted firms had become privately owned, and the huge SOLIMA oil refinery at **Toamasina** was subdivided and sold off in 2000. In mid-2004, only a half-dozen major corporations remain on the list—including Air Madagascar, the power/water monopoly Jirama, the telecommunications utility Telma, and the sugar cartel Sirama. Government programs have been required to assist in compensation and retraining for thousands of redundant employees laid off in the privatization process. At times, the incumbent administration has been accused of orienting privatizing policy for the benefit of investors with political connections—particularly in the case of President **Didier Ratsiraka**’s family—but many investors have come from **France**, **Mauritius**, and other foreign sources.

**PROCOOP.** An investment fund and network of **cooperatives** set up in 1979 by **AREMA**, the regime party of the **Democratic Republic**, PROCOOP (also PROCOOPS) was financed in part through personal loans to President **Didier Ratsiraka** from **Libya** and Iraq. The director of PROCOOP was Ratsiraka’s sister-in-law, **Hortense Raveloson-Mahasampo**. Undertakings financed by PROCOOP could bypass state auditing controls. They included an automobile factory in **Fianarantsoa**, several hotels, a machine plant, and various **agricultural**

projects. These enterprises either failed on the ground, or were converted into private corporations after the fall of the Ratsiraka dynasty in 2002.

**PROTECTORATE OF 1885.** The first French protectorate over the **Merina Empire** was established by the treaty of 17 December 1885 that ended the **Franco-Malagasy War of 1883–1885**. The treaty required the Merina government to pay **France** an indemnity of 10 million francs and gave the French the right to a naval base at **Diégo-Suarez**. In addition, the French were to exercise supervision over Madagascar's external affairs and to maintain a resident administrator with a military contingent at **Antananarivo**. Quarrels over the interpretation of the treaty began even as it was signed. The first French resident, **Charles-Marie Le Myre de Vilers**, saw his role as expanding French control over the island, while the Malagasy prime minister, **Rainilaiarivony**, sought greater autonomy than provided in the treaty. By 1894, buoyed by **Great Britain's** benevolent neutrality, Paris was determined to consolidate French interests in Madagascar. It sent Le Myre de Vilers, by then a National Assembly deputy, back to Antananarivo to demand a revision of the protectorate; France insisted on the right to control the conduct of **foreign affairs**, to grant land **concessions** to its nationals, to station troops, and to undertake public works. Refusal by the Merina government to agree to these terms led to the **Franco-Malagasy War of 1895**.

**PROTECTORATE OF 1895.** After their conquest of Madagascar in 1895, the **French** established a protectorate through a treaty signed by Queen **Ranavalona III** on 1 October. Under the protectorate, the occupying power assumed control over both the internal and external affairs of the island, but left the monarchy and most of the administration of the **Merina Empire** intact. This arrangement was unstable, and the revolt of the **Menalamba**, which broke out in November 1895, was blamed by the French on monarchist machinations. In 1896, the monarchy was abolished, and on 6 August 1896, a law of **annexation** declared Madagascar a French possession.

**PROTESTANT CHURCHES.** Approximately 21 percent of the Malagasy **population** is affiliated with a Protestant church. The largest de-

nomination—Congregationalist—was established by the **London Missionary Society** (LMS), which began **mission** activity in Madagascar in 1817. Second largest are churches founded by the French Evangelical Society, which began work in 1897. Other denominations are the Anglicans and Quakers from England, and Lutherans who arrived from Norway in 1866. The churches agreed to a division of territory at the end of the 19th century whereby the Quakers and Lutherans concentrated on the southern parts of Madagascar. Pentecostal sects have recently made headway against the established churches. After the French conquest, while anti-clerical governors had to tolerate mission activity, the English-based Protestant churches were suspected of encouraging the **nationalist movement**; Protestant congregations suffered heavily in the repression of the **Rebellion of 1947**. The main Protestant denominations became organizationally independent of their mother churches in 1958, although missionary activity continues. In 1970, the FJKM (Fiangonan'i Jesosy Kristy eto Madagasikara, Church of Jesus Christ in Madagascar) linked the churches derived from the London Missionary Society, the French Evangelicals, and the Quakers. In 1980 the Council of Christian Churches (**FFKM**) brought the **Catholics**, the FJKM, the Lutherans, and the Anglicans into a single evangelical association.

Both in their preaching and as a social movement, the Protestants have for long been politically engaged. Suspected of nationalist sympathies by the Francophile **First Republic**, the Antananarivo Protestants and southern Lutheran clergy also became openly critical of the social and spiritual record of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM). The 900 pastors of the FJKM joined with Catholic priests in the late 1980s to encourage liberalization of the DRM and ultimately to bring down its president, **Didier Ratsiraka**. FFKM politicization subsided somewhat during the early **Third Republic** administrations of **Albert Zafy**, a Catholic, and the rehabilitated Ratsiraka, but the churches emerged fervently in 2001 to favor presidential candidate **Marc Ravalomanana**, mayor of the largely Protestant capital and FJKM vice president. As Madagascar's president, Ravalomanana makes no attempt to disguise his devotion to Christian values. One of the two pillars of his state credo is *fahamasinana* (sacredness; the other is truth, or *fahamarinana*), and he calls openly for prayer and Christian ethics in his exhortations to the civil service and

population at large. Exaggerated examples of Ravalomanana's religiosity inspired identification with the Biblical prophets, "Saint Mark," and Martin Luther King, Jr. These comparisons have induced backlash, both abroad and among an essentially pious but less than theocratic Malagasy elite who inherit the French tradition of radical church-state separation.

**PROVINCES.** "Province" has been applied to a variety of administrative units in Madagascar since the **French** conquest. The first five of today's provinces—**Fianarantsoa**, Majunga (now **Mahajanga**), Tamatave (now **Toamasina**), Tananarive (now **Antananarivo**), and Tuléar (now **Toliara**)—were created in November 1946, in part as an attempt to break the cohesion of the island's **nationalist movement**. The province of Diégo-Suarez (now **Antsiranana**) was created from portions of Tamatave and Majunga provinces in 1956. The provinces had a two-college assembly (European French voting separately from enfranchised Malagasy) that also served as an electoral college for the territorial assembly in Tananarive. The 1956 **Loi-Cadre** increased the authority of the provinces, but the coming of internal autonomy in 1958 and independence in 1960 weakened their position through centralization of the ruling **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD) and the elimination of provincial oppositions. By 1963, the central authority could substitute an appointed for the elected chief of province without arousing resentment. Under the **First Republic**, the provincial councils were composed of the provinces' national deputies and senators and a group of general councilors whose number varied from province to province. The councils' powers were limited, extending mainly to primary **education**, cultural affairs, and sports. The provincial councils were suspended by the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** in 1973 and their functions transferred to the province chiefs.

Provinces, rebaptized with their Malagasy name *faritany*, were retained under the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM), but without genuine autonomy. In the 1991–1992 crisis that ended his DRM, President **Didier Ratsiraka** encouraged the *faritany* to separate from hostile Antananarivo into a federal structure, blunting the power that had built up in the capital. The effort failed, for the major issue at the time was the DRM's record, not a center-periphery an-

tagonism. Ratsiraka revived the federal (actually, secessionist) project as a last resort from his headquarters at Toamasina during the **Crisis of 2002**. Despite favorable responses from four province chiefs (his appointees), he abandoned the idea under pressure from French and African leaders solicitous to keep the Malagasy state intact, whoever its chief might be.

Between his two federalist challenges, Ratsiraka sought in his second term (1997–2001) to **decentralize** authority to “autonomous provinces” redefined in his **Referendum of 15 March 1998**. Decentralization was being pressed by the international donor community, led by the **World Bank**, although the heavy layering postulated in the referendum appeared somewhat exorbitant to the outside bankers. The provincial apparatus was put in place through **elections** to *fari-tany* councils and governorships, dominated by the presidential **AREMA** party; transfer of budgetary and other powers merely awaited reaffirmation in Ratsiraka’s own anticipated reelection in January 2002. That reelection did not happen, however. The winner in the first round on 21 December 2001, Antananarivo mayor **Marc Ravalomanana**, replaced the provincial governors by his direct appointees (called presidents of special delegations). Ravalomanana later determined that the decentralization process would proceed from empowerment of elected mayors and **communal** councils in conjunction with traditional *fokonolona*, rather than from the *fari-tany*. Refer to the map on page xxv.

– Q –

**QUEEN’S PALACE.** *See* MANJAKAMIADANA.

– R –

**RABEARIMANANA, GABRIEL.** A geography professor and dean at the **University of Madagascar** and a member of **MONIMA**, Rabearimanana served as an advisor to President **Didier Ratsiraka** in the early days of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar**. In 1977, when **MONIMA** party leader **Monja Jaona** took the party out of the

**Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution (FNDR)**, Rabearimanana joined with other members in protesting this “arbitrary action.” They left the party and founded Vondrona Socialista MONIMA and successfully applied for readmission to the FNDR. Dean of the Faculty of Letters, Rabearimanana has been an unsuccessful candidate for the university’s rectorship. He returned to politics in 2002 as an affiliate of the **Réconciliation Nationale** committee and an outspoken critic of newly elected President **Marc Ravalomanana**.

**RABEMANANJARA, JACQUES (1913–2005).** An important Malagasy political figure from 1945 to 1972, Jacques Rabemananjara received his higher education in **France** and was living in Paris as a writer and poet connected with the *Présence Africaine* at the end of the World War II. In 1946, he joined the two Malagasy delegates to the French **Constituent Assemblies**, **Joseph Raseta** and **Joseph Ravoahangy**, to found the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Renovation Malgache** (MDRM) and was elected to the French National Assembly on the MDRM ticket. As a **Betsimisaraka** Catholic, he added ethnic and religious balance to the MDRM leadership. With the other two MDRM deputies, Rabemananjara was accused of complicity in the **Rebellion of 1947**. On 4 October 1948, he was sentenced to life imprisonment at forced labor, a sentence that was later commuted to imprisonment in Corsica and, in 1955, to assigned residence in Paris, where he resumed his literary activities.

In 1957, Rabemananjara was released from assigned residence, but not permitted to travel to Madagascar. Eventually he made his peace with the new regime of **Philibert Tsiranana** and returned to Madagascar in July 1960, just after independence. In the September 1960 **elections** to the Malagasy **Assemblée Nationale**, he ran in **Toamasina** province at the head of the **Miara-Mirindra** list, which gained 16 seats in the assembly. Although the Miara-Mirindra ran against an “orthodox” list of candidates from Tsiranana’s **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD), it included some PSD supporters, and Rabemananjara himself was made minister of agriculture in the new government. He joined the PSD officially in 1961, becoming minister for the **economy** and, in 1967, minister of foreign affairs.

Rabemananjara was widely considered a possible successor to Tsiranana. By the early 1970s, however, his prestige had declined, in

part because of the agreements he had negotiated with **South Africa** as foreign minister and in part because of accusations of **corruption**. After the collapse of the **First Republic** in 1972, Rabemananjara went into exile in Paris. He returned to Madagascar after the fall of the **Democratic Republic**, and ran in the presidential elections of 1992, offering himself as a “transitional pope.” Although he gained the endorsement of some conservative elements of the Comité des **Forces Vives**, including General **Jean Rakotoharison**, he lost decisively and retired from political life.

**RABEMANANJARA, RAYMOND WILLIAM.** A **Merina** noble not related to **Jacques Rabemananjara**, Raymond William Rabemananjara was also a writer active in **nationalist** politics after World War II; he, too, was one of the founders of the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** (MDRM). In the period before independence, he was active in trying to form a popular Christian party. In 1956 he formed the **Union Travailleuse et Paysanne**, and in the 1956 municipal **elections** he ran unsuccessfully in **Antananarivo** on a list called Union et Action Communale. Rabemananjara has published extensively on Malagasy history and culture. He maintains that the **Rebellion of 1947** was deliberately provoked by the **French**, and advocates a republic based on *fokonolona* and other traditional Malagasy institutions. He maintains residences in both France and Antananarivo.

**RABENORO, CESAIRE (1923–2003).** Commissioner of planning under the **First Republic** from 1960 to 1967, Rabenoro was one of four high-ranking **Merina** in President **Philibert Tsiranana**’s government. He was originally trained in the sciences and took a doctorate in pharmacy at the Sorbonne; much later, he added a second doctorate, in political science at Aix-en-Provence. Named ambassador to **Great Britain**, Greece, Israel, and Italy in 1967, he also served on African-Malagasy-European oversight councils for **coffee** and **sugar**. Returning to Madagascar in 1970, Rabenoro was successively secretary of state in **Jacques Rabemananjara**’s foreign ministry, minister of public health and population, and minister of mining, industry, and trade. He left government after the fall of the First Republic to sit on boards of directors of a number of corporations (pharmaceutical, **banking**, sugar, **transportation**) and was appointed president of the



prestigious Académie des arts, des lettres et des sciences (the “Académie Malgache”) in 1973, a distinction he held until his death. In 1992, he became foreign minister in the transitional **Third Republic** administration under **Guy Willy Razanamasy**, serving until the formation of a parliamentary responsible government in August 1993. A professor at the **University of Madagascar** and author of a large number of scientific, historical, and economic studies, Rabenoro published his doctoral dissertation, an analysis of First Republic foreign relations, in 1987.

**RABESAHALA, GISELE (1929– )**. Born into a politically active **highland** family, Rabesahala began her political activities in the early 1950s in organizations linking Malagasy nationalists with French sympathizers like Pierre Boiteau. In the preindependence period she served as secretary-general to the **Comité de Solidarité Malgache** and on the executive of FISEMA, the Malagasy **labor union** affiliated to the French communist Confédération Générale de Travail. She was also on the editorial board of the **nationalist** newspaper *Imongo Vaovao*, a relentless antagonist of pro-French policies under the **First Republic**. Rabesahala was one of the founders of the **AKFM**, and became secretary-general in 1959. Under the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) she was an AKFM representative to the **Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution** (FNDR) and a deputy for **Antananarivo** in the **Assemblée Nationale Populaire**. An unequivocal Marxist in the AKFM and the DRM, Rabesahala became minister for revolutionary art and culture in 1977, suffering a change of title to minister of culture in 1989.

In the August 1991 transition government of **Guy Razanamasy** the ministry was abolished and she left office. By then, her regular AKFM (AKFM-KDRSM) had lost most of its momentum to **Richard Andriamanjato's AKFM-Fanavaozana** which had joined the **Forces Vives** movement that was to topple Ratsiraka and the DRM. Rabesahala and the rump AKFM had rejected Andriamanjato's presidential candidacy against Ratsiraka in 1989; it joined Ratsiraka's new **Mouvement Militant pour le Socialisme Malgache** in 1990 and supported him against **Albert Zafy** in the **Third Republic's** 1992–1993 presidential **elections**. After Ratsiraka's defeat, the AKFM-KDRSM failed to place a deputy in the June 1993 legislative

election. Persisting in her opposition to Zafy as a journalist and pamphleteer, Rabesahala returned to political action with Ratsiraka's second mandate in 1997. She became an advisor to Prime Minister **Pascal Rakotomavo**, resigning after her party again failed to win a seat in the parliamentary election of 1998 and the Rakotomavo ministry had given way to an administration of technocrats oriented toward liberal market strategies. She coordinated a multipartisan support coalition for Ratsiraka until 2001 when, at the age of 72, she was appointed senator by Ratsiraka and became one of six vice presidents of the republic's initial **Senate**. Since 2002, she has consistently denounced what she regards as foreign intervention and neoliberalism in the options of President **Marc Ravalomanana**.

**RABETAFIKA, ROLAND.** A member of a noble **Merina** family and a graduate of Saint Cyr, Rabetafika was one of three colonels in the Malagasy **armed forces** at the time of the **May 1972 Revolution**. When General **Gabriel Ramanantsoa** took power after the revolution, he appointed Rabetafika to head his personal cabinet and gave him responsibility for the management of the army, for the intelligence activities of the *Deuxième Bureau*, and for the direction of the **economy**. In the factional disputes that characterized the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**, Rabetafika's personal ambition and his preference for a state-run capitalist economy clashed with the ambitions and more socialist options of Colonel **Richard Ratsimandrava** and naval captain **Didier Ratsiraka**.

As economic czar, Rabetafika was responsible for the creation of the state marketing corporations that often saw French managers replaced by Merina elites. Eventually he became identified with the mismanagement and **corruption** that plagued these enterprises. In December 1974, the *Deuxième Bureau* discovered a coup plot led by Colonel **Bréchara Rajaonarison**, who accused the administration and Rabetafika in particular of corruption and a pro-Merina bias in military promotions. The discovery of the plot and its consequences led to Ramanantsoa's fall, and Ratsimandrava and Ratsiraka were able to block Rabetafika's attempts to succeed the general. When Ratsimandrava was assassinated after one week in power, on 11 February 1975, Rabetafika was one of the main suspects, both because of thwarted ambition and because Ratsimandrava had been using the

intelligence services of his Ministry of the Interior to investigate reports of corruption. Rabetafika was arrested in April 1975 and was denied a seat on the **Directoire Militaire** that succeeded Ratsiman-drava. The case against him in the “**Trial of the Century**” was dismissed in June. He was later promoted to the rank of major general and given the largely honorary post of inspector-general of the armed forces that Rajaonarison had held before him.

**RABETSITONTA TOVONANAHARY.** A **Merina** born in the south and a former member of the radical nationalist **MONIMA** party, Rabetsitonta is a professor of demography at the **University of Madagascar** and founder of **Grad/Iloafo**, a think-tank and occasional political party. He consults for a number of international agencies and enterprises in **Antananarivo**, and owns the prominent radio/TV *Antsiva*. Linking with the **Forces Vives** that overthrew President **Didier Ratsiraka** in 1992, Rabetsitonta ran with a negligible showing (2 percent) in the presidential election of 1992. He was the only Grad/Iloafo candidate elected to the **Assemblée Nationale** of the **Third Republic** in June 1993 and was rewarded with the portfolio for economy and planning in the several ministries headed by **Françisque Ravony** under President **Albert Zafy**. His handling of the portfolio was subjected to constant criticism for accommodating the market-oriented directives of the **World Bank** and **International Monetary Fund**, strategies that were anathema to the **nationalist** president. He held his post until Zafy was constitutionally able to vacate the entire Ravony ministry in October 1995. Rabetsitonta subsequently moved in and out of successive governments, while his party made little electoral headway. Noting **Marc Ravalomanana**’s prospects for success in the presidential election campaign of 2001, Grad/Iloafo switched allegiance from its hitherto preferred candidate, **Leader Fanilo**’s **Herizo Razafimahaleo**, to help Ravalomanana win **Antananarivo province**. Although Grad/Iloafo maintains minimal formal presence in the Ravalomanana system, it is well connected in international business circles. Rabetsitonta was named counselor to the president in 2002, joining a privileged group of advisors.

**RABEZAVANA (?–1900).** An official of the **Merina Empire** and one of the leaders of the resistance of the *Menalamba* against the impo-

sition of colonial rule, Rabezavana led a successful assault on the royal city of **Ambohimanga**. He surrendered to the **French** in June 1897, but escaped and was recaptured twice, and finally exiled to **Réunion**. He was returned to Madagascar in 1899, where he died under mysterious circumstances.

**RABOZAKA**. A **Protestant** minister and official of the **Merina Empire**, Rabozaka was one of the leaders of the revolt of the *Menalamba* against the imposition of **French** rule. His group rose in March 1896, the traditional period of the *fandroana* (the queen's ritual bath) and threatened the capital, **Antananarivo**. He surrendered in February 1898, and was exiled to **Réunion**.

**RADAMA I (?–1828)**. King of **Imerina** from 1810 to 1828, Radama continued the work of his father, **Andrianampoinimerina**, extending the boundaries of the **Merina** monarchy. He conquered the territory east of Imerina, taking the port of **Toamasina** in 1817, and engaged in less successful warfare with the kingdoms of the **Sakalava** to the west. He also moved south into the territory of the **Betsileo**. He began diplomatic contacts with outside powers, signing a treaty with the **British** governor of Mauritius, **Sir Robert Farquhar** in 1817. The treaty required him to abandon the **slave trade** in return for recognition of his claim to be king of Madagascar, payment of an indemnity, and British help in modernizing his kingdom. The modernization project brought in clergy from the **London Missionary Society** to transliterate the Malagasy **language** into the Latin alphabet, set up an **educational** system, and establish small **industries**. Under **James Hastie**, British soldiers participated in the training of the Malagasy army, which Radama made a standing force for the first time. Although he consulted *ombiasy*, as had his father, Radama was a skeptic in **religious** matters. He limited the proselytizing activities of the **missionaries**, but he also minimized the ritual aspects of the monarchy. When he died in 1828 he was succeeded by his first wife and cousin, who ruled as **Ranavalona I**.

**RADAMA II (1829–1863)**. Prince Rakoto, or Rakotond-Radama, was the son of **Ranavalona I** and was accepted as the son of **Radama I**, who had died 18 months before his birth. Although her reign was

marked by a closure against Western influences, Ranavalona saw that her son had some **education** and did little to limit his contacts with such Europeans as **Jean Laborde**. By the end of Ranavalona's reign Prince Rakoto had become the focus of expectations for less despotic rule and for a reopening of the country to outside contacts. He had gathered around him a counter-court of like-minded Malagasy. In 1857, an attempted coup against Ranavalona caused the expulsion of Laborde, but left the prince in line to succeed.

When Ranavalona died in 1861, Radama proceeded to liberalize the system as promised. The death penalty and ordeal by poison were abolished, as were rituals like circumcision and the *fandroana* (the monarch's bath). In addition, Radama abolished import and export duties and began to implement the **Lambert Charter** which granted the French-based Compagnie de Madagascar extensive land and mineral rights on the island in return for 10 percent of the company's profits. These reforms aroused considerable opposition. The ruling elite of his mother's reign was disturbed by intrusions into their control of the **Merina** economy and by Radama's reliance on a group of advisors drawn from outside their ranks, called the *menamaso* or "Red Eyes." (The reasons given for the name vary: it might refer to the members' reputation for being dissolute; others claim that "red eyes" connoted courage, or that they resulted from late nights spent poring over state papers.) Most of the *menamaso* came from aristocratic families from the south of **Imerina**, rather than from the northern **Andafiavaratra** clan that had helped establish the kingdom.

Peremptory abandonment of central royal rituals disturbed the population profoundly; an epidemic of spirit possession, called the *ramanenjana*, broke out in the countryside and spread to **Antananarivo**. Those affected claimed to be possessed by the spirits of Ranavalona and other royal **ancestors** come to reproach their unworthy descendant. In March 1863 the *fandroana* was not held. At the same time, the Andafiavaratra were criticizing Radama II for the terms of the Lambert Charter and demanding that he stop his association with the *menamaso*. Radama refused, and at the beginning of May the Andafiavaratra, led by **Raharo**, son of Ranavalona's prime minister, staged a coup. The *menamaso* were assassinated, and in the night of May 11–12 Radama himself was strangled. He was suc-

ceeded by his first wife and cousin, who ruled as **Rasoherina**. Raharo became prime minister and husband of the queen.

**RAHARIJAONA, HENRI (1932– )**. A lawyer and magistrate from **Antananarivo**, Raharijaona was Malagasy ambassador to the **United States** under the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** from 1972 to 1975, becoming ambassador to **France** (as well as **Great Britain** and **UNESCO**) from 1975 to 1984. He held a professorship at the **University of Madagascar** law school from 1976 to 1994. A trusted advisor to President **Didier Ratsiraka** during the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM), he was special counselor in the presidency from 1984 to 1993. During this period he drafted (with Nirina Andriamanerisoa) a new **investment code** and other important legislation. In 1990, Raharijaona was appointed director general of the highly controversial Direction Générale de l'Investigation et de la Documentation intérieure et extérieure (DGIDIE, Madagascar's principal intelligence service). He was removed in the transition of 1992 after Ratsiraka's fall but retained memberships on the boards of numerous civic and cultural associations in the capital. His son, Pierre Raharijaona, is Antananarivo leader of Ratsiraka's **AREMA** party, albeit in frequent policy feuds with the ex-president and other party directors.

**RAHARO (ALSO KNOWN AS RAINIVONINAHITRINIONY).**

One of the leaders of the conservative faction in the **Merina** court of the early 19th century, Raharo was the son of Rainiharo, husband and prime minister of Queen **Ranavalona I**, and the brother of **Rainilaiarivony**, who was to rule as prime minister for most of the second half of the century. When his father died in 1852, Raharo became commander in chief of the Merina armies. He first supported Ranavalona's successor, **Radama II**, and became his prime minister, his brother taking over as commander in chief. Disturbed by Radama's commitment to Westernization, however, and by the growing influence of a group of advisors called the *menamaso*, Raharo led the coup d'état that overthrew and assassinated the king in May 1863. He became the prime minister and husband of the new queen, **Rasoherina**. Raharo soon fell out of favor with the ruling group because of his excessive conservatism and his irascibility, and in 1864, he was

removed from his post and sent into exile on his estates. He was succeeded by his brother, Rainilaiarivony.

**RAILROADS.** *See* TRANSPORTATION.

**RAINILAIARIVONY (1828–1896).** Prime minister of the **Merina Empire** from 1864 to 1895, Rainilaiarivony was a member of the *hova* Tsimiamboholahy clan of the **Andafiavaratra** who had helped the kingdom's founder, **Andrianampoinimerina**, seize power from his uncle. His father, Rainiharo, had served as prime minister from 1828 to 1851, and his brother, **Raharo**, from 1861 to 1864. In his youth, Rainilaiarivony received some **mission education**, participated in his family's commercial and **military** activities, and served as private secretary to Queen **Ranavalona I**. He was one of the leaders of the coup that overthrew her son and successor, **Radama II**.

Rainilaiarivony joined in the plot that removed his brother from the office of prime minister in 1864. He succeeded Raharo both as prime minister and as husband of Queen **Rasoherina**. He continued as prime minister for the remaining years of the **Merina** state, placing on the throne and marrying the two succeeding sovereigns, **Ranavalona II** and **Ranavalona III**. It was Rainilaiarivony's goal as prime minister to preserve Madagascar from domination by foreign powers and to defend the economic and political position of the ruling oligarchy that included his own clan. This involved a certain degree of Westernization, symbolized by the conversion of Ranavalona II and Rainilaiarivony to **Christianity** in 1869. This conversion entitled the Merina kingdom to consideration as a "civilized" country, and secured his leadership of the growing **Protestant** faction in the kingdom. He also presided over the creation of two written legal codes, in 1868 and 1881. Rainilaiarivony continued his predecessors' efforts to modernize the army and organize a territorial administration. In 1881, he created a cabinet with eight ministries: interior, foreign affairs, justice, defense, commerce, industry, finance, and education.

In practice Rainilaiarivony continued to handle most important matters. This excessive personalization and centralization of power aggravated the Merina state's vulnerability to **French** imperialist pressure in the 1880s and 1890s. His diplomacy failed to appreciate the seriousness of **Great Britain's** loss of interest in his country. In

1883, the first **Franco-Malagasy War** demonstrated the weakness of the army and state apparatus, and led to the imposition of an indemnity and what France called a **protectorate** for external matters. Rainilaiarivony's remaining years as prime minister were marked by increasing popular discontent and by court intrigues to undermine the ageing statesman. In 1894, the French delivered an ultimatum demanding a reinforcement of their protectorate. Rainilaiarivony refused, and the second Franco-Malagasy War began. After the French victory in October 1895, Rainilaiarivony was exiled to Algiers, where he died in 1896. His body was returned to Madagascar to be buried with his family.

**RAJAOBELINA, PROSPER (1913–1975).** An author and political activist, Rajaobelina was linked with Gabriel Razafintsalama in several post–World War II moderate **nationalist** groups. Under the **First Republic**, he was director of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration from 1960 to 1967. He also carried out several diplomatic missions.

**RAJAONARISON, BRECHARD.** Rajaonarison was one of three colonels in the Malagasy armed forces at the time of the **May 1972 Revolution** and the installation of the **military-civilian** regime led by General **Gabriel Ramanantsoa**. Unlike the other colonels—**Roland Rabetafika**, who became Ramanantsoa's second-in-command, and **Richard Ratsimandrava**, minister of the interior—Rajaonarison was given a largely honorific post as inspector-general of the army. He attributed this slight to his **Côtier** origins (he is **Antaisaka**) and to his low status as a former noncommissioned officer promoted to the officer corps at the time of independence. At the end of 1974, disquieted by nationalist **economic** policies and the putative **Merina** domination of the (increasingly discredited) **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**, Rajaonarison began plans for a coup d'état. His plot was discovered by Rabetafika's intelligence services, and he fled to the **Antanimoro** military camp outside **Antananarivo**. From the camp, controlled by the largely **Côtier** **Groupe Mobile de Police**, Rajaonarison issued communiqués accusing the Ramanantsoa administration of **corruption**, of disgracing the armed forces, and of undue preference for Merina officers.



As the crisis proceeded, it was evident that Rajaonarison had some support for his point of view. Not only was he visited by such figures from the former regime as **Philibert Tsiranana** and **André Resampa**, but by revolutionaries including the brother of **Didier Ratsiraka**. Confronted by so much *Côtier* solidarity the government did not dare attempt to dislodge him from Antanimoro. The crisis led to the fall of General Ramanantsoa and to the naming of Richard Ratsimandrava as president on 5 February 1975. After the assassination of Ratsimandrava on 11 February, the army did attack the camp, and Rajaonarison was arrested. He was tried for plotting the assassination along with 305 others in the “**Trial of the Century**,” which began on 21 March 1975. The charges against Rajaonarison and the other defendants were dismissed, and he was retired from the army. He remained an icon for *Côtier* political loyalism into the 1990s, however. His attempt to run against Didier Ratsiraka for president in 1982 was disqualified because he did not belong to a member party in the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar’s Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution (FNDR)**. Nevertheless, his name appeared as a slogan whenever east-coast politics heated up under the DRM and its successor **Third Republic**.

**RAJAONARIVELO, PIERROT JOCELYN (1945– )**. A native of **Sainte-Marie**, Rajaonarivelo was trained as an administrator in **France** and at **Antananarivo**. After service in the ministry of trade and at Malagasy embassies in Paris and the **United Nations**, he became vice president of a state commercial bank under the **Democratic Republic** and from there went as ambassador to the **United States** in 1989. Retaining his embassy for eight years through the fall of his patron, **Didier Ratsiraka**, and the administration of Ratsiraka’s opponent, **Albert Zafy**, Rajaonarivelo returned to Madagascar in 1997 as one of three vice prime ministers in Ratsiraka’s **Third Republic** administration. He also became national secretary of the president’s **AREMA** party. Elected **Assemblée Nationale** deputy in AREMA’s successful May 1998 campaign, he then became sole vice prime minister under **Tantely Andrianarivo**, with responsibility for budget and for the president’s program of **decentralization** of powers to the autonomous **provinces**. It was an extraordinary move by Ratsiraka to entrust party management and the politically delicate de-

volution of central powers to a person who had spent nine years out of the country, had never been a party functionary, and was relatively free of political debts—except to the president himself. It probably helps that they are both **Betsimisaraka**.

Thus endowed with presidential confidence, Rajaonarivelo developed the centrist-liberal factions of the party into dominance over its older ideological wing. He was able to associate other sympathetic parties with this strategy, notably the **Leader Fanilo** and the **Rassemblement pour la Social-Démocratie**. His dramatic political rise, his ability to work across partisan lines, and his extensive network of associates in international institutions and businesses helped identify Rajaonarivelo as Ratsiraka's (as yet undesignated) heir; his turn would presumably arrive in 2007, once the admiral had completed his presumed second mandate. Rajaonarivelo even considered jumping the gun by running for president instead of the ailing Ratsiraka in December 2001, but was peremptorily dissuaded when the president confirmed his own candidacy. All ambitions became problematic, however, after Ratsiraka was defeated by **Marc Ravalomanana** in that election.

Following his patron to **Toamasina** in the **Crisis of 2002**, Rajaonarivelo joined Ratsiraka in their Paris refuge that June. Holding dual French citizenship, he continues to direct AREMA policies from abroad. He maintains authority over the rejectionist wing of the party represented by his protégé, Senator Benjamin Vaovao, and seeks to influence the accommodationist AREMA politicians who followed Antananarivo secretary Pierre Raharijaona into the parliamentary **elections** of December 2002. Rajaonarivelo also controls a French-language daily newspaper, *La Gazette*, founded in 2003 to focus criticism against the Ravalomanana administration and prepare for Ratsiraka's second recall from exile. His own return remains in doubt, however. Indicted for malfeasance and abuse of office, Rajaonarivelo was sentenced in absentia on 12 March 2004 to five years imprisonment. His political future depends on the outcome of his appeal of this conviction, or, if he is unsuccessful, on prospects for general **amnesty**.

**RAKOTO, ABEL.** Gendarmerie captain Abel Rakoto was one of three officers arrested in 1977 and charged with conspiracy against the

state. In 1983, he was sentenced to 10 years at forced labor, while the others were given sentences of deportation for life. Although all three appealed their sentences, Rakoto later withdrew his appeal. *See also* OFFICER'S TRIAL.

**RAKOTO, PRINCE.** *See* RADAMA II.

**RAKOTOARIJAONA, DESIRE (1934– ).** A commandant (major) in the gendarmerie, Rakotoarijaona served in **Richard Ratsimandrava's** weeklong government as minister of finance in 1975. He then became one of the members from **Antananarivo province** in the **Directoire Militaire**, which took control of the country and elected **Didier Ratsiraka** as Ratsimandrava's successor in June 1975. Later that year, with the other members of the Directoire, he became a member of the **Conseil Suprême de la Révolution**. In 1977, Rakotoarijaona succeeded Justin Rakotoniaina as prime minister, and in 1983, he was named to the political bureau of the regime party, **AREMA**. In February 1988, he resigned as prime minister, officially for health reasons but largely because of growing political disagreements with Admiral Ratsiraka. His 11 years in the job set a record unchallenged by any other prime minister in modern Malagasy history. In 1990, his disapproval of the admiral led Rakotoarijaona into the **Forces Vives**, a political coalition militating for the collapse of Ratsiraka and his **Democratic Republic**. A renowned orator, General Rakotoarijaona was elected to the **Third Republic's Assemblée Nationale** from **Antananarivo** in June 1993. He served on the assembly's national security committee.

**RAKOTOHARISON, JEAN.** Rakotoharison became commander in chief of the Malagasy armed forces in August 1976, and was commander at the time of the 1984 **Kung Fu** attack on the **Tanora Tonga Saina** bases in **Antananarivo**. The army was criticized for its failure to intervene rapidly in the conflict, and Rakotoharison was already suspect for his independent attitude and links with the **MFM**. Three days after the assault he was removed as commander in chief and "promoted" to the figurehead chairship of the **Conseil Militaire pour le Développement**. He later retired from the **military**. In 1991,

Rakotoharison joined the opposition to the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** and, in July, he agreed to serve as president of the counter-government set up by the **Forces Vives** coalition. In the 1992 **election** for the presidency of the **Third Republic**, he supported the unsuccessful candidacy of **Jacques Rabemananjara**.

**RAKOTOMAHARO, GUY RAJEMISON (1950– )**. Customarily known by his second surname, Rajemison began his career in **transportation** and lecturing in economics at the **University of Madagascar**. In 1996, he became a lieutenant and intimate advisor of **Marc Ravalomanana**, then president of the Tiko agro-business complex. He campaigned for Ravalomanana's 1999 election as mayor of **Antananarivo** and was appointed assistant to the mayor and his spokesperson. Elected in 2000 to the provincial council of Antananarivo, Rajemison directed Ravalomanana's successful campaign for the presidency in 2001. He organized the demonstrations, strikes, and ceremonies in the capital during the **Crisis of 2002** that manifested public endorsement of Ravalomanana's controversial victory. After contemplating a number of ministerial and diplomatic posts, Rajemison was appointed to the **Senate** in July 2002, immediately becoming president (speaker) of that chamber. In this position, he is constitutionally second in rank to the president of the republic.

**RAKOTOMALALA, JOEL (1929–1976)**. The first prime minister of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM), Rakotomalala came from **Fianarantsoa province** and began officer training in **France** in 1957. He joined the Malagasy army at the time of independence, and after the **May 1972 Revolution** became minister of information in the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1973. Rakotomalala held the position of minister of posts and telecommunications in the weeklong government of **Richard Ratsimandrava** and became a member of the **Directoire Militaire** that took power after Ratsimandrava's assassination. Rakotomalala was one of the main organizers of the **Referendum of 21 December 1975** that ratified the DRM's choice of **Didier Ratsiraka** as president, and in January 1976 he became prime minister. He was killed in a helicopter accident on 30 July 1976.

**RAKOTOMALALA, LOUIS.** A bank employee in **Antananarivo**, Rakotomalala was active in nationalist politics during and after World War II. Although he had been a member of the **Comité du Salut Public** (Committee of Public Safety), after the war he helped found the **Mouvement Social Malgache** rather than adhering to the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** (MDRM) as had many other CSP activists. In the 1957 provincial elections he ran on the Liste de Défense des Droits du Peuple with **Alfred Ramangasoavina** and Gabriel Razafintsalama, but he did not follow Ramangasoavina into alliance with the dominant **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD). He eventually made his peace with the PSD and its leader, **Philibert Tsiranana**, and after independence was named Madagascar's first ambassador to the **United States** and the **United Nations**.

**RAKOTOMAVO, PASCAL (1934– ).** A banker, Rakotomavo was a longtime financial advisor to President **Didier Ratsiraka** and Ratsiraka's representative in long, desultory negotiations with the **International Monetary Fund** and the **World Bank**. He was head of the state insurance company, Assurance Réassurances Omnibranches (ARO) until 1982 when he was named minister of finance, succeeding **Rakotovao-Razakaboana**, leader of the anti-presidential "right **AREMA**." Rakotomavo later became minister in the president's office with responsibility for finance and the **economy** and, in 1989, special counselor to the **Conseil Suprême de la Révolution**, until the CSR was abolished in 1992. In 1997, immediately after Ratsiraka's return as president, Rakotomavo spent a year as prime minister, mainly in search of a working parliamentary majority (obtained in the election of May 1998) and of a team of younger technocrats acceptable to Madagascar's impatient international creditors. **Tantely Andrianarivo** fit that bill and replaced Rakotomavo in July 1998. Rakotomavo subsequently filled special assignments for the presidency until his election in June 2001 as governor of his native **Antananarivo province**. In that role for only a few months, Rakotomavo resisted Ratsiraka's declaration of martial law in Antananarivo during the political **Crisis of 2002**. Moreover, he was the only governor (of six) to refuse to declare secessionist sentiments as demanded by Ratsiraka from his base at **Toamasina**. Nevertheless, Rakotomavo also

opposed **Marc Ravalomanana**'s irregular self-investiture as president in February of that year. Hence, he was deposed by Ravalomanana and went into retirement.

**RAKOTONDRABE, SAMUEL (?–1948).** A merchant in **Antananarivo** whom the colonial administration identified as the “general” of the **Rebellion of 1947**, Rakotondrabe was captured, and then executed on 19 July 1948, three days before the beginning of the **Tananarive Trial**.

**RAKOTONIAINA, PETY (1959– ).** A cattle rancher and outspoken advocate of the interests of his native **Fianarantsoa province**, Rakotoniaina began his political career in 1993 as a parliamentary deputy from Ikalamavony, adhering to **Manandafy Rakotonirina**'s **MF** party. He was reelected in May 1998 despite an intense national campaign in favor of his **AREMA** party opponent. Joining the bandwagon for **Marc Ravalomanana**'s candidacy for president in 2001, Rakotoniaina claimed Fianarantsoa province to have been won by Ravalomanana. In April 2002, he led a squad of Ravalomanana advocates to take provincial headquarters by force. He then served a year as interim head of the province with the title of President of the Special Delegation (PDS). Constantly inviting controversy, he became entangled with the national gendarmerie commander in an exchange of accusations of leniency for cattle-rustlers, a major sore point in the province. Eventually, despite the backing of Manandafy Rakotonirina who served as special counselor to Ravalomanana, he seems to have become a liability for the new **Antananarivo** establishment. Rakotoniaina was peremptorily removed from his post in January 2003 without explanation. One of three to be dismissed from these PDS posts at that time, he was probably ousted in order to prevent his incumbency from turning into a de facto provincial power-base.

After his forcible eviction, Rakotoniaina turned angrily against the president whom he had served in 2002. He instigated conversion of the 2001 Committee to Elect Marc Ravalomanana into the Committee for Truth and Justice, ironically keeping its Malagasy initials **KMMR**. Charismatic and an unusually hard worker, Rakotoniaina was elected mayor of Fianarantsoa in November 2003, not on his

MFM party ticket, but through a list sponsored by the *Tambratr'i Fianarantsoa* (Solidarity Fianarantsoa), a political association that might develop into a rival party to Manandafy's MFM which Rakotoniaina considers too close to the administration. He claims to have been subject to police harassment during a prolonged and unusually violent strike by Fianarantsoa high school students in early 2004, during which 10 of his *Tambatra* militants were arrested. Nevertheless, Rakotoniaina sought reconciliation with the president at two private meetings, in March and June 2004.

**RAKOTONIRINA, MANANDAFY (1938– ).** A sociologist at the **University of Madagascar** and ORSTOM, Rakotonirina led the radical opposition to the **First Republic** in the late 1960s and early 1970s. He worked at first in conjunction with **MONIMA**, but after a quarrel with the party's leader, **Monja Jaona**, he assembled his own group at the university following examples from the radical European student movement of the late 1960s. The journal of the group, *Ny Andry*, criticized the regime for its "neo-colonial" ties with **France** and for continuing an authoritarian relationship with the population. It also denounced French domination of the university and the failure of higher **education** to deal with what it saw as the problems of Malagasy society. Adept at organizing public protests, Rakotonirina was instrumental in politicizing groups of unemployed youth in the capital, called **ZOAM**, and in forging alliances between those lower class militants and the more privileged student groups. These alliances emerged as the **Komity Iraisan'ny Mpitolona** (KIM) that claimed credit for the **May 1972 Revolution**.

After the fragmentation of the KIM, Rakotonirina founded the **MFM** (Militants for Power to the Little People), and criticized the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** for failing to pursue the goals of the revolution. Several riots were blamed on the MFM, and Rakotonirina himself spent some time in jail. When the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) was created in 1975, Rakotonirina at first maintained a distant attitude, and the MFM boycotted DRM institutions and the first set of **elections**. Unable to prosper outside the system, however, the MFM joined the **Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution** (FNDR) in July 1977; Rakotonirina entered the **Conseil Suprême de la Révolution** (CSR) as head of its **economic** commis-

sion. During the economic crisis of the 1980s, Rakotonirina became increasingly critical of President **Didier Ratsiraka**'s socialist options and increasingly prone to argue for the virtues of the market as a cure for those difficulties. In March 1987, he combined with other leaders in the Alliance Démocratique Malgache to oppose the regime's economic policies, and in the presidential elections of March 1989 he ran against Ratsiraka, coming in second, with 19.3 percent of the vote.

Known customarily by his given name, Manandafy, Rakotonirina pursued his antagonism to Ratsiraka to its conclusion. He was one of the founders of the Comité des **Forces Vives**, dedicated to the overthrow of Ratsiraka's DRM. When the Forces Vives named a counter-government and began occupying administrative offices in July 1991, he took the MFM out of the alliance, declaring that step to be too "insurrectional," but continued nonetheless to cooperate with the opposition. He subscribed to the **Panorama Agreement** that set up the transition to the **Third Republic**, sharing the chairmanship of its **Comité National de Redressement Economique et Social** with **Richard Andriamanjato**. Rakotonirina ran for president in the 1992 election, but came in a distant third with 10.2 percent of the vote, behind another Forces Vives leader, **Albert Zafy**, and second-place Ratsiraka.

Elected to the **Assemblée Nationale** in June 1993 from Manandriana in his native **Fianarantsoa province**, Rakotonirina kept his party in the public eye despite its deliberate distance from Zafy and its weak performances at the polls. It held 15 seats in the 1993 Assembly, but returned only three of those deputies in the elections of May 1998, not including Rakotonirina. While still in Ratsiraka's CSR, however, he had been instrumental in helping young **Marc Ravalomanana** obtain financing for his eventually lucrative Tiko agro-dairy business. He remained in contact with Ravalomanana who became mayor of **Antananarivo** in 1999. In 2001, he was an early advocate of Ravalomanana's **election** to the presidency, and his skills at mobilizing public rallies became useful to Ravalomanana during the **Crisis of 2002**. Despite these loyalties he has refused to allow the MFM to be swallowed by the new regime party, **Tiako-i-Madagasikara**. He was also unable to effect reconciliation between the president and the MFM's Fianarantsoa star, **Pety Rakotoniaina**, who became a vociferous detractor of Ravalomanana after being dismissed without



apparent cause in 2003 as chief of Fianarantsoa province. Rakotonirina has retained important relationships in international agencies and Francophone Africa. He tarnished his credibility in February 2004, however, by publicly claiming (apparently inaccurately) that, according to Senegal's president Abdoulaye Wade, international donors were insisting on a general **amnesty** for Ratsirakist political prisoners as a precondition for new financial assistance.

**RAKOTONIRINA, MARSON.** A captain in the army and a former aide of General **Gabriel Ramanantsoa**, Rakotonirina was one of three officers arrested in 1977 and charged with conspiracy against the state. Tried in 1983, Rakotonirina was sentenced to deportation—in effect, permanent house arrest. An appeal of the sentence was rejected in 1987. *See also* OFFICERS' TRIAL.

**RAKOTONIRINA, STANISLAS (?–1976).** A bank employee in **Antananarivo**, Rakotonirina was the first elected mayor of the capital. He began his political career as a member of the provincial assembly from the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache**. After the **Rebellion of 1947** he was arrested but later acquitted of participation in the uprising. He returned to political activity and ran unsuccessfully for the provincial assembly and the French National Assembly, always losing to more “moderate” candidates. He founded the **Union des Indépendants de Tananarive** (UIT) to contest the 1956 municipal **elections**, which he won. After the passage of the **Loi-Cadre**, which promised increased autonomy for Madagascar, Rakotonirina attempted to extend the UIT beyond the capital. Although he was not successful in this, he was elected to the Antananarivo provincial assembly and by that assembly to the Assemblée Représentative of the colony. In the campaign for the **Referendum on the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic** Rakotonirina advocated a “no” vote. Consistently refusing to ally with other parties, however, he did not join the **AKFM** in the referendum fight, finding it too strongly influenced by communists; although a **Catholic**, he also declined to participate in a party based on the **mission** network, finding it too conservative. In October 1958, the head of the Loi-Cadre government council, **Philibert Tsiranana**, was able to form a new majority on the Antananarivo municipal council with the coop-

eration of **Louis Rakotomalala** who replaced Rakotonirina as mayor. Tsiranana also succeeded in having Rakotonirina ousted from the governing council of **Antananarivo province**. Finally, in the election of 4 September 1960 he lost his seat in the **Assemblée Nationale**. Rakotonirina died in Paris in 1976.

**RAKOTO-RATSIMAMANGA, ALBERT (1907–2001)**. A notable botanist who published voluminously on medicinal plants and a wide range of subjects, Rakoto-Ratsimamanga founded the **Association des Etudiants d’Origine Malgache** in France in 1934. He was a founding member of the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** after World War II, but was not implicated in the prosecutions of MDRM leaders for instigating the **Rebellion of 1947**. After independence, he served as Madagascar’s first ambassador to France.

**RAKOTOVAHINY, ARSENE**. A founder of the **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD), Rakotovahiny had been an ally of **Philibert Tsiranana** from the early 1950s, participating with him in the **Front National Malgache**. In the 1960 election, he led the “orthodox” PSD slate in **Toamasina province** against the **Miara-Mirindra** of **Jacques Rabemananjara**. The failure of his list greatly reduced his political influence, and it was Rabemananjara who moved into the Tsiranana government as minister. Rakotovahiny was later sent to Taiwan as ambassador.

**RAKOTOVAHINY, EMMANUEL (1938– )**. A veterinarian educated in France, Rakotovahiny has been **Albert Zafy**’s most fervent advocate during the vicissitudes of **Third Republic** politics. Minister of agriculture in **Francisque Ravony**’s governments at the start of the Zafy presidency, Rakotovahiny became prime minister in November 1995 after Zafy won his referendary battle to control ministerial appointments and dominate the **Assemblée Nationale**. He had just taken office when a tragic and still mysterious fire broke out at the summit of **Antananarivo**, destroying the **Manjakamiadana**, symbol of precolonial independence; his government was inevitably blamed for failure to control the fire and to capture the arsonists. As prime minister, Rakotovahiny had difficulty diversifying his portfolios; old

collaborators in Zafy's **Forces Vives** movement declined ministries that had become vulnerable to presidential intimidation. Hence, the Rakotovahiny government became overloaded from his own **Union Nationale pour le Développement et la Démocratie**, the national umbrella for Zafy's northerner **AFFA** league. This imbalance paralyzed the executive, confronted with a rebellious Assembly contemptuous of Rakotovahiny's loyalty to the president, his **Antankarana** compatriot. In addition, he was condemned by the **International Monetary Fund** for failure to implement internationally imposed structural adjustment measures, a stance that reflected Zafy's defiance of external interference.

In April 1996, Rakotovahiny lost a vote of no confidence and had to resign. Returning to his veterinary practice in Sabotsy-Namehana during **Didier Ratsiraka**'s second mandate, Rakotovahiny quietly backed Zafy through the second half of the 1990s. Like Zafy, he refused to accept the legitimacy of **Marc Ravalomanana**'s presidential victory of December 2001. He became vice president of the **Comité de Réconciliation Nationale**, an alliance between Zafy and Ratsiraka that aims at toppling Ravalomanana and to found a new regime by plebescite.

**RAKOTOVAO-RAZAKABOANA (?–1994).** A native of **Antananarivo province**, Rakotovao-Razakaboana was minister of finance of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) from 1975 to 1982. He had previously served as director of the planning bureau under the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** and, in 1975, was considered to be close to the **AKFM**. Although he was a founding member of the regime party, **AREMA**, and head of its Antananarivo section, his political position increasingly differed from that of President **Didier Ratsiraka**, until by 1980, he was considered to be the center of a “right AREMA” that opposed the socialist options of the “left,” or presidential, AREMA. Rakotovao-Razakaboana's position was strengthened by the confidence earned from officials of the **International Monetary Fund** during early negotiations to resolve Madagascar's **economic** crisis. After the 1982 campaign, where he failed to mobilize a large enough vote for the president in Antananarivo, Ratsiraka fired Rakotovao-Razakaboana as finance minister and “promoted” him to the **Conseil Suprême de la Révolution**. He aban-

doned Ratsiraka during the collapse of the DRM and, in June 1993, was elected to the **Assemblée Nationale** on an independent ticket.

**RALAIMONGO, JEAN (1884–1942).** The most important leader of Madagascar's interwar **nationalist movement**, Ralaimongo was born to a **Betsileo** family and attended the Normal School of the French **Protestant mission**. He served in **France** in World War I, and after the war remained in Paris where he helped found the **Ligue Française pour l'Accession des Indigènes de Madagascar aux Droits des Citoyens Français**, becoming its secretary-general. He also participated in journals critical of France's colonial policy such as *L'Action coloniale* and *Le Libéré*. In 1923, Ralaimongo returned to Madagascar at the same time as **Joseph Ravoahangy**, with whom he frequently collaborated. There he founded a series of newspapers, including *L'Opinion*, which were usually seized and forced out of operation by the colonial authorities. He spent much of his time under house arrest but continued to attempt to organize peasant resistance to the *indigénat*. During a period of liberty he helped organize the **Demonstration of 19 May 1929** at the Excelsior Theater in Antananarivo and was arrested and sentenced to house arrest in the Antalaha district. He died there in 1942. *See also* RALAIMONGO GROUP.

**RALAIMONGO GROUP.** This name was given to a band of nationalists centered around **Jean Ralaimongo** and active after the First World War. It represented the first **nationalist movement** to reach beyond the elite of **Antananarivo**. In addition to Ralaimongo, the group included **Jules Ranaivo**, **Joseph Raseta**, **Joseph Ravoahangy**, and Abraham Razafy. Among its European sympathizers were **Paul Dussac**, Edouard Planque, and Ignace Albertini. The Ralaimongo group at first demanded only the end of the *indigénat* and the extension of the rights of French citizens to the Malagasy, but after the **Demonstration of 19 May 1929** in Antananarivo, it began to urge independence. Several members of the group were active in the post–World War II **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** (MDRM).

**RALIBERA, REMI (1926– ).** A Jesuit priest, radio producer, and editor of the **Catholic church's** political journal, *LaKroan'i Madagasikara*

from 1965 to 2001, Ralibera was a critical commentator on Malagasy politics beginning in the later days of the **First Republic**. He was arrested at the time of the **May 1972 Revolution** along with several hundred students. Originally supportive of both **Gabriel Ramanantsoa** and the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar (DRM)**, Ralibera became increasingly critical of the **corruption** and political and **economic** failure of the DRM. In August 2001, at the age of 75, Ralibera left journalism to become general secretary of the **FFKM**, the ecumenical structure unifying his church with the three major **Protestant churches**. Throwing their considerable political support into **Marc Ravalomanana's** presidential campaign later that year, the FFKM subsequently endorsed Ravalomanana's claim to have won the presidency outright. Through Ralibera's multifarious contacts, the FFKM was able to publicize the **Antananarivo** mayor's case internationally during the **Crisis of 2002**. The churches also endorsed the president's **Tiako-i-Madagasikara** and other pro-regime candidates in the December 2002 parliamentary **elections**, but under Ralibera's deft touch, began subsequently to allow more distance between themselves and the political establishment.

**RAMAHATRA, PRINCE (1858–1938).** A cousin and brother-in-law of Queen **Ranavalona III**, Ramahatra was a member of the **Catholic** faction at the **Merina** court. In 1895, he was minister of war and a member of the Grand Council of the kingdom, where he frequently quarreled with the prime minister, **Rainilaiarivony**. After the **French** conquest he joined in the “pacification” of the Vakinankaratra region south of **Antananarivo** and served in the French colonial administration until 1913. In 1921 he became the first Malagasy appointed to the Conseil d'Administration of the colony.

**RAMAHATRA, VICTOR.** Army lieutenant colonel Victor Ramahatra became prime minister of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar (DRM)** in February 1988. A native of **Antananarivo province** and considered to be a “president's man,” he had been minister of public works since 1982. As the DRM weakened, he offered his resignation several times, and in August 1991, was finally fired by President **Didier Ratsiraka** and replaced by nonpartisan **Guy Razanamasy**. Continuing in the army as a specialist in security matters, Ramahatra

remained close to Ratsiraka's family in their business affairs. He was arrested in June 2002 by forces loyal to **Marc Ravalomanana** for alleged conspiracy with foreign mercenaries. The charges were dismissed by an Antananarivo court, supposedly after remonstrances in his behalf by the French embassy.

**RAMAHOLIMIHASO, MADELEINE (1939– )**. Descendant of a distinguished family from **Antananarivo province**, Ramaholimihaso is founder and secretary general of the **Comité Nationale pour l'Observation des Elections et d'Education des Citoyens** (CNOE) formed in 1989 by church groups to monitor the highly doubtful **elections** of the **Democratic Republic**. Casting doubt on the authenticity of the **Didier Ratsiraka** machine's electoral tallies, she and CNOE began cooperating within the civil society to obtain the system's collapse. Expanding her interests into civil rights litigation during the **Third Republic**, she remained critical of Ratsiraka after his return to power in 1997. Nevertheless, she objected to CNOE's (and the parent **FFKM's**) endorsement of **Marc Ravalomanana's** claim to an outright electoral majority in the presidential contest of December 2001, preferring to observe an honest run-off with the second-place incumbent. Reconciled to Ravalomanana's de facto authority after the **Crisis of 2002**, she has focused her own and CNOE's attention on projects of civic education. A devout **Catholic** and a prolific writer, Ramaholimihaso directs planning for the church's **CARITAS** social programs and has participated in international church conferences and jubilees. An accountant by training (in **France**), she has been in private business since 1963 and is responsible for a national business association program to aid the development of small enterprises in the island.

**RAMANANTSOA, GABRIEL (1906–1979)**. Madagascar's first general and commander-in-chief of the army, to which he transferred at the time of independence after a distinguished career in the French military, Ramanantsoa became the nation's second chief of state in 1972. Descended from **Merina** royalty, he graduated from Saint Cyr in 1931 and entered a colonial infantry regiment. He served in the defense of **France** in 1940, and was decorated. From 1943 to 1946, he commanded a company stationed in Madagascar, but was in France

attached to the Ministry of Defense at the time of the **Rebellion of 1947**. He later served in the French army in Indochina and had the rank of colonel at the time of Malagasy independence.

In the **May 1972 Revolution**, the armed forces were seen as a guarantee of stability against the collapse of the **First Republic** and the radicalism of the militants. The French, who had supported the First Republic until that time, and who had 4,000 paratroopers stationed just outside the capital, declined to intervene on behalf of President **Philibert Tsiranana**, evidently regarding General Ramanantsoa as a preferable successor. He first received a grant of “full powers” from the president on 17 May, and after the **Referendum of 8 October 1972**, which Tsiranana opposed, became chief of state in his own right. Despite Paris’s confidence, **foreign** and **economic** policies during the three-year **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** included unexpected assaults on France’s privileged position in Madagascar.

Ramanantsoa at first conceived his mandate as a chance to give Madagascar a rest cure from politics. This respite never occurred, however, and the interregnum was marked by unrest, both on the left and on the right, and by rivalry among its leaders. By late 1974, these disputes, in addition to increasing **corruption** (rumored to include Ramanantsoa’s wife, if not the general himself), and Ramanantsoa’s perceived leadership weaknesses had brought his regime into discredit. When a disaffected colonel, **Brécharid Rajaonarison**, attempted a coup in December 1974, even former supporters called for Ramanantsoa’s resignation, and the two most important members of his government, **Richard Ratsimandrava** and **Didier Ratsiraka**, refused to continue to serve under him. After an attempt to remain in office, Ramanantsoa handed power over to Ratsimandrava on 5 February 1975. Ramanantsoa remained in the background during the subsequent assassination of Ratsimandrava and the period of rule by the **Directoire Militaire** that ended with the coming to power of Didier Ratsiraka. He was retired at the end of 1975 along with other senior generals, and died in Paris in May 1979. *See also* MILITARY.

**RAMANANTSOA INTERREGNUM.** This regime, headed by General **Gabriel Ramanantsoa**, succeeded the **First Republic** after the **May 1972 Revolution** and lasted through the beginning of 1975. Although

Ramanantsoa himself and the chief figures of his government—his second-in-command, army colonel **Roland Rabetafika**; the minister of the interior, gendarmerie colonel **Richard Ratsimandrava**; and the minister of foreign affairs, naval captain **Didier Ratsiraka**—were all drawn from the **military**, the cabinet also included civilian figures. Its legitimacy derived both from the transfer of power effected during the May revolution, when a military-led government seemed to be the only plausible nonrevolutionary alternative, and from the **Referendum of 8 October 1972**, which established a five-year interregnum to prepare more permanent political institutions. The referendum also established an elected consultative legislature, the **Conseil National Populaire de Développement**.

The main policy task of the Ramanantsoa administration was to implement the “**Malgachization**” of the **economy**, **educational system**, and **foreign policy** of the country, as demanded by the participants in the May revolution. The **Cooperation Agreements** were renegotiated, ending the special relationship with **France** that had characterized the First Republic; some French firms were nationalized; and state corporations took the place of the large French **commercial companies** as well as some **Chinese** and **Indo-Pakistani** business networks. Malgachization of **education** was more controversial, and fears that the policy would mean the imposition of the **Merina** dialect of Malagasy contributed to riots in coastal regions as early as December 1972.

Ramanantsoa expected his interregnum to free society from the intensity of politics, but the country never found real tranquility. Its leaders had to contend with resistance both from the displaced politicians of the First Republic and from the radical **Komity Iraisan’ny Mpitolona** who saw the interregnum as a betrayal rather than the culmination of the revolution. The one organized political force that reliably supported the government was the **AKFM**, the major opposition party of the First Republic, but its influence was limited to the capital. The period was also marked by factional disputes among the three leading officers. Personal ambition played a role, but each also had a different vision of Madagascar’s future. Rabetafika espoused French-style state-directed capitalism; Ratsimandrava initiated a form of direct democracy based on the *fokonolona* tradition; and Ratsiraka was attracted by Marxist socialism. In addition, **corruption** of government



officials and directors of the new state companies became increasingly blatant.

When Colonel **Bréhard Rajaonarison** staged his attempted coup at the end of December 1974, he was able to demonstrate considerable support in the armed forces and among civilian politicians if not for his succession to power, at least for the end of Ramanantsoa's rule. The general dismissed his government in January 1975, and attempted to form a new one. The two crucial figures for any continued credibility, however, Ratsimandrava and Ratsiraka, both refused to serve with him. Each also refused to serve in a government in which the other held any position of power. In the end, Ramanantsoa handed power over to Ratsimandrava on 5 February 1975. *See also* RESAMPA, ANDRE; TSIRANANA, PHILIBERT.

**RAMANENJANA.** *See* ANCESTORS; RADAMA II.

**RAMANGASOAVINA, ALFRED (1917– ).** A student of political science and law in Paris, Ramangasoavina was active in the **Association des Etudiants d'Origine Malgache**. He returned to Madagascar and, in 1956, formed the **Union des Intellectuels et Universitaires Malgaches** (Union of Malagasy Intellectuals and Academicians). He was elected to the **Antananarivo** provincial council in 1957 on a list for the defense of provincial interests that he formed with **Louis Rakotomalala**. He at first supported rapid movement to independence, and UNIU was one of the participants at the 1958 **Tamatave Congress** of nationalist-minded parties. This led to his dismissal from the **Loi-Cadre Government Council** by **Philibert Tsiranana**, the council's vice president. Ramangasoavina then renounced his earlier stand and made peace with Tsiranana, joining the latter's **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD) in 1960. At independence, he became minister of justice of the **First Republic**, the most important **Merina** and chief juridical mind of the government. After abandoning politics during the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM), Ramangasoavina reemerged from law practice in 1989 to help revive the old PSD and, in 1990, to adhere to the **Union Nationale pour le Développement et la Démocratie** with northerners **Albert Zafy** and **Emmanuel Rakotovahiny**. In 1991, he became vice prime minister in the transition government of **Guy Razamasy**.

**RAMAROHETRA.** A director of the secret society **JINA**, Ramarohetra testified for the prosecution after the **Rebellion of 1947**, accusing the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** (MDRM) deputies of instigating the rebellion. At the **Tananarive Trial**, however, he retracted his testimony, claiming that it had been extracted by torture.

**RAMAROLAHY, PHILIBERT.** A native of **Antananarivo** province, Ramarolahy served as a noncommissioned officer in the French army, and was promoted to the officer corps when he joined the Malagasy **military** after independence. Commander in chief of the army during the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**, he was the presiding judge at the “**Trial of the Century**” after the assassination of Colonel **Richard Ratsimandrava**; he stepped down when one of the most important of the accused, Colonel **Brécharde Rajaonarison**, attacked him for complicity in what he called the pro-**Merina** bias of the armed forces. Ramarolahy retired in September 1975.

**RANAIVO, JULES.** Born into a **Merina** family living in **Betsileo** territory, Ranaivo was a leader of the interwar **nationalist movement** and, with **Paul Dussac**, founded one of the movement’s important journals, *L’Aurore malgache*. At the beginning of World War II, he was interned by the colonial administration, and his daughter, who had been active in a **Free French** faction, was executed. After the war he joined the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** and was elected to the French **Conseil de la République** on 30 March 1947, just at the outbreak of the **Rebellion of 1947**. The announcement of his election was delayed until after his arrest, and his parliamentary immunity was lifted *ex post facto*. He was condemned to 10 years solitary confinement, but was released in 1953. He revived the nationalist journal *Ny Rariny (Justice)* and later joined the **AKFM**.

**RANAVALONA I (c.1790–1861).** Ruler of the **Merina Empire** from 1828 to 1861, Ranaivalona I was the cousin and first wife of **Radama I**. After his death, she succeeded to the throne as the result of a coup d’état staged by *hova* factions that had originally helped his father, **Andrianampoinimerina**, take power. They were led by **Rainiharo**,

who became her prime minister and whom she married secretly. Many of the policies of her reign reflected these factional interests. In defense of Malagasy traditions, Ranavalona reversed many of Radama's policies, particularly the opening of the island to European influences. The teaching activities of the **missions** were stopped, and the missionaries themselves expelled in 1835. Suspected of subversive loyalty to foreign powers through the missionaries, Malagasy **Christians** were ordered to renounce their beliefs. Many were killed when they refused to do so.

At the same time, Ranavalona encouraged the economic activities of such Europeans as **Jean Laborde** and **James Cameron** and she continued Radama's conquests over the rest of the island, centralizing power in **Antananarivo**. During her reign the city of **Fianarantsoa** was founded, a Malagasy dictionary was begun, and a code of laws published. Toward the end of her reign the queen became increasingly unpopular and, in 1857, she had to survive a coup designed to replace her with her son, Prince Rakoto (later **Radama II**). After her death in 1861, her policy of closure against European influences was abandoned and the Malagasy court converted to **Protestantism** in 1869, but her spirit was believed by traditionalists to have possessed the **Ramanenjana** throngs who plagued the short reign of her son.

**RANAVALONA II (?–1883).** A niece of **Ranavalona I** and second wife of **Radama II**, Ranavalona II succeeded Queen **Rasoherina** in 1868 and was ruler of the **Merina Empire** until 1883. Her reign marked the beginning of the **Christian** period of the **Merina** monarchy, a change foreshadowed at her coronation, where the traditional royal talismans, or **sampy**, were replaced by the Bible. The queen and her husband and prime minister, **Rainilaiarivony**, were baptized as **Protestants** in February 1869. To mark their independence from foreign domination, the ceremony was conducted by a Malagasy minister rather than European missionaries. In September 1869, the **sampy** were ordered destroyed (in fact, most were taken into hiding by their guardians, to reappear at the time of the revolt of the **Menalamba** in 1896). Ranavalona presided over the creation of the Palace Church, whose network, very much under the control of Rainilaiarivony, was an important part of the administration of the Merina state in its later

years. Her reign was also marked by the publication of the **Code of 305 Articles** and the beginning of the **Franco-Malagasy War of 1883–1885**. She died before the signature of the treaty that established the first **French protectorate**.

**RANAVALONA III (1863–1917)**. Queen of the **Merina Empire** from 1883 until 1896, Ranavalona was the member of the royal family chosen by Prime Minister **Rainilaiarivony** to fill what was essentially a figurehead position. She remained as queen after the **French** conquest in 1895, but was exiled when the French abandoned the **protectorate** and made Madagascar a colony after the revolt of the *Menalamba*, a revolt made in her name although probably without her knowledge. Ranavalona died in Algiers in 1917. When her body was returned to **Antananarivo** in 1939, the occasion set off a major demonstration of **nationalist** sentiment.

**RANDRIAMAROMANANA, ALBERT (1913–1947)**. A lieutenant in the French army at the time of the outbreak of the **Rebellion of 1947**, Randriamaromanana joined the secret society **JINA** that year, and was responsible for planning the attack on French installations in **Antananarivo**. The assault was called off at the last minute and he was arrested and then executed on 28 April 1947. In 1974, he was given the posthumous title of commander of the Ordre National Malgache.

**RANJEVA, MARCEL (1944– )**. From a prominent **Catholic Antananarivo** family, Ranjeva joined the Malagasy army as a cadet at age 19. He was trained at **France's** Saint Cyr academy and at specialized military institutes. On his return to Madagascar in 1968, he began a diverse career in the Malagasy **military**, including service in agricultural and economic development agencies under the **Democratic Republic**. From 1986 to 1992, he was commandant of the national military academy at **Antsirabe**, staying away from politics. Early in the **Third Republic**, however, after managing the national **tobacco** monopoly for two years, Ranjeva was appointed to President **Albert Zafy's** **military** staff, advancing to brigadier general in 1994. He remained at the presidency until June 1996 when he became minister of defense in the government of Prime Minister **Norbert Lala Ratsirahonana**. Unlike any other senior official at the time, Ranjeva

kept his portfolio through the end of **Didier Ratsiraka**'s second administration, resigning only on 7 March 2002 when self-proclaimed President **Marc Ravalomanana** sent loyal army contingents to take over his ministry.

He remained a senior officer with an avowed duty to uphold legality and the unity of the nation. Hence, after Ravalomanana's electoral victory had been confirmed by the **Haute Cour Constitutionnelle** (High Constitutional Court) on 29 April 2002, Ranjeva encouraged the army to leave its barracks to remove Ratsiraka's armed blockades of the **highland** capital. A month later, declining to resume his former defense portfolio, he was appointed foreign minister in the first cabinet of prime minister **Jacques Sylla**. He has remained in that post through successive reshufflings of Sylla's ministries. Although surprising to many, General Ranjeva's diplomatic assignment made sense as a balance against Ravalomanana's activist commercialism and Sylla's politicized affinities with France. The appointment is said to have been urged on Ravalomanana by Cardinal Armand Gaétan Razafindratandra, the Roman Catholic leader in the pro-Ravalomanana **FFKM**.

**RAOMBANA (1809–1854)**. Descendant of an early ruler in **Imerina**, Raombana and his twin brother Rahaniraka were sent to England for their **education** from 1819 to 1827. When he returned to **Antananarivo**, Raombana became private secretary to Queen **Ranavalona I** and was charged with diplomatic missions and the education of the future **Radama II**. He wrote extensively and secretly in English on the history and contemporary life of the monarchy.

**RASETA, JOSEPH (1915–1979)**. A physician from **Antananarivo**, Raseta's involvement in **nationalist** activities began with his membership in **Vy Vato Sakelika** (VVS), for which he was arrested in 1915 and sent to the prison island of **Nosy Lava**. He was amnestied in 1921, and continued to be active in nationalist politics in the **Ralaimongo group**, spending much of his time in assigned residence as a result. He was interned in 1940, but after the war returned to Antananarivo and was elected as one of two Malagasy delegates to the **Constitutional Assemblies** of the Fourth French Republic. In company with the other delegate, **Joseph Ravoahangy**, and with **Jacques Rabemananjara**, he founded the **Mouvement Démocra-**

**tique de la Rénovation Malgache** (MDRM) in Paris in 1946. All three were elected deputies to the French National Assembly in November 1946. After the outbreak of the **Rebellion of 1947**, Raseta's parliamentary immunity was lifted, and he was tried for plotting the uprising, although he had been in **France** at the time. The **Tananarive Trial** of 1948 sentenced him to death, a sentence that was commuted to life imprisonment in 1949.

Raseta spent the subsequent years in prison in Corsica and after 1955 in restricted residence in France. He was freed in 1957, but not permitted to return to Madagascar. In July 1959, he made an attempt to return to the island, but was intercepted at Djibouti and sent back to France. He finally returned with the other MDRM deputies in July 1960, and stood as an **AKFM** candidate for the **Assemblée Nationale**. He did not win a seat, and in 1963 he left the party to form the short-lived Malagasy National Assembly. Repeated overtures to combine dissident elements into an opposition front always included Raseta, and always failed. Raseta ran unsuccessfully for president against **Philibert Tsiranana** in 1965.

**RASOHERINA (?–1868)**. Queen of the **Merina Empire** from 1863 to 1868, Rasoherina succeeded her cousin and husband, **Radama II**, who had been killed in a coup d'état. Radama's assassination had been provoked by his flaunting of royal traditions and his attacks on the economic and political position of the ruling oligarchy led by the **Andafiavaratra** families who staged the coup. Accordingly, her reign was marked by a return to tradition and by the domination of the oligarchy under the leadership first of **Raharo** and then of his brother, **Rainilaiarivony**, who were, successively, her prime ministers and husbands. Rasoherina was named queen on condition that she sign a document stating that the wishes of the sovereign became law only upon the agreement of the leaders of the people. She was thus the first "constitutional" monarch in the Malagasy system.

**RASSEMBLEMENT CHRETIEN DE MADAGASCAR (RCM) / CHRISTIAN ASSEMBLY OF MADAGASCAR**. The RCM, founded in 1958, was an attempt to form a coalition of Christian parties. It included members from the **Rassemblement du Peuple Malgache**, the **Parti Démocratique de Madagascar**, and the **Union Sociale**

Malgache. It made a strong showing in the municipal elections of 1959, but split over the issue of participation in the government led by the **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD). Jean-François Jarison took his RCM followers first into cooperation with **Jacques Rabem-  
ananjara** and then into the government, while another leader, Michel Randria, opposed participation and was ousted as mayor of **Fianarantsoa** as a result. The RCM disappeared into the PSD and other stronger parties.

**RASSEMBLEMENT DU PEUPLE MALGACHE (RPM) / ASSEMBLY OF THE MALAGASY PEOPLE.** The RPM was founded in 1956 by, among others, **Fianarantsoa** mayor Michel Randria. It was an attempt to link the **Protestants** and **Catholics** of the **highlands** on a platform of autonomy within the French Community. The party attempted to expand outside the Highlands, but without success, and Randria later took his followers into the **Rassemblement Chrétien de Madagascar**.

**RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL MALGACHE (RNM) / MALAGASY NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (ALSO RENOUVEAU NATIONAL MALGACHE, MALAGASY NATIONAL RENEWAL).** After the formation of the AKFM at the **Tamatave Congress** of 1968, Tamatave (**Toamasina**) mayor **Alexis Bezaka** sought to mobilize the remaining congress parties that had resisted the **highland** nationalism and/or the Marxism identified with the AKFM. Among the parties that joined the RNM were the **Union Nationale Malgache** and the **Union des Travailleurs et Paysans**. **Stanislas Rakotonirina** was approached to bring his **Union des Indépendants de Tananarive** into the coalition, but he refused. The RNM was strongest in Bezaka's home base of **Toamasina province**, with some support in **Antananarivo** and **Fianarantsoa**. At the time of the 1960 legislative elections, Bezaka cooperated in forming the **Miara-Mirindra** list with **Jacques Rabem-  
ananjara**. After the elections the bulk of the party's elected members (but without Bezaka) joined the governing **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD).

**RASSEMBLEMENT POUR LA SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIE (RPSD) / ASSEMBLY FOR SOCIAL DEMOCRACY.** This avatar of the

**First Republic's** regime **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD) was founded in November 1990 by reemerging PSD luminaries behind Pierre Tsiranana, son of the late PSD leader, President **Philibert Tsiranana**. While the young Tsiranana's star faded in the political brawls of ensuing years, RPSD general secretary, then president, **Evariste Marson**, prospered in one ministerial post after another. Although both Marson and his successor as general secretary, Jean-Eugène Voninahitsy, fared poorly in the presidential **elections** of 1992 and 1996, respectively, the party clung to 11 **Assemblée Nationale** and 10 provincial council seats won during **Didier Ratsiraka's** second administration, from 1977 through 2001. In Fall 2001, driven by Voninahitsy's energy against Marson's caution, the RPSD joined the campaign of Ratsiraka's challenger, **Antananarivo** mayor **Marc Ravalomanana**. One reason for abandoning Ratsiraka was the conviction of Voninahitsy (later overturned on appeal) for check fraud in December 2000; the government had undertaken prosecution against Voninahitsy, then deputy speaker of the Assembly, for his criticism of its shadowy contract with a Ukrainian firm for the construction of a pontoon bridge in **Toamasina province**.

Having served six months in prison under Ratsiraka, Voninahitsy once again brought RPSD into entanglement with regime power in late 2002 when Ravalomanana's prime minister, **Jacques Sylla** campaigned actively against his reelection in Maintirano (**Mahajanga province**, the RPSD stronghold). Successfully contesting the original tally in favor of the presidential **Tiako-i-Madagasikara** (TIM) candidate, Voninahitsy won in a run-off against the TIM opponent in March 2003, bringing the RPSD caucus to six, although the conflict with Sylla and TIM probably cost the party several seats elsewhere on the island.

The RPSD holds 70 mayoralties (of over 1,500) and six of 160 city councilors in **Antananarivo**. Its options straddle the political fence. While the party's titular leader, Marson, was sent to Rome as ambassador, Voninahitsy formed the *RPSD-Vaovao* (New RPSD) and, still resenting the effort by TIM to unseat him, turned against the regime in 2004. Under his leadership, RPSD participates in broad opposition appeals for the **amnesty** of prisoners arrested during the **Crisis of 2002** as well as a new constitution and a revised electoral law. It is bitterly opposed to Sylla's premiership, and, although less antagonistic toward the president, has charged him with ethnic bias against *Côtiers*.



**RASSEMBLEMENT POUR LE SOCIALISME ET LA DEMOCRATIE (RPSD).** *See* RASSEMBLEMENT POUR LA SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIE.

**RATSIMANDRAVA, RICHARD (1931–1975).** Head of state from 5 to 11 February 1975, Ratsimandrava was born into a **Merina** family of **slave** descent. His father was a teacher in **Antananarivo** and one of the founders of the capital's section of the **Parti des Dëshérités de Madagascar**. Ratsimandrava graduated from Saint Cyr in 1954, and served with the French army in Morocco and Algeria. In 1962, he became a captain in the Malagasy gendarmerie, and in 1969, was promoted to colonel and first Malagasy commander of the gendarmerie. In that capacity he had responsibility for suppressing the April 1971 **Peasant Rebellion** in southern Madagascar.

At the time of the **May 1972 Revolution**, although considered a protégé of President **Philibert Tsiranana**, Ratsimandrava refused to commit the gendarmerie to the defense of Tsiranana's **First Republic**. His defection assured the fall of the regime. In the subsequent **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**, Ratsimandrava became minister of the interior. During the factional struggles that marked the interregnum, he joined with **Didier Ratsiraka** to present a "Left Front" against Ramanantsoa's more conservative second-in-command and presumed successor, **Roland Rabetafika**. He used his powers as minister of the interior to mobilize a populist alliance of the peasantry, the urban *Lumpenproletariat*, and some radical intellectuals responsive to his attacks on **corruption**, his indefatigable radio broadcasts and grassroots tours, and his proposals for a radical restructuring of the country's administration based on the traditional *fokonolona* council units. His strategy was aimed at weakening state power at the local level and instituting "popular control of development."

After the December 1974 coup attempt of Colonel **Bréchara Rajaonarison**, Ratsimandrava joined Ratsiraka in refusing to serve in any future government headed by General **Gabriel Ramanantsoa**. When Ratsiraka made his own participation conditional on Ratsimandrava's abandonment of his posts as minister of the interior, head of the gendarmerie, and leader of the *fokonolona* reform, Ratsimandrava prevailed, thanks to support in the gendarmerie and parts of the

army. He became head of state on 5 February 1975, vowing to continue his attacks on the central apparatus and on official corruption. On 11 February while returning home from his office, he was gunned down. The “**Trial of the Century**” convicted the immediate assassins, but charges were dismissed against 300 other suspects, including former President Tsiranana and Rabetafika. Responsibility for the assassination has never been formally attributed to any source. Ratsimandrava was promoted to the rank of general posthumously and is still remembered with nostalgia among some **military** personnel and in the rural **highlands**. Ratsiraka subsequently captured enough votes in the **Directoire Militaire** to succeed Ratsimandrava and bring in the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM).

**RATSIMILAH**O (?–1750). Founder of the **Betsimisaraka Confederation**, Ratsimilaho was the son of an English **pirate** and a Malagasy mother. He was sent to England for an education, but quickly returned with guns and a plan to extend the authority of the **Zanamalata** over eastern Madagascar. Between 1712 and 1720, he was able to conquer the east coast from **Antongil Bay** to the port of **Toamasina** and to threaten other **Betsimisaraka** polities to the south. After his death in 1750, his successors were not able to hold the confederation together; it gradually disintegrated and was absorbed by the **Merina Empire** after 1815.

**RATSIRAHONANA, NORBERT LALA** (1938– ). A distinguished lawyer from **Antananarivo**, Ratsirahonana spent the beginning of his career in the civil service of the **First Republic**. Entering the legal system, he served in the justice ministry and at the Supreme Court from 1973 to 1992 when he became president of the **Haute Cour Constitutionnelle** (HCC). By then he had changed political allegiances from membership in the regime **AREMA** party during the **Democratic Republic** to **Richard Andriamanjato**’s **AKFM-Fanavaozana**. He participated in drafting the **Third Republic** constitution as a member of the Andriamanjato faction of the **Forces Vives**. In May 1996, Ratsirahonana was appointed prime minister on the insistence of the **International Monetary Fund** that President **Albert Zafy** provide Madagascar’s international partners with a coherent government capable of planning **privatization** of state enterprises,

fiscal austerity, and other principles of **economic** adjustment. His second ministry a month later embraced all major factions of the **Assemblée Nationale**, including Ratsirakists, and was remarkably successful in advancing legislation through a fissiparous parliament.

In September 1996, after confirming the impeachment of Zafy, the HCC deputized Ratsirahonana (its former chief justice) as acting president and authorized him to organize **elections** for the presidency. When he threw his own hat in that ring, eyebrows were raised in the capital. Finishing a disappointing fourth with 10.4 percent of the vote in those elections, he endorsed Zafy in the run-off of December 1996 which Zafy lost by one percent to the resurrected **Didier Ratsiraka**. To support his political ambitions, Ratsirahonana founded the **Asa Vita no Ifampitsarana** (AVI) / People Judged by Their Work with preponderant strength in Antananarivo where he has strong personal influence among the business class. He was elected deputy to the **Assemblée Nationale** along with 13 other AVI members in May 1998. During Ratsiraka's 1997–2001 mandate, AVI maintained its independence, at times endorsing regime initiatives, at times opposing them.

After announcing his candidacy for president in 2001, Ratsirahonana withdrew in September in favor of Antananarivo mayor **Marc Ravalomanana** who had backed him for president in 1996. His decision was impelled in part by AVI's failure to obtain a governing majority in the Antananarivo provincial elections of that September. He advised Ravalomanana during the **Crisis of 2002** that followed the controversial election of the previous December and argued Ravalomanana's case for a recount of the vote before the National Electoral Council. He has been credited with promoting the idea that Ratsiraka's illegitimately "packed" HCC should be repudiated and the court restored to its composition before November 2001. After this juridical strategy resolved the stalemate and brought the army out to eliminate the Ratsirakist militias, Ratsirahonana became a counselor to the new president. He has retired from active politics but has continued to steer AVI as an independent force. Exclusion of AVI from cabinet and parliamentary offices by the triumphalist presidential **Tiako-i-Madagasikara** in 2002 has provoked some criticism of the wisdom of Ratsirahonana's unswerving allegiance to Ravalomanana.

**RATSIRAKA, CELINE.** Wife of the president of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM), Céline Ratsiraka is the daughter of a founder of the **Parti des Dëshérités de Madagascar** (PADESM) and colonial period parliamentarian, **Pascal Velonjara**. In her own right, she was an important political figure in the DRM. With her sister, **Hortense Raveloson-Mahasampo**, she was instrumental in organizing the **women's** branch of the regime party, **AREMA**, and in running the party's **cooperative** movement, including the investment bureau known as **PROCOOP**.

**RATSIRAKA, DIDIER (1936– ).** Born at Vatomandry in **Toamasina province**, with a father who had been a colonial administrator and a founder of the **Parti des Dëshérités de Madagascar**, Ratsiraka entered the Malagasy navy after studies in **France**. At the time of the **May 1972 Revolution** he was serving as naval attaché at the Malagasy embassy in Paris, and was called back to serve as minister of foreign affairs in the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**. As foreign minister he renegotiated the **Cooperation Agreements** with France, earning prestige as the person who brought Madagascar its “second independence.” In the factional struggles of the interregnum, Ratsiraka sided with Interior Minister **Richard Ratsimandrava** to form a “Left Front” in opposition to more conservative officers like **Roland Rabetafika**. After the attempted coup against General **Gabriel Ramanantsoa** in December 1974, Ratsiraka and Ratsimandrava prevented a new Ramanantsoa government by refusing to serve under him. Then Ratsiraka also refused to join a government with Ratsimandrava unless the latter gave up his posts of minister of the interior and head of the gendarmerie. In this struggle Ratsiraka was handicapped by the small size of his primary base of support, the navy, and it was Ratsimandrava who became chief of state on 5 February 1975, forming a government that excluded Ratsiraka.

In the security crisis that followed Ratsimandrava's assassination on 11 February, Ratsiraka joined the **Directoire Militaire** that took power, and was a candidate for the succession. He was able to put together a coalition that held the balance between a conservative faction headed by General **Gilles Andriamahazo** and Ratsimandrava's radical populists led by Commandant **Soja**. On 15 June, the **Directoire** chose Ratsiraka as president. His mandate was confirmed in the

**Referendum of 21 December 1975** that simultaneously endorsed formation of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) and Ratsiraka's **Charter of the Malagasy Revolution**. Ratsiraka was to be the only president of the DRM, serving until his ouster in 1992. Although authoritarian in style and a professed admirer of **North Korea's** Kim-il Sung, he was never an uncontested dictator. He was unable to forge Madagascar's political fragments into a single-party state and he skillfully used legal means to vindicate policy. In the years between 1975 and 1992 he faced several crises, including divisions in the regime party, **AREMA**, in the early 1980s; a contested presidential **election** in 1982 in which his opponent, **Monja Jaona**, called for a general strike and the overthrow of the regime; violent urban opposition in the form of **Kung Fu** groups in 1984–1985; and another presidential election in 1989 in which three opposing candidates were able to gain an official total of 48.7 percent of the vote.

Several reasons account for Ratsiraka's difficulties. In the first place, Malagasy **political culture** pays formal homage to unity while suspecting the motives of any authority (*fanjakana*) that claims to enforce it. Moreover, that culture rewards oratorical skills in the Malagasy **language** that Ratsiraka, although eloquent in French, did not display. On the institutional level, although he promoted himself to admiral, he was never able to establish firm control over the **military** or the civil service. Growing **corruption** in governing circles, with grave suspicions cast on his own family, caused resentment. Finally, virtually from the start of his republic, Madagascar struggled with a crisis of poverty and international **debt** that his strategies proved incapable of resolving. In the end, these imperatives required a progressive abandonment of socialism and a reluctant but inevitable rapprochement with the West. By adroit maneuvers which he likened to a masterful basketball "dribbler," Ratsiraka was able to manage the divided opposition until after 1989, when his challengers began to combine their disparate interests.

In 1991, the opposition united in the Comité des **Forces Vives** to demand an end to the DRM and the removal of Ratsiraka. In the power-sharing **Panorama Agreement** that prepared the way for the **Third Republic**, he managed to retain his title, but without any real power. He then attempted to mobilize his political and military following to demand the creation of a federal state. When the **National**

**Forum** rejected this maneuver and disqualified him from presidential candidacy, Ratsiraka campaigned against the proposed **constitution**. In several coastal provinces the campaign became violent. Facing the threat of civil chaos, the electoral committee agreed to let Ratsiraka run for president. He came in second in the initial round, held on 25 November 1992, receiving 28.3 percent of the vote. In the runoff election, held on 10 February 1993, he again placed second, with 33 percent of the vote, to **Albert Zafy**, consensus candidate of the Forces Vives. His defeat took him into self-imposed exile in France while awaiting the recall that he was sure would come. It did, in October 1996.

The revived Didier Ratsiraka of 1996 bore little resemblance to his original revolutionary inspiration. What survived after the three-year interruption was a master tactician, a Francophone elder modeled on the most durable leaders of French-speaking Africa, a protecting presence who could embody the mythical *fanjakana rayamandreny* (parental establishment) for enough of the Malagasy electorate to win election. Above all, he profited from the vicissitudes of his rival, Zafy, who had managed in his three-year presidency to antagonize most of the **Assemblée Nationale** (which impeached him in mid-1996) together with the international agencies and foreign embassies of **Antananarivo**. Ratsiraka also benefited from the failure of a credible third alternative. When elections were scheduled to replace the ousted Zafy on 3 November 1996, Ratsiraka was ready. Zafy was also permitted to run, so that the disgraced president of 1992 outscored the newly impeached president by 36.6 to 23.4 percent; 13 other candidates divided the remainder. In the run-off between the two on 29 December, while half the electorate stayed away, Ratsiraka outpolled Zafy by less than a single percentage point. Abandoning the mythology of his revolutionary past, the newly reelected president announced the advent of an "ecological and humanist" state.

Although briefer, Ratsiraka's second mandate ended in the same temper of mass protest and bellicose confrontation as his first. While it was functioning, however, the five-year administration proved seriously dedicated to three main objectives: reconsolidation of the AREMA party patronage system, particularly in the countryside where residents had few if any alternatives; constitutional devolution of administrative powers away from central Antananarivo; and the

application of a less politicized, technocratic ministerial team to the dictates of **economic** adjustment, market liberalization, **privatization** of remaining state enterprises from the DRM, and management of the external **debt**. All three projects were placed in the hands of capable lieutenants without overt intervention by the head of state; all three took time to complete; all were on the way to resolution when the presidential term would expire in February 2002.

Despite reports of failing health (his diabetes was affecting his eyesight, at the least), Ratsiraka faced his reelection with confidence. He seemed unabashed by exposure of overt nepotism in favor of his son and three daughters, and he believed himself the incarnation of whatever political ethos happened to prevail in the country. He had crafted a benign, cosmopolitan image that suited the expectations of a *rayamandreny* (father and mother). His party had carried three rounds of elections successfully (the National Assembly in May 1998, the newly created **Senate** and the “autonomous provinces” in 2001). The national economic growth rate showed impressive progress with significant prospects for debt relief and eventually for the rise in living standards demanded by the Malagasy people. He could also count on the “usual suspects” to pose multiple candidacies against him in a fragmented opposition. In November 2001, barely one month before the first-round election, he replaced three presidential appointees on the nine-judge **Haute Cour Constitutionnelle** (HCC) which was to certify the election—a serious mistake.

Rather than scatter as widely as Ratsiraka had anticipated, his most substantial opposition concerted on the candidacy of Antananarivo mayor, **Marc Ravalomanana**, whose own campaign had unprecedented national scope, resourceful use of advertising techniques, and a simple, direct appeal to voter aspirations. Conducting his usual paternalistic campaign, the 65-year old Ratsiraka showed little enthusiasm for the fight, preferring to reply on party efficacy and *Côtier* disdain for the **Merina** Ravalomanana. His calculations proved inaccurate, as even his interior ministry had to concede, awarding Ravalomanana a plurality of 46 percent to Ratsiraka’s 40 percent. No doubt, the incumbent expected his machine to deliver the second round, but that run-off never occurred. Scorned by strikers and demonstrators in the pro-Ravalomanana capital, charged with electoral fraud by national observers and church officials, Ratsiraka

failed to mobilize his army to administer a decree of martial law on 28 February 2002. He thereupon abandoned the hostile capital and set up a parallel administration at more congenial Toamasina, his home province and the island's major port.

During the **Crisis of 2002**, the beleaguered admiral appealed to the governors of the provinces to separate from Antananarivo, and all but **Antananarivo province** responded. This secessionist strategy was revoked when it incurred disapproval in Paris and among his colleague presidents in the **Organization of African Unity** who undertook to mediate. Ratsiraka also failed to obtain direct international intervention so long as Ravalomanana could show that popular opinion was against a second round in the election that the mayor claimed to have already won. Ratsiraka's final attack on that position came in a virtual siege of **highland** Antananarivo through roadblocks, dynamited bridges, and interruption of food and fuel supplies. Without support from the army or gendarmerie, however, his improvised militias proved inefficient. They were readily eliminated in May and June when the regular military, persuaded of Ravalomanana's legitimacy by action of a restored HCC, conducted its sweep of pacification. For the third time in Ratsiraka's public career, the country had been brought to the brink of civil war.

Ultimately, after long hesitation, the French government decided to abandon its neutrality and to initiate relations with Ravalomanana. On 25 June, after a final appeal in Paris, where he hoped to count on his friendship with President Jacques Chirac, Ratsiraka abandoned the island for refuge in France. There the unreconciled ex-president is compelled to renew his visa every six months. He is also expected officially to conduct himself discreetly, although he is believed to hold regular, well-attended meetings of Malagasy, French, and African sympathizers.

In Madagascar, AREMA loyalists have joined in Ratsiraka's behalf with his erstwhile mortal rival, Albert Zafy, to nullify the Ravalomanana presidency, liberate the (mostly AREMAist) prisoners from 2002, and return the island by plebiscite to a new constitution. Several episodes of disturbance in the island have been traced by conjecture to Ratsiraka's instigation, but French authorities have expressed no reason to disapprove of his conduct. For its part, the Ravalomanana government has tried the ex-president in absentia and, on 6 August 2003,



sentenced him to 10 years hard labor and a fine of \$1 million for embezzlement of public funds, but Antananarivo has refrained from embarrassing the French by a request for his extradition.

**RATSIRAKA, ETIENNE.** The older brother of ex-President **Didier Ratsiraka**, Etienne Ratsiraka is married to the daughter of Jean-François Jarison, a cabinet minister during the **First Republic**. Ratsiraka was a civil servant in the Ministry of the Interior at the time of the **May 1972 Revolution**. He was briefly secretary-general of the ministry, but clashed with the minister, **Richard Ratsimandrava**, over the latter's strategy to empower the local *fokonolona* councils. He then became director of the **Société Nationale de Commerce**, a position that he left in 1976 to enter the private sector.

**RAVALOMANANA, MARC (1949– ).** When he was elected mayor of **Antananarivo** in November 1999, Ravalomanana was already a national personality. Starting in 1982, he had created an island-wide empire of agricultural and dairy products (under the “Tiko” brand-name) without benefit of grand family status, but with a \$1.5 million loan from the **World Bank**. From an *andriana* (noble) family of modest means in rural **Imerina**, Ravalomanana had taken a degree in Denmark, learned English, and developed a passion for the **Protestant** faith. As mayor of the shabby, over-crowded, badly polluted capital, he could take credit for balancing the municipal budget, cleaning slums and managing waste disposal, improving water quality, and bringing new technology into the school system. When he campaigned for the presidential **election** of 16 December 2001, he came out of the sky in his own helicopter followed by cameras from his own television channel, spouting Malagasy proverbs to appreciative crowds. When President **Didier Ratsiraka**'s interior ministry (and subsequently, his hand-picked courts) announced Ravalomanana's plurality of 46 percent of the vote, he surprised nobody by claiming an outright majority and using his control of the capital to paralyze (and subsequently restart) the government apparatus.

Ravalomanana's image as giant-killer and bringer of hope had spread virtually throughout Madagascar, where he had obtained pluralities—or at least impressive scores—in all provinces, helping destroy the myth that a **Merina** would never be trusted by voters outside the **highlands**.

In this process, his self-confidence and autocratic powers of decision catalyzed an urban population into massive demonstrations, general strikes, and civil disobedience that eventually forced Ratsiraka out of the capital. Ravalomanana had himself inaugurated on 22 February prematurely, albeit with approval by the **FFKM** churches; he named **Jacques Sylla** prime minister, and sent civil servants back into the ministries to begin functioning; and, while respecting efforts at mediation by the **Organization of African Unity**, he never yielded the conviction that he had won a majority in December. When this claim was vindicated by the **Haute Cour Constitutionnelle** (HCC)—reconstituted to reflect its membership before it was “packed” by Ratsiraka a month prior to the election—Ravalomanana gained the support of Madagascar’s cautious **military** leadership and, gradually, of the international community. National unity was restored through army assaults on the blockades erected by Ratsiraka partisans during the **Crisis of 2002**. Ravalomanana proceeded to a second, more orthodox, inauguration on 6 May 2002. International recognition followed gradually, although ties with **African Union** colleagues remained stigmatized for an additional year by the peremptory eviction of Ratsiraka and the presumption of the 22 February inauguration.

A brand of pragmatism with an “American” promotional flair is combined with Ravalomanana’s passion for Malagasy traditional culture and his **Christianity**, a blend that even his most ardent admirers have trouble reconciling at times. Passion for his job, contrasting with Ratsiraka’s lofty insouciance, is expressed in the titles chosen for his political and commercial ventures. Playing on his well-known brand name, his mayoral campaign was baptized “*Tiako Iarivo*” (I love Antananarivo) and his presidential banner became adapted into “*Tiako-i-Madagasikara*” (TIM) / I love Madagascar. TIM was indeed the title chosen for the new political party formed in 2002 to campaign for parliamentary and subsequent elections. Many of his closest advisors are drawn from his company and allow themselves to be identified as “Tiko boys.”

Drawing the line between sentiment and “business,” Ravalomanana’s major appointments have been calculated to accommodate international partner expectations, to heal the wounds of the 2002 confrontations, and to prod Madagascar toward “rapid and sustained” development. His unabashed piety (he is vice president of the **Protestant**

**church** assembly FJKM) and his insistence on enforcing probity at all levels of administration—corresponding to the regime’s two watchwords, *fahamasinana* (sacredness) and *fahamarinana* (honesty)—have struck observers as naïve in a country accustomed to brigandage by the elite. In truth, these goals have proved elusive in Ravalomanana’s first years, as they had for his predecessors. Although budget and fiscal tightening and plans for “poverty reduction” have impressed international experts, progress in tangible living standards remains elusive. Several highly publicized development initiatives failed to produce appreciable results; two of them—a tax holiday for importers and an offer of land grants to foreign investors—even seemed to backfire in resentment from established producers and property owners. The import concessions drew criticism from the **International Monetary Fund** (IMF) and started gossip to the effect that they were mainly a service to Tiko and its partners—thus arousing unflattering comparisons with the putatively venal Ratsiraka dynasty.

Ravalomanana has alternated tactics between blunt offensiveness to former backers who no longer serve his purposes and exaggerated respect for established ways of the bureaucracy. In search of the ideal balances, Ravalomanana has reorganized his ministerial teams four times since February 2002, albeit not at the sacrifice of Prime Minister Sylla or Foreign Minister **Marcel Ranjeva**. Noting the president’s impulsiveness and inconsistencies, sympathetic observers wonder if he had a defined agenda for the country beyond populist manipulation of imagery. Although willing to give Ravalomanana more than two years to turn socioeconomic conditions around, the population can scarcely be blamed for some impatience. Two decades of stagnation, malnutrition, and declining services have taken their toll on a proud people who believe their country entitled to a better rank in the world prosperity list than 12th place from the bottom.

Expatriates around the ousted Ratsiraka have found voice in Madagascar through sympathizers of the prisoners of 2002, most of them **AREMA** partisans. Ravalomanana was unable to induce the **Assemblée Nationale** (controlled by his TIM party) and the **Senate** (with a pro-Ratsiraka majority) to agree on the terms of an **amnesty** bill needed to clear the prisons and reduce the regime’s vulnerability to human rights criticism. His inadequate recourse on 31 December

2003 was to issue 70 presidential pardons that, by law, had to fall short of the envisioned amnesty. The opposition “national reconciliation” campaigns are conducted by an otherwise unlikely alliance of AREMA rejectionists, adherents of ex-president **Albert Zafy**, and some embittered former fellow travelers of Ravalomanana disappointed at having been left out of the distribution of spoils. What they have in common is largely outrage at Ravalomanana’s triumph through unconventional rules and an unfortunate tribalist sense of solidarity as *Côtiers* at the mercy of a Merina. They use against him all signs of weakness in the regime, its evidence of cronyism, the president’s occasional self-righteousness, and hints of influence on him by the “great Merina families” and princes of the church.

**RAVELOJAONA (1879–1956).** Born in **Antananarivo** to a **Protestant** minister father attached to the **London Missionary Society**, Ravelojaona attended the **Ecole Le Myre de Vilers** and taught in the Protestant **mission** schools. He founded an organization called the Union Chrétienne des Jeunes Gens (Christian Young People’s Union) to unite the educated youth of the capital, but the union was banned by the colonial authorities as a potential center of **nationalist** activity. In 1913, Ravelojaona wrote a series of articles entitled “Japan and the Japanese,” discussing the possibility of modernization while maintaining traditional culture. These ideas are said to have been the inspiration for the formation of **Vy Vato Sakelika** (VVS). When that organization was suppressed in 1915 he was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment. The charges against him were dismissed on appeal. Although Ravelojaona was never a member of the interwar **Ralaimongo group**, he was elected in 1939 to the **Conseil Supérieur des Colonies** and during the war organized the **Comité du Salut Public**. After the war he founded the **Parti Démocratique Malgache** and ran unsuccessfully against **Joseph Ravoahangy** in the 1945 elections to the French **Constituent Assemblies**. He subsequently formed the Parti Libéral Chrétien but was not able to recapture his prewar audience.

**RAVELOSON-MAHASAMPO.** An administrator in the colonial civil service from **Toliara** province, Raveloson-Mahasampo was one of the founders of the **Parti des Dëshérités de Madagascar** (PADESM). He

ran unsuccessfully against **Joseph Raseta** in the 1946 elections to the second of the French **Constituent Assemblies**. In 1951 he was elected to the French National Assembly from the western district of Madagascar. In 1956, arguing that PADESM had become too centered on **Antananarivo** and too interested in autonomy, Raveloson-Mahasampo formed the Union Démocratique Côtère and ran unsuccessfully for reelection against **Philibert Tsiranana**. In 1957, he was elected to the provincial assembly of Toliara on a list affiliated with the **Union Démocratique et Sociale de Madagascar** (UDSM), opposing the **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD) ticket of **André Resampa**. He was also elected to the **Assemblée Nationale** and became a vice president, but his quarrels with Tsiranana and Resampa prevented him from extending his political influence. His son, **Christophe Raveloson-Mahasampo**, was an important figure in the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM).

#### **RAVELOSON-MAHASAMPO, CHRISTOPHE BIEN-AIMEE.**

Son of a founder of the **Parti des Dshérités de Madagascar**, Christophe Raveloson-Mahasampo's marriage to a daughter of **Pascal Velonjara** made him a brother-in-law of **Didier Ratsiraka**. A captain in the army at the time of the **May 1972 Revolution**, he became **military** governor of the province of **Toamasina** during the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** and was named minister of public works in the government of Colonel **Richard Ratsimandrava**. Raveloson-Mahasampo was a representative of **Toliara province** in the **Directoire Militaire** that took power after Ratsimandrava's assassination. When the directoire elected Ratsiraka president in June 1975, Christophe Raveloson-Mahasampo became head of the chief internal security organization, the Direction Générale d'Investigation et de Documentation (DGID). The service was much criticized both for brutality and for lack of effectiveness, particularly in a series of trials in 1983. Raveloson-Mahasampo was removed as head of the service in March 1985, as a gesture by Ratsiraka to placate his opposition. After the death of **Guy Sibon** in May 1986, however, Raveloson-Mahasampo, by then a general, was named minister of defense. He was dismissed from this post in February 1991 again as part of Ratsiraka's effort to accommodate opposition criticism. His wife, **Hortense Raveloson-Mahasampo**, was important during the **Democratic**

**Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) in her own right, and their son, Thierry Raveloson, was for a time governor of Toliara province under the presidency of **Marc Ravalomanana**.

**RAVELOSON-MAHASAMPO, HORTENSE.** Wife of **Christophe Raveloson-Mahasampo** and sister of **Céline Ratsiraka**, Hortense Raveloson-Mahasampo was an influential figure in the politics of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM). With her sister she was head of the women's branch of the regime party, **AREMA**. She was also involved in the economic activities of the party, including the **cooperative** and investment agency called **PROCOOP**, which was considered the regime's secret fund. She kept Ratsiraka's presence alive within AREMA during the ex-president's self-exile in 1993–1996 and was elected to the **Assemblée Nationale** in 1998.

**RAVOAHANGY-ANDRIANAVALONA, JOSEPH (1893–1970).**

Born in **Fianarantsoa** to a family of the **Merina** aristocracy, Ravoahangy attended Protestant **mission** schools, the **Ecole Le Myre de Vilers**, and the medical school at **Befelatanana**. While at Befelatanana he was a founder of **Vy Vato Sakelika**, and when the society was dissolved by the colonial administration he was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment. He was amnestied in 1921, and took up nationalist activities again, working with the **Ralaimongo group**. He helped found the group's journal, *L'Opinion*, and took over responsibility for it when **Jean Ralaimongo** was sent to prison. After the **Demonstration of 19 May 1929** in **Antananarivo**, he was sentenced to assigned residence and not released until 1936. Ravoahangy was also active in the efforts of the Ralaimongo group to establish **labor unions** in Madagascar. During World War II, he was secretary-general of the **Syndicat des Agriculteurs et Eleveurs de Madagascar** and after the war he was elected to the **Constituent Assemblies** of the Fourth French Republic. Together with the other delegates, **Joseph Raseta** and **Jacques Rabemananjara**, Ravoahangy founded the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** (MDRM). In November 1946, he was elected to the French National Assembly.

After the outbreak of the **Rebellion of 1947**, Ravoahangy's parliamentary immunity was lifted and he was convicted as one of the organizers of the revolt and sentenced to death. The sentence was

commuted in 1949, and he was sent first to prison in Corsica, then to assigned residence in **France**. The sentence was lifted in 1957, but Ravoahangy and the other MDRM deputies were not allowed to return to Madagascar until July 1960. Like Rabemananjara, Ravoahangy made his peace with the new president of Madagascar, **Philibert Tsiranana**, and in the September 1960 elections to the Malagasy **Assemblée Nationale**, he headed a list of national unity in **Antananarivo province**. He joined the government **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD) in 1961. Ravoahangy served first as minister of public health and, after 1964, as minister without portfolio in Tsiranana's governments.

**RAVOAJANAHARY, CHARLES.** A professor at the **University of Madagascar**, and a native of **Antananarivo province**, Ravoajana-hary was one of the main contributors to the early ideology of **AREMA**, the regime party of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM). Under the **First Republic** he had been a member initially of the **AKFM** and then of **MONIMA**. After the establishment of the DRM in 1975, he served as an advisor to President **Didier Ratsiraka** and was named to the **Conseil Suprême de la Révolution** (CSR) when it was enlarged to include civilian members. As the oldest member, he filled the position of doyen and was head of the political and ideological committee. In the early 1980s, he supported the anti-presidential "right AREMA," led by the minister of finance, **Rakotovao-Razakaboana**, and in 1982, was ousted from his position on the AREMA political bureau and the CSR.

**RAVONY, FRANCISQUE (1942–2003).** A lawyer who had successfully defended his father-in-law, **Philibert Tsiranana**, against charges of plotting the assassination of **Richard Ratsimandrava** in 1975, Ravony led the **MFM** committee that helped negotiate the end of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** in 1991–1992. He became deputy prime minister in the transition government named by **Guy Razanamasy** on 13 November 1991, and held the post into mid-1993. Although born in Vohipeno in the southeast, he came from a notable **Merina** family and was thus politically acceptable to "tribalists" on both sides. The son of Jules Ravony, president of the **Senate** in the **First Republic**, he married Honorine Tsiranana, daughter

of that republic's president. In 1992, Ravony left the MFM to form the Comité de Soutien au Développement et à la Démocratie (CS-DDM), grouping partisans of **Forces Vives** presidential candidate, **Albert Zafy**. Enjoying President Zafy's respect as well as a reputation for moderation and cool-headedness (his nickname, *Tsiatosika*, means he "won't be pushed"), Ravony was a compromise choice to become the first prime minister of the **Third Republic**.

During his three ministries over two years (9 August 1993 to 30 October 1995), Ravony faced two votes of no-confidence in the uproarious **Assemblée Nationale** as well as a gradual collapse in his relations with the president. Zafy chafed under parliamentary prerogatives granted by the new **constitution** and was also suspicious of "foreign" influences that he descried in Ravony's efforts to satisfy international donor demands for fiscal austerity and market liberalization. Once the president had solved the first problem through his murky **Referendum of September 1995**, he fired Ravony and took hold of the **economy** on his own with a more complaisant ministry under **Emmanuel Rakotovahiny**. Zafy even took to denouncing Ravony as corrupt and a threat to security, unlikely charges that were never substantiated.

Once relieved of his ministry, Ravony scrapped the CSDDM, which had placed only one legislative deputy beside himself, and formed the **AVAMAMI** (*Antokon'ny vahoaka malagasy miray*, Party of the Malagasy People on the March). Still a lone voice, he joined the opposition in **Didier Ratsiraka**'s second administration from 1997 to 2001. During that period, while practicing law, he sought to reconcile the diverse factions into a coherent opposition. These efforts materialized in the December 2001 presidential **election** campaign when Ravony and others declared for **Antananarivo** mayor **Marc Ravalomanana** whose agro-dairy firm, Tiko, he had represented in the courts. While never a part of Ravalomanana's inner circle, Ravony defended the new president in the legal skirmishes fought during the **Crisis of 2002** with Ratsiraka. He died suddenly of a heart attack on 15 February 2003.

**RAZAFINDRABE, VICTORIEN (c.1898–1948)**. A member of a **Merina** family of **slave** ancestry, Razafindrabe was a member of the secret society **JINA** and the head of the section of the **Mouvement**



**Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** in Moramanga, a strategic town along the line of rail between **Antananarivo** and **Toamasina**. He led the **Rebellion of 1947** in that sector, and was not captured until September 1948. He died in October of the effects of deprivation while a fugitive.

**RAZAFINDRAKOTO, EMMANUEL.** Razafindrakoto was a journalist and member of the **Ralaimongo group** of nationalists in the interwar period. He collaborated with another **nationalist** figure, **Joseph Ravoahangy**, in several attempts to create Malagasy **labor unions**, most of which were declared illegal by the colonial administration. In 1941, he was interned by Governor-General **Léon Cayla**, but after the **British Invasion** of 1942 and the coming of the **Free French**, he was released in 1943.

**RAZAFIMAHALEO, HERIZO (1956– ).** A businessman, Razafimahaleo was founder of the important centrist party **Leader Fanilo** (Leading Torch) in May 1992. He and his party maintained an off-and-on relationship with both **Third Republic** Presidents **Albert Zafy** and **Didier Ratsiraka**. After Ratsiraka's fall in 1992, he became minister of industry, trade, and tourism in the first **Francisque Ravony** administration, resigning in August 1994 when Ravony divided the ministry and offered him half. After running against both ex-presidents in the **election** of November of 1996, where he polled 15 percent of the vote, he endorsed Ratsiraka in the run-off election in December and accepted cabinet posts for himself and other Leader Fanilo politicians in Ratsiraka's administration. In 1998, he withdrew after one year as foreign minister and vice-premier under Prime Minister **Pascal Rakotomavo**, and in October 2001, he pulled Leader Fanilo out of the Ratsiraka administration entirely in order to run once more for the presidency (he obtained only 4.26 percent of the vote). After they both lost that election to **Marc Ravalomanana**, Razafimahaleo sought a return to the Ratsiraka camp but encountered a pro-Ravalomanana consensus against him in the party. He resigned the Leader Fanilo presidency in August 2002 and decided not to run for parliamentary reelection in December. By that time, heavily in debt to finance his political ambitions, Razafimahaleo sold his controlling interest in the printing company that publishes the important **Antananarivo** daily *L'Express*.

**RAZANABAHINY-MAROJAMA, JEROME (1930– )**. A native of the southeast and founder of **Vonjy Iray Tsy Mivaky** (Salvation in Unity), Razanabahiny has a reputation for joining whatever administration happens to hold power. He began his political career in the **First Republic** as a member of the 1959 Constituent Assembly. He was a director of the youth branch of the **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD) and a senator from 1966 to 1972; during this period he was also mayor of Vangaindrano in **Fianarantsoa province**. After the **May 1972 Revolution**, Razanabahiny split with the other PSD leaders to support the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**. He founded Vonjy in 1973, and was elected to the **Conseil National Populaire pour le Développement**. In 1976, he took his party into the **Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution** (FNDR) and became a member of the **Conseil Suprême de la Révolution**. In both bodies, he and his party were regarded as representing the conservative, middle-class wing.

With the **economic** crisis of the 1980s, Razanabahiny was increasingly critical of President **Didier Ratsiraka**. In March 1987 he joined the leaders of **MONIMA** and the **MFM** in the **Alliance Démocratique de Madagascar** to resist government policies, and in March 1989, he ran against Ratsiraka for president of the republic. He came in third, after Ratsiraka and **Manandafy Rakotonirina**, with 14.8 percent of the vote. He returned to the admiral's beleaguered side in the "federalist" **Mouvement Militant pour le Socialisme Malgache** in March 1990 and in September his house was set on fire by crowds returning from an anti-Ratsiraka demonstration at the presidential palace. Switching sides again, he joined the transitional **Haute Autorité d'Etat** as vice president under the **Forces Vives** leadership of **Albert Zafy** and was elected as a pro-Zafy Vonjy deputy to the **Assemblée Nationale** from Vangaindrano in June 1993. Jumping back to Ratsiraka in 1997, Razanabahiny failed reelection to the Assembly in 1998 and returned to the practice of medicine.

**RAZANAMASY, GUY WILLY (1928– )**. In August 1991 Guy Razanamasy, mayor of **Antananarivo**, was asked by President **Didier Ratsiraka** to form a government within his **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) that would include members of the opposition. Razanamasy's first cabinet included some people unaffiliated with

Ratsiraka, but the project was shunned by the main opposition groups, including the **Comité des Forces Vives** and the **FFKM** churches, which demanded the removal of Ratsiraka before they would participate. Razanamasy made several further efforts toward national reconciliation and to end the demonstrations and strikes staged by the opposition, but without success. It was not until December 1991, when the power-sharing **Panorama Agreement** was ratified, that Razanamasy was able to propose a government acceptable to the opposition; that cabinet included only one supporter of Ratsiraka. Razanamasy continued as prime minister during the period of transition to the **Third Republic**. Although weakened by his fence-straddling during the 1991 crisis, as well as by aggravated inflation and other worries during his watch, and ridiculed especially for his endorsement of **Jacques Rabemananjara**, a sorry loser in the 1992 presidential contest, Razanamasy was able to resume negotiations with the **World Bank** and **International Monetary Fund (IMF)** and other international partners. He delivered an austerity budget and registered some progress in **economic** production and **external trade**.

In June 1993 Razanamasy won a seat, together with seven other members of his Fihaonana (Assembly) party, in the **Assemblée Nationale** of the **Third Republic**. He placed a respectable second in the race for president (speaker) of the Assembly behind his mayoral predecessor, **Richard Andriamanjato**. In 1995, after calling for the resignation of President **Albert Zafy** whom he regarded as a disappointment, Razanamasy was reelected mayor, beating a candidate proposed by Andriamanjato's **AKFM-Fanavaozana**, an influential component of the Forces Vives. He declined to run for the post again in 1999, thus opening a way for businessman **Marc Ravalomanana** to advance to even higher levels.

**REBELLION OF 1947.** One of the first and most serious uprisings in the postwar colonial world, this revolt broke out in the night of 29–30 March 1947, with attacks on French installations and **settlers** along the eastern region of Madagascar. At its height the rebellion reached as far inland as **Fianarantsoa** and reduced communications between that city and **Antananarivo** to daytime convoys. The center of gravity of the revolt was the cash-crop region of the east coast, where peasants had been displaced by the creation of plantations and sub-

jected to demands for **forced labor**. It also spread rapidly along the rail lines. The failure of attacks on the French military camp at Fianarantsoa itself, as well as on installations at **Diégo-Suarez** and Antananarivo, and the quiescence of the western region of Madagascar, prevented the island-wide uprising that the rebels had hoped for. It was late 1947, however, before the French were able to place the Malagasy forces on the defensive, and December 1948 before the revolt could be considered terminated. Some parts of the island remained in a state of siege until 1956.

Estimates of the death toll in the insurrection vary widely. Immediately after its suppression the French high command put the number of dead at 89,000, of which 550 were non-Malagasy, while a French investigation conducted from 1950 to 1952 estimated that 11,200 had died, 1,900 during the insurrection itself, 3,000 during its suppression, and 6,300 from disease and malnutrition. Other observers put the toll as high as 100,000.

The colonial administration attributed responsibility for the rebellion to the nationalist party, the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** (MDRM); it arrested party activists, including the three MDRM deputies, **Joseph Ravoahangy**, **Joseph Raseta**, and **Jacques Rabemananjara**, conducted the highly controversial **Tananarive trial**, executed many rebel combatants and imprisoned the others. The MDRM itself was dissolved in May 1947. It is probable that the actual planning of the revolt was carried out by the secret societies **PANAMA** and **JINA**, recruiting from the party, **labor union** members, and returned soldiers, as well as from peasants who had been displaced by cash-crop **agriculture**. The causes of the rebellion and the behavior of French authorities in its repression continue to be debated in **France**. Nevertheless, as the death toll indicates, the revolt was in many ways a civil war, and the Malagasy victims included both rebels and many Malagasy whom the rebels considered collaborators with the colonial system.

The revolt wove together longstanding grievances against the existence of the colonial system with complaints created by the privations of World War II and by the mobilization of the island's resources for the war effort, as symbolized by the **Office du Riz**. Its goal was an independent Malagasy state. The **Brazzaville Conference** and the **United Nations** Charter had raised hopes that colonialism was coming

to an end, as had the early electoral successes of the MDRM. For some Malagasy, the revolt also looked back to the previous independent Malagasy state—the **Merina Empire**—and was timed to coincide with the traditional period of the precolonial purification ritual, the *fandroana*.

Since the rebellion was in part a civil war, it reflected and inspired highly ambivalent attitudes among the Malagasy population. Many members of the governing party of the **First Republic**, the **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD), had been opposed to the MDRM through the **Parti des Dëshérités de Madagascar** (PADESM) and had both suffered in the revolt and participated in its suppression. It was not until 1967 that the date of the outbreak of the revolt was declared a national holiday, and even then the anniversary issue of the journal *Lumière* was seized. The **Revolution of May 1972** converted anti-French **nationalism** into a state principle, however. Hence, the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** considered itself to be the culmination of the hopes of “the martyrs of 1947,” and the **Charter of the Malagasy Revolution** made specific reference to them.

**RECONCILIATION NATIONALE, COMITE DE (CRN) / COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.** A loose coalition of political factions opposed to the **Third Republic** administration of **Marc Ravalomanana**, the CRN was formed in 2002 by ex-President **Albert Zafy** together with a resuscitated **AREMA**, regime party of **Didier Ratsiraka**, and an association of families seeking liberation for over 400 Ratsiraka partisans arrested on security grounds during and after the **Crisis of 2002**. It has been joined by a heterogeneity of erstwhile Ravalomanana supporters disappointed by the new regime’s refusal to share the spoils of its 2002 and 2003 electoral victories. CRN principals regard Ravalomanana as illegitimate and dictatorial; they call for a new national convention and referendum to restore legality to Madagascar. Others, including **MONIMA**’s **Gabriel Rabearimanana**, **MFM**’s **Pety Rakotoniaina**, **Rassemblement pour la Social-Démocratie** (RPSD) maverick **Jean-Eugène Voninahitsy**, and **Pierre Tsiranana**, assign criminal blame on all sides of the 2002 controversy, urging formation of a “truth and reconciliation” commission similar to **South Africa**’s recent experiment. Only the AREMA constituents demand rehabilita-

tion and repatriation for Ratsiraka, his family, and lieutenants in exile. They have joined Zafy and others in seeking to arouse resentment among *Côtiers* against what they describe as a restoration of **Merina** hegemony under Ravalomanana. Handicapped by its limited parliamentary presence, the CRN has found resonance in provincial capitals **Toamasina**, **Toliara**, and **Mahajanga**, but its widely publicized rallies have been subject to increasing police repression, forcing the movement to resort to press conferences and communiqués.

**REFERENDUM ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FIFTH FRENCH REPUBLIC.** On 28 September 1958, citizens of the overseas territories voted along with metropolitan French to adopt the constitution of **France's** Fifth Republic. For the territories, including Madagascar, approving the constitution meant the acquisition of autonomy within the French Community, while rejection would have led to immediate independence (as in the case of Guinée, sole territory to register a majority in the negative). In Madagascar the referendum polarized the party landscape. The **Parti Social Démocrate** and the **Union Démocratique et Sociale de Madagascar** formed the **Cartel des Républicains** to campaign for a “yes” vote, while the parties that had attended the **Tamatave Congress** urged rejection of the constitution. General **Charles De Gaulle's** visit to **Antananarivo** in August effected little change in these commitments, although De Gaulle seemed to predict eventual restoration of the nation's independence. Some groups were encouraged to support an affirmative vote after Paris conceded that countries choosing autonomy within the French Community could subsequently opt for eventual independence. In spite of this, Madagascar had the highest proportion of votes against the constitution after Guinée. Negative votes were 22 percent of the total for the whole island, and 50.5 percent in the province of Antananarivo.

**REFERENDUM, 8 OCTOBER 1972.** This referendum ratified the position of General **Gabriel Ramanantsoa** as head of state after the **May 1972 Revolution** and the acquisition of emergency powers by Ramanantsoa. The question was: “Do you accept the law that will enable General Ramanantsoa and his government of national unity to undertake over a period of five years the structural transformations

necessary for reform and to create in political life a climate acceptable to the wishes of the population?" The law in question eliminated the position of president of the republic, thereby effectively denying **Philibert Tsiranana**, who had nominally kept the office after May 1972, any claim to legitimacy.

**REFERENDUM, 21 DECEMBER 1975.** This referendum marked the official beginning of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** and ratified the presidency of **Didier Ratsiraka**. The question posed by the referendum was: "In order to create a new society and to bring about the reign of justice and social equality, do you accept the **Charter of the Socialist Revolution** and the **constitution** applying it and do you accept Captain Didier Ratsiraka as president of the Republic?" Of those eligible to vote 92.6 percent did so, and 94.7 percent voted in favor of the referendum.

**REFERENDUM, 19 AUGUST 1992.** Drafted by committees of a **National Forum** organized by the **FFKM** churches, the new **constitution** called for a balance of powers between executive and legislative branches of government. It was to have been put to plebiscite in June 1992, but the vote was postponed until it could be held without disorder. Titular President **Didier Ratsiraka** had refused to cooperate in a process that entailed his abdication without transferring authority to "federated" provinces. The result was a procedural compromise in which Ratsiraka was declared eligible to stand for the presidency in exchange for suspension of his boycott against the referendum. The poll asked voters, "Do you accept this draft Constitution, reaffirming national unity and advocating democracy, to usher in the **Third Republic**?" The ex-president voted on 19 August although not all his partisans acquiesced. Diehard federalists managed to keep voter turnout to 66 percent and to provoke violence at polling stations in **Toamasina** and **Antsiranana**. The constitution nevertheless obtained favorable majorities in all six provinces, with an overall endorsement of 76.37 percent. It was promulgated by interim Prime Minister **Guy Willy Razanamasy** on 18 September 1992. **Elections** were organized for president of the **Third Republic** on 29 November. They were won by **Forces Vives** candidate **Albert Zafy** in a run-off against second-place Ratsiraka on 10 February 1993. Elections to

the new **Assemblée Nationale** followed after additional delay, on 16 June 1993.

**REFERENDUM, 17 SEPTEMBER 1995.** Exasperated by both an unruly **Assemblée Nationale** and a recalcitrant cabinet of ministers responsible to that parliament, **Albert Zafy**, President of the **Third Republic**, took his case for enhanced presidential powers to the electorate. In complex legal language, Malagasy voters were asked to approve a **constitutional** amendment that among other advantages, granted presidents the privilege of firing cabinet ministers and appointing replacements. Warned by the opposition that autocratic prerogatives had worked against the national interest in the **First Republic** and in **Didier Ratsiraka's Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM), several political and church organizations boycotted the vote. As in most such plebiscitary consultations, a majority of voters proved nonetheless willing to give their president the tools he claimed to be needed for governance in their name. With a turnout of 65.39 percent of the electorate, Zafy's project was approved by 63.56 of the vote. The president promptly changed cabinets, replacing the independent-minded prime minister **Francisque Ravony** with his trusted comrade, **Emmanuel Rakotovahiny**. In the aftermath, the parliamentary majority gathered sufficient energy to pass articles of impeachment against the president and to see that decision ratified by the **Haute Cour Constitutionnelle** (HCC) in September 1996, one year after Zafy's referendary triumph.

**REFERENDUM, 15 MARCH 1998.** On election to the presidency of the **Third Republic** in December 1976, **Didier Ratsiraka** first intended to substitute an entirely new federalist system for the **constitution** of 1992 that had formalized the downfall of his **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM). Reconsidering the implications of so drastic a move on an already fragile national unity, Admiral Ratsiraka resorted to a somewhat less ambitious amendment to the 1992 document (already amended in presidential favor by the **Referendum of 17 September 1995**). In an omnibus project, the electorate was offered a series of proposals on 15 March 1998 that, among other changes, protected the president against "arbitrary" impeachment (like the process that had toppled his predecessor, **Albert**



**Zafy**); revised the ways in which the **Assemblée Nationale** was to be constituted; anticipated the creation of a **Senate**; and redefined territorial administration with powers devolved upon six autonomous provinces (*faritany*). Encountering resistance to one or another item in the text, Ratsiraka benefited from administrative “blunders” that in effect deleted nearly two million voters from the registers just before the plebiscite—most of them in areas presumably antipathetic to presidential strategy. Opposition was further reduced through a boycott called by the **FFKM** church leaders. Even so, the referendum managed to pass by the barest 50.96 percent of the vote, with 70 percent of the electorate participating. Partly as a result of these anomalies, Ratsiraka proceeded with great caution to implement its provisions. The Senate waited three more years before being formed, and complete operation of the **decentralization** machinery was to begin only after the president’s presumed reelection in December 2001.

**RELIGION.** Although established **Christianity** claims more than half the population in one combination of churches or another, virtually all Malagasy practice a traditional form of religion based on proverbial **ancestral** precedent, the priorities of family and clan loyalty, and the sanctity of family-clan burial grounds. Whether practicing exclusively as in much rural Madagascar, or in parallel with **Protestant**, **Catholic**, or **Islamic** rituals as among the urban classes, a Malagasy tends to accept identification in a sacred system of life that precedes birth and survives death. However strong the discipline of a Christian or Muslim commitment—in the public life of President **Marc Ravalomanana**, for instance—few Malagasy regard themselves as “liberated” from reliance on precedent expressed in proverbial wisdom, consultation of cosmic signs via mediation of “wise people” (*ampanandry*), overt reverence for ancestors, rituals assuring clan fecundity, and even susceptibility to “possession” by ancestral or other spirits. These principles emerge in family and communal ceremonies, in all-important oratory, in **art** and in pervasive forms of **music**. On the coasts, these practices are more overtly African in inspiration, while in the **highlands** the historic confrontation between indigenous tradition and the Christian **missions** under Queen **Ranavalona I** remains a living memory in the consciousness of the Christian faithful.

Although the European churches have had their triumph against Malagasy “superstition,” the cultural needs of an insular population for the sacred are still supplied in part (without proselytization) by the indigenous rituals that had been defended by the 19th-century queen.

**RENE, JEAN (d. 1826).** A Creole trader established at **Toamasina** around 1798, René, with help from French agent **Sylvain Roux**, declared himself “king” of the port in 1811, successfully challenging the **Zanamalata** leaders of the **Betsimisaraka Confederacy** for control of the area. René and his half brother Fiche served as intermediaries in the trade between Europeans at Toamasina and the developing **Merina Empire**. In 1817 he signed a treaty with the Merina ruler, **Radama I**, acknowledging Radama’s overlordship in return for protection in his business and administrative activity.

**RESAMPA, ANDRE (1924–1993).** A founder and dominant member of the **Parti Sociale Démocrate (PSD)**, Resampa was born in **Toliara** province and first worked in the colonial administration. In 1952, he was elected to the provincial assembly of Toliara on a list called Union Cotière. In 1956, he participated in the formation of the PSD and became its general secretary. In 1957, he was elected to the provincial assembly and to the *Assemblée Représentative*. In 1958, he became minister of education and health, and in 1959, minister of the interior, of the new Malagasy Republic. He was head of the delegation that negotiated the **Cooperation Agreements** with **France** at the time of independence in 1960, but eventually developed more **nationalist** commitments and lobbied unsuccessfully with President **Philibert Tsiranana** to have the agreements renegotiated.

During his period in power, Resampa was able to use his government offices to reinforce the status of the PSD and his position within it, and to apply leverage from the party to reinforce his weight in the government. His early service as minister of education gave him access to the network of state teachers, many of whom were recruited to the party, while the interior portfolio put the territorial administration at his disposal. As minister of the interior, he created the **Forces Républicaines de Sécurité (FRS)**, a paramilitary police unit under his control. In his home district around Morondava, where he was

mayor, he formed the Syndicat des Communes, a **cooperative** of villages and towns that successfully enhanced production and marketing of **Cape peas**, beef, and other commodities. Within the PSD he was considered a member of the more “radical” wing, favorable to extending Madagascar’s international contacts beyond the tie with France, and interested in more “socialist” policies than those favored by Tsiranana.

Resampa’s strong position in the all-conquering party created jealousies, but throughout the 1960s it appeared unassailable. In October 1970, recovering from a paralytic stroke, Tsiranana appointed Resampa first vice president (of four) and identified him as his heir-apparent. Resampa’s position became vulnerable in 1970–1971 when he flagrantly resisted Madagascar’s new friendship with **South Africa**, engineered by his rival, Foreign Minister **Jacques Rabemananjara**. He then sought to tighten PSD organization, inserting his own partisans into posts formerly held by Tsiranana supporters known as the “**Tsimihety** clan” because many of them belonged to the same ethnic group as the president. Persuaded that Resampa was plotting to oust him, Tsiranana removed him as vice president and transferred most of his ministerial powers to a new Ministry of Internal Affairs attached to the presidency; the minister who inherited police and territorial administration was **Barthélemy Johasy** whose previous disputes with Resampa were well known.

When the **Peasant Rebellion** broke out in April 1971, the president reasoned that if Resampa had not actually been involved in the revolt, it demonstrated incompetence on his part, occurring as it did largely in his “fief.” In June 1971, Tsiranana accused Resampa of plotting against him with a foreign embassy (understood to be the **United States**); somehow, the charge also involved Communist China, an unlikely co-conspirator with either Resampa or Washington. Resampa was arrested and imprisoned on **Sainte-Marie** Island, where he remained until the **May 1972 Revolution** brought down Tsiranana and his republic.

After his release from detention, Resampa at first supported the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**, aligning the new party he had created, the **Union Socialiste Malgache**, behind the campaign for a “yes” vote in Ramanantsoa’s **Referendum of 8 October 1972**. He increasingly objected to the regime’s anti-French policies and its ideological

recourse to *fokonolona* reform, however, and accused it of pro-**Merina** and anti-**Côtier** bias. These options allowed him to reconcile with Tsiranana, and together they formed the **Parti Socialiste Malgache** in 1974. When Colonel **Bréchar**d **Rajaonarison** attempted to overthrow Ramanantsoa in December 1974, taking refuge with the other plotters in the **Antanimoro** camp, Resampa and Tsiranana declared support for Rajaonarison. When the camp was attacked after the assassination of Colonel **Richard Ratsimandrava** on 11 February 1975, Resampa was arrested at the old PSD headquarters and charged with complicity in the assassination. The charges against him and the other defendants in the “**Trial of the Century**” were eventually dismissed.

Resampa returned to his home town of Morondava where he had once been mayor. In 1983, he was elected to the local council on the **Vonjy** ticket, but the party did not support his aspirations to higher electoral levels. When the formation of new parties was authorized in 1990, Resampa left Vonjy to help form a revived PSD (the **Rassemblement pour la Social-Démocratie**, RPSD). He participated in the 31 August 1991, government of **Guy Razanamasy**, but was not included in the transitional government created by the **Panorama Agreement** that prepared the way for a new system. Suffering from diabetes, he died shortly after the **Third Republic** was instituted.

**REUNION.** Situated only 300 kilometers off Madagascar’s east coast, Réunion, like the other **Mascarenes**, was a French possession until the Napoleonic Wars. After a brief British occupation during those wars, the island was returned to **France**. Réunion had long depended on trade with Madagascar for **slaves**, **cattle**, and **rice** to supply its plantation economy, and by the late 19th century, deputies from Réunion, led by **François de Mahy**, were urging the colonization of Madagascar to provide an outlet for excess population. After the French conquest, about half the **settlers** who came to Madagascar were Réunionnais, and settlement plans continued into the 1950s with the launching of the **Sakay** project. When the headquarters of the French **Indian Ocean Fleet** was moved from **Diégo-Suarez** in 1973, it was transferred to Réunion. Prospering as an Overseas Department of France, Réunion no longer seeks outlets for survival in the Great Island. Under French sponsorship, it participates with

Madagascar as a partner in the **Indian Ocean Commission**, conducting a lively cultural exchange with its neighbor.

**RICE.** Not only is rice the principal food crop grown by most Malagasy farmers; it is the preeminent staple of the national diet. Over one million hectares are devoted to rice cultivation. Only in parts of the deep south, where cassava (manioc) and corn provide basic sustenance, is rice not a daily requirement of the Malagasy appetite. At 165 kilograms per person the island's annual consumption is said to be the highest in the world. Rice is produced in inundated lowlands and, especially among the **Betsileo**, on terraced hillsides. Major areas of production include the Lake Alaotra region in the northern **highlands**, the Vakinankaratra hills around **Antsirabe**, the Lower Mangoky basin in the southwest, and along the east coast. When in doubt over the profitability of cash crops, especially **coffee** and tree fruits, Malagasy farmers tend to revert to rice growing. Wherever population pressures have imperiled food supply, their recourse is to cut back the remaining parcels of forest to put new land into paddy. Apart from the Betsileo, production is normally left to artisan technology, certified by the **ancestors** but relatively unproductive, yielding a national average of only 1.8 metric tons per hectare. Traditional "slash and burn" techniques (*tavy*) furnish the necessary acreage for a time, but when the available land gives out, the terrain turns at best to pasture and all too often to sterile laterite.

Despite soaring demographics the Great Island can nearly satisfy its overall annual needs for rice production (about 2.7 million tons) in favorable years when rainfall is adequate, cyclones take a negligible toll, locusts do not swarm, credit is available, and market prices provide incentives for farmers to offer the crop. Too often, however, one or more of these factors turns negative and, as in 1999–2000, the government must appeal for international donations of grain and/or devote the **economy's** scant foreign exchange to importing rice from Asian sources. This need has become a cultural embarrassment in an **agricultural** economy where peasant farmers work diligently during critical periods of the season. Madagascar changed from a net exporter of rice (usually luxury, long-grain varieties) to a regular importer in 1969. Food imports increased steadily through the 1980s and 1990s, costing the economy \$58 million in 1999, nearly half of

that for rice. Farmers began avoiding the state-run marketing system early in the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) preferring to sell for higher prices on the black market or to reserve production for their own subsistence. The supply situation has improved with the replacement of the inefficient bureaucratic **Société d'Intérêt National de Commercialisation des Produits Agricoles** (SINPA) by private, mostly **Chinese** and **Indo-Pakistani**, traders who deal face-to-face with planters, provide advance credit, and offer trade goods in exchange.

**RICHARD, CHRISTIAN REMY.** Under the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**, Richard was elected to the **Conseil National Populaire pour le Développement** from **Toliara province**. He was named minister of **education** in the weeklong government of **Richard Ratsimandrava** and minister of youth affairs in 1976. Richard was a founding member of the political bureau of the regime party, **AREMA**, and was minister of foreign affairs from 1977 to 1983.

**ROUX, SYLVAIN (?–1823).** Commercial agent for **France** at Tamatave (**Toamasina**) from 1804, Roux organized provisions from east coast Madagascar to French **Indian Ocean** possessions, particularly **Réunion** and the Ile de France (**Mauritius**). He asserted de facto control over the port and its hinterland, even crowning a “King of Tamatave” (**Jean René**, a Creole trader) to administer the hinterlands of the port and serve French interests until **Great Britain** evicted the French from their headquarters on Mauritius in 1811. In 1818, Roux was established on **Sainte-Marie** Island, which had been French since 1750.

**ROVA.** The name for many fortified hilltops in **highland** Madagascar, *rova* has been popularly identified with the historic summits of King **Andrianampoinimerina**. His original royal compound at **Ambohimanga** is now a world historic monument. His dynasty's palaces on the *rova* of **Antananarivo** (the **Manjakamiadana**) were destroyed by fire in 1995. Both are among a dozen sacred hills in **Imerina** that have become sites of pilgrimages as well as **tourist** attractions.

**RPSD.** See RASSEMBLEMENT POUR LA SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIE.

**RUPHIN, GEORGES.** Under the **First Republic**, Ruphin was director of the research and training center of the **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD), the Fondation Philibert Tsiranana. By the coming of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) in 1975, he was a close advisor of President **Didier Ratsiraka** and a founding member of the political bureau of the regime party, **AREMA**. In 1977 he was named minister of information and in 1982 became minister of public administration in order to reassert party control over the civil service, hitherto in the jurisdiction of the **Vonjy** party's Célestin Radio. In **Guy Razanamasy's** August 1991 government, the ministry was abolished and Ruphin was left without a government position. He served as ambassador to Italy and the Vatican in Ratsiraka's second administration, from 1997 to 2002.

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**SAINT AUGUSTINE BAY.** Located 37 kilometers south of **Toliara** on the southwest coast, Saint Augustine Bay was used by British ships as a stopover on the trip to India starting about 1611. An attempt to found a settlement was made in 1645, but without success. At the end of the 17th century, Saint Augustine Bay was frequented by **pirates**. Until well into the 19th century it served as a port for the **slave trade**, sending Malagasy captives to **South Africa**, the **Mascarenes**, and other destinations. An international trading community was established on Nosy Be island just off the bay.

**SAINT LAWRENCE'S ISLAND.** In 1500, the Portuguese explorer **Diogo Diaz** named Madagascar Saint Lawrence's Island because he had sighted it on Saint Lawrence's feast day, 10 August.

**SAINTE-MARIE (ALSO NOSY IBRAHIM OR NOSY BORAHA; 16°50'S, 49°55'E).** Situated between **Antongil Bay** and **Foulpointe**, Sainte-Marie Island served as a haven for **pirates** at the end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th centuries. The **Compagnie des Indes Orientales** established a trading post there. In 1750, Queen **Betia** signed the island over to the French, who attempted to occupy it, but abandoned their post after the garrison was massacred in 1754. In

1821, the French agent, **Sylvain Roux**, established a trading post on Sainte-Marie to replace **Toamasina** (Tamatave), which had become a British staple. Under Roux's successor, Blevec, the French built a fort to reinforce **Betsimisaraka** resistance against the expanding **Merina Empire**. The island is now a center of clove production and of tourism.

**SAINT-MART, PIERRE DE.** A career officer in the **French** colonial service, Saint-Mart succeeded **Paul Legentilhomme** as the **Free French** governor of Madagascar in May 1943. His continued mobilization of the island's resources for the French war effort, including creation of the **Office du Riz**, exacerbated relations between the colonial authorities and the Malagasy. Saint-Mart's administration also failed to purge the administration of officials associated with the period of **Vichy** rule. When Saint-Mart was succeeded by **Marcel De Coppet** in May 1946, **nationalist** activities were well established, and the leaders who were to form the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** (MDRM), had already won their first electoral victories. *See also* REBELLION OF 1947.

**SAKALAVA.** With a population that was estimated at 470,156 in 1972 and 700,000 in 1994, the Sakalava inhabit the west coast and interior of Madagascar from **Toliara** in the south to **Nosy Be** in the north. They are considered to have expanded from their southern base beginning in the late 15th century under the leadership of the **Maroserana** dynasty, absorbing local populations as they went. This movement gave rise to a large number of kingdoms, since disputes over succession were often resolved by the loser's moving away with an entourage to found a new unit. Among the more important kingdoms were Menabe to the south and **Boina** to the north. Others were **Am-bongo**, which formed a buffer zone between the two larger kingdoms, and **Bemihisatra**, founded in the 1830s by refugees from Boina after the capture of **Mahajanga** by the **Merina Empire**. The original basis of the Sakalava economy was **cattle** herding, hunting and gathering, and some **agriculture**. They also came to dominate the trade between the west coast and the interior, first with the **Arab** and **Swahili** traders, and then with the Europeans. The economy then came to depend on the exchange of **slaves** for weapons and other



commodities, and the Sakalava in the 18th century conducted slave raids themselves and exacted tribute, often in the form of slaves, from neighboring groups, including the **Merina**.

At the end of the 18th century the development of the Merina state permitted the **highlanders** to reverse the pressure, and they occupied large sections of Sakalava territory, including Toliara and Mahajanga, although they were never able to subdue the Sakalava as a whole. Several Sakalava rulers signed treaties of protection with the **French** to provide a counterbalance to the Merina, although the creation of the French **protectorate of 1885**, which recognized Merina sovereignty over the island, disappointed many of these rulers. Reaction varied to the French conquest of 1895, with some rulers becoming part of the colonial administration, and others joining in the **Sambirano Rebellion**. The Sakalava area was largely untouched by the **Rebellion of 1947**.

Sakalava culture has certain brilliant particularities, including *sal-egy music* and **dances**, imaginatively adorned family tombs, and intense rituals of spirit possession (*tromba*) by royal **ancestors**. The modern Sakalava **economy** remains oriented around cattle raising. Their area has been subject to intensive in-migration, by both the **Tsimihety** from the north and the **Betsileo** from the east. The Betsileo, in particular, have introduced improved agricultural techniques, including **rice** farming. *See also* BAIBOHO.

**SAKAY.** A region 100 kilometers to the west of **Antananarivo**, the Sakay was the site of a modern **agricultural** project designed in the early 1950s to bring in **settlers** from **Réunion**. The scheme was criticized for channeling funds to settlement rather than to Malagasy agriculture and for displacing the Malagasy herders who had occupied the land. After independence the Malagasy government took over the project, creating the Société Malgache de la Sakay (SO-MASAK) to settle Malagasy on the land. In 1977, the lands and society became a state farm, and the remaining Réunionnais settlers were expelled.

**SAMBIRANO REBELLION.** Intense resistance against the imposition of **French** colonial rule took place in the **Sakalava** territory of western Madagascar in 1897. The rulers of different Sakalava king-

doms had originally made common cause with the French in their wars with the **Merina Empire**, expecting that this would drive the Merina out of their territory. The rebellion occurred when it became clear that the French intended to replace the Merina, but it could not mobilize all Sakalava, as monarchs like **Binao** continued to be loyal to the French.

**SAMPY.** Originally the amulets of particular **highland** clans or regions, the *sampy* were appropriated by the **Merina** monarchy as it incorporated new groups into the kingdom. These royal talismans were responsible for the welfare of the ruler and realm and for success in battle. Among the more important were *rabehaza*, associated with the monarchy since the 17th century; *manjakatsiroa*, particularly associated with the founder of the modern monarchy, **Andrianampoinimerina**; and perhaps the most important, *kelimalaza*. A 19th-century observer described *kelimalaza* as “a piece of wood two or three inches long, and as large as the middle finger of a man’s hand, wrapped in two thicknesses of scarlet silk about three feet long and three inches wide, the wood pointed at the end, and movable in the silk, with two silver chains, about three inches in length, at either end of the silk.” Each *sampy* had a group of guardians. After her conversion to **Christianity** in 1869, **Ranavalona II** ordered the *sampy* burned and removed the privileges of their guardians; however, several of the *sampy* were reconstructed in their regions of origin almost immediately. They reappeared at the time of the **French** conquest, which many in **Imerina** attributed to the abandonment of traditional ways by the government; *kelimalaza* in particular played an important role in the revolt of the *Menalamba*.

**SENATE.** The Malagasy **First Republic** had a bicameral legislature. Its 54-member Senate consisted of 36 senators chosen by the six provincial legislatures (six each), and 18 appointed by the president of the Republic, 12 of them from lists presented by “representative groups” of the population. The senate was steadily marginalized during the First Republic, and the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) had a unicameral legislature. The constitution of the **Third Republic** provides for a 90-member senate in which two-thirds are chosen by an electoral college composed of representatives

of local governments and interest groups, and one-third is appointed by the president from lists put forth by economic, social, and cultural organizations. The term of office for senators was to be four years.

Having his hands full dealing with the single **Assemblée Nationale**, President **Albert Zafy** did not initiate organization of a senate during his term (1993–1997) at the outset of the Third Republic. By constitutional **Referendum of 15 March 1998**, his successor, **Didier Ratsiraka**, had the senatorial term of office raised to six years, gave the Senate special advisory responsibilities for territorial administration, and retained the equality principle for the provincially elected senators, thus weakening the relative voting strength of **An-tananarivo province**. Once his **AREMA** party had consolidated its control over local government offices, Ratsiraka proceeded to organize the Senate by indirect elections on 18 March 2001. Electoral colleges of 1,391 mayors and 336 provincial councilors chose their 60 senators; 49 were from AREMA with eight more from closely allied parties, giving the opposition a negligible trio. These proportions were of course reinforced by Ratsiraka's 30 presidential appointees, chosen from such sectors as the law, business, civil society, and cultural institutions.

Constitutionally prevented from dissolving the elected Senate before the end of its term (2007), the new president, **Marc Ravalomanana**, was able only to replace his predecessor's 30 appointees and to obtain pledges of good faith from the three independents and two **AVI** party senators. Hence, the Senate majority remains in opposition although it has cooperated with Ravalomanana on several issues, including the election of the president's close advisor, **Rajemison Rakotomaharo** as presiding officer. Under constitutional protocol, the president of the Senate stands first in rank behind the president. The most notorious conflict emerged in 2003 when, at presidential behest, the Senate majority adopted a generous bill of **amnesty** for prisoners convicted of security crimes during the **Crisis of 2002** (most of them AREMA sympathizers) which failed to be reconciled with the more vindictive bill proposed by the Assembly.

**SERVICE CIVIQUE.** During the **First Republic**, the Service Civique was the branch of the **military** to which most conscripts were assigned. It was used for rural development projects and to staff some

rural schools. In 1972 it had approximately 1,500 members. Under the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) in 1975 the Service Civique was merged with the infantry and the engineering corps to create the Development Army.

**SERVICE DE LA MAIN-D'OEUVRE DES TRAVAUX D'INTERET GENERAL (SMOTIG).** The SMOTIG was set up in 1926 by Governor-General **Marcel Olivier** to furnish labor for the construction of the **Fianarantsoa-East Coast railroad** and other public works. It recruited Malagasy of an age to be subject to **military** service, housing them in camps under military discipline. Although the SMOTIG recruits were supposed to be used on works "of general interest," many were in fact diverted to labor on **settler** plantations. The French leftwing Confédération Générale de Travail attacked the SMOTIG as a form of slavery at meetings of the International Labour Organization, and in 1930, the French government agreed to end the operation. It was not until the **Popular Front** government in 1936, however, that the SMOTIG was formally abolished. *See also* FORCED LABOR.

**SETTLEMENT.** Although there were Creole **settlers** from the **Mascarenes** on Madagascar's east coast at the time of the **French** conquest in 1895, large-scale settlement began only after the first **governor-general, Joseph Gallieni**, provided land grants and equipment for his demobilized soldiers and immigrants from **Réunion**. He was disappointed by the response and on his departure declared that in his opinion Madagascar was not suited to be a colony of settlement. Subsequent governments proceeded with settlement projects, however. In 1926, the French state was declared the owner of all unregistered land, and in 1929, land surveys were undertaken and credit facilities set up to encourage colonists. By 1939, the **settler** population was approximately 45,000, concentrated on the east coast, the **highlands**, and the cash-crop areas of the north and northwest. Alienation of land for settlement and for large plantations known as **concessions** caused considerable resentment among the Malagasy, and those areas were among the hardest hit during the **Rebellion of 1947**. In 1939–1940, some circles in Nazi Germany briefly considered forcing **France** to cede Madagascar as a "reservation" for millions of deported European

Jews but nothing came of the idea. The last large-scale settlement scheme was the **Sakay** project of the 1950s.

**SETTLERS.** During the colonial period settlers came to Madagascar both from **France** and from the **Mascarenes**, particularly **Réunion**. Often hopelessly undercapitalized, faced with competition from the large **concessions** and increasingly from Malagasy producers, many settlers accumulated large debts and went bankrupt during the not infrequent depressions in **agricultural** prices. Their relationship with the colonial administration was also difficult since they objected to taxation policies and to what they saw as the failure of the administration to provide them with adequate supplies of Malagasy labor. Settler demands for representation and the government desire to mobilize production for the war effort led to the creation, in 1915, of a mixed advisory commission of settler representatives and colonial officials. Further demands resulted in the formation of the **Délégations Economiques et Financières** in 1924 and of a legislature after World War II. Settler organizations included the *Ligue des Intérêts Economiques de Madagascar*, founded in 1925, and the **Ligue de Défense des Intérêts Franco-Malgaches**, founded in 1946. The settler community generally resisted attempts to grant political status to the Malagasy after World War II and particularly after the **Rebellion of 1947**. By the mid-1950s, however, the community had become divided over the issue, with such settler leaders as Roger Duveau coming to support the 1956 **Loi-Cadre**.

It is difficult to measure the impact of independence on the settler community since departures of settlers in the 1960s were offset by the influx of French technical assistants. Estimates suggest that the numbers of permanent French residents declined by half, from about 70,000 at independence to about 35,000 in 1970 and that further departures after the 1975 establishment of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) reduced that number by half again. Since the later 1980s, revived French interest in the island **economy** has induced a considerable enlargement of both the transitory technician and commercial communities and the number of relatively permanent transplants.

**SIBON, GUY (?–1986).** Like **Didier Ratsiraka** a captain in the Malagasy navy at the time of the **May Revolution of 1972**, Sibon served

as the **military** governor of the province of **Antsiranana** under the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**, during the weeklong government of **Richard Ratsimandrava**, and under the **Directoire Militaire** that took power after Ratsimandrava's assassination in 1975. He became minister of defense of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) in 1977, and held that post, rising to the rank of admiral, until his death in a plane crash in 1986.

**SIHANAKA.** An estimated 184,000 Sihanaka (lake people) occupy the northern **highlands** of Madagascar around **Lake Alaotra**, a major **rice**-growing area; their legends refer insistently to original settlement of those lands by the aboriginal **Vazimba**. The modern Sihanaka live both by rice farming and fishing. Their strategic position along trade routes to the coast subjected them to pressure from both the **Betsimisaraka** and **Merina** at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries. They were able to hold off the Betsimisaraka and engage in **slave** and **cattle** raids of their own, but were one of the first groups to be conquered by the **Merina Empire**, and the area became subject to heavy in-migration. The current population is probably a mixture of the original Sihanaka and the Merina immigrants.

**SISAL.** Sisal plantations were established between the world wars in the **Taolagnaro** region of **Toliara province** and in **Antsiranana province**. Production declined with the rise of synthetic substitutes for fabrication of rope. By 1959 only the plantations and processing plants in the Taolagnaro region remained; they **exported** 10,000 to 12,000 metric tons annually from 1980 to 1996, but could export barely half that much in subsequent years at production levels of about 15,000 tons.

**SLAVE TRADE.** Before the arrival of Europeans in the western **Indian Ocean**, **slaves** were purchased and exported by **Arab** and **Indian** traders serving markets in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. European penetration in the 16th century made the Americas a dominant destination. **South Africa** also provided a market for Malagasy captives and, in the mid-18th century, the plantation economy of the **Mascarenes** absorbed an increasing number. Trading occurred on

both coasts, with the important harbors being (on the east coast) **Antongil Bay**, the **Sainte-Marie** Island, **Foulpointe**, and **Toamasina**. On the west coast, **Mahajanga** and **Toliara** (replacing **Saint Augustine**) were among the important posts. Captives were obtained by raids on neighboring peoples and were traded for weapons and other manufactures. The emergence of the **Sakalava** monarchies, the **Betsimisaraka Confederation**, and the **Merina Empire** is directly connected with the need to organize these raids, to control the trajectories of trade, and to defend against being raided, as well as to obtain access to slaves imported from southern Africa for their own purposes.

Anti-slaving treaties were signed between the Merina Empire and **Great Britain** in 1817, 1820, and 1865, but some degree of slave trading persisted until the **French** conquest of Madagascar in 1895.

**SLAVES.** Most precolonial Malagasy societies had slaves, usually a mixed population composed of war captives, the destitute, and people sentenced to servitude. There was also a special class of royal slaves in societies possessing monarchies. Slaves were considered to be outside society and to lack **ancestors**. It was in the **Merina Empire** of the 19th century that the need for slaves—both Malagasy and Africans—was greatest, since their labor had to substitute for freemen occupied by the demands of compulsory **military**, civic, and administrative service. Toward the end of the 19th century, approximately half the population of **Antananarivo province** was estimated to consist of slaves. The *masombika*, or slaves of African descent, were freed by the monarchy in 1877, and in 1897, the **French** colonial administration emancipated the remaining slaves. Not given land, many of these freed people became sharecroppers on the property of their former masters. The distinction between descendant of slave (*andevo*) and descendant of freeborn (*hova*) retains some social and political importance in Madagascar today.

**SOCIÉTÉ D'INTERET NATIONAL POUR LA COMMERCIALISATION DES PRODUITS AGRICOLES (SINPA).** Established by the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** in 1972, this corporation became operational a year later. It was designed to replace the networks of **Chinese** and **Indo-Pakistani** (*Karana*) intermediaries that domi-

nated the collection and marketing of **rice**. These minority traders had often been closely connected with the previous regime, and since rice is the staple food of Madagascar, the possibilities of disruption made their replacement a political necessity. SINPA absorbed the personnel and equipment of other organizations, including the *Syndicats des Communes* in the southeast. Problems with **corruption** emerged from the outset, and after the creation of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) in 1975, the organization was placed under the control of a specially created Ministry of Transportation and Food Supply. Inefficiency and corruption persisted, exacerbated by the collapse of the road infrastructure, the withering of **agricultural** credit, and a lack of equipment in the **economic** crisis of the 1980s. Many of SINPA's functions were taken over by the army, but, in the long period of recovery under **International Monetary Fund** (IMF) and **World Bank** guidance, they have been returned to the private sector, including the previous intermediaries. *See also* AGRICULTURAL POLICY.

**SOCIETE NATIONAL DE COMMERCE EXTERIEURE (SONACO)**. Established in 1972 by the **Ramanatsoa Interregnum**, this corporation was given the responsibility for the collection of cash crops and the importation and distribution of a range of items, including cooking oil, tires, cement, and batteries. Like the **Société Nationale pour la Commercialisation des Produits Agricoles**, which handled **rice**, SONACO was designed to replace networks of non-Malagasy intermediaries, but many of these people, usually **Indo-Pakistani** or **Chinese**, continued working for it under contract. Again like SINPA, SONACO ran into problems from the beginning, and its first director was jailed for embezzlement. When the French **commercial companies** that handled the exportation of cash crops were nationalized in 1976, most of SONACO's collection functions were handed over to other agencies. Its **import** activities were hard hit by the financial crisis of the 1980s, and these functions have been gradually returned to private merchants. *See also* PRIVATIZATION.

**SOJA**. A captain in the gendarmerie at the time of the **May 1972 Revolution**, Soja (he has no first name) served under the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** as military governor of his native province of **Toliara**.



In the factional politics of the period he supported the *fokonolona* reform strategies of gendarmerie Colonel **Richard Ratsimandrava** and was expected to implement those strategies as minister of rural development in the government that Ratsimandrava formed on 5 February 1975. As a representative from Toliara in the **Directoire Militaire** that took power after Ratsimandrava's assassination, Soja was both the major advocate for continuation of Ratsimandrava's policies and one of the contenders for the succession. He was unable to attract a majority to his position, however, and on 15 June the DM chose **Didier Ratsiraka** to become president of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM). Soja took up the (noncommand) post of inspector of the gendarmerie. He was appointed to the largely symbolic **Comité Militaire pour le Développement** in 1986 and served as director of highway security from 1989 to 1992, when he joined the **National Forum** that prepared the **Constitution of the Third Republic**. Returning to **military** service, he took part in the pacification of Toliara province to end the **Crisis of 2002** and once again became governor (president of the Special Delegation) of the province in 2003. Confronting popular resentment over the peremptory eviction of his predecessor, Thierry Raveloson, Soja maintained order in his impoverished, contentious province. In January 2004, he was brought into the national government as minister of the interior.

**SORABE.** The *sorabe* are sacred manuscripts written in Malagasy using Arabic script. They include histories and genealogies, works on medicine and astrology and manuals of divination. Most *sorabe* are in the possession of **Antaimoro** and **Antambahoaka** scribes, but have been used for divination by other groups. The Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris also has a collection of *sorabe*.

**SOUCADAUX, ANDRE.** A member of the French Socialist party, Soucadaux became **governor-general** in 1954 and presided over the transition to independence. It was his task to promote the formation of a successor elite, for Malagasy political life had been paralyzed since the **Rebellion of 1947**, and to avoid reempowerment of the nationalist **Merina**. He assisted fellow socialist **Philibert Tsiranana** in the creation of the **Parti Sociale Démocrate** and in his rise to the vice presidency of the **Loi-Cadre Government Council** chaired by Sou-

cadaux. After the passage of the **Loi-Cadre**, the title of **governor-general** changed to high commissioner. Soucadaux nurtured the new, largely *Côtier* establishment into the French Fifth Republic in 1958 when Madagascar became an autonomous republic, and to independence in June 1960. He then left the island.

**SOUTH AFRICA.** Beginning as an importer of **slaves** from Madagascar from the late 17th century into the 18th centuries, South Africa has occasionally played a notable role in modern Malagasy history. Desperate for foreign investment as **French** enthusiasm waned in the late 1960s, the **First Republic** welcomed South African **tourists** and capital, particularly in the beach resort area of **Nosy Be** and a prospective new seaport and dry-dock at Narindra Bay in the northwest. **Antananarivo** braved the technical African taboo on such collaboration by assuring the world that the Great Island's example of multiethnic democracy might even help liberate the South African spirit from the hold of *apartheid*. Pretoria was allowed to open an "information office" in the capital but French influence blocked it from naval-air facilities on the island, even in the common cause of anticommunism. So strong were these relations that antagonism by vice president and interior minister **André Resampa** contributed to Resampa's fall as **Philibert Tsiranana**'s presumptive heir-apparent in 1971. All ties with South Africa were categorically renounced by the nationalist **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** and its successor, the **Democratic Republic** of the self-styled Marxist president, **Didier Ratsiraka**. The Ratsiraka government watched warily as mercenaries, some of them from South Africa, operated in nearby **Comoro Islands**.

In 1990, burdened by external **debt** and under siege from his own people, Ratsiraka turned, as had Tsiranana, to investment from a no-longer pariah South Africa. Some interest developed in manufacturing at Antananarivo's **export processing zones**, but deeper engagements were inhibited by Madagascar's political instability. During the **Third Republic**, the Malagasy gradually warmed to prospects for productive linkages with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) where South Africa plays a leading role. Until the arrival of **Marc Ravalomanana** as Malagasy leader, however, these linkages had proved daunting to the island's Francophone elites.

Even after Ravalomanana's installation, prospects for crossing the African geo-cultural divide were delayed while South African President Thabo Mbeki recovered from his suspicions over the legitimacy of Ravalomanana's mandate. In 2004, Madagascar joined the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and applied for membership in SADC. Pretoria opened an embassy in Antananarivo on 11 February 2004.

**SPICES.** Madagascar produces several tropical spices, of which the most important are cloves, **vanilla**, cinnamon, and pepper. Vanilla has been a mainstay for the island's **exports**, placing second in 2001 with earnings of \$166 million. Exports of cloves ranked third at \$97 million, but production has fluctuated with the vicissitudes of the main market in **Indonesia** and by the spread of competitive clove cultivation in such countries as Brazil and Indonesia itself. Production of pepper has been increasing, but its role in Malagasy export earnings is much less than that of cloves and vanilla.

**STIBBE, PIERRE (1912–1966).** A French lawyer and veteran of the Resistance, Stibbe defended the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** deputies accused of treason after the **Rebellion of 1947**. He persisted in the defense even though he was severely beaten by unknown assailants upon his arrival in Madagascar. After the trial he continued to defend other African **nationalist** figures in trouble with French law.

**SUEZ CANAL.** The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 tilted the strategic balance in the western **Indian Ocean** to the strategic disadvantage of the **Merina Empire**. British interest shifted to protecting the crucial link to India through the northern ocean, away from the old route around the southern tip of Africa that gave Madagascar geo-strategic prominence. This shift of interest culminated in the **Franco-British Convention** of 1890 in which **Great Britain** exchanged acceptance of **France's** claims in Madagascar for recognition of Great Britain's protectorate in Zanzibar.

**SUGAR.** Introduced to Madagascar around 1800, probably from the **Mascarenes**, sugar grows easily at the lower altitudes along the coast.

It was at first cultivated mainly for subsistence consumption, but after World War II industrial processing for **export** was undertaken by the Société Sucrière de Madagascar (SOSUMAV). Sugar mills are now located in the provinces of **Antsiranana** and **Mahajanga**, and the largest company is the recently **privatized** Siramamy Malagasy (SIR-AMA). Production stayed at minimal levels while SIRAMA was state owned, averaging about 2.2 million metric tons of cane annually, yielding between 61,000 and 68,000 tons of raw sugar. Sugar exports remain negligible for the time being.

**SYLLA, ALBERT (1909–1967).** A native of **Sainte-Marie** in **Toamasina province**, Sylla was one of the founders of the **Union Démocratique et Sociale de Madagascar**. In 1959, as independence was approaching, he led his faction of the party into the governing **Parti Social Démocrate** and was named minister for foreign affairs in the **First Republic**. Although he played a subordinate role to President **Philibert Tsiranana** in foreign policy formulation, Sylla's dual nationality (French and Malagasy) helped put him at ease in conducting Madagascar's most delicate **foreign relations**, with **France**. Sylla was killed in a plane accident in 1967 and was succeeded by **Jacques Rabemananjara**.

**SYLLA, JACQUES (1946– ).** A lawyer from **Sainte-Marie**, Sylla is the son of **Albert Sylla**, independent Madagascar's first foreign minister. After practicing law privately in **Toamasina**, Sylla became a founding member of the **Comité National d'Observation des Elections** (CNOE) in 1989 during the decline of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM). His Toamasina base gave him a role of monitoring putative manipulations by the regime **AREMA** party in the home bailiwick of President **Didier Ratsiraka**. An outspoken critic of Ratsiraka, he joined the **Forces Vives** movement that overthrew the DRM in 1991–1992. In the ensuing **Third Republic**, Sylla was elected deputy to the **Assemblée Nationale** from Toamasina in June 1993 and became foreign minister in the first government under President **Albert Zafy**. He thus became part of the coalition of **Côtier** notables in government affiliated with Prime Minister **Françisque Ravony**'s ephemeral Comité de Soutien au Développement et à la Démocratie. Uniquely among all cabinet officers, Sylla held his

portfolio through five consecutive governments from 1993 through September 1996.

He returned to private practice and CNOE activism in Toamasina when Ratsiraka won reelection for a second term, remaining a thorn in the admiral's side until January 2002. At that time, he helped argue the case presented by presidential candidate **Marc Ravalomanana** for a recount of the December 2001 vote in which Ravalomanana claimed the presidency through an absolute majority. When that case lost in a pro-Ratsiraka court, the self-declared president asked Sylla, partly by virtue of his standing in Toamasina, partly on the recommendation of **FFKM** church leaders, to form a cabinet.

Sylla's durability has again been demonstrated by his reappointment as prime minister in four distinct governments during 2002–2004. His cabinet reshuffles of 16 January 2003 and 5 January 2004 aimed at enhanced regional balance, efficiency, and economy; the total number of portfolios was cut from 29 to 22 in 2003 and to 19 a year later. In late 2002, he also became general secretary of Ravalomanana's new political party, the **Tiako-i-Madagasikara** (TIM), that successfully contended the parliamentary **election** of December 2002.

His unwavering service to Ravalomanana emerges from more than Sylla's long antagonism against Ratsiraka. An east coast notable and a Roman **Catholic** with an extensive record of participation in lay Catholic organizations, he balances his head of state's **highland Merina** and **Protestant** identity. Although his patience is proverbial, as is his willingness to cede to Ravalomanana's often impetuous decisions, he has proved anything but phlegmatic. Sylla has been in conflict, and won, against an array of challengers to his position (some indicting his belated adherence to the Ravalomanana crusade) as well as in electoral disputes on behalf of TIM candidates. In mid-2004, he is once again under attack for alleged ineffectual handling of inflation and **currency** depreciation, a university teachers strike, and the clamorous ex-army reservists disgruntled over inadequate recompense for their service in the **Crisis of 2002**.

**SYNDICAT DES ENSEIGNANTS ET CHERCHEURS DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT SUPERIEUR (SECESS) / UNION OF TEACHERS AND RESEARCHERS IN HIGHER EDUCATION.** This union at the **University of Madagascar** has been active politically

since the last days of the **First Republic**, when its series of seminars on democratization and **Malgachization** of the **educational** system helped politicize the student demonstrators who would later stage the **May 1972 Revolution**. Unrest in education has continued to be a problem for succeeding regimes, and SECESS has frequently been involved in strikes at the university.

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**TAMATAVE.** *See* TOAMASINA.

**TAMATAVE CONGRESS.** Held in May 1958 at the initiative of the **nationalist** leader and mayor of the city (now **Toamasina**), **Alexis Bezaka**, this was the first gathering of parties interested in moving beyond the **Loi-Cadre** to immediate independence. The congress was attended by a variety of political movements, including the Association des Amis des Paysans, the Comité d'Action Politique pour l'Indépendance de Madagascar, the **Front National Malgache**, the Mouvement Travailleiste Chrétien, the **Parti Nouveau Démocrate de l'Océan Indien**, the Parti Populaire Malgache, the **Union Nationale Malgache**, the Union du Peuple Malgache, the Union Travailleiste et Paysan, as well as delegates from the **Association des Etudiants d'Origine Malgache** and the Union des Intellectuels et Universitaires de Madagascar. One party that might have been expected to attend and did not was the **Union des Indépendants de Tananarive** of **Stanislas Rakotonirina**.

The congress passed resolutions calling for independence, **amnesty** for the prisoners from the **Rebellion of 1947**, and a constitutional assembly elected by universal suffrage. The congress also formed a committee to campaign against the **Referendum on the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic**. Besides Bezaka himself, two other members of the **Loi-Cadre Government Council** attended—**Justin Bezara** and **Alfred Ramangasoavina**. When they were reproached by the vice president of the council, **Philibert Tsiranana**, Ramangasoavina and Bezara apologized for their participation. Bezaka did not apologize, leading to the first break between himself and Tsiranana.

After the referendum, an attempt was made to unite the different groups that had attended the congress into a single political party. The parties based on the coast or in **Catholic mission** networks refused to join, but the Union du Peuple Malgache, the Front National Malgache, and the Association des Amis des Paysans agreed and formed the **AKFM** (Independence Congress Party of Madagascar).

**TANALA.** The “People of the Forest” live in the rain-forest region of southeastern Madagascar. They practice slash-and-burn **agriculture** (*tavy*), including the cultivation of some **coffee**. Located in the southern part of Tanala territory, Ikongo has been the site of several kingdoms, usually headed by a royal caste, the Zafirambo. They claim descent from the Islamicized **Zafiraminia** and are believed to have arrived in the area during the 17th century. In 1836, a rebellion broke out against the **Merina Empire**, which had conquered large parts of Tanala territory and imposed the payment of tribute (including **slaves**); centered in Ikongo, the revolt was led by a member of the royal family, Tsiandrofa. Ikongo was also the center of Tanala resistance to French colonial rule and of the **Insurrection of 1904–1905**.

**TANANARIVE.** *See* ANTANANARIVO.

**TANANARIVE TRIAL.** The defendants at this trial were accused by the colonial administration as the principal leaders of the **Rebellion of 1947**. The proceedings were held from 22 July to 4 October 1948, in the Palace of **Andafiavaratra** in **Antananarivo** (then called Tananarive). Among the accused were the three deputies of the **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache** (MDRM), **Jacques Rabemananjara**, **Joseph Raseta**, and **Joseph Ravaohangy**, as well as members of the party’s political bureau and leaders of the two secret societies implicated in the rebellion, **PANAMA** and **JINA**. The trial shed only limited light on the events of 1947, since most of the actual combat leaders were dead—the man considered by the French to be the “general” of the rebels, **Samuel Rakotondrabe** having been executed three days before the trial began. Some witnesses withdrew their previous testimony on the stand, claiming that it had been extracted by torture.

At the end of the trial, Raseta and Ravoahangy were condemned to death, as were four others. The third deputy, Rabemananjara, was condemned to life at hard labor. The death sentences were upheld by the French appeals court in 1949, but were later commuted to life imprisonment by the French president, Vincent Auriol. A bill granting **amnesty** to those convicted of complicity in the uprising was passed by the French National Assembly in 1958. *See also* COMITE DE SOLIDARITE DE MADAGASCAR; STIBBE, PIERRE.

**TANORA TONGA SAINA (TTS) / YOUTH AWARE OF RESPONSIBILITY.** The TTS drew its members from the same gangs of unemployed youth that had formed the **ZOAM**, playing a central role in the **May 1972 Revolution** that overthrew the **First Republic**. After 1975, the **Democratic Republic** reorganized elements of the ZOAM into its revolutionary youth core, the TTS. Nominally under the control of the Ministry of Youth, the TTS was often used to break up, and sometimes to precipitate, strikes and demonstrations. It also continued the ZOAM practice of petty crime and extortion in marketplaces. In December 1984, its strongholds in **Antananarivo** were attacked by members of the **Kung Fu** movement, with considerable neighborhood approval. **Military** units surrounded the battleground, but did not intervene for three days, by which time between 100 and 200 TTS were killed. The TTS and similar groups of unemployed youth have since revived, but with less emphasis on political activities and more on petty crime.

**TANTARAN'NY ANDRIANA ETO MADAGASIKARA.** The *Tantara*, or history of the kings of Madagascar, is a compilation of **Merina** oral tradition collected by a Jesuit priest, Father Callet, between 1868 and 1881. It deals with the history of Merina kingdoms from the time of their arrival in the **highlands** and in particular with the establishment of the modern Merina monarchy under **Andrianampoinimerina**. The *Tantara* was originally published in Malagasy, but the French edition appeared in four volumes from 1936 to 1958, and other editions have since come out. The narrative represents traditions from the dominant 19th-century Merina political elites while other bodies of tradition exist giving alternative versions of the same events.



**TAOLAGNARO (25°2'S, 47°0'E).** Formerly **Fort-Dauphin**, site of the first **French** settlement of the **Compagnie des Indes Orientales** and later headquarters of the American Lutheran **missions**, Taolagnaro is now a minor port, handling local traffic, ocean fish and crustacean catch, and the **sisal** produced in the town's hinterland. Taolagnaro has an oceanographic research station and is surrounded by dry forest and savanna that attract attention from ecologists and **tourists**. Its port and overall **economy** are expected to expand once a major ilmenite mine begins operation; this is scheduled for 2005 but is being resisted by **environmentalists**; unfortunately, the region lacks the volume of electricity required to process the ilmenite ore. *See also* MINING.

**TECHNICAL ASSISTANTS.** Under the **First Republic**, **French** technical assistants (*coopérants*) staffed the **educational** system, the administration, and the **military**. The most important numerically were teachers and educational administrators who filled 80 percent of the posts in the **university** and the state secondary schools. In the administration, the upper **judiciary** levels, and the military, they occupied approximately half of the senior posts under President **Philibert Tsiranana**; the presidential chief of staff, head of the internal security services (Deuxième Bureau), and various cabinet directors were all French. The head of the gendarmerie was French until 1969. Demands for the **Malgachization** of these services were an important component of the **May 1972 Revolution** that brought about the fall of the First Republic. The numbers and overall importance of the *coopérants* were sharply reduced by both sides in the **Democratic Republic**; some were replaced by Soviet and East European advisors, and the military had contingents of **Chinese** and **North Korean** specialists. French personnel began returning as relations thawed in the early and mid-1980s. They continue to play important roles in highly specialized, usually short-term, assignments in the ministries and educational institutions of the **Third Republic** where the directorial levels are almost entirely occupied by Malagasy.

**THIRD REPUBLIC.** Successor to the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM), the Third Republic had its roots in a civic re-

volt against the regime of **Didier Ratsiraka**. The attack was led by an alliance of the **Forces Vives** political parties, the **labor unions**, churches (the **FFKM**), and parts of the **armed forces**. The transition period between republics was characterized by considerable instability, largely the result of actions taken by Ratsiraka and his followers to hang on to power. The Third Republic was authorized by the **Referendum of 19 August 1992**. Its main institutions included a presidency of limited powers, a bicameral legislature composed of an **Assemblée Nationale** and a **Senate**, and a government headed by a prime minister responsible to the Assembly. Successive presidents have managed to expand their executive jurisdiction while weakening parliament, subordinating the ministries, and controlling the **judiciary**.

Although his aggrandizement of presidential prerogatives was popularly endorsed in the **Referendum of 17 September 1995**, the republic's first chief of state, **Albert Zafy**, encountered irreconcilable hostility in the Assembly (a Senate had not yet been formed). The challenge was spearheaded by Assembly president (speaker), **Richard Andriamanjato** who had been instrumental in the Forces Vives movement and previously in the Ratsiraka system. In July 1996, the Assembly voted articles of impeachment against Zafy who was consequently deposed by action of the High Constitutional Court in September. A transitional administration under Prime Minister (and Acting President) **Norbert Lala Ratsirahonana** organized presidential **elections** in November and December. The contest was won not by the insurgents against Zafy, but by Ratsiraka who had returned from **France** to recover his place.

While probably intending to create still another "republic," Ratsiraka settled on **constitutional** and legislative changes in structure that secured the authority of the president, organized the Senate, and provided for a theoretical **decentralization** of powers to six autonomous provinces (*faritany*). Progress on this program was interrupted by Ratsiraka's unexpected loss to **Antananarivo** mayor **Marc Ravalomanana** in the presidential election of December 2001. After failing in the **Crisis of 2002** to obtain a second-round run-off with Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka began his second self-exile in France. Ravalomanana legitimately assumed the third presidency of the Third Republic on 6 May 2002.

**TIAKO-I-MADAGASIKARA (TIM) / I LOVE MADAGASCAR.**

Created in August 2003 by President **Marc Ravalomanana** to field candidates for the parliamentary **elections** of the following December, TIM formalized the loose popular movement (of the same name) under which Ravalomanana had successfully fought the 2001 presidential campaign. TIM is staffed by close business and political associates of the new president, with Prime Minister **Jacques Sylla** as general secretary. In the election to the **Assemblée Nationale** on 16 December 2002, TIM used the momentum from Ravalomanana's previous year's victory to win 110 of 160 legislative seats. It proceeded to claim all parliamentary offices and to prepare for local and provincial electoral campaigns that would allow it to claim the status of regime party, much like the **Parti Social Démocrate** of the **First Republic** and the **AREMA** party of the **Democratic Republic** and the second **Didier Ratsiraka** administration (1997 to 2001). Profiting from opportunistic defections from AREMA, TIM captured more than half the town halls in the **communal** elections of November 2003. In February 2004, TIM contracted a bipartisan relationship with **French** President Jacques Chirac's Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP).

Resistance to TIM's monolithic tendency soon erupted, not merely among Ravalomanana's rivals and detractors, but among independent and third-party politicians who had favored the new head of state and wanted some recognition for their support. Civic groups also deplore the tendency in TIM's Mouvement des Jeunes Patriotes (Young Patriots' Movement) toward abuses similar to those of Ratsiraka's **Tanora Tonga Saina**. Acknowledging the presence of these claims if not their legitimacy, TIM president Andrianatoandro Raharinaivo began a series of consultations in early 2004 with an array of disgruntled party leaders at **Antananarivo's** historic Hotel Panorama where many previous agreements and coalitions had been forged. Whether TIM will consent to a distribution of offices and other emoluments, or, rather, revert to the habitual quest for total patron-client control will be a test of how much Ravalomanana himself represents true systematic change. He is known to be autocratic in business style but while TIM pursued its course toward hegemony, its head of state retained close consultation with leaders of at least four sympathetic but independent parties. It is ominous in any case that the question of

power-sharing should have taken precedence in 2003–2004 over issues of TIM's actual platform, an audacious pledge of dedication to the interests of the poor who represent some 80 percent of the population, not the prerogatives of the political class.

**TOAMASINA (18°10'S, 49°25'E).** Once known as Tamatave, Toamasina is Madagascar's most important seaport, with a population estimated in 1993 as 137,782. The harbor, formed by a series of coral reefs, was already in use in the 18th century when it became the main terminus of trade with the **Mascarenes**. The port owes this eminence to its comparative security and better access to overland trade routes, compared with **Sainte-Marie**, **Antsiranana**, and **Antongil Bay**. At first controlled by the **Betsimisaraka Confederacy** and then by Creole traders under **Jean René** and the French resident, **Sylvain Roux**, it was captured by the **Merina Empire** in 1817. As the empire's chief port, Toamasina was subject to periodic attacks by outside powers, including bombardment by the French in 1829 and a Franco-British attack in 1845. It was occupied during the **Franco-Malagasy War of 1883–1885**. In 1913, under the French, it was linked by rail to **Antananarivo**.

Toamasina now handles about 70 percent of Madagascar's port traffic, although its capacity is severely reduced by periodic cyclones. It is also the site of the island's only oil refinery, an on-again, off-again industrial/commercial complex (SOLIMA) that was subdivided and **privatized** in 2001. The city has often been a foyer of political restlessness, from the 1958 **Tamatave Congress** that appealed for immediate independence, to intermittent pogroms against residents from the **highlands** and other parts of the island. During the presidential **Crisis of 2002**, it became headquarters for the defeated candidate, **Didier Ratsiraka**, who sought to use the port and the lines of access to strangle Antananarivo, occupied by his rival, **Marc Ravalomanana**.

After resolution of the crisis, Toamasina retains its inclination to turbulence and dissent. In early 2004, it was hit by wildcat dockers' strikes, rumors of clandestine arms shipments and of commando training centers, and a turbulent rally by the Comité de **Réconciliation Nationale** prior to which the national flag was furtively removed from some official buildings. Toamasina's current mayor, Roland

Ratsiraka, a nephew of the former president, pledged cooperation with the Ravalomanana administration in quieting the atmosphere and bringing progress to the city.

**TOAMASINA PROVINCE.** Occupying the central east coast of Madagascar, the province contains the island's most important port, the provincial capital of **Toamasina**. It is an important region for the cultivation of cash crops, including **coffee**, cloves, and **vanilla**, as well as tropical forest products. It also contains the **rice** basket around Lake **Alaotra** in the interior. Like other parts of the east coast, Toamasina was an important center of the **Rebellion of 1947**. The dominant Malagasy ethnic group in this very diverse province is the **Betsimisaraka**, but there are also important minorities, especially **Merina** and **Chinese**, as well as laboring immigrants from all parts of the island.

**TOBACCO.** Madagascar cultivates an indigenous form of tobacco that is used mainly for chewing. Maryland tobacco was introduced after World War I, and local production of cigarettes began. In 1964, the government took a monopoly of production. The island produces about 2,000 metric tons of tobacco leaf annually, far less than in the past, but cigarette production, exceeding 4,000 tons a year, is still an important **industry** for the island.

**TOLIARA (23°21'S, 43°40'E).** First developed as a port to handle the **slave trade** with the **Mascarenes** and **South Africa** in the late 18th and 19th centuries, Toliara (also known as Toliary) became the site of a garrison of the **Merina Empire**. After the **French** conquest it served largely as an administrative center. The port suffers from underdeveloped facilities and the lack of a productive hinterland. The city's population has grown only slightly from the estimated 80,826 of 1993. It is nonetheless a busy point of departure for **tourism** along the coasts and for movements of political protest. These range from the **MON-IMA** party of the **First Republic** to recent demonstrations against President **Marc Ravalomanana** by the **Réconciliation Nationale** politicians known as *Toliara Mijoro* (Toliara upright). Tensions have run high in the city during and after every **election** campaign, from December 2001 through November 2003.

**TOLIARA PROVINCE.** The southernmost of Madagascar's provinces is sparsely occupied by the **Antandroy**, **Antanosy**, **Mahafaly**, **Sakalava**, and **Vezo** ethnic groups. Although it has two sea-ports, **Toliara** and **Taolagnaro**, its isolation, the poor quality of the harbor accommodations, and the lack of a productive hinterland all keep the ports underused. Toliara is the most arid of the regions and is subject to periodic droughts that decimate the **cattle** herds on which its inhabitants depend. It is difficult to grow **rice** there, and manioc is a staple of diet for many southerners. Among the cash crops grown in Toliara are **sisal** and **Cape peas**. Recent gem **mining** and prospective ilmenite extraction, added to a growth in ecological and recreational **tourism**, bring some diversity and a promise of greater prosperity to a region where severe poverty has been exacerbated over decades by central government neglect.

**TOTOLEHIBE, FELIX.** A founder of the **Parti des Dëshérités de Madagascar** (PADESM), Totolehibe was that party's western district candidate in the 1946 elections to the French National Assembly. He was the most successful of the PADESM candidates, gaining 19,014 votes to **Joseph Raseta's** 21,475. In subsequent years he supported the political career of his cousin, **Philibert Tsiranana**.

**TOURISM.** A place of unique landscapes, explorable waters, and megabiodiversity, Madagascar has a potential to attract hordes of foreign admirers but has not yet developed the infrastructure necessary to accommodate them. Travel to the island is expensive and internal surface **transportation** highly problematic. Accommodations can be excellent in certain centers of tourist interest—**Antananarivo** the capital, lovely **Nosy Be**, outside the Isalo National Park—and relatively acceptable in other places, but the networks have yet to be connected at the level of density reached, for instance, by **Mauritius** or **Seychelles**. Serious development efforts, encouraged by the **World Bank** and other external partners, brought the total number of visitors to a record of 170,000 in 2001, earning about \$120 million for the island **economy**. Two-thirds of those visitors held French nationality—95,000 from metropolitan **France**, 17,000 from **Réunion**. The political crisis of the following year cut the number to a fraction of that count, and in the sluggish European economy, Madagascar stays off

the beaten track. Under President **Marc Ravalomanana**, emphasis on road construction, enhancement of the valiant intra-island service of Air Madagascar, and the likelihood of renewed hotel building by Mauritian and Asian entrepreneurs could help the Great Island reach its potential—while at the same time raising fears of profiteering and **environmental** exploitation.

After the capital city and Nosy Be, the largest contingents of tourists visit nature reserves like the Isalo in the center, Ranomafana in the east, Berenty in the southeast, and Perinet on the escarpment east of Antananarivo, all of which house fascinating lemur populations. Beaches and seashore resorts have sprung up on **Sainte-Marie** in the northeast and north of **Toliara** in the southwest, but they rank far lower than Nosy Be in tourist traffic. The **highland** lakes at Mantasoa and Itasy draw weekenders from the capital, as does Tritriva near **Antsirabe**. Visitors find **Antsiranana**, Antsirabe, and **Toamasina** the most attractive of the Great Island cities, after Antananarivo and its perimeter of historic hilltowns (particularly **Ambohimanga**). The most interesting centers of Malagasy **arts** are in the provincial capitals and at Ambositra and **Ambalavao** in the southern highlands and Ampanihy in the south.

**TRANSPORTATION.** Madagascar's transport infrastructure has always been dependent on the strengths and weaknesses of its **external trade** relationships. The island forms an archipelago of production for export—**coffee** in the southeast, **vanilla** in the northeast, **fisheries** in the far north and far south, manufacturing in the **highlands**, minerals and gemstones in the interior, **tourism** at **Nosy Be** and the south. Seaports, lines of rail, and roadways have served these respective purposes, while airports had to be constructed at dozens of outposts to serve administrative and social needs. The main seaport at **Toamasina** handles over one million metric tons of cargo, about 70 percent of the island's total sea-borne freight traffic, including **petroleum**. Three of the four major lines that visit the port are internationally owned while the state's 59 percent interest in the fourth, the Société Malgache des Transports Maritimes (SMTM), is due to be sold. Toamasina is connected with **Antananarivo**—which dominates industrial production as well as administrative and social consumption—by a deteriorated highway and occasionally func-

tional rail links. Fourteen other seaports off-load regional traffic under difficult circumstances.

Madagascar's four railroads were constructed before World War II by the **French** colonial administration. They cover a total of 893 kilometers, all on one-meter gauge track. The oldest, the Antananarivo-East Coast, runs for 360 kilometers from the capital to Toamasina; it was started under Governor-General **Joseph Gallieni** and finished in 1913. A spur line from Moramanga to the **rice**-growing area of **Lake Alaotra**, a distance of 168 kilometers, was finished in 1922, and another line, covering the 158 kilometers from Antananarivo to **Antsirabe**, was opened in 1923. Freight and passenger traffic actually declined radically through the 1990s, until the railways were turned over to competent private management and ownership. Even after **privatization**, the three northern lines, operated by Madarail, encounter perpetual technical and financial difficulties—as well as theft of their rails by bandits. A separate line, the **Fianarantsoa**-East Coast railroad, ends at the port of Manakara in coffee-growing territory, a distance of 163 kilometers; it was finished in 1938 and restored to operation in 2004 after several years of interrupted service. The lines running to the coast are difficult to maintain, both because of the steep grade and because of the frequent cyclones and heavy rains that characterize the east-coast climate.

The insular road system never reached efficiency for cargo or passenger transportation, although the general population, its herds of **cattle**, and its consumer necessities appear to a visitor to be constantly on the move. Paved highway actually declined from 15.4 percent of roadways in 1992 to 11.6 percent in 1999. Current development priorities call for improvement of the island's 5,000 kilometers of paved roads and 40,000 kilometers of unpaved roads and tracks, all plied by plethoras of flatbed trucks and "mamy-wagons." This program for circulation of people and goods is crucial for long-neglected rural development purposes and for an approach toward parity among the six diverse **provinces**.

Until the surface system strengthens, passenger traffic around the island will continue to depend on Air Madagascar's service to 46 far-flung airports. The island ranks fourth in sub-Saharan Africa for aircraft departures—29,000 in the year 2000, most of them domestic flights. Four international airports—at **Toamasina**, **Mahajanga**,



**Antsiranana**, and by far the busiest, **Antananarivo**/Ivato—link Madagascar directly with **France**, Southeast Asia, and **Indian Ocean** neighbors, albeit at high cost while traffic volume remains low. The inevitable financial loss incurred by the national airline in maintaining its domestic service has discouraged bidders away from Air Madagascar, which has been scheduled for privatization for several years. It is currently operated by contract with Lufthansa.

**TRIAL OF THE CENTURY.** A special **military** tribunal was convened on 21 March 1975 at **Antananarivo** to try suspects in the assassination of Colonel **Richard Ratsimandrava**. Among the 302 accused were three soldiers from the Groupe Mobile de Police (formerly **Forces Républicaines de Sécurité**) who had been arrested at the site. Others suspected of having plotted the assassination included the leader of the December mutiny, Colonel **Bréhard Rajaonarison**, former president **Philibert Tsiranana**, former minister of the interior **André Resampa**, and Ratsimandrava's main rival in the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**, **Roland Rabetafika**. The trial became an expose for the quarrels and intrigues of those who had ruled the country since independence. It has been argued that it also served to distract public attention while the **Directoire Militaire** that took power after the assassination settled the question of who would succeed Ratsimandrava. On 16 May, 270 of the defendants were excused, one day before the military directorate announced formation of an executive committee headed by Captain **Didier Ratsiraka**. On 12 June, the case against the majority of the remaining defendants was dismissed for lack of evidence. Only the three GMP soldiers received sentences—of four years each. On 15 June, Didier Ratsiraka became head of state. The site of the tribunal, **Andafiavaratra** Palace, was burned during a riot in September 1976, taking the records of the trial with it.

**TSIANDROFANA (?–1901).** A ruler of the **Tanala**, Tsiandrofana led a revolt in 1850 that ended with the establishment of de facto independence from the **Merina Empire**. First contacts with the **French** began in 1890. When the French began to move their armies into Tanala country after their conquest of 1895, Tsiandrofana urged cooperation, but could not prevent his people from resisting. He died before the conquest was completed.

**TSIEBO, CALVIN (1902–?).** Born in southern Madagascar and educated at American Lutheran **mission** schools, Tsiebo was a founder of the **Parti Social Démocrate** and vice president of the **First Republic**. He served in the colonial administration and, after 1949, was elected to the provincial assembly of **Toliara** and to the representative assembly. In 1960, he became president of the new **Assemblée Nationale**, leaving the post to become vice president. He was among the most loyal supporters of President **Philibert Tsiranana** and was in charge of the government during Tsiranana's absences, including his serious illness in 1970.

**TSIHOZONONY, MAHANANGA.** A member of **MONIMA** from **Toliara province**, Tsihozonony was named to the **Conseil Suprême de la Révolution** in 1976. When **Monja Jaona** took **MONIMA** out of the regime in 1977, Tsihozonony and others separated from the party to found the Vondrona Socialista **MONIMA**, which successfully applied for readmission to the **Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution**.

**TSIMIHETY.** These “people who do not cut their hair” live in the northwestern part of Madagascar and, in 1994, had an estimated population of 800,000 (558,100 in the census estimate of 1974). Traditionally an inland pastoral group, they claim to have moved westward from the Maroantsetra area, migrating into **Sakalava** territory as their herding-based economy expanded. They have absorbed both Sakalava and **Sihanaka** neighbors until they now occupy much of both **Mahajanga** and **Antsiranana provinces**. The Tsimihety are notable for their loose social structure and lack of hierarchical political institutions. The president of the **First Republic**, **Philibert Tsiranana**, was Tsimihety, as were many of his associates.

**TSIOMEKO.** Queen of the Bemihisatra monarchy established by the **Boina Sakalava** after the capture of their capital, **Mahajanga**, by the **Merina Empire**. Tsiomeko fled to the island of **Nosy Be** in 1839 to escape from the advancing Merina. She applied unsuccessfully for help to the sultan of Zanzibar, and, in 1840, signed an agreement for protection with Captain Passot, commander of the **French** forces in

the area. The agreement was formalized in 1841 by the governor of **Réunion**, Admiral de Hell.

**TSIRANANA, PHILIBERT (c.1910–1978).** The only president of the **First Republic**, Tsiranana was a **Tsimihety** of peasant ancestry. He attended the **Ecole Le Myre de Vilers** and at the time of the **Rebellion of 1947** was studying at the teachers' college of the University of Montpellier. While a student in **France**, he formed the Union des Etudiants Malgaches as a counterweight to the more **nationalist** and **Merina**-dominated **Association des Etudiants d'Origine Malgache**. When he returned to Madagascar in 1950, Tsiranana began teaching and became active in politics as a member of the **Parti des Dëshérités de Madagascar** (PADESM). In 1952, he was elected to the provincial council of **Mahajanga** and was sent as one of its delegates to the representative assembly in Antananarivo. In 1956, he was elected to the French National Assembly from the western electoral district, and while there joined the French Socialist (SFIO) party. On his return to Madagascar, he formed the **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD), with the active encouragement of the French governor-general, **André Soucoudaux**, also a member of the Socialist party. When the **Loi-Cadre Government Council** was elected, his PSD was strong enough for Tsiranana to become council vice president.

Although Tsiranana was more favorable toward autonomy than other erstwhile members of PADESM, he resisted outright independence, arguing that internally the **Côtier** population was still too weak to avoid domination by the **Merina** and that externally a small state like Madagascar could fall prey to international communism. He argued for a "yes" vote in the 1958 **Referendum on the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic**, entailing rejection of full independence. In May 1959, he was elected president of an autonomous Madagascar in the French Union. Pressures for decolonization had become overwhelming, however, and in January 1960, his government began the process of negotiating full independence. Tsiranana's desire to avoid total separation from France influenced the negotiations, and independence came accompanied by a series of **Cooperation Agreements** that maintained a large measure of French influence. On 26 June 1960, independence was proclaimed, and in July, Tsiranana brought back the three **Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation**

**Malgache** (MDRM) deputies whose exile in France had symbolized the divisions of the Malagasy population.

For most of the First Republic Tsiranana, seconded by the secretary-general of the party and minister of the interior, **André Resampa**, was able to maintain his dominance of Malagasy politics. He was an astute student of politics, local and national, and an indefatigable and eloquent speaker, able to adapt his message to the diverse audiences that attended his frequent tours of the countryside. That dominance began to fade when he suffered a stroke at a meeting of the **Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache** at Yaoundé in February 1970. He spent the next several months hospitalized in Paris, and when he returned to Madagascar found that the struggle to succeed him had already begun. One of the main pretenders was André Resampa, whom Tsiranana gradually removed from power, finally accusing him (inaccurately) of plotting subversion with the **United States** and China. Nevertheless, Tsiranana had increasing difficulty controlling political events, coming more and more to rely on a small group of advisors known as the “Tsimihety clan.” The **Peasant Rebellion** of 1971 caused a further loss of prestige.

Tsiranana tried to recover lost ground by staging his reelection as sole candidate in January 1972, winning 99 percent of the vote, and requiring ritualistic professions of loyalty from the members of his government. Shortly thereafter, however, a crisis in the **educational** system turned into the **May 1972 Revolution**, directed at Tsiranana and his regime. In his efforts to contain the uprising, Tsiranana unleashed the **Forces Républicaines de Sécurité** (FRS) whose anti-riot violence only enraged the demonstrators further. Finally, he appealed to Paris for help, but President Georges Pompidou declined to commit France’s 4,500 paratroopers on the island to his rescue. On 18 May, Tsiranana was forced to grant emergency powers to General **Gabriel Ramanantsoa** and was removed as president after the **Referendum of 8 October 1972** that ratified the **military’s** authority for a transitional period of five years.

Tsiranana continued to be active in politics during the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**, reconciling with Resampa to form the **Parti Socialiste Malgache**. He was suspected of complicity in the 1975 assassination of Ramanantsoa’s successor, Colonel **Richard Ratsimandrava**, and was one of the defendants at the “**Trial of the**

**Century,”** but like the other defendants, Tsiranana was released, and the charges against him dismissed. Tsiranana played little part in the subsequent **Democratic Republic of Madagascar**, and died in 1978. Two of his children, Pierre and Ruffine, have continued in political life.

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**UNION AFRICAINE ET MALGACHE (UAM) / AFRICAN AND MALAGASY UNION.** The UAM, whose charter was signed at **Antananarivo** in September 1961, was formed to link **France** and its former African colonies after the French Community had dissolved in the 1959–1960 passage from internal autonomy to full independence. Annual meetings of heads of state allowed the erstwhile colonies to compare notes, to coordinate policies with Paris, and to solicit benefits from their continuing privileged relationships with France. In 1965 the name was changed to **Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM)**.

**UNION DEMOCRATIQUE ET SOCIALE DE MADAGASCAR (UDSM) / MALAGASY DEMOCRATIC AND SOCIAL UNION.** The UDSM was founded in 1957 by two brothers from the east coast of **Fianarantsoa province**, **Norbert** and Antoine **Zafimahova**. In the 1957 legislative elections, the party gained a majority in both **Fianarantsoa** and **Toliara provinces**, and Norbert Zafimahova became president of the Territorial Assembly, in which the UDSM had 36 seats, only one less than the **Parti Social Démocrate** of **Philibert Tsiranana**. The platforms of the two parties resembled each other in their rejection of immediate independence, and they formed the **Cartel des Républicains** to combat the parties that had advocated a “no” vote in the **Referendum on the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic**.

After 1958, however, the UDSM attempted to expand outside its southern base in competition with the PSD. In response, Tsiranana successfully attracted some UDSM leaders, including Robert Marson and **Albert Sylla**, to the PSD. In the 1958 debates on the constitutional structure of Madagascar’s internal autonomy, the UDSM lost

its battle for the adoption of a parliamentary rather than a presidential form of government, and in the 1959 municipal elections it was unable to maintain control of its bases in Farafangana and Manakara. After these elections, the party split, and a majority of its members in the legislature, led by Albert Sylla, joined the PSD. Norbert Zafimahova reacted by forming the **Union des Sociaux Démocrates de Madagascar**.

**UNION DES CHRETIENS DE MADAGASCAR (UDECMA) / CHRISTIAN UNION OF MADAGASCAR.** Breaking off from the Christian Democratic Party of **Alexis Bezaka**, UDECMA was founded by **Norbert Solo Andriamorasata**, a journalist from Antananarivo, in 1971 as a left-wing Christian party. In 1972, Andriamorasata attempted to run for the presidency of the **First Republic** against President **Philibert Tsiranana**, but his candidacy was annulled, leaving Tsiranana the sole candidate. Under the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar (DRM)** in 1977, Andriamorasata took UDECMA into the **Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution** to mobilize east coast and Roman **Catholic** support for President **Didier Ratsiraka**; Andriamorasata joined the DRM's **Conseil Suprême de la Révolution**. UDECMA continued its support of Ratsiraka during the crisis that led to the end of the regime, while the majority of Christian organizations militated in the opposition. It failed to seat delegates in the legislative elections of 1993.

**UNION DES ETUDIANTS SOCIALISTES MALGACHES (UESM) / UNION OF MALAGASY SOCIALIST STUDENTS.** The UESM was formed at the **University of Madagascar** in 1962. It was created by the governing **Parti Social Démocrate**, which considered the existing student group, the **Fédération des Associations des Etudiants Malgaches (FAEM)**, too radical. The UESM itself was on the left of the party, however, and pushed for the renegotiation of the **Cooperation Agreements** with **France** and for reform of the **educational** system. It participated in the **May 1972 Revolution** and was absorbed into the revolutionary structures that ensued from the movement.

**UNION DES INDEPENDANTS DE TANANARIVE (UIT) / UNION OF INDEPENDENTS OF TANANARIVE.** The UIT was

founded by **Stanislas Rakotonirina** in 1953, and was the main force behind his election as mayor of **Antananarivo** in 1956. Although assisted by the **Catholic** mission, the UIT also attracted non-Catholic groups in a platform of moderate **nationalism**. After the coming of the **Loi-Cadre** and Rakotonirina's quarrels with the Catholic mission, the UIT entered a period of decline. It did not attend the **Tamatave Congress** of 1958 or participate in the formation of the **AKFM**, which emerged from the congress. The UIT's endorsement of a negative vote in the 1958 **Referendum on the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic** came only one week before the referendum was to be held. For these reasons the UIT lost its place to the **AKFM** as the party of Antananarivo nationalism.

**UNION DES INTELLECTUELS ET UNIVERSITAIRES MALGACHES (UNIUM) / UNION OF MALAGASY INTELLECTUALS AND ACADEMICS.** UNIUM was an organization of **Antananarivo** intellectuals founded in 1956 by, among others, **Albert Ramangasoavina**. It declared that its goal was to "contribute to the elevation of the life of the Malagasy in the political, economic, cultural and social domains." It called for internal autonomy and supported the passage of the **Loi-Cadre**. In 1958, UNIUM attended the **Tamatave Congress**, which called for immediate independence. **Ramangasoavina**, however, by now a member of the **Loi-Cadre Governing Council**, disavowed this action. The union dissolved as its members moved into more overt partisan activity.

**UNION DES PEUPLES MALGACHES (UPM) / UNION OF THE MALAGASY PEOPLES.** This party was a successor to the **Parti de l'Union des Peuples Malgaches**. It was strongest in **Antananarivo**, with sections in **Toamasina** and **Diégo-Suarez**. In 1956, it supported the candidacy of **Stanislas Rakotonirina** for mayor of Antananarivo. It sent delegates to the **Tamatave Congress** in 1958, and was one of the parties that united to form the **AKFM**, or Independence Congress Party of Madagascar.

**UNION DES SOCIAUX DEMOCRATES DE MADAGASCAR (USDM) / SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC UNION OF MADAGASCAR.** This party was formed in 1960 by **Norbert Zafimahova** after

his original party, the **Union Démocratique et Sociale**, suffered defections into the dominant **Parti Social Démocrate**. Zafimahova's party sought to defend its independence from the PSD, but it foundered under weak leadership. At the time of the 1965 legislative elections it took the name *Manjakavoaka* (Popular Power), but was unable to win any seats in the elections.

**UNION ET ACTION COMMUNALE.** See RABEMANANJARA, RAYMOND WILLIAM.

**UNION NATIONALE MALGACHE (NAM) / NATIONAL MALAGASY UNION.** UNAM was established at **Toamasina** in 1957 to advocate independence beyond what had been granted by the **Loi-Cadre** and its "moderate" socialism. UNAM attended the **Tamatave Congress** of 1958, but refused to join in the unification of **nationalist** parties that created the **AKFM** at the congress.

**UNION NATIONAL POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ET LA DEMOCRATIE (UNDD) / NATIONAL UNION FOR DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY.** The UNDD was formed in 1989 by **Albert Zafy**, a professor of surgery at the **University of Madagascar** to advance an "ecological" ideology. It quickly became one of the leading groups opposing the continuation of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM), and in March 1990 joined with other groups to form the **Comité des Forces Vives**, which successfully overthrew the DRM in 1991–1992. On the formation of a government after his **election** as president of the **Third Republic** in 1993, Zafy imposed several UNDD ministers on Prime Minister **Françisque Ravony**, although the party was represented by only five deputies (out of 135), all from Zafy's northern bailiwick of **Antsir-anana**. After dismissing Ravony in October 1995, Zafy appointed the UNDD's **Emmanuel Rakotovahiny** as prime minister with a cabinet largely chosen from the UNDD. This government was blamed for obstructing the **economic** structural reforms demanded by Madagascar's external partners; it suffered a parliamentary vote of no-confidence in May 1996. At Zafy's insistence, UNDD ministers participated in the successor government of **Norbert Lala Ratsirahonana** but they were excluded from Ratsirahonana's second



ministry, after judicial confirmation of Zafy's impeachment in September 1996.

The party virtually vanished after **Didier Ratsiraka**'s election to a second term in December. Zafy himself recomposed a new party, **AFFA**, but the UNDD remained on the books and in early 2004, Rakotovahiny participated in its name in the **Panorama** Hotel conversations between President **Marc Ravalomanana**'s triumphant **Tiako-i-Madagasikara** (TIM) and 14 smaller parties seeking concessions from TIM.

**UNION SOCIALISTE MALGACHE (USM) / MALAGASY SOCIALIST UNION.** The USM was founded in September 1972 by the former secretary-general of the **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD), **André Resampa**. Resampa advocated a positive vote in the **Referendum of 8 October 1972** authorizing the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**, but became increasingly critical of the regime's anti-French policies and its perceived pro-**Merina** bias. This attitude, combined with the USM's lack of success in elections to local councils and the **Conseil National Populaire du Développement**, led Resampa into a reconciliation with **Philibert Tsiranana** and the integration of the USM into a new **Parti Socialiste Malgache**.

**UNITED NATIONS (UN).** In its declaration regarding non-self-governing territories, the UN Charter, signed at San Francisco in 1945, provided that the interest of the indigenous inhabitants of these territories should be paramount. **Nationalists** in Madagascar interpreted this as support to their claims for greater autonomy. Figures like **Ravelojaona** contended that Madagascar was suited to trusteeship status like that given to Togo, while some organizers of the **Rebellion of 1947** argued that the United Nations would come to the assistance of their uprising. Although not crediting the UN with a prominent role in the achievement of independence, the new Malagasy Republic participated in United Nations activity through the Francophone caucus. Under the **Democratic Republic**, this participation was oriented toward the **non-aligned movement** and the "Zone of Peace" initiative for the **Indian Ocean**. Since the eruption of Madagascar's **economic** crisis in the early 1980s, the UN's Bretton Woods organizations, the **International Monetary Fund** and

the **World Bank**, have played critical roles in strategies of recovery and development.

**UNITED STATES.** The first U.S. consulate was accredited to the **Merina Empire** in 1866 and treaties of friendship were signed in 1867 and 1883. In the late 19th century, American clergy and their families joined the Lutheran church **missions** in the south and at **Antananarivo**. After the **French** conquest, the consulate continued on a desultory basis, and at independence was upgraded to an embassy. By that time, the American “colony” consisted of about 250 people, most of them missionaries. The **First Republic** had an ambivalent relationship with the United States. The government was firmly pro-Western and anticommunist, generally supported U.S. foreign policy stands, and in 1963, authorized a NASA tracking station at **Mahajanga**, subsequently transferred to Imerintsiasosika, near Antananarivo. Nevertheless, President **Philibert Tsiranana** declined to accept Peace Corps volunteers; he was disappointed by his official visit to Washington in 1964; and he shared French fears of “Anglo-Saxon” designs on Madagascar. In 1971, when the vice president and interior minister, **André Resampa**, was accused of plotting with a foreign embassy to overthrow him, Tsiranana made it clear that it was the U.S. embassy that he suspected. The American ambassador was recalled, leaving relations at the level of chargé d’affaires. Tsiranana later retracted his accusation.

Relations worsened when the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) adopted its Marxist orientation in 1975, and the NASA base was closed. In 1976, two American diplomats were accused of supporting a strike in the technical schools and were expelled, leading to the reciprocal expulsion of Malagasy diplomats from Washington. The United States remained one of Madagascar’s chief trading partners, however, with a balance of trade favorable to Madagascar. The **debt** crisis of the early 1980s led Madagascar to improve its relations with Western countries, including the United States. Ambassadors were exchanged again in 1981, and in 1983, the 100th anniversary of the 1883 friendship treaty was celebrated.

Relations continued undramatically through the DRM years to 1991 and into the ensuing **Third Republic**. Madagascar continued to export **vanilla** and to receive a trickle of American **tourists** and

**environmental** researchers, while the United States provided judicious doses of technical and cultural assistance, concentrating increasingly on the cultivation of civil society organizations, public **health** improvement (much of it through Peace Corps volunteers), environmental protection (largely through an array of nongovernmental contractors), and English-language training. Cultural exchange strengthened under each successive administration in Antananarivo. The English language as well as American popular culture, management and marketing techniques became increasingly in demand among the Malagasy middle class.

Although relations remained cordial during **Didier Ratsiraka's** second administration from 1997, Washington expressed resentment over Ratsiraka's ungenerous reaction to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. In 2002, the United States perceived a more congenial interlocutor in the new president, **Marc Ravalomanana**, an English-speaking businessman who had proved his efficacy as mayor of Antananarivo. Like **France**, Washington took a restrained approach to the **Crisis of 2002** while Ravalomanana asserted his claim to an outright majority in the presidential **election** of the previous December. It seized an opportunity to help end the crisis after 29 April, however, when the Malagasy **Haute Cour Constitutionnelle** (HCC) announced the result of a ballot recount in favor of that majority claim. Its embassy even reported verification of the recount in Ravalomanana's favor, and it attended the new president's second "inauguration" on 6 May. Recognition followed on 26 June and inaccurate rumors surged of a newly Americanized epoch in Antananarivo to replace the discredited French. Paris recovered its advantage promptly, and the United States returned to its position of subordinate foreign power, albeit with more enthusiasm for the new regime. Assistance to public health, infrastructure, **education**, and environmental conservation resumed, and the United States provided six patrol boats for the Malagasy coast guard. American assistance amounts to \$25 to \$30 million per year, far lower than France's normal \$150 million. Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) offered Madagascar's textile industries an unprecedented opportunity for exports to the American market, an advantage worth \$159 million in 2003. In

early 2004, the United States admitted Madagascar to the first wave of 16 countries eligible for its Millenium Challenge Account, entailing a 50 percent increase in American assistance over three years.

**UNIVERSITY OF MADAGASCAR.** The university was created at **Antananarivo** in 1960 by combining several preexisting postsecondary institutions, including the Institut des Hautes Etudes, the Ecole Supérieure des Sciences, and the Ecole Supérieure des Lettres. At the beginning its degrees were given equivalence with **French** diplomas, and its rector was appointed by the French minister of education. The campus was moved to Ambohitsaina on the outskirts of the city in 1967. In 1972, student protests against French domination of their **education** intensified into the **May 1972 Revolution** that overthrew the **First Republic**, and revision of the university system was a priority for the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** that followed. Since 1980, university centers have been established in each of the provincial capitals so that, technically, the original institution is now entitled l'Université d'Antananarivo.

In 1986, the government of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM) attempted to reduce expenditure on the system by limiting the number of times students could repeat years and restricting upper-level instruction to two of the university centers. The result was a series of strikes and demonstrations that forced the government to withdraw the plan. Projected reforms announced in 1990 were prevented by the political instability that brought about the collapse of the DRM in 1991–1992. Plagued by inadequate budgets, poor quality of over-crowded facilities, and intermittent strikes by students and staff, the six universities struggle to retain their regular faculties against competition from specialized institutes and more modern, better financed private schools (which often employ the same university instructors). The island elite families continue to send their children abroad for post-secondary study. In January 2004, the faculty walked out in protest over Prime Minister **Jacques Sylla**'s cost-conscious merger of the higher education portfolio together with lower echelons in a single ministry of education under Haja Razanajatovo.

## – V –

**VANILLA.** Introduced to Madagascar from **Réunion** in the mid-19th century, the vanilla orchid is grown primarily along the northeast coast. It is Madagascar's most important **agricultural export**, generating about 18 percent of foreign exchange revenues in 2001. Main markets for Malagasy bean are in the **United States** and Western Europe. Production and exportation have been government controlled since 1960, although the Vanilla Board now merely sets upper and lower price limits, leaving the rest to market factors. Madagascar remains the world's largest producer of vanilla, averaging 1,200 metric tons annually, but in recent years Malagasy vanilla has faced increased competition from new producers (including **Indonesia** and India) and from artificial vanilla. Since the world market can absorb only about 2,000 tons annually, overproduction frequently causes Malagasy growers to defend prices by withholding quantities of bean; often the stockpile has to be unloaded subsequently at whatever price they can get. Crop theft and smuggling have also harmed the industry, forcing planters to harvest too early for optimum quality of bean. New, more productive, and more easily grown strains of vanilla are expected to challenge the Malagasy position further. *See also* SPICES.

**VAZIMBA.** This name is usually given to the earliest inhabitants of **highland** Madagascar. They are commonly described in local mythologies as small, ugly, dark of skin, primitive hunters and gatherers. There are several theories about who the Vazimba actually were. One argues that they were Africans (or "Melanesians") who arrived before the current occupants of the island and were absorbed or driven out by the later arrivals. Others argue that the Vazimba represent a premonarchical phase of later Malagasy society; their way of life lost out in the evolution toward more hierarchical political systems. In many areas, the spirits of the Vazimba are still considered to inhabit their former territory, and the highland **Merina** honor them with a kind of guilty reverence. There is also a present-day group in southwest Madagascar that calls itself Vazimba and claims to have been driven out of territory to the east.

**VELONJARA, PASCAL.** A cofounder of the **Parti des Dëshérités de Madagascar** (PADESM), Velonjara was the party's candidate for the eastern district in the 1946 elections to the French National Assembly, losing to **Jacques Rabemananjara** with 12,619 votes to 28,227. In 1951, he won election to the French National Assembly, where he opposed bills to extend **amnesty** to the prisoners from the **Rebellion of 1947**. Velonjara's influence extended into the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM), since two of his daughters, **Céline Ratsiraka** and **Hortense Raveloson-Mahasampo**, played important roles in the DRM. A third daughter married an influential army officer, Ferdinand Patureau, who was helpful to DRM President **Didier Ratsiraka** in 1975–1976 before entering private business.

**VEZO.** The Vezo are a coastal population of semi-nomadic people who fish for a living on the west coast of Madagascar north of **Toliara** between the Onilahy and the Mangoky rivers. They are closely related to the **Sakalava**.

**VICHY.** After the German invasion and the fall of **France** in June 1940, the French parliament met in the southern town of Vichy, in the unoccupied part of France. There it made peace with Germany and formed a government under a hero of World War I, Marshal Philippe Pétain. Most of the administrators of France's African colonies accepted the authority of this government rather than that of **Charles De Gaulle's Free French**, headquartered in London. **Marcel De Coppet**, governor-general of Madagascar, first sided with the Free French and then with Vichy. Under the Vichy regime both Malagasy **nationalists** and the French and Malagasy Free French partisans were prosecuted as dangers to security. Vichy control over Madagascar ended with the **British Invasion** of 1942 and the surrender of Governor-General **Armand Annet** in October of that year.

**VOHEMAR (ALSO IHARANA).** Vohemar was one of the most important **Islamic** settlements of the northeast coast of Madagascar. Archaeological evidence suggests that the town flourished between the 14th and 17th centuries. Like other such settlements, it was a commercial port, as findings of pottery from China and East Africa

suggest. What remains of the town indicates that its culture was a mixture of Muslim and non-Islamic influences.

**VONINAHITSY, JEAN-EUGENE.** *See* RASSEMBLEMENT POUR LA SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIE (RPSD).

**VONJY IRAY TSY MIVAKY (SALVATION IN UNITY).** Vonjy was founded in 1973 by Dr. **Jerome Razanabahiny-Marojama**, a former youth wing leader of the **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD) who broke with PSD leaders **Philibert Tsiranana** and **André Resampa**, and offered his support to the **Ramanantsoa Interregnum**. It proved over two decades to be an intrepid “survivor,” providing a home for many former PSD politicians and adhering to majorities wherever they were found. The party joined the **Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution** in 1977, but objected to the **Democratic Republic’s** commitment to Marxist socialism, preferring a brand of social democracy not unlike that practiced by the PSD. Vonjy split over support for **Didier Ratsiraka’s** bid for a second term as president in 1982, but the party itself has done better than predicted in parliamentary and local **elections**, gaining six seats in the **Assemblée Nationale Populaire** in 1983. In 1988, it tried in vain to mobilize a coalition against Ratsiraka in the ephemeral Alliance Démocratique de Madagascar; when that failed, a year later, Razanabahiny ran against Ratsiraka, gaining 14.8 percent of the vote. Vonjy was weakened when Resampa, who had been serving as a local official of the party, left in March 1990 to form a renewed PSD (the **Rassemblement pour la Social-Démocratie**). The party split again during the crisis that brought an end to the DRM, with some party members supporting Ratsiraka and others the opposition **Forces Vives**. Although Razanabahiny managed to stay alive politically under both **Third Republic** presidents, **Albert Zafy** and Ratsiraka, his party captured only one seat beside his own in the June 1993 parliamentary election, and subsequently failed to keep its toehold.

**VY VATO SAKELIKA (IRON STONE NETWORK).** Usually known by its initials, the VVS was created in 1912 by students at the medical school at **Befelatanana** hospital in **Antananarivo**. Members included such future **nationalist** leaders as **Joseph Raseta** and

**Joseph Ravoahangy.** Many had belonged to an earlier banned organization, the Union Chrétienne des Jeunes Gens. The VVS altered the conventional nationalist discourse by espousing adaptation of Western political methodology to Malagasy aspirations, rather than continue emphasizing restoration of the **Merina** monarchy. In this it was inspired by a series of articles by **Ravelojaona** on the successful modernization of Japan. The organization also differed from previous nationalist groups in recruiting beyond the capital, at least as far as the **Betsileo**.

Although this type of organization was forbidden under the *indigénat*, the colonial administration generally ignored it until the outbreak of World War I in 1914, when it was estimated that the VVS had about 300 members. In December 1915, the authorities discovered a plot, which they attributed to the VVS, to poison the French residents of Antananarivo. Nearly 200 VVS members and affiliates were arrested and sent to the prison island of **Nosy Lava**. Eventually 41 of the prisoners were tried, and 34, including Ravoahangy, Raseta, and Ravelojaona, were sentenced to hard labor for from five years to life. Ravelojaona's sentence was overturned on appeal, and the rest were amnestied in 1921.

–W–

**WOMEN.** Notwithstanding virtually continuous rule by four queens between 1828 and 1896, Madagascar has traditionally been a patriarchal society in age, class, and gender. For more than a century women have enjoyed theoretical legal equality in matters of property and marriage, and even an advantage in primary school enrollment (but not secondary). For decades, women have composed 44 to 45 percent of the work force, rural and urban, and they head 18 percent of Malagasy households. They participate fully in **rice** and other crop cultivation (although rarely in livestock care), and they excel in **educational** professions, public **health**, and the law, as well as in business where nearly one-third of the top management is female. Women also occupy most of the low-paid jobs in the **Export Processing Zones** where their working conditions are inferior to those of the men. Statistical unemployment is lower among women than men, and females



are as free to leave the protection of family as their male counterparts. In public life, however, few women manage to penetrate into positions of political or institutional power. They are found in negligible numbers in the **Assemblée Nationale** (12 of 160 after the December 2002 election), in the police (17 commissioners out of 242), town halls (52 mayors out of 1,553), and the **military**. Governments normally include three to five women ministers who are usually limited to social and cultural affairs, and often serve brief mandates; that contingent was reduced to one—the justice portfolio—in **Jacques Sylla**'s January 2004 cabinet.

Prominent exceptions include **Gisèle Rabesahala**, Madagascar's most influential and tenacious Marxist politician for nearly a half-century; **Madeleine Ramaholimihaso**, a business woman who has directed the **Comité National pour l'Observation des Elections** since 1989; Zèle Rasoanoro, an influential "backstage" player in the **First Republic**'s regime **Parti Social Démocrate**; **Céline Ratsiraka** and her sister, **Hortense Ravaloson-Mahasampo**, both of whom wielded power in **Didier Ratsiraka**'s **AREMA** party (essentially thanks to their husbands' respective positions); Lila Ratsifandrianana, minister of foreign affairs in Ratsiraka's last government, who became ambassador to Senegal under his successor, **Marc Ravalomanana**, the only woman to direct a diplomatic mission.

Associations for women's advancement have proliferated since the **First Republic**, and women have shown greater propensity to agitate for their rights than in the past. Family planning work is carried out successfully in many villages throughout the island. UNICEF and government agencies operate among rural women to improve health and hygiene. As in most societies, women assume full responsibility for domestic economy and child rearing, whatever their social class or professional function. Working Malagasy women thus have several fulltime roles. They are also more vulnerable to AIDS, and an international sexual **tourism** industry has recruited scores of teenage Malagasy women.

**WORLD BANK.** Officially the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the World Bank was founded in 1944 at Bretton Woods to provide loans for the development of its members. Members of the IBRD must also be members of the **International**

**Monetary Fund** (IMF), which was founded at the same time. Although the World Bank was at first occupied with the reconstruction of Europe, it increasingly came to focus on the development of Third World economies. The bank has become active in Madagascar since the country's attempts to loosen its financial reliance on **France** in the mid-1970s. It was a World Bank report that helped inspire the "all-out" **investment policy** undertaken by the **Democratic Republic** in 1978, and the bank has become Madagascar's largest multilateral creditor, almost entirely through its "soft-loan window," the International Development Agency (IDA). Since the onset of the external **debt** crisis, the bank has been instrumental in organizing both multilateral and bilateral aid to Madagascar. It established an office at **Antananarivo** in 1983.

The World Bank has since been involved both in organizing specific aid projects in various sectors and in preparing general **economic** plans for the island. Economic policy has emphasized **privatization** of 136 government firms and liberalization of the economy, improvements in the collection of government revenues, control over official spending, and protection of the endangered **environment**. The strategy also seeks to resolve the social problems created by Madagascar's economic difficulties, stressing the need for more effective social programs. The bank chairs the **Paris Club** whose members hold most of Madagascar's official external debt, and it has approved benefits to the Great Island under the multilateral Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). It has also encouraged Madagascar to become more fully integrated into East and southern African economic cooperation arrangements.

By 2004, the bank's own Madagascar portfolio contained 15 projects valued at \$717 million; 45 percent was dedicated to **education**, **health**, and nutrition; 33 percent to energy, infrastructure, **mining**, and **transportation**; 16 percent to rural development; and 6 percent to financial and private sector development. New investment is planned for protection of the environment, transport infrastructure, governance reforms, and watershed preservation. Bank missions and communications continue to urge expeditious privatization of remaining key state industries, including JIRAMA, the national electric power and water utility, Air Madagascar, the **cotton** cartel HASYMA, and the telephone company TELMA. The bank performs

periodic studies of Madagascar's needs, considerably augmenting the volume of publications on the island.

Having assumed leadership of assistance donors and creditors during the 1990s, the World Bank has been subject to criticism from Malagasy elites of all persuasions who express impatience with its prescriptive approach to financial and economic process and its putative tendency to study problems without bringing them to solution. For its part, the bank suspended project implementation at several points in Madagascar's political evolution; they include the presidency of **Albert Zafy** which resisted the structural adjustments prescribed by the Bretton Woods agencies and the political **Crisis of 2002**. After periods of tension, however, relations usually revert promptly to cordiality.

– Y –

**YOUTH.** Malagasy tradition has a precious place for children. They reinforce family/clan solidarity, assure continuity of lineage, and provide security for ageing parents. By adolescence, a young person's fate has usually been decided, whether in the rural or urban, traditional or modern context. The young person either has scholastic prospects and should continue schooling whenever possible, or he/she lacks that privilege and must go to work. The kind of work is determined by family property. A young person without land (or a place in urban commerce) becomes a pawn of authority. Land and commerce have been decreasingly accessible to newcomers since the time of independence, so that young people's situations have become increasingly perilous. Girls without **educational** prospects are forced into early marriage or into domestic service. Boys are strewn about the streets and countryside looking for something to do. Early school leavers began streaming into **Antananarivo** (and to an extent, other large towns) in the 1960s, jostling one another for fugitive work to be found on the streets, living with often impecunious relatives, shuttling back to their villages in seasons requiring their marginal labor. These prospects are determined by elders, usually males, who supposedly possess the wisdom and legitimacy of the proverbial *rayamandreny* (literally, father and mother).

As the overall **population** has increased, opportunities in both the urban and rural environments have been squeezed drastically. The result by the end of the 20th century was a vast population of urban youth in rags, young mothers desperately seeking low-paid work in the textile mills while maintaining responsibility for families, crowds sleeping in public places, organized banditry and petty theft.

This is of course a lamentably familiar pattern throughout regions of poverty in the world. Madagascar's version differs from others in some respects. Young urbanites were among the principal pressure points that overthrew the **First Republic** in the **May 1972 Revolution**, but they obtained little benefit for their efforts. The **economic** collapse and cultural nationalization associated with the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar (DRM)** in the 1980s entailed lower rates of school attendance and weaker standards than the education available to older generations, rural and urban. As a result, the qualifications of young people born between 1964 and 1973 were inadequate to the jobs normally open to school leavers. These jobs tended to go to over-qualified diploma holders who themselves could not find appropriate work and, because of family poverty, could not follow more fortunate siblings into employment abroad. Still, the unemployment rate for diploma holders was actually greater in the 1980s and 1990s than for the unschooled who settled for parttime, informal sector work wherever it could be found. Purchasing power of all first jobs fell drastically during the 1980s and 1990s. Politicization of dissatisfied youth intensified during this period, including recourse to theft and countryside banditry, as well as to clashes between the militants of **Kung Fu** and rival **Tanora Tonga Saina** clubs.

– Z –

**ZAFIMAHOVA, NORBERT.** Born into a powerful family in Farafangana, southeast Madagascar, Zafimahova was in the representative assembly for the **Parti des D sh rit s de Madagascar (PADESM)** at the time of the **Rebellion of 1947** in which members of his family were killed. He later served in the Conseil de la R publique of the Fourth French Republic. In 1956, he participated in the formal

breakup of PADESM, founding the **Union Démocratique et Sociale de Madagascar** (UDSM) with his brother Antoine in opposition to the **Parti Social Démocrate** (PSD) of **Philibert Tsiranana**. Although he did not accept office on the 1956 **Loi-Cadre Governing Council**, Zafimahova agreed with Tsiranana in 1958 on adoption of the **Referendum on the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic**. His UDSM had 36 out of 90 members of the constituent assembly that drafted a **constitution** for Madagascar's internal autonomy under the new French constitution, and he was elected Assembly president, despite the PSD's 37 votes. While Zafimahova advocated a parliamentary form of government for Madagascar, it was the presidential form modeled on the Fifth French Republic that was preferred by Tsiranana, and that was adopted.

Throughout the two-year period of autonomy, Zafimahova lost influence as members of his party accepted positions in the government and often joined the PSD. In May 1959, he resigned his assembly presidency, on the point of being censured for absenteeism. In the 1960 presidential **election**, Zafimahova ran against Tsiranana in alliance with the **Rassemblement Chrétien de Madagascar** (RCM), and lost. After the election some of Zafimahova's former allies, such as Jean-François Jarison, moved into the PSD government. Zafimahova continued to be active in politics, forming the **Union des Soci-aux Démocrates de Madagascar** (USDM) after the rupture of the UDSM in 1960, but the PSD's control over the political system was so strong that he was never elected to office. He occupied a sinecure in the foreign ministry of his erstwhile UDSM colleague, **Albert Sylla** during the early 1960s, but had no substantive role in public life.

**ZAFIRAMINIA.** Several dynasties of southern Madagascar, including the **Maroserana**, claim to be descended from the Zafiraminia—literally, “the Children of Raminia,” a legendary figure said to have come to the east coast of Madagascar from Mecca in early times. People calling themselves Zafiraminia were recorded by Portuguese visitors to the region around **Fort-Dauphin** in 1613, although the visitors commented that the Zafiraminia seemed ignorant of most of the tenets of **Islam**. The *ombiasy*, ritual specialists who operated throughout Madagascar, also claimed to be Zafiraminia.

**ZAFY, ALBERT (1927– )**. The first president of the **Third Republic** of Madagascar, Zafy was born in **Antsiranana province**. He began his education in **France** in 1954, graduating with a medical degree and practicing there until 1970. He returned to Madagascar as a surgeon and professor of medicine at the **University**. From 1972 to 1975, Zafy served as minister of health in the government of General **Gabriel Ramanantsoa**. When **Didier Ratsiraka** rose to power in 1975, Zafy campaigned against acceptance of Ratsiraka's **Democratic Republic of Madagascar (DRM)**. He emerged from his teaching post in 1989 to found the **Union Nationale pour le Développement et la Démocratie (UNDD)**. In 1990, urged by church leaders in the **FFKM**, he joined with other opposition leaders to form the **Comité des Forces Vives**, aiming to overthrow Ratsiraka and his DRM. He was named prime minister in the Forces Vives counter-government in July 1991. When the DRM collapsed, Zafy became president of the **Haute Autorité d'Etat**, the highest institution set up by the **Panorama Agreement** to manage the transition to a **Third Republic**. Running as the Forces Vives candidate in the presidential **election** of 25 November 1992, he obtained 46 percent of the vote, and in the 10 February 1993 runoff election against Didier Ratsiraka, he gained 66.6 percent to Ratsiraka's 33.4 percent. He was inaugurated president on 9 March 1993.

Zafy's incumbency as the Third Republic head of state ended in disappointment from all viewpoints—except Ratsiraka's. Constant disputes with his ministries under Prime Minister **Francisque Ravony**, as well as with the **Assemblée Nationale** to which those ministries were responsible, fractured the heterogeneous Forces Vives coalition. Very little legislation passed. Constitutional requirements for the creation of a Senate, implementation of a program for **decentralization**, and a middle-level constitutional court never materialized. Zafy obtained enhanced powers in his **Referendum of 17 September 1995** and was able thenceforth to fire his ministers. His erratic **economic** decisions and his resistance to international pressures for financial and economic adjustments resulted in a general suspension of seriously needed foreign aid. After three years of inconsequential wrangling, most of Zafy's parliamentary base had abandoned him. In May 1996, his hand-picked government under **Emmanuel Rakotovahiny** was delivered a vote of no-confidence,

virtually on demand by the **International Monetary Fund** (IMF). He was deserted even by the FFKM church leaders who on 28 April, denounced his “disastrous management” of the republic.

On 26 July 1996, by a 99 to 32 vote, the Assembly passed a bill of impeachment against Zafy for seven counts of abuse of authority, two of which were upheld by the **Haute Cour Constitutionnelle** (HCC) on 4 September. Resisting what he denounced as a constitutional coup d'état, Zafy tried to hold on until 10 October, but he was ruled out of office forthwith. Zafy ran for the vacant presidency on 3 November 1996, gaining only 23.4 percent of the first-round vote, second to Ratsiraka's 36.6 percent. In the run-off on 29 December, with less than 50 percent electoral turnout, Ratsiraka won by a bare 50.7 percent. Zafy cried “foul,” but he had clearly been rejected by a majority, voting and abstaining.

In unreconciled opposition to Ratsiraka's mandate, Zafy formed a new party, the **AFFA**, to give him a personal platform for denunciations of both Ratsiraka and the disloyal parliamentarians who had betrayed him in 1996. He won a seat in the Assembly in May 1998 and promptly sought to dose his rival with the impeachment curse, but his bill fell short of the requisite two-thirds majority. Appealing to simple, honest, Malagasy values, the “surgeon in the straw hat” adopted demagogic tactics to promote *Côtier* particularism, accusing the **Merina** politicians of his old Forces Vives coalition of conspiracy to subordinate the coastal population. This reversion to the tribalism theme played poorly on the island and, in the presidential election of December 2001, Zafy obtained only 5.4 percent of the vote (only 26.7 percent in his home province). That election was won by the Merina mayor of Antananarivo, **Marc Ravalomanana**, whose achievement of pluralities in all provinces except Ratsiraka's **Toamasina** demonstrated the ability of the Malagasy electorate to rise above the mythical *Côtier*-Merina antithesis.

During the long **Crisis of 2002**, Zafy denounced both antagonists for foul play. In April, however, he was publicly humiliated when Ravalomanana refused to allow him to join the delegation to the **Organization of African Unity** mediation meeting at Dakar. This affront turned Zafy resolutely against the new president. Even after judicial confirmation of Ravalomanana's electoral majority later that month, Zafy continued to attack what he regards as an illegitimate

government. He called, in vain, for a boycott of the December 2002 parliamentary elections; his own son chose to run, on the AFFA ticket, and lost.

His parliamentary audience reduced to a single AFFA senator, Zafy has joined forces with his antagonists of the 1990s, Ratsiraka's **AREMA** party in a **Comité de Réconciliation Nationale**. Together, these once mortal enemies have adopted the cause of several hundred Ratsiraka loyalists (most of them *Côtiers*) arrested on national security charges during the crisis of 2002. Although Zafy declines to join in AREMA's demand for Ratsiraka's repatriation, he and his AREMA allies (and several defectors from Ravalomanana's side) insist on a national constitutional conference and referendum to start Madagascar afresh on a fourth republic. Zafy also attacks the government for allowing **currency** depreciation and inflation to weaken the economy and on alleged tolerance for official **corruption**, a sore point with Ravalomanana and his team. Their rejectionist campaign, with its anti-Merina overtones and attacks on **World Bank** and **International Monetary Fund** (IMF) "control" over the economy, has given the otherwise forlorn Zafy new status as extra-parliamentary leader of a vociferous opposition. He claims persistent harassment by authorities, including wire-tapping, denial of his right to public forums, and an attempted assassination at his Antananarivo residence in July 2004.

**ZANAMALATA.** The "Children of Mulattoes," were the descendants of **pirates** and Malagasy living around **Antongil Bay** on the northeast coast. After 1712, they were united by **Ratsimilaho** to form the leadership of the **Betsimisaraka Confederation**, which conquered the area from Antongil Bay to **Toamasina**. At the beginning of the 19th century, the confederation was conquered by the **Merina Empire**, which took Toamasina in 1817. The Zanamalata staged a last rebellion against the Merina in 1826, but were defeated. Their leaders were taken to the Merina capital, **Antananarivo**, and executed.

**ZOAM.** These gangs of unemployed youth in **Antananarivo** began as **ZWAM**, or *Zatovo Western Andevo Malagasy*, which could be loosely translated as "young slave cowboys of Madagascar." They modeled themselves on Clint Eastwood, the hero of the spaghetti



westerns of the day. Many were school dropouts, and they responded fervently to the criticisms of **education** and other circumstances in the **First Republic** advanced by such radical personalities as **Manandafy Rakotonirina**. In their politicized form they were rebaptized *Zatovo Orin'asa Anivon'ny Madagasikara*, the young unemployed of Madagascar. The ZOAM were active in rallies that preceded the **May 1972 Revolution** and in the revolutionary demonstrations. The succeeding **Ramanantsoa Interregnum** was unable to satisfy their hopes for education or for employment, and many were drawn to the radical populism of **Richard Ratsimandrava**. With the formation of the **Democratic Republic of Madagascar** (DRM), some ZOAM were recruited into the **Tanora Tonga Saina** (TTS), others to **Kung Fu** societies. The more sophisticated ZOAM joined with Rakotonirina in the **MFM party**.

## **Appendix A**

### **Monarchs of the Merina Empire, 1787(?)–1896**

Andrianampoinimerina	1787(?)–1810
Radama I	1810–1828
Ranavalona I	1828–1861
Radama II	1861–1863
Rasoherina	1863–1868
Ranavalona II	1868–1883
Ranavalona III	1883–1896

## Appendix B

### French Colonial Governors, 1895–1960

Laroche, Hippolyte (resident)	1895–1896
Gallieni, Joseph-Simon	1896–1905
Augagneur, Victor	1905–1910
Picquié, Albert	1910–1914
Garbit, Hubert (acting)	1914–1917
Merlin, Martial	1917–1918
Schrameck, Abraham	1918–1919
Guyon	1919–1920
Garbit, Hubert	1920–1923
Brunet, Auguste (acting)	1923–1924
Olivier, Marcel	1924–1930
Cayla, Léon	1930–1939
Coppet, Marcel de	1939–1940
Cayla, Léon	1940–1941
Annet, Armand	1941–1942
Legentilhomme, Paul	1942–1943
Saint-Mart, Pierre de	1943–1946
Coppet, Marcel de	1946–1948
Chévigné, Pierre de	1948–1950
Bargues, Robert	1950–1954
Soucadaux, André	1954–1956
Soucadaux, André (high commissioner)	1956–1960

## Appendix C

### Heads of State of Independent Madagascar, 1960–2004

Philibert Tsiranana, president	June 1960 to May 1972
Gabriel Ramanantsoa, head of state	May 1972 to February 1975
Richard Ratsimandrava, head of state	5–11 February 1975
Directoire Militaire, collective head of state	February to June 1975
Didier Ratsiraka, head of state	June to December 1975
Didier Ratsiraka, president	December 1975 to August 1992
Haute Autorité d'Etat, collective head of state	August 1992 to March 1993
Albert Zafy, president	March 1993 to September 1996
Norbert Lala Ratsirahonana, acting president	September 1996 to January 1997
Didier Ratsiraka, president	January 1997 to February 2002
[vacancy during period of dispute, February–May 2002]	
Marc Ravalomanana	May 2002 to present

## Appendix D

### Major Political Parties in Independent Madagascar

**AFFA (Asa, Fahamarinana, Fampandrosoana, Arindra / Action, Truth, Progress, Harmony).** Third Republic; Albert Zafy.

**AKFM (Antokon'ny Kongresin'ny Fahaleovantenan'i Madagasikara / Independence Congress Party of Madagascar).** First Republic; DRM and Third Republic under title AKFM-KDRSM (AKFM Committee for the Defense of the Malagasy Revolution). Richard Andriamanjato (until 1989); Gisèle Rabesahala.

**AKFM Fanavaozana (AKFM Renewal).** DRM and Third Republic; Richard Andriamanjato.

**AREMA (Avant-garde de la Révolution Malgache / Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution).** DRM and Third Republic; Didier Ratsiraka.

**AVI (Asa Vita Ifampitsarana / A Person Is Judged by Work).** Third Republic; Norbert Lala Ratsirahonana.

**GRAD Iloafo (Groupe de Réflexion et d'Action pour le Développement de Madagascar / Study and Action Group for the Development of Madagascar).** Third Republic; Tovonana-hary Rabetsitonta.

**Leader Fanilo (Leading Torch).** Third Republic; Herizo Razafimahaleo, Manassé Esoavelomandroso.

**MFM (Mpitolona ho amin'ny Fanjakan'ny Madinika / Movement for Power to the [Little] People).** Ramanantsoa Interregnum and DRM; Manandafy Rakotonirina. *Subsequently* **Mpitolona Fanavaozan'i Madagasikara (Militants for the Progress of Madagascar).** DRM and Third Republic; Manandafy Rakotonirina, Pety Rakotoniaina.

**MONIMA (Mouvement National pour l'Indépendance de Madagascar / National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar).** First Republic; Monja Jaona. *Since 1967* **Madagasikara Otronin'ny Malagasy (Madagascar Guided by Mala-**

**gasy).** All republics; Monja Jaona, Roindefo Zafitsimivalo Monja, Gabriel Rabearimanana.

**PARTI SOCIAL DEMOCRATE (PSD, Social Democratic Party).**

First Republic; Philibert Tsiranana, André Resampa.

**PARTI SOCIALISTE MALGACHE (PSM, Malagasy Socialist Party).** Ramanantsoa Interregnum. Philibert Tsiranana, André Resampa.

**RASSEMBLEMENT POUR LA SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIE (RPSD, Assembly for Social Democracy).** DRM, Third Republic; Pierre Tsiranana, Evariste Marson, Jean-Eugène Voninahitsy.

**TIAKO-I-MADAGASIKARA (TIM, I Love Madagascar).** Third Republic; Marc Ravalomanana, Jacques Sylla.

**UNION DES CHRETIENS DE MADAGASCAR (UDECMA, Union of Christian Democrats of Madagascar).** Ramanantsoa Interregnum, DRM; Andriamorasata Norbert Solo.

**UNION DES SOCIAUX-DEMOCRATES DE MADAGASCAR (USDM, Union of Social Democrats of Madagascar).** *Successor to* UNION DEMOCRATIQUE ET SOCIAL DE MADAGASCAR (UDSM, Democratic and Social Union of Madagascar). First Republic; Norbert Zafimahova.

**UNION NATIONALE POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ET LA DEMOCRATIE (UNDD, National Union for Development and Democracy).** DRM, Third Republic; Albert Zafy, Emmanuel Rakotovahiny.

**VONJY IRAY TSY MIVAKY (VITM, Salvation in Unity).** DRM, Third Republic; Jerome Razanabahiny-Marojama.



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## INTRODUCTION

Madagascar has inspired an abundance of literature, both by the Malagasy themselves and by foreign observers, with the bulk of readily accessible material written in French. Although this abundance is an advantage for researchers, it creates problems for the bibliographer and imposes some criteria of selection. We have been particularly selective among materials written before 1960 (the Grandidier volume for the period from 1933 to 1956 has over 20,000 entries) and have included only a selection of important articles dealing with topics—such as the origins of the Malagasy—discussed in the body of the Dictionary. We have also tried to include at least one title by each of the important writers on Madagascar and to cite major scholarly works by participants in Malagasy politics, like the poet-politician Jacques Rabemananjara.

Coverage of the period since 1960 is less restrictive, in part because materials are less abundant. We have tried to include all books of importance as well as articles from the major Malagasy journals of history and geography: *Omaly sy Anio*, *Taloha*, *Tantara*, and *Madagascar: Revue de Géographie*. Other French-language periodicals published in Madagascar are listed in the Bibliography with their dates of publication. We have excluded articles in Malagasy on the assumption that anyone who reads the language is likely to have access to existing lists of resources about the island. Entries under a given author are listed chronologically.

Overviews of various periods of Malagasy history, in English, are to be found in the volumes of the Cambridge *History of Africa* and the more recent UNESCO *General History of Africa*. Yearly reviews of Malagasy politics and economics can be found in the *Annuaire des pays de l'Océan Indien* (APOI in the Bibliography) and in *Africa Contemporary Record*.

Monthly and weekly coverage can frequently be found in *Jeune Afrique*, *Afrique Contemporaine*, *Africa Confidential*, *The Africa Research Bulletin* (political and economic issues), and more abundantly in the *Lettre de l'Océan Indien/Indian Ocean Newsletter* and *Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens*. *Africa South of the Sahara* has a general overview of Malagasy history, politics, and economy, with annual updates.

Important titles can be found on virtually all of the topics in this bibliography, most but not all of them in French. The two best general studies are by major authorities on Malagasy history—Hubert Deschamps' brief treatment in the *Que sais-je* series and Pierre Vérin's 1992 *Madagascar*. Patrick Rajoelina and Alain Ramelet produced a more recent introduction, *Madagascar, la grande île*. Visitors to the great island may consult Hilary Bradt's 1997 *Guide to Madagascar* and Mauro's *Country Guide* in Le Petit Futé series. Former British Ambassador Mervyn Brown's *Madagascar Rediscovered* treats island history up to the 1970s. For pre-20th-century history, intriguing titles abound, including the works of the Grandidières and Chapus' translation of the Merina royal narratives (the *Tantaran'ny andriana*). In English, Raymond Kent supplies a definitive study of *Early Kingdoms* of the 16th through 18th centuries, with an emphasis on linkages between the island and the African continent. Vérin's *History of Civilization in Northern Madagascar* is highly recommended. Studies of the colonial period are almost entirely dominated by French-language works, including speculation on the tragic rebellion of 1947, from Pierre Boiteau's indictment of the colonial regime to Jacques Tronchon's more balanced assessment (*L'insurrection malgache de 1947*), coming full circle to Raymond William Rabemananjara's reindictment of imperial France in *Madagascar: l'affaire de mars 1947*. Antoine Bouillon's psychological interpretation of *le colonisé et son 'âme'* rivals Octave Mannoni's classic analysis, translated as *Prospero and Caliban: the Psychology of Colonization*.

Postindependence history has been best treated through specialized articles, especially those in the *Annuaire des pays de l'Océan Indien (APOI)*, while political culture and ideology are reflected in works by the authors of this Dictionary. Authoritative French-language assessments of the successive Malagasy republics are contributed by Charles Cadoux and Pascal Chaigneau, as well as Patrick Rajoelina in *Quarante*

*années de vie politique*. The best fullscale treatment of the modern economy is Frederic L. Pryor's comparison of Malawi and Madagascar, *The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth*. Rajoelina's *Madagascar: refondation et développement* is more current as are periodic sectoral studies by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

Sociological and anthropological inquiry has proliferated in Madagascar over more than a century, with excellent monographs on ethnic groups—Father Dubois' on the Betsileo, Faublée on the Bara, and, in English, Linton on the Tanala, Feeley-Harnik on the Sakalava—as well as salient social problems and cultural specificities like the communitarian *fokonolona* and various forms of spirit possession. Notable syntheses include Gérard Althabe's brilliant *Oppression et libération dans l'imaginaire* and Jean-Pierre Raison's study of *Les hautes terres*, as well as Raymond Decary's classic *Moeurs et coutumes des Malgaches*. Much fine work can also be found in English, particularly Maurice Bloch's prodigious anthropological research on highland societies (his *From Blessing to Violence* is a scholarly must-read), W. R. Huntington's *Gender and Social Structure* and Karen Middleton's recent *Ancestors, Power, and History in Madagascar*. Valuable collections of culture studies have been edited by Evers and Spindler and folklorist Lee Haring.

Education, most often treated in journal articles and monographs, is intricately linked with economic development in the World Bank's 2002 study, *Education and Training in Madagascar*. The most probing of several good books on religion is Françoise Raison-Jourde's *Bible et pouvoir à Madagascar*. While classified here under philosophy, Richard Andriamanjato's thesis, *Le tsiny et le tody dans la pensée malgache* provides a most authoritative Christian explanation of Malagasy culture. Jacques Dez has contributed several important studies of the Malagasy language and Bakoly Domenichini-Ramiamanana has carried on the tradition of the illustrious Jean Paulhan in analysis of traditional Malagasy poetry. The great book on Malagasy arts has yet to be written, but music is conscientiously served by Mireille Rakotomalala in her 2003 study, *Madagascar: la musique dans l'histoire*. An impressive library on Madagascar's unique environment and its denizens is best exemplified by Alison Jolly's splendid *A World Like Our Own*.

Few libraries in the English-speaking world contain more than a basic collection on Madagascar. To conduct research in any discipline re-

quires an extended sojourn in France, Réunion, and the Great Island itself, and even in those environments, materials tend to be scattered among official archives (the French Government collection at Fontainebleau, for instance) and universities with Indian Ocean research departments. The most useful among these are at the universities of Aix-Marseille (Aix-en-Provence), Nice, and Paris X (Nanterre). These collections include doctoral and masters dissertations on important areas of Malagasy society and history. The most likely places to find materials for purchase are at the Harmattan bookstore in Paris and the Librairie de Madagascar in Antananarivo.

Internet resources are growing rapidly in virtually all fields of pertinence to Madagascar. A nearly complete collection of URLs is available from [www.123madagascar@ibonia.com](mailto:www.123madagascar@ibonia.com). Each of the French-language daily newspapers and periodicals maintains its own website with access to archives; among the most reliable are *L'Express*, *Midi-Madagasikara*, and *La Tribune*. All major ministries and embassies of the Republic of Madagascar, and the main political parties, maintain somewhat desultory websites. The official government website is [www.madagascar.gov.mg](http://www.madagascar.gov.mg), and visitors to the capital should obtain information through [www.iarivo-town.mg](http://www.iarivo-town.mg). Indigo Publications' stable of useful resources can be consulted at [www.africaintelligence.fr](http://www.africaintelligence.fr).

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*Note:* Dates of publication are given for Malagasy journals. Abbreviations for journals used throughout this bibliography are indicated in parentheses.

- Africa Confidential.*  
*Africa Contemporary Record.*  
*Africa Research Bulletin.*  
*Afrique-Asie.*  
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